Dear Peter,
Namaste. Thank you for furthering this discussion. The vast lacuna that lies between Heidegger's dogmatic/empirical presumptions concerning being and Hegel's scientific,(i.e. systematic, dialectical) self-development of the thought Being are hardly comparable at the philosophical level. However, it does serve as a useful ruse to show exactly what distinguishes the systematic development of pure reason from the opinionated contingencies of empirical thought. This might more clearly be understood as the difference between pure thought thinking itself (pure because thinking does not go beyond its own self for its content, and is thus self-determined or free), and Heidegger's thought thinking about things, which is the empirical attitude, embracing duality (thought v. tjhing) and dogmatism (the giveness of things) and the contingent epistemology that adopts opinion, hypothesis, interpretation, or theory that to conjoin the opposition of thought and thing without ever being able to understand their prior underlying dialectical unity in difference.
The fact that anyone is "widely praised" does not speak to their authenticity but only to their resonance with those who may be under the same common misconceptions as the author. Popularity is often, but not always, an indication of superficial sentiment than sound reasoning, which is always rare to find among the masses.
It would be hard to call James' essay on "Some Hegelisms" penetrating. Are you aware of the author's own comment on his essay? Here is how he estimates it in his own words:
"The essay 'On some Hegelisms' doubtless needs an apology for the superficiality with which it treats a serious subject. It was written as a squib, to be read in a college-seminary in Hegel's logic, several of whose members, mature men, were devout champions of the dialectical method. My blows therefore were aimed almost entirely at that. I reprint the paper here (albeit with some misgivings), partly because I believe the dialectical method to be wholly abominable when worked by concepts alone, and partly because the essay casts some positive light on the pluralist-empiricist point of view."
As for Kierkegaard, his relation to Hegel has come under more careful scrutiny of late. In his review of Jon Sewart's book, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, CUP 2003, Matthew Edgar of Fordham University writes in his review:
"Without denying the existence of a certain “metalevel” dispute between Hegel and Kierkegaard, Stewart argues that (a) many of Kierkegaard’s central ideas, such as the theory of stages, are creatively, i.e., not uncritically, adopted from Hegel, and, (b) the true target of Kierkegaard’s critique is not Hegel per se, but prominent Danish Hegelians of his time. According to Stewart, ignorance of Kierkegaard’s intellectual milieu, coupled with a distorted and inadequate understanding of Hegel, has led many English-speaking critics to adopt the overly simple ’either / or’. Stewart seeks to correct this problem by showing how Kierkegaard’s writing rose out of, and responded primarily to, debates in Denmark in the 1830’s and 40’s surrounding Hegel’s philosophy and its implications for theology."
Again,many popular opinions on matters of philosophical and scientific importance are based on ignorance of the proper "intellectual milieu, coupled with a distorted and inadequate understanding of Hegel," As mentioned in previous posts, the current epistemological attitude of modern science fosters dogmatic opinionation in opposition to rational conceptual self-critique and self-determined truth.
No doubt my previous statement