Power Sharing and the prospect of Future Genocide
Elisabeth Janaina
Power Sharing and the prospect of Future Genocide
"Even if all is to be ignored and compromise is reached, more implications may arise on how power should be shared and how long the coalition government may last."
By: Mark Mayen Ater
The echoing of power sharing by IGAD negotiation mediators as the new incentives for prospect of signing peace agreement opened new frontiers for exploring how a coalition government can really bring peace in South Sudan. It is not a new thing since the days of liberation, interim period with government of Sudan and after independence. President Kiir has extended this so called power sharing from the global stage and embodied to bring in many militia groups that were fighting the SPLA during liberation days. He modified coalition government from inclusive government that brought in Dr. Riek factions to SPLM/A leadership and sharing power in transition period with the Government of Sudan to a military-sharing strategy to appease rebel militias.
Just as it is being sung now, the so called “Cabinet sharing” or “Military sharing” has been a short-term solution to crisis but does it put into account the dilemmas of implementing such arrangement after civil war, does it put into account the measures to prevent future rebellions or does it bring communities together? The answers are broad but my concern is whether this new round of grand Coalition can really be a transition to full democracy or a creation of beasts that might perpetuate a worse genocide in the near future.
To remind the reader briefly, the 1991 ethnic cleansing masterminded by Dr. Riek was stopped, though to some extend military might counts, through power sharing but instead of lasting peace it brought a new round of conflict. Hence, the short term motives for adopting power sharing may contradicts the long-term intentions to bring lasting peace among communities and promote democracy.
In South Sudan today, the government is the only actor in allocating resources and providing security, on the other side, the private sector is small in size and mostly rely on government contracts. The rebel groups perhaps feel it is crucial for them to be part of the government and to be shun out of the cabinet or other decision making bodies is to be unable to protect their tribes against exploitation, even victimization. This shared believe has led many tribe based warlords to mobilized as many of their tribesmen as possible, killed civilian and SPLA soldiers and later negotiate for proportional role in the army and political center.
Even if all is to be ignored and compromise is reached, more implications may arise on how power should be shared and how long the coalition government may last.
The power-sharing package presented in Addis Ababa is between the SPLM warring factions but it must also include other opposition’s parties. A compromise may be reached to share power by using DRC model where the president and different rebels group signed a power sharing government in April 2, 2003. Kabilla would retain his post and assisted by four vice presidents. The inclusive government sought to end fighting but, thought it did reduce fighting, the government never remains stable. In August 2004, one of the parties to the agreement suspended his party members from participating and threatened fresh war.
South Sudan model may not be exactly like the one of DRC that collapsed but despite how best it would be, it must one day reach its peak and fresh beginning has to be made. A full or partial breakdown of this coalition government may lead to ethnic cleansing far severer to what happened in 1991 and 2013.
With leaders that can compromise anything for power, it is likely that some of them may continue to recruit tribal extremist to remain on standby for future forceful option while they continue to pretend to do the national agenda. In Rwanda for example, the external mediation reached a deal to create institutions to share power between Juvenal Habyarimana’s Hutu-led Movement Revolutionair Pour le Developpement(MRND) and the Tustsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front(RPF) as well as various opposition parties in 1991. Power was perfectly distributed between these tribal led parties as well other moderate opposition parties. This was seen as a major shift in conflict resolution but soon enough in 1992, Habyarimana lashed out protocols and called upon militia for continue backing. The perception of changing balance of power resulted into heightened tension especially among the Hutus resulting to a sense of exclusion and hence made a fateful decision to plan genocide in 1993.
The negotiation team may learned from the experience of Rwanda and come up with a new model suitable for our condition but lack of commitment and good will might as well be a critical issue in implementation of coalition government. If peace agreements were to be believed as binding principles between former belligerents, they require trust in all side. This means each party involved in Addis Ababa as well as all opposition parties leads in reconciliation efforts.
In theory all parties will gain by maintaining peace and abiding with the agreement. In practice, however, majority groups leaders cannot credibly commit by the bargain in the future. Despite amnesties granted to some of the leaders before, most of them have joint current rebel movement and may come with Dr. Riek or continue with their own operations. This inability to commit to agreements may make power sharing a breathing ground for future genocide.
Nevertheless, coalition government can be handicapped by lack of shared norms and aspirations. Polarize and hostile perception that natured civil war may not be transformed by power sharing arrangement to tolerance and harmonious perception. The coalition government may continue to preserve separate identities of belligerents and include them in the political center which will just assures limited compromises but not serious decisions to solve problems.
Political survival of some political leaders defends on their ability to instigate and maintain hostilities between communities. These leaders will hardly commit to secularization of the society. The harmony of armed rebellion and coalition government will have to continue as aspirations of leaders continue to differ. The next election might be concluded with allegations of rigging hence opening fresh ground for the new cycle of violence.
Power sharing proposal put in place might be a solution to short-term crisis but it is not liable for long term solution. Coalition government may be a solution to the current crisis and bring about equitable and fair representation in the cabinet but will it prepare citizens for national identity. The example of Rwanda and DRC led to more conflict under perceived need for more power through violence and its subsequent power sharing.
The elite’s concession to inclusive government is basically derived by their satisfaction on the incentives of power sharing and subsequent economic and social security benefits hence making it impossible for serious issues to be solved.
The most crucial issues are: the inability of our leaders to work as truly unified government and overcome the persistent atmosphere of distrust; the inability of our leaders to work towards national peace; the inability of our leaders to avoid tribal affiliations and avoid future conflict; the inability of our leaders to improve the lives of common citizens; the inability of militia warlords involved to commit to peace agreement and avoid repeated rebellion; the inability of the coalition government to be real inclusive; the inability of coalition government to provide justice for the victims and above all, the inability of the coalition government to organize peaceful elections and avoid genocide after the interim period.
The author is an independent writer and currently based in Nairobi Kenya.
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