If you look at the party submissions, almost all of this came from the
pursuer - so the judge did not start an analysis of "true meaning of
science" sua sponte, he uses those parts of the party submission that he
considered persuasive. It would have been wrong, by contrast, had he
based his decision on say a structuralist (in the
Moulines/Stegmueller/Balzer sense) account of how a proper scientific
theory looks, or a more sociological one - not because they are
necessarily inferior conceptions, but because the parties did not argue
them. Similarity, it's not the job of the judge to come up with a more
acceptable version of ID if this is not what the parties plead. In both
cases, a third party observer might want to argue that this is not the
best account of science, or the best account of ID, neither would matter
as the court is limited to what the parties argue.
Now, where the court does come in is where it gives reason why they find
the party submissions convincing or unconvincing. Here Jones could have
in my view made his own life easier - the definition of science that he
adopts is pretty much identical to the one that as a matter of law
(post-Daubert), US courts in most states use to distinguish science from
non-science as a matter of routine. So a shorter and in my view neater
result could have been to argue that this is not mainly a question of
fact, but one of law - for the purpose of law, the relevant definition
of science comes from the FRE as interpreted by Daubert. And on
questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact, the judges have much
more leeway for their own analysis.
I have to wonder whether Judge Jones was daydreaming all
> through Scott Minnich's testimony of an impeccably scientific
> experiment establishing that a certain kind of bacterial
> flagellum was irreducibly complex.
>
> Did you ever read that part of the Dover transcript? IIRC the
> Opinion of the Court makes no reference at all to Minnich's testimony.
>
Definitely not asleep, for no other reason that he gives several
procedural rulings on Minnich's evidence. There are 40 or so references
to Minnich's testimony in the decision, but none I think on his detailed
discussion of irreducible complexity. And the reason that this is not
coming up in the decision is simply that almost all of it is simply
irrelevant. Whether or not there are ID systems as defined, whether the
definition of ID system is sound, and whether Minnich's method for
testing for ID is scientifically appropriate has no bearing on the case
- and that is the majority of his evidence.
What is the issue, for the court, if the subsequent inference "... and
hence design" is so obviously scientifically sound to lend a
"legitimate secular reason" to what looks otherwise for all intends and
purposes like Paley's argument.
And here Minnich does not help his side a bit - from thr court's
decision: "Irreducible complexity is a negative argument against
evolution, not proof of design, a point conceded by defense expert
Professor Minnich. (2:15 (Miller); 38:82 (Minnich) (irreducible
complexity “is not a test of intelligent design; it’s a test of
evolution”)."
But it is exactly that test for design that his side would have needed.
Now, Minnich asserts, rather than argues, that there is an "inference to
the best explanation" here - that would have been the place for him to
elaborate and show that the way he uses ItBE the way it is one in
science. He doesn't, and I'd say he could not. ItBE are a form of the
hypothetic-deductive model, and as such indeed central to empirical
research. BUT to be an inference to "the best" explanation, and not just
any abductive inference (which are after all strictly logically speaking
invalid), it needs not just the hypothetic part - the postulation of a
cause - but also the deductive part, that it testing if that cause
actually exists and what precisely its properties are. Neither Behe nor
Minnich do this, or even come up with a plausible scientific programe on
how it could be done.
One of the two relevant claims Minnich makes is in response to the
question if IC systems cannot evolve - where in his answer he switches
to "there is no detailed evolutionary process for them in the
literature". But that's of course not good enough, that is indeed just
an argument from incredulity something which in other parts of his
testimony he rejects.
The courts are having none of it. It reasons, quite correctly, that the
only thing Minnich's testimony shows is that there are things we do not
know - and that holds of course true for all sciences.
Now, there is a part of his testimony that is potentially interesting
and relevant - but his side does not follow it through to make it a
solid argument (and I don't think ultimately they could) That's when he
talks about bioengineering and what he calls "backward engineering" as a
new paradigm for doing biological research.
That, at least in theory, might have given his side a different way to
argue for the legitimacy of ID, provided that
- they can show that this approach leads to interesting new and testable
results (that is easy)
- AND, crucially, it requires reasoning about the designer, and only
"makes sense" if such a designer is acknowledged.
It is that second hurdle they would fall down I'd say - they would have
to show that Darwinists could not possibly use this method and stay
consistent. But that is of course false at the face of it, and Minnich
himself acknowledges as much when he describes the emerging field,
which has lots of people who don't believe in design at all. The reason
is that it is just standards analytic biology - tearing something apart
to see how it works. The "backward" in backward engineering is from the
observed function, not from the intention or plan of the designer - now
THAT would indeed have been a different approach.
>
>> And they most certainly should not make up
>> arguments on behalf of the parties, even if these were sound arguments.
>> The Kansas school board did not suggest to teach directed panspermia,
>> it was a traditional "teach both sides" with references to a
>> non-specified creator.
>
> WERE there any such explicit references? My understanding is that,
> even before the Dover trial, the Discovery Institute (DI) actively
> dissuaded teachers from mentioning ID, advising them to instead
> focus on the weaknesses of current evolutionary theory.
Which is why they did not want that trial - and as I said, what is at
stake here is not the DI, or Behe, but what the school board proposed
-and that was to refer to Panda and People, which indeed contains this
reference.
The note in question is :
"Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs
from Darwin’s view. Of Pandas and People, is available for students who
might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent
Design actually involves."
So according to the defendant, ID "is" exactly as described in Panda and
People - a book that among other issues included the claim that ID
("creationism " in earlier versions of the book) is “various forms of
life that began abruptly through an intelligent agency with their
distinctive features intact – fish with fins and scales, birds with
feathers, beaks, and wings, etc"
That is the definition of ID that is relevant for the Kitzmiller case.
> [This is what Ron O calls "the switch scam".]
>
>
>> FSM called the bluff on that
>
> Where do you see that in Bobby Henderson's letter? It's such
> a crass satire that I find it impossible to tell in most places
> whether he is mocking a specific ID statement, or whether he
> is just spoofing ID in general.
Crass maybe but I'm talking about the structure of the argument. It
challanges the cop out "ID does not say anything about the designer" -
if it says nothing, then anything goes, so the best way to combat any
unwarranted "nudge nudge" inference to a traditional monotheistic deity
is to be explicit about the range of explanations that ID permits.
>
>
>> - had they been
>> serious in their neutrality, they could have led FSM in.
>
> And risk a circus like that in a famous Chicago trial that pitted
> Judge Julius Hoffman against a bunch of Yippees including Abbie
> Hoffman? IIRC that was the trial in which Bobby Seale was bound
> and gagged.
Well, it would not have come to a trial in that case. But the comparison
is interesting - judge Hoffman was on all accounts a terrible judge,
long before the trial that made him infamous, which his hostility and
bias against defendants on open display. It took the Chicago seven
trial, and the subsequent "bench slap" he got from the appeal court
which vacated all his decisions in that case, to bring this into the
open. So sometimes a circus is what it takes.
>
>
>> But of course,
>> the last thing these type of ID proponents want are discussions of a
>> creator that looks different from the traditional Christian one
>
> That disregards repeated assurances that ID makes no claims about
> what the *designer* [1] is like, let alone what it looks like.
Well yes, it disregards them as essentially a cop out and either simply
dishonest or self-defeating.
As an analogy, if I promise you a car for £50000, and on delivery you
note that is doesn't have an engine, brakes, or wheels, you will feel
cheated. If I claim in my defense that I never promised you wheels,
engine and brakes, only a car, that will leave you unimpressed. And even
if somewhere in the small print, I have an explicit disclaimer ("this
car is delivered without engine, brakes or wheels, and should not be
used for driving), the law would disregard this, and rightly so.
So there is a choice to be made: claim to have an ID theory, and then
deliver something that has the property theories of a domain normally
have. In this case, this means testable claims about who designed what,
when, how and for what purpose. That is how every other scientific
discipline that reasons about design works (and Dembski at least makes
the claim ID is nothing but what forensic science, anthropology and
history also do)Note that what is required here is not necessarily
answers to these questions now, (all theories have gaps, or there would
be no research) but a research programme with well defined methodology
that is capable of answering them eventually, using accepted
methodological precepts
Or there is no ID theory, and it should be called by what it is - well,
in case of Behe and Minnich, essentially standard molecular biology
which the two personally think (but few scientists agree) might indicate
that some of our perfectly normal gaps in evolutionary theory will be
more difficult to plug than others. In which case there is no reason why
it should be included in the curriculum, and in any way Panda, the book
in question, goes way beyond that.
Current ID theorist do neither. They claim explicitly not to make
statements about the designer in some outputs, while at the same time
and in other fora loud and clearly say that it was the Christian deity,
and relying otherwise on the simple sociological fact that in a society
like the US, the children will be predominantly, and of the exclusively
be exposed to that specific conception of the non-natural (Minnich, in
Kitzmiller, explicitly) powerful etc etc entity. To which the judge said
rightly that meanwhile in the real world, the disclaimer is fooling
absolutely nobody.
All
> that is claimed is that it is immensely powerful and intelligent,
> which eliminates Hume's "belly of an infinite spider" from which the
> world was spun, but not one with the outward form of a bowl of pasta.
Yes, that's the point. All these would be compatible with ID. Its
proponents rely on the real social context, the "nudge nudge", to make
sure pupils will interpret it as a reference to the classical
monotheistic deity. To disentangle ID (in the legally relevant "Lemon"
sense) could mean to state the permitted range of designers explicitly -
giving equal time to all of them.
>
>
> [1]not to be confused with a hypothesized creator
> of our universe, even though most ID proponents happen
> to believe they coincide.
>
>
>> - so they decided to rather have no creator mentioned at all rather than the
>> danger of "false gods'.
>
> You are missing the point. The point is that they are focused
> on evidence for intelligent *design* and are not, *qua* ID theorists,
> addressing any other attributes the designer has. Behe for one has been
> quite explicit about that.
It's what lawyers call "venire contra factum proprium" - giving explicit
disclaimers in one fora and then acting against it in another. For the
purpose of the court case and the Lemon test, that is all that is needed
- not an abstract evaluation of the content of the theory, but how it
would affect the typical student, taken all of the context into account.
ID would then need an extremely strong and persuasive secular reason to
allow its inclusion in the curriculum that exceptionally permits it
despite the danger of the inference to some religions at the expense of
others.
And Behe's ID does not give you that, because even when looked at it
abstractly, it simply won't wash. In every scientific explanation, if
you posit a causal agent as an explanation for a range of phenomena, the
next step always and with necessity is to then derive from the
hypothesized properties of the agent new expected observations. If you
don't do this, then you don't have a theory, and you don;t adhere to the
methodological precepts of science.