consciously experiencing (contd 3)

[someone]

Again posts not getting through. Continuation of https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/oEZVqM4Mkj8/g0QSL-i0BgAJ

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 9:58:52 AM UTC, SortingItOut wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:55 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> > I thought you'd bailed from the conversation https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/cN9jdFyB-uA/QiLp3h5JAwAJ
> > I mentioned it to you before I thought, but you didn't continue. What did you think, that we'd just start all over again?
> >
> Not start over, but continue from a point much closer to actually making progress. Wouldn't you agree that the goal is for you to make a valid point and for others to understand that point? And wouldn't you agree that reaching that goal quickly is better than slowly or not at all?
>
> After many weeks, we were getting nowhere with the NAND gate discussion and there was no end in sight. I followed Inez's thread because it seemed much closer to actually making progress toward some valid point that shows physicalism is implausible. I'm still hopeful you can get there. I thought I could help focus the discussion, but apparently not. Therefore, I'll continue to lurk until your point is made.

The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour. Furthermore one can consider the Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, Mary knows the behaviour of the people when they say "the sky is blue" the feature she doesn't know is what the conscious experience of a blue is. Again highlighting what I think is obvious to the non-atheists, and is an undeniable feature of reality, what is bizarre is why, other than indoctrination, atheists would feel the need to avoid considering the feature, and therefore considering the clues it gives about reality. If you aren't familiar with philsophical zombies then here are a couple of links:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

I'm not concerned with the arguments made using zombies, only about whether you can understand what feature they are being imagined to lack (I imagine that the average 10 year old could understand it). Likewise, I am not interested in the arguments people trying to make with the Mary thought experiment, only in whether you understand the feature that Mary doesn't know about when people state that the "sky is blue", the conscious experiencing of a blue. Here is a link that contains a rough synopsis of the Mary thought experiment in section 2:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
and a couple of other similar thought experiments in section 1.

I did think there was an end in sight at least to your failure to comprehend that the neural identity theorists, or dualists for that matter, could explain how a NAND gate arrangement was controlled a robot, and led to its behaviour, without needing to assume that it had the feature of consciously experiencing, and I wasn't surprised that you bailed where you did. https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/cN9jdFyB-uA/QiLp3h5JAwAJ . I don't mind continuing just to highlight the ridiculous position that atheists have allowed themselves to be indoctrinated into. The Asch experiments come to mind. But I had assumed you understood the the feature I was referring to. If you hadn't managed to understand the feature that I was suggesting the neural identity theorist or dualists could imagine the robot to lack, then perhaps continue the discussion on this thread, maybe after trying to understand the feature that philosophical zombies lack, or the conscious experience of a blue (which is a possible feature of the feature that I am referring to) that Mary doesn't know.

[Greg Guarino]

On 11/24/2015 8:23 AM, someone wrote:

> Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same
> behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined
> to lack isn't a behaviour.

Until philosophical zombies are demonstrated to be possible, no argument
that depends on the concept will "clearly" show anything.

First, I doubt that a being without consciousness could produce the
external behavior that human beings exhibit. But supposing it could, its
*internal* behavior and "wiring" would need to be radically different
from ours; an unimaginably complex set of algorithms to mimic the
external appearance of normal human behavior, but via an entirely
different method.

[someone]

I wasn't making any argument that depended on the existence of philosophical zombies. The reference to philosophical zombies was simply to highlight which feature the philosophical zombies were thought to lack. I gave links to articles that helped explain it. It clearly isn't a behaviour, since they are imagined to have the same chemical composition and behave the same. I assume the average 10 year old child that hasn't been subjected to atheist indoctrination would be able to understand which feature of reality the philosophical zombies would lack. Were you able to understand which feature philosophical zombies were imagined to lack?

[Bill Rogers]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:23:54 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:

>
> The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour.

Likewise, the feature that zombies are considered to lack is epiphenomenal, since it has no causal effect on behavior. Since we agree that consciousness is not epiphenomenal, it is clear that whatever features zombies are imagined to lack is not consciousness.

[someone]

No that is wrong. The feature zombies are considered to lack *is* the feature of consciously experiencing. What is implausible is that the feature is epiphenomenal, and that it would make no difference to behaviour. Though it is possible to believe that as long as other features were the same (the chemical arrangement, and the strong nuclear force etc.) the resultant behaviour would be the same, and thus would result in a philosophical zombie. It is implausible that these beliefs are correct because it is implausible that the feature was an epiphenomenal feature. However a dualist for example might believe in a model where quantum events reflect the minds choices, and that the brain would be sensitive to these quantum events, so that if the feature was different or absent, then the quantum events would be different, and so the behaviour would be different. So there would be a disagreement about the influence the feature had on behaviour, but not which feature they were discussing. I had explained that before. So did you understand what feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack?

[Greg Guarino]

On 11/24/2015 9:39 AM, someone wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 2:23:56 PM UTC, Greg Guarino wrote:
>> On 11/24/2015 8:23 AM, someone wrote:
>>
>>> Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same
>>> behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is
>>> imagined to lack isn't a behaviour.
>>
>> Until philosophical zombies are demonstrated to be possible, no
>> argument that depends on the concept will "clearly" show anything.
>>
>> First, I doubt that a being without consciousness could produce
>> the external behavior that human beings exhibit. But supposing it
>> could, its *internal* behavior and "wiring" would need to be
>> radically different from ours; an unimaginably complex set of
>> algorithms to mimic the external appearance of normal human
>> behavior, but via an entirely different method.
>
> I wasn't making any argument that depended on the existence of
> philosophical zombies.

If they cannot exist, your argument disappears.

The reference to philosophical zombies was
> simply to highlight which feature the philosophical zombies were
> thought to lack. I gave links to articles that helped explain it. It
> clearly isn't a behaviour, since they are imagined to have the same
> chemical composition and behave the same.

Which I contend is impossible. To mimic consciousness, without having
consciousness, a being would need different architecture. Even then, I
suspect the simulation would be easy to detect before much time had passed.

I assume the average 10
> year old child that hasn't been subjected to atheist indoctrination
> would be able to understand which feature of reality the
> philosophical zombies would lack.

I think the same ten year old would similarly understand that the
external behavior of a being without consciousness would be different
than that of one with consciousness. I can imagine creatures that lack
consciousness; I am one, at least some of the time. But I, and my inner
architecture, behave differently during those times as compared with
times when I am conscious.

As for "indoctrination", I claim no position on the ultimate "truth" of
reality, except that it seems awfully optimistic (to be kind) to think
we can divine it at all, much less through thought experiments.

> Were you able to understand which
> feature philosophical zombies were imagined to lack?

I understand that you posit a "feature" which otherwise identical
creatures can either have, or not have, which is already problematic.
But in addition, you assume what you are trying to prove.

[someone]

Was that a "yes" or a "no"?

[Greg Guarino]

I get it. Always ask, never answer. Always demand, never explain. Oh,
and for a touch of irony, sprinkle in words like "cowardice".

But no, I don't understand an argument that depends on a feature that is
undetectable (either from external behavior or by investigation the
internal behavior of the architecture), and intuitively impossible.

[Bill Rogers]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 10:33:55 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:23:54 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour.
> >
> > Likewise, the feature that zombies are considered to lack is epiphenomenal, since it has no causal effect on behavior. Since we agree that consciousness is not epiphenomenal, it is clear that whatever features zombies are imagined to lack is not consciousness.
>
> No that is wrong. The feature zombies are considered to lack *is* the feature of consciously experiencing. What is implausible is that the feature is epiphenomenal, and that it would make no difference to behaviour. Though it is possible to believe that as long as other features were the same (the chemical arrangement, and the strong nuclear force etc.) the resultant behaviour would be the same, and thus would result in a philosophical zombie. It is implausible that these beliefs are correct because it is implausible that the feature was an epiphenomenal feature.

I agree that it is implausible that consciousness is epiphenomenal. But you have defined it in such a way that it *is* epiphenomenal (since you defined it as "that feature which philosophical zombies are considered to lack".)

>However a dualist for example might believe in a model where quantum events reflect the minds choices, and that the brain would be sensitive to these quantum events, so that if the feature was different or absent, then the quantum events would be different, and so the behaviour would be different. So there would be a disagreement about the influence the feature had on behaviour, but not which feature they were discussing. I had explained that before. So did you understand what feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack?

The only thing I understand is that any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenomenal.

In the end, though, we will never agree, because I think that consciousness is a form of behavior and you think that it is something else. I know you don't agree, but you've not shown anything implausible about my view (as opposed to some view you wish atheist evolutionists held). Here it is again..

Well, it's hard to know what position you think you are arguing against. Here's mine.....

The same physical laws govern everything there is. Some complex physical systems behave in a way that we call conscious. That complex set of behaviors that we call consciousness is a behavior of the physical system, following the same fundamental laws of physics as everything else. On this view, it's easy to see why physical damage to the system (strokes, toxins, trauma, infection, Alzheimer's) alters consciousness. It's also easy to see how consciousness could be evolutionarily selected for - since it is a set of behaviors, it obviously is a phenotype, one which seems to be selectively advantageous. And consciousness is certainly no epiphenomenal - as a set of behaviors it affects all sorts of things.

Your critique of positions like this seems to come down to the following claim. With perfect knowledge of the physical system, one could predict its behavior without making explicit reference to consciousness. Therefore consciousness has no effect on behavior. And as I, and others have told you, that's simply silly. You might just as well say that friction, or turbulence, or weather, have no effects because one could describe the behavior of systems which exhibit friction, turbulence, or weather, without explicitly using those terms (again assuming you had an impossibly detailed knowledge of the physical systems).

But it doesn't matter whether you make explicit reference to consciousness or not. Consciousness is a sort of behavior, and it effects both the outside world and the subsequent behavior of the system, whether you call it consciousness, or whether you avoid the word and simply describe the behavior that the word "consciousness" summarizes.

[someone]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 4:23:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 10:33:55 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:23:54 AM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > >
> > > >
> > > > The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour.
> > >
> > > Likewise, the feature that zombies are considered to lack is epiphenomenal, since it has no causal effect on behavior. Since we agree that consciousness is not epiphenomenal, it is clear that whatever features zombies are imagined to lack is not consciousness.
> >
> > No that is wrong. The feature zombies are considered to lack *is* the feature of consciously experiencing. What is implausible is that the feature is epiphenomenal, and that it would make no difference to behaviour. Though it is possible to believe that as long as other features were the same (the chemical arrangement, and the strong nuclear force etc.) the resultant behaviour would be the same, and thus would result in a philosophical zombie. It is implausible that these beliefs are correct because it is implausible that the feature was an epiphenomenal feature.
>
> I agree that it is implausible that consciousness is epiphenomenal. But you have defined it in such a way that it *is* epiphenomenal (since you defined it as "that feature which philosophical zombies are considered to lack".)
>
> >However a dualist for example might believe in a model where quantum events reflect the minds choices, and that the brain would be sensitive to these quantum events, so that if the feature was different or absent, then the quantum events would be different, and so the behaviour would be different. So there would be a disagreement about the influence the feature had on behaviour, but not which feature they were discussing. I had explained that before. So did you understand what feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack?
>
> The only thing I understand is that any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenomenal.
>
> In the end, though, we will never agree, because I think that consciousness is a form of behavior and you think that it is something else. I know you don't agree, but you've not shown anything implausible about my view (as opposed to some view you wish atheist evolutionists held). Here it is again..
>

You are using the word consciousness to refer to a different feature than I was using the expression consciously experiencing to reference. So sure maybe we won't agree which feature(s) words involving consciousness should be applied to. But that's no problem. For your benefit, I'll use a different expression for the feature I am referring to: "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". The feature which I am referring to when using that expression is the feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. Can you understand which feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack, and so what feature I am referring to when I use that expression?

[snip]

[Bill Rogers]

As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.

[someone]

I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?

[someone]

Sorry I hadn't noticed your reply. I didn't ask you whether you understood any argument or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. Can I assume your answer was "no"?

[Bill Rogers]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:

> > > [snip]
> >
> > As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
>
> I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?

What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.

If you are trying to define consciousness as "The feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack, but don't actually lack because if they did consciousness would be epiphenomenal", then I suggest you try a more explicit definition of what you mean by consciousness. In the meanwhile, all I can say is that any feature that zombies actually lack is, by definition, epiphenomenal.

But anyway, you have not come any closer to showing that my own position is implausible. And, just for convenience, here it is again.....

[someone]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
>
> > > > [snip]
> > >
> > > As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
> >
> > I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?
>
> What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.
>

A dualist can believe that philosophical zombies wouldn't exist, because without the feature that they are imagined to lack, the behaviour would be different. So a dualist could understand what feature was being referred to, without believing it to be an epiphenomenal feature. As I mentioned I'll be referring to the feature as "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". I assume you are an atheist, but can you give a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether you understand the feature that a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?

[snip]

[eridanus]

El martes, 24 de noviembre de 2015, 13:23:54 (UTC), someone escribió:
> Again posts not getting through. Continuation of https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/oEZVqM4Mkj8/g0QSL-i0BgAJ
>
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 9:58:52 AM UTC, SortingItOut wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:55 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> > > I thought you'd bailed from the conversation https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/cN9jdFyB-uA/QiLp3h5JAwAJ
> > > I mentioned it to you before I thought, but you didn't continue. What did you think, that we'd just start all over again?
> > >
> > Not start over, but continue from a point much closer to actually making progress. Wouldn't you agree that the goal is for you to make a valid point and for others to understand that point? And wouldn't you agree that reaching that goal quickly is better than slowly or not at all?
> >
> > After many weeks, we were getting nowhere with the NAND gate discussion and there was no end in sight. I followed Inez's thread because it seemed much closer to actually making progress toward some valid point that shows physicalism is implausible. I'm still hopeful you can get there. I thought I could help focus the discussion, but apparently not. Therefore, I'll continue to lurk until your point is made.
>
> The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour. Furthermore one can consider the Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, Mary knows the behaviour of the people when they say "the sky is blue" the feature she doesn't know is what the conscious experience of a blue is. Again highlighting what I think is obvious to the non-atheists, and is an undeniable feature of reality, what is bizarre is why, other than indoctrination, atheists would feel the need to avoid considering the feature, and therefore considering the clues it gives about reality. If you aren't familiar with philsophical zombies then here are a couple of links:

I think you are using some abstract words that are not defined. "consciously experiencing". Put together is impossible to understand what you mean.
For experience is a part of consciousness. When you are experiencing something
you are not working with an automatic routine. You are sort of making a list
of the elements you are observing.
On the other hand, the argument you were presenting about watching a
cloudless sky during the mid day or so, you only can say the sky is blue,
because other people say this phrase, this color of the sky is blue. But a
blind can not see the color of the sky, he can not see any colors, but he
had learned some words about colors, from the people that live around he,
that can see, and discern some colors. A limited number of colors.
Then a blind knows the sky is blue, the grass is green, and the auto he has and his wife drives is red, more or less a shade of red. Then, the blind knows
something about colors by hearing people to talk about. This is not different
to a bad student (a common one, that had learned a lot of questions in the
school, but he never understood the reasons that prop up his scholar matters
to be correct, or more or less true. It is like someone speaking of the
Holy Trinity but he does not understand why this is true, or more or less
apparently is true.
Then, we can be speaking about questions we do no understand but we had
learned a little bit the lyrics of the song. Most of us, me included, are
like cockatoos speaking of questions that we do not understand.

You should try to present at least one example, of something that can be
considered "a conscious experience", as something distinct from other sort
of experiences.
Please, make an effort and speak in plain English.
Eri

[eridanus]

You should tell us. Please, tell us what lacks a philosophical zombie.
The kids of 10 can easily be deceived with some silly arguments.
Try with to deceive me, I am a little older than a kid of 10 years.

Eri

[someone]

I am writing in plain English. I'm referring to a feature, a that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. To avoid any language issues, I'll make up my own expression to refer to the feature: "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". And hopefully this English isn't too complicated for you: Can you understand the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack? (there are some links below about philosophical zombies in case you still haven't attempted to read what they are).

[Bill Rogers]

I've told you all I can tell you about features that a philosophical zombie lacks. Any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenemonal. If the philosophical zombie does not actually lack the feature you are trying to describe, why are you referring to zombies in the first place? The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it lacks conscious experience. But I cannot say that I understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack (ie consciousness) unless I know what *you* mean by consciousness. So far the only definition you've given is "that feature imagined to be lacking in zombies," with the added complication that any feature actually lacking in zombies must be epiphenomenal. Perhaps you should try to give a more explicit definition of what you mean by consciousness.

In the meanwhile, you've made no progress on showing why my own, zombie-free, view is implausible. I'll post it again, just for convenience....

[someone]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:43:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:53 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > [snip]
> > > > >
> > > > > As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
> > > >
> > > > I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?
> > >
> > > What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.
> > >
> >
> > A dualist can believe that philosophical zombies wouldn't exist, because without the feature that they are imagined to lack, the behaviour would be different. So a dualist could understand what feature was being referred to, without believing it to be an epiphenomenal feature. As I mentioned I'll be referring to the feature as "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". I assume you are an atheist, but can you give a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether you understand the feature that a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?
> >
> > [snip]
>
> I've told you all I can tell you about features that a philosophical zombie lacks. Any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenemonal. If the philosophical zombie does not actually lack the feature you are trying to describe, why are you referring to zombies in the first place? The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it lacks conscious experience. But I cannot say that I understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack (ie consciousness) unless I know what *you* mean by consciousness.

I don't think that there are some people that think philosophical zombies lack one feature, but others think it lacks some other feature. I think everyone who understands the feature that a philosophical zombie is thought to lack understands the same feature. I'm not interested in whether if philosophical zombies were possible it would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal. You presumably understand that a philosophical zombie is imagined to behave the same as a human, so you presumably understand it isn't any behavioural feature that is imagined to lack. You must know whether you think you understand it or not, whether if a person asked you whether you understand what a philosophical zombie is or not you'd be able to reply "yes" or "no". You presumably don't feel that you'd need to run and ask me. So again, I'll ask you do you understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?

[snip]

[Bill Rogers]

I don't know why you keep ignoring my answer. I don't know what feature *you* imagine a philosophical zombie to lack, because you have not said. The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it lacks conscious experience. But I don't know what *you* understand by the phrase "conscious experience" (except that you don't understand conscious experience to be a behavior). And defining conscious experience as "that thing which zombies are imagined to lack," is obviously circular. And that ignores the problem that any feature that zombies actually lack (as opposed , I guess, to just being imagined to lack) is an epiphenomenal feature. Why do you run away from just stating your definition of consciousness directly, rather than with these weird, useless circumlocutions, "the feature that a zombie is imagined to lack" or "the experience that some atheists think they won't be having after they are dead"?

And why do you seem uninterested in a plain, straightforward "atheist evolutionary account"? I've given it to you and you never seem to make any progress in showing why it is implausible.

Just for convenience, here it is again....

[someone]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 10:13:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 4:08:55 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:43:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:53 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > [snip]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?
> > > > >
> > > > > What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > A dualist can believe that philosophical zombies wouldn't exist, because without the feature that they are imagined to lack, the behaviour would be different. So a dualist could understand what feature was being referred to, without believing it to be an epiphenomenal feature. As I mentioned I'll be referring to the feature as "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". I assume you are an atheist, but can you give a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether you understand the feature that a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?
> > > >
> > > > [snip]
> > >
> > > I've told you all I can tell you about features that a philosophical zombie lacks. Any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenemonal. If the philosophical zombie does not actually lack the feature you are trying to describe, why are you referring to zombies in the first place? The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it lacks conscious experience. But I cannot say that I understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack (ie consciousness) unless I know what *you* mean by consciousness.
> >
> > I don't think that there are some people that think philosophical zombies lack one feature, but others think it lacks some other feature. I think everyone who understands the feature that a philosophical zombie is thought to lack understands the same feature. I'm not interested in whether if philosophical zombies were possible it would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal. You presumably understand that a philosophical zombie is imagined to behave the same as a human, so you presumably understand it isn't any behavioural feature that is imagined to lack. You must know whether you think you understand it or not, whether if a person asked you whether you understand what a philosophical zombie is or not you'd be able to reply "yes" or "no". You presumably don't feel that you'd need to run and ask me. So again, I'll ask you do you understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?
> >
> > [snip]
>
> I don't know why you keep ignoring my answer. I don't know what feature *you* imagine a philosophical zombie to lack, because you have not said.

I'm not ignoring your response, but you keep avoiding answering the question. I imagine it to lack the same feature that the people in the articles I linked imagine it to lack. The philosophical zombie isn't something I've made up. I supplied some articles describing what a philosophical zombie is, but you snipped the articles, however for your convenience, I've put them back in

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Do you think that you understand that what feature the people in the articles imagine philosophical zombies to be lacking? With regards to the wiki article I'm referring to the neurological zombie.

[snip]

[Bill Rogers]

I keep answering your question. Maybe it's hard for you to understand answers longer than one syllable. The standard definition of a zombie (as given in your links, and as I have said again and again) is that a zombie lacks conscious experience. Yes, I understand that they say that. But, No, I don't understand what *you* mean by "conscious experience." You define conscious experience either as "that experience which some atheists think they won't have after they are dead" or "the feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack." Both of those definitions are obviously circular.

So I keep asking you to say what *you yourself* mean by "conscious experience." All I know so far is that you do not think it is a kind of behavior and that you do not think it is epiphenomenal.

In the meanwhile, I keep giving you a clear statement of the "atheist, evolutionary account" and you are no closer than ever to showing why it is implausible. Here it is again

Well, it's hard to know what position you think you are arguing against. Here's mine:

[someone]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 11:13:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 5:23:51 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 10:13:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 4:08:55 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:43:52 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:53 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > > > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 8:08:53 PM UTC, Bill Rogers wrote:
> > > > > > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > [snip]
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > A dualist can believe that philosophical zombies wouldn't exist, because without the feature that they are imagined to lack, the behaviour would be different. So a dualist could understand what feature was being referred to, without believing it to be an epiphenomenal feature. As I mentioned I'll be referring to the feature as "The Obvious Clue To Reality That Atheists Are Sometimes Too Indoctrinated To Be Able To Face". I assume you are an atheist, but can you give a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether you understand the feature that a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > [snip]
> > > > >
> > > > > I've told you all I can tell you about features that a philosophical zombie lacks. Any feature that a philosophical zombie lacks is, by definition, epiphenemonal. If the philosophical zombie does not actually lack the feature you are trying to describe, why are you referring to zombies in the first place? The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it lacks conscious experience. But I cannot say that I understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack (ie consciousness) unless I know what *you* mean by consciousness.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think that there are some people that think philosophical zombies lack one feature, but others think it lacks some other feature. I think everyone who understands the feature that a philosophical zombie is thought to lack understands the same feature. I'm not interested in whether if philosophical zombies were possible it would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal. You presumably understand that a philosophical zombie is imagined to behave the same as a human, so you presumably understand it isn't any behavioural feature that is imagined to lack. You must know whether you think you understand it or not, whether if a person asked you whether you understand what a philosophical zombie is or not you'd be able to reply "yes" or "no". You presumably don't feel that you'd need to run and ask me. So again, I'll ask you do you understand what feature a philosophical zombie is imagined to lack?
> > > >
> > > > [snip]
> > >
> > > I don't know why you keep ignoring my answer. I don't know what feature *you* imagine a philosophical zombie to lack, because you have not said.
> >
> > I'm not ignoring your response, but you keep avoiding answering the question. I imagine it to lack the same feature that the people in the articles I linked imagine it to lack. The philosophical zombie isn't something I've made up. I supplied some articles describing what a philosophical zombie is, but you snipped the articles, however for your convenience, I've put them back in
> >
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > Do you think that you understand that what feature the people in the articles imagine philosophical zombies to be lacking? With regards to the wiki article I'm referring to the neurological zombie.
> >
> > [snip]
>
> I keep answering your question. Maybe it's hard for you to understand answers longer than one syllable. The standard definition of a zombie (as given in your links, and as I have said again and again) is that a zombie lacks conscious experience. Yes, I understand that they say that.

But you have repeatedly stated that you understand consciousness as a behaviour, and clearly they aren't suggesting that there is any behavioural difference between a philosophical zombie and a human. They mention that the zombie "lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie ), or that "by definition there is 'nothing it is like' to be a zombie" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/). But without any help from me, do you think you are capable of understanding the non-behavioural feature that the authors are claiming a philosophical zombie lacks?

[snip]

[Dale]

maybe philosophy and abstract thinking is more complex than
consciousness/awareness

non-sentient life is aware, but they seem to act without abstraction

if sentient life are philosophical zombies then determinism/pre-
ordainment is fulfilled

as a recent agnostic, I can't seem to say I have ever run into
anything outside of cause and effect


--
Dale
http://www.dalekelly.org

[someone]

Zombies by definition lack sentience. So sentient life can't be philosophical zombies. Do you think you understand the non-behavioural feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack?

[Bill Rogers]

No.

[Dale]

zombies that philosophize

like a plant that can philosophize

seems like philosophy is essential to sentience, maybe one and the
same thing

--
Dale
http://www.dalekelly.org

[Greg Guarino]

I understand what "consciousness" generally refers to, or at least as
well as the next guy. But you persist in doggedly using the same odd
formulations, as if you are aware that clarity does not serve your
argument.

You are asking if I understand something that seems to be a
contradiction in terms, or at least the way you ask it. Do I understand
what is lacking in a being that is simultaneously *identical* to a human
being and *very different from* a human being? The obvious answer seems
to be "existence", or "possibility".

If I were to be more specific, I think a philosophical zombie would also
have to lack a functional brain, as functional brains seem to produce
consciousness. Further, I would say that the zombie would have to have a
stupendously large processor of some type and an algorithm so
comprehensive that it can somehow produce appropriate human-like
responses to every possible stimulus, without the zombie actually
knowing anything at all.

But that - besides being sort of preposterous - violates the condition
that the zombie be identical in composition to the human.

Perhaps you could simply ask if I can imagine a disembodied
consciousness. Is that what you're actually getting at? If your ideas
have any merit, answering questions and giving clear explanations
shouldn't damage them.

---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus

[SortingItOut]

On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 7:23:54 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> Again posts not getting through. Continuation of https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/oEZVqM4Mkj8/g0QSL-i0BgAJ
>
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 9:58:52 AM UTC, SortingItOut wrote:
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:55 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> > > I thought you'd bailed from the conversation https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/cN9jdFyB-uA/QiLp3h5JAwAJ
> > > I mentioned it to you before I thought, but you didn't continue. What did you think, that we'd just start all over again?
> > >
> > Not start over, but continue from a point much closer to actually making progress. Wouldn't you agree that the goal is for you to make a valid point and for others to understand that point? And wouldn't you agree that reaching that goal quickly is better than slowly or not at all?
> >
> > After many weeks, we were getting nowhere with the NAND gate discussion and there was no end in sight. I followed Inez's thread because it seemed much closer to actually making progress toward some valid point that shows physicalism is implausible. I'm still hopeful you can get there. I thought I could help focus the discussion, but apparently not. Therefore, I'll continue to lurk until your point is made.
>
> The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour. Furthermore one can consider the Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, Mary knows the behaviour of the people when they say "the sky is blue" the feature she doesn't know is what the conscious experience of a blue is. Again highlighting what I think is obvious to the non-atheists, and is an undeniable feature of reality, what is bizarre is why, other than indoctrination,

There is no indoctrination, other than religious indoctrination that many of us receive starting at a very young age. Very effective.

> atheists would feel the need to avoid considering the feature,

Atheists are not avoiding any feature. I would guess that most, if not all, have considered the feature.

> and therefore considering the clues it gives about reality.

Well, that's the problem...it doesn't really seem to give clues about reality. Considering reality is what drives people toward physicalism.

> If you aren't familiar with philsophical zombies then here are a couple of links:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

You're talking about consciousness that is not a behavior, right? So...what about it?

>
> I'm not concerned with the arguments made using zombies, only about whether you can understand what feature they are being imagined to lack (I imagine that the average 10 year old could understand it). Likewise, I am not interested in the arguments people trying to make with the Mary thought experiment, only in whether you understand the feature that Mary doesn't know about when people state that the "sky is blue", the conscious experiencing of a blue. Here is a link that contains a rough synopsis of the Mary thought experiment in section 2:
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
> and a couple of other similar thought experiments in section 1.
>
> I did think there was an end in sight at least to your failure to comprehend that the neural identity theorists, or dualists for that matter, could explain how a NAND gate arrangement was controlled a robot, and led to its behaviour, without needing to assume that it had the feature of consciously experiencing, and I wasn't surprised that you bailed where you did.

There's no significance to there being multiple explanations for *outward* behavior of a robot. The only thing that matters is whether or not the behaviors result from consciousness. And that depends on how the robot is constructed. Your contrived hypothetical scenario provides no useful insight.

[someone]

I don't want you to ask you if you can imagine a disembodied consciousness, because so far I'm not sure you don't understand the word consciousness to refer to a behaviour for example.

Here are two links that I had supplied to articles describing what a philosophical zombie was imagined to be. Clearly they aren't suggesting that there is any behavioural difference between a philosophical zombie and a human. They mention that the zombie "lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie ), or that "by definition there is 'nothing it is like' to be a zombie" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/). But without any help from me, do you think you are capable of understanding the non-behavioural feature that the authors are claiming a philosophical zombie lacks?

[someone]

On Wednesday, November 25, 2015 at 7:38:51 AM UTC, SortingItOut wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 7:23:54 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> > Again posts not getting through. Continuation of https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/oEZVqM4Mkj8/g0QSL-i0BgAJ
> >
> > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 9:58:52 AM UTC, SortingItOut wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 3:23:55 AM UTC-6, someone wrote:
> > > > I thought you'd bailed from the conversation https://groups.google.com/d/msg/talk.origins/cN9jdFyB-uA/QiLp3h5JAwAJ
> > > > I mentioned it to you before I thought, but you didn't continue. What did you think, that we'd just start all over again?
> > > >
> > > Not start over, but continue from a point much closer to actually making progress. Wouldn't you agree that the goal is for you to make a valid point and for others to understand that point? And wouldn't you agree that reaching that goal quickly is better than slowly or not at all?
> > >
> > > After many weeks, we were getting nowhere with the NAND gate discussion and there was no end in sight. I followed Inez's thread because it seemed much closer to actually making progress toward some valid point that shows physicalism is implausible. I'm still hopeful you can get there. I thought I could help focus the discussion, but apparently not. Therefore, I'll continue to lurk until your point is made.
> >
> > The point of this thread is simply to point out the feature that I am referring to when I use the term consciously experiencing. It isn't a behaviour. Others could use the term consciously experiencing to refer to a behaviour, but they'd be using the term to refer to a different feature. The feature that I am referring to is the feature a philosophical zombie is considered to lack. Since philosophical zombies are considered to have the same behaviour, it is clear that the feature that the zombie is imagined to lack isn't a behaviour. Furthermore one can consider the Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, Mary knows the behaviour of the people when they say "the sky is blue" the feature she doesn't know is what the conscious experience of a blue is. Again highlighting what I think is obvious to the non-atheists, and is an undeniable feature of reality, what is bizarre is why, other than indoctrination,
>
> There is no indoctrination, other than religious indoctrination that many of us receive starting at a very young age. Very effective.
>
> > atheists would feel the need to avoid considering the feature,
>
> Atheists are not avoiding any feature. I would guess that most, if not all, have considered the feature.
>
> > and therefore considering the clues it gives about reality.
>
> Well, that's the problem...it doesn't really seem to give clues about reality. Considering reality is what drives people toward physicalism.
>
> > If you aren't familiar with philsophical zombies then here are a couple of links:
> >
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> You're talking about consciousness that is not a behavior, right? So...what about it?
>

So you can understand the non-behavioural feature that the authors of the articles are imagining a zombie to lack?

[someone]

Though I suspect you do understand but are too much of an intellectual coward to admit it, for the purpose of discussion I'll take your claim at face value and try to help.

I don't know whether you are familiar with Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, but if not here is a link that contains a rough synopsis of it in section 2 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/ and a couple of other similar thought experiments in section 1.

So let's imagine for the sake of discussion that the Physics Assumptions were correct, for your convenience I'll restate them here:
(a) the minimal set of laws of physics required to describe the behaviour of things that aren't consciously experiencing are sufficient to describe the behaviour of things that are consciously experiencing
(b) the fundamental forces behind the laws in (a) are the same for things that consciously experience and things that don't.

I realise that you will interpret the phrase "consciously experiencing" differently from how I intend it to be understood, and that you'll be interpreting it as either a behaviour, or referring to some feature of reality that you don't recognise. But that's ok.

So imagine Mary is in her black and white room, and has all the observable information gleaned from all manner of scanners and probes about subject X that was in a field and stated "The sky is blue". And that she can explain "just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'".

Can you imagine that when shown a blue picture that Mary will obtain knowledge about a feature of subject X that she didn't previously know, what it was like for subject X to experience a blue?

[eridanus]

even if you look more natural in your writes, I was feeling weird with the word sentience. Not anything I read contains this word. Then I come to google and find a Merriam Webstern dictionary
I copy

Definition of SENTIENCE
1 : a sentient quality or state
2 : feeling or sensation as distinguished from perception and thought

Well, I have problems to understand how can be a feeling or sensation
different from a perception.

I look for perception.

Full Definition of PERCEPTION

1 a: a result of perceiving: observation (see perceive)
b: a mental image : concept

2 obsolete : consciousness
3 a: awareness of the elements of environment through physical sensation
<color perception>
b :physical sensation interpreted in the light of experience

4 a: quick, acute, and intuitive cognition : appreciation
b: a capacity for comprehension

All those words are not making any clear if there is a distinct meaning.

There is a question about feeling, whatever their meaning.

Look at a blue sky, it does not mean anything in particular except
you could be pushed "by habit" to make a speech about "blueness" or
about "the blue sky" or about all things more or less blue, like
the surface of a lake or the sea.

We must be able to distinguish a cloudless sky (a blue one during the day)
from the speeches you can make, for you had been tamed to make speeches
about anything that has not any special meaning in itself.

Of course, a blue sky, "if deep blue" it could mean a cold day early in the
morning, or a cold day if you are in the top of a high mountain, etc.

If the color of the sky is "light blue" or "milky blue" it ca be cold in the
morning but hot during the rest of the day, for the lightness of the blue
color means "the air has a lot of water vapor" that reflects the warm of
ground, as it is being heated by the sun. That is why it can be cold in the
morning and hot a few hours later.

But these are speeches we make about a blue sky, for we had learned a little
bit about the physics related to the weather.

If we are not much trained to making speeches, we are not going to say or to
think anything about "the blue sky" in both its varieties, "deep blue" or
"light blue" or "milky blue".

Let's consider now a blind person. He cannot see the blue sky, but her knows
something because he had heard people trying to explain him about the blue sky or other colors he cannot see.

Then, a blind cannot have any perception that comes through the eyes, but is
well aware that people can talk about the colors. And that the colors do not
convey any particular meaning, except perhaps to distinguish some things from
some distance because have different colors. You can see if a fruit is ripe
or not by its color and from a distance. While a blind would know this only by
some "verbal information" from other people.
But, when close enough, a blind can know if a fruit is ripe, with several other
senses, like the touch, or by biting some samples to taste the degree of
sweetness a fruit has. The fruit can be biter or acid when it is not ripe. So,
the blind can learn a lot from his own senses, and from other people informing
him about the surrounds to him. There is some park there, with green grass and
some trees, but there are also some trees that have a sort of darker green
leaves. While the grass has a brilliant light green. Some flowers are coming
out from the grass, that are of different colors, like blue, white, orange and
yellow. But about the proper meaning of the colors, the blind cannot make
speculations for he is unable to discern them. But even the person that can
see the colors is little what he can say. The orange is orange because it
has this color, orange.
eri

[Bill Rogers]

As I explained earlier, the part that I don't understand is what *you* mean by consciousness. Telling me that consciousness is that feature that zombies are imagined to lack is circular and useless. Look:

Q: What is consciousness? A: Consciousness is the feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack.

Q: What feature are philosophical zombies imagined to lack A: Consciousness, idiot, go look it up in Wikipedia.

Can you see how that definition doesn't really help me understand what *you* think consciousness is?

If I were as quick to call people intellectual cowards as you are, I might consider that refusing to just out and say what you mean by consciousness is a form of intellectual cowardice.

When you showed up at t.o. again a few months ago, the title of your thread was something like "Help understanding atheist evolutionary account". Looks like that was a blatantly dishonest title. You are not in the least interested in understanding an "atheist, evolutionary account" of consciousness. I, and others, have laid out related versions of an "atheist evolutionary account," of consciousness and you ignore them. And if you ignore what actual "atheist evolutionists" say about their own accounts of consciousness, it's not surprising you make no progress in understanding them or in showing them to be implausible. So, just for convenience, here's my account....

Well, it's hard to know what position you think you are arguing against. Here's mine.....

The same physical laws govern everything there is. Some complex physical systems behave in a way that we call conscious. That complex set of behaviors that we call consciousness is a behavior of the physical system, following the same fundamental laws of physics as everything else. On this view, it's easy to see why physical damage to the system (strokes, toxins, trauma, infection, Alzheimer's) alters consciousness. It's also easy to see how consciousness could be evolutionarily selected for - since it is a set of behaviors, it obviously is a phenotype, one which seems to be selectively advantageous. And consciousness is certainly no epiphenomenal - as a set of behaviors it affects all sorts of things.

Your critique of positions like this seems to come down to the following claim. With perfect knowledge of the physical system, one could predict its behavior without making explicit reference to consciousness. Therefore consciousness has no effect on behavior. And as I, and others have told you, that's simply silly. You might just as well say that friction, or turbulence, or weather, have no effects because one could describe the behavior of systems which exhibit friction, turbulence, or weather, without explicitly using those terms (again assuming you had an impossibly detailed knowledge of the physical systems).

But it doesn't matter whether you make explicit reference to consciousness or not. Consciousness is a sort of behavior, and it effects both the outside world and the subsequent behavior of the system, whether you call it consciousness, or whether you avoid the word and simply describe the behavior that the word "consciousness" summarizes. .

>
> I don't know whether you are familiar with Mary and the black and white room thought experiment, but if not here is a link that contains a rough synopsis of it in section 2 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/ and a couple of other similar thought experiments in section 1.
>
> So let's imagine for the sake of discussion that the Physics Assumptions were correct, for your convenience I'll restate them here:
> (a) the minimal set of laws of physics required to describe the behaviour of things that aren't consciously experiencing are sufficient to describe the behaviour of things that are consciously experiencing
> (b) the fundamental forces behind the laws in (a) are the same for things that consciously experience and things that don't.
>
> I realise that you will interpret the phrase "consciously experiencing" differently from how I intend it to be understood, and that you'll be interpreting it as either a behaviour, or referring to some feature of reality that you don't recognise. But that's ok.
>
> So imagine Mary is in her black and white room, and has all the observable information gleaned from all manner of scanners and probes about subject X that was in a field and stated "The sky is blue". And that she can explain "just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is blue'".
>
> Can you imagine that when shown a blue picture that Mary will obtain knowledge about a feature of subject X that she didn't previously know, what it was like for subject X to experience a blue?

No. Mary learns nothing. The reason you think she learns something is that you've not thought through in detail what it means for her to know absolutely everything that is going on in subject X. But I'm not interested in wasting time on Mary the color scientist when you (1) won't cough up your own definition of what you mean by consciousness (2) ignore the "atheist evolutionary account" that I've already given you.

[*Hemidactylus*]

On 11/24/2015 03:07 PM, Bill Rogers wrote:
> On Tuesday, November 24, 2015 at 12:18:54 PM UTC-5, someone wrote:
>
>>>> [snip]
>>>
>>> As I said, any feature that philosophical zombies lack is epiphenomenal, by definition. It has no causal effect on their behavior and it is experimentally undetectable. Therefore I conclude that the feature you are referring to, your "Obvious clue to reality....", has no causal effect and is undetectable. It's perhaps not simply indoctrination that makes me fail to see undetectable clues to reality.
>>
>> I didn't ask you whether the the existence of philosophical zombies would imply that the feature was epiphenomenal or not, I asked you whether you understood the feature philosophical zombies are imagined to lack. So are you suggesting that you cannot understand what feature they are imagined to lack?
>
> What I am saying is that any feature that philosophical zombies lack is, by definition epiphenomenal.
>
> If you are trying to define consciousness as "The feature that philosophical zombies are imagined to lack, but don't actually lack because if they did consciousness would be epiphenomenal", then I suggest you try a more explicit definition of what you mean by consciousness. In the meanwhile, all I can say is that any feature that zombies actually lack is, by definition, epiphenomenal.
>
> But anyway, you have not come any closer to showing that my own position is implausible. And, just for convenience, here it is again.....
>
> Well, it's hard to know what position you think you are arguing against. Here's mine.....
>
> The same physical laws govern everything there is. Some complex physical systems behave in a way that we call conscious. That complex set of behaviors that we call consciousness is a behavior of the physical system, following the same fundamental laws of physics as everything else. On this view, it's easy to see why physical damage to the system (strokes, toxins, trauma, infection, Alzheimer's) alters consciousness. It's also easy to see how consciousness could be evolutionarily selected for - since it is a set of behaviors, it obviously is a phenotype, one which seems to be selectively advantageous. And consciousness is certainly no epiphenomenal - as a set of behaviors it affects all sorts of things.

One contentious aspect of having an alleged conscious is volition. As
Daniel Wegner holds this is a sort of preview of coming attractions or
self-prediction. Pinker relates it to "foreseeable consequences". [both
in contributions to _Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will_] So there's
a potential function to volition, whether truly free or not. Morality
might thus be bootstrapped in that we could act otherwise and foresee
good and bad consequences or recognize duty or work towards developing
character.

But as such at best consciousness is but a covert set of antecedents
that may result in actual overt behavior, not behavior itself. Actually
I would step back to the unconscious wellsprings from where
consciousness stems. I would go to Libet's readiness potential even.
Checkmate.

> Your critique of positions like this seems to come down to the following claim. With perfect knowledge of the physical system, one could predict its behavior without making explicit reference to consciousness. Therefore consciousness has no effect on behavior. And as I, and others have told you, that's simply silly. You might just as well say that friction, or turbulence, or weather, have no effects because one could describe the behavior of systems which exhibit friction, turbulence, or weather, without explicitly using those terms (again assuming you had an impossibly detailed knowledge of the physical systems).
>
> But it doesn't matter whether you make explicit reference to consciousness or not. Consciousness is a sort of behavior, and it effects both the outside world and the subsequent behavior of the system, whether you call it consciousness, or whether you avoid the word and simply describe the behavior that the word "consciousness" summarizes.

Not really feeling consciousness as behavior. Behavior of organism in an
environmental situation is an outcome of non-behavior (cognitive)
antecedents whether conscious or unconscious. One could say a neuron
"behaves" or a molecule, such as serotonin, behaves or a post synaptic
receptor "behaves", but that's a sort of confusing anthropomorphism.