pratiyogI-jnAna being mandatory for abhAva-jnAna

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om,

It is accepted in advaita-vedAnta that prior pratiyogI-jnAna is a prerequisite for abhAva-jnAna. Unless and until one has x-jnAna, one cannot have x-abhAva-jnAna.

My question is -- is there any branch of Indian Philosophy, dvaita, vishishTAdvaita, nyAya etc who dispute this premise and hold that one can have abhAva-jnAna without pratiyogI-jnAna.

Learned members may please guide.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar. 

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Sudhanshu prabhuji
Hare Krishna

It is accepted in advaita-vedAnta that prior pratiyogI-jnAna is a prerequisite for abhAva-jnAna. Unless and until one has x-jnAna, one cannot have x-abhAva-jnAna.

> I have not read any tarka shAstra grantha, after reading above statement I am inferring that : one should have Atma jnAna first to feel that NOW he is not having that jnAna or having the 'abhAva' of that jnAna!! Like in this pot there was milk sometime back and now that milk is not there (abhAva) in this pot. Is this what the doubt here!!?? Not sure, please elaborate.

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

The question is very simple BhAskar ji. In order to know whether there is abhAva of ushkalanta in the room, one has to first know what is ushkalanta.

So, x-abhAva-jnAna in the room requires x-jnAna.

This is what advaita teachings holds.

I was interested to know if any other Indian Philosophy branch holds contrary view.

Regards.

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Sudhanshu prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

I would like to know this from avidyA-vidyA perspective.  Hence I asked that doubt.  To talk anything about Atma jnAna we should have had knowledge about it  ‘then’ and feeling the absence of the same ‘now’.  If this query not related /applicable to this then I have least interest in knowing anything further. 

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

 

The question is very simple BhAskar ji. In order to know whether there is abhAva of ushkalanta in the room, one has to first know what is ushkalanta.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Sudhanshu Shekharji, pranam. 

Often you have raised this pratiyogin objection against an abhavarupa avidya however it is based on some kind of existential positive abhava entity as opposed to a mere absence of knowledge. That seems to be an original argument made in the Ishta Siddhi and apparently repeated in the Vivarana but is addressed by SSSS in chapter 12 of his Vedanta Prakriya Pratyabinna/The Method of the Vedanta. SSSSji first cites the original objection and then offers the correct view with support from Sankara in Gita 13.26.  

"The illusory manifestation is totally non-existent in any form or at any time apart from the place, time and form in which it was perceived. And at the time of cancellation its whole being is seen to have been exhausted in its manifestation in that way at that place." 

 

This is explained by Bhasyakara as the correction of an apparent conjunction between snake and rope by the negation of the apparency upon the only ever existing rope without the possibility of any kind of positive ignorance being assumed 

I have simplified but hope it will not be taken as a substitute for SSSSji's clarification. Here are links to the exact pages for more clarification and depth regarding this issue. Kindly consider

Regards, MCC

https://archive.org/details/the-method-of-the-vedanta-a-critical-account-of-the-advaita-tradition-swami-satchidanandendra/page/n845/mode/2up

https://archive.org/details/the-method-of-the-vedanta-a-critical-account-of-the-advaita-tradition-swami-satchidanandendra/page/n791/mode/2up?view=theater 

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

Let us not go to avidyA-vidyA debate here. We should first crystallise as to whether it is possible to have x-abhAva-jnAna without x-jnAna. 

If I ask Mr A - do you have tuoli in your home? 

He cannot answer unless he knows what is a tuoli.

So he would counter question - what is a tuoli. 

Such normal usual course of daily affairs proves without a doubt that x-jnAna is a prerequisite of x-abhAva-jnAna.

And to the best of my knowledge, all branches of Indian Philosophy accept this basic concept.

I just wish to know if there is any branch of Indian Philosophy which does not accept this. I would read their arguments.

As for SSSS Ji's view, we may consider it some other time. He has taken up this issue and tried to argue that x-jnAna is not required for x-abhAva-jnAna. However, that is not correct in my opinion.

Regards.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

asm Sudhanshuji,  

Are you ignoring SSSS's refutation? There is no proper appearance in time or space to require a previous positive pratiyogin. There is simply right knowledge dismissing wrong knowledge and that "At the time of the cancelling cognition, the question of whether the world does or’ does not exist in the Absolute becomes totally irrelevant."

Please do consult the previously cited links. 

Regards, mcc

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

//"The illusory manifestation is totally non-existent in any form or at any time apart from the place, time and form in which it was perceived.//

It is non-existent even at the place, time and form of its manifestation and not only at "apart from". SSSS ji should have mentioned this. I don't know why he skipped that.

//And at the time of cancellation its whole being is seen to have been exhausted in its manifestation in that way at that place."//

At the time of negation, one understands the traikAlika-abhAva. At the time of error, one does not understand the traikAlika-abhAva. That is the difference.

 

//This is explained by Bhasyakara as the correction of an apparent conjunction between snake and rope by the negation of the apparency upon the only ever existing rope without the possibility of any kind of positive ignorance being assumed//

Mere rope cannot be confused for snake. It is rope+ajnAna that is confused for snake. Rope alone is never confused.

//I have simplified but hope it will not be taken as a substitute for SSSSji's clarification. Here are links to the exact pages for more clarification and depth regarding this issue. Kindly consider//

I saw it. Merely quoting BhAshyakAra does not help. One has to answer the questions. And one such basic question is this -- can x-abhAva-jnAna occur without x-jnAna.

//Are you ignoring SSSS's refutation?//

What is his refutation here?

//There is no proper appearance in time or space to require a previous positive pratiyogin.//

What is "proper appearance"? There is appearance of snake. Who can deny it? All VivaraNa is saying is that there is a snake-abhava there. VivaraNa says that there is traikAlika-snake-abhAva in rope. The place where snake appeared, at that very place, there is traikAlika-abhAva of snake. That is what is mithyAtva of snake. What is wrong in it?

//There is simply right knowledge dismissing wrong knowledge//

Knowledge does not happen without an object of knowledge. You dispute this and I will ask you to define knowledge and mechanism of arising of knowledge. Please note that the discussion is being held in SDV.

//and that "At the time of the cancelling cognition, the question of whether the world does or’ does not exist in the Absolute becomes totally irrelevant."//

World does not exist in Brahman. There is traikAlika-abhAva of world in Brahman. World exists nowhere. It has no existence.

There is merely sat-tAdAtmya because of which one says - world is. This sat-tAdAtmya is equally mithyA and merely appears while it is non-existent.

The question is relevant when world appears and appears to exist. Enquiry shows that - world is like snake, it merely appears while it is not.

Singular inactive Brahman cannot give rise to even a mistake. So, a non-existent apparent avidyA needs to be accepted, from its own frame of reference, to explain appearance. 

Regards.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

AUM SUdhanshuji, Thank you for your response. I fear you continue to interpret some kind of positive factor abhava ignorance rather a lack of knowledge hence our disagreement. 

-SSSS: "The illusory manifestation is totally non-existent in any form or at any time apart from the place, time and form in which it was perceived

-SS response: It is non-existent even at the place, time and form of its manifestation and not only at "apart from". SSSS ji should have mentioned this. I don't know why he skipped that.

-mcc: Yes, 'apart from' skipped or not makes no difference and only confirms SSSS's position. 

SS: "At the time of negation, one understands the traikAlika-abhAva. At the time of error, one does not understand the traikAlika-abhAva. That is the difference."

-mcc: I don't follow. Whether understanding or not,  there is no snake and never was a snake. The mere perception of a thing doesn't account for its existence. And please don't let the hare's horn resurface intending to create a distinction in non-existence. Whether a perception does not exist or a non-appearing conception does not exist, makes no difference to non-existence. 

SS: "Mere rope cannot be confused for snake. It is rope+ajnAna that is confused for snake. Rope alone is never confused."

mcc: Agreed but here is where you insist on '+ajnAna' as a positive ignorance in addition to rope. Error of the fact of rope is sufficient, there is no need to add anything positive to the error. Consider the ignorance concerning the perception of a flat earth or two moons - error of the fact is sufficient  

SS: can x-abhAva-jnAna occur without x-jnAna.

mcc: I believe, answered just above.

SS: "Knowledge does not happen without an object of knowledge."

mcc: agreed. Mirage requires sand as snake requires existing rope - remove mirage and sand is as it ever was, so too, with snake and rope. 

,

SS: "Singular inactive Brahman cannot give rise to even a mistake. So, a non-existent apparent avidyA needs to be accepted, from its own frame of reference, to explain appearance."

mcc: Again agreed but the devil is in the details and the term, 'apparent,' means something fundamentally different to vyakhana karas and Sankara Bhasya such that the former are accused of misinterpreting Bhasya, Advaita hani and nirmoksa vada by positing the continued appearance of form despite the falsification of adhyasa. 

are we making any headway or just rehashing our entrenched views? If you understand my thinking and believe I understand your thinking, what are to gain? 

with respect and regards, mcc

[लोकेश]

प्रणाम सुधांशु जी

While I don't know any Indian philosophy that says not-x can exist without accepting the possibility of x, I know a philosophy that makes an even stronger statement, that is - even x cannot exist unless possibility of not-x is recognized. And this philosophy says that this is true for everything, from the lowest concept to the highest concept one can think about. There's simply no exception. Whatever we can talk about in words it says, exists in dependence on existence and non-existance.

The reasoning goes like this - Any word or concept of mind that is perceived in the mind is via set of attributes attribute. For example when you talk about rose, you are thinking about red color, it's shape, it's smell etc. Now unless you perceive the absence of red color, you cannot perceive red color. Imagine if everything was red, would it be possible to recognize anything red? Ofcourse not. And this is precisely how everything works. We only recognise pain because we can also perceive absence of pain, we can perceive heat only because we can also perceive absence of heat. 

This is the philosophy of आर्य नागार्जुन. In addition Arya says that unless you understand existence and non-existance in its entirety, mukti is impossible.

निर्वाणं नास्ति भावेन नाभावेन विमुच्यते ।

भावाभावपरिज्ञानाद् वै निर्वाणं महात्मनाम् ॥ ४

Not by knowing existence, neither by knowing non-existance, is one liberated.

But by understanding existence and non-existance, the Great Ones are liberated.

Arya even denies the possibility of sunya which is seen as the highest concept in this philosophy because, like I previously said that there's simply no exception, there's no special provision like we have there in AV for Brahman and Avidya. Arya says 

यद्यशून्यं भवेत्किंचित्स्याच्छून्यमिति किं चन ।

न किंचिदस्त्यशून्यं च कुतः शून्यं भविष्यति ॥ १३,०७

If there were something not-sunya, there might have been the possibility of sunya. Since not-sunya doesn't exist, so how can sunya ever be?

The following saying of Arya denies abhāva without corresponding bhava

अविद्यमाने भावे च कस्याभावो भविष्यति ।

Given it doesn't exist in the first place, whose non-existance will be possible?

इति शिवम् ।

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Sudhanshu Ji,

In my understanding, in Advaita Siddhanta, prior pratiyogI-jnAna in full is not essential for its abhAva-jnAna. It is sufficient to have  some features of the pratiyogI-jnAna. Partial pratiyogI-jnAna. For example in a place where there are no round bodied objects, there can be abhAva-jnAna of a pot if it is understood to have a round shape. There need not be jnAna of what a pot exactly is.

Regards 

Virus-free.www.avast.com

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[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Sudhanshuji,

On Mon, Jul 29, 2024, 6:07 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

Let us not go to avidyA-vidyA debate here. We should first crystallise as to whether it is possible to have x-abhAva-jnAna without x-jnAna. 

...

Unfortunately, even after your request, yet another thread has been hijacked into ill-translated avidyA and then into its erroneous corollary of abhAvarUpa claim and worse yet into imagined accusations on vyAkhyAnakAras! There has even been some statement of their claiming to know more than Bhagavan Bhashyayara! It's laughable. Factually, those who accuse later *sub-*commentators are the ones who claim to know more than the sampradAya. Let that be. I'll find ease in ignoring these posts henceforth, else it is hurtful to read such disrespect to sampradAya.

If I ask Mr A - do you have tuoli in your home? 

He cannot answer unless he knows what is a tuoli.

...

And to the best of my knowledge, all branches of Indian Philosophy accept this basic concept.

Not that it is your focus, but you may already be aware but i think Tarkikas themselves accept an exception to this when the pratiyogi is abhAvarUpa or when it is anullikhita prakAraka jnAna. I recall coming across it in some part of dinakarI or rAmarudrI... I found the page, it is attached herewith for quick reference.

gurupAdukAbhyAm

Ananta Chaitanya

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

Let us come back to the original problem. I don't think any digression is required presently.

Is x-abhAva-jnAna possible without x-jnAna?

Regards.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Ananata Chaitanya ji,
 
//I'll find ease in ignoring these posts henceforth, else it is hurtful to read such disrespect to sampradAya.//

From my own experience, I can share that it is only intellectual lethargy and non-application of mind coupled with lack of study which can give rise to non-acceptance and consequent disrespect to teachings of sampradAya. Better to ignore such statements except in cases of some serious aspirants.
 
//Not that it is your focus, but you may already be aware but i think Tarkikas themselves accept an exception to this when the pratiyogi is abhAvarUpa or when it is anullikhita prakAraka jnAna. I recall coming across it in some part of dinakarI or rAmarudrI... I found the page, it is attached herewith for quick reference.//

I am unable to understand the logic adduced in the given page. Let us examine it:

//Tarkikas themselves accept an exception to this when the pratiyogi is abhAvarUpa//

if the pratiyogI itself is abhAva i.e. we are talking about examples such as pot-abhAva-abhAva. Here, pratiyogI is pot-abhAva. In such cases, in order to have pot-abhAva-abhAva-jnAna, presumably, the tArkika says that we need not have pot-abhAva-jnAna. That basically means, in order to have pot-jnAna (pot-abhAva-abhAva-jnAna), we need not have pot-abhAva-jnAna.

That is a fair point I guess. As our premise is -- for x-abhAva-jnAna, we need to have prior x-jnAna and not the other way round. So, I don't think that the tArkika view is anyway damaging here because it supports our original premise.  

//or when it is anullikhita prakAraka jnAna//

Can you suggest some basic material upon this. I will study.

Namaste Chandramouli ji.

//In my understanding, in Advaita Siddhanta, prior pratiyogI-jnAna in full is not essential for its abhAva-jnAna.//

So, when we have partial knowledge of pratiyogI, we say that we have knowledge of pratiyogI whose pratiyogitA is delimited by that dharma (which is known to us).

//It is sufficient to have  some features of the pratiyogI-jnAna. Partial pratiyogI-jnAna. For example in a place where there are no round bodied objects, there can be abhAva-jnAna of a pot if it is understood to have a round shape. There need not be jnAna of what a pot exactly is.//

Yes. So, here we have ghaTa-nishTha-vartula-AkAratva-avachchhinna-pratiyogitA-nirUpita-abhAva. So, here we know pot to be an object with property round-ness. So, the condition of prior pratiyogI-jnAna is not violated.

Namaste Michael Ji,

I am not responding to the points not relevant to the discussion. Kindly initiate a separate thread, if needed.

//what is this x-jnana? Why assume such a proposition?//

x can be anything. A pot, a cot, some ushkalanta, some tuoli. Anything. Certainly non-abhAva. That goes without saying.

//If we must assume, we can as well assume the teaching of Vedanta and Bhasyakara of an x-abhava jnana with creating some additional illogical necessity for some positive Intermediary, i.e., indeterminable  bhavarupa avidya.//

Let us understand the concepts from the basic. Then only we will be able to understand what bhAshya is saying. As for bhAshya and AchArya, even abhAva is bhAvarUpa, please note.

[न च घटाभावः सन्पटः अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । एवं घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि घटादन्यत्वं स्यात् , घटेन व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; तथैव भावात्मकताभावानाम् ।] 

//How will you then prove such an indeterminable mithya no less than its ultimate falsification? Proof must rely on universal experience and not merely apta testimony. It must be shown that jagat and its creation can be transcended thus negated.//

That is easily deduced from our experience and logic. No Shruti is needed for that. drishyatva, parichchhinnatva, anshitva, jaDatva.. there are so many hetus available. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,

The cognition that the hare's horn does not exist does not require the prior knowledge of the hare's horn. 

Regards,

Venkatraghavan

On Sun, Jul 28, 2024 at 6:54 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar via Advaita-l <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Venkat ji,

On Wed, Jul 31, 2024, 9:40 AM Venkatraghavan S <agni...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,

The cognition that the hare's horn does not exist does not require the prior knowledge of the hare's horn. 

I'm afraid, here too, the prior knowledge of hare without horns, and horns without hare is needed. 

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

[Kuntimaddi Sadananda]

Venkatraghavanji - PraNAms.

You made an interesting statement. To make a statement related to harn's hare. One should have knowledge that Hares do not have horns, and for that, one should have the knowledge of what is a horn too.

 

Can I just say hare's do not have 'gaagaabuubu' without knowing what is that 'gaagaabuubu'? -I am reminded of the statement –

 

Existence of an objects is established by the knowledge its existence'.

 

Conversely 'Nonexistence of an object must also have the knowledge of existence of it elsewhere'. I should know what ‘gaagaabuubu’ is before I can deny its non-existence at some other place.

 

Just my 2c

 

Hari Om!

Sada 

 

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[putran M]

Namaskaram,

Does this example apply here? To know "this is fire, this is not water", I would have to know "fire" and that "fire" is not water (or that "water" refers to something else, whether existing or not). I do not have to know water is wet, transparent etc. I do have a negative knowledge about water - that it is not another name for the fire that I know; but I don't think that is same as saying "I know water".

thollmelukaalkizhu

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[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji

I'm afraid, here too, the prior knowledge of hare without horns, and horns without hare is needed. 

Yes indeed. But I am not referring to the horn of a hare, I am referring to an akhaNDa asat vastu - the hare's horn. To know that such a hare's horn does not exist, merely knowing a hare and a horn is not sufficient.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Dear Sirs, Pranam.

I am confounded by all the discussion of pratiyogin. If we speak of the absence of some empirical object, then the notion of its prior existence or pratiyogin is clear. So too with the invent of an imaginary positive notion such as hare's horn or ‘gaagaabuubu’ But Bhasyakara does not speak of any positive entity being perceived in a place now characterized by its absence. There ever only was the substratum, rope, and there never was a snake to be known as absent. Pratiyogin simply does not apply!  The snake is totally non-existent.  There is not some positive ignorance that has been canceled to reveal the rope. All that Vedanta teaches is the supplanting of an erroneous knowledge by the discernment of right knowledge. All the rest is the logician's wrangling

The consequences of alternatively taking some positive bhavarupa avidya as the cause accounting for the manifestation of the world of appearance must then also account for the destruction of that world of appearance along with cancelation its cause, positive ignorance, supposedly by knowledge. 

Please advise where my understanding misses the point. 

Kind regards to all, mcc

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[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Venkat ji,

On Wed, Jul 31, 2024, 6:37 PM Venkatraghavan S <agni...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji

I'm afraid, here too, the prior knowledge of hare without horns, and horns without hare is needed. 

Yes indeed. But I am not referring to the horn of a hare, I am referring to an akhaNDa asat vastu - the hare's horn.

True that the avacchedaka is not a particular...

To know that such a hare's horn does not exist, merely knowing a hare and a horn is not sufficient.

There was no intention to say that it is sufficient, but that both units of knowledge are needed too. The pratiyogi of the context is made up of both the objects of units of knowledge. The abhAva expressing na~n is going with the vishiShTa along with the visheShaNa. 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji,

Re

The pratiyogi of the context is made up of both
the objects of units of knowledge. The abhAva expressing na~n is going with
the vishiShTa along with the visheShaNa.

I don't think that is the case - the pratiyogi of the absence of hare's horn is neither the hare nor the horn. 

If A stands for hare and B stands for the horn, the hare's horn is not A∩B, but an independent entity C, so ~C (the absence of C) is not dependent on the knowledge of A and B.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know
That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

[Venkatraghavan S]

A correction. By ~C, I don't mean the absence of C, I meant to say "that C is absent". That is, to know that C is absent/non-existent, knowing about A or B is not relevant.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

[लोकेश]

C is definitely dependent on A and B, because no one can understand C, unless they understand what A and B are.

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[Bhaskar YR]

A correction. By ~C, I don't mean the absence of C, I meant to say "that C is absent". That is, to know that C is absent/non-existent, knowing about A or B is not relevant.

 

praNAms Sri Venkataraghavan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Kindly pardon me I am not able to understand the subtleness of the above statement.  C as per the statement is hare’s horn, by saying: ‘I don’t mean the absence of C’, you mean to say there is a possibility of existence of C i.e. hare’s horn!!  But subsequently again you said that C is absent!!  Could you please explain this in simple layman terms prabhuji.

 

By the way,  one more mischievous doubt here after reading A and B is AB i.e. hare’s horn,  : we know vaNdhya and we also know putra like hare and horn and we also know about the act of killing, so by the help of above logic can we say : vaNdhya putra has been killed by hare’s horn 😊 

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Lokesh prabhuji

Hare Krishna

C is definitely dependent on A and B, because no one can understand C, unless they understand what A and B are.

• IMO, here in this context C (hare’s horn or vaNdhyA putra) is atyanta abhAva vastu so no question of its dependency nor there is a question of its understanding.  C is an abhAva vastu that is what we need to understand in this context OTOH what we are trying to say here is,  I know there is hare (A) and I also know there is horn on the bull (B) so hare’s horn is A&B, totally unwarranted logic to give existence to an absolutely non-existent thing!!  IMO, this is how the mere logic (shushka tarka) can damage our anubhava sammata (experience based) shrutyukta tarka.  bhAshyakAra always warns us against engaging ourselves in dry logic.    

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Bhaskar ji,

No, you have not understood the intent correctly. 

~C is a mathematical operation referring to the negation of C, making C absent. That is not being meant here. What is meant is the knowledge that C is absent.

The whole point of this is that a hare's horn is not simply AB, the knowledge of whose absence requires the prior knowledge of A and B - it is C, something different. 

Regards,

Venkatraghavan

[Venkatraghavan S]

The discussion is not about whether knowing C requires the knowledge of A and B, it is whether the knowledge of the absence of C requires the prior knowledge of C or not (pratiyogi jnAna being mandatory for abhAva jnAna). 

Even if the knowledge of the absence of C required the prior knowledge of A or B (it does), that still does not prove that it requires the prior knowledge of C.

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[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Venkat ji, 

I don't think that is the case - the pratiyogi of the absence of hare's horn is neither the hare nor the horn. 

Surely the pratiyogi C is different from A and B, but it is not without the individual knowledge units of A and B. 

If A stands for hare and B stands for the horn, the hare's horn is not A∩B, but an independent entity C, so ~C (the absence of C) is not dependent on the knowledge of A and B.

For C to be a valid word construct, A and B have to be valid word constructs. Else one can claim that hare's horn does exist because it is completely different from any combinations of meanings of hare and horn! 

Ergo, I surmise that the two unknown padArthas cannot give rise to their sambandha when the respective padas come together in a sentence samasta or as vyasta. The impossibility of such sambandha is also known, not without the knowledge of these individual units. If that is not the case, how would you see the vigrahavAkya of शशशृङ्ग? 

Further, in शशशृङ्ग, what do you consider the avacchedaka for shRnga as? shasha, shashashRngatva or something else? (Just trying to apply the ongoing study of dinakarI here :) )

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste. Apologies, replying to myself since i see that there is a request to explain the ongoing discussion in layman's terms, as well as, calling it as shuSka tarka!! Then, there is also an imagination that someone is claiming that since A and B exist, therefore C should exist! No one is claiming that. prAptasyaiva pratiShedhaH kartavyaH, na tu aprAptasya.

This is exactly how sampradAya has been misunderstood by some. If i don't even know what is being argued, let alone why, what compulsion should I have to publicly opine it as wrong?! mAyayA sarvasya sambhavAt. :-)

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji,

On Thu, 1 Aug 2024, 09:50 Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati], <bhatp...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Venkat ji, 

I don't think that is the case - the pratiyogi of the absence of hare's horn is neither the hare nor the horn. 

Surely the pratiyogi C is different from A and B, but it is not without the individual knowledge units of A and B.

Yes. However does absence of C require prior knowledge of C? If so, what kind of knowledge of C is required? 

For us asat vastu is known through a vikalpa vRtti - but is that vikalpavRtti jnAnAkAra or otherwise?

If it is jnAnAkArA, then we should have the experience of the type "I know shashashRNga", but we don't have that experience. So vikalpa must be some other type other than jnAna, hence in the classification scheme of yogashAstra, it is treated as a vRtti type different to pramANa and viparyaya.

So, vikalpa is not a jnAnAkArA vRtti. If that is the case, there is an exception to the rule that abhAva jnAna requires pratiyogi jnAna.

 

If A stands for hare and B stands for the horn, the hare's horn is not A∩B, but an independent entity C, so ~C (the absence of C) is not dependent on the knowledge of A and B.

For C to be a valid word construct, A and B have to be valid word constructs. Else one can claim that hare's horn does exist because it is completely different from any combinations of meanings of hare and horn! 

Ergo, I surmise that the two unknown padArthas cannot give rise to their sambandha when the respective padas come together in a sentence samasta or as vyasta. The impossibility of such sambandha is also known, not without the knowledge of these individual units. If that is not the case, how would you see the vigrahavAkya of शशशृङ्ग? 

Yes, I agree the two pada-s have pada-padArtha sambandha, the two pada-s also have samsarga between each other, but the vAkya has no object corresponding to it, that is, there is no sambandha between the vAkya and vAkyArtha - hence शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः.

Further, in शशशृङ्ग, what do you consider the avacchedaka for shRnga as? shasha, shashashRngatva or something else? (Just trying to apply the ongoing study of dinakarI here :) )

The pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma is shashashRNgatva in my view.

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri MCC prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

• By the time you must have realized how difficult it is to compete with MNC’s jury 😊  Which always think that they have already finalized what is shankara siddhAnta and wanted to hear from every corner what they have already understood as shankara siddhAnta 😊 if anything goes against their fundamental belief then they see that as attack on sampradaya siddhAnta, sampradAya Acharya-s, they laugh at you, they ignore your ‘socalled’ Shuddha shankara prakriya  and giving their final verdict that you are not competent enough to understand sampradaya siddhAnta and they come very hard on you because you are opposing and questioning their age old convictions.  Anyway this is not a new story that needs to be told again, let us come back to pratiyOgi jnAna that needs to be filled in the container 😊

 

I am confounded by all the discussion of pratiyogin. If we speak of the absence of some empirical object, then the notion of its prior existence or pratiyogin is clear.

 

• Let us take the pot example again.  If the pot is absent on the table and if we have the prior knowledge of existence of pot on the table then we say now the pot is absent on the table, table (which gives place /room to pot) is the dharmi and after seeing the absence of pot on the table, if we keep a pot on the table, the pot is ‘pratiyOgi’ coz. it fills the absence of the thing in the container or the place on which it was placed earlier.  In short, the thing that removes the absence in dharmi (table) is pratiyOgi (pot).  Similarly, the absence of the thought ‘ahaM brahmAsmi’ (I am Brahman)’ in the intellect is avidyA (jnAnAbhAva). The thought ‘I am Brahman’ is vidyA. This thought (vrutti rUpa jnAna) is also in the intellect. This means that the intellect is the dharmi (container) of vidyA  and the realization that  ‘I am Brahman’ is the pratiyOgi of that jnAnAbhAva avidyA. And this jnAnAbhAva avidyA is the cause of adhyAsa.  And this is not in the sense that avidyA as jnAnAbhAva as kAraNa and adhyAsa is kArya, as you know Sri SSS has very clearly explained, the very concept of kArya-kAraNa is within the realm of adhyAsa and hence he very clearly insist it is adhyAsa vAda which shankara explained in adhyAsa bhAshya coz. very pramAtru-pramANa-prameya is within the realm of adhyAsa and hence all shAstra (vaidika) and vyAvahArika based on this adhyAsa only AND it is  not something that has been illogically introduced by vyAkhyAnakAra-s in the form of  bhAvarUpi, objectively existing avidyA vAda.  So, jnAnAbhAva is ekarUpi in all jeeva-s, which gives room (aaspada) to  adhyAsya.  Like in the absence of brahma jnAna the jeevi thinks that he is kartru, bhOktru, jeeva etc.  which is naisargika, anAdi and ananta so there is absolutely no need for searching the material cause for it. bhAshyakAra somewhere says whether the first or the last, or continuous or intermittent, the intellectual thought which removes the avidyA  is vidyA.  In the sugama there is very detailed discussion on this why positive existence of avidyA is not possible to prove in any of the three states.  It is because of jnAnAbhAva somany misconceptions taking place in our mind and getting rid of this misconceptions (avidyA) is the main purport of shruti vAkya, it is not about revealing the nature of rope but OTOH getting rid of our wrong notion that it is snake, once this is removed there is no need for extra effort to get the knowledge of rope simply because brahma jnAna is not like any objective jnAna it is svayaM-siddha, self-luminous and Aprameya jnAna. 

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Venkataraghavan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

Yes, I agree the two pada-s have pada-padArtha sambandha, the two pada-s also have samsarga between each other, but the vAkya has no object corresponding to it, that is, there is no sambandha between the vAkya and vAkyArtha.

 

• This is very important observation IMHO to understand why jnAnAbhAva is always in abhAva rUpa not bhAva rUpa.  This is what I had written in one of my mails : 
• //quote// The absence of any form / picture in intellect of a thing heard through someone is called the absence of knowledge of that object.  In the misconception (adhyAsa/ bhrAnti samaye) like seeing the snake in place of rope we have the form of snake in place of rope which is called 'wrong knowledge' and after bhrAnti nirasana (after the dawn of knowledge) we have the right picture of rope in our intellect.  Where as in the scenario of lack of knowledge of anything (gAgAbubu) there is no vrutti rUpa jnAna in our intellect at all.  Hence avidyA (not knowing) is always called as jnAnAbhAva and it is not an objectively existing thing. //unquote// 
• Am I saying anything different from what you meant above prabhuji?? 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Bhaskar ji,

I am afraid I don't understand the connection between what I have written and what you have.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

On Thu, 1 Aug 2024, 11:14 Bhaskar YR via Advaita-l, <adva...@lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

praNAms Sri Venkataraghavan prabhuji
Hare Krishna

Yes, I agree the two pada-s have pada-padArtha sambandha, the two pada-s also have samsarga between each other, but the vAkya has no object corresponding to it, that is, there is no sambandha between the vAkya and vAkyArtha.

  *   This is very important observation IMHO to understand why jnAnAbhAva is always in abhAva rUpa not bhAva rUpa.  This is what I had written in one of my mails :
  *   //quote// The absence of any form / picture in intellect of a thing heard through someone is called the absence of knowledge of that object.  In the misconception (adhyAsa/ bhrAnti samaye) like seeing the snake in place of rope we have the form of snake in place of rope which is called 'wrong knowledge' and after bhrAnti nirasana (after the dawn of knowledge) we have the right picture of rope in our intellect.  Where as in the scenario of lack of knowledge of anything (gAgAbubu) there is no vrutti rUpa jnAna in our intellect at all.  Hence avidyA (not knowing) is always called as jnAnAbhAva and it is not an objectively existing thing. //unquote//
  *   Am I saying anything different from what you meant above prabhuji??

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri Venkataraghavan prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

You observed : , but the vAkya has no object corresponding to it

 

• Like this, I said,  the compound word ‘jnAnAbhAva’ has not corresponding object in our mind.  Whereas in mithyAjnAna we have sarpa rUpa in our intellect, and in satya darshana rajju jnAna in our intellect whereas when we talk about jnAnAbhAva there is no corresponding or respective vrutti in mind.  Whether they be the thoughts of vidyA or thoughts (misconceptions) of avidyA both have corresponding vrutti rUpa jnAna whereas when we are talking about jnAnAbhAva it is just an excuse in a pretext to show adhyAsa but definitely not in the sense that avidyA is the cause of adhyAsa  and this objectively existing avidyA is the upAdAna or nimitta.  It is only gives room for misconception.  Just like an : idle brain is devil’s workshop, when we have the abhAva of svarUpa jnAna all sorts of misconceptions we entertain ourselves but certainly this abhAva is not the material cause for this misconception.  Lack of owner’s presence in an empty house may cause strangers occupancies. That does not mean absence of owner is the upAdAna kAraNa for these occupancies.  The absence here is just an excuse, a pretext.  I think this is the relevance I have seen with your above statement.  Anyway, I am OK if you disagree with it 😊

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Bhaskar ji,

Ok, I understand what you are saying. Thanks.

I don't think the topic of this thread is whether avidyA is jnAna abhAva or something else.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

[Bhaskar YR]

praNAms Sri MCC prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

I am confounded by all the discussion of pratiyogin. If we speak of the absence of some empirical object, then the notion of its prior existence or pratiyogin is clear.

 

• Yes, absence of milk in a pot and filling the pot with milk is enough to understand the empirical pratiyOgi transaction.  No qualms with that.

 

So too with the invent of an imaginary positive notion such as hare's horn or ‘gaagaabuubu’

 

• This invention is not at all necessary if it is imaginary then it cannot exist positively / objectively at any point of time like shashavishANa or vaNdhya putra. 

 

But Bhasyakara does not speak of any positive entity being perceived in a place now characterized by its absence.

 

• For this some say by giving the example of snake-rope,  even though the snake is NOW absent you have ‘SEEN’ some positively existing snake during your bhrama period, which is indescribable and cognition of the snake during that period is the cause of your tremors, perspiration etc.  So, you have to accept some satta tAdAtmya thing existing at some point of time which is sadasat vilakshaNa or anirvachaneeya.  This theory is famously known as anirvachaneeya khyAti vAda advocated by later vyAkhyAnakAra-s, perhaps ‘vivaraNa’ school in particular.  Hence they insist for two types of adhyAsa i.e. jnAnAdhyAsa and arthAdhyAsa.   

 

There ever only was the substratum, rope, and there never was a snake to be known as absent. Pratiyogin simply does not apply!  The snake is totally non-existent. 

 

• Please see above, as per some, snake cognition cannot be ruled out during bhrama though it is not sat it is nor asat nor satasat it is anirvachaneeya. Hence avidyA is anirvachaneeya!!

 

There is not some positive ignorance that has been canceled to reveal the rope. All that Vedanta teaches is the supplanting of an erroneous knowledge by the discernment of right knowledge. All the rest is the logician's wrangling

 

Ø     This is mere adhyAsa vAda but for adhyAsa to happen there must be some cause and that cause is anirvachaneeya bhAvarUpa brahmAshrita mUlAvidyA.  Again as per some. 

 

The consequences of alternatively taking some positive bhavarupa avidya as the cause accounting for the manifestation of the world of appearance must then also account for the destruction of that world of appearance along with cancelation its cause, positive ignorance, supposedly by knowledge. 

 

• Knowledge can remove both tUlAvidyA and mUlAvidyA because both are jnAna virOdhi, hence this dOsha cannot be imposed on us…so says some!!

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Venkatraghavan ji.

Thank you very much for your inputs. I made a study of relevant portions of Advaita Siddhi and applied mind on the issue.

I will just summarize the discussion so far. Kindly let me know if you disagree with any of it.

(a)    X-abhAva-jnAna requires x-jnAna. That is to say, without x-jnAna, one cannot have x-abhAva-jnAna. However, it is subject to exception. One exception is -where x itself is a vishesha-abhAva such as pot-abhAva. In such cases, since x is pot-abhAva, x-abhAva will be pot (pot-abhAva-abhAva). So, saying x-abhAva-jnAna requires x-jnAna would imply ---- pot-jnAna (pot-abhAva-abhAva-jnAna) requires pot-abhAva-jnAna, which is contradicted by anubhava. Hence, the rule would not apply if x is vishesha-abhAva.

So, it can be safely said that the rule – x-abhAva-jnAna requires x-jnAna is valid in only those cases wherein x is not vishesha-abhAva. This is basically the point made by Anant Chaitanya ji.

(b)    Now comes your point, wherein you basically stated that an exception to the impugned rule is possible even when x is nirvishesha-abhAva such as a shashashringa. That is to say, the knowledge of an abhAva, where shashashringa itself is the pratiyogI, does not require shashashringa-jnAna. That is to say, shashashringa-abhAva-jnAna does not require shashashringa-jnAna. Here, you hold that shashashringa-abhAva has shashashringa as pratiyogI and shashashringa-tva as pratiyogitA-avachchhedaka.

Further, you hold that shashashringa (C) is a vastu independent of shasha (A) and shringa (B). It is an akhanDa asat vastu in its own right. So, even if shashashringa-abhAva-jnAna required shasha-jnAna and shringa-jnAna, i.e. even if C-abhAva-jnAna required A-jnAna and B-jnAna, it still does not prove that C-abhAva-jnAna requires C-jnAna. So, the exception is valid.

Further, you hold that shashashringa-jnAna is not through jnAnAkAra-vritti but through vikalpa-vritti. So, even if shashashringa-abhAva-jnAna requires shashashringa-jnAna, it still does not require a jnAnAkAra-vritti, hence requirement of pratiyogI-jnAna is not met.

Kindly let me know whether I have summarised your views correctly.

In this connection, let me put my views:-

1.       Shashashringa means a vastu which has shringa-tva and shashIya-tva. Such a vastu is not sattvena-pratIti-yogya. And hence, it is called asat or tuchchha. Certainly such a vastu is neither shasha nor shringa nor an intersection of these two. It is an independent construct which is not sattven-pratIti-yogya i.e. it is nihswarUpa (असत्त्वं तावन्निःस्वरूपत्वम्). So, even if shashashringa-abhAva-jnAna requires shasha-jnAna or shringa-jnAna, it does not result in requirement of shashashringa-jnAna. It is a valid point. 

2.        When shashashringa is nihswarUpa i.e. sattvena-pratIti-ayogya, can there be a shashashringa-abhAva-jnAna at all? If yes, then how do we know this shashashringa-abhAva? Being an abhAva, it can only be known through anupalabdhi-pramA. However, there is no yogyA-anupalabdhi in the case of shashashringa-abhAva. “If shashashringa were there, it would have been perceived” – is not possible in case of shashashringa because such anupalabdhi is not pratiyogI-sattva-virodhinI [even if shashashringa were there, it would not have been perceived]. That is why advaita-siddhi holds in Nishedhapratiyogitva-anyathA-anupapattitva-vichArah that tuchha-pratiyogika-abhAva is not accepted in siddhAnta.

This being the position, what happens to the jnAna “shashashringam nAsti”? Does it not signify an abhAva which has shashashringa as pratiyogI. This is what your proposition is.

The text answers that even in such case – the cognition states the absence of shringa in shasha (that is to say, shasha is anuyogI and shringa is pratiyogI) and it does not have shashashringa as pratiyogI. एवं च शशशृङ्गं नास्तीत्युल्लिखन्त्या अपि बुद्धेः शशे शृङ्गाभाव एव विषयः ।

In the cognition – “gavi shashashringam nAsti” – the anuyogI is a shringa-of-cow and pratiyogI is shashIyatva.  एवं च शशशृङ्गं नास्तीत्युल्लिखन्त्या अपि बुद्धेः शशे शृङ्गाभाव एव विषयः । गवि शशशृङ्गं नास्तीत्यस्या अपि गवाधिकरणकशृङ्गे शशीयत्वाभावो विषयः, अनन्यगतिकत्वात् ।

In a nut-shell, it is held in siddhAnta that tuchha/asat does not have abhAva-pratiyogitA. 

3.       This being the position of siddhAnta, wherein asat is not accepted as pratiyogI of an abhAva, i.e. asat-pratiyogika-abhAva is not accepted, our discussion becomes non-starter. That is to say, when asat-ptatiyogika-abhAva itself is not accepted, to say that asat-pratiyogika-abhAva-jnAna does not require asat-jnAna, is not possible.

4.       Now, this is a phenomenal point – that asat does not have nishedha-pratiyogitA. But, in second mithyAtva-vichArah, it is categorically stated that asat and mithyA both have traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA. How to explain that? I would request your views here.

My understanding is – asat does not have any connection with kAla. And hence, it is stated to have traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA.

The basis of my saying is – mithyA is accepted to have a sattva during pratibhAsa-kAla which is non-contradictory to its traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA. This sattva of mithyA vastu is defined as yat-knichit-kAla-abAdhyatva. This sattva is not present in asat, not because it has abAdhyatva, but because it has no connection with kAla.; किंचित्कालाबाध्यत्वरूपं किंचित्कालावच्छिन्नं बाधाविषयत्वमित्यर्थः । ब्रह्मतुच्छयोर्व्यावृत्तये अवच्छिन्नान्तम् । ब्रह्मणि बाधाविषयत्वं न कालावच्छिन्नम् ; सार्वत्रिकत्वात्, तुच्छे तु कालस्यासंबन्धादपि न तदवच्छिन्नं तदिति भावः । (LaghuchandrikA -page 639 Old edition – Nirnaya Sagar press).

Extending the same logic, it can be said that asat has traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA, not on account of asat having nishedha-pratiyogitA, but on account of absence of sambandha with kAla.

5.       So, my view is – since asat-pratiyogika-abhAva is not accepted in siddhAnta, "asat-pratiyogika-abhAva-jnAna does not require asat-pratiyogI-jnAna", cannot be said. And hence, shashashringa cannot be placed as x in our original premise – x-abhAva-jnAna requires x-jnAna. And hence, nirvishesha-abhAva cannot be an exception to our original rule. Vishesha-abhAva can, however, be a valid exception. But not anything else.

Kindly share your views.

--
Additional Commissioner of Income-tax,
Pune

sudhanshushekhar.wordpress.com

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

//But Bhasyakara does not speak of any positive entity being perceived in a place now characterized by its absence. There ever only was the substratum, rope, and there never was a snake to be known as absent. Pratiyogin simply does not apply!  The snake is totally non-existent.//

A person who mistakes rope for snake makes two statements:

(a)    There is a dangerous snake there. [during illusion]

(b)    There has never been a snake here. There was always a rope here. [during bAdha]

During bAdha, he makes a statement – there has never been a snake here. That means, there has always been a snake-abhAva here. That means, there has always been an abhAva here whose pratiyogI is snake. So, the concept of pratiyogI very much applies. That which appeared during illusion, that very snake is the object of negation.

That the snake is totally non-existent is a valid point. But still, it is not horns of hare. Because, horns of hare is ineligible to appear whereas illusory snake is eligible to appear. 

Further, snake is not identical to rope. If it were identical to rope, then you cannot say – there has never been a snake here. Because that would amount to – there has never been a rope here.

So, some difference between snake and rope is to be assumed. That is why advaita says – rope-avachchhinna-chaitanya is substratum and snake is a modification of ignorance-of-rope-avachchhinna-chaitanya.

Mere rope does not and cannot appear as snake. So, (rope-avachchhinna-chaitanya + ajnAna thereof) gives rise to illusory snake which is negated by jnAna of rope-avachchhinna-chaitanya.

 //There is not some positive ignorance that has been canceled to reveal the rope. All that Vedanta teaches is the supplanting of an erroneous knowledge by the discernment of right knowledge. All the rest is the logician's wrangling.//

Let us discuss it in another thread. I have already referred you to Brihadaranyak wherein BhagvatpAda has said that abhAva is bhAvarUpa. He has given irrefutable logic there. So, if you hold that "avidyA is abhAva and hence not bhAvarUpa", you stand contradicted by Shankara because He proved that abhAva is bhAvarUpa. Either you explain Shankara (in separate thread) or accept that avidyA is bhAvarUpa. Without doing that, merely repeating something is not a valid argument.

//The consequences of alternatively taking some positive bhavarupa avidya as the cause accounting for the manifestation of the world of appearance must then also account for the destruction of that world of appearance along with cancelation its cause, positive ignorance, supposedly by knowledge.//

BhAvarUpa means neither bhAva nor abhAva. It implies that avidyA is neither sat nor asat nor prAk-abhAva, pradhvansa-abhAva, atyanta-abhAva, anyonya-abhAva nor any of the bhAvAtmaka-avidyA-kArya. So, please note that translating bhAvarUpa to positive is incorrect and the intent is to emphasise abhAva-vilakshaNa. But then, bhAvarUpa does not imply bhAva. It is bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa.

The manifestation and "destruction" world is just as it is in the case of rope-snake. So, we have a perfect analogy there.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/advaitin/CAAz9PvHmZqp3qEfC6cv13bdSMneWmK8ofoMWEuo2OP%2BRcENrQw%40mail.gmail.com.

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Venkat ji, 

Looks like i missed the lists in the earlier reply. Also making a correction herewith: there is no gauravadoSha that i mentioned since the abhAva is atyantAbhAva not ananoyAbhAva. My apologies.

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

On Thu, Aug 1, 2024, 11:21 AM Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati] <bhatp...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Venkat ji,

On Thu, Aug 1, 2024, 10:52 AM Venkatraghavan S <agni...@gmail.com> wrote:

So, vikalpa is not a jnAnAkArA vRtti. If that is the case, there is an exception to the rule that abhAva jnAna requires pratiyogi jnAna.

Thanks. That yoga view makes sense. 

Yes, I agree the two pada-s have pada-padArtha sambandha, the two pada-s also have samsarga between each other, but the vAkya has no object corresponding to it, that is, there is no sambandha between the vAkya and vAkyArtha - hence शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः.

True, in which case, i would also think recalling Chhandogya's asadevedamagra AsIt. That is, the na~n of abhAva would go with the vAkya and not pada.

Further, in शशशृङ्ग, what do you consider the avacchedaka for shRnga as? shasha, shashashRngatva or something else? (Just trying to apply the ongoing study of dinakarI here :) )

The pratiyogitAvacChedaka dharma is shashashRNgatva in my view.

Yes, but there would be gauravadoSha here. Anyway, thanks for the discussion.

gurupAdukAbhyAm,

--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,

Thank you for a very nice summary of the discussion and the illuminating points raised by you. I agree with your analysis and the refutation of asat-pratiyogika-abhAva, which forms the basis of the chapter on  niShedhapratiyogitva anyathAnupapatti. from the siddhi.

That chapter is based on the argumentation by Sri Anandapurna in nyAyachandrikA, wherein he argues that anirvachanIyatva stands proven because only anirvachanIya objects are capable of being abhAva-pratiyogi. To do this he proved that asat cannot be an abhAva-pratiyogi.

Interestingly, while asat-pratiyogika-atyantAbhAva is not accepted in the siddhAnta, asat-pratiyogika-anyonyAbhAva is accepted. In the first definition of mithyAtva, the siddhikAra defines the sAdhya as - सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं वा साध्यम्. That is, mithyAtva is the combination of two differences having sat and asat as their counterpositives. 

I believe the basis for this is that the perception of bheda only requires anuyogi yogyatA (which Brahman/anirvachanIya objects have), whereas perception (via anupalabdhi) of abhAva requires pratiyogi yogyatA, which asat objects do not have.

Thus, if asat cannot be the pratiyogi of abhAva, one can argue that it falls outside the scope of the abhAva jnAna requiring pratiyogi jnAna rule.

Interestingly, the madhva system accepts that asat can be the pratiyogi of abhAva. 

The siddhikAra in refuting the aprasiddhi argument of the mAdhva in the chapter on मिथ्यात्वानुमानस्यानुमानबाधोद्धारः says असत्प्रतियोगिकाभावं स्वीकुर्वतः पराभ्युपगममात्रेणैव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिसंभवात् - for you, who accept that absence can have asat as a counterpositive, the acceptance of the prasiddhi of aniravachanIya avidyA on the basis of the opponent's system is not out of the question. 

Your point on asat being out of the scope of the topic under discussion is well made. Thank you for this discussion.

Regards,

Venkatraghavan 

[putran M]

Namaskaram,

As far as I understand:

"hare's horn" : Does not exist because it is a contradiction of the meaning of hare.

"hare with horn": this can be interpreted as a new "name" to denote an imaginary object that has the hare's body with a horn extension. Similar to unicorn.

Does unicorn exist? It has praathibhasika existence as an object of (jiva's) imagination but not vyavaharika satya as an object in ishvara's creation. Special exception would be if Ishvara decides to bring it into manifestation (like narasimha avatara).

If x=hare's horn, then x-jnana is not possible but x-abhava jnana is realized in the knowledge that "hare does not have horn, therefore hare's horn does not exist". Hare's horn is asat.

If x=unicorn, then I would think it should be classified mithya because it has a constructed existence as an object, in our mind, and yet is non-existent as a manifest object. So one has x-jnana as far as what it means and x-abhava jnana as far as its existence "outside". So for mithya objects of this kind, one can say that x-abhava jnana (as gross object) implies x-jnana (as mind-object).

thollmelukaalkizhu

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste Sudhanshu Ji,

Reg  //  Now, this is a phenomenal point – that asat does not have nishedha-pratiyogitA. But, in second mithyAtva-vichArah, it is categorically stated that asat and mithyA both have traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA. How to explain that? //,

My understanding is different. Such a statement is not made by AS in second mithyAtva-vichArah. Response of AS is to the objection raised by NM proposing such a declaration. NM states that there is no other option, in connection with which it presents several possibilities and discounts all of them. Response of AS is that even if such traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA were to be accepted provisionally, still there is scope for distinguishing between asat and mithyA by pointing out the unique distinguishing feature ** तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः । **.

Regards

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Venkatraghavan ji.

//Interestingly, while asat-pratiyogika-atyantAbhAva is not accepted in the siddhAnta, asat-pratiyogika-anyonyAbhAva is accepted. In the first definition of mithyAtva, the siddhikAra defines the sAdhya as - सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं वा साध्यम्. That is, mithyAtva is the combination of two differences having sat and asat as their counterpositives.//

(a) My understanding has been that, in siddhAnta, only atyanta-abhAva is accepted and the other three abhAvAs are not admitted at all. What is denoted by pot-pratiyogika-bheda is basically pot-abheda-pratiyogika-atyanta-abhAva. So, asat-pratiyogika-bheda basically stands for asat-abheda-pratiyogika-atyanta-abhAva. [Tattva-anusandhAnam, DakshiNAmUrti Math edition, page 261].

As per this understanding, asat-pratiyogika-bheda does not imply that asat is being accepted as pratiyogI of anyonya-abhAva in siddhAnta. However, we need to still find out as to what is "asat-abheda". If asat-abheda is mithyA, our problem is solved. But if asat-abheda is taken as asat, then the problem stands. 

If asat-pratiyogika-bheda is accepted by siddhAntI, then by the force of reason, we will need to admit asat-abheda as mithyA.

(b) Further, if we see the flow of discussion in first mithyAtva vichAra, then this definition सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं is postulated as tushyatu-durjana-nyAya and is not the first choice defintion, which is सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावासत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपं धर्मद्वयम्. Only by accepting the arthAntara-dosha of pUrvapakshI as a matter of tushyatu-durjana-nyAya, this definition is postulated. So, we cannot rule out the possibility that the siddhAntI is using the opponent's language to quieten him. Just as siddhAntI does not accept prAk-abhAva, but still uses it in avidyA-anumAna-vichAra as चैत्रप्रमा, चैत्रगतप्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्तानादिनिवर्तिका, प्रमात्वान्मैत्रप्रमावत्. 

So, the usage by siddhAntI can be explained in this fashion as well.

In either case, I do not think that asat is accepted as pratiyogI of anyonya-abhAva in siddhAnta. Please share your views.

 

//I believe the basis for this is that the perception of bheda only requires anuyogi yogyatA (which Brahman/anirvachanIya objects have), whereas perception (via anupalabdhi) of abhAva requires pratiyogi yogyatA, which asat objects do not have.//

It appears quite convincing. Is there something to this effect mentioned somewhere in any text? 

//Interestingly, the madhva system accepts that asat can be the pratiyogi of abhAva.//

Yes. And as per them, even shuktirUpya is within the ambit of asat. 

Many thanks.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Chandramouli ji.
 
//My understanding is different. Such a statement is not made by AS in second mithyAtva-vichArah. Response of AS is to the objection raised by NM proposing such a declaration. NM states that there is no other option, in connection with which it presents several possibilities and discounts all of them. Response of AS is that even if such traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA were to be accepted provisionally, still there is scope for distinguishing between asat and mithyA by pointing out the unique distinguishing feature ** तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः । **.//

 AS says - इति चेन्मैवम् ; सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वाच्ययोः साधारणम् ; तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , शूक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्तिः ।

The SiddhAntI responds to opponent by declaring his position. I will share the context and translation from advaitasiddhi.com.

We now look at the siddhikAra's response to these arguments. He says:
इति चेन्मैवं if this is the argument, not so.
स्वरूपेणैव त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रपञ्चे शुक्तिरूप्ये चाङ्गीकारात् we hold that the negation of the pratiyogi in all three periods of time is an absolute negation - that is, neither the world nor the shell-silver are existent in any of the three periods of time. How?
तथाहि - शुक्तौ रजतभ्रमानान्तरं अधिष्ठानतत्वसाक्षात्कारे रूप्यं नास्ति नासीन्नभविष्यतीति स्वरूपेणैव, 'नेह नाने'ति श्रुत्या च प्रपञ्चस्य स्वरूपेणैव निषेधप्रतीते: - after the illusion of silver seen in a shell is removed by the direct knowledge of the shell, the substratum, the negation of silver is absolute - it does not exist now, did not at any time in the past, nor will it at any time in the future. In a similar fashion, the shruti which says "there is no multiplicity here" negates the existence of the world absolutely.

The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्मैवम् not so;
सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वचनीया साधारणम् ; while the absolute absence of an object in all time and space is common to both asat and mithyA  
तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , asat is something that is incapable of being perceived as existing in any locus
तच्च शुक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्ति:  |  whereas that is not the case with regard to shell-silver and the world before their sublation, thus their being asat is not true
नच बाधात् पूर्वं शुक्तिरूप्यम् प्रपञ्चो वा सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयते | as before their sublation, shell-silver and the world do appear to exist.

As is clear from the above two citations of dvitIya-mithyAtva-vichArah, it is accepted by siddhAntI as his first-choice theory ---- that ---- asat and mithyA have sarvatra-traikAlika-nishedha-pratiyogitA. There is no question of it being accepted provisionally. This is the primary siddhAnta. 

I would request views of Venkatraghavan ji and Anant Chaitanya ji on the comment by Chandramouli ji.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.
 

//thank you for your patience and continued engagement.//

It is a matter of joy to discuss these issues with sincere sAdhakAs like yourself and others in this group.
 
//who is this person who is guilty of mistake? Aren't you putting the cart before the horse? Asmat confused with yusmad includes pramatr. Such being the case bAdha of any empirical superimposition does not apply hence no pratiyogin.//  

When you confused rope for a snake - you had a knowledge - "there is a dangerous snake there". The object of your knowledge - the content of your knowledge - was not rope. The object of your knowledge was snake.

Now this snake was not a real snake made with biological parts. Was it? Obviously not. It was an illusory snake. [This illusory snake had a snake-hood which was basically vyAvahArika-snakehood-tAdAtmya.]

Further, this illusory snake, which is the object of your knowledge, did not exist. Nonetheless, it appeared to exist. It appeared to exist and was about to bite you, so you ran.

And then you realised - it is not a snake, it is a rope. So, the object of your knowledge changed from a snake to a rope. And you say -- there has never been a snake here. There was just an appearance of snake. The snake -- which was the object of my knowledge -- was non-existent and yet, it appeared. All that was there, was a rope.

This is all which I am saying. There was an appearance of a non-existent snake. This is what is called a prAtibhAsika-snake. A non-existent appearance. This "appearance" is also called sattvena-prateeti or sat-tAdAtmya. It appears to exist.

Where is putting the cart before the horse? I am merely explaining our experience.

//Asmat confused with yusmad includes pramatr. Such being the case bAdha of any empirical superimposition does not apply hence no pratiyogin.//

Please explain what exactly you wish to convey here.

//we need to recognize that both non-existents are only thought concepts AND there are no distinctions within non-existence. Please, we have scrubbed this issue threadbare several times. Without a new fiber of argument, best to let it dissolve methinks.//

This is the view of MAdhvAs, the dualists, that there are no distinctions between non-appearing non-existent (tuchchha) and appearing non-existent (mithyA). They consider both as asat. This is contradicted by anubhava and also by reason. BhAshya also equates world with illusory snake, magically created elephant, dream-objects. However, BhAshya never equates world with horns of hare. BhAshya itself distinguishes illusory objects from horns of hare.

Entire world is mithyA. It is non-existent. Otherwise, there would be a charge of duality. And yet, it appears. That is the magic. That is mAyA. Appearing while it is not. And on the basis of this appearance, this is differentiated from horns of hare.

//"Advaita says"? Not Sankara bhasya, if I am not mistaken.//


Of course you are mistaken.🙂  It is the crystalised view of Shankara.
 
//How might there exist avachchhinna or modificiation in Chaitanya?//

Avachchhinna does not mean modification in chaitanya. Take for example a pot. It gives rise to the usage "pot-space". This pot-space does not lead to modifciation in space, but ghaTa-avachchhinna-AkAsha becomes available for transaction. Similarly, for chaitanya.

 //Are you referring to Ghata Bhasya in Brh. Up. ?//

Yes.

//Please spell out more specifically with examples of what you mean by bhava-abhava vilakshana.//

The term used for avidyA is bhAvarUpa. It is explained that bhAvarUpa word is used to signify its abhAva-vilakshaNatA. One should not infer that bhAvarUpa means bhAva. So, all those who translate bhAvarUpa as "positive" are not correct. Please note.

bhAvarUpa means bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa. 

Now, what are the items within the ambit of abhAva --- asat, prAk-abhAva, pradhvamsa-abhAva, anyonya-abhAva and atyanta-abhAva

What are the items within the ambit of bhAva -- Brahman, all avidyA-kArya (such as pot, cloth, this world, illusory snake etc. Both prAtibhAsika and vyavahArika avidyA-kArya).

avidyA is different from both. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

aum Sudhanshuji, lovely response -- let me post on Facebook and see what comes of it. 🙏

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Raghav ji 

avidyA is bhAvarUpa while avidyAkArya and Brahman are bhAva ?

Kindly clarify since the kArya is being clubbed with Brahman while kAraNa
is sadasadvilaxaNa?

Even the four abhAvAs are avidyA-kArya. So, avidyA-kArya are bhAva as well as abhAva. All vyAvhArika and prAtibhAsika vastu is bhAvAtmaka-avidyA-kArya and is within the ambit of "bhAva" in bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa. The four abhAva are abhAvAtnaka-avidyA-kArya and are within the ambit of "abhAva" in bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa.

avidyA is not avidyA-kArya. It is the upAdAna thereof. Hence, it is different from both bhAva and abhAva. 

Further, Brahman is taken within the ambit of bhAva and asat, within the ambit of abhAva. This is not stated in so many words in Advaita Siddhi. There, it focuses on difference of avidyA from bhAvAtmaka-avidyA-kArya and abhAvAtnaka-avidyA-kArya and hence bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa. However, on closer scrutiny, as we have discussed earlier in this forum, we have found that asat is included within abhAva. And Brahman is the ultimate bhAva. So, it has to be within the ambit of bhAva.

This is discussed in avidyA-lakshaNa-vichArah. 

Some excerpt:

न च – अभावविलक्षणाविद्यादौ भावविलक्षणत्वमसम्भवि, परस्परविरोधादिति – वाच्यम् ; भावत्वाभावत्वयोर्बाधकसत्त्वेन तृतीयप्रकारत्वसिद्धौ परस्परविरहव्यापकत्वरूपविरोधासिद्धेः, परस्परविरहव्याप्यत्वरूपस्तु विरोधो नैकविरहेणापरमाक्षिपति । 

Objection: BhAva and abhAva are mutually contradictory. They have mutual-virodha. Therefore, it is not possible that avidyA which is abhAva-vilakshaNa has also bhAva-vilakshaNatA.

Answer: No. There is presence of bAdhaka in case avidyA is accepted as having either bhAvatva or abhAvatva. 

bAdhaka for bhAvatva: avidyA is stated by Shruti to be jnAna-nivartya and vinAshI. If it were to be bhAva, then anything which is bhAva and vinAshI has to have sAditva. [विनाशिभावः सादि:, घटवत्] However, Shruti says avidyA to be anAdi. Hence, the rule – that vinAshI bhAva is with beginning – is the bAdhaka for bhAvatva of avidyA.

bAdhaka for abhAvatva of avidyA: avidyA is the upAdAna of the world. abhAva can never be upAdAna of anything. Hence, upAdAnatva is the bAdhaka for abhAvatva of avidyA.

Therefore, avidyA is accepted to be bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNA.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[putran M]

Namaskaram Sudhanshu-ji and Venkataraghavan-ji,

 

The term used for avidyA is bhAvarUpa. It is explained that bhAvarUpa word is used to signify its abhAva-vilakshaNatA. One should not infer that bhAvarUpa means bhAva. So, all those who translate bhAvarUpa as "positive" are not correct. Please note.

Since "positive" is an English term, it is a matter of how we interpret the word in this context. It is actually a new usage for me, but people repeating it makes it standard if there is clarity about how it is meant. So it would be good if there is some consensus on whether it is ok to use the term or not.

I saw the term in Michael-ji's chatgpt post where he refers to "positive ignorance". But this was later reiterated by Venkataraghavan-ji when he wrote: 

"It is because ignorance is not of the nature of absence that it is being spoken of as a veil, a covering - a positive entity. A covering is not the absence of a thing, it is that which obscures the perception of the thing. In the real world, a covering is simply not the absence of knowledge."

Clearly positive here, with reference to avidya, does not mean "sat" but an emphasis that it is not (vyavaharika) asat/zero either. 

thollmelukaalkizhu

 

bhAvarUpa means bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa. 

Now, what are the items within the ambit of abhAva --- asat, prAk-abhAva, pradhvamsa-abhAva, anyonya-abhAva and atyanta-abhAva

What are the items within the ambit of bhAva -- Brahman, all avidyA-kArya (such as pot, cloth, this world, illusory snake etc. Both prAtibhAsika and vyavahArika avidyA-kArya).

avidyA is different from both. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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[V Subrahmanian]

Dear All,

In the Adhyasa bhashya we have a definition:  smRti-rUpa paratra pUrvadRSTa avabhAsaH. Here, the component rUpa is explained as 'sadRsa', smRti sadRsa, that is, it is akin to smRti and not smRti itself.  In the same way, the term bhAva rUpa means:  akin to bhAva and not bhAva itself.  That way, avidyA will never qualify to be akin to Brahman which is the Absolute Bhava.  Thus the objection to bhAva rUpa avidya is not at all justified.  

warm regards

subbu

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Pranam Sudhanshu ji et. al., 

Here are two replies to your last posting by Prasanth Netiji:

The word "appearance" in the context of world as used in bhashya is only a call to understand it as “not existent". That much only is the intent. And there is no intention to vouch for appearnce per se as a positive phenomenon - the appearance side of that non-existence is of least importance!

How can we say so?

If there is such intention behind the word 'appearance' (i.e. to vouch for its positive nature just as how Sudhanshu ji is vouching for in his reply), there would have been "mulavidya" as a word defined and used in bhashya. But there is no such word! Therefore, one must cull their own intention to 'talk about' or 'find place' to that which is an 'appearance' - because it is 'an appearnce in ignorance' inasmuch as the appearance itself being nature of error is nothing but ignorance!

Marking it as ignorance and applying sruti pramana that atman which alone exists as one without a second is ever free from ignorance is all that is necessary and it is all that can be done with Sruti as pramana (for removing misconception). Anyother usage of Sruti will simply make Sruti become a pramana for showing 'some sort of existence' to something other than Brahman/Atman and it is misuse and abuse of Sruti.

That which do no exist in the beginning and do not exist at the end, also will not exist in between. This is siddhanta.

And what do not exist, is not subject matter of Vedanta, let alone discussing its apparent nature with a theory.

Everyone must keep this in mind in proposing even ‘some sort of’ existence to ignorance (i.e. even bhAvar”rUpa”tva is misuse and abuse of Sruti).

To summarise, if Śruti is pramana for removal of misconception then when Śruti teaches world as appearance, it is pramana in culling the misconception that world is existent. Thats all. To that extent alone the pramanatvam applies. If some vyakhyanakara stretches that appearance and asks the seeker to look up on it as that which is after all having some sort of existence then they are misleading the seeker by asking the seeker to strengthen their misconception instead of asking to give up that misconception. Therefore bhAvarUpa Avidyā is Śruti being put to misuse and abuse.

If some teacher when expounding Vedānta, keeps on saying:

“Isnt it appearing?”

“It is appearing, isn’t it?”

“After all it appears!”

“There you go it appears!”

Again and again in 100 different ways, that appearance will end up being “some sort of existence” because the seeker forever remains in the idea that “after all it appears”. That is what happens with mūlāvidyā based Vedānta teaching.

Instead if it is taught as appearance and then we move on to teach Brahman’s sole existence where there is no iota of ignorance whatsoever let alone as an appearance, it helps seeker to imediately intuit the Self in its true nature.

second addition

To add to my above comment, there is only one “thing” according to scripture which can be ultimately put into category of ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ and it is Brahman alone. Period.

Gītā 13.12:

ज्ञेयं यत्तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते।

अनादिमत्परंबह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते॥

12. I shall (now) set forth the knowable by grasping which one attains immortality — the supreme Brahman without a beginning. It is said to be neither existent nor non-existent.

By putting Avidyā as also that which is ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ (sad-asad-vilakShaNa), are we not saying mūlāvidyā = Brahman? (such mūlāvidyā theory by its definition somehow implies such equation thought they may disagree)

And then by proceeding to say that mūlāvidyā is sublated by knowledge (which again honestly I do not know how), are we not saying mulavidya (which is equal to Brahman) is sublated by knowledge?

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

सत्  असत्  अनिर्वचनीय  (sat  asat  anirvachanIya) are the only three existential status admitted in Adavaita Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada. Brahman/Atman is सत् (sat). Entities like शशशृङ्ग (shashashRRi~Nga) (Hare's Horn) are असत् (asat). ALL else go under the category of अनिर्वचनीय (anirvachanIya). भावरूप (bhAvarUpa) is synonymous with   अनिर्वचनीय (anirvachanIya). Advaita Siddhi could not have taken any other position. It needs to be understood within this framework.

Regards

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

//my understanding of an ‘appearance’ in Shankaras Advaita is: That which appears to exist, but in truth never existed in the past, present or future.//

What else have I said? Same thing. It appears to exist while it never exists.

//It is not some strange thing, unknown in any other Philosophical system, called ‘abhava-vilakshanata’???//

It is indeed anirvachanIya. It is bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa as demonstrated earlier.

//An appearance is definitely NOT ‘Bhava’ in any sense . Any thing imagined by ignorance, Avidya Karya, is NON EXISTENT, and not a Bhava.//

Not correct. An appearance can be bhAva as well as abhAva. Pot is an appearance, it is bhAva. Pot-abhAva is an appearance. It is abhAva.

Existence is not a requirement for bhAva as it is defined traditionally. Also, avidyA-kArya can be both bhAva and abhAva. So, pot is bhAva while pot-abhAva is abhAva as per the definition of bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa.

When one discusses something, it is essential to define keywords. Otherwise, the discussion is meaningless. The words "bhAva" and "abhAva" used in bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa have specific defined connotation. You cannot coin your own definition and claim infirmity.   

//And to place Avidya in a category that is different from both Bhava and abhava, is to come up with something not known or verifiable in anyone’s experience.//

This is not correct. 

1. avidyA cannot be abhAva as it is the upAdAna-kAraNa of the world as stated by VArtikakAra. 

     अस्य द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य यदुपादानकारणम्। अज्ञानं तदुपाश्रित्य ब्रह्मकारणमुच्यते।। 

2. It cannot be abhAva because it is stated to cover Brahman. An abhAva cannot cover anything. 

    अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं.

3. It cannot be abhAva because of the following two anumAna:

a. विवादगोचरापन्नं प्रमाणज्ञानं, स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त-स्वविषयावरण-स्वनिवर्त्य-स्वदेशगत-वस्त्वन्तरपूर्वकम्, अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वात्, अन्धकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत्।

b. चैत्रप्रमा, चैत्रगतप्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्तानादिनिवर्तिका, प्रमात्वान्मैत्रप्रमावत् ;

4. Everyone knows that he is ignorant. This knowledge of ignorance is impossible with avidyA as abhAva, because knowledge of abhAva requires the knowledge of pratiyogI and this would result into impossibility of knowledge of avidyA as the pratiyogI would already be known.

There are hundred reasons as to why avidyA cannot be abhAva. Those who claim that avidyA is abhAva should answer these well-documented reasons after studying them.

Please appreciate that mere holding that avidyA is not bhAva does not imply that avidyA is abhAva. This simple fact should be understood. There are bAdhaka-sattva for both bhAvatva and abhAvatva of avidyA.

//Sat asat vilakshana Avidya is not only a logical impossibility, if there were such a category, KNOWLEDGE COULD NOT REMOVE IT!//

There would have been a logical contradiction if bhAva and abhAva were paraspara-viraha-rUpa or paraspara-viraha-vyApaka-rUpa. However, bhAva and abhAva are parapara-viraha-vyApya-rUpa and hence there is no logical contradiction.

Take for example, cowness and horseness. While they cannot appear together, their absences can pretty well co-appear, say in an elephant. Similarly, co-appearance of bhAva and abhAva is a logical contradiction, the co-appearance of bhAva-vilakahaNata and abhAva-vilakashaNatA is not a logical contradiction, like co-appearance of cowness-vilakshaNatA and horseness-vilakshaNatA in an elephant.

To appreciate the above statement, one needs to understand the meaning of abhAva and bhAva.

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Michael ji.

//That which does not exist in the beginning and does not exist at the end, also will not exist in between. This is siddhanta.//

True.

//And what does not exist, is not subject matter of Vedanta, let alone discussing its apparent nature with a theory.//

There is no theory here. People who hold that ignorance is bhAva or ignorance is abhAva – they are both negated. Advaita is not established through a theory. It is a self-shining truth. All theories are rejected. To say that avidyA is bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNa is not propounding a theory. It is negating all attempts of theorizing avidyA.

It is what is obvious from Shruti, logic and our own experience.

Instead, it is those who vehemently claim that avidyA is abhAva – they are liable for theorizing that which is non-existent. SiddhAnta just simply does not bother with theorizing. But yes, out of great karuNA, it shreds to pieces the arguments of those who try to theorize the non-existent avidyA as either abhAva or bhAva.
 
//Everyone must keep this in mind in proposing even ‘some sort of’ existence to ignorance (i.e. even bhAvar”rUpa”tva is misuse and abuse of Sruti).//

I am afraid it amounts to putting words in mouth. When there is traikAlika-nishedha of ignorance, where is the question of giving “some sort of existence” to ignorance. BhAvarUpa-tva does not mean that one gives some sort of existence. Such notions have come up on account of being unfamiliar with the siddhAnta. BhAvarUpatva means bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNatA. It has nothing to do with presumption of existence. The "some sort of existence" which you are talking about is not sattva, but sat-tAdAtmya which is also non-existent appearance. 

 //If some vyakhyanakara stretches that appearance and asks the seeker to look upon it as that which is after all having some sort of existence then they are misleading the seeker by asking the seeker to strengthen their misconception instead of asking to give up that misconception. Therefore bhAvarUpa Avidyā is Śruti being put to misuse and abuse.//

Such statements coming from a sincere sAdhaka like Prasanth Neti ji are really unfortunate. These statements show his gross unfamiliarity with siddhAnta. He should first understand the siddhAnta before arguing against it. He should understand that “traikAlika-nishedha by swarUpa” does not accommodate “some sort of existence”.

 //there is only one “thing” according to scripture which can be ultimately put into category of ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ and it is Brahman alone. Period.

By putting Avidyā as also that which is ‘neither existent nor non-existent’ (sad-asad-vilakShaNa), are we not saying mūlāvidyā = Brahman? (such mūlāvidyā theory by its definition somehow implies such equation thought they may disagree)

And then by proceeding to say that mūlāvidyā is sublated by knowledge (which again honestly I do not know how), are we not saying mulavidya (which is equal to Brahman) is sublated by knowledge?//

This is really funny. I mean this is really not done. But for my respect, love and good wishes to Prasanth ji, I would not have answered it.

SiddhAntI’s position

When we say sat-asat-vilakshaNa, it is not “neither existent, nor non-existent”. That is why I keep on requesting to understand the terms as siddhAnta holds it. This is the least expectation in a civilized debate.

The word existence for sat is fine. But it is likely to confuse. Hence, we define it as “traikAlika-bhAdhyatva-abhAva”. In fact, it still is refined as " traikAlika-bAdhyatva-abhAva-vishishTa-tAdAtmya-upalakshita-swarUpa".

The word non-existence for asat is not fine. Asattva is defined as क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् (the absence of eligibility of appearance as being identified with existence in any locus). Non-existence is not how we define it.

Non-existence is common to anirvachanIya as well as asat. Hope I made myself clear.

Neither asat can be removed by knowledge nor can sat be removed by knowledge. I mean, you cannot remove Brahman by knowledge. You certainly cannot remove horns of hare by your knowledge. Even a class five student can tell you that what knowledge removes, must be something different from Brahman (sat) and horns of hare (asat). What great logic is needed here?

GitA 13.12

Equating mUlAvidyA to Brahman by Prasanth ji is on account of incorrect understanding of the words sat and asat as mentioned in GItA. When Brahman is said to be different from sat and asat in GItA, these words have different connotation. There, sat refers to asti-buddhi-anugata-pratyaya-vishaya and asat refers to nAsti-buddhi-anugata-pratyaya-vishaya. Thus, sat refers to pot and asat refers to pot-abhAva in GItA 13.12. Both are avidyA-kArya. Thus, in Gita 13.12, sat and asat are used to signify indriya-gamya-vastu like pot and the abhAva thereof like pot-abhAva. And Brahman being beyond senses, is neither sat nor asat. One has to be really adventurous to use this connotation in sat-asat-vilakshaNa. 😀 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

[putran M]

Namaskaram,

 When there is traikAlika-nishedha of ignorance, where is the question of giving “some sort of existence” to ignorance. BhAvarUpa-tva does not mean that one gives some sort of existence. Such notions have come up on account of being unfamiliar with the siddhAnta. BhAvarUpatva means bhAva-abhAva-vilakshaNatA. It has nothing to do with presumption of existence. The "some sort of existence" which you are talking about is not sattva, but sat-tAdAtmya which is also non-existent appearance. 

Again, (like with "positive"), the objection to "some sort of existence" is not entirely clear to me as being a direct consequence of definition and not of interpretation of translation. We are using English terms to correspond with meaning implied in Sanskrit words, and that will leave some room for variation (which can result in confusion when people understand differently). But this may not be resolved necessarily by insisting on the only possible definition for the English word. I have seen sat translated as (absolute) existence and mithya as relative (or at least, apparent) existence and asat as non-existence. 

Others may give their opinions on this, if possible.

thollmelukaalkizhu

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

It is not a question of  translation. It is a question of alternate viewpoints.

As per my understanding of the Bhashya, relative levels of existence is recognized and forms a fundamental concept of Advaita Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada. Any denial of this is contradictory to the Bhashya.

Regards 

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[V Subrahmanian]

On Thu, Aug 8, 2024 at 9:16 PM H S Chandramouli <hschand...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste.

It is not a question of  translation. It is a question of alternate viewpoints.

As per my understanding of the Bhashya, relative levels of existence is recognized and forms a fundamental concept of Advaita Siddhanta as advanced by Sri Bhagavatpada. Any denial of this is contradictory to the Bhashya.

Yes, the famous Taittiriya Upanishad mantra:  satyam cha anRtam cha satyam abhavat - has been commented upon by Shankara as depicting three  levels or reality.  Two detailed articles on this is: 

https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/paramarthika-vyavaharika-satyam/

https://adbhutam.wordpress.com/2019/06/05/three-types-of-existence-in-vedanta/ 

Also, in the Gita Bhashya 2.16 Shankara says:  What does not really exist, appears to exist.   

warm regards

subbu

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[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Continuing to cut/paste....

Two replies from Sudhanshuji's previous comments on this thread. 

First, Sri Kumarji, our Admin, replying to Atma Chaitanya/Musta Ramji and then Nemanja Stefanovic

Musta Ram ji . You are absolutely right! No, bhāșya does not have that interpretation of bhāva-abhāva-vilakșaņa in TaiU or for that matter anywhere else, to the best of my knowledge. It is also not the seed, or avyakta, in that TaiU context. One commentary on TaiU by Sri. Anandajñāna (mistaken for Anandagiri) has that interpretation.

Below, I am copying my comments on Sr Bhaskar ji’s pos. t:

Start of my comments:

The mūlāvidyā is brought in here as anirvacanīya (indescribable) sort of arbitrarily even though there is no need for it and though bhāșya is clear by itself.

I am drawing from pages 9 and 10 of SSSS ji’s preface to TaiU.

It appears that commentary/vyakhyāna on TaiUBh has been written by Sri Anandajñāna (who has been mistaken later for Anandagiri). In this commentary, the above bhāșya vākya is interpreted as:

“The ‘indescribable’ and beginningless ignorance, which is of nature consciousness (cinmātra tantra), transforms into the antahkaraņa. The reflected consciousness within it mistakenly assumes the attributes of its adjuncts, resulting in delusion, and is thus engaged in activities. Therefore, truly, neither knowledge nor ignorance exists within it."

Everything is good, except the word ‘indescbable’ suddenly pops up. From where? From interpretation of another section of bhāșya (bhāga 216, pp 260), where deep sleep is discussed and the vyākhyana goes “ajñāna/ignorance present in deep sleep cannot be considered separate from the Self.” Hence the indescribability!

When one reads the bhāșya, it is clear that there is no pratyaya (right or wrong, jñāna or ajñāna) in deep sleep.

Bhasya IAST:

suṣupte'grahaṇamanyāsaktavaditi cet, na ; sarvāgrahaṇāt

Bhasya English

(The opponent): Non-perception (of duality) in suṣupti is like the non-perception of a thing by one who is quite preoccupied with another thing [1].

(Answer): No; for there is then (in suṣupti) no perception of anything at all [2].

——

SSSS footnotes:

[1] Just like an archer taking aim does not see anything else except his target. BSBh 3.2.10.

[2] Self only, another does not appear. Ekatva is the reason. BrBh 4.3.11; ChBh 6.8.1; BSBh 3.2.7. Here the later commentators’ views are not supported by Bhāsya. See introduction to this book

Nemanja Stefanovic

Moderator

1,895 points

His (Sudhanshu ji's) problem is that he wants to put Self Knowledge into the frame of mind, as if it were really an issue of knowledge vs ignorance. So he insists on difference between something that appears and something that can never appear (snake-rope vs square-circle/hare's horns).

He doesn't understand the method of A&A, that it is a tool of the teaching, in the culmination of which nothing appeared to anyone, there is no and never was a knower-known distinction (in the presupposition of which one may speak of the difference between appearance and something that can never appear, but such differentiation cannot stand when the knower itself is falsified).

The insistence of defining metaphysical ignorance to the sphere of its 'effects' is only going to put it into problem of there really being an event in which some error occured, as if there there were some transaction. Here we see the insistence on logicality/possibility of error, BECAUSE ONE WANTS TO PUT THE SELF KNOWLEDGE INTO THE FRAME OF MIND/KNOWER.

One doesn't see knowerhood/duality as an error, when it is seen as an error, it doesn't exist. All that teaching does is showing that it is an error/illusion/non-existent and non-existence of duality is shown in non-dual Vastu.

And again, he is reifying absence of something as if it itself were something. He is ignoring that illusoriness/non-existence/unreality of something is proven in what that something actually is.

I'm baffled with the example he provides with pot. Absence of pot is proven in the fact of clay. Absence of pot is clay. Pot is an appearance (it illusory/unreal/non-existent) because it is clay alone. He cannot point to 'absence-of-pot', he can only point to clay.

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Hari Om,

In this context, it is submitted that we have seen that pratiyogI-jnAna is a mandatory requirement for abhAva-jnAna, except where the vastu itself is vishesha-abhAva. Thus,  x-abhAva-jnAna mandatorily requires x-jnAna except only those cases wherein x is vishesha-abhAva such as pot-abhAva.

In this context, it is noted that this basic rule - which is the cornerstone of NyAya and VedAnta - is disputed by SSS ji as follows in his work - "Heart of Shri Shankara".

२८. प्रतियोगिज्ञानं नापेक्षितमभावज्ञाने सर्वत्र

यत्तूच्यते प्रतियोगिज्ञानमन्तरा न शक्योऽभावानुभव इति । तदसत् दृष्टान्तभावाद्विपक्षेऽपि । यथा - इह समाजे नास्ति कश्चिदेस्किमो नामा विदेशीयो जन इति केनाप्युक्ते सत्याजन्मनोऽप्यदृष्टचरतादृशजनोऽपि व्युत्पित्सुर्यदि जानीते सभ्यास्सर्वे कार्णाटिका इति निस्संशयम्, तदा स्यादेवास्यापि पुरुषस्यानाकलितप्रतियोगिनोऽपि तादृशविलक्षणजनाभावज्ञानम् | तस्मान्नेदं तन्त्रं यत् प्रतियोगिज्ञानमवश्यमेवापेक्ष्यतेऽभावज्ञान इति ।

28. Knowledge of something as existent is not invariably required to recognize its non-existence

The opponent is wrong to maintain that there cannot be experience of the non-existence of anything without knowledge of that thing (so that there could not be absence of knowledge in dreamless sleep:' in dreamless sleep one must have knowledge of positive Ignorance, cp. Viv. p. 74, quoted M.V. p.756). For there are examples showing that it can. Supposing it was said, `These is no Eskimo in our society', then that would be understood by somebody who had never seen an Eskimo in his life, provided that he was sure that all citizens of this province were Karnatics. He would then be sure of the absence of people of different races (such as Eskimos), even though he might never have seen one. So there is no universal rule that for knowledge of the nun-existence of anything there must always be knowledge of that thing. 

My views

This is the argument provided by SSS ji to reject the cornerstone of NyAya and VedAnta regarding mandatory pratiyogI-jnAna for abhAva-jnAna. 

He says that if Mr A

a. has never seen an Eskimo in his life. AND

b. knows for sure that all persons in his society are kArNAtika.

then

he can have the EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana-abhAva-jnAna.

And, this, as per him, proves that pratiyogI-jnAna is not required for abhAva-jnAna.

This argument of his is incorrect. How?

In  EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana-abhAva-jnAna, the pratiyogI is EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana. The person living in a housing society, where there are all KArNAtiks, has never seen an Eskimo in his life. However, it cannot be said that he does not possess EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana-jnAna. 

This is so because he knows that such an EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana is a foreigner. And since all persons in the society are kArnAtiks, which are non-foreigners, he can pretty well say that there is EskImo-nAmA-videshIya-jana-abhAva in the society.

Thus, the case mentioned by SSS ji is an example of -- एस्कीमो-नामा-विदेशीय-जन-निष्ठ-विदेशीयता-अवच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिता-निरूपित-अभाव. Thus, the person does possess एस्कीमो-नामा-विदेशीय-जन-jnAna with the pratiyogitA delimited by videshIyatA. Hence, the statement by SSS ji that - there is no pratiyogI-jnAna and yet there is presence of abhAva-jnAna - is completely wrong. 

Such statement could be made by SSS ji because he did not appreciate the concept of pratiyogitA-avachchhedaka. And thus, not paying attention to this basic concept, his entire theory went astray. 

Regards.

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

 

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu Ji,

Correct, the pratiyogitAvacChedaka of the abhAva jnAna there is videshiyatvam, not eskimotvam, where videshiyatA is kArNATakIyatva abhAva. 

1) So one can very well possess videshIyatva abhAva jnAna because he has knowledge of the pratiyogi, videshiyatA. 

2) And one has knowledge of videshiyatA because he has knowledge of its pratiyogi, kArNATakIyatva.

If the pratiyogitAvacChedaka  of the abhAva jnAna had been eskimotvam, then one can argue that one can argue that it is possible for one to have ekimo abhAva jnAna without eskimo jnAna.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan 

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[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, Venkat ji, 

It appears to me that that the person has no visheShAbhavajnAna here at all. He only knows tadbhedakUTAbhAva or kArNATakIya-bhinnatva-avachChinna-pratiyogitAka-abhAva.

Kind rgds,
--Ananta Chaitanya
/* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know That, owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */

On Tue, Aug 20, 2024, 4:29 PM Venkatraghavan S <agni...@gmail.com> wrote:

Namaste Sudhanshu Ji,

Correct, the pratiyogitAvacChedaka of the abhAva jnAna there is videshiyatvam, not eskimotvam, where videshiyatA is kArNATakIyatva abhAva. 

1) So one can very well possess videshIyatva abhAva jnAna because he has knowledge of the pratiyogi, videshiyatA. 

2) And one has knowledge of videshiyatA because he has knowledge of its pratiyogi, kArNATakIyatva.

If the pratiyogitAvacChedaka  of the abhAva jnAna had been eskimotvam, then one can argue that one can argue that it is possible for one to have ekimo abhAva jnAna without eskimo jnAna.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan 

On Tue, 20 Aug 2024, 18:09 Sudhanshu Shekhar, <sudhans...@gmail.com> wrote:

Hari Om,

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Venkat ji.

2) And one has knowledge of videshiyatA because he has knowledge of its pratiyogi, kArNATakIyatva.

Very nice point.

 

If the pratiyogitAvacChedaka  of the abhAva jnAna had been eskimotvam, then one can argue that one can argue that it is possible for one to have ekimo abhAva jnAna without eskimo jnAna.

Absolutely. And since he does not eskimo-tva-avachchhinna-pratiyogitA-nirUpita-jnAna, if there is even one foreigner in the society, the person would not be able to have eskimo-abhAva-jnAna. He does not know the eskimo as an eskimo, he knows the eskimo as a foreigner.

Namaste Ananta Chaitanya ji.

//It appears to me that that the person has no visheShAbhavajnAna here at all.//

I think vishesha-abhAva-jnAna is pretty much there and pratiyogI-jnAna is also there. Only thing, the pratiyogitA-avachchhedaka is different. While the pratiyogitA-avachchhedaka is videshIyatva i.e. kArnaTika-bhinnatva, SSS ji has confused it to be Eskimo-tva.

//He only knows tadbhedakUTAbhAva or kArNATakIya-bhinnatva-avachChinna-pratiyogitAka-abhAva.//

True.

Regards.

[Ananta Chaitanya [Sarasvati]]

Namaste Sudhanshuji, 

//It appears to me that that the person has no visheShAbhavajnAna here at all.//

I think vishesha-abhAva-jnAna is pretty much there and pratiyogI-jnAna is also there.

Yes, of course. By visheShAbhAva here, i meant eskimotvAvachChinnapratiyogitAkAbhAva.

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu Ji / Ananta Chaitanya ji,

One argument that SSS ji appears to be making is that by knowing the sAmAnya (videshIyAh) one can know sAmAnya-abhAva (videshIya abhAva) and by knowledge of sAmAnya abhAva, one can have knowledge of visheSha abhAva (eskimo abhAva) also.

However, here too there is a problem for him. To make such an argument, the knower has to possess the knowledge that Eskimo is a type of videshi - without such a knowledge, one cannot claim that eskimo, a visheSha, is a subset of the sAmAnya, a videshI. Thus, unless one has this eskimo jnAna (that E is a subset of V), the videshIya abhAva jnAna is not sufficient to claim knowledge of eskimo abhAva. We come back to abhAva jnAna requiring pratiyogi jnAna.

One may say I have such a sAmAnya jnAna of the visheSha (ie, that an Eskimo is a videshI) but I don't have visheSha knowledge of the visheSha (what kind of videshI is an eskimo), but such a visheSha's abhAva (an Eskimo, who is denoted by such and such characteristics, is absent) is not the object of the jnAna of eskimo abhAva gleaned from knowledge of the videshI abhAva - coming back to the pratiyogitAvacChedaka being videshIyatva, not eskimotva.

Kind regards,

Venkatraghavan 

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[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Venkat ji.

Yes. That is quite obvious.

That is why, even if a single person in the society is a foreigner, the person won't able to aver EskIno-abhAva.

A similar example someone else quoted -- I don't know Russian language. Yet, when there is a newspaper before me in English, I say, there is Ruassian-abhAva in this newspaper. So, there is violation of requirement of pratiyogI-jnAna as I knew Ruasian-abhAva-jnAna despite not having Russian-jnAna.

Here also same mistake. He knows that Russian is a language and that language is different from English. That is, he has English-language-bhinnatva-vat-Russian-jnAna.

Based on this knowledge, by seeing an English newspaper, he says - there is Russian-abhAva here. But, this is Russian-nishTha-English-bhAshA-bhinnatva-avachchinna-pratiyogitA-nirUpita-abhAva wherein the pratiyogI is English-bhAshA-bhinnatva-vat-Russian. And he has pretty much this knowledge.

In a nutshell, not appreciating the concept of pratiyogitA-avachchhedaka, SSS ji and his followers made this fundamental error which resulted in completely wrong foundation of their theory. 

Regards 

Sudhanshu Shekhar.

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