Why calling for a ceasefire in South Sudan can be a bad idea
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Elisabeth Janaina
Apr 15, 2017, 2:26:49 PM4/15/17
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Why calling for a ceasefire in South Sudan can be a bad idea
By Aly Verjee
April 12, 2017
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Even a seemingly uncontroversial demand can have complex, and
potentially adverse, implications.
Violence continues across South Sudan despite President Salva Kiir’s
announcement of a ceasefire. Credit: UNMISS.
On 23 March, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, speaking to the
United Nations Security Council, declared: “There can be no real
dialogue for as long as South Sudan is ravaged by fighting.”
“All parties must respect an immediate cessation of hostilities,” he
said. “As President, Salva Kiir is responsible for taking the first
step – and others must follow”.
In his own Security Council remarks, UN Secretary-General Antonio
Guterres made a similar call for an immediate cessation of
hostilities.
Two days later, the South Sudanese government duly responded. At a
meeting of regional leaders in Nairobi, Kiir declared that his
government was to “announce a unilateral ceasefire and grant amnesty
to those that renounced violence”.
The governments of Norway, the UK and US promptly welcomed the move,
expressing their “strong support” for the “recent calls on all armed
parties, including the Government of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement in Opposition, and other armed groups, to commit
to a ceasefire.”
However, despite Kiir’s announcement and all its international
backing, violence continues across South Sudan. From Pajok in the far
south to Wau in the northwest, the proclamation of a national
ceasefire has done little to stop civilian populations being
indiscriminately targeted, leading to widespread misery and further
displacements.
[Failing South Sudan: First as Tragedy, Then as Farce]
Fragmented fighting
The merits of calling for a ceasefire in South Sudan seem
unquestionable. The war that has engulfed the country has left 5.8
million people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, of whom
1.9 million are internally displaced.
[As thousands flee South Sudan every day, donors must shell out more
than just hollow promises]
However, an end to hostilities is no easy feat. And, crucially, such
an outcome cannot be achieved without the slow and deliberate work of
convincing those fighting – at the level of individual commanders and
officers – that it is in their interests to stop. Without this
preparatory work, simply lobbying for the declaration of a ceasefire
is at best ineffectual and at worst counterproductive.
Understanding why this is the case requires an appreciation of the
deeply fragmented nature of South Sudan’s conflict dynamics. Back in
2014, the government’s armed opponents – most of whom eventually
identified as the SPLM-in-Opposition – had a degree of cohesion, even
if it was fractious, riven by personal rivalries, and struggling to
maintain a common political umbrella. But today, that cohesion is
almost entirely absent.
Today’s armed opposition is fragmented. There are third, fourth and
fifth groups that have little affinity for the SPLM-in-Opposition.
Even within what remains of the movement loyal to former vice
president Riek Machar, the political and military leadership is
disconnected.
[Down but not out: What Machar’s absence means for South Sudan’s peace process]
This means that even if Machar were to follow Kiir’s lead in declaring
a ceasefire, the fighting would not end. Instead, given the state of
fragmentation of armed groups, obtaining a ceasefire today would
require the consent and acceptance of all the relevant individual
commanders and factions. For this strategy to succeed, these
commanders would need to be persuaded that local ceasefires –
involving the specific armed groups, government forces and allied
militias of that area – could be durable despite the broader national
circumstances.
A hollow distraction
The disunity and disparate objectives of opposition forces at the
moment means that a universal ceasefire applying to all of the
relevant groups is, for now, out of reach. And in the absence of work
to establish conditions for opposition forces to meaningfully
participate in such an initiative, the declaration of a ceasefire is
little more than a hollow distraction.
In fact, what has happened repeatedly is that the South Sudanese
government has declared a cessation of hostilities unilaterally, but
insincerely, all the while continuing its blunt campaign of
counterinsurgency. This has been seen again in recent days as
government troops have fought in the vicinity of Wau and Pajok,
leading to more deaths, reports of house-to-house reprisals, and
thousands more displacements.
However, while government forces may seem more cohesive than the armed
opposition, it is important to carefully assess their complex and
sometimes contrasting motivations too. On the one hand, for example,
the battle for Baggari, near Wau, was almost certainly directed by the
SPLA general command in Juba, as evidenced by the use of tanks and
helicopters. But it is less clear that the reprisals in Wau, in which
witnesses allege that dozens of people were killed as government
troops stormed houses and looted property, were similarly centrally
authorised. Some believe the attacks were retaliation for the deaths
of two senior officers, but that is only conjecture.
Legally and morally, the government bears ultimate responsibility for
its forces. Of that there is no question. But that does not mean that
commanders in Juba could necessarily have prevented the violence in
Wau, even if they were completely sincere in their desire for peace.
Until the day that government forces, wherever they are in the country
and of whomever they consist, believe that their mission is to protect
and not oppress the communities with whom they live, abuses and
atrocities will continue – with or without the complicity or direction
of central command.
The achievement of peace in South Sudan is not, and has never been,
dependent on demands made from New York, Washington, Addis Ababa or
Nairobi. It has always depended on the South Sudanese. But as the
fighting in the country continues, international actors should be
aware that even an apparently uncontroversial policy such as the
demand for a ceasefire can have complex, and potentially adverse,
implications.
By Aly Verjee
April 12, 2017
0
Share:
Even a seemingly uncontroversial demand can have complex, and
potentially adverse, implications.
Violence continues across South Sudan despite President Salva Kiir’s
announcement of a ceasefire. Credit: UNMISS.
On 23 March, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, speaking to the
United Nations Security Council, declared: “There can be no real
dialogue for as long as South Sudan is ravaged by fighting.”
“All parties must respect an immediate cessation of hostilities,” he
said. “As President, Salva Kiir is responsible for taking the first
step – and others must follow”.
In his own Security Council remarks, UN Secretary-General Antonio
Guterres made a similar call for an immediate cessation of
hostilities.
Two days later, the South Sudanese government duly responded. At a
meeting of regional leaders in Nairobi, Kiir declared that his
government was to “announce a unilateral ceasefire and grant amnesty
to those that renounced violence”.
The governments of Norway, the UK and US promptly welcomed the move,
expressing their “strong support” for the “recent calls on all armed
parties, including the Government of South Sudan, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement in Opposition, and other armed groups, to commit
to a ceasefire.”
However, despite Kiir’s announcement and all its international
backing, violence continues across South Sudan. From Pajok in the far
south to Wau in the northwest, the proclamation of a national
ceasefire has done little to stop civilian populations being
indiscriminately targeted, leading to widespread misery and further
displacements.
[Failing South Sudan: First as Tragedy, Then as Farce]
Fragmented fighting
The merits of calling for a ceasefire in South Sudan seem
unquestionable. The war that has engulfed the country has left 5.8
million people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance, of whom
1.9 million are internally displaced.
[As thousands flee South Sudan every day, donors must shell out more
than just hollow promises]
However, an end to hostilities is no easy feat. And, crucially, such
an outcome cannot be achieved without the slow and deliberate work of
convincing those fighting – at the level of individual commanders and
officers – that it is in their interests to stop. Without this
preparatory work, simply lobbying for the declaration of a ceasefire
is at best ineffectual and at worst counterproductive.
Understanding why this is the case requires an appreciation of the
deeply fragmented nature of South Sudan’s conflict dynamics. Back in
2014, the government’s armed opponents – most of whom eventually
identified as the SPLM-in-Opposition – had a degree of cohesion, even
if it was fractious, riven by personal rivalries, and struggling to
maintain a common political umbrella. But today, that cohesion is
almost entirely absent.
Today’s armed opposition is fragmented. There are third, fourth and
fifth groups that have little affinity for the SPLM-in-Opposition.
Even within what remains of the movement loyal to former vice
president Riek Machar, the political and military leadership is
disconnected.
[Down but not out: What Machar’s absence means for South Sudan’s peace process]
This means that even if Machar were to follow Kiir’s lead in declaring
a ceasefire, the fighting would not end. Instead, given the state of
fragmentation of armed groups, obtaining a ceasefire today would
require the consent and acceptance of all the relevant individual
commanders and factions. For this strategy to succeed, these
commanders would need to be persuaded that local ceasefires –
involving the specific armed groups, government forces and allied
militias of that area – could be durable despite the broader national
circumstances.
A hollow distraction
The disunity and disparate objectives of opposition forces at the
moment means that a universal ceasefire applying to all of the
relevant groups is, for now, out of reach. And in the absence of work
to establish conditions for opposition forces to meaningfully
participate in such an initiative, the declaration of a ceasefire is
little more than a hollow distraction.
In fact, what has happened repeatedly is that the South Sudanese
government has declared a cessation of hostilities unilaterally, but
insincerely, all the while continuing its blunt campaign of
counterinsurgency. This has been seen again in recent days as
government troops have fought in the vicinity of Wau and Pajok,
leading to more deaths, reports of house-to-house reprisals, and
thousands more displacements.
However, while government forces may seem more cohesive than the armed
opposition, it is important to carefully assess their complex and
sometimes contrasting motivations too. On the one hand, for example,
the battle for Baggari, near Wau, was almost certainly directed by the
SPLA general command in Juba, as evidenced by the use of tanks and
helicopters. But it is less clear that the reprisals in Wau, in which
witnesses allege that dozens of people were killed as government
troops stormed houses and looted property, were similarly centrally
authorised. Some believe the attacks were retaliation for the deaths
of two senior officers, but that is only conjecture.
Legally and morally, the government bears ultimate responsibility for
its forces. Of that there is no question. But that does not mean that
commanders in Juba could necessarily have prevented the violence in
Wau, even if they were completely sincere in their desire for peace.
Until the day that government forces, wherever they are in the country
and of whomever they consist, believe that their mission is to protect
and not oppress the communities with whom they live, abuses and
atrocities will continue – with or without the complicity or direction
of central command.
The achievement of peace in South Sudan is not, and has never been,
dependent on demands made from New York, Washington, Addis Ababa or
Nairobi. It has always depended on the South Sudanese. But as the
fighting in the country continues, international actors should be
aware that even an apparently uncontroversial policy such as the
demand for a ceasefire can have complex, and potentially adverse,
implications.
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