Sudan’s interest in South Sudanese peace
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Elisabeth Janaina
Jan 24, 2017, 12:18:00 PM1/24/17
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Sudan’s interest in South Sudanese peace
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By Rashid Abdi
Sudan and South Sudan’s relationship is of vital importance to
resolving conflicts in both countries. Khartoum, and other countries
in the region, clearly benefit from a stable South Sudan.
Once-fraught relations between the two countries have improved in
recent years, helped by substantive discussions over shared interests,
including oil exports, support for armed groups, and border security.
Khartoum should now use its influence in Juba to seek better regional
cooperation and a peaceful resolution of internal and cross-border
conflicts.
A more sophisticated Sudanese approach that ensures southern armed
groups are part of a more inclusive, and thereby stable, government in
Juba, is in Khartoum’s own best interests. A constructive
Khartoum-Juba relationship is likely to be significant, for instance,
in the U.S. government’s mid-2017 assessment of its recent decision to
ease sanctions on Sudan.
Do not support South Sudanese armed groups
There is currently fighting in several parts of South Sudan, a
disaster for those in the affected areas. But violence is not on the
scale of the 2013-15 civil war, and is unlikely to escalate
dramatically, partly thanks to Khartoum’s refusal to support rebel
groups.
When the former First Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar,
arrived in Khartoum after fleeing fighting in Juba in July 2016, the
Sudanese government severely restricted his capacity to re-start his
rebellion. He then left for South Africa, and was subsequently denied
re-entry to Sudan in November 2016; he was eventually obliged to
return to South Africa.
Khartoum’s actions are central to determining whether South Sudan
moves towards sustainable peace or falls back into a complex and
multi-layered conflict Ending armed rebellion in South Sudan is the
primary responsibility of South Sudan’s transitional government who
must reach out to armed groups to make peace. Yet violence in South
Sudan is most deadly and protracted when warring parties receive
support from neighbouring states.
Khartoum should continue resisting requests from South Sudanese
opposition leaders to arm or provide other forms of support to rebel
fighters.
Political rather than military support
Sudan can go further by using its influence with Juba to implement
relevant parts of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South
Sudan (ARCSS), to which Sudan was a signatory and guarantor in August
2015. Sudan should also work with other Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD, a regional body) member states – notably Uganda,
Ethiopia and Kenya – to support Juba’s commitment to conduct a
national dialogue with opposition political parties and armed groups.
Sudan’s visible engagement with these processes is critical to
overcoming the trust deficit between Juba and armed groups.
As well as supporting peace in South Sudan, Khartoum should accept
that there is no military solution to its own domestic conflicts in in
the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile states) and Darfur. These
conflicts have cost billions of dollars and Sudan should seek a
sustainable political resolution, supported by regional actors,
including Uganda.
For recently improved relations between Khartoum, Juba and Kampala to
translate into real regional harmony, Sudan should honour its
commitment to a Cessation of Hostilities in both Darfur and the Two
Areas and reconvene negotiations on humanitarian access to South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
To help peace take hold in frontier areas, Sudan should also consider
innovative approaches to border security that are based on the complex
realities of armed groups and ethnic communities in both countries.
Leaders are drawing from examples such as the 2010 agreement between
Chad and Sudan which halted support for one another’s rebels.
Without such measures, improved relations with Juba will not be
sufficient to resolve Sudan’s own internal conflicts, which have
domestic drivers, require their own political solution, and are not
simply the expression of a Sudanese proxy war with South Sudan.
The benefits of better relations with Juba
Overall, Sudan can benefit from improved relations with Juba in three ways.
First, by agreeing that it will not support South Sudanese rebel
groups, it can continue to demand that Juba, in turn, deny support to
Sudanese rebels in the Two Areas and Darfur.
Secondly, improved relations will bring much needed economic benefits.
December’s three-year oil deal profits both sides and improves the
terms of South Sudan’s transit fee regime. Production is also
re-starting in Unity state which will increase exports. The new
index-linked arrangement means that fees will reflect global oil
prices, rather than simply being a fixed rate which, at a time of low
prices and conflict-suppressed production, contributed to South
Sudan’s economic challenges.
Khartoum should understand that the oil agreement, together with
support for security arrangements in South Sudan’s Unity state that
favour stability, ties both countries more closely in a regime of
economic interdependence - to their mutual benefit. This makes it less
likely that conflict will break out again along the shared border.
Third, the conflict in South Sudan is a major preoccupation for the
international community. Continuing to play a constructive role in its
resolution and preventing further escalation, coupled with renewed
efforts to resolve its own internal conflicts peacefully, will help
Khartoum lock in its improving relations with the U.S. and the
European Union. This will increase the chances for complete sanctions
removal and debt relief.
Diplomacy, not destabilisation, is Sudan’s winning strategy in South Sudan.
Rashid Abdi is Horn of Africa Project Director at International Crisis
Group, the independent conflict prevention organisation.
The views expressed in the 'Comment and Analysis' section are solely
the opinions of the writers. The veracity of any claims made are the
responsibility of the author not Sudan Tribune.
If you want to submit an opinion piece or an analysis please email it
to com...@sudantribune.com
Sudan Tribune reserves the right to edit articles before publication.
Please include your full name, relevant personal information and
political affiliations.
Article
Comments (0)
email Email
print Print
pdfSave
separation
increase
decrease
separation
separation
By Rashid Abdi
Sudan and South Sudan’s relationship is of vital importance to
resolving conflicts in both countries. Khartoum, and other countries
in the region, clearly benefit from a stable South Sudan.
Once-fraught relations between the two countries have improved in
recent years, helped by substantive discussions over shared interests,
including oil exports, support for armed groups, and border security.
Khartoum should now use its influence in Juba to seek better regional
cooperation and a peaceful resolution of internal and cross-border
conflicts.
A more sophisticated Sudanese approach that ensures southern armed
groups are part of a more inclusive, and thereby stable, government in
Juba, is in Khartoum’s own best interests. A constructive
Khartoum-Juba relationship is likely to be significant, for instance,
in the U.S. government’s mid-2017 assessment of its recent decision to
ease sanctions on Sudan.
Do not support South Sudanese armed groups
There is currently fighting in several parts of South Sudan, a
disaster for those in the affected areas. But violence is not on the
scale of the 2013-15 civil war, and is unlikely to escalate
dramatically, partly thanks to Khartoum’s refusal to support rebel
groups.
When the former First Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar,
arrived in Khartoum after fleeing fighting in Juba in July 2016, the
Sudanese government severely restricted his capacity to re-start his
rebellion. He then left for South Africa, and was subsequently denied
re-entry to Sudan in November 2016; he was eventually obliged to
return to South Africa.
Khartoum’s actions are central to determining whether South Sudan
moves towards sustainable peace or falls back into a complex and
multi-layered conflict Ending armed rebellion in South Sudan is the
primary responsibility of South Sudan’s transitional government who
must reach out to armed groups to make peace. Yet violence in South
Sudan is most deadly and protracted when warring parties receive
support from neighbouring states.
Khartoum should continue resisting requests from South Sudanese
opposition leaders to arm or provide other forms of support to rebel
fighters.
Political rather than military support
Sudan can go further by using its influence with Juba to implement
relevant parts of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South
Sudan (ARCSS), to which Sudan was a signatory and guarantor in August
2015. Sudan should also work with other Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD, a regional body) member states – notably Uganda,
Ethiopia and Kenya – to support Juba’s commitment to conduct a
national dialogue with opposition political parties and armed groups.
Sudan’s visible engagement with these processes is critical to
overcoming the trust deficit between Juba and armed groups.
As well as supporting peace in South Sudan, Khartoum should accept
that there is no military solution to its own domestic conflicts in in
the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile states) and Darfur. These
conflicts have cost billions of dollars and Sudan should seek a
sustainable political resolution, supported by regional actors,
including Uganda.
For recently improved relations between Khartoum, Juba and Kampala to
translate into real regional harmony, Sudan should honour its
commitment to a Cessation of Hostilities in both Darfur and the Two
Areas and reconvene negotiations on humanitarian access to South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states.
To help peace take hold in frontier areas, Sudan should also consider
innovative approaches to border security that are based on the complex
realities of armed groups and ethnic communities in both countries.
Leaders are drawing from examples such as the 2010 agreement between
Chad and Sudan which halted support for one another’s rebels.
Without such measures, improved relations with Juba will not be
sufficient to resolve Sudan’s own internal conflicts, which have
domestic drivers, require their own political solution, and are not
simply the expression of a Sudanese proxy war with South Sudan.
The benefits of better relations with Juba
Overall, Sudan can benefit from improved relations with Juba in three ways.
First, by agreeing that it will not support South Sudanese rebel
groups, it can continue to demand that Juba, in turn, deny support to
Sudanese rebels in the Two Areas and Darfur.
Secondly, improved relations will bring much needed economic benefits.
December’s three-year oil deal profits both sides and improves the
terms of South Sudan’s transit fee regime. Production is also
re-starting in Unity state which will increase exports. The new
index-linked arrangement means that fees will reflect global oil
prices, rather than simply being a fixed rate which, at a time of low
prices and conflict-suppressed production, contributed to South
Sudan’s economic challenges.
Khartoum should understand that the oil agreement, together with
support for security arrangements in South Sudan’s Unity state that
favour stability, ties both countries more closely in a regime of
economic interdependence - to their mutual benefit. This makes it less
likely that conflict will break out again along the shared border.
Third, the conflict in South Sudan is a major preoccupation for the
international community. Continuing to play a constructive role in its
resolution and preventing further escalation, coupled with renewed
efforts to resolve its own internal conflicts peacefully, will help
Khartoum lock in its improving relations with the U.S. and the
European Union. This will increase the chances for complete sanctions
removal and debt relief.
Diplomacy, not destabilisation, is Sudan’s winning strategy in South Sudan.
Rashid Abdi is Horn of Africa Project Director at International Crisis
Group, the independent conflict prevention organisation.
The views expressed in the 'Comment and Analysis' section are solely
the opinions of the writers. The veracity of any claims made are the
responsibility of the author not Sudan Tribune.
If you want to submit an opinion piece or an analysis please email it
to com...@sudantribune.com
Sudan Tribune reserves the right to edit articles before publication.
Please include your full name, relevant personal information and
political affiliations.
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