veda's apaurusheyatva based on anupalabdhi pramANa
Bhaskar YR
praNAms
Hare Krishna
At the outset from one of my friends I have received attached PDF about this pramANa from wiki. Is this definition OK and accepted in tradition?? I hope so because in the article itself it has been mentioned both pUrva meemAmsaka and Advaita Vedanta accepts this as pramANa and it also says this is not acceptable as valid pramANa in V.advaita and prabhAkara schools. It also points out different varieties :
//quote//
There are four verities of Anupalabdhi which have been identified, they are – a) kāraṇa-anupalabdhi or 'non-perception of the causal condition', b) vyāpaka-anupalabdhi or 'non-perception of the pervader', c) svabhāva-anupalabdhi or 'non-perception of presence of itself', and d) viruddha-anupalabdhi or 'nonperception of the opposed'. The lack of perceptible (yogya) adjuncts (upādhi) is known through nonperception of what is perceptible (yogya-anupalabdhi) and the lack of imperceptible adjuncts is known by showing that which is thought to be an adjunct. [8]
//unquote//
The topic of apaurusheyatva of veda-s proved from which variety?? Is it : kAraNa anupalabdhi?? Anyway, in my next mail
I shall pose my doubts with regards to this pramANa while proving the veda’s apaurusheyatva. And also it seems there are two pramANa-s to prove veda’s apaurusheyatva one is svataH pramANa and another one is anupalabdhi pramANa. Can any one who is familiar with this pramANa confirm the authenticity of this definition please.
Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar
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Bhaskar YR
praNAms
Hare Krishna
Further to my previous mail, anupalabdhi is (as per my understanding) all about knowledge of abhAva ( knowledge of non-existence) of the abhAva vastu (a non-existing thing). For example : the knowledge of absence of absence of milk in an empty vessel. OTOH if I see the milk in vessel and if I know that there is milk in the vessel that is knowledge (prama) of an existing thing (prameya). i.e. upalabdhi vastu jnana.
So, before taking this pramANa to prove veda’s apaurusheyatva, I just wondering about the very definition of pramANa. What does the pramANa mean?? pramANa is that through which we have the ‘right knowledge’ of an existing thing. Hence it is called prama not bhrama. And when one does not have this right cognition (yathArtha jnana) but only having only saMshaya jnana or anyathAjnAna then it is not prama but only bhrama for which nobody asks for a valid pramANa coz. very sanctity of the word ‘pramANa janita jnAna’ defeated here.
In this scenario I am just wondering how is it possible at all to talk authoritatively about prama (right knowledge) when the prameya (object) itself is absent / abhAva (non-existent!!). Therefore when an object is not available for any prama (pramANa) its abhAva is automatically proved. When we see the absence of milk in vessel the absence of milk in the vessel is automatically proved!! Is there any need for us to treat the non-availability / non-existence of milk itself as a prameya (an object) and also build the theory of pramANa for this imaginary prameya!!?? And in addition, the prama of this non-existence of milk in vessel ONLY AFTER the question about its ‘existence’ is raised otherwise it does not rise its hood automatically on its own.
And I asked my FB group (where most of them are Sri SSS followers) about the bhAshyakAra’s usage of this pramANa anywhere in his PTB with respect to proving the apaurusheyatva of veda. No conclusive evidence I got with regard to this. OTOH, bhAshyakAra categorically mentions only five pramANa-s (pratyaksha, anumAna, Shabda, upamAna & arthApatti, anupalabdhi conspicuous by its absence in this list) in his refutation of jnana-karma samucchaya vAda in bruhadAraNyaka bhAshya (3-3-1) excerpts here from Sri Madhavananda translation (again shared by my friend) :
//quote//
Objection: True. We admit that work alone is of such a nature; but disinterested work coupled with meditation is of a different nature. It is common experience that things known to have a particular property, such as poison or curd, display, in combination with special knowledge, charms or sugar, for instance, quite a different property. Why not admit the same about work?
Reply: No, for there is no evidence in support. In other words, there is not one evidence—neither perception, nor inference, nor comparison, nor presumption, nor scriptural statement to prove that work has any other function but those enumerated above.
//unquote//
It seems nowhere in Vedanta / Vedanta bhAshya by bhAshyakAra we find the use of this pramANa to prove veda’s apaurusheyatva. OTOH bhAshyakAra both in devatAdhikaraNa and taittireeya bhAshya explains how veda-s are nityaM and how veda-s contents about karma, upAsana, dhyAna, lOkAntara, kAlAntara phala too nityam. bhAshyakAra treated both pravAha nityatvaM of veda and pariNAmi nityatvaM of mUla prakruti with same calibration contrasted both with kUtastha nityatvaM of parabrahma tattva. So IMO it is unreasonable to talk about any pramANatva in the absence of very cognizable object. pramANa is that which throws light on an unknown thing, when that thing itself is absent how pramANa can effectively meets all its criteria to fetch us the right knowledge?? This is not something about brahman who is Aprameya i.e. no means to know him. The absence of means is different from absence of object, so I am really unable to understand how veda’s apaurusheyatvaM can be conclusively proved by using this anupalabdhi pramANa!!
putran M
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সপ্ত Rishi
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Kuntimaddi Sadananda
Bhaskar YR
praNAms Sri Sada prabhuji
Hare Krishna
Yes, valid for objects that are previously known to exist. We cannot say - bhuutale gaagaabuubu nasti -unless the existence and the knowledge of its existence of gaagaabuubu have been established before.
Yes, in other words upalabdhi pramANa is required to talk same thing’s non-existence and the knowledge of non-existence of non-existing thing (anupalabdhi as pramANa and anupalabdhi of prameya) are interlinked to upalabdhi pramANa. That is the reason why I said :
//quote//
the prama of this non-existence of milk in vessel ONLY AFTER the question about its ‘existence’ is raised otherwise it does not rise its hood automatically on its own.
//unquote//
No question of existence or non-existence of ghata or gAgAbUu when there is absence of upalabdhi pramANa entirely. We have to say there is flower vase on the table ( using the upalabdhi (existing object) of flower vase on the table) and there is no flower vase on the table when it is not there on the table (using the upalabdhi pramANa of earlier and concluding now that there is no flower vase (seen earlier) on the table). If this is not the scenario then whole scenario of this unique pramANa goes for a six!!.
Having said this I must confess here I am not well read about tarka / nyAya and unfortunately I have not seen anywhere Sri bhagavatpaada or Sri SSS used this pramANa exhaustively to prove anything in general or veda’s apaurusheyatva in particular. After seeing anupalabdhi pramANa for veda’s apaurusheyatva I have started to scratching my head about this pramANa and I don’t know how far my doubts valid in classical nyAya and how these doubts have been dealt by using the logical tool. And interestingly, as a side note, in one of the recent interactions with someone ( surely not from Sri SSS’s school), he said he remembered that he has read that vArtikakAra ( Sri Sureshwara) straightaway rejected this anupalabdhi as valid pramANa in his vArtika. He said he will send the relevant reference in due course.
Bhaskar YR
praNAms Sri Putran prabhuji
Hare Krishna
Very clearly written. If I may on behalf of myself and others ignorant on the nuances, can you also give your understanding of how your purvapakshin ("sampradaya advaitins") are using this pramana, specifically to show Veda apaurusheyatva. That will enable me to understand the core objection.
- Frankly I don’t know as this pramANa is not used by bhAshyakAra himself when arguing about veda’s nityatva. AFAIK, this pramANa can be used (as per definition available in wiki which I shared) : since there is non existence of any authors name and that non-existence of authors of veda itself a pramANa as there is non-perception of authors by any source and in veda itself. It is just like : since I have not seen the milk in the vessel (abhAva of milk or non existence of milk) I have concluded that there is non-existence of milk in the vessel. If at all there is milk in the vessel I would have not said that there is no milk in the vessel. (abhAva itself is pramANa here and through that non-existence of author (prama / jnana) is gained. Even the veda darshtaara-s do not know the authors of veda it is logical to conclude that abhAVa is the pramAna to prove veda’s apaurusheyatva (without any human origin). But I am not sure about the classical position /defense of this pramANa by pUrva meemamsaka-s with regard to veda’s apaurusheyatva.
Also please explain the terms pravaha, parinami, kutastha nityatvam, and how the purvapakshin's usage of nityatvam for Veda differs from yours.
Ø kUtastha nityam of parabrahman is the term used by bhAshyakAra himself. The parabrahma tattva has been explained as ‘samaH, kUtastha nityaH, sarvasya Atma, sarva bhUtastaH etc. that means it is unchanging and constant satya. ( that satya which does not undergo any change ) is kUtasthaH. Sri Venkat prabhuji said though veda-s are nitya it is not like kUtasta nityatvaM of brahman but it is pravAha nitya…that roughly means constant current flow in a river. I said jagat is also nitya like pariNAmi nitya ( I don’t know whether bhAshyakAra used this terminology) like veda is nitya in the upamAna of pravaaha, jagat too nitya in the upamAna of pariNAma…the consistency / eternality (nityatva and anAditva) of the jagat is its pariNAma and both pariNAmi and pravAha nityatva of both jagat and veda based on ‘kUtastha nityatvaM of brahman.
putran M
- Frankly I don’t know as this pramANa is not used by bhAshyakAra himself when arguing about veda’s nityatva. AFAIK, this pramANa can be used (as per definition available in wiki which I shared) : since there is non existence of any authors name and that non-existence of authors of veda itself a pramANa as there is non-perception of authors by any source and in veda itself. It is just like : since I have not seen the milk in the vessel (abhAva of milk or non existence of milk) I have concluded that there is non-existence of milk in the vessel. If at all there is milk in the vessel I would have not said that there is no milk in the vessel. (abhAva itself is pramANa here and through that non-existence of author (prama / jnana) is gained. Even the veda darshtaara-s do not know the authors of veda it is logical to conclude that abhAVa is the pramAna to prove veda’s apaurusheyatva (without any human origin). But I am not sure about the classical position /defense of this pramANa by pUrva meemamsaka-s with regard to veda’s apaurusheyatva.
Bhaskar YR
praNAms Sri Putran prabhuji
Hare Krishna
It is not just the fact that we don't see an author but that there is the unbroken tradition of the student learning the Veda from the teacher. And the Veda is taught by a teacher to his student in the very manner the teacher learned from his teacher. All available information posits these aspects in Vedic learning.
Ø Yes I agree that veda has been taught through ‘avicchinna’ guru-shishya paraMpara hence it is called ‘shruti’. But practically if you see for the past few years even veda-s (or in the name of veda) / Upanishads are coming up with authors!! And over a period of time if we lose the track of these authors who knows these ‘modern day’ Upanishads too may join the list of sanAtana scriptures. Why I am saying this is even in regular vedic mantra-s some mantra-s cannot be found in Rigveda likewise some mantra-s cannot be found in Yajurveda but there is a practice in chanting Yajurveda mantra-s with Rigveda svara and Rigveda mantra-s (khila-s in particular) chanted in yajurveda svara-s. Example : brahmajagnaanaM mantra, shree sUkta mantra, phala shruti etc. So practically there is no hard and fast rule here for us to substantiate the claim that we are maintaining the same style of chanting in tradition since time immemorial. And if there is any doubt in any svara of the mantra-s socalled ‘ghana pAti-s’ too tempted to refer the ‘printed’ version of mantra, printed in original Sanskrit. These claims are there in tradition to prove nityatvam ( my friend guided me to some explanations in defense with regard to this in ‘quora’ as well) but practically lot has been changed in tradition and these changes would be an obstacle to claim anything openly in favor of veda nityatvaM. And more importantly we do not have substantial evidence to prove that the ‘change’ in traditional practices is quite recent.
So both facts are working together. 1. No one is seen or remembered to have created something new of the Veda, either by way of mantras or by way of method.
- The method of chanting is also different in Yajurveda we have andra pAtha, Dravida pAtha, in Rigveda we have kAnchi pAtha and Mysore pAtha (Sringeri follows Mysore style where as kAnchi follows its style) for the ‘same svara-s’. And as said above some veda mantra-s not available in Rigveda but there is a practice of chanting it in Rigveda style (with change in svara-s though it is available in ONLY yajurveda) and likewise in Yajurveda as well. Some sUkta-s chanted in Yajurveda style though available in Rigveda only.
2. The singular learning process that is always seen, remembered, known is from guru to sishya following a fixed system for that unbroken tradition, where the guru is clear that he is only passing on the knowledge.
Ø Kindly see above.
Thus we have no pratyaksha basis to do any sort of anumana either in order to dispute apaurusheyatva of Veda. Then on what basis do you claim that either of these two must have been falsified in the past and that humans conjured up the Veda?
Ø See being a faithful follower of traditional stand I don’t have to have these explanations to defend the veda’s apaurusheyatva, our beloved Acharya vAkya is more than enough to have ‘shraddha’ in this stand. But when the same statements have been questioned by an outsider with some logical premise, we the traditionalists desperately come out with explanation like : veda-s are not written in language, it is not Sanskrit, it is in meter, so language and grammar is not important, it is not about any particulars it is pointing to universals (though the text of veda-s and its contents, culture representation, land scape etc. strictly restricted to some particular part of the universe and people), it can be proved by some paurusheya pramANa like anupalabdhi ( though we ourselves claiming all paurusheya texts / stands may invariably have defect due to the limitation) and at the same time we don’t want to entertain any other logic other than Indian classical logic!! or veda-s are aparusheya because veda-s themselves saying so, since it is in itself pramANa (svataH pramANa) no need for any external means to prove it. Etc. See these things are well and good for the traditional followers but an outsider with an open mind can cross question all these statements / claims with all sorts of doubts. For which we the conventional traditionalists hardly have any convincing answer. But at the same time we are not ready to accept that it is shraddhaamAtra or traditional belief some claims are work like axioms.
putran M
Ø But practically if you see for the past few years even veda-s (or in the name of veda) / Upanishads are coming up with authors!! And over a period of time if we lose the track of these authors who knows these ‘modern day’ Upanishads too may join the list of sanAtana scriptures.
Why I am saying this is even in regular vedic mantra-s some mantra-s cannot be found in Rigveda likewise some mantra-s cannot be found in Yajurveda but there is a practice in chanting Yajurveda mantra-s with Rigveda svara and Rigveda mantra-s (khila-s in particular) chanted in yajurveda svara-s. Example : brahmajagnaanaM mantra, shree sUkta mantra, phala shruti etc. So practically there is no hard and fast rule here for us to substantiate the claim that we are maintaining the same style of chanting in tradition since time immemorial. And if there is any doubt in any svara of the mantra-s socalled ‘ghana pAti-s’ too tempted to refer the ‘printed’ version of mantra, printed in original Sanskrit. These claims are there in tradition to prove nityatvam ( my friend guided me to some explanations in defense with regard to this in ‘quora’ as well) but practically lot has been changed in tradition and these changes would be an obstacle to claim anything openly in favor of veda nityatvaM. And more importantly we do not have substantial evidence to prove that the ‘change’ in traditional practices is quite recent.
So both facts are working together. 1. No one is seen or remembered to have created something new of the Veda, either by way of mantras or by way of method.
- The method of chanting is also different in Yajurveda we have andra pAtha, Dravida pAtha, in Rigveda we have kAnchi pAtha and Mysore pAtha (Sringeri follows Mysore style where as kAnchi follows its style) for the ‘same svara-s’. And as said above some veda mantra-s not available in Rigveda but there is a practice of chanting it in Rigveda style (with change in svara-s though it is available in ONLY yajurveda) and likewise in Yajurveda as well. Some sUkta-s chanted in Yajurveda style though available in Rigveda only.
2. The singular learning process that is always seen, remembered, known is from guru to sishya following a fixed system for that unbroken tradition, where the guru is clear that he is only passing on the knowledge.
Ø Kindly see above.
Thus we have no pratyaksha basis to do any sort of anumana either in order to dispute apaurusheyatva of Veda. Then on what basis do you claim that either of these two must have been falsified in the past and that humans conjured up the Veda?
Ø See being a faithful follower of traditional stand I don’t have to have these explanations to defend the veda’s apaurusheyatva, our beloved Acharya vAkya is more than enough to have ‘shraddha’ in this stand. But when the same statements have been questioned by an outsider with some logical premise, we the traditionalists desperately come out with explanation like : veda-s are not written in language, it is not Sanskrit, it is in meter, so language and grammar is not important, it is not about any particulars it is pointing to universals (though the text of veda-s and its contents, culture representation, land scape etc. strictly restricted to some particular part of the universe and people), it can be proved by some paurusheya pramANa like anupalabdhi ( though we ourselves claiming all paurusheya texts / stands may invariably have defect due to the limitation) and at the same time we don’t want to entertain any other logic other than Indian classical logic!! or veda-s are aparusheya because veda-s themselves saying so, since it is in itself pramANa (svataH pramANa) no need for any external means to prove it. Etc. See these things are well and good for the traditional followers but an outsider with an open mind can cross question all these statements / claims with all sorts of doubts. For which we the conventional traditionalists hardly have any convincing answer. But at the same time we are not ready to accept that it is shraddhaamAtra or traditional belief some claims are work like axioms.
Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar
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putran M
Let E be the set of all features common to Veda and human authored texts. Let F be features that we find among authored books but not Veda. Let G be features in Veda that are not found in any known authored book.2 says the features essential to authorship are contained in E. 3 says F and G are non-essential for authorship and hence irrelevant to the question of whether Vedas were authored.The Tradition says otherwise.1. There are features of 'human conditioning' in F that are necessary effects/marks of human authorship. This is knowledge of vyapti, of "man-made" pervading such features.2. The (knowledge of) absence of F in G, or the non-perception of these F-features in the Veda, implies the non-existence of human authors for the Veda. (This also tells us how non-perception of authors is really interpreted, by way of vyapti.)
The stronger version of vyapti is (I recall) what is held by the naiyayikas. They say there is a special inner knowledge that can be obtained by yogis, not merely from data correlation but from the actual apprehension of the causal relations between two objects. So smoke and fire are nama-rupas that are well-defined and one who perceives fully knows their natures and thus becomes aware of the vyapti of fire in smoke. This type of vyapti knowledge is incontrovertible and applies independently of location etc.And this is the type of vyapti that should be understood as being invoked when our tradition appeals to anupalabdhi, based on 'non-perception of authors', to know apaurusheyatva of Vedas.
putran M
For the purposes of this thread, we can assume that apaurusheya-positing traditions either accept alaukika pratyaksha or some alternate version that does not reduce to data correlation (if we think it necessary to avoid the latter in order to defend against charvakas).
putran M
The "resolution" may be as he said in the May 2020 post: "one may gather that the invariable connection between smoke and fire is known when the meaning of the word 'fire' [smoke] is known to be that which is always pervaded by fire."
thollmelukalakizhu
H S Chandramouli
Namaste.
Reg अपौरुषेयत्वम् (apauruSheyatvam) of Veda, citing below from BUB 2-3-6. I am copying this post to Chittaranjan Ji also for info just in case he is no longer following this thread anymore.
BUB 2-3-6 // निरपेक्षत्वात् वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रति । //
// nirapekShatvAt vedasya prAmANyaM prati | //
Translation (Swami Madhavananda) // for the Vedas do not derive their authority from any other source // .
In this context, Sri SSS, in his kannada translation, makes the following observation in a Foot Note
// 1. ಪೌರುಷೇಯವಾಕ್ಯವು ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷಾದಿಗಳಿಂದ ತಿಳಿದದ್ದನ್ನೇ ಹೇಳುವದರಿಂದ ಅದರ ಪ್ರಾಮಾಣ್ಯವು ಸಾಪೇಕ್ಷವು ; ಆದರೆ ವೇದವು ಪ್ರತ್ಯಕ್ಷಾದಿಗಳಿಂದ ತಿಳಿಯುವದಕ್ಕಾಗದ ಅರ್ಥವನ್ನೇ ಹೇಳುವದರಿಂದ ಅದರ ಪ್ರಾಮಾಣ್ಯವು ನಿರಪೇಕ್ಷವು //.
Translation (mine) // Any pauruSheya text , since it conveys only what is known through Pratyaksha etc, is dependant for its validity. But since Vedas convey only what is not known through Pratyaksha etc , their validity is independent //.
Regards
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Kalyan
suresh srinivasamurthy
Suresh
Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2024 6:12 PM
To: advaitin <adva...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [advaitin] Re: veda's apaurusheyatva based on anupalabdhi pramANa....continued
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Bhaskar YR
In my opinion, apaurusheyatva of vedas, nityatva of vedas, are matters of faith, just like existence of God is a matter of faith.
Strictly speaking, the only thing that is not a matter of faith is the "present I-ness" that I experience. If a Guru says that this I-ness is sat-chit-Ananda brahman, that is also a matter of faith until the dawn of jnAna. Once there is direct experience of brahman, faith, which was earlier a useful tool for the non-jnAni, is no longer necessary.
praNAms Sri Kalyan prabhuji
Hare Krishna
Yes, and IMHO there is nothing wrong in this undiluted faith in shAstra and sampradaya. Only thing is we should not dare to take it out of these axiomatic stands outside the circle of tradition. And if at all in future if someone, within the tradition, proves veda-s are the product of some brahma jnAni-s who do not want to identify themselves with dehAtma buddhi given this to us in an ecstatic state ( like Krishna in geeta) that finding should not bring us an iota of disrespect to our sanAtana scriptures. Are we not accepting paurusheya smruti and nyAya text with utmost reverence as valid pramANa?? So, IMHO, to consider veda-s as valid pramANa there is no need for it should invariably having nityatva and apaurusheyatva tag. Our Acharya-s in tradition said and confirmed that it is nitya and apaurusheya, that Apta vAkya pramANa is enough for us and unfortunately if it is proven otherwise also it should not shake our faith in it a bit…We are accepting veda as valid and ‘antya pramANa’ (ultimate pramANa) irrespective of its status. And with all sincerity, I don’t think just coz. one is trying to understand the logic behind axioms in tradition would make him a chArvAka or nAstika (atheist).
putran M
putran M
Noted this passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad bhashya II. iii. 1:"... Hence the (Yajur-)mantras are (in the last analysis) nothing but the knowledge of the Self, which is identical with the beginningless and endless Consciousness that is the Self lodged in and conditioned by the mental functions referred to as Yajus that act as Its limiting adjuncts. Thus is the eternality of the Vedas justifiable.