von Manstein: the greatest general in WW2?
lord...@my-deja.com
2. Anyway, my friend told that he think Manstein is the best general in
WW2, and after I have finished "Lost Victories" I think the same too!!
So what you you guys think?
PS: I can't find anymore books on Manstein, a bit odd, because there
are at least 3 or 4 books about Rommel or Guderian. Anyone know any
books about Manstein?
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Before you buy.
Alex Walkling-Ribeiro
lord...@my-deja.com schrieb:
<Snip>
> So what you you guys think?
Pretty good, if you _always_ take into consideration that he had a
really big ego, while reading it. Especially the quite self-centered
assumption that HE always knew the right way... It's often like the
claim (in the below mentioned book) that he almost single-handedly
introduced/invented the "Sturmgeschuetz" (assault guns) to/for the
Wehrmacht.
> PS: I can't find anymore books on Manstein, a bit odd, because there
> are at least 3 or 4 books about Rommel or Guderian. Anyone know any
> books about Manstein?
Well, there's even one more largely written by himself (and after his
biographical notices). There's a german edition of it, though I don't
know if there exists an english one. The translated title in english
would be:
"Soldier in the 20th century"
If you're interested, I could post complete bibliographical data and
ISBN here. And that book also did urge some reaction, therefore there
are more publications (all in german AFAIK) following it.
Regards, Alex.
--
"Mit aller Schaerfe ist einzuschreiten: Gegen Willkuer und Eigennutz,
gegen Verwilderung und Undisziplin, gegen jede Verletzung der
soldatischen Ehre." (von Manstein, 20.11.1941)
Louis Capdeboscq
> WW2, and after I have finished "Lost Victories" I think the same too!!
If that's what it takes to persuade you, then I suggest you read the memoirs
of other generals, and you'll end up equally convinced that they were the
best generals of WWII.
More seriously, Manstein was a very good general. I don't believe he's the
best general in WWII, though. My vote would rather go to someone like
Guderian, or Zhukov.
Terje R.
Why him?
A General wasting men, like Zhukov did, shouldn`t make him that honour.
In my opinion Z. only had success because of "neverending" supplies of men
and material.
Terje. Norway
swi...@my-deja.com
At the battles of Leningrad and Moscow, Zhukov had no such "neverending
supplies of men and material". He took over the defense of Leningrad
after Marshal Voroshilov botched the defense of the city. In dire
straits and with trivial reserves from STAVKA, he stabilized the front
to the point that he could be called off to manage the defense of Moscow
in a similarly dire situation. For the battle of Moscow, his artillery
was limited to 1 round/gun/day, and his forces had no clear numeriucal
superioity over the Germans. The fact that his nerve did not crack
under the intense pressure in the situations he faced is a marvel
---
Stuart Wilkes
lord...@my-deja.com
big ego, at least compare to Rommel's book or Guderian's book. I think
he is pretty objectve in writing Lost Victories.
And I welcome any good suggestion of WW2 books, so fire away!!
I have only read a Guderian book by Kennth Macksey, but I find it very
informative. And based on what I've learnt in that book, I think
Guderian might be a good strategist, but he never got the chance to
show his ability. One thing though, Guderian is surprising good at
political stuff for a general. just the fact that he didn't "retired"
before the war has ended is proof enough for me.
I haven't read any book about Zhukov, but I think with the stalin's
firing squad at his back and enemies at his front, it was not that hard
for him to stand fast against German's offense in Moscow and Leningrad.
In article <8b8a9k$phe@beast>,
Alex Walkling-Ribeiro <AW...@Netscape.Net> wrote:
> lord...@my-deja.com schrieb:
> <Snip>
> > So what you you guys think?
>
> Pretty good, if you _always_ take into consideration that he had a
> really big ego, while reading it. Especially the quite self-centered
> assumption that HE always knew the right way... It's often like the
> claim (in the below mentioned book) that he almost single-handedly
> introduced/invented the "Sturmgeschuetz" (assault guns) to/for the
> Wehrmacht.
Dave Gower
Different situations require different skills. Eisenhower, for example, was
a master diplomat, and so was probably the best choice for European theatre
commander. But even he admitted that he was lacking when it came to combat
decisions.
Manstein was a master at improvising in a fluid situation. His campaigns in
the Crimea and in retaking Kharkov after the disaster at Stalingrad are
regarded as classic military masterpieces. One of his advantages in these
victories was that he was relatively free of interference from above. During
Crimea, this was because the attention of the high command was focussed on
Moscow. During Kharkov, Hitler was temporarily demoralized after the
Stalingrad disaster and meddled less than normal. To that degree, his
success although earned was partly due to happenstance. Other equally
competent German commanders may not have had the same opportunity to show
their stuff.
How would Manstien have fared if he had not been removed from command for
disagreeing with Hitler? Would he have been as effective during the long
hard defensive fighting in the last two years of the war? Did Hitler give
him his reputation by firing him while his record was still intact? Of
course we will never know, but one could play what-if. Manstein Vs Patton
during the breakout from Normandy...George would have loved it.
Cheers
<lord...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:38e714ef...@mail.nsw.dialix.com.au...
...., my friend told that he think Manstein is the best general in
Louis Capdeboscq
> Zhukov??????
Himself.
> Why him?
Because I consider him pretty good ! Galkin Gol, Smolensk, Leningrad,
Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Ukraine, Berlin... not too bad, eh ?
> A General wasting men, like Zhukov did, shouldn`t make him that honour.
Well, Manstein wasted quite a few men in what made him famous, i.e. the
assault of Sevastopol. And even more in Kursk and in Ukraine.
> In my opinion Z. only had success because of "neverending" supplies of men
> and material.
Then your opinion probably needs to be qualified by further reading... :-)
The Soviet endless hordes are a myth. Soviet ressources and manpower were
definitely not bottomless. As a matter of fact, Zhukov fought Smolensk,
Leningrad and Moscow without having superiority in numbers, or whatever
else. Zhukov devised the plan for Stalingrad, in which the Soviets had
approximately equal ressources to the Axis forces.
Manstein had superior ressources when he was corps commander during
Barbarossa (since the forces opposing Army Group North were generally weak),
again during the assault on Sevastopol, again during his famous backhanded
blow that retook Kharkov, and again locally at Kursk (where he failed to
breakout, never mind what he writes in his memoirs).
George Hardy
<8baiko$jd6@beast>
Organization: Club of Anchor Friends
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In article <8baiko$jd6@beast>, lord...@my-deja.com says:
>
>Athex, I haven't read many books, but I don't find Manstein to have a
>big ego, at least compare to Rommel's book or Guderian's book.
The idea that to be a great general one needs to be modest must be
part of a new-age philosophy. Big egos are standard issue to great
generals.
As to the 'greatest', it all depends on what criteria are used to
define 'greatest'. Greatest at a division level and greatest at
an army level is not necessarily the same. Coordinating allied
armies is yet another level. I think that the question is 1)
unanswerable and 2) not meaningful.
GFH
***************************************************************
http://www.ankerstein.org/
The Anchor Stone Building Set (Anker-Steinbaukasten) Home Page
See what makes me tick.
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Matthew
plan. Zhukov had endless amounts of men compared to what Manstein had in the
classic battle of Kharkov and such.
Alex Walkling-Ribeiro
lord...@my-deja.com schrieb:
<Snip>
> And I welcome any good suggestion of WW2 books, so fire away!!
OK, so I'll mainly stick to the german editions, because there I can
judge what is useful and what not.
For a abbreviated biographical survey, I'd recommend
"Erich von Manstein, Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert, Bonn, 1997 (4th Ed.),
ISBN 3-7637-5214-5"
Somewhat earlier, but with lots of the same material:
"Erich von Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887-1939, Bonn, 1958"
There's another book particularily referring to it from one of the
current leading military historians in Germany (we have quite few). I'll
post the bibliographical notices later, as i don't have it at hand.
During the war, Manstein wrote two books, where I lach the exact
bibliographical data for. They were originally named "Bessarabien,
Ukraine, Krim" and "Wir erobern die Krim"(="We conquer the Krim"). The
material might be incorporated into "Lost victories" anyway, as I have
no hints of there being a post-war reprint. Interesting footnote: The
income from both these books was used for the education of kids of
soldiers fallen on the crimea by Manstein. Of additional interest for
anyone looking at manstein are IMHO Prof. Hillgruber's article from
1974:
"Andreas Hillgruber, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein in der
Sicht des kritischen Historikers, in: Geschichte und militärgeschichte,
ed. by Ulrich von Gersdorff, Frankfurt a.M., 1974"
And especially with regards to the "trial" (Exclamation marks set on
purpose!) Manstein had to face in Hamburg after the war:
"P. Leverkuehn, Verteidigung Mansteins, Hamburg, 1950."
and
"R.T. Paget, Manstein - seine Feldzüge und sein Prozeß, Wiesbaden, 1952"
(which should be available in english as Mr. Paget was a british member
of parliament taking up Mansteins defence in Hamburg)
Furthermore, B.H.Liddell Hart, who is alleged to name von Manstein "the
most dangerous opponent of the allies" did quite something about him in
a book named "On the other side" IIRC.
HTH.
> I have only read a Guderian book by Kennth Macksey, but I find it very
> informative. And based on what I've learnt in that book, I think
> Guderian might be a good strategist, but he never got the chance to
> show his ability. One thing though, Guderian is surprising good at
> political stuff for a general. just the fact that he didn't "retired"
> before the war has ended is proof enough for me.
Well, Guderiasn had been taken out of "real" service quite early. He had
the unpopular habit to speak up to Hitler quite open and frankly.
Figures... And later on, as practical chief of the staff, there wasn't
much more to do for him. Nevertheless, his and Mansteins influence on
the nascent german "Bundeswehr" are a relatively anonymous part of their
biography, I did discover recently. And as both played a major role in
the "trials" against the former general staff in Nuremberg...
<Snip>
funkraum
[...]
>"R.T. Paget, Manstein - seine Feldz|ge und sein Proze_, Wiesbaden, 1952"
>(which should be available in english as Mr. Paget was a british member
>of parliament taking up Mansteins defence in Hamburg)
'Manstein - His Campaigns and His Trial' Paget, R.T., COLLINS
1951
The forward by Lord Hankey must ranks with the opening paragraph of
Gibbon in my opinion:
"THE PROUD STORY of British Justice is occasionally marred by the
shabby episodes where the national character falls below its
accustomed standards of chivalry, honour and common sense. Examples
are the burning of Joan of Arc in the market place of Rouen in Many,
1431; the trial of Kind Charles I and his execution in Whitehall on
January 30th, 1649; the court-martial and execution of Admiral Byng in
1756, "pour encourager les autres", as Voltaire remarked at the time;
and the six-years' long impeachment of Warren Hastings before his
acquittal in 1791; all of which have been condemned by modern
historians. To that list, I doubt not will be added in due course the
War Crimes Trials that began with the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal on 20 November, 1945, and ended, so far as Great Britain was
concerned, with the trial which is so well described in this volume."
funkraum
13th 1973.
'####' indicates that my copy was unreadable.
--
'Obituary: Field Marshal non Manstein - An outstanding German soldier'
Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, one of the outstanding soldiers
of the Second World War, died on Sunday at the age of 85.
His influence and effect came from powers of mind and depth of
knowledge rather than by generating an electrifying current among the
troops or "putting over" his personality. Ice-cold in manner although
with strong emotions underneath, he exersized command more in the
style of Moltke than of Napoleon and those who cultivate the
Napoleonic touch. The range and versatility of Manstein's ability was
shown in the way that, after being trained as an infantryman, and then
becoming pre-eminent as a staff planner, he proved a brilliant and
thrusting armoured corps-commander in his first test run with
mechanised troops. In his next big test he proved equally successful
in directing the seige-attack on a fortress. By the variety of his
experience and qualities he was exceptionally well equipped for high
command.
Erich von Manstein was born on November 24, 1887, the tenth child
of his parents. His original surname was von Lewinski, but his parents
agreed to his adoption by a childless aunt who had married a von
Manstein. Both families had long-standing military traditions and 16
of the boy's immediate forebears had been generals, in Prussian or
Russian service. After leaving a cadet school in 1906, he was
commissioned into the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards. Badly wounded in
the autumn of 1914, he was given a staff post on recovery, and made
his mark in a series of such appointments on the Eastern, Western and
Balkan fronts.
After the war he was taken into Reichswehr, and by 1935 he had
risen to be head of the operations section of the General Staff, while
the next year he was advanced to Oberquartiermeister I - the deputy to
the Chief of the General Staff, then General Beck.
Early in 1938, when Fritsch was dismissed from the post of Army
Commander-in-Chief, Manstein was sent away to command a division,
having come to be regarded in Nazi circles as an obstacle to the
extension of their influence in the Army. But on mobilisation in 1939
he was made Chief of Staff of Rundstedt's Army Group, which played a
decisive role in the Polish Campaign. He then moved with Rundstedt to
the Western Front, and there soon began to advocate a change in the
plan for the coming offensive. He urged that the main thrust, with the
bulk of the armoured forces, should be shifted from the right wing in
the Belgian plain to the hilly and wooded Ardennes - as the line of
least expectation. His persistence in pressing for the change of plan
deprived him of a hand in directing it, for he was honourably pushed
out of the way by promotion to command a reserve corps, of infantry,
just before the new plan was adopted under Hitler's pressure - after
hearing Manstein's arguments.
In the crucial opening stage of the offensive, which cut off the
Allies' left wing and trapped it on the Channel coast. Manstein's
corps merely had a follow-on part. But in the second and final stage
it played a bigger role. Under his dynamic leadership, his infantry
pushed on so fast on foot that they raced the armoured corps in the
drive southward across the Somme and the Seine to the Loire.
When the German plan of invading England was discarded in favour
of an attack on Russia, Manstein was given the command of an armoured
corps. With it he made one of the quickest deepest thrusts of the
opening stage, from East Prussia to the Dvina, nearly 200 miles,
within four days. Promoted to command the Eleventh Army in the South,
he forced an entry into the Crimean peninsula by breaking through the
fortified Perekop Isthmus, and in the summer of 1942 further proved
his mastery of siege warfare technique by capturing the famous
fortress of Sebastapol, the key centre of the Crimea - being Russia's
main naval base on the Black Sea.
He was then sent north again to command the intended attack on
Leningrad, but called away by an emergency summons to conduct the
efforts to relieve Paulus's Sixth Army, trapped that winter at
Stalingrad, after the failure of the main German Offensive of 1942.
The effort failed because Hitler, forbidding any withdrawal, refused
to agree to Manstein's insistence that Paulus should be told to break
out westward and meet the relieving forces. Following Paulus'
surrender, a widespread collapse developed on the German's southern
front under pressure of advancing Russian armies, but Manstein saved
the situation by a brilliant flank counterstroke which recaptured
Karkov and rolled back the Russians in confusion.
Then in the German's last great offensive of the war in the East,
"Operation Citadel" launched in July 1943 against the Kursk salient,
Manstein's "Southern Army Group" formed the right pincer. It achieved
a considerable measure of success, but the effect was nullified by the
failure of the left pincer, provided by the "Central Army Group".
Having checked the German offensive, the Russians now launched their
own on a larger scale along a wider front, with growing strength.
From that time onwards the Germans were thrown on the defensive,
strategically, and with the turn of the tide Manstein was henceforth
called on to meet, repeatedly. what has always been judged the hardest
task generalship - that of conducting a fighting withdrawal in the
face of much superior forces. His concept of the strategic defensive
gave strong emphasis to offensive action in fulfilling it, and he
constantly looked for opportunities of delivering a riposte, while
often ably exploiting those which arose. But when the urged that a
longer step back should be made - a strategic withdrawal - in order to
develop the full recoil-spring effect of a counter-offensive against
an over-stretched enemy advance, Hitler would not heed his arguments.
Unlike many of his fellows, Manstein maintained the old Prussian
tradition of speaking frankly, and expressed his criticism forcibly
both to Hilter in private and at conferences, in a way that staggered
others who were present. That Hitler bore it so long is remarkable
evidence of the profound respect he had for Manstein's ability, and to
the General Staff as a body. In March 1944, Hitler removed Manstein
from command and thereby removed from the path of the Russians and
their allies the most formidable individual obstacle in their advance
to victory.
Manstein moved westward when the Russian tide of advance swept
over Eastern Germany, and surrendered himself to the British in May
1945. The Russians demanded that he along with other generals who had
served on the Eastern Front should be handed over to them as war
criminals. The British and Americans refused, but agreed to put him on
trial in special military courts. Many questions were raised in
England about the legality or justice of the procedure adopted, while
a long delay occurred, during which most of the other British
prisoners of war were released. But Manstein was eventually put on
trial at Hamburg, in August, 1949 - four years after the end of the
war. A subscription list was opened in England, on the initiative of
Lord d'Isle, VC, and Major-General Lord Bridgeman, to provide the
funds necessary for an adequate defence, and Mr Winston Churchill was
one of the first subscribers. Mr R.T. Paget, QC, offered to lead the
defence without fee. The trial continued with intervals, until the
week before Christmas. In the end Manstein was acquitted on the eight
most serious charges and convicted only on a number of lessor or
modified charges. The decision of the court followed Nuremberg Trial
precedents, and he was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, but this
was later reduced, and in 1953 he was released. In a deeper sense,
however, that period of imprisonment was penalty and retribution for
his failure, in common with most of his fellow generals, to make a
firm and timely stand against the Nazi regime and its abuses, despite
the disapproval he early and often showed.
In 1955-56 he was chairman of a Military Sub-Committee appointed
to advise the Bundestag Defence Committee on the organisation, service
basis, and operational doctrine of the new German forces of the
Federal Republic.
In 1920 Manstein married Jutta Sibylle von Loesch, daughter of a
Silesian landowner, and had two sons, the elder of whom was killed in
the war.
Rich Rostrom
>...to conduct the
>efforts to relieve Paulus's Sixth Army, trapped that winter at
>Stalingrad, after the failure of the main German Offensive of 1942.
>The effort failed because Hitler, forbidding any withdrawal, refused
>to agree to Manstein's insistence that Paulus should be told to break
>out westward and meet the relieving forces.
Gerhard Weinberg has shown that this story was an after the fact
invention for Manstein's memoirs.
Manstein did _not_ urge the evacuation of Stalingrad. On the
contrary, he was the only field commander to endorse Hitler's
decision to order Paulus to hold out.
His claim that he defied Hitler and sent Paulus a breakout
order which Paulus ignored was a flat lie. Weinberg went
through all the records of Manstein's HQ and found no evidence
that such an order was ever sent.
--
It seemed incredible that the petty manipulations | Rich Rostrom
we had done so quietly in the dark could result in |
such a glorious catastrophe. | rrostrom@
--- Vladimir Peniakoff, _Popski's Private Army_ | 21stcentury.net
James
Commanders of equal rank and had he been given a free hand
the war in the East against Russia might have been a
different affair.
His recovery of the Southern sector following the Collapse
at Stalingrad and the defeat of the russia winter
offensive, the defensive action at Kharkov are without
equal. Like all generals he perhaps says what he wants the
reader to believe of him and make light of his failings.
Guderian did likewisse in his post war writings .
Best General/Feldmarshall ? Yes he is up there with a
select number of commmanders.
Patton , no he would not have gotten the better of
Manstein , nor would Monty.
Rommel excellent Army Commander but he would have been too
impulsive , he could see the exact moment in which to act
but often he put himself out on a line.
Monty never fought a battle with equal forces to that which
he attacked , he always had the balance of power in his
favour and relied on attrition to win for him.
Granted he delt well and defeated the Panzer s in Normandy
by ensuring they went in piece meal , he would on any day
have failed against Manstein or Rommel if faced in an equal
fight.
Manstein was the best man the germany Army had at that
level but even he could not prevail when his supreme
commander was Adolf Hitler.
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Drazen Kramaric
wrote:
>Gerhard Weinberg has shown that this story was an after the fact
>invention for Manstein's memoirs.
>Manstein did _not_ urge the evacuation of Stalingrad. On the
>contrary, he was the only field commander to endorse Hitler's
>decision to order Paulus to hold out.
>His claim that he defied Hitler and sent Paulus a breakout
>order which Paulus ignored was a flat lie. Weinberg went
>through all the records of Manstein's HQ and found no evidence
>that such an order was ever sent.
Gerhard Weinberg is not 100% flawless when Germans are concerned and
definitely not without an axe to grind. For example, he still
maintains the opinion that bombing of Rotterdam was "terror attack"
aimed to frighten Dutch into submission while prime sources show it
was close ground support mission to help German paratroopers in
struggle against Dutch troops.
However, what you wrote here is mostly correct with the addition that
when Manstein's breakthrough forces met increasing Soviet resistance,
he asked for Paulus to launch an attack of its own in SW direction
towards Hoth's panzer corps. It was that "breakthrough" attempt that
Hitler forbade.
It was argued that panzers within the pocket had fuel for only 20
kilometers and that they waited for Hoth to close to 20 kilometers
from the 6th army lines. But, if 6th Army sortied Soviet troops could
have found themselves between rock and a hard place and might have
succumbed to such a pressure
Drax
funkraum
[...]
> Weinberg went
>through all the records of Manstein's HQ and found no evidence
>that such an order was ever sent.
So what did Weinberg say was missing exactly - Maps, plans, orders,
telegrams ?
Edward Glamkowski
> wrote:
>
> >Gerhard Weinberg has shown that this story was an after the fact
> >invention for Manstein's memoirs.
According to Manstein himself, he initially didn't want Paulus to
withdraw because he thought the situation could be mastered. When
it became clear that this wasn't going to happen, he did support a
breakthrough attempt, but that didn't happen, he felt it necessary
for the 6th army to hold out as long as possible without prospect of
relief, in order to buy time for the rest of AG South to stabilize
the front.
So he went back and forth depending on the situation.
Depending on how much you want to trust his memoirs...
funkraum
>His claim that he defied Hitler and sent Paulus a breakout
>order which Paulus ignored was a flat lie. Weinberg went
>through all the records of Manstein's HQ and found no evidence
>that such an order was ever sent.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. You would have thought
a 'published' historian would know this. Until then I'll take it that
von Manstein was telling the truth. Perhaps his adjutant was in on the
conspiracy, as he has published his memoirs too.