Prasanth Netiji's Reply to Venkatraghavanji

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Refer to original Post (OP):

https://www.facebook.com/.../permalink/1420247308641563/

Michael ji,

I went through the above post and read through the claims or objections (however you call them) that were raised by Sri Venkata Raghavan ji. Here is my response to what we get to read in that OP.

I am not responding on a point by point basis. Instead, I would respond in a way that it addressess (amlost) everything that is given in that OP.

As I understood, the following paragraphs (in no specific order) represent the majority of the argument:

Sri Venkata Raghavan ji says: In the ancient works of Vedanta - ie around the time of Shankara and previous to his time, the term "nimitta" did not come to exclusively refer to efficient causation. The clear and exclusive differentiation in the usage of the terms "nimitta-kAraNa" to mean efficient causation and "upAdAna-kAraNa" to mean material causation, is a post Shankara development.

Sri Venkata Raghavan ji says: this is a very small selection of the vast number of results that show up for the word "nimitta" in just the BSB. There are many more references where the term nimitta does not mean efficient causation. Therefore, the mere use of the term does not necessarily imply that efficient causation is meant or material causation is denied.

Sri Venkata Raghavan ji says: Therefore, a word frequency based analysis is not something that we can rely on to conclude that Shankara rejected material causation when he used the term "avidyA-nimitta".

Sri Venkata Raghavan ji says: Therefore, Shankara must necessarily hold avidyA to be the material cause of adhyAsa, for the two statements "wise ones consider adhyAsa to be avidyA", and "names and forms are creations of avidyA" to both hold true simultaneously.

Sri Venkata Raghavan ji says: This is the basis of satkAryavAda In Advaita. It is in this sense of satkAryavAda, where the effect is identical with its material cause, that Shankara employs the sentence - "wise men refer to this kind of adhyAsa as avidyA".

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P.S.: First of all, I seek an excuse for my long response because my main intention is not to just give a brief response for sake of responding and defending, but I wanted to help fellow seekers who are interested to know the Vedanta as taught by bhagavan bhashyakara by pointing some nuances I understood in the Vedanta as taught in the Prasthanatraya Bhashyas. Therefore, I have ended up repeatedly explaining and hence it became long response.

My response is as below:

First of all, it is wrong to say that the words निमित्तकारण (in the sense of being an efficient or instrumental cause) and उपादानकारण (in the sense of being the material cause) are post-shankara developments. Bhagavatpada clearly uses both निमित्तकारण and उपादानकारण in prasthānatraya bhāshya in the same sense they are always meant. BSB 1.4.23 is good enough example (प्रकृत्यधिकरणम्). We will discuss it in detail.

But before that, let me say that it is true that the Sanskrit word निमित्त simply means “cause” without being explicit as to whether “efficient cause” or “material cause”. We can also say that it is this simple meaning which Bhagavatpāda would have meant when he used word निमित्त at several places in BSB as quoted.

Now, based on this reasoning i.e. “nimitta as a word at several places in BSB simply means ‘cause’ and need not necessarily mean efficient cause”, Sri Venkata Raghavan ji derived a conclusion that, “there is no guarantee that material causation is denied in usage of mithya-jñāna-nimitta”. To me, this is too far fetching!

Why?

Because, if we want to stick to the argument that nimitta as a word simply meant ‘cause’ elsewhere in BSB, let that alsosimply mean a ‘cause’ in the adhyasa bhashya phrase mithya-jñāna-nimitta – why is this force fitting it as ‘material cause’ – i.e. why say “mere use of the term does not necessarily imply that material causation is denied?”

Therefore my take is, if one argues that ‘nimitta’ as a word simply meant ‘cause’ at several other places in BSB without a necessarily meaning ‘efficient cause’, let that be so for sake of argument and let that be applied everywhere – leave ‘nimitta’ in mithya-jñāna-nimitta too as ‘cause’ without forcing it as ‘material cause’.

It appears to me that perhaps Sri Venkata Raghavan ji thinks that by saying, ‘the word nimitta in mithya-jñāna-nimitta do not necessarily mean efficient/instrumental cause’, he may gain some strength to his further argument, where he points to a adhyasa bhashya statement which occurs a few sentences later to phrase mithya-jñāna-nimitta i.e. तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते (This superimposition, that is of this nature, is considered by the learned to be avidya), where by arguing that for adhyasa which is an effect (कार्य), in order to be considered by the wise as identical to its cause (कारण), it must necessarily imply that it is through ‘material causation’ alone that an effect can be said as identical to its cause but not through an implication to ‘efficient/instrumental causation’. Thus, it appears to me that Sri Venkata Raghavan ji wants to conclude that across both phrases i.e. mithya-jñāna-nimitta and तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, avidya is only meant to be a material cause and not an efficient cause.

If that is the case, then to me this is clearly a deviation from sampradayic teaching of prashtanatraya bhashya!

Why? Please let me explain:

First of all, it is true as Sri Venkata Raghavan ji pointed that within the context of satkaryavada where Brahman is presented as the material cause of the world, it is said that, for an effect to be identical with its cause it must imply that such cause must be material cause and it can not be an efficient/instrumental cause – I agree to this. In fact, Bhagavan Bhashyakara himself says that in the BSB 1.4.23 (प्रकृत्यधिकरणम् sutra प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्).

However, before jumping to hasty conclusions, the bhashya to sutra 1.4.23 must be studied carefully to understand first of all the context in which Bhagavan Bhashyakara says so and then we must also understand the nuance of the satkaryavada as accepted by Bhagavan Bhashyakara.

Let me start with relevant portion of the bhashya and explain what I mean. Bhagavan Bhashyakara says in BSB 1.4.23:

प्रकृतिश्चोपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, निमित्तकारणं च। न केवलं निमित्तकारणमेव। कस्मात्? प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्। एवं हि प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तौ श्रौतौ नोपुरुध्येते। प्रतिज्ञा तावत् — ‘उत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्’ (छा.उ.६.१.३) इति। तत्र चैकेन विज्ञातेन सर्वमन्यदविज्ञातमपि विज्ञातं भवतीति प्रतीयते। तच्चोपादानकारणविज्ञाने सर्वविज्ञानं सम्भवति, उपादानकारणाव्यतिरेकात्कार्यस्य। निमित्तकारणाव्यतिरेकस्तु कार्यस्य नास्ति, लोके तक्ष्णः प्रासादव्यतिरेकदर्शनात्।

[[Translation (Sw.Gam.): Brahman has to be admitted as the material cause as well as the efficient cause. It is not merely the efficient cause. Why? “So that the proposition and the illustration may not be contradicted.” Of these the proposition is: “Now then, did you ask about that subject-matter of instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, and the unknown becomes known?" (Ch.VI.i.2), where it is obvious that by knowing one thing all other things, even though unknown, become known. And that knowledge of all things can be possible only from the knowledge of their material cause, since the effect is non-different from its material, whereas the effect is not non-different from its efficient cause, as is evident from the difference noticed in the world between the architect and his architecture.]]

The Context – Clarifying the below doubt is the context of the sutra 1.4.23:

When the sutra 1.1.2 says “जन्माद्यस्य यतः (that from which the universe has its birth etc.)”, there arises a doubt that what type of causation is meant? – Is it material cause or efficient cause?

As a response to this doubt, Bhagavatpada first of all points to the opponent’s conclusion which says “Brahman is only an efficient cause”. The opponent gives his own reasoning as to why Brahman can only be an efficient cause and interestingly the opponent also concludes by saying that, it implies “Brahman can not be material cause”.

It is to this wrong implication (i.e. an implication that Brahman can not be material cause) that this sutra 1.4.23 provides an answer, says Bhagavatpada. And the answer is, Brahman is “also” the material cause. Note here carefully that this sutra is to teach that Brahman is “also” material cause while being the efficient/instrumental cause.

It is very important to note that though satkaryavada largely focusses on the ‘material causation’, it do not address the ‘material causation’ aspect alone. There is a very subtle nuance to Vedanta’s satkaryavada which Bhagavatpada brings out in the bhashya to this sutra 1.4.23. We must pay attention to that nuance and it is like this:

First of all in upanishads, the way they teach a topic, there is a pratijna (proposition) and there is a dRShTAnta (illustration) to support that proposition. In the topic of teaching ‘Brahman as the material cause of the world’, the proposition is एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् (by knowing One, it becomes possible to know all that is made of that One). To this, the illustration is clay-pot. That means, just like by knowing clay all that is made out of clay stands known as nothing but a name and form a.k.a. appearance in clay, similarly by knowing Brahman all that is “made out of” Brahman (i.e. all = सर्वं = everything in the World) becomes known as nothing but name and form a.k.a. appearance of Brahman alone. The proposition here is एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् and as I said before, there is a very subtle nuance that we need to pay attention to.

When this proposition is applied to the illustration i.e. clay-pot, एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् at one time limits itself to clay and all things made out of clay and it do not include all things made out of, say metal – that means, you have to apply to metal separately – by knowing clay you only know all things made out of clay but not things made out of metal. Morever, even within the clay-pot, it applies only to knowing the material of all that is made out of clay, but, not the knowledge of who is the intelligent maker of all those items of clay – there could be many potters and knowledge about all of them will not be known. Thus, the सर्वविज्ञानम् in the एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् when applied to clay-pot limits itself to the knowledge of material of all.

However, when it is applied to dArShTanta i.e. to the “pair” called Brahman-World, the सर्वविज्ञानम् portion within the proposition एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् will include everything i.e. it also includes KNOWING BRAHMAN AS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE WORLDinto it. If suppose we say that, knowing Brahman to be the efficient cause to the world is not included in the सर्वविज्ञानम्, it leads to unfufilment of the proposition itself where it is set forth to establish that एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्. As I understood, this is the master stroke teaching about Vedantin’s Satkaryavada which Bhagavatpada gives in the bhashya of sutra 1.4.23. He says:

निमित्तत्वं त्वधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावादधिगन्तव्यम्। यथा हि लोके मृत्सुवर्णादिकमुपादानकारणं कुलालसुवर्णकारादीनधिष्ठातॄनपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते, नैवं ब्रह्मण उपादानकारणस्य सतोऽन्योऽधिष्ठातापेक्ष्योऽस्ति, प्रागुत्पत्तेः ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इत्यवधारणात्। अधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावोऽपि प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधादेवोदितो वेदितव्यः — अधिष्ठातरि ह्युपादानादन्यस्मिन्नभ्युपगम्यमाने पुनरप्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानस्यासम्भवात्प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तोपरोध एव स्यात्। तस्मादधिष्ठात्रन्तराभावादात्मनः कर्तृत्वमुपादानान्तराभावाच्च प्रकृतित्वम्॥

[[Translation (Sw.Gam.): As for the efficient causality of Brahman, it is to be understood from the absence of any other ordainer. Unlike the basic substances like earth, gold, etc., acting under the control of their moulders – the potter, goldsmith, and others – Brahman, even though It is a basic substance, does not depend on any other ordainer; for it is emphasized that before creation, all this was but one without a second. And it is to be understood that this absence of any other ordainer has to be assumed so that no conflict between the proposition and the illustration may arise. For if any ordainer be admitted apart from the material, it will become impossible again to have a knowledge of all from the knowledge of one, and so the proposition and the illustration will be at variance. Accordingly, the Self is the ordainer since there is no other designer, and It is also the material cause since there is no other material.]]

That means the correct conclusion from learning the nuance of the Vedanta’s satkaryavada as admitted by Upanishads is:

Though effect’s identity with its cause implies material causation, owing to the original proposition of Vedanta which the satkaryavada intends to serve i.e. the proposition that एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्, it must imply that the cause is both material and efficient/instrumental at the same time – Other upanishadic statements such as “before creation all this was but one without a second” (प्रागुत्पत्तेः ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’) also supports this. Therefore, it is wrong to limit the cause to material cause alone by invoking the satkaryavada – the implicaiton to efficient cause is automatic in case of metaphysical entities.

You may limit it to material cause alone within the clay-pot illustration because there potter who stands as an efficient/instrumental entity is separate to material and there are many such potters. But we can not limit it to material cause alone when applied Brahman-World dArShTAnta to which the Satkaryavada draws our attention through the discussion on illustration – here Brahman is both material as well as efficient cause to the World! In this conclusion alone lies the wisdom – It is in this correct conclusion alone there is a sign of being ‘wise/learned’ (पण्डिता).

In other words, understanding of satkaryavada which do not include the nuance explained above is not a wise understanding of Satkaryavada as taught in Upanishads. Period.

Therefore, when it is said in adhyasa bhashya that तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, the correct implication of the word ‘wise/learned’ (i.e. पण्डिता) lies in not restricting the avidya to be only a “material cause”. As we are in the realm of Vedanta’s Satkaryavada, the ‘material cause’ very easily slips into also being an ‘efficient cause’ when applied to context of metaphysical entities and it is well known that Vedantins accept that metaphysically, Brahman is both efficient and material cause at the same time. One should not stuck up at illustration, but one must take illustration and move on to the correct application to its proposition and also be ready for the ramifications of such application – there alone lies the wisdom!

P.S.: Here I am aware that the word ‘ramification’ in English usually suggests an adverse outcome and one may ask what kind of wisdom is there is in such adverse outcome? I purposefully wrote “be ready for the ramifications”, because I mean to say that, it is a ‘welcome adversity’ in the sense that, it is ‘welcome’because such understanding connotes vidya. And being vidya, it is also connotes that it is ‘adverse to avidya’ – We must be ready to this vidya because, debating on dry intellectual philosophy is not purpose of Vedanta – Vedanta is mokSha sastra. And sastra teaches in adhyaropa-apavada framework where both adhyaropa and apavada each are apavada-pradhana in their intention.

Anyways, having said this, now let me also take up some interesting questions and try to answer them for sake of manana:

Question-1: In metaphysical sense, are material cause and efficient cause different?

Answer-1: No – In metaphysical sense they are not different. Brahman is both material cause and efficient cause to the world at same time. But being non-dual, Brahman is said to be ‘the cause’ of the world only owing to ignorance inasmuch as the ‘perceived world’ (about which an enquiry into its cause is being made) is after all considered existential at the start of enquiry but it gets sublated into that which is only notional as the enquiry proceeds. Thus, ‘the world’ or in other words ‘the ignorance which makes one perceive it as world’ (where both mean the same) is though taken to be ontological enquiry at its start, it gets slipped into epistemological enquiry as the enquiry proceeds – because world is after all mithya-jnana about what alone exists i.e. Brahman. That is Vedanta!

Question-2: In the context of avidya-adhyasa pair (where avidya is cause and adhyasa is its effect) because metaphysical avidya is both material cause and efficient cause at same time and also due to the reason that, as being material cause and efficient cause they are not different, what is wrong in referring to it as “material cause” alone within the Vedantic discussions by defining it as a material-like entity?

Answer-2: I think the answer to the previous question is not understood in a proper way. Let me expand it. Though material cause and efficient cause are not different in the metaphysical sense, within the context of avidya-adhyasa pair, sampradaya Vedantins however prefer to not present avidya as material cause but choose to present avidya as efficient cause or even better to say, sampradaya Vedantins choose to call it simply ‘a cause’ without unnecessarily even adding label “efficient” before it.

It is in this sense alone the word nimitta in general simply means “cause” and that is why Bhagavatpada being the teacher of true sampradaya when uses the word nimitta he simply means “cause”. And it is not that Bhagavatpada is not aware of the division into efficient cause and material cause. He is well aware of it and he indeed used it where it is necessary to the extent it needs to be used. However, as a sampradaya Vedantin, he transcends the difference between them in his bhashya and while he does that, he sublates material cause into efficient cause (but not the other way around) and by word nimitta he simply means “cause”.

There is also another important reason behind sublating material cause into efficient cause – it connotes vidya and thus it is apavada-pradhana where as the other way around connotes avidya and thus it is adhyaropa, which also must be understoof in apavada-pradhana way.

When bhashyakara says mithya-jnana-nimittah in adhyasa bhashya, he simply means ‘cause’ which can be taken by us as “efficient cause” and later on in the adhyasa bhashya when he says तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, it is not necessarily only “material cause”. it can very easily pave way to mean avidya is “efficient cause” to adhyasa.

In one way though I am inclined to say that it is meaningless to unnecessarily differentiate between material causalhood Vs efficient causalhood to adhyasa because entire causality is within adhyasa, and I personally like that kind of transcendence in the argument/enquiry, I am not taking that route here because I feel a bit more needs to be said about the objections above.

Let me explain a even a bit more on this. The knowers of true sampradaya say that adhyaropa-apavada is the framework of teaching and I would say that the answer to this Question-2 must also be attempted to understand through proper understanding of adhyaropa-apavada framework. We have to now turn to upanishads for this. It is like this:

Let us ask when upanishads present Brahman as cause to the world and when they try to explain the process of creation, how is Brahman presented into that context of creation to start with? – Is it presented first as material cause or as an efficient cause?

To start with, it is “Brahman’s will” (or to be specific Isvara’s will) out of which the creation takes place. Therefore, to start with, Upanishads always present Brahman as efficient/instrumental cause and later on they continue to teach that the material to such creation is also Brahman. Finally they rescind this process of creation and gives the message that the final beatitude lies in understanding of Brahman in its true nature as none other than atman. In this way, the process of ascribing efficient causality (saying Brahman “desired”) to start with and then ascribing material causality as it expands up on is all nothing but adhyaropa and the process of rescinding all of that when pointing to Brahman’s true nature while saying that the final beatitude is through establishing identity of atman in the true nature of Brahman, is the apavada.

To my understanding, Bhagavatpada is taking the same route when he first says in adhyasa bhashya mithya-jnana-nimittah (ascribing avidya as efficient cause) and a little later when saying तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते implies material cause status purely for sake of explanation and again immediately pointing there itself the viewpoint of wise, which is, saying material cause and efficient cause are non different and it is simply to be taken as ‘cause’ without meaning unnecessary watertight differentiation (into material vs efficient) which only becomes an obstruction to the very goal to be achieved i.e. ‘transcending ignorance’.

In this way, when we understand the framework in the upanishads way of teaching that, from the Brahman as the most subtlest principle (which is none other than ‘Atman in its true nature’) there arises a will (an efficient cause) and thus happens the manifestation (vyAkRta) of the unmanifest (of the avyAkRta) names and forms. Therefore compared to vyAkRta (which is considered to be ‘gross world’ by the ajnani), avyAkRta is more subtle principle. Nevertheless, either of vyAkRta and avyAkRta is only about names and forms, which are in turn “subtle” (than being “gross”).

Therefore the journey in Vedantic enquiry is from gross-to-subtle and from subtle-to-more-subtle levels. It is a journey to intuit inmost atman as Self-of-All. In this journey, the route is always from sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa. This route (i.e. sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa) is vidya and the opposite route (kAraNa-to-sUkSha-to-sthUla) is avidya.

And importantly all of this is not just applicable to the discussion on ‘process of creation’ and causality between ‘created world’ and its cause ‘the Brahman’. But it is also for everything else including the discussion of causality between ‘adhyasa’ and ‘avidya’ – instead of talking always in material-like terms which is surely a sign of avidya (lack of wisdom) there must be assimilation in more subtler terms which is sign of vidya (presence of wisdom – पण्डिता).

That is why though in metaphysical sense, both material cause and efficient cause are not different, in the context of metaphysical ignorance, sampradaya vedantins still prefer to present it as efficient cause rather than asking to seekers to consider it as indescribable material-like cause by relying heavily on ascribing jaDattvam to avidya. Always remember that in the kAraNAnvEShaNa (in the search for the most primordial cause), it is a quest towards that which is more and more subtle or in other words it is journey of ontological-to-epistemological shift where taking something to be ontological and taking something to be epistemological are both in their strictest sense must be after all notional (i.e. epistemological) alone! – Only when avidya is nothing but an epistemological error it makes sense to say that jnana can remove it, otherwise it is not possible.

Finally, in order to differentiate between karma portion of veda and jnana portion of veda, where in the former, karma is said to bestow final beatitude by literally producing a new outcome, the final beatitude in the latter though is spoken of ‘removal of ignorance’ it is not really an act of removal as in an action of sweeping the material (like) dirt with a broom stick. But, it simply means that with raise of jnana the vastu reveals itself and by raise of jnana we mean only correcting an erroneous notion in the light of sruti vakya as the only pramana.

Therefore the conclusions which makes sense are:

1) The satkaryavada based identity of effect (adhyasa) with its cause (avidya) which is implied in the causality between adhyasa and avidya within the adhyasa-bhashya statement i.e. तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते in its full import i.e. in satkaryavada’s primary intention to serve the proposition एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् also automatically establishes the avidya as efficient cause and it never just stops at saying avidya is material cause alone.

2) The real wisdom lies in taking the route of searching for a cause to more subtler levels inasmuch as the effect (adhyasa) being identical to its cause (avidya), it must ultimately result in as a challenge to the entire causality argument to which ajnani subscribes to. Finally, Brahman alone bereft of any causalhood whatsoever must remain as none other than Atman. That Thou Art! – the correct message of Vedanta which can be established in no other way than through understanding meaning of upanishad vakyas in adhyaropa-apavada framework.

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri MCC prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Work at office is too hectic for me.  Not able to spend any time on these activities/discussions.

 

I really appreciate your indefatigable efforts to shuttle between FB and E-mail group,  sharing the posts from here to FB group and again sharing here the responses received there 😊  this is really a tedious job.  Why they are not ready to join this group and directly take the discussion here??  I asked this query to Sri Prashant Neti prabhuji but I don’t remember what he said to my request. 

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

Bhaskar

 

PS :: I marked a copy to Sri Prasanth Neti prabhuji to see if he considers joining this group to clarify Sri SSS’s Shuddha shankara prakriya. 

 

 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Michael ji,

Thanks for sharing the response. I am just responding at a high level for the sake of brevity.

1) Our position is not that avidyA is only the material cause of adhyAsa, and not its efficient cause, as Sri Neti-ji has alleged. Rather, avidyA is both the efficient and material cause of adhyAsa. It is the material cause because the stuff that makes up adhyAsa is triguNAtmikA avidyA. It is also the efficient cause as a doSha, as a defect which gives rise to adhyAsa. To indicate that it is both, Shankaracharya uses the word nimitta, in the general sense of the cause, as opposed to exclusively as an efficient cause as Sri SSS and Hacker hold, or exclusively as a material cause as Neti ji has mistaken our position for. 

When Neti ji says "Therefore, when it is said in adhyasa bhashya that तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, the correct implication of the word ‘wise/learned’ (i.e. पण्डिता) lies in not restricting the avidya to be only a “material cause”." we agree wholeheartedly. It is both a material and efficient cause.

2) Sri Neti-ji says " First of all, it is wrong to say that the words निमित्तकारण (in the sense of being an efficient or instrumental cause) and उपादानकारण (in the sense of being the material cause) are post-shankara developments." To clarify, I didn't say that the usage of nimittakAraNa and upAdAnakAraNa as efficient and material cause respectively is a post Shankara development, I said the exclusive usage to efficient and material cause respectively is a post Shankara development. Meaning - Shankara, Padmapada, Sureshvaracharya use the terms interchangeably. Sometimes using nimitta and upAdAna in a general sense of cause, sometimes specifically to refer to efficient and material causes respectively, sometimes using one word to refer to both types of causation, and rarely, using one to mean the other. The strict usage of the term nimittakAraNa to mean efficient cause only and upAdAna kAraNa to mean material cause only is a later development.  

The consequence of this is that Hacker's frequency based analysis of the word nimitta to Shankara's writings and conclusion that Shankara only referred to avidyA's efficient causation, is on shaky ground. 

4) Sri Neti ji asks "Because, if we want to stick to the argument that nimitta as a word simply meant ‘cause’ elsewhere in BSB, let that also simply mean a ‘cause’ in the adhyasa bhashya phrase mithya-jñāna-nimitta – why is this force fitting it as ‘material cause’ ".

Respectfully, we are also using it in the sense of "cause" - to include both material and efficient cause. 

a) There are several places in the bhAShya (references have been provided) where avidyA has been spoken of as the material cause. Hacker half agrees with this too but rejects such an interpretation on the basis of a frequency analysis of the word nimitta, which as shown, is flawed, when applied to Shankara's writings. So, this position is consistent with all those places in the bhAShya where the bIja shakti that is avidyA is spoken of as the unmanifest names and forms that goes on to become manifest during creation - and not a force fit as alleged. Now, Sri SSS may have a different interpretation of all those places in the bhAShya, but then each of those places will have to be explained in a different way. We are yet to see that. 

b) The first sentence of the adhyAsa bhAShya has already mentioned one of the nimitta-kAraNa-s for adhyAsa - the itaretara aviveka between Atma and anAtma - the non-discrimination between the self and the non-self. There is now an expectation of its upAdAna kAraNa. If there was no upAdAna kAraNa for adhyAsa, it should have been mentioned. If it was mAya different to avidyA, it should have been stated. The only words that can refer to the upAdAna kAraNa in that sentence are mithyAjnAna-nimittah. By doing so, both the efficient and material causes of adhyAsa are stated.

c) Why did Shankara use the word mithyAjnAna nimitta then? and not mithyAjnAna upAdAna? Because Shankara wants to indicate that avidyA is both the material (as the constituting stuff of adhyAsa) and the efficient cause (as a defect that gives rise to it) of adhyAsa, and so he uses the word nimitta in the general sense of a cause here and in doing so, covers both type of causation.

5) I only skim read Sri Neti-ji's analysis of satkAryavAda, and in doing so, I didn't find anything there that I materially disagreed with. The only issue is that he seemed to quote satkAryavAda to argue against limiting avidyA to only be a material cause of adhyAsa, but that is castigating us for a position we have not adopted. 

 

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Venkatraghavanji, shared in FB - I will in turn share any response here.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

THE PROPER LINK, 

http://www.adhyatmaprakasha.org/php/bookreader/templates/book.php?type=english&book_id=042&pagenum=0001#page/44/mode/1up

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om Prasanth ji, Michael ji, Venkat ji and other respected members,

I have summarised Prasanth Neti ji's post. The post was quite large and it is easy that the main points are missed or ignored. I think even this summary is quite large. But then it was a test of my precis writing skills. I will offer my comments on his post in a separate e-mail.

 

1.    It cannot be argued that material-causality of mithyAjnAna is not denied in adhyAsa bhAshya. This is so on account of following: -

a.      Let nimitta remain mere “cause” in adhyAsa bhAshya. Why to force fit “material causality”?

b.      It cannot be argued that identity of kArya (adhyAsa) with kAraNa (avidyA) stated through तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते implies material causality of avidyA. This is so because it will imply deviation from bhAshya.

2.      It is true that satkAryavAda hold that for an effect to be identical with its cause it must imply that such cause must be material cause and it can not be an efficient/instrumental cause. However, BSB 1.4.23 should be studied to gain glarity on context. The salient features thereof are as under:

a.      As a response to the doubt as to whether जन्माद्यस्य यतः talks of material causation or efficient causation, BhAshykAra mentions the opponent’s conclusion which thinks of Brahman having only efficient causation and not material causation. AchArya clarifies, that Brahman is not only efficient cause, but also material cause. SatkAryavAda not only covers material causation but also efficient causation as explained by BhAshyakAra.

b.      सर्वविज्ञानम् in the एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम् when applied to clay-pot limits itself to the knowledge of material of all. However, in the context of dArShTanta Brahman-World, the सर्वविज्ञानम् includes everything i.e. it covers Brahman as efficient cause also.

c.      VedAntic satkAryavAda refers to both material causation and efficient causation. It does not restrict to material causation alone. Shruti also supports it through प्रागुत्पत्तेः ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’.

3.      Therefore, it is wrong to limit the cause to material cause alone by invoking the satkaryavada – the implicaiton to efficient cause is automatic in case of metaphysical entities for wise/learned.

4.      Therefore, when it is said in adhyasa bhashya that तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, the correct implication of the word ‘wise/learned’ (i.e. पण्डिता) lies in not restricting the avidya to be only a “material cause”.

Further, some important points are as under:

 1.      In metaphysical sense, material cause and efficient cause are not different. Being non-dual, Brahman is said to be ‘the cause’ of the world only owing to ignorance as the ‘perceived world’ is considered existentital at the start of enquiry but gets sublated later. World initially considered as ontological, becomes epistemic as world is only mithyA-jnAna about the sole reality, Brahman.

2.       It is wrong to present avidyA as “only” material cause of adhyAsa. Though material cause and efficient cause are not different in the metaphysical sense, within the context of avidya-adhyasa pair, sampradaya Vedantins prefer to not present avidya as material cause but choose to present avidya as efficient cause or simply ‘a cause’ without unnecessarily even adding label “efficient” before it.

3.      There is also another important reason behind sublating material cause into efficient cause – it connotes vidya and thus it is apavada-pradhana whereas the other way around connotes avidya and thus it is adhyaropa, which also must be understoof in apavada-pradhana way.

4.      When bhashyakara says mithya-jnana-nimittah in adhyasa bhashya, he simply means ‘cause’ which can be taken by us as “efficient cause” and later on in the adhyasa bhashya when he says तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, it is not necessarily only “material cause”. It can very easily pave way to mean avidya is “efficient cause” to adhyasa.

5.      I am inclined to say that it is meaningless to differentiate between material causalhood vs efficient causalhood to adhyasa because entire causality is within adhyasa.

6.      Upanishads always present Brahman first as efficient cause and then as material cause. Subsequently, creation is rescinded and Brahman is presented as sole reality. Attributing causality is adhyAropa and rescinding that is apavAda. Same idea is there in adhyAsa-bhAshya wherein AchArya first presents avidyA as efficient cause by “mithyA-jnAna-nimittah” and then as material cause by “तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते” but then immediately ensures that unnecessary distinction is not created between material and efficient causality. Hence, He uses merely the word “nimittah” so that ultimate goal of transcending ignorance does not suffer.

7.      Brahman is subtlest. From there, there arises a will (an efficient cause) and thus happens the manifestation (vyAkRta) of the unmanifest (of the avyAkRta) names and forms. Both vyAkRta and avyAkRta are sybtle. Vedantic enquiry is from gross-to-subtle and from subtle-to-more-subtle levels. It is a journey to intuit inmost atman as Self-of-All. In this journey, the route is always from sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa. This route (i.e. sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa) is vidya and the opposite route (kAraNa-to-sUkSha-to-sthUla) is avidya.

8.      This is not just applicable to the discussion on ‘process of creation’ and causality between ‘created world’ and its cause ‘the Brahman’. But it is also for everything else including the discussion of causality between ‘adhyasa’ and ‘avidya’ – instead of talking always in material-like terms which is surely a sign of avidya (lack of wisdom) there must be assimilation in more subtler terms which is sign of vidya (presence of wisdom – पण्डिता).

9.      We should always remember that it is a journey of ontological-to-epistemological shift where taking something to be ontological and taking something to be epistemological are both in their strictest sense must be after all notional (i.e. epistemological) alone! Only when avidya is nothing but an epistemological error it makes sense to say that jnana can remove it, otherwise it is not possible.

10.   ‘Removal of ignorance’ it is not really an act of removal as in an action of sweeping the material (like) dirt with a broom stick. But, it simply means that with raise of jnana the vastu reveals itself and by raise of jnana we mean only correcting an erroneous notion in the light of sruti vakya as the only pramana.

Therefore the conclusions which makes sense are:

1) avidya is not only the efficient cause but also material cause. It is incorrect to hold that avidyA is material cause alone.

2) The real wisdom lies in rescinding entire causality. Finally, Brahman alone bereft of any causalhood whatsoever must remain as none other than Atman. That Thou Art! – the correct message of Vedanta which can be established in no other way than through understanding meaning of upanishad vakyas in adhyaropa-apavada framework.

Regards,

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Prasanth ji, Venkat ji, Michael ji and other respected members.

In continuation to the previous e-mail wherein I had summarised Prasanth ji's post, I offer my comments here for consideration:

 1.    It cannot be argued that material-causality of mithyAjnAna is not denied in adhyAsa bhAshya. This is so on account of following: -

a.      Let nimitta remain mere “cause” in adhyAsa bhAshya. Why to force fit “material causality”?

b.      It cannot be argued that identity of kArya (adhyAsa) with kAraNa (avidyA) stated through तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते implies material causality of avidyA. This is so because it will imply deviation from bhAshya.

While Prasanth ji starts to show as to how material causality cannot be force-fitted in adhyAsa bhAshya, he arrives at the conclusion that avidyA is not only material cause but also efficient cause. He says that it is wrong to hold avidyA as material cause alone.

3.      Therefore, it is wrong to limit the cause to material cause alone by invoking the satkaryavada – the implicaiton to efficient cause is automatic in case of metaphysical entities for wise/learned.

4.      Therefore, when it is said in adhyasa bhashya that तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, the correct implication of the word ‘wise/learned’ (i.e. पण्डिता) lies in not restricting the avidya to be only a “material cause”.

Thus, he did not prove what he set out to prove. He started to show as to why material causality of avidyA should not be force-fitted in adhyAsa bhAshya. But proved that avidyA should not be restricted to material causality alone.

It is irrelevant whether he contradicts himself. I am happy that his conclusion is absolutely spot on. avidyA is indeed both efficient cause as well as material cause. Just a small bit of difference - chaitanya-reflected-in-avidyA is the efficient cause, and not avidyA per se. After all, efficient cause has to be chaitanya. 

Further, some important points are as under:

 1.      In metaphysical sense, material cause and efficient cause are not different. Being non-dual, Brahman is said to be ‘the cause’ of the world only owing to ignorance as the ‘perceived world’ is considered existentital at the start of enquiry but gets sublated later. World initially considered as ontological, becomes epistemic as world is only mithyA-jnAna about the sole reality, Brahman.

Perfect in so far as causality of Brahman owing to ignorance is concerned. However, regarding ontological and epistemic, I submit that this distinction is erroneous. The gradation is not from ontological to epistemic, it is from "sequential transformation" to "simultaneous transformation" of ignorance and ultimately to no transformation. The world is earlier believed to be a sequential transformation in the form of space, air, fire etc (SDV). But, subsequently, it is believed to be a "simultaneous transformation" like a dream (DSV). Both sequential and simultaneous transformations have equal lack of ontological status. They both are non-existent in three periods of time in the locus where they are perceived. VedAnta does not admit of any ontological status to the world, ever.

 

2.       It is wrong to present avidyA as “only” material cause of adhyAsa. Though material cause and efficient cause are not different in the metaphysical sense, within the context of avidya-adhyasa pair, sampradaya Vedantins prefer to not present avidya as material cause but choose to present avidya as efficient cause or simply ‘a cause’ without unnecessarily even adding label “efficient” before it.

3.      There is also another important reason behind sublating material cause into efficient cause – it connotes vidya and thus it is apavada-pradhana whereas the other way around connotes avidya and thus it is adhyaropa, which also must be understoof in apavada-pradhana way.

4.      When bhashyakara says mithya-jnana-nimittah in adhyasa bhashya, he simply means ‘cause’ which can be taken by us as “efficient cause” and later on in the adhyasa bhashya when he says तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते, it is not necessarily only “material cause”. It can very easily pave way to mean avidya is “efficient cause” to adhyasa.

Addressed earlier.

 

5.      I am inclined to say that it is meaningless to differentiate between material causalhood vs efficient causalhood to adhyasa because entire causality is within adhyasa.

Just a word of caution. Efficient causality requires chaitanya.  

6.      Upanishads always present Brahman first as efficient cause and then as material cause. Subsequently, creation is rescinded and Brahman is presented as sole reality. Attributing causality is adhyAropa and rescinding that is apavAda. Same idea is there in adhyAsa-bhAshya wherein AchArya first presents avidyA as efficient cause by “mithyA-jnAna-nimittah” and then as material cause by “तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते” but then immediately ensures that unnecessary distinction is not created between material and efficient causality. Hence, He uses merely the word “nimittah” so that ultimate goal of transcending ignorance does not suffer.

7.      Brahman is subtlest. From there, there arises a will (an efficient cause) and thus happens the manifestation (vyAkRta) of the unmanifest (of the avyAkRta) names and forms. Both vyAkRta and avyAkRta are sybtle. Vedantic enquiry is from gross-to-subtle and from subtle-to-more-subtle levels. It is a journey to intuit inmost atman as Self-of-All. In this journey, the route is always from sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa. This route (i.e. sthUla-to-sUkShma-to-kAraNa) is vidya and the opposite route (kAraNa-to-sUkSha-to-sthUla) is avidya.

8.      This is not just applicable to the discussion on ‘process of creation’ and causality between ‘created world’ and its cause ‘the Brahman’. But it is also for everything else including the discussion of causality between ‘adhyasa’ and ‘avidya’ – instead of talking always in material-like terms which is surely a sign of avidya (lack of wisdom) there must be assimilation in more subtler terms which is sign of vidya (presence of wisdom – पण्डिता).

9.      We should always remember that it is a journey of ontological-to-epistemological shift where taking something to be ontological and taking something to be epistemological are both in their strictest sense must be after all notional (i.e. epistemological) alone! Only when avidya is nothing but an epistemological error it makes sense to say that jnana can remove it, otherwise it is not possible.

Addressed above.  

10.   ‘Removal of ignorance’ it is not really an act of removal as in an action of sweeping the material (like) dirt with a broom stick. But, it simply means that with raise of jnana the vastu reveals itself and by raise of jnana we mean only correcting an erroneous notion in the light of sruti vakya as the only pramana.

There can be a separate discussion on what exactly avidyA-nivritti is. Let that be a separate discussion. 

 

Therefore the conclusions which makes sense are:

1) avidya is not only the efficient cause but also material cause. It is incorrect to hold that avidyA is material cause alone.

As discussed above. 

 

2) The real wisdom lies in rescinding entire causality. Finally, Brahman alone bereft of any causalhood whatsoever must remain as none other than Atman. That Thou Art! – the correct message of Vedanta which can be established in no other way than through understanding meaning of upanishad vakyas in adhyaropa-apavada framework.

This is perfectly in accordance with VedAnta.

I made this attempt to respond to Prasanth ji's post out of my love and respect to Prasanth ji, Michael ji, Venkatraghavan ji and other learned members of this group. I tried to present Prasanth ji's views as succinctly as I could. If there is any dissonance between my presentation and what Prasanth ji intended, I apologize, though I don't see any probability of dissonance. However, I will be grateful if the same can be conveyed.  

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

a great effort - kudos. I will share both email sections in one original post. 

regards, michael

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