GREEK MASSACRES
AttilaAtaman
You are all fucking ugly shit eating animals
nothing more...
Nearly everyone knows your fucking archbishop Makarios and ENOSIS!!!!
FUCK YOU ALL,YOU ARE ALL ANIMAL KIND THAT SOON WILL BE DESTROYED DUE TO
THE NATURAL CAUSE OF THE EVOLUTION,YOU MONKEY BASTARDS,SONS OF ONE DOLLAR
WHORES!!!!
sosiasmonos
markt...@yahoo.com
AttilaAtaman Apr 2, 5:01 am
Newsgroups: soc.culture.greek
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Date: Sat, 02 Apr 2005 08:01:22 -0500
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Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The true Greek N17 spirit is alive and well just like in times of
Alexander the Homo.
Supporting convicted terrorists and murderers is not part of Democracy
and against the law and agaist to human decency in every democratic
country in the World, of course except for Greece and some other
countries in Europe (Syria, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Denmark, France and others) which support and harbor thugs and
murderers of Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK Anti-Turkish Hatred Inc.
Democracy IS NOT tolerance to terrorism or terrrorists. Democracy IS
NOT a freedom for or right to terrorism either.
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a veracious appetite for innocent
Turkish blood, never stop in their relentless dreams of massacring all
Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK
terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over
legitimize their rape, torture and murder of innocent and defenceless
Turkish human beings.
After Europeans very generously supported and sponsored Greek,
Armenian, Arab and other terrorists, with a veracious appetite for
innocent Turkish blood, to massacre innocent and defenceless Turkish
subjects of Ottoman empire and to ethnically cleanse Ottoman
territories off of their Turkish inhabitants during WWI, and after they
harbored, supported, sponsored PKK/KADEK terrorist organization which
murdered nearly fourty thousands innocent human beings to destroy
Turkey to establish a marxist, lennisist, communist PKK/KADEK
dictortship in Turkey, and other terrorist and extremist Islamist
terrorist organizations and persons with the same purpose, and Armenian
terrorists who, during 1970s and '80s, murdered hundreds of Turkish
diplomats, their family members, colleagues, embassy personnel (Turkish
and local), and having missed no chance whatsoever to fabricate
anti-Turkish hate propaganda based on total lies in every possible
instance and relentlessly complain about Turkey, it is very clear that
the purpose of Europe is to destroy the democratic Republic of Turkey
and totally wipe out the Turkish race/nation off of the face of Earth.
http://www.atmg.org/GrecoPKK.html
GREECE AND PKK TERRORISM
CONTENTS:
Prologue
1. Introduction
2. The Organisational Structure of the PKK in Greece
3. PKK's Activities in Greece
a. Media and Propaganda Activities
b. Militant Training Camps
c. Fundraising
4. Greek Authorities' Support to the PKK
a. Government and Other Authorities
b. Parliamentarians and Political Parties
c. Local Authorities and Other Circles
5. International Publications and Press Reports
6. Testimonies of the PKK Militants Exposing the Greek Involvement in
PKK Terrorism
7. Conclusion
Epilogue
Press Review
Appendices
PROLOGUE
THE COLD KILLERS OF 17 NOVEMBER WHO ALWAYS GO FREE
THE OBSERVER
28 SEPTEMBER 1997
Leonard Doyle examines the role of the Greek intelligence service.
Ever since the Greek terrorists known as the Revolutionary Movement 17
November gunned down the CIA station chief in Athens a few days before
Christmas 1975, the shadowy group has managed to strike with impunity
at its chosen targets. Western intelligence agencies have long
suspected 17 November of acting at the behest of prominent left-wing
Greek politicians. The little that is known about the organisation is
that it is nationalistic, left wing and likes to issue rambling
communiques that quote Balzac. But in Washington and London it has long
been suspected of being the cats paw of a radicalised Greek
intelligence service, the GYP. Washington made its frustration's with
Athens clear in its most recent world terrorism survey, where it
stated: "The Greek government continues to make no headway in its
pursuit of Greek terrorists, in particular, the Revolutionary
Organisation 17 November that is responsible for numerous attacks
against US interests, including the murder of four US officials." Until
today's Observer revelations, a direct link between 17 November and the
Greek secret service had not been established. The Kurdish bomber Seydo
Hazar has told the Observer that:
17 November leaders work hand-in-glove with elements of the Greek
intelligence service.
Police were kept away from PKK training camps by 17 November leaders
who checked the identity of car numberplates with Greek officials.
Funds were obtained and distributed to the PKK by a retired naval
commander who lives on a military base and is a well-known sympathiser
of 17 November.
The organisation is the most feared group in Greece and often referred
to as the deadliest terrorist group in Europe. Since 1975 its members
have executed 21 people, without anyone being arrested, charged or
convicted. Indeed, a close analysis of 17 November's actions down the
years, points to a remarkable set of coincidences in which Greek
government interests are seen to have been furthered by individual
attacks.
The Observer's evidence directly implicates the 17 November in
sheltering the PKK by providing housing and training facilities for its
guerrillas.The PKK bomber has told the Observer that Kurdish agents
could not train and pass through Greece without direct government
backing. "The Greek intelligence service were organising the chemicals,
the high explosives, for example they were giving people in the
(Kurdish) "home office" Greek passports," Hazar said.
The name 17 November comes from the day in 1973 when the Greek Colonels
sent tanks and soldiers to smash a student uprising at Athens
Polytechnic University, killing 34 young people. It was Europe's
Tiananmen Square and out of it grew a terrorist organisation. Highly
nationalistic, the group is anti-Greek establishment, anti-US,
anti-Turkiye, anti-Nato; it is committed to removing US bases and the
Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and to severing Greece's ties to
Nato and the European Union. 17 November's operations are always
planned and carried of with military precision. First there is the
"hit", carried out with the same small collection of Colt. 45 and Smith
and Wesson revolvers. The Colt. 45 that dispatched the CIA man, Robert
Welch, in 1975 was used again last June to murder Cosfi Peraticos,
scion of a Greek shipping family, which bought the privatised Elefsis
Shipyards in 1992. British diplomats, businessmen and interests have
also been singled out by 17 November; most recently the HMS Ark Royal
which was targeted with rockets when it docked in Pireaus in 1994 with
a crew of 1,000. Heavy rain prevented the rockets detonating, but there
were other successful rocket attacks that day against American and
German interests.
The 17 November communiques, with a five-pointed star and the name
"17N", typically come from the same typewriter that issued the
movement's first proclamation in 1975 shortly before Welch's execution.
But again, the Greek authorities have never come up with any leads.
This summer, the US government renewed the reward for the capture and
conviction of 17 November terrorists (it is now worth $2 million),
implicated in the deaths of four Americans, injuries to 28 other
Americans and a rocket attack on the US embassy compound in February
1996. What distinguishes the 17 November from other terrorist
organisations is that in 22 years not a single member of the group has
been arrested. Indeed, the identity of no member of 17 November is said
to be known to Greek, American or European police and intelligence
agencies. It is a claim no other terrorist group can make.
1.INTRODUCTION
Greece, with its complex and problematic relationship with Turkiye, has
traditionally adopted a supportive attitude towards elements hostile to
Turkiye, inspired by the motto "my enemy's enemy is my friend". In view
of its long-standing policy to tolerate the activities of various
terrorist groups on its territory, Greece has readily extended its
hostility towards Turkiye into this domain. Greece's past record in its
fight against terrorism is most revealing. The findings of consecutive
annual reports on terrorism by the US State Department have not only
categorically described Greece "to be a venue for a large number of
international terrorist attacks", but also have underlined the failure
of the Greek governments in taking appropriate measures in combating
terrorism and the toleration shown to terrorist groups active against
Turkish interests. Taking into consideration Greece's disposition to
harm the interests of Turkiye, it was not a coincidence to witness the
escalation of terrorist attacks against Turkish targets including the
assassination of a large group of Turkish diplomats and other
government officials abroad by the infamous Armenian terrorist
organisation ASALA during the years following the Turkish intervention
in Cyprus in 1974, in the wake of the Greek coup d'état designed to
annex the island. Various interviews with members of the ASALA who took
part in the heinous murders of Turkish diplomats serve as an
eye-opener.
Greece provides facilities on its soil to the PKK, a notorious
terrorist organisation, in the form of providing shelter, training and
logistics for its activities aiming at the dismemberment of Turkiye.
Greece's support to the PKK dates back to the late 1980s. Each time
Turkiye voiced its resentment and concern for the support given by
Greece to the PKK, the Greek governments while denying the charges have
insisted on the need for Turkiye to prove its claims with concrete
evidence. Yet it is not easy at all for Turkiye to provide Greece with
such evidence since Turkiye does not, in contrast to the Greek
practice, conduct intelligence operations on another NATO country's
territory. Nevertheless, front organisations of the PKK have been given
permission to establish themselves and function in major cities of
Greece. Furthermore, abundant number of testimonies by the captured PKK
terrorists contain detailed accounts of the training that they have
been given in various camps in Greece and the logistical support that
they have been provided with. These constitute evidence, which cannot
be ignored. Greek governments have in the past made unconvincing
statements to condemn terrorism in a somewhat ambiguous fashion.
Besides, they have been careful not to condemn the PKK by any explicit
reference. After the arrival in Rome of Abdullah Ocalan, the ringleader
of the PKK, Greece came up in front to voice its sympathy for the
"Kurdish cause" and started to campaign for the convening of an
international conference to discuss the so-called "Kurdish question",
which it claimed to be a matter of great interest for Europe, while
underlining the systematic support of Greece to the rights of the Kurds
to their national self-determination. Although the official statements
insist that Greece does not allow the PKK to operate on its soil, the
undeniable facts prove the contrary. The latest example to a series of
incidents in that direction has been the recent visit to Athens of Kani
Yilmaz (also known as Faysal Dunlayici), a member of the PKK leadership
and its representative for Europe. During this visit, in an interview
to the Greek press, Yilmaz stated that he and the PKK support violence,
and that violence will be extended to the major cities of Turkiye such
as Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. Greece has indicated publicly and
repeatedly in the past that it does not condone violence, and that it
does not allow any activity on its soil aimed at the use of force
against third countries. It remains as a legitimate question as to how
this official line of Greece is compatible with the fact that a PKK
representative for whom the Greek government has been duly notified by
an Interpol arrest warrant could have the freedom to travel to Greece
and to make statements inciting violence against Turkiye.
Greek involvement in terrorist activities is not restricted to the
provision of a propitious environment for the activities of the PKK
only. Turkish diplomats in Greece were the targets of numerous attacks
carried out by a terrorist organisation, "17 November", which resulted
in loss of life. Consecutive Greek governments have not traced this
organisation for more than two decades. Yet there have been repeated
speculations in the Greek press with respect to the structure,
composition and objectives of this organisation. The latest fatal
incident came just after a list of addresses and car license plate
numbers of the Turkish diplomats serving in Greece, which had been
communicated to the Greek security authorities, was published in the
Greek press.
There are a number of international instruments to which Greece is a
party and is under the obligation to combat and cooperate effectively
against terrorism. Greece is also duty bound according to the
agreements that it has signed not to permit terrorist organisations and
their affiliates to operate on its territory. Given its record Greece
is in blatant violation of these commitments.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to see the name of Greece
being mentioned in connection with terrorism. Yet, it is known how
serious a threat terrorism constitutes for the contemporary world.
Increasingly violent acts of terrorist organisations and the ever
growing links between terrorism and organised crime such as drug
trafficking, money laundering, extortion and smuggling of people and
weapons point clearly to the need for concerted action in combating and
suppressing terrorism. In spite of the abundance of statements,
resolutions, conventions and other documents regarding co-operation
against terrorism adopted at various international fora, including the
United Nations, Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE, a number of
countries, including Greece, persistently ignore their international
commitments in combating terrorism and do not refrain from lending
moral and material support to various terrorist organisations.
The pursuit of policy of hostility to Turkiye has long been a
misconceived cornerstone of Greek foreign policy. In the hope of taking
advantage of any instability that might be instigated in Turkiye, in
flagrant disregard of its obligations as a NATO member and under
international conventions, Greece has rendered encouragement and
support to the terrorist organisation PKK. In return, the notorious
head of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, does not miss any opportunity to
express openly his gratitude for the continuous sustenance its
organisation receives from Greece. In an interview published on 13
September 1998 in the Greek Cypriot daily Simerini, Ocalan took the
occasion "to pass his thanks to the Greek and (Greek) Cypriot people
for their devoted support" and noted that "only a joint combat would
bring about victory."
MEGA-TV, a Greek private TV station, broadcast an interview with Ocalan
on 15 September 1998, whereby the head of the PKK proposed a joint
military doctrine among the Middle Eastern countries, including Greece,
against Turkiye, similar to the one between Greece and the Greek
Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus. Ocalan also promised victory to
Greece in a possible Turco-Greek war, which he volunteered to command
and claimed that if the (Greek) Cypriots cooperated with the Kurdish
militants, the war would last for years.
These outrageous flirtations of the terrorist gang leader with Greece
and the Greek Cypriots preceded his escape from his long time hideout
in Syria in October 1998 in search of a new safe haven. It is revealing
to note that Athens was Ocalan's first preferred destination where he
went and sought political asylum. Providing sanctuary to such a
terrorist would have entailed a high price to pay for Greece by totally
exposing its policies in support of PKK terrorism. Therefore, Ocalan's
request was not granted, but ample support continued to flow to him
from Greece, notably from the ruling Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party
(PASOK), during the following episodes of Ocalan's flight first to the
Russian Federation through Athens, then to Italy and back to the
Russian Federation again.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the Greek support to the
PKK, which is a well established, but so far not a widely known fact.
This strange phenomenon - support given by a NATO member to a
separatist Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisation against another NATO
member - deserves to be seriously studied because of the paradoxes it
creates and the questions it poses, in the first instance for Greece
itself as an EU and NATO member. In the following sections, the
evolution of Greece's PKK-inspired policy toward Turkiye is examined.
While it merits being the subject of a particular study, there are
unavoidable references in this paper to the Greek Cypriot
Administration in South Cyprus because of Greek Cypriot involvement and
support for terrorism along similar lines with Greece.
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PKK IN GREECE
The PKK carries out its activities in Greece through two ERNK (Kurdish
acronym of the PKK's propaganda wing, "National Liberation Front of
Kurdistan") offices, two "Kurdistan Committees", one "Kurdistan
Cultural Centre" and a "Kurdish Red Crescent Office", which are all
subsidiaries of this terrorist organisation. Through these so-called
offices, committees and centres the PKK has established in Greece a
network which serves its logistical and operational needs as well as
its propaganda in its terrorist campaign against Turkiye.
Due to its geographical position, Greece serves as a bridge in the
transit of PKK militants between Western Europe and the Middle East. In
this regard Greece plays for the PKK a role comparable to that of Syria
and territories under Syrian control where the head of the PKK and PKK
militants have for years benefited from the sanctuary and facilities
provided to them. Since the agreement reached between Turkiye and Syria
on 20 October 1998 in Adana, Turkiye, whereby Syria designated the PKK
as a terrorist organisation and undertook to eradicate PKK presence and
activities on its territory, Greece stands alone among the neighbours
of Turkiye where the PKK has an officially sanctioned free hand.
Greece is a country where the PKK militants are sheltered and given
terrorist training in safe-houses, in camps disguised as "Refugee
Treatment Centres" or "farmhouses" on a temporary basis for periods of
2-3 months. This is a very serious violation of international rules and
norms, involving the use of Greek territory by a terrorist organisation
to prepare acts of terror against its neighbour.
Ocalan is on record to have said that he and the leadership of the PKK
had been invited to relocate in Greece by the Papandreu Government. He
has added that geographically Greece would not be convenient for
conducting PKK activities in Turkiye, but that efforts would be
underway to establish PKK training camps in Greece and particularly in
South Cyprus by August 1994. This invitation must have left an
unforgettable mark in Ocarina's mind as it was Greece where he sought
sanctuary and political asylum when he was forced to leave Syria in
October 1998 and again when he was desperately seeking a safe haven for
himself in January 1999 before being squeezed out of Rome.
On 5 April 1994, the PKK was allowed to open a representative office of
its own in Athens, called "the ERNK representation in Athens and the
Balkans." The PKK banner was hoisted in front of this ERNK office. A
number of well-known Greek politicians attended the office's opening
ceremony, including Panayiotis Sgouridis, Deputy Speaker of the Greek
Parliament, and four other members of parliament -- Dimitrios
Vounatsos, Michaelis Galeneanos, Yiannis Spathopoulos and Maria Mahera
Haralambidis. A senior member of PASOK's Central Committee was also
present in the ceremony.
Greek officials have persistently attempted to depict the ERNK, the
facade behind which the PKK criminal network operates in Europe, as a
"Kurdish political organisation" with a view to concealing their
support to the terrorist organisation. In a 1988 document entitled "The
Mass Character of Our Party and Front", the PKK describes the duties of
the ERNK under ten headings. According to this illuminating document,
among other duties of the ERNK, special emphasis is placed upon issues
such as organising mass activities (raids, occupations,
demonstrations), recruiting militants to turn them into "fighters",
providing combat training to these terrorists, maintaining contacts
with other armed groups, gathering intelligence and creating financial
resources for the terrorist organisation through extortion, drug
trafficking and human smuggling. In PKK's own words, its militants are
"fighting under the flag of the ERNK and armed with the weapons of the
ARGK (the armed wing of the PKK).
Another ERNK office under the name of the so-called "Kurdistan
Solidarity Committee" has also been operating in Thessalonica (Egnatia
Street No.75) since 14 November 1994. This ERNK office has been active
in particular in organising PKK's propaganda campaigns.
These ERNK offices in Greece see no harm in even openly selling the
propaganda documents of the terror organisation and issuing receipts
printed under the name of ERNK, given in return for the so-called
"donations" that are in fact forcibly collected. Some have been mailed
also to the Turkish Embassy in Athens.
3. PKK'S ACTIVITIES IN GREECE
The head of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, said in an interview published by
the Greek daily "Eksusia" on 23 December 1998 the following: "...Greece
has played a great part in my decision to go to Europe. Let me put it
clearer: If there had not been my Greek friends, I would never have
been able to come to Europe...If we did not have this friendship with
Greece, I could not come to Europe...My friendship with Greece
encouraged me in making my decision to come to Europe... We opened a
gateway in Europe (meaning his arrival in Italy). If we succeed going
through this gateway, a political solution to the problem would then be
found. This would be a political success for Greece ... as well."
He also confirmed press reports that three members of the Greek
parliament, including Deputy Speaker Sgouridis, visited him in Rome. In
the same interview, Ocalan implied Greece's continuing support to the
PKK with the following words: "Greece has always supported us
morally... By allowing us to sell the magazines, which we publish in
Greece, it is also lending support to us economically..."
a. Media and Propaganda Activities
In Greece, two propaganda magazines, the "Kurdish Report" and "Foni Tu
Kurdistan" - Kurdistan's Voice, are published by the PKK in Greek.
Apart from these two magazines, books, pamphlets and leaflets handbills
are also published in Athens mostly in Arabic, to be sent to Syria.
Recently, the PKK has begun to publish in Greece two new magazines
called "Al Aouge" and "El Evch", both in Arabic, and to distribute them
in Syria, Lebanon and northern Iraq for propaganda purposes. Besides
the above mentioned PKK publications, the Greek press itself is
inundated with articles, interviews, comments and reports openly
supporting the terrorist organisation PKK and even calling for action
against Turkiye.
The PKK was allowed to engage in extensive propaganda activities
against Turkish tourism in Greece in the summer of 1993. PKK posters
asking tourists not to travel to Turkiye were displayed all around
Athens. A PKK militant, calling himself the spokesman of the ERNK, held
a press conference in the island of Samos and openly called for a
boycott on travel to Turkiye. Such campaigns of the PKK against Turkish
tourism continue unabated, and are bolstered by certain Greek quarters
that hope to benefit from the possible negative consequences PKK's
anti-Turkish propaganda might inflict on Turkiye's image abroad.
b. Militant Training Camps
PKK militants have been trained in Greece on sabotage techniques and
the use of explosives for conducting terrorist attacks in Turkiye.
These training programs covering periods of 2-3 months have been
carried out with the moral and material support of the Greek
authorities. Following the training provided to groups of 50-70
militants in the camps located mostly in mountainous areas, PKK
terrorists are sent to Turkiye illegally for conducting acts of terror.
Since mid-1994, many PKK militants apprehended in Turkiye have
confessed that they were trained in matters of bomb attacks and
sabotage in these camps in Greece with the help of Greek authorities.
According to the testimonies of the PKK terrorists, one of these
training camps is located in the Psahna district of Evia Island to the
north of Athens, and the other one is based around Lepenu village,
north of the town of Agrinion. Other than those temporary camps
mentioned above, the PKK terrorists mostly coming from various European
countries are provided with theoretical training on
"political-military" subjects at the "Lavrion Refugee Camp" and in the
PKK safe-houses in Athens. Greece has allowed the PKK to use the
"Lavrion Refugee Camp" for planning its terrorist acts and organising
its "fund-raising" activities. The PKK terrorists captured in Turkiye
have independently provided detailed maps and diagrams of these camps
(Appendix 1). One of the most striking cases of Greek involvement in
the PKK's militant training activity came in 1994 and early in 1995.
Police in Istanbul and Izmir arrested groups of PKK militants who were
preparing to attack tourist resorts in Turkiye. It quickly became clear
that the terrorists had been trained as "urban militants" in Greece in
a camp near Athens.
c. Fund-raising
The fund raising activities of the PKK in Greece are mostly carried out
with the help of Greek parliamentarians and other circles supporting
the PKK. Illegal immigration to Europe via Greece from third world
countries has long become one of the lucrative sources of finance for
the terrorist organisation PKK, which is actively involved in almost
every stage of this "modern art" of human smuggling. Extortion of money
from asylum seekers and illegal immigrants during their temporary stay
in Greece's "refugee treatment camps" is also another pitiless method
of fund-raising of the PKK.
Brian Murphy of the Associated Press has reported, in an article
entitled "Kurdish Rivalries Boil Over at Key Stop in Refugee Trail,"
published in the Greek daily Athens News on 11 August 1998, that the
Greek government acquiesced in the PKK militants using the Iraqi
Kurdish camps in the country as centres for fund-raising and propaganda
activities. Based on interviews conducted in the "Kurdish" refugee camp
in Patras, Greece, Mr. Murphy has pointed to the Iraqi Kurds' claim
that they have been forced to pay "PKK taxes" and "protection money"
while they waited for political asylum or transfer to another European
country. Mr. Murphy has indicated that PKK members who demand
commissions from the profits of the human smugglers and beat or murder
those who refuse to cooperate reportedly pressured many Kurds in the
camp into submission.
Donations of various Greek circles and sale of propaganda publications
are also among the sources of income of the PKK.
4. GREEK AUTHORITIES' SUPPORT TO THE PKK
a. Government and Other Authorities
A multitude of contacts were carried out between the head of the PKK
Abdullah Ocalan, Stationed in Syria and the Bekaa valley in Lebanon,
and the Greek administration during the 1981- 89 Papandreu Government.
For instance, a Greek delegation, comprising parliamentarians, press
members and Prime Minister Papandreu's adviser Mr. Haralambidis,
visited Ocalan in Lebanon on 17-19 October 1988. Mr. Papandreu was an
extremely negative factor in Turkish-Greek relations, responsible for
charting a confrontational course and fomenting hostility between the
two nations. A terrorist organisation such as the PKK was a perfect
tool that could serve these radical Greek policies. The policy of
collaboration with the PKK, created during Papandreu's premiership, was
maintained and reinforced through the succeeding New Democracy and
PASOK administrations. Courting, encouraging and supporting PKK
terrorism became a permanent fixture of Greek policies. As time went
by, such support from Greece to the PKK became more vocal and more
visible. Press statements by Government Spokesman Venizelos and Deputy
Foreign Minister Pangalos, following the crackdown on the PKK in France
and Germany in 1993, were extremely detrimental to the common fight
against terrorism. These two Greek officials referred to PKK terrorism
as "a struggle for independence", displaying an irresponsible and
inadmissible attitude by any standards.
Three months later, Greek authorities permitted the PKK to open a
"Kurdish Red Crescent Society" in Athens, whose stated objective was to
"offer medical treatment to Kurdish guerrillas wounded in the
continuing war in Turkish Kurdistan and to help the spouses and
children of Kurdish guerrillas held in Turkish prisons."
On 8 July 1993, the Greek government permitted the ERNK to hold a
provocating press conference on Cos, one of the Dodecanese Islands only
a few miles from the Turkish coast. Several observations on Greece's
refugee policy would also be in order. Greece has its own arbitrary
criteria for treating illegal migrants asking for asylum. In this
context, it accepts on its territory those terrorists, fugitives and
other people especially of Kurdish origin coming from Turkiye, whom it
believes, can be manipulated for its propaganda activities against
Turkiye. At the same time, it deports immigrants and asylum seekers
coming from countries like Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
This inhumane Greek policy is a blatant violation of the fundamental
principles of international law, which regulate the rules of a just
treatment for asylum seekers, but, at the same time, categorically deny
to terrorists the right of asylum. This is true particularly for the
provisions of "The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" and the "European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism." Greek Government's support
for the PKK reached its peak point on 30 April 1998, when the PKK was
allowed to open an "official" representation in the centre of Athens,
called "PKK Representation of Balkans." The opening ceremony was
"honoured" by the participation of MPs from both the government and the
main opposition parties. This was the first time that the PKK had
opened an official representation under its own name in any country.
The Greek authorities deny that such a representation bureau was
opened, but the evidence clearly indicates otherwise.
During the latest crisis with Italy over Ocalan that was triggered by
the arrest of PKK's head in Rome on 12 November 1998, government
officials, almost all political parties and the media in Greece called
on the Italian authorities to reject Turkiye's demand for the
extradition of Ocalan and to grant him political asylum. The Government
Spokesman Mr. Dimitris Reppas stated on 14 November 1998 that "Greece
has systematically supported the right of the Kurds to their
self-determination", making null and void all the previous Greek
statements on respect for Turkiye's territorial integrity. George
Papandreou, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, asserted in Rome on
17 November 1998 that "the crisis over Ocalan is not a problem of Italy
but that of Europe" and called on the European Union to act in
solidarity and cooperation with Italy on this issue, while Stelios
Papathemelis, PASOK Deputy and former Minister of Public Order, hoped
that "the Italian government will not yield to the unbelievable demands
of certain countries, which, motivated by intrinsic Turkophile
sentiments, want to try a fighter as though he was a terrorist or a
murderer." Furthermore, the Minister of Defence Akis Tsohatzopoulos
expressed his hope that Ocalan's request for political asylum from the
Italian authorities will pave the way to "the political settlement of
the Kurdish question."
The words of Greek Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, George Nicolaidis, in
his interview published by the Riyadh Daily on 8 December 1998, leave
no room for doubt with regard to Greek official attitude to the PKK
terrorism: "...PKK is a political organisation and also a military one.
It fights for the liberation of Kurdistan. So, it is a liberation
movement. It has a political office in Greece, which, you know, is a
free country..." With these words, Ambassador Nicolaidis also
acknowledged unequivocally the presence of the terrorist organisation
PKK in Greece. Among Ocalan's lawyers, there are also two Greeks,
Thrasinoulos Kontaksis and Yeorgios Adamapoulos. According to these
lawyers who expressed their views in the Greek daily Eleftherotipia on
3 January 1999, "it is the Turkish State, but not Ocalan, that is to be
labelled as terrorist". One of them, Kontaksis, in the same interview
that upon Ocalan's arrival in Rome, "PKK's Balkans Representation" in
Athens contacted him to ask "his legal advice with regard to the
presence of President (Ocalan) in Italy." These words of Kontaksis
revealed unambiguously once again the fact that contrary to the
persistent denials of Greek authorities; the PKK has a presence in
Athens under the name of "representation" which operates without any
restriction.
At an annual Foreign Press Association luncheon held on 26 November
1998, Prime Minister Simitis claimed that the PKK is an "organisation
fighting for the rights of the Kurdish minority and using various means
to reach this end." Mr. Simitis also said, "Greece is in favour of
political asylum being given to Ocalan. Italy has handled the matter
properly". These words can be considered as nothing but an unambiguous
attempt of the Greek Government to justify PKK terrorism which has
resulted, to date, in the death of thousands of people, including many
civilians mostly of Kurdish origin in Turkiye.
On 22 December 1998, Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos participated in a
demonstration at Lavrion camp, one of the main terrorist training
facilities of the PKK in Greece. On this occasion Mr. Pangalos made a
speech at the camp, full of baseless accusations against Turkiye, in
front of PKK demonstrators carrying photographs of Ocalan and posters
against Turkiye's national unity and territorial integrity. Mr.
Pangalos did not refrain from instigating the crowd against Turkiye
with the following words: "The great powers, which had recently decided
on pressing the trigger (British backed American air strikes against
Iraq), do not show the same sensitivity on the right to a free life of
Kurdish people on its own territory..."
b. Parliamentarians and Political Parties
On 20 March 1992, a group of Greek politicians held a joint press
conference with ERNK militants in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. The
group included three members of the Greek Parliament belonging to PASOK
(the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party of Mr.Andreas Papandreou) Lefteros
Varivakis, Dimitrios Vounatsos and Elizabeth Papazoi. The group also
paid a call on Ocalan. The Greek government gave its permission for the
press conference to take place, thereby implicitly giving the
terrorists an opportunity to announce that they would be targeting
tourist resorts in Turkiye. Similar declarations have been issued
periodically. For example, on 11 March 1996, Greek television broadcast
an interview with the PKK gang leader Abdullah Ocalan by Panos
Panayotopoulos. During the interview, Ocalan repeatedly threatened to
attack tourists and tourism companies in order to damage the Turkish
tourism industry and advised "foreign tourists not to go to Turkiye. If
they do, the PKK cannot be held responsible."
In February 1993, a second group of Greek Parliamentarians attended the
self-styled Kurdish diaspora assembly in Brussels. They reportedly
"exchanged views with the Kurds on the subject of genocide committed by
the Turkish Army."
On 20-21 September 1994, Greek parliamentarians held another meeting
with PKK representatives. Three PASOK deputies, Costas Badouvas,
Dimitrios Vounatsos and Hristos Kipouros, travelled to the Bulgarian
capital, Sofia, to attend a pro-PKK meeting. With them travelled a
retired admiral and well-known PKK supporter, Naksakis and Dimitrios
Martos, the representative of the "League for People's Rights and
Liberation." Once again the Greek deputies publicly affirmed their
solidarity with the PKK.
In November 1994, Kani Yilmaz, "PKK's representative in Europe", was
arrested in London. On 17 November 1994, 22 Greek deputies signed a
joint letter circulated in other European capitals, denouncing the
arrest.
Early in 1995, the PKK moved to set up a self-styled "Kurdistan
Parliament in Exile." On 12 April 1995, the PKK organised a meeting in
The Hague to launch the so-called "parliament" with the participation
of seven members of the Greek Parliament - Dimitrios Vounatsos (PASOK),
Yiannis Statopoulos (PASOK), Costas Badouvas (PASOK), Leonardos
Harziandrou (PASOK), Nicholas Conomipoulos, Payiotis Camenos (PASOK)
and Petros Taulis.
On 26-29 June 1995, Yasar Kaya, the titular head of PKK's self-styled
"Kurdistan Parliament in Exile", visited Athens with two of his
supporters. They were given an official welcome and received by
Panayiotis Sgouridis, the Deputy Speaker of the Greek Parliament. Some
Greek parliamentarians once again met with the PKK members in Syria on
12 June 1995. This time the delegation consisted of the representatives
of all the mainstream Greek political parties and was headed by the
Deputy Speaker of the Greek Parliament. The delegation expressed its
support for the "PKK's struggle" and awarded Ocalan a plaque.
Photographs of the meeting, published in the Turkish daily newspaper
Milliyet in July 1995, depicted one of the Greek deputies presenting
Ocalan with a blue flag symbolising Greece's territorial aspirations
against Macedonia. A second picture showed Ocalan with one of the other
Greek deputies in front of a map portraying alternative routes for the
proposed oil pipeline from the Caspian basin to the Turkish
Mediterranean coast.
Mihalis Haralambidis, a member of the Central Executive Board of PASOK,
said the following in a speech he delivered during a conference held
for "National Day" on 25 March 1997: "In order to solve the Kurdish
issue, it is necessary for Greece to spend efforts to hold a 'European
Kurdish conference' and for the Greek Government to invite Ocalan
officially."
With the initiative of Mr. Haralambidis, 110 (afterwards this number
increased to 178) deputies of the Greek Parliament signed a joint
letter on 11 April 1997, addressed to the President of the Parliament,
requesting that Abdullah Ocalan be invited to visit Greece. The letter
contained glowing praise to Ocalan. In response, Ocalan sent a letter
to Mr. Haralambidis, thanking him for the invitation.
In this context, the participation of a Greek parliamentary delegation
headed by Deputy Speaker Sgouridis, along with his several other
colleagues in the third anniversary meeting of the so-called,
self-proclaimed "Kurdish Parliament in Exile," the propaganda wing of
the PKK, constitutes another example of the support given by the Greek
Parliament to the PKK. In that meeting, held on 12 April 1998, Mr.
Sgouridis and other members of Greek Parliament made speeches
reaffirming their support to and solidarity with the PKK. Costas
Badouvas, Greek MP and former minister, made a speech during a PKK-led
demonstration in Rotterdam on 12 September 1998 and held that "Kurdish
people's struggle", which he claimed was gaining momentum, would not be
defeated. Mr. Badouvas also wanted Turkiye to respond to PKK's
so-called cease-fire calls.
On 12 November 1998, Ocalan was arrested in Rome on his arrival from
Moscow. PASOK MP Badouvas went to Rome on 13 November 1998 to present
Ocalan with a letter, which had been signed by 109 Greek MPs, inviting
the terrorist to Greece. In the letter, which was also signed by three
deputy speakers of the Greek Parliament, Ocalan was referred to as "the
legitimate representative of the most repressed people of the world
standing between liberation and genocide."
Furthermore, some PASOK MPs, academics, artists and journalists
established "the Committee of Solidarity with the Kurdish Leader",
aimed at supporting Ocalan's application for political asylum in Italy.
c. Local Authorities and Other Circles
In 1994, the pro-PKK campaign inside Greece went a stage further. A
non-governmental organisation called "The League for People's Rights
and Liberation" launched a "campaign for solidarity with the Kurdish
people" with the stated aim of collecting 200 million Drachmas (US$
885,000) as financial support for "Kurdistan's struggle".
In addition to these initiatives, the Governor of Korfu, Andreas
Pangratis, sent a letter to the Greek Government on 30 May 1997, in
which he stated that he supported the initiatives of the Greek deputies
to invite the head of the PKK to Greece, and that in case Ocalan came
to Korfu, they would be pleased to host him and to organise in Korfu a
Europe-wide conference on Kurds. The Greek authorities also permitted
the PKK to hold a meeting in Thessalonica from 19 to 21 September 1997,
organised by the Kurdistan Solidarity Committee and called "an
international festival of peace and solidarity with the Kurdish
people," at which the PKK engaged in propaganda for its terrorist
activities. Greek officials, including the Governor of Thessalonica and
representatives of political parties, participated in the so-called
festival.
According to the Greek press news of 15 September 1998, Dilan (Semsin
Kiliç), known as "PKK/ERNK's representative in the Balkans",
participated in the panel organised by the Municipality of Veria,
Greece, and the "Kurdish Solidarity Committee" and put out anti-Turkish
statements such as the following: "Our war has been serving the
interests of the peoples of the region. Escalating this war will make a
positive contribution to the peaceful coexistence of the Kurds, the
Turks, the Armenians, the Hellenes of Pontus and other peoples..." At
the meeting Mihalis Haralambidis, member of PASOK's Central Committee,
claimed that the rapprochement between the Greeks and the Kurds could
be achieved only after the liberation of "the peoples of Asia Minor".
On 7 December 1998, the Sikies Municipality of Thessalonica issued a
communiqué, forwarded to the Greek Government and Parliament, in which
it called for granting Ocalan the right of political asylum and asked
the Greek Government to take all necessary initiatives to bring to the
international platform the issue of recognition of Kurdish people's
right of having their own territory.
5. INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS AND PRESS REPORTS
In view of all this, it comes as no surprise to read in a report on the
"Patterns of Global Terrorism," published annually by the U.S. State
Department that Greece is "a venue for a large number of international
terrorist attacks." The report comments that "the Greek authorities
made little progress against terrorist groups in 1994, in part due to
ambivalent Government attitudes toward counter-terrorism. Greece still
lacks a new anti-terrorism law to replace legislation repealed in 1993
by the in-coming PASOK Government." The 1996 issue of the report,
published in April 1997, continues to include the PKK among the main
international terrorist organisations and goes on to say that "
...Greek Government also continues to tolerate the official presence in
Athens of two Turkish terrorist groups- the National Liberation Front
of Kurdistan, which is the political wing of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK), and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front
(DHKP/C) -- formerly Devrimci Sol -- which is responsible for the
murder of two US Government contractors in Turkiye..." It should be
emphasised in this regard that the PKK and the DHKP/C are among the
four top terrorist groups that conducted 51 percent of all
international terrorist attacks in 1996 and they also accounted for 60
percent of international terrorist activities in 1995. The PKK and the
DHKP/C together were responsible for almost 25 percent of all the
international terrorist activities in the same year. As seen from these
figures, the activities of the PKK terrorist organisation extend far
beyond Turkiye.
The Observer in its 28 September 1997 issue, published an interview
entitled "Poison Bomber Offers Secrets for Sanctuary" wherein a member
of the PKK, named Seydo Hazar, revealed from his hideout in Greece the
secret plans of the terrorist organisation and its connections with the
Greek Government and other terrorist groups. The following are some of
the highlights of the information revealed by PKK member Seydo Hazar
whose identity and terrorist connections have been verified by a number
of security sources in Europe:
11 Stinger missiles, manufactured under license in Greece were sold by
the PKK group in Greece to the Tamil Tigers subsequently used to shoot
down military transport planes over Sri Lanka.
The PKK is protected by the shadowy Greek Marxist revolutionary
organisation 17 November and funded by elements close to the Greek
security service while preparing terrorist attacks in London and those
targeted at European tourists in Turkiye.
The 17 November leaders work hand-in-glove with elements of the Greek
intelligence service.
The 17 November has been involved with the PKK in training militants in
Greece for missions in Turkiye.
The Greek intelligence service is giving the PKK militants 'home
office' and Greek passports.
Greek police are kept away from PKK training camps by the 17 November
leaders who check the identity of car numberplates with Greek
officials.
A retired Greek Naval officer who lives on a military base and is a
well-known sympathiser of the 17 November pays all the PKK militants'
expenses in Greece and even acts as an informal censor of their
magazine, the "Voice of Kurdistan".
The terrorist PKK also has links with the German neo-Nazis, the Tamil
Tigers and the Hamas organisation. It has also a liaison officer in
Damascus dedicated to working with Hamas."
As can be seen from the above-mentioned revelations, Seydo Hazar, a PKK
terrorist, states that he and his group were protected and supported by
the Greek security services and the Greek terror organisation known as
17 November, the latter having staged numerous attacks against Turkish
and other foreign diplomats and installations in Athens since 1974,
claiming many lives and inflicting material damage. As a unique case in
the international arena, none of the members of this organisation have
ever been identified, let alone captured, raising serious question
marks as to its roots.
The Observer's interview is only a confirmation of what is already
known. Not surprisingly, the Greek government denied The Observer
reporting claiming that: "everything mentioned in the report is false,
unsubstantiated and made up." Nevertheless, it was learnt that,
following the revelations of Seydo Hazar, the Greek Intelligence
Service began to apply pressure on PKK members in order to make them
observe strict secrecy. The campsite at the Psahna town in Evia Island
was evacuated on 13 November 1997, as were the safe-houses near Athens
used by the PKK members, with the help of PASOK MP Badouvas.
There is substantial evidence shared within the Interpol mechanisms
underlining the fact that the PKK is actively involved in human
trafficking as well as other organised crimes. A striking example of
the PKK involvement in human trafficking was given in the "Report"
program aired by the German ARD television channel on 19 January 1998
which included statements by a gang member convicted of human
trafficking. In his own words, the convict said: "Our organisation in
not directly linked with the PKK, but on several occasions we had to
pay ransom to the PKK in order to do our job. The PKK itself is also
involved in human trafficking. In Greece there is no permission to the
others. My organisation can only smuggle people into Greece, but from
Greece onwards, it is exclusively a PKK job."
Another international press report on the Greek support to PKK
terrorism was published in the 30 March 1998 issue of TIME magazine
entitled "A Hellenic Haven: The flight of Kurdish refugees to Greece
adds to a cycle of violence and vengeance". The report explains in
detail how the vicious terrorist organisation, the PKK, has been given
in Greece a free hand in recruiting and training new cadres and in
planning its terrorist activities. The text of the TIME article is in
Press Review.
6. TESTIMONIES OF PKK MILITANTS EXPOSING THE GREEK INVOLVEMENT IN PKK
TERRORISM
Testimonies of PKK militants apprehended in Istanbul and Izmir at the
end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 revealed that the terrorists were
trained in a camp near Athens before they were sent to Turkiye to
organize violent attacks on tourist installations. PKK militants,
Sakine Dönmez, Atilla Kaya and Abdurrahman Yaruk, caught after a bomb
attack on Istanbul's famous covered bazaar, Kapaliçarsi, on 2 April
1994, causing several deaths, confessed that they were trained in
explosives in Greece. Testimonies of other PKK terrorists apprehended
in Turkiye confirmed undeniably the previous revelations. According to
these testimonies, PKK members are given "political" and "military
training" at two camps within 200 kilometres of Athens -- the Lavrion
Refugee Camp and the Lamia-Halkida Camp -- where PKK members have been
sheltered and trained to use explosives and firearms.
Dozens of PKK militants arrested in Turkiye have unveiled that former
Greek military officers have trained them in explosives and military
tactics in camps near Athens. In June 1997, the Greek Cypriot press
published photographs of a retired Greek Admiral training PKK
terrorists at a camp in northern Iraq. There are also several reports
stating that PKK members are serving as agents of the Greek
Intelligence Service, acting on its behalf against Turkiye.
The confessions made by PKK militant Fethi Demir, who surrendered to
the Turkish security forces on 6 March 1998, and by Semdin Sakik, PKK's
"second man", who was captured in northern Iraq in April 1998, have
exposed that the Greek support to PKK terrorism goes far beyond what
was formerly known. Excerpts from the testimonies of PKK terrorists on
the Greek support given to the terrorist organisation are at Appendix
2.
7. CONCLUSION
Terrorism has been universally condemned and, under the relevant
international agreements, all countries have committed themselves to
combating and cooperating effectively against terrorism. They have
undertaken not to permit their territories to be used by terrorist
organisations. There is no doubt that Greece is in blatant violation of
its commitments.
A study on terrorism and organised crime entitled "Terrorism And
Organised Crime: Preparing NATO For Future Security Threats", made by
Mr. Larry C.Johnson and Ambassador Morris D.Busby, concluded that
"...Less well known but more disturbing is the support that Greece, a
member of NATO, has given to the PKK. The Deputy Speaker of the Greek
Parliament, accompanied by several colleagues, visited PKK leader
Ocalan at his headquarters in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in June 1995. A
similar visit was made in the summer of 1997. In addition, 110 members
of the Greek Parliament and the Deputy Speaker called for PKK leader
Ocalan to be officially invited to Athens. Dozens of PKK operatives
arrested in Turkiye claim former Greek military officers at camps near
Athens trained them in explosives and military tactics. In June of
1997, the Greek Cypriot press published photos of a retired Greek
Admiral training PKK terrorists at a camp in northern Iraq. There also
are several press reports that PKK members are agents of the Greek
Intelligence Service, acting on its behalf against Turkiye. In
addition, PKK front groups operate openly in Greece and members of the
ruling party, PASOK, have met on several occasions with PKK leaders...
Put in less diplomatic terms, the government of Greece either turns a
blind eye to the activities of the PKK on its soil or in the worst case
actively supports the PKK with training and logistics. According to US
Government sources. which spoke on the condition of not being
identified, Greece deserved to be included with Iran and Syria as a
sponsor of terrorism, but US political considerations have precluded
this sanction.
In the past, the issue of Greek support of the PKK appears to have been
widely viewed as an extension of the long-standing political dispute
between two NATO members. This situation is awkward for NATO and is
usually only dealt with in unavoidable circumstances. However, given
the PKK's terrorist and criminal activities throughout Europe, it poses
a real threat to the security of several NATO members. Indeed. the PKK
probably is the major terrorist and organised crime threat to NATO. At
a minimum, NATO should call on the member nations to cooperate in
reducing or removing this threat through collective action. In
addition, NATO should convene a plenary session to review and discuss
the threat the PKK represents in Europe. Such a forum would permit
close scrutiny of Greece's policy of supporting a terrorist group while
focusing NATO members on the meatier issue of taking collective action
to confront a new kind of threat."
These are far from being the full story. But all the available
information unmistakably sheds light on the extent of the Greek policy
of hostility towards Turkiye, a policy that has been stretched to the
point of trying to undermine Turkiye's stability by supporting the
terrorist activities of the PKK.
EPILOGUE
As this publication shedding light on the background of Greek
involvement with PKK terrorism went into print, unfolding events
totally exposed the protection and physical sanctuary provided by
Greece to Abdullah Ocalan. It was established that despite persistent
official Greek denials, Ocalan was in fact brought to Athens at the end
of January 1999 under the knowledge of the Greek Government which also
arranged the safe passage of this terrorist to Africa and harboured him
in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi from 2 to 16 February 1999 while
concealing his identity from the Government of Kenya. This shocking
behaviour is a unique case of flagrant contravention of international
law and rules of international conduct, in particular among members of
NATO and the European Union, which deals a serious blow to the standing
and credibility of Greece as a law abiding state.
This further episode of Greek involvement in PKK terrorism will be
dealt with in greater detail in a separate publication. The readers
will find in the final pages on this publication self explanatory
material originating from Greece itself and the Government of Kenya in
order to bring to light the dark and unacceptable role played by Greece
to help the head of a brutal terrorist organisation which has claimed
thousands of lives in Turkiye escape justice.
PRESS REVIEW
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
April 1997
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1996 - GREECE
"The Greek Government also continues to tolerate the official presence
in Athens of two Turkish terrorist groups-the National Liberation Front
of Kurdistan, which is the political wing of the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK), and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front
(DHKP/C)- formerly Devrimci Sol-which is responsible for the murder of
two US Government contractors in Turkiye."
THE OBSERVER
28 September 1997
THE ONLY WAY TO BEAT TERRORISM
It may not be the end of history, but the era of states waging war as a
means of settling conflicts is receding. Violence, instead, is becoming
the preserve of terrorist organisations prepared to use any means to
achieve ends that cannot be reached by peaceful methods. Their capacity
to destabilise governments is huge - so the temptation for these
governments' enemies to do business with them is ever present. Worse,
the march of technology makes the efficiency of the weapon systems
available to them ever more terrifying.
Our disclosure today that the Kurdish PKK separatist group has
ambitions to use poison bombs against tourists and British interests is
part of this wider picture. It is extremely disturbing. European
governments are committed to fighting terrorism together but, as we
reveal, some groups have been able to operate within Greece. Worse, it
appears some elements in the Greek secret service have connived in the
PKK's operations and are alleged to have offered funding. This is a
grave charge, but the evidence of our informant, and Greece's failure
to deal with the 17 November terrorist group, requires more than ritual
denials.
The story of Seydo Hazar offers evidence that terrorists can produce
homemade nerve agents like sarin or biological weapons, which utilise
deadly bacteria. The way they go about it of course cannot be kept a
secret. It is already available in patent offices and on the Internet.
Theory, it seems, has too easily been allowed to become practice.
The new upward ratchet in the terrorist threat to civilians is
alarming. But so are the close links, previously only speculation,
between German neo-Nazi, the PKK, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the
Palestinian Hamas Organisation. Weapons are being traded between groups
with murderous results.
National rivalries have no place in the joint fight against terrorists.
This lesson has to be learned above all in Greece, where a
faction-riven secret service seems to bear some responsibility for
exposing citizens to PKK terrorists-its rivalry with Turkiye persuading
wilder fringes of its secret services to sponsor the cell on the
principle that my enemy's enemy is my friend. Our evidence shows its
assurances to the United States that these activities would stop are
not seen as credible. The US has threatened sanctions if Greece does
not fulfil its responsibilities. Now Greece's European Union and Nato
partners must reinforce the message.
THE OBSERVER
THE REPENTANT TERRORIST BOMBER ON THE RUN HAS NO PLACE TO HIDE
Shyam Bhatia on the Greek Island of Naxos meets a fearful Kurd who
predicts a wave of terror across Europe.
For the past four weeks a dark young man in blue shorts and green
bandanna has wandered the Greek islands, trading jokes with the German
and Scandinavian tourists who throng the Aegean at summer's end. None
guessed that Seydo Hazar is a desperate man who fears death at the
hands of the terrorists he served as a bomb-maker, who imagines an
executioner in every bar and hotel corridor, and wants to trade his
secrets for a new life.
He sits on the bed of his simple hotel room on the island of Naxos and
talks of a career that has resulted, he says, in the murder of 60
fellow Kurds and of a young woman killed when one of his bombs exploded
in the Turkish holiday resort of Bodrum in July. He warns of a ruthless
new round of terrorist attacks aimed at tourists, including Britons
which may involve chemical weapons.
He chain-smokes and his dark hooded eyes glance restlessly round the
room. His paranoia is infectious. He catches my arm and, saying we are
both in mortal danger, insists that we toss a coin to decide who goes
through the door first.
The patio outside is empty, but he regards the most innocent encounter
with suspicion. When South African holidaymakers invite us to join them
for a drink, he looks petrified and scurries away. Only when he is
reassured that they are tourists does he join us briefly to watch the
dusk descend on the island that has given him brief sanctuary but no
peace.
In the past 48 hours he has managed to leave Greece and is now believed
to be hiding for his own safety somewhere in Western Europe. He
contacted the Observer through an Irish intermediary, insisting he
wanted to reveal how his former terrorist masters had now switched
their targets to civilians, and that a new wave of atrocities was
planned to begin as early as next month.
His identity and terrorist connections have been verified by a number
of security sources in Europe.
The story of how Hazar, 31, became involved with what is reputed to be
one of the deadliest terrorist organisations in the world has elements
of the classic Faustian bargain. The master from whom he is fleeing is
the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK.
Since the early Seventies, this Marxist-Leninist group has sought a
separate Kurdish state in southeast Turkiye. Its reputation is that it
uses terror without compunction, settles its own internal quarrels with
summary violence and controls many of Europe's drug cartels.
He believes he is being hunted by two other deadly enemies. The first
is the little known but highly dangerous 17 November left-wing Greek
terrorist group, which he says has been involved with the PKK in
training Kurds in Greece for missions in Turkiye. In 1975 it murdered
the CIA's Athens station chief, Richard Welch, and it has since killed
about 20 more people, including three other American officials, two
diplomats from Turkiye and 13 Greeks.
The other enemy is the Greek secret service, the GYP (pronounced Kip),
which stands to be seriously embarrassed by Hazar's disclosures. It has
been waging a secret war against Greece's traditional enemies, the
Turks, by helping the Kurds with their bomb making and weapons
training.
THE OBSERVER
28 September 1997
POISON BOMBER OFFERS SECRETS FOR SANCTUARY
Fugitive Kurdish terrorist reveals
by Shyam Bhatla Naxos and Leonard Doyle.
ONE OF THE world's most dangerous bombers has revealed that terrorist
groups on three continents have developed poison bombs to attack
civilians-in an extraordinary confession to the Observer from a secret
hideout in Greece...
...Seydo Hazar, 31, says he and his group were protected by the shadowy
Greek Marxist Revolutionary Organisation 17 November and funded by
elements close to the Greek security services while preparing terrorist
outrages in London and on European tourists...
...Western intelligence agencies are taking the allegations
seriously...
...Hazar has gone public because he is disgusted by the targeting of
civilians by a splinter group of the Marxist Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK)...
...His claims provide the most complete picture yet of the close
collaboration between international terrorist organisations, as well as
disturbing evidence that one NATO power may have been harbouring
militants from a group waging a war against the government of another
NATO member.
...11 Stinger missiles, manufactured under licence in Greece, were sold
by his group to the Tamil Tigers and subsequently used to shoot down
military transport planes over Sri Lanka...
...He says that the splinter unit of the PKK in Greece has the means to
destroy entire population centres, as well as contaminating beaches and
fresh produce in pursuit of their deadly aims...
...when he lived in a PKK safe house in the village of Drosia (Greece),
he left behind a large cache of explosives, including TNT and Amonal,
as well as the precursors for chemical and biological agents. These
include the nerve agent sarin and laboratory facilities for producing
the E-coli and botulism bacterias...
... The allegation that Athens has been turning a blind eye to PKK
guerrillas using its territory for training and crossing to Kurdish
frontline areas has surfaced before, only to he flatly denied in Athens
as Turkish propaganda.
On Friday, the Observer gave the Greek government the specific
locations of the two sites identified by the bomber as the weapons
dumps. As turned out, PKK arms had already been discovered at one of
the locations and three people taken away for questioning. There were
no arrests, however...
...The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is also understood to
have raised the question of Greece's support for Kurdish militants on
her most recent visit to Athens. In confirmation hearings before
Congress, Washington's incoming ambassador to Greece, Nicholas Burns,
put the war against terrorism as a top priority.
"They said so many innocent Kurds had died, it made no difference if
innocent Turkish and foreign civilians died as well"
... According to Hazar, a retired Greek naval officer pays all the
Kurds' expenses in Greece and even acts as an informal censor of their
newspaper, Voice of Kurdistan, 'so as not to spoil the good relations
between Greeks and Kurds'.
....and regional ally. Last year the US formally warned Greece, a
fellow Nato member, that if these activities continued it might be
declared a 'state sponsor of international terrorism'.
...To avoid harsh US economic sanctions, Greece was reported to have
given assurances that PKK activities would be curtailed and its bases
and training camps in Greece closed....
....He does not deny suggestions that he was picked up and trained by
the secret police of the former East Germany before the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. Hazar will admit only that he has lived in
Poland...
...Hazar was persuaded to leave Germany and go to Athens by an inner
elite within the PKK, known as the "home office" (Ülke Bürosu in
Turkish).
...Soon after his arrival in Athens last February he was taken to a
farm near Triada, north of the city. This was a training camp run by a
Greek called Dimitri and his partner Martha. Hazar believes Dimitri to
be the leader of 17 November and that the couple also has good
connections with the Greek secret service.
...Greek authorities were training and equipping Kurdish guerrillas for
missions in Turkiye.
...A small flat was founded for him near the Hotel Pefkakia in the
village of Drosia, about 12 miles north of Athens....
...unprimed bombs are given to three separate couriers to see which one
was caught, or if any in the PKK group in Greece had betrayed them.
...I didn't mind at all about hitting the Turkish army because that was
a legitimate military target.'
...was planned for Antalya, close to where former Turkish Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller's family owns a holiday resort. Another bomb was
planned for the beaches of Marmaris, popular with British tourists.
...half a litre of sarin, a deadly nerve agent...
...for the Ankara mausoleum of Kemal Atatürk,...
...28 October
STATEMENT BY JAMES B. FOLEY, US STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE
TO A QUESTION AT THE REGULAR PRESS BRIEFING ON
1 October 1997
QUESTION: Yesterday, we asked the question about the British Observer
newspaper news items about Greece and PKK cooperation. Do you have
anything about this subject today?
ANSWER: Yes. As the April 1997 edition of our publication, "Patterns of
Global Terrorism" noted, the Greek government continues to tolerate the
official presence in Athens of offices of two Turkish terrorist groups;
the PKK's formerly known as Dev-Sol. The latter group is responsible
for the murder of two U.S. government contractors in Turkiye. The Greek
government is clearly aware of our concerns. We're also aware of a
recent allegation, I think you or one of your colleagues noted
yesterday, by a self-described former PKK member or operative of
involvement by Greek government personnel in operational PKK terrorist
activity. I have no information report. We're assessing it as we take
all such reports seriously.
TIME
30 March 1998
EUROPE A HELLENIC HAVEN
Its not every day one sees recruits inducted into a terrorist
organisation. But at the Kurdish Cultural Centre in downtown Athens it
happens three or four times a month. About that often, a self-described
"political branch" of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (P.K.K.) sets up a
few dozen plastic chairs in a room on the centre's dingy first floor,
hangs the red and yellow P.K.K flag on the wall and carts in a Yamaha
electric organ to pound out Ey Ragip, a P.K.K. anthem. Grizzled P.K.K.
loyalists watch as recruits proclaim their allegiance to the armed
movement that has earned a place on the US State Department's list of
terrorist organisations. "Five to 10 Kurds leave here every week to
return (to Kurdistan) and fight," says Rozerin Laser, Balkans general
director of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (E.R.N.K.), the
P.K.K political group that seeks a Kurdish homeland in parts of
Turkiye, Syria, Iran and Iraq.
The P.K.K. recruitment of Kurds in Greece is an overlooked link in the
vicious cycle of refugees and revolution across Europe's southeastern
frontier. In January, an influx of thousands of Kurds into Italy and
Greece reminded the rest of the EU how permeable its borders really
are. But not all Kurdish asylum seekers end up in Western Europe. Some
join the P.K.K. and return to would-be Kurdistan to fight, fuelling
more Turkish repression and a new flood of refugees and a new flood of
refugees and potential PKK. recruits. With the Greek government turning
a blind eye, P.K.K. representatives claim the recruiters are free to
start the process over again. The latest refugee crisis says one senior
Western diplomat in Athens, who specialises in terrorist issues,
"unveiled Turkiye's appalling human rights record and revealed the
porous frontiers of Greece and Italy." But, he says, "It also took the
wrappings off Greece's tolerance of rebel Kurds."
The E.R.N.K's induction ceremonies are just the tail end of the process
for turning refugees into revolutionaries. The real indoctrination and
recruitment goes on at places like Lavrion, 45 km southeast of Athens,
one of about five main refugee camps for the 100 or so Kurdish asylum
seekers arriving each month. Although hardly lavish, the camp boasts an
18-inch colour TV with a satellite dish to receive daily broadcasts
from MED TV, the Kurdish news station. Kurdish camp leaders use cell
phones for calls to their "brothers in battle," as they describe their
cohorts on the outside. The crumbling walls are hung with pictures of
P.K.K. strongman Abdullah Ocalan and martyrs to the Kurdish cause.
"This is the greatest help that Greece is providing us," says Ferzeyn
Iskender, a self-proclaimed P.K.K. loyalist at Lavrion. "It is here
away from their homeland that the Kurds nurture their ethnic identity,
learn who they are, what they stand for, how they've been abused by the
Turkish authorities." He points to a group of children playing in the
compound's concrete courtyard. . "Listen," he says, "They're singing Ey
Ragip." P.K.K. tutors arrive twice a week, according to camp leaders,
to teach the history of Kurdistan, its language, customs and
traditions, subjects that would be illegal in Turkiye. But P.K.K.
activists at the camp quickly turn such topics into propaganda. The
E.R.N.K.'s Laser admits that her success in recruitment "is the result
of a process of ideological training."
Turkiye says Greece is aiding and abetting the P.K.K, citing the
confessions of P.K.K. members as proof. "We are just stating what
P.K.K. terrorists captured in Turkiye are saying," says Sermet
Atacanli, a spokesman for Turkiye's Foreign Ministry. "They have been
trained in Greece, both ideologically and militarily." "Lies, lies,
lies!" responds Greece's fiery Foreign Minister, Theodore Pangalos, to
accusations of Greek involvement. Western diplomats monitoring the
P.K.K. say there's no hard evidence substantiating such accusations,
but that "there is a grey area in the field of financial support."
Much sympathy and support comes from the Greek population itself, which
sees parallels between the Kurdish nationalist movement and their own
1830 liberation from the Ottoman Empire. "The same thing is happening
now with the Kurds," says English teacher Kaiti Piperopulou as she
delivers school supplies to Lavrion. "We must help them." The P.K.K.
builds on that backing, circulating fundraising leaflets festooned with
symbols of Greek, Kurdish and Greek Cypriot unity and bearing slogans
like, "The solution to the disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus goes
through Kurdistan." The leaflets always include the bank account
numbers for the E.R.N.K. "We are not hiding what we are doing," says
Lavrion's Iskender.
In the U.S., such open P.K.K. activities would be a breach of the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 and would bring prison sentences of up to 10
years for those perpetrating them. But in Greece, the P.K.K.'s
terrorist fire spreads virtually unchecked. Across the border, Turkiye
fans the flames with its draconian treatment of the Kurdish minority,
and year by year more Kurds are drawn into the conflagration.
- Reported by Anthee Carassava/Athens
PRESS STATEMENT OF KENYAN GOVERNMENT ON THE ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY BY
ABDULLAH OCALAN
The Government received information that Mr. Abdullah Ocalan, leader of
the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkiye, arrived in the country on
2nd February, 1999 at 1 1.33 p.m., aboard a private jet. The request
for diplomatic clearance for the said aircraft was sought by the
Embassy of Greece. The aircraft landed without clearance, since the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had wanted to establish the status of the
persons in the aircraft prior to its arrival.
The Government also established that the names of the persons used in
the Greek Embassy's Note Verbale seeking clearance were fictitious. The
Greek Ambassador was at pains to explain why the names appearing in the
Note Verbale were different from the persons at the Embassy.
After intervention with the Greek Ambassador, it was confirmed that Mr.
Ocalan was in the Ambassador's residence. The Government immediately
requested for his expatriation from the Country to which the Greek
Ambassador agreed after consultations with his Minister in Athens. The
Embassy undertook the responsibility to pay for their Expatriation
expenses. Consequently, Mr. Ocalan departed the country yesterday, the
15th of February 1999, at about 7:30 p.m. local time, for a destination
known to the Greek authorities.
The Government has established that the Mr. Ocalan arrived in the
Country from Milan, Italy. According to the Greek Ambassador Nationals
from the following Countries accompanied Mr. Ocalan: Sweden, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Belgium and Greece. The entry of Mr. Ocalan into
the country appears to have been well known to the Greek Government. We
are puzzled as to why Kenya was chosen as a destination for Ocalan. It
is possible that the Greek authorities may have taken advantage of the
strong friendly relations existing between our two countries, which
raises serious questions about their sincerity and trustworthiness.
The Greek Government must be aware that Kenya was recently a target by
terrorists who bombed the United States Embassy on August 7th, 1998,
causing heavy loss of life and extensive damage to property in Nairobi.
The presence of Mr. Ocalan in the country, therefore, raises serious
security concerns. We would not have expected a friendly country like
Greece to subject Kenya to such an awkward situation giving rise to
suspicion and possible attack.
The Government is, therefore, taking up the matter with the Government
of Greece with a view to ascertaining the full circumstances and
reasons leading to the illegal entry of Mr. Ocalan to Kenya. The Greek
Ambassador H.E. Mr. George Costorlas was at hand to meet the group at
the J.K.I.A. He briefly boarded the aircraft and left with passengers
without following any of the formalities. No immigration arrival cards
were filled as the passengers were simply walked through. Initially
when the Government got wind of Mr. Ocalan presence in the Ambassador's
residence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Ambassador to
explain, but he vehemently denied. However, when he was confronted
yesterday concrete evidence, he owned up, setting into motion the
process of his departure as outlined above.
In view of the above, it is no longer possible to trust the Ambassador
as serious doubts about his credibility have been created. Accordingly,
the Government had demanded his recall with immediate effect.
The Government of Kenya wishes to emphasise that the Government had no
role whatsoever to play in Mr. Ocalan presence in Kenya.
16th February, 1999 NAIROBI
ATHENS NEWS
17 FEBRUARY 1999
GOVERNMENT PLACES THE BLAME ON KURDISH LEADER FOR HIS OWN CAPTURE
Pangalos gives official version of events, condemns embassy sieges with
harsh words Greece's Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos lashed out at
yesterday's occupations of Greek embassies and consulates throughout
Europe by Kurdish activists as he finally confirmed that Greece had
provided "temporary" refuge for Abdullah Ocalan, the rebel leader of
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Speaking at a hastily convened emergency news conference in Athens
yesterday morning, an irate Pangalos threatened to take "merciless"
action at home and abroad against Kurdish activists unless hostages
held in Greek embassies around Europe were released by noon, implying
that there could even be mass deportations of Kurds in Greece.
"We are giving them an ultimatum," Pangalos told the special news
conference. "Our behaviour will be merciless if they do not leave by 12
noon," he warned. In the wake of persistent official government denials
concerning the whereabouts of Ocalan, Pangalos admitted for the first
time that Greece had given Ocalan "temporary residence, for
humanitarian reasons" at the residence of the Greek ambassador in
Kenya.
Pangalos, admitting that Greece had sheltered Ocalan in a Greek
diplomatic building for the past 12 days, said that Ocalan himself, in
spite of Greek advice to the contrary, decided to attempt to leave
Kenya and go to Holland. The foreign minister said that contact with
Ocalan was lost during his transfer by car from the Greek ambassador's
residence to the airport. Ocalan's car was being followed by a number
of Greek embassy cars, including that of the Greek ambassador, which
"lost visual contact" with Ocalan's car.
Pangalos said that Greece had informed the Kenyan authorities and
awaited their update on exactly what happened, adding that contact had
also been made with the EU presidency, the German foreign minister and
the American government, asking them to intervene in order to find out
what exactly took place. He added that he would also be contacting the
British and Italian foreign ministers.
At the same time Pangalos said that he had sent a strict telegram to
the PKK leadership, asking it to order its members to withdraw from
occupied Greek embassies and consulates by midday. Pangalos
characterised as an "act of extreme brutality" the taking of hostages,
including women and children, at the Greek embassies in The Hague and
Vienna.
Accepting that Greece has always respected the struggle of the Kurdish
people and support for human rights, Pangalos reiterated that Greece "
never considered, or would consider, as expedient or useful the
presence of Ocalan on Greek territory for reasons concerning both the
interests of the Kurdish people and security and stability in the
region". He repeated that no application for granting political asylum
to Ocalan had been made to Greece, "and if such a request had been
submitted, under the 1991 Dublin Treaty on political asylum, such a
request would have been referred to Italy, which was the first European
country that Ocalan went to after his departure from Syria".
Replying to reporters' questions, Pangalos openly admitted for the
first time that Ocalan's plane had touched down at an airport in
western Greece in order to refuel after his failed attempts to land in
Holland before proceeding to Kenya.
Pangalos also revealed that Ocalan's presence on Greek territory in
Kenya was the exclusive knowledge of himself and the leadership at the
Greek foreign ministry. Finally, Pangalos reiterated that Greece should
not have been and should not be part of the Kurdish problem, which he
described as an internal Turkish problem that should not become part of
a Greek-Turkish dispute.
Two hours after Pangalos' impromptu press conference, the national
defence ministry's crisis management team held an emergency meeting to
" assess the situation following the attacks against the Greek
embassies abroad by protesting Kurds". According to media reports, the
crisis meeting was attended by the army, navy and airforce chiefs of
staff, national defence general staff senior officers and high-ranking
officials from the foreign ministry and Greek intelligence service
(EYP).
Later in the day, government spokesman Dimitris Reppas, who had
persistently denied government involvement in the prickly Ocalan saga,
requested clarifications from the Kenyan government concerning the
circumstances surrounding the capture of Ocalan. Reppas said that the
Greek government places exclusive responsibility for the latest
developments, including Ocalan's falling into the hands of the Turkish
authorities, with Ocalan himself, who negotiated with the Kenyan
authorities in person. Reppas also suggested the means of Ocalan's
transfer to Nairobi be such that it was open secret.
Reppas said Ocalan refused to leave Kenya for one of a number of
unspecified African countries that were willing to grant him asylum, as
had been suggested by the Greek side, instead choosing to seek asylum
in Holland, at which time the Greek authorities ceased to have any
participation in where the Kurdish leader would go.
A stern faced Reppas, who faced a barrage of reporters' questions
during his daily scheduled briefing, said that Ocalan had been in
direct contact with Kenyan government officials - in whom the Kurdish
leader had "shown trust" - with the aim of travelling to the
Netherlands. The Greek government, he added, has no information about
"the way things turned out" and bore no responsibility from the moment
of Ocalan's departure "from where has was, with the responsibility of
the Greek side" to an unknown destination. The handling of the issue by
the foreign ministry and jointly competent ministries was entirely
successful, Reppas said.
ATHENS NEWS
17 FEBRUARY 1999
OCALAN'S GREEK FRIEND, LAWYER TELLS THEIR STORY.
A different, more intriguing version to that of the government on the
Abdullah Ocalan saga also emerged yesterday. The backstage of PKK
leader's trip to Kenya, whence he ended up in the hands of the Turkish
security forces, was revealed by retired senior naval officer Andonis
Naxakis, a PKK sympathiser who played host to Ocalan when he visited
Greece at the end of last month.
Naxakis told SKAI television channel that, on Friday 29 January, he
chartered a private jet with the help of an unnamed Greek businessman
and following consultations with Kurdish representatives, transported
Ocalan from Leningrad to Athens. According to Naxakis, the Kurdish
leader was in dire danger from the Russian Mafia and had to leave
Russia urgently. The Russian secret services had apparently alerted
Greece, but Naxakis party escaped through the VIP exit of Hellinikon
Airport. The retired officer initially transported Ocalan to the house
of Voula Damianakou in Nea Makri, east of Athens, where he spent the
night, and took him to his own house on Saturday 30 January.
At this stage, Naxakis tried to bring Ocalan in touch with the Greek
foreign ministry so that he could apply for political asylum. Foreign
Minister Theodoros Pangalos allegedly agreed to visit the Kurdish
leader on that particular Saturday, but sent the head of the Greek
Information Agency (EYP) instead. EYP subsequently assumed the
responsibility of safeguarding Ocalan, and Naxakis told reporters that
he felt indirectly responsible for what happened next, since he had
arranged for the meeting.
Naxakis claims that on Monday 1 February the Greek government
guaranteed that Ocalan would be safely transported to a place of Greek
sovereignty, but the Kurdish leader discovered that they were referring
to the embassy in Nairobi just before he boarded the plane that was to
take him there on Tuesday. Naxakis' role ends at this point, but the
tale is continued by Failos Kranidiotis, one of Ocalan's lawyers, who
gave a full account of events as from Wednesday 10 February. On that
day, Kranidiotis was summoned to a secret location in Brussels for
consultations with PKK members, who told him that their leader was in
danger of being discovered and sent him to Nairobi.
Kranidiotis spent the weekend with Ocalan and was present as the
Kurdish leader conferred with Greek representatives on what to do next.
Ocalan's presence had become known in the Kenyan capital, and Athens
wanted him out of the embassy. According to the lawyer, Ocalan was
offered the options of being taken to a house in the Kenyan
countryside, or to be granted a temporary refuge by a local Greek
Orthodox Church. The Kurdish leader ruled out both plans, allegedly
stating that "Greece has brought me here under guarantee, and it should
get me out of here under guarantee".
In conversations with the head of the Greek foreign ministry's
diplomatic office, Ocalan asked for Greek Funds to buy a new passport,
a joint Greek-Kenyan guarantee of his safety, and a Greek plane-with a
government official on board - to fly him out of Nairobi. He also
reportedly made a fresh request for political asylum, which the Greek
foreign ministry apparently turned down as "disgraceful". The Kurdish
leader was also informed that four Greek security personnel were being
sent to the embassy to make sure that he left. At this point, one of
the two female fighters guarding the PKK leader pulled out a gun and
threatened to commit suicide. Kranidiotis was then sent to Athens with
another request for political asylum. Before he left, Ocalan allegedly
told him that he was caught between Turkiye and Greece, "the bandit
state on the one hand and the comedy state on the other". He was
intercepted on his way to Nairobi airport and was informed by the
Kenyan authorities that the President, Arab Moy, was fully aware of
Ocalan's presence.
All contact with the Kurdish leader was broken off on Monday 15
January, with the well-known results. PKK sources insist that their
leader was forced to leave the Nairobi embassy, despite the Greek
government's protests to the contrary, and that he was led away by
Kenyan police. Similar fears are voiced by his lawyers. Giuliano
Pisapia, Ocalan's legal representative in Italy, who visited his client
during the weekend, stated yesterday that there had been an operation
to capture the Kurdish leader as early as Sunday 14 February, but that
it had been called off due to the lawyer's presence. Eberhardt Schulz,
Ocalan's lawyer in Germany, claimed that his client had been tricked
into surrendering to the Kenyan authorities and had been dragged out of
the embassy by local forces. Meanwhile, the Italian news agency ANSA
reported on Monday that Ocalan had been handed over to the Kenyans by
the Greek embassy's staff
APPENDIX 1:
CAMPS AND CELLS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION PKK IN GREECE
LAVRION REFUGE CAMP: At the Lavrion Refugee Camp, apart from the PKK,
members of other terrorist organisations find shelter and are given
training. It has been found out that a bank account has been opened at
the Kaningos branch of the Greek National Bank for the PKK members
being sheltered at the Lavrion Camp. Samil Asmaad and Sinan Aslan, two
members of the PKK, are known to be responsible to meet such needs of
the terrorists.
LAMIA HALKIDA CAMP: This is a farmhouse 200 kilometres away from
Athens, used by the terrorist organisation PKK. The farmhouse is
surrounded by barbed wire fences. About 300-400 militants from
different terrorist groups are being sheltered at the camp. The
militants attend both political and military training in two different
phases. The military training includes all forms of bomb making and
planting explosives. The owners of the camp (farmhouse) are two Greek
citizens known as Dimitri and Marta. Two PKK terrorists trained at this
camp and apprehended by Turkish Security Forces have confessed that the
owners help the members of the PKK in the camp by all possible means;
they let the terrorists use their vehicles and they supply logistic
needs of the terrorists.
THE PKK CELL IN AHARNON/ATHENS: According to the testimonies of the PKK
terrorists apprehended in Turkiye, the PKK uses as a cell a flat on the
5th floor of the building, next to the station, at the very corner of
the road opposite the Saint Pandalemonas Church.
THE PKK CELL IN DAFNI/ATHENS: The location of this cell is described by
the terrorists as follows: "Take the Dafni bus. Get off at the Saint
Ionia stop. Walk up from the second street. Before you reach the end of
the street, the cell is on the third road across the street." In this
cell the PKK militants coming from Turkiye are trained on explosives
and attend a 15-day political training.
THE PKK CELL IN THESSALONICA: This PKK cell is depicted by the
militants as follows: "In a hilly district of the Thessalonica Bazaar,
there is a supermarket and a gas station next to the Goody's
Hamburgers. If you turn the corner from the cafe there, the second
floor of the building number 16 is the PKK cell."
APPENDIX 2
EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TERRORISTS TRAINED IN GREECE AND
SENT TO TURKIYE TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTS ON BEHALF OF THE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION PKK
Some excerpts from the testimonies of terrorists apprehended by Turkish
Security Forces, which indicate the support provided by Greece to the
PKK militants are as follows:
1- TESTIMONY OF SEYITHAN SAMACAN (CODE-NAME AHMET-MAHMUT-SEYDO) FROM
SIVEREK/SANLIURFA APPREHENDED IN BATMAN ON 27 DECEMBER 1993:
"I went to the Samos Island from Kusadasi/Turkiye with a group of
friends by a boat. We surrendered to the Greek police who later took us
to the Lavrion camp in Athens. A PKK member code-named Deniz took me to
the PKK bureau in Athens. The PKK members were presented with Greek
passports and sent to the Bekaa Valley/Lebanon. We were always in
contact with the Kurdistan Solidarity Committee in Greece.
(Phone:003013634905)"
2- TESTIMONY OF GIYASETTIN ALTUN FROM VARTO/MUS APPREHENDED IN ISTANBUL
ON 11 MAY 1994:
"I went to Athens from Germany by plane with a group of friends. We
were taken to a PKK cell in Athens and then to somewhere 200 kilometres
away from Athens for training. A terrorist code-named Faik was
responsible for training in the camp where there were about 20
militants. In the camp we were trained on explosives to conduct
terrorist attacks against military, economic and tourism targets."
3- TESTIMONY OF IMAM GÜR (CODE-NAME AKIF) FROM BEYDOGMUS/ELAZIG,
ARRESTED ON 5 JUNE 1994:
"I went from Germany to Athens where I was provided with a false
passport. I was first taken to a cell and then to a camp with the
others I had met in the cell. In the camp we were trained on explosives
(bombs) and instructed to go to Turkiye, in order to attack public
buildings and tourism facilities. We were provided with the phone
numbers of the militants in Germany to get in touch if necessary."
4- TESTIMONY OF VEYSEL BOZALI (CODE-NAME SAHIN-SEHMUZ) FROM BINGÖL,
APPREHENDED IN ISTANBUL ON 12 MAY 1994:
"I went to Athens from Germany where I was provided with a false
passport. In Athens, a PKK member code-named Cemil met me and took me
to the Kurdish Committee. Then, a Greek lady took me and 10 other
fellows to a hilly area 200 kilometres away from Athens. We stayed at a
house in a forest. For 2 months we were trained on explosives. A PKK
member code-named Faik was responsible for the training. We were
instructed to attack military, economic and tourism targets in Turkiye"
5- TESTIMONY OF AHMET AKKURT (CODE-NAME CIHAN- ALI-HASAN) FROM
IDIL/SIRNAK ARRESTED IN ISTANBUL ON 22 JUNE 1994:
"I went to Athens from Germany with a false passport and was taken to
the camp. The camp was about 3 km away from the Aegean cost and was
surrounded by hills. We were given training on explosives for a month.
A PKK militant code-named Faik who was responsible for training told us
that we would be sent to Turkiye to hit economic and tourism targets."
6- TESTIMONY OF ATILLA TEKEL FROM ELAZIG WHO SURRENDERED TO THE TURKISH
SECURITY FORCES DURING THE OPERATION HELD IN NORTHERN IRAQ ON 21 MARCH
1995:
"I went to Athens from Germany with a group of friends. A 35-year old
man approached me at the passport checkpoint at the airport and asked
us whether we were Turkish or Kurdish. We said that we were Kurds. Then
we were taken to an office without any passport control and were given
some food. The Greek agent dealing with us phoned a PKK militant
code-named Rojhat. Rojhat came and took us to Heyva Sor ('Kurdish Red
Crescent', one of Pak's front establishments) which is 15 kilometres
from Athens. Rojhat was a Syrian about 30 years old and spoke Greek.
Later on he took us to a PKK camp, 154 kilometres away from Athens, on
the way to Macedonia. The camp was about 6,000 square meters large and
called Ibrahim Incedursun camp. In February 1995 there were about 40
terrorists in the camp. For 3 months we received political and military
training to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkish cities. The camp was
being run totally under the umbrella of Greece. Greek parliamentarians
and the public were providing material support to the PKK. The
publications of the PKK are sold mostly from Greece to Europe. Lavrion
Camp is 1.5 hours away from Athens. It is close to the seaside. Its
full capacity is 400 militants. Apart from the PKK, militants of
extreme leftist terrorist organisations such as TKP/ML, DEV SOL, TDKP,
TKIP, TKEP, TKP/KIVILCIM were trained in the camp."
7- TESTIMONY OF CANSUR KIRT (CODE-NAME KAWA REMZI) FROM
LICE/DIYARBAKIR, APPREHENDED IN IZMIR:
"I crossed the River Meriç to Greece with my friend code-named Bozan.
We were intending to go to Germany. A villager from whom we asked for
some food took us to a Greek police station. We told the Greek police
that we were Kurds and PKK members. We were sent to Athens and
transferred to the Lavrion Camp. In the camp there were about 30 other
militants. The police collected our ID's and questioned all of us one
by one. The representatives of each terrorist organisation in the camp
asked us to which organisation we belonged. For three months we took
political training in the camp. One day we were taken to a forest, 5-6
hours away from the camp where the PKK militant code-named Faik trained
us on the use of explosives and firearms. Faik instructed us to go back
to Athens and then to Turkiye to conduct terrorist acts."
8- TESTIMONY OF MEHMET KAVAK (CODE-NAME ÇIYA) FROM
CEYLANPINAR/SANLIURFA APPREHENDED IN IZMIR ON 5 MAY 1995:
"I went from Cologne to Athens on 31 December 1994. The police officer
at the passport check told me that I could not enter Greece since I did
not have a visa. Upon the instructions I had received from the PKK, I
told that I was a Kurd and was to be met by the members of the Kurdish
Committee. Then the police changed his attitude and helped me. I spent
the night at the airport. Then, a PKK member came and took me."
9- TESTIMONY OF METIN SAGLAM FROM ERZURUM APPREHENDED IN ISTANBUL ON 8
AUGUST 1995:
"I swam across the River Meriç to Greece in 1994. I was arrested by
the Greek police. I told the police that I was a PKK member and I
sought political asylum. I was questioned by the Greek intelligence and
police before being taken to the Lavrion camp. In the camp there were
members of the PKK and extreme leftist Turkish terrorist groups. I
stayed in the camp for 15 days. Then I went to the PKK cell in Athens.
After that I was taken to a farmhouse which belonged to a Greek couple.
The camp representatives, code-named Cemal and Faik, gave political and
military training to us. Faik taught us to make and plant different
kinds of bombs."
10- TESTIMONY OF MEHMET ÇEKIÇ (CODE-NAME HÜSEYIN YILMAZ) FROM
ADIYAMAN:
"I went from Frankfurt to Athens with a false Dutch passport. I gave
the numbers of the Heyva Sor (Kurdish Red Crescent) to the customs
officer in Athens and entered Greece. A PKK courier came to pick me up.
This courier talked to a Greek parliamentarian with white hair called
Dimitris. We went to the Heyva Sor building in Athens. Soon I was sent
to a camp. While I was in the camp I heard that another PKK affiliated
association called 'Kurdistan Centre' was opened."
11- TESTIMONY OF FADIK ISIK (CODE-NAME SAHIN-RAMAN) FROM KAHRAMANMARAS,
APPREHENDED IN ANTALYA:
"I was sent to Bucharest/Romania in April 1994. Under the auspices of
the ERNK Bucharest representative Ömer Agaoglu, I was sent to
Thessaloniki in January 1995 for training on explosives. Then I was
sent to Athens. From Athens a PKK member took me to a camp about 20 km.
away where the PKK members were receiving military and political
training. In February 1995, a man who was said to be a Greek deputy
came to the camp and visited the PKK representatives in the camp. Greek
media members, MED TV reporters, former MPs Remzi Kartal and Zübeyir
Aydar of HEP and Necdet Buldan, (a fugitive wanted by Turkiye) visited
the camp."
12- TESTIMONY OF EMINE DIDEM MARKOÇ (CODE-NAME NELA FILIZ AYTEN) FROM
ARDAHAN, APPREHENDED IN ADANA ON 24 JUNE 1996:
"We came from Frankfurt to Athens. Greek police arrested me with four
of my friends. A PKK member code-named Rojhat came and told the police
that we are PKK militants. Then the police released us although they
had realised that we had false Dutch passports. One evening we were
taken to the PKK camp in Halkida/ Lamia. We had political training for
45 days. After the political training we had military training. Then I
was sent to the PKK cell in Aharnon/Athens. Meanwhile I had an
operation at the Evangelismos State Hospital, due to a throat illness.
The bill for the operation was issued on behalf of Menal-Dilxwvaz who
was from the ERNK Balkans Representation. Thanks to the ERNK document,
the hospital bill was paid by the Greek Ministry of Health. Soon I had
a second operation which was also paid by the Greek Ministry of
Health."
13- INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THE TESTIMONY OF SEREF KILIÇ (CODE-NAME
YALÇIN) WHO WAS CAUGHT IN THE GARDEN OF THE TURKISH CONSULATE GENERAL
IN URIMIYAH/IRAN AND BROUGHT BACK TO ANKARA FOR INTERROGATION ON 23
DECEMBER 1997
Seref Kiliç has established contact with PKK members in the Çanakkale
prison while he was a student in Çanakkale 18 March University and
joined the organisation. He went to Romania via Bulgaria on 10 March
1997 with Hanim Demir and Orhan Yüce who were friends from the
university and following their stay in Romania for some time, they came
back to Bulgaria. They passed to Athens from Bulgaria by motorway on
27th-28th March with Hamza (code-name) (ERNK Bulgarian Responsible),
Orhan Yüce and Hanim Demir. Hamza took them (S. Kiliç H.Demir and
O.Yüce) to a PKK house and introduced them to the militants; Rojhat,
Hatip, and Pino (code-name). Mahir (code-name), who was the General
Coordinator of the Balkan Province at that time, Sait Ali (code-name)
and Ilgaz (code-name), who were Revolutionist People Party (DHP)
militants, came to the house in question and Mahir, after taking them
to a separate room, told them that they had to act in accordance with
the organisation's demands, collected their passports and ID cards, and
then requested Sait Ali to take them to the building where they would
receive training. At 24:00 on the same day's night (27-28 March 1997)
S. Ali took them with a white "Tempra" automobile to a white,
three-storey building which was on a side street in the centre of
Athens. A total of 45 people, made up of 3 teams consisting of 15
persons each, inhabited the building used by the organisation for
political training and one or two members stood guard around the clock
for security. 40 of the total of 45 persons receiving training were
university students. In the beginning of June 1997, in order to receive
combined military and political training, they were taken by a minibus
to a campsite in the countryside 3 hours from Athens which was still
under construction. 45 persons in the form of 3 teams, settled in the
encampment in the mountainous area, and every morning they continued
with the political courses that they had been receiving earlier, and in
the afternoons they were being given military courses on ambush,
penetration and raids by militants named Cemal and Çektar
(code-names). These courses lasted from the beginning of June until the
beginning of September 1997. As the militants dwelled in the
encampment, two Greek citizens Memo (code-name) and Dilan (code-name)
(woman) carried food to a place 1 km. away from the camp, each time
with different vehicles. Seref Kiliç decided to escape from the camp
with Rabia Coskun, but they were noticed and captured while trying to
communicate through passwords since it was forbidden to talk with each
other. After this incident, Rabia Coskun was sent to Athens, and Seref
Kiliç was "put into practice" (which meant, "cell imprisonment" in the
PKK jargon). He was "kept in practice" for 40 days, and within this
period some of his friends with whom he had arrived in the camp were
periodically transferred to the "front". In the beginning of September
1997, as this camp place has been exposed, encampment was transferred
to another mountainous place 50 km away, and political and military
training continued. In this period, Çektar and Cemal were replaced by
two other militants code-named Deniz and Ilgaz (woman). From time to
time, they were also instructed by a militant named Necmi. The number
of militants increased up to 85 with new arrivals. Most of these
militants were university students. Students of Eskisehir Anatolian
University also existed within the group. In the beginning of November
1997 Deniz and Ilgaz announced that the training was completed and that
they would be transferred to northern Iraq. They took all of the 60-65
militants then in the camp to Athens. In Athens, after driving for
about 1 km. from the club named "Riba's" that is located in the city
centre, they arrived at a building complex. There war a meter high
stone wall in front of the complex, which consisted of one three-storey
and six single-story buildings. The other sides were surrounded by
barbed wire. The three-storey building was used by a retired Greek
general who used to come to this place from time to time, stay for a
few hours and communicate with the high ranking militants of the terror
organisation in Greece. According to the statements of Seref Kiliç,
the house he was taken to on March 27-28, 1997 for training was located
at Praksiteuls Road. No: 28 in Athens. The daily schedule applied
during political training, the harsh attitude towards people that were
being trained (seizure of their ID Cards, not being allowed to speak
with each other or to leave the camp) confirm the statements given by
more recently arrested members of the terror organisation. It
transpires that the campsite where they were taken for military
training, 3 hours to Athens by minibus, is the mobile camp at a
mountainous area to the north of the Phasna town at Evia island. The
campsite where they were taken in early November 1997 is the "Haki
Karaer" camp which is also described in the statement of Dr. Serdar
(code-name) Hasan Belli who surrendered to the Turkish Consulate in
Piraeus on 8 December 1997 and who was interrogated at the Edirne
Police Headquarters after he was taken to Turkiye with a temporary
travel document.
14. TESTIMONY OF ULAS AKBAL (CODE-NAME DURAN-ARTES-MAHIR) FROM
DIYARBAKIR: " - In the Association of "Komal Mezopotamya" functioning
in Lavrion, the periodical "Fonito Kurdistan" in Greek was sold in
order to collect money to the organisation. A group of 50 persons were
given political training in a house in Athens. In the Lavrion Refugee
Camp, training on explosives was given by Serdar (code-name). Militants
were trained for bomb attacks in the big cities in Turkiye.
15. TESTIMONY OF 1970 BORN FETHI DEMIR (CODE-NAME MAHIR) WHO
SURRENDERED IN BINGÖL/GENÇ ON MARCH 6, 1998: "The names of the PKK
militants, who would come to Greece from Turkiye or from other European
countries, were given to the Greek Ministry of Public Order. The
Ministry transmitted their names to the relevant authorities at the
border or in the airports and they facilitated their passage to Greece.
PKK militants met me at the Athens Airport and took me to a house
belonging to the PKK. There I was told that there were other houses
like this on Tiriyö Septen Biriyö Street 154, Vasilik Sophias Street
154, Omonia Square, Kipseli district). We went to a training camp
approximately two hours away by car from Athens. At the Ministry of
Public Order there is a separate section dealing only with matters
concerning the PKK. Militants who crossed the Turkish border to Greece
were taken by the Greek police to the Lavrion Camp and from there they
were picked up by a PKK militant and accommodated in different PKK
houses in Greece. Political training was given at the Greek Island
Evia. Local police and intelligence service supported us. Logistics of
this camp were supplied by two Greek nationals called Dimitri and
Martha. We rented a building in the centre of Athens with the help of
Thedor Susanoglu who had worked for the Greek Consulate General in
Izmir in the 1980s. Militants that came to Greece were provided with
"Refugee Passport". Using these passports they could travel to all
Schengen countries and if they had to travel to another country,
necessary visas were provided by the help of the Greek Consulate
General in the country concerned. For those militants operating in
Greece, Greek language courses were given in Athens Pandion University.
The Greek Intelligence wanted us to select 7 persons. They would give
them special intelligence training. PKK terrorist organisation was in
close contact with three Ministers in the Greek government. Foreign
Minister Pangalos, Education Minister Arsenis and Defence Minister
Choxarcopoulos gave us continuous and wide support. Funds were provided
to the PKK from the budget of the Greek Parliament. Among other high
ranking officials who directly supported the PKK were the Former
Minister of Interior Baduvas (we always contacted him when we had
problems with the Greek police or border units), retired General
Naksasis (he was responsible for our connection with the Greek
Intelligence Service), Thedor Susanoglu mentioned before, who could
speak excellent Turkish and was responsible for all kinds o
correspondence between PKK leadership and Greek officials and
translation of letters etc. The PKK terrorist organisation operated in
Greece during 1996-1997 through the following organisations, ERNK
Office (Andresis Vasilisis Sophias Street 54, Phone N:724 7022), Heyva
Sor Kurdistan (Kaningos Street, Athens), Kurdish Culture Association,
Greek Representation of Derri Agency, Kurdish Solidarity Committee in
Thessalonica.
markt...@yahoo.com
AttilaAtaman Apr 2, 5:01 am
Newsgroups: soc.culture.greek
From: "AttilaAtaman" <attilata...@hotmail.com> - Find messages by this
author
Date: Sat, 02 Apr 2005 08:01:22 -0500
Local: Sat, Apr 2 2005 5:01 am
Subject: GREEK MASSACRES
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You are always trying to make people forget your bloody past,Griks....
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The true Greek N17 spirit lives on as it did in the times of Alexandar
the Homo
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a veracious appetite for innocent
Turkish blood, never stop in their relentless dreams of massacring all
Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK
terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over
legitimize their rape, torture and murder of innocent and defenceless
Turkish human beings.
"It should also be pointed out that when the Greek army invaded Turkey
between 1919 and 1922, it carried out a conscious policy of ethnic
cleansing with the purpose of killing and/or driving out all
inhabitants of western Turkey who did not share Greek nationality and
religion, causing those Muslims and Jews who survived to flee to the
areas under Turkish nationalist control. This policy was eloquently
reported in a detailed report presented by an International Commission
of Investigation chaired by American Admiral and High Commissioner Mark
Bristol, and including representatives of Italy, France and Great
Britain, as well as Greek and Turkish observers, by a Red Cross report
written by the Red Cross representative in Turkey, Maurice Gehry, and
by historian Arnold Toybee in a series of articles published at the
time in the Manchester Guardian and later summarized in his book, 'The
Western Question in Greece and Turkey.' As a result, Great Britain cut
off all military and financial assistance to the Greek invasion, a
major reason for its ultimate defeat by the armies of Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk."
-- Professor Stanford
Shaw
Following their military defeat in 1922, after having attacked,
tortured, raped and massacred the Turks, Jews and others in Western
Anatolia and destroyed their country after Ottoman Empire collapsed
after WWI, the Greeks executed six Cabinet ministers of their own whom
they thought responsible for the humiliating failure.
One was brought on a stretcher to the execution ground, being too sick
to walk. Another died of a heart attack in the van taking him from his
prison cell. The sick and the dead were propped up alongside the others
and shot.
Being dead of heart attack was not dead enough for the Greeks; they
still wanted to kill him more(!) by shooting his already dead body.
Killing a sick man, too sick to walk, and shooting a dead body is
another dimension of Greek crulety, blood-thirstiness and savagery
against fellow human beings.
But the ultimate Greek crulety, blood-thirstiness and savagery against
fellow human beings, which is very rarely seen elsewhere, is this: The
six Greek goverment ministers (one was too sick to walk, another was
alread dead of a heart attack) were executed for failing to massacre
and/or drive out all inhabitants of western Turkey, Moslems, Jews and
others, who did not share Greek nationality and religion.
It is exactly like an organized crime syndicate punishing by executing
its member thugs and murderers failing to committ crimes. Mafia does
this all the time.
http://www.greekmurderers.net/documents.html
DOCUMENTED MASSACRES BY GREEK GOVERMENT IN TURKEY DURING 1919-1922
In 1919, Greeks entered Anatolia with the support of Entente Powers in
order to kill Turkish people living in Anatolia. To reach their goals,
they didn't hesitate to kill unarmed civilian people, even children.
We are publishing the documents which first appeared in Historical
Documents Magazine. The magazine compiled the documents from General
Directorate of Government Archives. The magazine includes particularly
the Greek atrocities, massacres, rapes, arson targeting unarmed Turkish
people and their sacred values between 1919-1922, a period in which the
Greek occupation of Western Anatolia took place.
Now we have a question: Do Greeks have any right to bring out the "Asia
Minor" genocide while they have committed all these massacres, rapes,
murders, and plunders against Turkish and Muslim people?
Below, you can see the original documents which prove all of the
massacres,
robberies, rapes of Greeks.
Date of The Document Summary:
May 20, 1919 The report of Izmir Gendarmerie Division to Gendarmerie
General Headquarters about the invasion, the murders, rapes, insults of
Greeks against Turkish people during the occupation of Izmir
May 20, 1919 The report of the Denizli Gendarmerie Division about
murders
and invasion of Greeks
July 3, 1919 The report of Aydin Central Command to 57th Division
Command
informing about the organization, formation and murders of "Aydin
Massacre"
July 7, 1919 The report of 57th Division Command to 2nd Army Inspectors
about the cruelly murdered Muslim people who happened to escape from
the
"Burning of Aydin"
July 7, 1919 The report of 57th Division Command to 2nd Army Inspectors
about burning of Aydin, killing of civilian people and the head
officer,
the attorney general and the judge by Greeks
August 1, 1919 The notes about the massacre of people in Cuma quarter
during the Battle of Aydin
August 30, 1919 The article by the office of Aydin Governor to
Lieutenant
Colonel Kadri Bey about murders, insults and robberies of Greeks around
Izmir
September 13, 1919 The petition of her father and doctor report about
the
rape of an 8-year-old girl by Greek soldiers
September 13, 1919 The statement of a girl raped by Greek soldiers
September 13, 1919 The statement of a brother whose sister was raped by
Greek soldiers
October 31, 1919 The writing of Heyeti Temsiliye stating that more than
five
hundred Muslim people in Odemis, Bergama, Tire and Salihli districts
have
been arrested and tortured with pretext of aiding national forces.
November 7, 1919 The report of Military Police Organization concerning
crimes
commited by Greeks such as murders, robberies, fire starting, insults
against
mosques and even Koran in Yenisehir and surrounding villages.
January 30, 1921 The report prepared by the Military Police Bozüyük
Directorate
and presented to the Western Front Headquarters about the atrocities of
Greeks
such as theft, plunder, and rape committed against people of Bozüyük
and Sögüt.
April 8, 1921 The help request of the Western Front Headquarters from
General
Staff concerning the fires of Bilecik, Sögüt, Bozüyük, the massacre
of the
Turkish people, including the müfti of Bilecik, and the suffering of
the survivors.
April 10, 1921 The testimony of the captured Greek Lieutenant Teodoros
Pedlis
about the fire of Bozüyük.
April 11, 1921 The orders of the Western Front Headquarters about the
participation
of the French writer Madam Glois to the committee formed to investigate
the Greek
atrocities and destruction in the Western Front region.
October 4, 1921 The letter from Abdülkadir Bey, who medically treated
Sidika,
burnt by Greek soldiers in Horti Village, to Halide Edip (Adivar) Hanim
concerning
the event.
November 15, 1922 The report by the 2nd Army Headquarters presented to
the
Western Front Headquarters about the imprisonment of Turkish villagers,
about
their mistreatment as POWs and about beheading of some villagers and
exhibiting
their heads to others.
December 1, 1922 The telegraph from 1st Army Headquarters informing the
Western
Front Headquarters that in Böceklik, Greek soldiers have burnt 380 of
the 1500
people near the station and 30 people in prison.
March 3, 1922 The list prepared by Saruhan Head Office showing the
names of
Greek soldiers and officers who participated in the atrocities and
massacres in
Manisa province.
November 22, 1923 The list of the names, prepared by Saruhan Head
Office and
presented to the Court-martial Presidency, of the Greek soldiers and
officers
who participated in the atrocities and massacres in Saruhan district
during the
invasion.
References:
Kadir MISIRLIOGLU; Yunan Mezalimi, 1972, Istanbul
Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri, Falih Rifki; Izmir'den Bursa'ya, 1338 (1922),
Deraadet (Istanbul)
Trakya Cemiyetleri Nesriyatindan, Sarki Trakya'da Yunan Zulümleri,
1338 (1922)
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
Look at the most brutal barbarism in the world, Greece:
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a38b1894c5df0.htm
Infanticide
Sir Alfred Zimmern, despite his German name, was an Englishman and a
professor at Oxford University. In 1911 he published what is still an
excellent book, The Greek Commonwealth, on the culture and civilization
of the pagan Greeks of the ancient world. The following long paragraph
is taken from pages 330-331 of the 5th edition, published by the Oxford
University Press:
It has not been easy for admirers of the Greeks to admit that Greek
theory and practice condoned the deliberate exercise of checks upon the
growth of the population. Yet the evidence shows us that such was
indeed the case.
When a child was born it remained, by a custom universal, so far as we
know, at least down to the fourth century, within the discretion of the
father whether it should be allowed to live. On the fifth day after
birth, at earliest, new-born infants were solemnly presented to the
household and admitted to its membership. Up to the time of this
ceremony the father had complete power of selection, and, what is more,
it appears that this was quite frequently exercised, particularly in
the case of female infants; for the provision of a dowry for his
daughters weighed heavily on a Greek father's mind, and what was easier
than to evade it by pleading inability at the outset?
When it was decided that the infants were not to be "nourished" they
would be packed in a cradle, or more often in a pot, and exposed in a
public place, the poor mother, no doubt, hoping against hope, like
Creusa in the Ion, that some merciful fellow-citizen might yet take
pity on its wailing. It is strange and horrible to think that any day
on your walks abroad in a Greek city you might come across a
"pot-exposed" infant, as the Athenians called them, in a corner of the
market-place or by a wrestling ground, at the entrance of a temple or
in a consecrated cave, and that you might see a slave girl timidly
peeping round to look if the child might yet be saved, or running back
to bear the news to the broken-hearted young mother.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Romulus himself was an unwanted, exposed infant. Because he was taken
in, first by a she-wolf and then by a shepherd, he lived to found his
beloved Eternal City. To this day, the City of Romulus honors its
founder when it reminds the world not to kill the unwanted infant.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++
DIRTY GREEKS
THEY ROUTINELY MURDERED THEIR BABIES
THEY LEFT WOMEN ALONE AND HAD SEX WITH YOUNG BOYS
http://www.aish.com/search/aish_search.asp?SearchString=Greece&Action...
In Greek society it was common for parents to kill newborn infants.
Babies
in Greece were routinely murdered by leaving them outside in a clay jar
to
die from exposure and starvation. The reasons parents would kill their
children:
Right behind infanticide on the list of what we today consider deviant
behavior was pederasty. (Today we call it child molestation.)
"In most Greek communities the women were kept at home, and men spent
their
days with other men or boys. Artists paid special attention to the nude
masculine form; and pederasty abounded. It was far more favored than
homosexual relations between men and youths of the same age, and indeed
a
whole philosophy was built up around the pederastic situation, founded
on
the concept that the lover was the beloved's educator and military
trainer."
- "The Founders of the Western World: A History of Greece and Rome," by
Michael Grant
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
http://www.mfhr.gr/archive/papers/Sitaropoulos.htm
Why Greece is not a safe host country for refugees
(article published with minor changes at the International Journal of
Refugee Law, vol. 16, 2004, 25-52)
Achilles Skordas*, Nicholas Sitaropoulos**
I. Introduction
In 1999, one of the authors of the present paper expressed serious
doubts in this journal as to whether Greece could be characterized as a
safe host country, despite the recent reform of its refugee law.[1]
Following that, it has been contended, again in this journal, that the
practice of the so-called 'Appeals Board', as restructured by the
1999 reform, constituted a major positive development.[2] The explicit
optimism of the above article implicitly suggested that Greece could
harmonize its refugee law with international standards. However, the
'Appeals Board' is not of a judicial nature, having a purely
consultative status with the administration; this is why we prefer the
term 'consultative appeals committee'.[3] Moreover, despite its
positive contribution, the above committee has not been able to
reorient the fundamental directions of the practice of the Greek
Ministry of Public Order which is responsible for the implementation of
the asylum legislation.
In May 2000, the British High Court (Queen's Bench Division) applied
the Dublin Convention in the case of R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Bouheraoua and ex parte Kerkeb.[4] The
applicants were Algerian nationals, who were threatened by non-state
agents in their country of origin. The Court refused to allow their
return to Greece because it considered that there was a real risk that
the Greek authorities would apply, not the protection, but the
accountability principle with respect to victims of non-state agents.
The Court of Appeal upheld this judgment.[5] However, in the Elshani
and Berisha case, British courts adopted the contrary position and
considered Greece as a safe host country to which Kosovo Albanians
could be returned.[6] Finally, the British High Court recently (late
2002) rejected similar arguments of Sudanese applicants in the case
Hanoun Baghtr Manoun Miedhat, Philip Shakir Fakhori Rimon and Fawzi
Gleddis Talaat.[7]
The position of UNHCR (Headquarters) with respect to Greece and the
application of the Dublin Convention was formulated in an internal
paper dated 15 July 1999[8] as an answer to an Austrian NGO. This
letter made clear that UNHCR considers that Greece generally observes
the principle of non-refoulement and that the fundamental deficit of
the Greek system is focused on the failure to satisfy the 'basic
subsistence needs' of refugees and asylum-seekers.[9]
The Greek legal practice after 1999 has convinced us that Greece is
still a non-safe host country for refugees, without distinction between
those transferred under the Dublin system or those directly arriving
from a third country and requesting asylum. The non-provision of aid to
refugees for the satisfaction of their 'basic subsistence needs' is
only one aspect of the problem. In fact, the Greek refugee system is
unfair not in the moral, but in a strictly legal sense. In 2002 and
2003, UNHCR Athens stressed the seriously defective application of
Greek asylum law by the Ministry of Public Order, mainly due to chronic
shortages of human resources and lack of appropriately trained
personnel.[10] The same office has expressed its serious concern at the
stark fall of the Convention refugee status recognition rate in 2002 in
Greece to 0.3% from 11.2% in 2001, while the respective EU average in
2002 was 10.6% and in 2001 it was 15.8%.[11] In 2003 the refugee status
recognition rate in Greece fell further to a record rate of 0.06%[12].
Due to the structural deficits of the Greek system an effective refugee
protection cannot be afforded unless a radical reform is introduced,
which seems very unlikely at the present time.
It should be noted that the lack of effective refugee protection is not
the 'fallout' of a security-oriented policy; after all, Greek
refugee legislation has never been particularly sensitive vis-à-vis
the threat of terrorism. It is noteworthy that domestic law still does
not confer upon the administration the competence to apply the
exclusion clause of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees during the procedure of refugee recognition. To activate the
clause, it is necessary to undertake an interpretative exercise of
national and international law, which is beyond the everyday operations
of a standardized administrative practice.[13] It is worth mentioning
that for many years Greece has acquiesced both to the activities of the
members of the Serbian élite in the Milosevic era[14] and, until 1999,
when Abdullah Oçalan was arrested in Kenya, to the political presence
of PKK in Greece. Over almost three decades, the Greek public opinion
has been rather sympathetic towards the different kinds of
'guerillas' in Western Europe, as well as towards the armed
activities of Palestinian organisations against Israel. The response of
Greek public opinion in the post-September 11 revealed once more the
irrationality of the domestic discourse concerning terrorism.[15]
The deficiencies of the Greek asylum system have to do with its
`archaism', its calculated ambivalence towards the legal situation of
the victims of non-state agents, the lack of effective remedies and,
last but not least, the absence of adequate social protection of
refugees and asylum seekers.
II. Main features of Greek refugee law
The legal status of refugees in Greece is determined by articles 24 and
25 of Law 1975/1991 on the legal status of aliens[16] (as amended by,
inter alia, Law 2452/1996 on the legal status of refugees[17]), by
Presidential Decree 61/1999 on refugee status recognition
procedure,[18] by the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 1951[19] and by the New York Protocol of 1967.[20] Greece
is also bound by the Dublin Convention[21] and by the Convention
Applying the Schengen Agreement.[22]
As far as recognition of refugee status is concerned, article 25.1 of
Law 1975/1991, as subsequently amended, as well as article 1 of
Presidential Decree 61/1999, make a direct reference to article 1A of
the Geneva Convention, as well as to the New York Protocol. The Greek
legislation incorporates, thus, the normative order of the Geneva
Convention into the domestic legal order. However, despite that formal
incorporation, Greek practice often seems to ignore international norms
and to neglect domestic jurisprudence. A good example is offered by Law
1975/1991 before its modification in the year 1996. The law attempted
to restrict the application field of the Geneva Convention through the
introduction of two additional criteria of admissibility for the
recognition of the refugee status. According to article 25.1a before
the enactment of Law 2452/1996, an alien's application for her/his
recognition as a refugee was inadmissible if it was not submitted
immediately upon her/his arrival to the competent authorities at the
frontier. The applicant was to be recognized as refugee according to
article 25.1b of Law 1975/1991, only if (s)he came directly from a
country where her/his life or freedom would be threatened, according to
the Geneva Convention.
These provisions had been sharply criticized in the legal and political
discourse because they conveyed wide powers of discretion to the
military and police authorities. In administrative practice, these
provisions led to refoulement of asylum-seekers, although they had a
well-founded fear of persecution, merely because their country of
origin did not have a common border with Greece or because they arrived
through a transit country.[23] It should be mentioned that the above
provision of the law was enacted and subsequently applied, despite the
fact that the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece, the Council of
State, had already decided in its Judgment 830 of 1985[24] that,
according to article 1A of the Geneva Convention, it is not necessary
for a refugee to arrive in the country of asylum directly from the
country of persecution. Both Law 1975/1991, adopted six years after the
above judgment, and the subsequent administrative practice ignored this
jurisprudence, even though article 28.1 of the Greek Constitution
stipulates that 'the generally recognized rules of international law,
as well as international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned
by statute and become operative according to their respective
conditions, shall be an integral part of domestic Greek law and shall
prevail over any contrary provision of the law'.[25] The Council of
State reaffirmed its jurisprudence in its Judgment 3103/1997 which,
however, had been adopted after the modification of the law. Article 2
of Law 2452/1996, followed by Presidential Decree 61/1999, abolished
altogether the conditions of admissibility provided for in Law
1975/1991. It is a fact, however, that both legislation and the
administration face difficulties in incorporating the letter and the
spirit of international agreements into domestic law and practice.
According to article 1.1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 any alien may
apply to be recognised as a refugee under the 1951 Geneva
Convention/1967 New York Protocol, upon their entry into Greek
territory. The asylum application is to be lodged in writing or orally
with any Greek authority. Article 1.1 specifically stresses that an
asylum applicant includes not only a person who expressly 'requests
asylum' in Greece, but also anybody who 'in any manner whatever
asks not to be deported to another country on the ground of fear of
persecution' on any of the five Geneva Convention grounds. The same
provision proscribes the applicant's 'removal'
('apomakrynsi') from Greece in any manner whatsoever until the
delivery of a final administrative decision upon the application. In
case the authority that receives the asylum claim is not a police
authority, it is to forward ex officio the relevant claim to the
competent police authority.[26]
The asylum claim is to be lodged by the refugee applicant in person and
includes all 'protected members' of his/her family, that is, the
applicant's spouse, unmarried children under the age of 18 of both
spouses, as well as their parents and their children over the age of 18
who have special mental or physical needs and may not lodge an
autonomous asylum application.[27] An asylum application may also be
lodged by an alien minor between the age of 14 and 18, unaccompanied by
their parents, on condition that the authorities may conclude that the
unaccompanied minor is mentally mature enough to 'realise the
significance' of that application. In any other event, the case of an
unaccompanied minor (under 18) is to be referred by the police to a
public prosecutor who is authorised by the same statute to act as the
minor's guardian.[28]
Competent authorities for processing asylum applications are the
'aliens' sub-directorates or units', the 'security units of the
airports' and the 'security sub-directorates or units of police
directorates'.[29] All these authorities are parts of the Greek
Ministry of Public Order (Police). Article 2.2 of Presidential Decree
61/1999 enjoins the examination of the asylum application within a
period of three months, except for the cases of applications lodged in
(air)ports where the applications are to be examined on the same day
(accelerated asylum procedure, see below). The authority that examines
and prepares the file regarding the asylum application is to forward
the file to its superior aliens police directorate or sub-directorate.
The asylum file is then to be forwarded to the asylum office of the
Ministry of Public Order.[30] Convention refugee status is recognised
by a decision issued by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public
Order following the recommendation of the state security directorate of
the above Ministry.[31] The duration of Convention refugee status in
Greece is five years, renewable.[32]
An asylum application is to be examined according to the accelerated
procedure provided for by article 4 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 in
the following cases:
- The asylum application is lodged upon arrival at the point of entry
in an (air)port;
- The application is manifestly unfounded and the persecution claims
are obviously unsubstantiated, fraudulent or abusive of the asylum
procedure;[33]
- The applicant comes from a third safe host country where the
applicant has no risk of being persecuted on any of the Convention
grounds, nor of being refouled to the country of nationality or
habitual residence.[34]
In the second and third cases, article 4 of Presidential Decree 61/1999
makes an express reference to the 1992 Resolutions of the EU
Immigration Ministers regarding manifestly unfounded asylum
applications and the concept of safe third host country, stipulating
that these Resolutions should be used as interpretative guidelines in
practice, along with the UNHCR Executive Committee Resolutions no. 30
and no. 58. The authority that decides upon these applications is the
chief of the section of police, security and order of the Ministry of
Public Order, following a recommendation of the directorate of state
security of the Ministry of Public Order.[35] According to article 1.1
sub-para 1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 as an asylum seeker is also
to be regarded any alien who is forwarded back to Greece from another
EU member state in accordance with the Dublin Convention. The asylum
cases transferred to Greece from another EU member state are examined
under the normal or the accelerated asylum procedures, depending on the
circumstances of the case.[36]
III. The issue of persecution by non-state agents in Greek refugee law
As is widely accepted by legal theory and state practice the Geneva
Convention protects not only persons who have a well-founded fear of
being persecuted by agents acting as organs of the state, but also by
private persons who act either on behalf of the state or as members of
revolutionary movements, or even by local populace where the
authorities do not provide effective protection against such
persecution. Although state practice may differ as to the exact scope
and legal justification of the protection of persons persecuted by
private groups, there is no doubt that the Geneva Convention does not
limit the application of article 1A to persecution by the authorities
and organs of the state. Such a conclusion may be drawn not only
through the direct interpretation of the above Convention, but also
through the international law state responsibility[37]. The question is
whether and to what extent the Greek authorities recognize non-state
actor persecution.
The question of the agents of persecution has not yet been dealt with
by the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece, the Council of State,
which is competent to control the legality of administrative acts
(article 95.1a of the Constitution). Since the rejection by the
administration of an asylum application constitutes an administrative
act, the Council of the State is also competent to decide on the
legality of acts refusing recognition of refugee status. In the
above-mentioned Judgments 830/1985 and 932/1988, the applicant was a
Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin who feared persecution as a member of
a Youth Organisation banned by the Turkish authorities. In Judgments
3832/1992[38] and 3833/1992, the applicants belonged to the Tamil
minority in Sri Lanka and feared persecution by the authorities. In
Judgment 3103/1997, the applicant was an Iraqi Kurd who had arrived in
Greece via Turkey. He requested refugee status in Greece because he had
a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq, but also in Turkey, where
he was threatened by members of a rival Iraqi organisation to the
Kurdish party in which he participated. His application was rejected by
the administration on grounds of admissibility in the aforementioned
sense of article 25.1 of Law 1975/1991. The Council of State quashed
the administrative act on the ground that the reasoning of the act was
inadequate. The Court did not specifically deal with the issue of the
agents of persecution. Finally, in Judgment 3381/1997,[39] which
quashed an administrative decision rejecting an application for ab
initio examination of an asylum application, the applicants were also
Tamil who maintained that they feared persecution by the authorities in
Sri Lanka.
A more recent case dealt with the application of Ali Ali, son of
Hussein and Qadria, Iraqi citizen, born in Iraq in 1946. The applicant,
who lived in Northern Iraq, fled his country to avoid persecution by
the two dominant political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan, namely KDP and
PUK. On 7 November 1997, he applied for asylum in Greece. His
application was initially rejected by the decision
9135/31466/26.04.1998 of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Public Order. The applicant appealed against that decision to the
Minister of Public Order, who rejected the application by Decision
9135/31466/23.11.1998. A week later, the Ministry of Public Order
adopted Decision 9135/31466-597523/30.11.1998, according to which the
applicant had to leave Greece in three months. In a relatively recent
written statement concerning the Ali Ali case, the Greek Ministry of
Public Order communicated some information to the UK Immigration and
Nationality Dept, Third Country Unit, Croydon, UK.[40] According to the
document:
'2. The applicant did not present any element relative to his claims
for fear of persecution. These concerned the fear of his return to
Iraq, due to the fact that he had deserted the army and the obstacles
he faced at his professional activities (painter) in the area of
Northern Iraq.
3. (...)
4. There is no doubt that our country applies the "protection"
approach to all asylum applications'.
This statement contradicts the Decision 9135/31466/23.11.1998 of the
Minister of Public Order rejecting the asylum application of Ali Ali
that had stated the following: 'The flight of the applicant from
Northern Iraq was due to threats by the two Kurdish parties KDP and
PUK; this cannot support the application for asylum, because the
threats are not attributed to state authorities and do not justify fear
of persecution in the sense of the Geneva Convention'.
The case, through an application for annulment, was brought before the
Greek Council of State on 10 February 1999 and is still (early 2004)
pending. It is therefore clear that, according to recent practice,
Greece does not offer effective refugee protection to victims of
non-state persecution and does not apply the protection principle,
contrary to some public statements otherwise.
This kind of misinformation effort can be clearly derived from the
Greek authorities' response to the request of the UK Immigration
Service in the Bouheraoua and Kerkeb case. The Service describes as
follows the communication with the Greek Ministry of Public Order on
the Ali Ali file and decision:
'I would further draw the Court's attention to the fact that the
decision issued simply contains a summary of the reasons for refusal. I
understand that the file contains a more fully reasoned explanation by
way of an internal submission. I have asked that a copy of this fuller
document be sent to me. I spoke to Mr. Galatoulas about this on 2nd May
2001, but understand that the document is a confidential internal
memorandum and that it is not possible to disclose it to me'[41].
The response of the Greek authorities clearly qualifies the nature and
character of the administrative practice: there exists a
'reasoning' with respect to the administrative acts rejecting the
asylum application, which is included in the file of the applicant.
However, the information cannot be disclosed. Therefore, it can
reasonably be concluded that the applicant himself is unable to respond
to that information. The Ali case has been decided on the basis of
information and reasons undisclosed to the applicant and to the
authorities of a Contracting State to the Dublin Convention.
Non-disclosure of the relevant information and inconsistencies of the
authorities render a fair hearing impossible and diminish the
credibility of the Greek Ministry of Public Order.
The statistics on the practice of the administration vis-à-vis
Sudanese nationals in general may be helpful as an example
demonstrating the insufficiencies and inconsistencies of the Greek
refugee policy. As far as the number of Sudanese refugee applicants
recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention is concerned, the
Greek practice has been hitherto restrictive. According to the official
statistics of the Greek Ministry of Public Order, regarding the years
1996-2002, the situation is as follows:
1996: three applications, one recognition decision;
1997: six applications, no recognition decision;
1998: twenty applications, two recognition decisions;
1999: seventeen applications, eleven recognition decisions;
2000: forty one applications, five recognition decisions;
2001: forty five applications, six recognition decisions;
2002: fifty eight applications, one recognition decision.
The above data show that in Greece in the above six years (1996-2001)
out of 132 refugee status applications of Sudanese nationals, only 25
were accepted. It is unfortunately not possible to draw any conclusions
on the question of the agents of persecution from the relevant
administrative decisions because they are not accessible. Another cause
for concern is the great fluctuation in the number of
'applications/recognitions' from year to year in the above period.
Moreover, according to statistics of the Greek Ministry of Public
Order, from 1997 until and 2001 there were 1,715 'humanitarian
status' recognition or renewal decisions. Out of these 'positive'
administrative decisions only 33 concerned Sudanese nationals, although
Sudan is a state with enormous humanitarian problems. It is noteworthy
that Greece still does not have a legal regime for the protection of
victims of armed conflict (on these issues, see below).
IV. Humanitarian Status and Temporary Protection
Article 24.4 of Law 1975/1991, in conjunction with article 8 of
Presidential Decree 61/1999, introduced another category of persons who
were protected on 'humanitarian grounds'. 'Humanitarian refugee
status'[42] in Greece is provided for by article 25.4 of Law
1975/1991, as amended by Law 2452/1996,[43] in conjunction with article
8 of Presidential Decree 61/1999. According to article 25.4 of Law
1975/1991, the Minister of Public Order 'in exceptional cases,
particularly for humanitarian reasons, may approve the temporary
residence of an alien whose refugee status application has been
rejected, until his departure from [Greece] becomes possible'.[44]
Article 8 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 provides the substantive and
procedural details regarding the application of article 25.4 of Law
1975/1991. Article 8 stipulates that an alien whose refugee status
application has been finally rejected by the administration (Secretary
General of Ministry of Public Order) and who has been granted a
temporary residence permit by the above executive organ, according to
article 25.4, is provided by the police with a 'special residence
card for humanitarian reasons', valid for one year, subject to
renewal. This residence card covers the alien's family (according to
the aforementioned family definition of article 1.3 of Presidential
Decree 61/1999), as well. As a consequence, in practice humanitarian
refugee status may in principle be applied for, or granted ex officio
by the Ministry of Public Order, only after an initial rejection by the
administration of Convention refugee status. Article 8.2 of
Presidential Decree 61/1999 has indicatively laid down the following
substantive criteria that 'should in particular be taken into
consideration' by the Ministry of Public Order for granting a
humanitarian residence permit:
(a) It is objectively impossible for the asylum seeker to be removed or
to return to his/her country of origin or habitual residence due to
force majeure (eg serious health reasons in relation to the main
refugee applicant or members of his family, existence of an
international embargo against the alien's country, civil war followed
by massive violations of human rights);
(b) The fulfilment of the requirements of the principle of
non-refoulement as enshrined in article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), or in article 3 of the UN Convention against
Torture (CAT), both ratified by Greece.[45] Article 3 ECHR prescribes
that '[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment'. Article 3.1 CAT is expressly
alien protection-oriented, proscribing the expulsion, return or
extradition of persons 'where there are substantial grounds for
believing that [these persons] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture'. The CAT has specified that for determining the existence of
such prohibitive grounds, the contracting states are to take into
account 'all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the
existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights' (article 3.2 CAT). The
above provisions have been effectively interpreted and applied by the
competent judicial organs (European Court of Human Rights and the UN
Committee against Torture) in cases involving extradition or
deportation of aliens, including asylum seekers.[46]
With regard to the substantive conditions for granting humanitarian
refugee status, Greek refugee law, as already mentioned, proscribes the
return of a rejected refugee applicant if this return is impossible for
force majeure reasons related to the applicant's person, or his/her
family's or their state of origin. The law also makes express
reference to article 3 ECHR and article 3 CAT that provide a wide
protective spectrum in favour of persons in need of effective
international protection.
In order, though, for Greek administrative authorities to apply these
international human rights protection standards and principles on the
domestic plane, they need to be aware of the relevant international
human rights law doctrine and, above all, of the relevant dynamic,
evolving jurisprudence of the competent judicial organs.[47] This is a
really crucial problem regarding the implementation of the above
international legal standards by the Greek administration. It is at
least questionable whether the competent Greek administrative organs
have the necessary background to apply those standards on a practical
basis.
Factual grounds on which humanitarian refugee status has been granted
in Greece by the Ministry of Public Order are the following:
international embargo against the country of origin, long residence in
Greece, young age, family or health reasons, dire economic situation in
the country of origin and civil war or indiscriminate violence in the
country of origin. It is to be noted that victims of civil war,
especially when ethnic or tribal grounds are involved, have also been
granted humanitarian refugee status.[48] However, the problem with
Greek refugee law is that it recognizes no right for a humanitarian
status. This decision lies within the absolute discretion of the
administration.
Greek refugee law does not provide for any deadline regarding the
examination of humanitarian refugee status applications in cases where
this has been submitted by a rejected refugee applicant. By contrast,
the law enjoins the examination of an asylum application within three
months from the lodging of that application. However, in practice,
ordinary asylum examinations (asylum interviews) in the region of
Attica, which receives the vast majority of asylum applications,
usually take place a year after the lodging of the relevant
application. As a consequence, this produces a serious additional delay
to the procedure for humanitarian status applications which depend upon
the initial rejection of a refugee status application.
Exceptions exist where the Ministry of Public Order grants ex officio
humanitarian refugee status, rejecting the refugee status application
in first instance, as it is entitled to do by virtue of article 25.4 of
Law 1975/1991 in conjunction with article 8 of Presidential Decree
61/1999. Greek law does not provide for the participation of any other
non-ministerial organ in the procedure that leads to the granting of
humanitarian refugee status. Although in asylum appeal instances the
consultative appeals committee[49] is also involved, the Minister is
not bound by its recommendation. In fact an informal information
provided by a subordinate police officer, which is not communicated to
the participants to the procedure, may weigh more than the
recommendation of the appeals committee and may substantially influence
a decision of the Minister of Public Order regarding the granting or
refusal of humanitarian status.
Humanitarian refugee status in Greece is considered by Greek law as
temporary. This is particularly evident in Presidential Decree 189/1998
on refugee employment. Article 4 of this Decree provides for the right
to temporary employment of, among others, humanitarian refugees, "in
order to cover their immediate life needs". Self-employment of
humanitarian refugees is not allowed.
The duration of the protection provided by humanitarian refugee status
is one year and may be renewed annually by the administration for as
long as the factual background that enjoins this status persists.[50]
In practice though several humanitarian refugees encounter difficulties
in renewing their humanitarian refugee cards,[51] a fact flowing from
the relevant inadequate law that provides the administration (subject
to no substantive judicial control) with a wide discretion when
deciding upon such cases in first instance or on appeal.
A third category of protected persons was introduced by Law 2452/1996.
Art. 25.6 of Law 1975/1991, as modified, provides for the temporary
protection of specific groups of aliens who seek protection in Greece
for reasons of force majeure. These persons can be temporarily admitted
into the country. The above provision is designed to protect specific
groups, usually the victims of armed conflict, who seek protection in
Greece. The protected persons need not apply for recognition of
refugee status, but they remain in the country provisionally until the
force majeure in their country of origin no longer exists. The exact
scope of the provision has to be specified by a common ministerial
decision of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Public Order,
Finance and Social Security. The necessary ministerial decision has not
yet (early 2004) been issued, more than seven years after the enactment
of the above Law 2452/1996. This fact alone demonstrates the
unwillingness of the Greek authorities to provide temporary protection
to victims of armed conflict.
V. Asylum Review Procedures in Greece
In case the Convention refugee status application is rejected, the
refugee applicant may appeal[52] the decision of the Secretary General
of the Ministry of Public Order to the Minister of Public Order within
thirty days from notification. The Minister has to reach a decision on
the appeal within ninety days since the filing of the appeal. The
relevant deadlines are much shorter in cases of 'accelerated asylum
procedures' provided for by article 4 of Presidential Decree
61/1999.[53] The ministerial decision on the appeal is to be preceded
by the submission to the Minister of a relevant non-binding
recommendation by the, mainly administrative, six-member consultative
appeals committee which actually examines the appellant in person. This
committee consists of the legal counsellor of the Ministry of Public
Order (chair), a legal counsellor of the Foreign Ministry, an officer
of the Foreign Ministry diplomatic corps, an officer of the Greek
Police Force, a representative of the Athens Bar and the Legal
Protection Officer of UNHCR BO for Greece. In current practice, the
Minister of Public Order follows less or about half of the appeals
committee's recommendations.
If the appeal is rejected, the case may be reviewed ab initio by the
Ministry of Public Order on condition that the applicant is able to
produce 'new crucial evidence regarding himself or members of his
family, which, if known before the final decision [of the
administration], would constitute a basic criterion for his refugee
status recognition'. No ab initio examination, though, is allowed
with respect to applications under the 'accelerated asylum
procedures'.
As is obvious, the whole asylum procedure, including the relevant
appeal stage, is of a wholly administrative character. Contrary to
European asylum norms regarding impartiality and procedural
fairness,[54] as well as to established practice in other EU states, it
is in effect the same administrative branch (Ministry of Public Order)
that adjudicates on asylum cases both in first instance and on appeal.
This practice is in sharp contrast to international human rights and
refugee law, as well as the fundamental principle of objectivity and
impartiality that should characterize all aspects of the asylum
process. Moreover there is no judicial means for examining the asylum
application on its merits and this is another major deficiency of Greek
refugee law.[55] These very serious drawbacks of the Greek asylum
procedure have been made public and brought to the attention of the
Greek administration by the Greek National Commission for Human
Rights.[56]
The situation is compounded by the fact that the relevant
administrative case law is not publicly available, in contrast to the
practice prevailing in many other EU member states. This makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to propose any kind of
effective legal defence for refugee applicants, contrary to fundamental
human rights law standards regarding the fairness of the relevant legal
procedures.[57] At the same time, due to this legal opaqueness, there
is no actual practical reason for the administration to produce a
coherent asylum jurisprudence that could contribute to the
establishment of the required minimum, at least, legal safety.
The only Greek court that may examine an asylum case on points of law
(judicial review) is the Council of State before which an appeal
('aitissi akyrossis'='application for annulment') may be lodged
against the final negative administrative decision.[58] Through this
procedure, the Council of State has jurisdiction to review
administrative acts solely for violations of law or abuse of
discretionary power.[59] The Council of State also has the power to
order the suspension of the administrative deportation order of a
refugee applicant until the issue of its judgment on the above appeal.
This suspension order is conditioned on the ability of the above Court
to conclude that the deportation would inadvertently harm the
applicant.[60] However, the application for stay of execution does not
have in itself a suspensive effect, with the consequence that the
applicant can be deported before the Council of State orders the
suspension of the deportation. Although the administration usually
abstains from the deportation procedure upon the lodging of a
suspension application, this practice is not based on hard law and does
not correspond to a respective right of the applicant. In that respect,
the Greek system is inconsistent with the principles and standards
enunciated in Conka and constitutes a violation of the right to an
effective remedy (article 13 ECHR).[61] In practice, the overall
annulment application procedure is extremely lengthy, usually exceeding
three years, due to the heavy caseload of the Greek Council of State
and its lack of human resources.
Article 25.4 of Law 1975/1991, in conjunction with article 8 of
Presidential Decree 61/1999, provides for the humanitarian refugee
status procedure.[62] Humanitarian refugee status, as already noted,
may be granted by the Ministry of Public Order on condition that
Convention refugee status has been rejected in the first place. Greek
refugee law does not provide for any reasoning of the humanitarian
refugee status decisions, similar to the ordinary refugee status
decisions. However, reasoning for negative administrative actions is
prescribed by Greek administrative law. In practice, the relevant
administrative (Ministry of Public Order) decisions, inaccessible to
the public, are very short and include similarly short reasoning
sentences, in sharp contrast to the prescriptions of the aforementioned
case law of the Greek Council of State[63] and relevant fundamental
principles of Greek administrative law. UNHCR, Athens has criticized
the reasoning of the asylum decisions by the Greek Minister of Public
Order in the first instance and on appeal for being 'generic and
inadequate'[64].
In contrast to Convention refugee status procedure, no administrative
appeal procedure is provided for by Greek refugee law with regard to
humanitarian refugee status cases. This serious procedural defect is
arguably due to the fact that the humanitarian refugee status procedure
is not autonomous but de iure dependent on the Convention refugee
status (non-)recognition procedure. The aforementioned possibility for
an exceptional application for ab initio examination is provided for
only with regard to the Convention refugee status applications which
have been rejected in first instance by the administration. As a
consequence, in these cases the only legal means of appeal remains the
application for annulment before the Council of State which is barred
by law from examining the merits of a case.
VI. Legal aid
Until 4 February 2004, when the first statute on legal aid (Law
3226/2004[65]) entered into force, in practice legal aid for aliens and
asylum-seekers was non-existent in Greece. Greece actually has been
found by the ECrtHR to be in breach of the right to a fair trial in two
cases regarding aliens to whom legal aid was not available in order to
appeal to the Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos).[66] In both cases the
appellants were aliens without means who had become involved in
criminal trials in Greece. In both cases, the ECrtHR held that Greece
had violated article 6, paras 1 and 3 (c) of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).[67] The Greek National Commission for Human Rights
(NCHR) expressed its grave concern at the lack of legal aid in Greece
in its relevant report of 25 June 2001 and called upon the Greek state
to proceed to the establishment of a comprehensive legal aid scheme
programme[68]. Law 3226/2004 on legal aid is the first attempt of the
Greek state to establish such a programme. It is to be noted though
that this statute (article 1.1) conditions the provision of state legal
aid to third country nationals on the latter's legal, permanent or
habitual, residence in the European Union. Arguably this condition
contravenes the civil right to legal aid, as established in
contemporary international and European human rights law[69]. The above
Law's scope covers only criminal, civil and commercial litigation. As
a consequence, legal aid for asylum litigation, which is of a purely
administrative nature, is still not provided for by Greek law.
The serious lack of legal aid has been glaring for decades, in contrast
with other European countries, in cases of aliens without means,
chiefly asylum-seekers - particularly vulnerable individuals who
require special protection. The sole legal assistance up to now in
these cases has come from non-governmental organisations, sometimes in
collaboration with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and,
occasionally, from Bar Associations.
In civil and criminal cases, legal aid is now regulated by Law
3226/2004. This Law in fact abolished the provision of article 195
para. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in accordance with which the
poverty benefit should be accorded to aliens on condition of
reciprocity. The condition of reciprocity in this provision was
contrary to the mandates of modern human rights law. Article 6 (1) of
the ECHR also safeguards the right of all persons, without any
discrimination on the basis of nationality, to a fair trial in cases of
rights and obligations of a civil nature. Legal aid is provided,
according to article 1 of Law 3226/2004 to 'citizens with low
income', that is, individuals 'whose annual family income does not
exceed the two thirds of the lowest annual personal salaries provided
for by the National General Collective Employment Agreement'. Greek
law makes no provision for the granting of legal aid in the advisory
stages of a civil or criminal case, where the provision of legal
assistance plays a catalytic role in regard to the successful outcome
of the relevant legal proceedings and the safeguarding of the relevant
legal interests of the individual without means.
Even though legal aid in administrative law cases is not covered by
Greek statutory legislation, the Council of State (Greek Supreme
Administrative Court), in its judgments 515/2000 (Section B) and
521/2000 (Section B),[70] basing itself on article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Law 2462/1997),
on article 6 ECHR, and on article 20.1 of the Greek Constitution, has
proceeded to a wide interpretation of relevant Greek legislation. The
Council of State, in applying, by analogy, Articles 194-204 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, has expressly recognised the right of a lawyer's
assistance for persons without means in proceedings before it, and not
merely the exception of the indigent litigant from the payment of
charges and a bond stipulated by Presidential Decree 18/1989
concerning the Council of State.
There has been no case law so far of the ECrtHR relating to the
conformity of Greek refugee law with the European Convention on Human
Rights. In Dougoz v Greece, the applicant had requested asylum in
Greece, but the merits of his application were related to the
conditions of detention pending expulsion. The Court decided that
Greece was in breach of article 3 ECHR because the conditions of
detention of aliens, whilst awaiting their expulsion, amounted to
inhuman or degrading treatment. Greece also violated article 5 of the
Convention because the arrest of the applicant with a view to ensuring
his deportation was arbitrary and the domestic courts did not have the
power to control the lawfulness of the detention.[71] In Peers v
Greece the Court has found Greece in breach of article 3 ECHR due to
the conditions of detention in the Koridallos prison in Athens. The
significance of the above case is that it disclosed, inter alia, the
enormous drug problem in Greek prisons.[72]
In 2002 the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, in similar
fashion to international human rights organisations, issued a report
which stressed the serious deficiencies of the current Greek asylum
procedure, regarding, inter alia, the problematic situation of
non-recognition, in many cases, by Greek authorities of the asylum
seekers' right to access to lawyers upon their arrival in Greece, and
the lack of information by the Greek authorities to asylum seekers
regarding the relevant Greek procedures.[73]
On 15 June 2002, 45 international (including Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch) and Greek human rights NGOs also stressed publicly
that:
'Greek NGOs have documented an almost systematic absence of competent
translators during examination by law enforcement officials or in
court. Moreover, the Greek authorities frequently fail to inform
foreigners of their rights, refuse them asylum application forms or
even provide misleading information. Undocumented migrants or asylum
seekers have often been tried without benefit of legal counsel, and
sentenced to imprisonment or deportation after trials lasting only a
few minutes. Detention conditions are in many cases degrading and
inhumane, and access to lawyers and NGOs has been severely and
arbitrarily limited. When authorized representatives of detainees have
requested the full documentation for their cases, this has been denied
by the authorities, on the grounds that this might hinder efforts to
deport them'.[74]
The above statement has been corroborated by a report of June 2002 on
the issue of transfer of asylum seekers from Norway to Greece in the
context of the Dublin Convention, issued by the Norwegian Organisation
for Asylum Seekers (NOAS) and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.[75]
According to this report, based on the above NGOs' recent visit to
Greece:
'the Greek system of asylum appears strongly objectionable on several
accounts: by not providing all refugees with basic information,
interpretation and judicial assistance; by extensive use of detention,
even of children; and by what appears as tactical means to prevent
refugees from seeking asylum. Furthermore, the Greek system of asylum
appears to be excessively (and most likely inconsistently) strict. On
the other hand, it would be wrong to regard it as unpredictable,
insofar as it seems predictable that most asylum applications are
rejected'.
The report concludes stressing that 'Greece is in a difficult
situation, in which the country neither has the possibility to turn
down requests of transfer from countries further north in accordance
with the Dublin Convention, nor the means to properly take care of
asylum seekers once they are transferred to Greece'.
VII. Welfare (social rights) of refugees and asylum-seekers in Greece
The living conditions for refugees and asylum seekers in Greece have
been characterised as harsh by the UNHCR BO for Greece, while the Greek
National Commission for Human Rights recently expressed its serious
concern at this issue, submitting specific proposals to the Greek
state.[76] These harsh living conditions have been prevailing in Greece
for many years, a situation that according to UNHCR BO for Greece is
due to the inertia of the competent Greek authorities who allegedly
'fear that the amelioration of living conditions of refugees would
constitute an attraction for more asylum seekers'[77].
Accommodation for asylum seekers, humanitarian (de facto) refugees and
Convention refugees, is a major issue that has not been effectively
tackled as yet by the Greek state. Even though Greek law has provided
for the establishment of more asylum seekers' centres since 1991 (Law
1975/1991, article 24.2), Greece currently has two permanent
(established by law) state reception centres for asylum seekers and
refugees in operation, funded entirely by the Health and Social Welfare
Ministry. The first and oldest one is at Lavrio (south of Athens) and
has capacity for a maximum of three hundred persons[78]. A second
permanent state reception center for asylum seekers with capacity of
one hundred persons was established in Athens on 12 December 2002.[79]
Since 1997 NGOs have become increasingly active in the field of refugee
reception. In 1997, two small reception centres were established in
Attica, managed by the Hellenic Red Cross and Médecins du
Monde-Grèce, both partially funded by the EU. More small reception
centers have been opened in and out of Athens after 1997 by NGOs. In
2003 there were eight (including the two permanent) reception centres
in Greece with a total capacity of 1,300 persons[80].
However, the refugee status applications (an application may involve
more than one individual) in 1998 were 2,953, in 1999 were 1,528, in
2000 were 3,083, in 2001 were 5,499 and in 2002 were 5,664. From these
figures it is evident that the majority of asylum seekers in Greece
remain, in effect, homeless, at least during the first stage of their
residency. In the majority of cases of refugee applicants, the waiting
period until the delivery of the first administrative decision exceeds
one year. In Attica, there are cases exceeding even two years.
Moreover, priority at the Lavrio centre has been given by the
centre's NGOs-managers to vulnerable individual cases, such as
unaccompanied minors, elderly people and persons with special needs.
The Convention refugees' right to employment was not recognized in
Greece until the enactment of Presidential Decree 209, in 1994.[81]
According to the subsequent Presidential Decree 189/1998,[82]
recognized Convention refugees and their spouses have the right to
self- and wage-earning employment, as long as they have refugee status
in Greece (Convention refugees are entitled to a five years'
residence permit, renewable). Greek law also provides for the
participation of Convention refugees in the vocational training schemes
of the Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) on the same terms as the
Greek citizens.[83]
Employment of asylum seekers was first recognized in 1998 but is
subject to an extremely strict legislative regime. The above Decree
allows these persons to be employed 'temporarily in order to cover
their immediate life needs'. Asylum seekers are allowed to work on
condition they have been issued with an asylum seeker's card (which
in practice, especially in Athens with the main bulk of asylum
applications, includes a waiting period of at least 6 months), and they
are not housed at the reception centre at Lavrio. This is a provision
that discriminates in effect against the asylum seekers resident in the
Lavrio centre. Greek law excludes these people from employment because
they are provided with housing, food and social and health care by the
Health Ministry and the NGOs (Hellenic Red Cross and the International
Social Services) that currently run the Lavrio centre. It is, though,
doubtful whether these persons can make a decent living while being
asylum seekers in Greece, a waiting period that in many cases,
especially in Athens, exceeds one or even two years. No financial
assistance is in principle provided to them. In effect, Greek law
prompts these persons to seek employment in the informal labour market,
where they are exploited.
Humanitarian refugees may be employed as long as they are recognized as
such. Those refugees' initial residence permit is valid for one year,
renewable. Every working alien in Greece, irrespective of their legal
status, is entitled by Greek law to the same work-related rights and
benefits as native Greeks. However, no vocational training is provided
for by law to qualified asylum seekers or humanitarian refugees,
although in most of the cases these people remain in Greece for over
one year. It is arguable that these people should be expressly allowed
by law to join vocational training schemes and thus contribute to their
own well-being as well as to the host country's development through
lawful employment.
The Greek state does not provide any special financial assistance to
asylum seekers or refugees. Such assistance has always been provided by
Greek NGOs, such as the Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) and the Social
Work Foundation (SWF), both partially funded by UNHCR, to vulnerable
asylum seekers, Convention refugees and humanitarian refugees. UNHCR,
Athens, in its annual report for the year 2002 underlined that 'a
large number of refugees [in Greece] live beneath the poverty
line'.[84] A large number of refugees and asylum seekers are in
practice sheltered and fed by Greek humanitarian (including
church-related) NGOs or by municipalities offering shelter and food to
destitute people. In its report for the year 2000 UNHCR, Athens
condemned the Greek authorities for their non-provision of fundamental
social welfare (food and shelter) care to the vast majority of asylum
seekers and refugees in Greece. UNHCR characteristically stated that
the Greek authorities 'allege that there is a lack of
resources...However it may well be discerned that [the authorities] are
in fact cautious to adopt relevant measures fearing that an
amelioration of living conditions of refugees would be a pull factor
for more asylum seekers. Due to the harsh living conditions of refugees
in Greece, a few of them try to reach other western European states
hoping to find there a more favourable environment'.[85]
Medical, pharmaceutical and hospital services are in principle provided
for by Presidential Decree 266/1999 [86] for all Convention refugees,
asylum seekers and humanitarian refugees, on condition that they are
not covered by insurance and are in need of financial assistance. The
above services include health examinations in state hospitals, health
centres and state regional medical centres, 'para-clinic
examinations', provision of medication prescribed by a doctor in the
above medical centres and hospitals and in-hospital care in state-run
hospitals. However a large number of asylum seekers in the area of
Athens who remain for a long period of time, in practice, without the
asylum seeker's card, issued by the Ministry of Public Order
(Police), due to police staff inadequacy, remain medically uncovered.
These persons remain in effect illegally in the country and are,
according to current law, entitled only to emergency medical care.
VIII. Other legal and political aspects of refugee protection -
concluding remarks
Even though Greece is one of the main EU gateways in the areas of
immigration and asylum, Greek refugee law and policy are still
underdeveloped with a large number of serious drawbacks. Until the
early 1990s Greece actually was a transit country for refugees who
wished to and could be resettled, mainly through projects of UNHCR, to
Western, industrialized states such as the US, Canada or Australia.
Also, until January 1990 there was a bifurcated refugee status
recognition procedure in Greece that allowed refugee status recognition
both by the Greek state and by UNHCR BO for Greece (mandate refugees).
Thus, UNHCR played until then the major role in the refugee status
recognition process, while its role in legal and, above all, social
protection of refugees, now along with a large number of national and
international NGOs, is still significant. The first ever statute of
Greece with special provisions on refugee protection was Aliens Law
1975/1991. This was admittedly a reactive piece of legislation of a
generic, immigration control nature. The asylum-related provisions, in
particular, of that Law laid down only a general asylum framework,
allowing the Greek state to regulate the significant, practical
details, including implementation through Presidential Decrees and
Ministerial Decisions that are subject to no parliamentary scrutiny. A
number of such Decrees and Decisions constitute the main body of
current Greek refugee law.
The Convention refugee population in Greece is currently estimated at
7,000. Greece, with a population of 11 million, receives some of the
lowest numbers of asylum applications in the European Union[87]. The
Greek rate of asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants in the late
1990s was also the second lowest one in the EU: 0.14; while in Belgium,
Ireland and the UK it was 3.52, 2.07 and 1.21 respectively[88]. The
vast majority of asylum seekers in Greece have traditionally been
originating in countries of the Middle East, that is, Turkey, Iraq and
Iran. In 2001-2002 an increase of Afghan refugee applicants took place
due to the political developments in that country.[89]
The relatively small inflow of asylum seekers into Greece is arguably
one of the main factors that has contributed to the undeveloped
character of the Greek refugee regime[90]. Unlike other EU states, such
as the UK or Germany with large immigrant and refugee populations,
refugees and asylum seekers have never been a major issue of public
debate or controversy in Greece, despite their admittedly harsh living
conditions. The civil society is still very weak, it is dependent on
state for the financing of its different activities, and it seems
unwilling to confront the authorities in a way that would cause them a
considerable political cost domestically and internationally.
As a consequence, refugee legal and social protection so far have met
with the indifference, to a great extent, of both the Greek public and
state. By contrast, since the late 1980s the growing number of illegal
immigrants (exceeding half a million), especially from former Eastern
bloc countries, and their presence all over Greece as a very active
labour force, has alarmed the public and become one of the most
controversial widely discussed issues.[91] The Greek state in this case
has been extremely swift in its reaction, first by enacting the
restrictive Aliens Law 1975/1991, then by the 1997 and 2001 illegal
immigrants' regularization procedures, as well as by the latest
Immigration Law 2910/2001 that entered into force on 2 June 2001.[92]
Greece has also been very active in concluding co-operation and
readmission agreements with neighbouring states to combat, inter alia,
illegal immigration. However, Greek asylum law and practice remain
underdeveloped with a large number of serious shortcomings in the areas
of legal and social protection.[93] This situation affects, in
particular, persons in need of international protection who may not
however satisfy the criteria of the Geneva refugee definition, and
whose civil and social rights are, as a rule, especially limited in
host states.
Many aspects of asylum procedure in Greece have given serious concerns
to both UNHCR, Athens, the Greek Ombudsman and the Greek National
Commission for Human Rights. UNHCR, Athens in its latest reports has
emphasized that access to asylum procedure has been problematic
especially in the Athens area, since the competent authorities proceed
to the registration and examination of asylum claims at a very slow
pace, forcing asylum seekers to wait for their first asylum interview
for many months. In addition the Greek Ombudsman has expressed his very
serious concern about the difficulty that asylum seekers have to access
the asylum procedure in Greek border areas, such as border islands of
the Eastern Aegean Sea, when they are arrested and detained by Greek
authorities for illegal entry. The main reasons for this situation,
pinpointed by the Greek Ombudsman in a recent report, are the lack of
provision of information by the authorities to the asylum seekers about
the relevant legal procedure, the lack of state interpreters and the
lack of special education of Greek police and port authorities under
whose jurisdiction the above asylum seekers remain after they have been
arrested.[94]
UNHCR, along with international NGOs like Amnesty International and the
World Organization against Torture (OMCT), have recently recast their
serious doubts and expressed grave concern about disrespect by Greek
authorities towards asylum seekers' absolute right to apply for
asylum on Greek territory, especially when the latter arrive in Greece
through Turkey. In November 2001, UNHCR, Athens, strongly criticized
the Athens Protocol of 8 November 2001 for the Implementation of
article 8 of the Ankara Agreement between Greece and Turkey on
Combating Crime, especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug
Trafficking and Illegal Migration.[95] The major reason for UNHCR's
concern was the non-inclusion in that Protocol of any specific
reference to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 'as
in the case of other readmission agreements that Greece has signed with
third countries'.[96]
In fact, a resurgence of refoulement cases regarding asylum seekers
arriving in Greece from Turkey started after the signing of the above
Protocol. Both Amnesty International and OMCT condemned Greece for the
clear refoulement to Turkey of 34 asylum seekers of Afghan and Iraqi
origin in December 2001.[97] A similar case concerning refoulement by
Greece to Turkey of 14 Afghan asylum seekers was recorded by the Greek
Council for Refugees in February 2002. In 2003 the Greek Section of
Amnesty International recorded more cases of refoulement from Greece to
Turkey.[98]
The Greek National Commission for Human Rights, a new statutory
organisation (National Human Rights Institution established according
to the Paris Principles) with a consultative status with the Greek
state on human rights issues, issued in 2001 two reports on the legal
and social protection of refugees and asylum seekers in Greece. In both
reports, NCHR expressed their serious concern about and pinpointed a
series of major issues of refugee law and practice that called for the
immediate action of the Greek state. In the former report,[99] NCHR
proposed to the competent Ministries a series of amendments regarding
the modernization of Greek asylum law and practice. The particular
issues tackled by that report were the following: transfer of asylum
competence from the Ministry of Public Order to the Ministry of
Interior; freedom of movement of refugees and asylum seekers;
accelerated asylum procedures; asylum seekers in transit zones;
reception centres; information to asylum seekers about Greek asylum
procedure; formation of a state interpreters corps; establishment of a
special asylum task force for emergency cases; education of asylum
personnel; asylum appeal procedure; legal aid for refugee and asylum
seekers; unaccompanied minor refugees.
On 31 January 2002 NCHR expressed publicly its grave concern regarding
the allegations of UNHCR and Amnesty International according to which
Greek authorities have refouled to Turkey asylum seekers arriving from
that country, violating, among other fundamental rights, those
persons' right to seek asylum.[100] On 6 June 2002 NCHR underlined
the serious drawbacks of the application of Greek refugee law,
especially with regard to the access of asylum seekers to the refugee
status recognition procedure, reception conditions and legal aid and
counselling.[101] On 17 December 2003 NCHR reiterated its concern at
the chronic problems of the Greek asylum regime and the precarious
status of humanitarian (de facto) refugees in Greece.[102]
Thus, a comprehensive view of the Greek refugee system leads to the
conclusion that Greece may not be considered a safe host country for
refugees, at least for the time being, due to the grave inadequacies
that, as shown above, asylum practice in this country demonstrates in
the fields of both legal and social protection. The Greek refugee
protection regime needs to be radically revamped. Regrettably, it seems
the situation will only change if the competent authorities feel
serious political and diplomatic pressure on the domestic plane, as
well as in European and international fora. As mentioned in the first
section, the defective Greek asylum practice is not seriously connected
to a public security-oriented policy of the state. However, the
international politico-legal developments after the terrorist events of
September 2001 have paved the slippery road to a securitization of
refugee protection, with detrimental effects upon human rights and the
asylum regime worldwide. The urgently needed restructuring and
modernization of the Greek asylum regime, as well as the efforts to
combat contemporary terrorism, are to be squarely grounded in the
fundamental principles of modern international and European law of
human rights protection, which are flexible enough to permit states to
take all reasonable measures against the scourge of terrorism.
***
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Dr. jur. (Frankfurt/Main); Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,
University of Athens; Head of the Department for International and
Defence Studies of the Greek Parliament; member of the Odysseus
Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and Asylum Law in
Europe.
** PhD in Law (London, UCL), LLM in Int'l Human Rights Law (Essex),
LLB (Aristotle U Thessaloniki); Legal Officer at the Greek National
Commission for Human Rights; member of the Odysseus Academic Network.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone. The law is
stated as at 1st March 2004.
[1] A. Skordas, 'The new refugee legislation in Greece', 11 IJRL
678-701 (1999). On the general framework of Greek refugee law and
policy see also N. Sitaropoulos, 'Modern Greek asylum policy and
practice in the context of the relevant European developments', 11
Journal of Refugee Studies 105-117 (2000), N. Sitaropoulos,
'Comparative legal study on subsidiary protection - Greece' in D.
Bouteillet-Paquet (ed), Subsidiary Protection of Refugees in the EU:
Complementing the Geneva Convention?, Brussels, Bruylant, 2002,
529-568.
[2] M. Stavropoulou, 'The practice of the Greek Appeals Board: A
major leap ahead', 12 IJRL 90-96 (2000).
[3] The exact name currently used by the Ministry of Public Order is
'consultative asylum committee'.
[4] Judgment of 22 May 2000, Case no CO/878/1998, CO/2734/1998
(transcript copy on file with the authors). See also ECRE Documentation
Service, No. 5, October 2000, 'Legal Developments', 21. This
article is an adapted version of the expert opinion on the Greek system
submitted to the High Court.
[5] Judgment of 11 May 2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 747, C/000/2271 (copy on
file with the authors).
[6] Queen v Secretary of State for Home Department; An Immigration
Officer ex parte Agon Elshani and Mentor Berisha, [1999] EWCA Civ 1071
(23 March 1999). See also The Queen on the Application of Besim Berisha
and Immigration Appeal Tribunal, [2002] EWHC 1526 (Admin), accessible
through www.bailii.org.
[7] The transcription of the applicants' names is that of Mr R
Pulham, IND, in his letter of 27 August 2002 to Patterson Sebastian and
Co Solicitors; Cases CO/1579/2002, CO/1279/2002, CO/751/2002
respectively; hearings took place on 29 August 2002 (information
provided by Ms Y. Patterson of the Patterson Sebastian and Co.,
Solicitors, 1 Olympic Way, Wembley, Middlesex HA9 ONP).
[8] Document on file with the authors.
[9] 'In the case of Greece, it is certainly the requirement of
"treatment in accordance with accepted international standards"
which is the most difficult to ascertain, in particular after recent
reported improvements concerning the observance of the non-refoulement
provisions. So far, we have not issued a precise definition of the
standards associated with "accepted international standards". In
the 1995 "Overview of Protection Issues in Western Europe"
document, we referred to "treatment according to basic human
standards" which was also described as 'that refugees must be able
to satisfy basic subsistence needs'.
As you rightly inferred from the December 1998 press briefing
summary, the general reception conditions for asylum-seekers in Greece
are from ideal (sic). However, after consultation with BO Athens, we
feel that it would be premature for UNHCR to argue that these
conditions would generally result in treatment not in accordance with
'basic human standards'. At this point in time, UNHCR should
normally not raise objections against the transfer of asylum-seekers to
Greece, unless this would be clearly indicated by the particular
circumstances of the specific case. Since UNHCR consistently emphasized
that the fulfillment of the abovementioned criteria have to be assessed
in regard to each individual case, there may be exceptional
circumstances in which UNHCR would advocate a non-transfer from one
Dublin country to another. This would be the case, for instance, in
regard to a specific vulnerable asylum-seeker (e.g. an asylum seeker
who is in need of particular medical care) which would require special
attention and treatment in the third country. (...)
Although we therefore do not object against the transfer of
asylum-seekers to Greece, UNHCR considers reception conditions
(including accommodation, social assistance, etc.) for asylum-seekers
in Greece, including returnees under the Dublin Convention, still
unsatisfactory. While there is a reception center for asylum-seekers
known as Lavrio, its capacity is clearly insufficient and there is no
guarantee that an asylum-seeker will be actually referred to that
center. In the absence of state assistance, UNHCR, through its
implementation partners, does provide limited assistance to
needy/vulnerable refugees, and in certain (exceptional) cases to
asylum-seekers or persons granted humanitarian status. Therefore,
asylum-seekers who are returned to Greece under the provision of the
Dublin Convention may face some difficulties in obtaining the necessary
assistance form the Greek government in terms of accommodation and
their daily subsistence needs'. The above reflected the position also
of UNHCR Athens in 2002.
[10] UNHCR BO for Greece, Annual Report on Refugee Protection in Greece
in 2001, Athens, April 2002 (in Greek), 4; UNHCR BO for Greece, UNHCR
Positions on Crucial Issues Relating to Refugee Protection in Greece,
Athens, October 2003 at www.unhcr.gr. Its serious concerns at the Greek
asylum system has also expressed the Greek National Commission for
Human Rights with a series of resolutions and recommendations in 2001,
2002 and 2003 (see NCHR documents 2001, 2002 and 2003 at www.nchr.gr).
[11] UNHCR BO for Greece, Press release no 63/02, 10 December 2002 (in
Greek) and statistics at www.unhcr.gr. Arguably this fall of refugee
status recognition rates in Greece is related to an increased
cautiousness of the Greek authorities after the September 11 events.
[12] Based on data from January until November 2003, information
provided by UNHCR BO for Greece.
[13] See A. Skordas, above note 1, 682-684.
[14] See T. Michas, Unholy Alliance - Greece and Milosevic's
Serbia, Texas A&M University Press, 2002 and H. Smith, 'Greece faces
shame of role in Serb massacre - War crimes tribunal will hear
secrets of support for Milosevic's ethnic cleansing', The Guardian,
5 January 2003, http://www.observer.co.uk/ international/ story/
0,6903,868843,00.html, viewed on 6 January 2003.
[15] G. Auernheimer, `Terrorismus und Antiamerikanismus in
Griechenland', 50 Südosteuropa 497-501 (2002).
[16] Official Journal of the Hellenic Republic (OJHR) A, 184.
[17] OJHR A, 283.
[18] OJHR A, 63.
[19] Ratified by Legislative Decree 3989/1959, Official Journal of the
Kingdom of Greece (OJKG) A, 201.
[20] Ratified by Law 389/1968, OJKG A, 125.
[21] Law 1996/1991, OJHR, A, 196.
[22] Law 2514/1997, OJHR A, 140.
[23] For the interpretation of the 'direct' arrival to the country
of asylum, see J. Pugash, 'The dilemma of the sea refugee: Rescue
without refuge', 18 Harvard International Law Journal 590 (1977).
[24] Judgment 830/1985; see also Judgment 932/1988, abstracts 88, 89
in 3 IJRL 740-742 (1991).
[25] Our italics. Translation by E. Spiliotopoulos, X. Paparrigopoulos,
S. Vassilouni, The Constitution of Greece, Athens, Directorate of
Studies, Hellenic Parliament, 1995. On the relationship between
international and municipal law, see A. Fatouros, 'International law
in the new Greek Constitution', 70 AJIL 501-503 (1976), E. Roucounas,
'Le droit international dans la Constitution de la Grèce du 9 juin
1975', 29 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 64-66 (1976).
[26] Articles 1.2 and 2.1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[27] Article 1.3 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[28] Article 1.4 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[29] Article 2.1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[30] Article 2.9 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[31] Article 3.1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[32] Ibid article 3.2.
[33] Article 4 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 in conjunction with
article 25.2 of Law 1975/1991, as amended by Law 2452/1996.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Article 4.2 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[36] See also F. Liebaut (ed), The Dublin Convention - Study on its
Implementation in the 15 Member States of the European Union, Danish
Refugee Council, January 2001, passim. In 2001 Greece lodged 19
applications with other EU states and accepted 656 applications from
other EU states (statistics of the Greek Ministry of Public Order). In
2000 Greece accepted 485 applications for readmission of asylum
applicants in the context of application of the 1990 Dublin Convention,
see UNHCR BO for Greece, Annual Report on Refugee Protection in Greece
in 2000, Athens, March 2001 (in Greek, hereinafter Report 2000) at 5.
[37] On the agents of persecution, see, for instance, UNHCR, Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Geneva,
1979, para 65; G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd
edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, 70-74; N. Sitaropoulos,
Judicial Interpretation of Refugee Status: In Search of a Principled
Methodology based on a Critical Comparative Analysis of British, French
and German Jurisprudence, Athens, Baden-Baden; Ant. N. Sakkoulas
Publishers, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, 283-320; H. Dipla, La
responsabilité de l'Etat pour violation des droits de l'homme,
Paris, Pedone, 1994, 55-75; J. Wolf, 'Zurechnungsfragen bei
Handlungen von Privatpersonen', 45 Zeitschrift für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 232-264 (1985). See also UK Court
of Appeal, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Adan, 23 July 1999, reproduced in 11 IJRL 702-729 (1999).
[38] See abstract 226, 7 IJRL 512-513 (1995).
[39] See abstract and note in Yearbook of Refugee and Aliens Law - 1998
(Athens, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, UNHCR BO for Greece, 1998, in
Greek), 51-55
[40] MPO ref. 95/31466- [deleted]...-468473, dated 20 February 2001 and
signed by the Head of the Asylum Office Mr Dimitrios Galatoulas.
[41] Witness statement dated 02 May 2001, CO: 2374/98 and 878/98, para
15, emphasis added.
[42] The exact terminology used in order to define the beneficiary of
humanitarian refugee protection in Greece is `alien with a special
residence permit for humanitarian reasons' (article 8 of Presidential
Decree 61/1999). This terminology is not used consistently throughout
Greek legislation. Other similar terms used to describe the same status
are `person residing in Greece temporarily for humanitarian reasons'
(article 4 of Presidential Decree 189/1998 on refugee employment) and
`persons remaining [in Greece] for humanitarian reasons'
(Presidential Decree 266/1999 on refugee reception and social welfare).
The terminological opaqueness of Greek law has been compounded by the
new administrative practice of providing temporary residence permits,
on humanitarian or force majeure grounds, to aliens (immigrants) who
have not entered at all the refugee status recognition procedure
(article 37.4 of Law 2910/2001).
[43] This Law regulated issues relating to refugee protection amending
provisions of Law 1975/1991.
[44] This competence was transferred to the Secretary General of the
Ministry of Public Order by Ministerial Decision 7004/3/26/10 March
1999, OJHR B, 1578, 5 August 1999.
[45] Greece ratified ECHR and CAT by Legislative Decree 53/1974, OJHR
A, 256 and Law 1782/1988, OJHR A, 116 respectively.
[46] See relevant ECHR case law in A. Mowbray, Cases and Materials on
the European Convention on Human Rights, London etc, Butterworths,
2001, at 110-128; see also H. Lambert, 'The European Court of Human
Rights and the right of refugees and other persons in need of
protection to family reunion', 11 IJRL 427-450 (1999). On
refugee-related CAT case law see 11 IJRL 202-226 (1999) and B. Gorlick,
'The Convention and the Committee against Torture: A complementary
protection regime for refugees', 11 IJRL 479-495 (1999).
[47] Case law of the competent Greek administrative organs adjudicating
on refugee status and humanitarian refugee status applications is not
publicly available.
[48] Relevant administrative case law is not publicly available. See
also Greek Council of State's Judgments 3832/1992, 3833/1992 and
3381/1997 annulling, on points of law, administrative decisions
rejecting refugee status applications of Sri Lankan Tamil applicants
related to the Sri Lankan civil war: see abstracts of above case law in
Yearbook of Refugee and Aliens Law - 1998 (Athens, Ant. N. Sakkoulas
Publishers, UNHCR BO for Greece, 1998, in Greek), at 43-49 and 51-55.
[49] See below section V.
[50] Article 8.1 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[51] UNHCR BO for Greece, Report 2000 at 6. Serious concerns relating
to the inadequate protection provided to 'humanitarian refugees'
were also expressed by the Greek National Commission for Human Rights,
Resolution on the protection of 'de facto refugees' by Greece,
17.12.2003, in Greek at www.nchr.gr.
[52] Article 3 of Presidential Decree 61/1999.
[53] In these cases, an appeal against the administrative decision
rejecting the application is to be lodged within ten days from
notification and the Minister of Public Order is to decide on the
appeal within thirty days since the filing of the appeal, following the
non-binding opinion of the appeal board (Article 4.4 and 4.5 of
Presidential Decree 61/1999). If the applicant remains in transit zones
of Greek (air)ports, the above deadlines are reduced by half (Article
4.6 of Presidential Decree 61/1999).
[54] See EU Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum
Standards on Procedures in member States for Granting and Withdrawing
Refugee Status, Doc. COM (2002) 326 final/2, Article 38 The right to an
effective remedy before a court of law: '1.Member States shall ensure
that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective remedy of a
decision taken on their application for asylum before a court of law.
2. Member States shall ensure that the effective remedy referred to in
paragraph 1 includes the possibility of an examination on both facts
and points of law...' See also Council of Europe Committee of
Ministers Recommendation No. R (98) 13 on the right of rejected asylum
seekers to an effective remedy against decisions on expulsion in the
context of Article 3 ECHR, where it is pointed out, inter alia, that in
order for the above remedy to be considered effective the national
authority before which the asylum seeker brings the case should be in
principle judicial `or, if it is a quasi-judicial or administrative
authority, it [should be] clearly identified and composed of members
who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence'.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Greek National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), Report 2001,
Athens, National Printing Office, 2002, at 127-128 (in Greek) and at
www.nchr.gr. On NCHR and asylum in Greece see below.
[57] A relevant chronic, serious problem of Greek refugee practice is
the severe shortage of properly trained, state interpreters at all
stages of the refugee recognition procedures, in violation of
fundamental standards regarding the fairness of the relevant legal
procedures; see also article 9 (Guarantees for applicants for asylum)
of the EU Commission Proposal Doc. COM (2002) 326 final/2, cited above:
'1. With respect to the procedures provided for in...this Directive,
Member States shall ensure that all applicants for asylum enjoy the
following guarantees:...(b) They must receive the services of an
interpreter for submitting their case to the competent authorities
whenever reasonable...In this case and in other cases where the
competent authorities call upon the interpreter, the services shall be
paid for out of public funds'.
[58] The rules of procedure of these applications before the Greek
Council of State are laid down by Presidential Decree 18/1989 on the
Council of State ('Symvoulio tis Epikrateias').
[59] The Greek Council of State's jurisdiction over examination of an
'application for annulment' is based on the prototype of the French
recours pour excès de pouvoir, see K.D. Kerameus, P.J. Kozyris (eds),
Introduction to Greek Law, Deventer, Kluwer/Sakkoulas, 1993, 2nd
edition, at 46-47.
[60] See relevant case law in Judgments of the Council of State, inter
alia, 286/1990, 344/1990, 559/1990, 596/1996, abstracted in Yearbook of
Refugee and Aliens Law -1998, at 65, 66, 67 and 127 respectively (in
Greek).
[61] Conka v Belgium, appl. no 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002,
para 64 ff (accessible through www.echr.coe.int). On this judgment, see
A. Skordas, 'Human rights and effective migration policies: An
uneasy co-existence - the Conka judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights', in C. Urbano de Sousa (ed.), The Emergence of a
European Asylum Policy - Amsterdam, Tampere and beyond, Bruylant,
Brussels, 2004 (forthcoming).
[62] On the substantive criteria regarding humanitarian refugee status
laid down by article 8.2 of Presidential Decree 61/1999 see above.
[63] See also Judgment 3832/1992, abstract 226, 7 IJRL 513-514 (1995).
[64] UNHCR BO for Greece, Report 2000, op cit at 6 and 7. On delays of
asylum procedure in Athens see also Médecins Sans Frontières, Grèce,
Umbrella of Legal Protection for Forgotten Populations in Greece,
Athens, February 2002 (in Greek), 14-15 and Amnesty International,
Greek Section, The Greek refugee policy, June 2002-November 2003,
Athens, January 2004 at 18-21 (in Greek) at www.amnesty.gr.
[65] OJHR A, 24.
[66] Case of Twalib v Greece, appl no 42/1997/826/1032, Judgment of 9
June 1998, Affaire Biba c Grèce, no 33170/96, Arrêt du 26 septembre
2000 (accessible through www.echr.coe.int).
[67] The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has
also called upon the Greek authorities to ensure the right of aliens to
fair legal proceedings, including legal defence, see ECRI, Second
Report on Greece adopted on 10 December 1999, Doc CRI (2000) 32, 27
June 2000, para 10.
[68] NCHR, Report 2001, Athens, National Printing Office, 2002, 133-142
(in Greek).
[69] See NCHR, Opinion on the draft law regarding the provision of
legal aid to citizens with low income, 30.10.2003, in Greek, at
www.nchr.gr. Article 16.3 of Law 3226/2004 provides that legal aid may
be extended to administrative cases through a Presidential Decree that
should be proposed by the Ministers of Finance and of Justice.
[70] To Syntagma (Greek legal journal), 3/2000, 589 and 592,
respectively.
[71] Appl no 40907/98, Judgment of 6 March 2001 (www.echr.coe.int).
[72] Appl no 28524/95, Judgment of 19 April 2001 (www.echr.coe.int). On
New Year's Eve 2003, three female inmates died in the above prison,
due to the consumption of drugs and alcohol. According to the public
prosecutor, the prison governor did not take any preventive measures,
although she knew the activities concerning drug smuggling, see Greek
daily Kathimerini (English edition, with IHT) 3 January 2003, 1.
[73] NCHR, Report on issues relating to the reception of asylum seekers
and their access to the asylum procedure in Greece, 6 June 2002, in 50
Nomiko Vima (Greek legal journal) 1598-1603 (2002) and at www.nchr.gr.
See also Council of Europe, Office of the Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles on his Visit to the Hellenic
Republic, 2-5 June 2002, Doc CommDH(2002)5, 17 July 2002, paras 32-37;
Council of Europe, Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Report to
the Government of Greece on the visit to Greece, 23 September-5 October
2001, Doc CPT/Inf (2002) 31, 20 November 2002, paras 49-53.
[74] Statement of 45 Human Rights NGOs on 'frequent and grave
violations of foreign detainees' rights in Greece', Athens, 15 June
2002 (www.greekhelsinki.gr). On these issues, see the high standard of
the case Conka v. Belgium, appl. no. 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February
2002, para. 44.
[75] NOAS and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, The Transfer of Chechen
Asylum Seekers from Norway to Greece in accordance with the Dublin
Convention, June 2002 (report accessible through www.greekhelsinki.gr).
[76] See UNHCR BO for Greece, Report 2000, 10-11, NCHR, Report 2001,
op. cit, 169-177 (and at www.nchr.gr). On the shortcomings of refugee
welfare and integration policy in Greece see N. Sitaropoulos,
'Refugee welfare in Greece: towards a remodelling of the
responsibility-shifting paradigm?', 22 Critical Social Policy 436-455
(2002), A. Skordas, 'The case of recognized refugee families in
Greece: The "undesirable" integration', Quarterly on Refugee
Problems (AWR-Bulletin), 40.(49.) Volume, Number 4/2002, 210-221.
[77] UNHCR BO for Greece, ibid.
[78] Presidential Decree 266/1999, OJHR A 217.
[79] Presidential Decree 366/2002, OJHR A, 313.
[80] UNHCR BO for Greece, UNHCR Positions on Crucial Issues Relating
to Refugee Protection in Greece, Athens, October 2003, para. I.2
(www.unhcr.gr).
[81] OJHR A, 131.
[82] OJHR A, 140.
[83] Article 3.1, Presidential Decree 189/1998.
[84] UNHCR BO for Greece, The Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers
in Greece in 2002, Athens, May 2003 at 14 (in Greek).
[85] UNHCR BO for Greece, op. cit. at 10-11.
[86] OJHR A, 217.
[87] See UNHCR, Asylum Trends in Europe, 2000, Part II, Geneva, 30
January 2001, at 3-14.
[88] See UNHCR, Population Data Unit, Selected country indicators,
Geneva, 21 February 2001, Table 1 and UNHCR, Trends in Asylum
Applications Lodged in Europe, North America, Australia and New
Zealand, 2001, UNHCR, Population Data Unit, Geneva, 31 January 2002,
Table 1.
[89] See European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Presentation
to European Union High Level Working Group on Afghanistan, 08 March
2001 (www.ecre.org/speeches).
[90] Greece is one of the first signatory states, with a series of
reservations, of the UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Until
1994 Greece kept her reservation to article 17.1 (on wage-earning
employment) of the UN Refugee Convention. She still keeps her
reservation to article 26 (on freedom of movement) of the Convention.
[91] See on the regularization process A. Skordas, 'The
regularization of illegal immigrants in Greece' in Ph. de Bruycker
(ed), Regularizations of Illegal Immigrants in the European Union,
Bruylant, Brussels, 2000, 343-387.
[92] See A. Skordas, 'The new immigration law in Greece:
Modernization on the wrong track', 4 European Journal of Migration
and Law 23-48 (2002); N. Sitaropoulos, 'The new Greek immigration
law: A step forward?', 15 Tolley's Immigration & Nationality Law &
Practice 228-234 (2001). On Greek immigration law and policy see N.
Sitaropoulos, Immigration Law and Management in Greece, Athens, Ant. N.
Sakkoulas Publishers, 2003 (in English).
[93] See also UNHCR BO for Greece, Report 2000, Report 2002, passim.
[94] Greek Ombudsman, Report on inspection of the detention areas of
economic immigrants and refugees on the isle of Kos, 12 November 2001
(in Greek, accessible through www.synigoros.gr), 6-7 and 12-15. See
also Greek National Commission for Human Rights, Report on issues
relating to the reception of asylum seekers and their access to the
asylum procedure in Greece, cited above.
[95] By Law 2926/2001, OJHR A, 139, Greece ratified the 2000 Ankara
Agreement with Turkey on combating crime, especially terrorism,
organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal migration.
[96] The Protocol was ratified by Law 3030/2002, OJHR A, 163; see UNHCR
BO for Greece, Comments on the Greco-Turkish Protocol, November 2001.
Article 8 of this Agreement provides that, until the signing of a
readmission agreement, the two contracting states will authorize the
re-entry into their territory of persons who have illegally travelled
through the territory of the other contracting state. Serious concerns
were also expressed by NCHR in its Resolution on the Protocol applying
article 8 of the Greco-Turkish Agreement on combating crime, especially
terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal
migration, NCHR, Report 2002, op. cit., at 91-92 and at www.nchr.gr.
[97] See Amnesty International, Greece: 55 Iraqi Kurds and Afghans -
Other foreign nationals denied the opportunity to apply for asylum, AI
Index: EUR 25/011/2001, 7 December 2001 and 25/012/2001, 11 December
2001; World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), Press Release, Illegal
deportation of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey and fear of further
deportation to Iraq, 11 December 2001.
[98] Amnesty International, Greek Section, The Greek refugee policy,
op. cit. at 9-12.
[99] NCHR, Proposals for the promotion of a modern, efficient framework
for refugee protection in Greece, 8 June 2001 in NCHR, op. cit. at
119-130 (in Greek). On NHRIs see www.nhri.net.
[100] NCHR Resolution cited above.
[101] NCHR, report of 6 June 2002, cited above.
[102] NCHR Resolution cited above. See also Athens Conference
Conclusions, The Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union:
the Challenge of Asylum and Immigration, 14 IJRL (2003), 632 ff, esp.
637-8.
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The Greek N17 terrorist organization and the culture which created and
nourishes it has never been eliminated, will always be kept well and
alive in Greece by the the Greek Nation.
It is obvious that the main purpose of "the highly irregular trial
conducted by a special court with closed doors" was not to disclose the
involment of the Greek government of N17 terrorists acts. So, N17 has
never eliminated. Only a few foot-soldiers of it were put behind bars
wher they cannot talk; they do not know anything significant anyway.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_17_(terrorist_group)
November 17 (terrorist group)
>From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
November 17 (also known as 17N or N17) was a Marxist Greek terrorist
group. Its full name was Revolutionary Organization 17 November (Greek:
?pa?astat??? ??????s? 17 ???µß??, Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri).
N17 had perpetrated a series of attacks from 1975. Until 2002 no member
of the group had been identified or arrested. The group is named after
the November 17, 1973 uprising by students at the Athens Polytechnic
university against the military junta, in which twenty students were
killed. Since the military junta was backed by the United States as
part of that country's anti-Communist efforts, most of the group's
attacks have been directed at American targets.
The group's first attack was in December 1975, when the CIA's Athens
station chief was shot. The group have committed further
assassinations, often using a .45 caliber handgun, and around fifty
other attacks. Initial attacks were aimed at American and Greek
officials but the range of operations was expanded in the 1980s and
1990s to include bombings and EU targets. The group is also opposed to
Turkey and NATO.
The group wanted to get rid of U.S. bases in Greece, to remove the
Turkish military from Cyprus, and to sever Greece's ties to NATO and
the European Union.
In June 2000, the group killed Stephen Saunders, a British Defense
Attaché. His wife went on television urging the Greek people to help
apprehend his killers.
Following a failed operation on June 29, 2002 the Greek authorities
captured an injured suspect, Savvas Xiros. His interrogation led to the
discovery of two safe houses and to the arrest of a further six
suspects, including two brothers of Savvas. A 58 year old professor,
Alexandros Giotopoulos, was identified as the group leader and was
arrested on July 17 on the island of Lipsi. On September 5, Dimitris
Koufodinas-identified as the group's chief of
operations-surrendered to the authorities. In all, nineteen
individuals were charged with some 2,500 offences relating to November
17's activities. Because of the 20-year statute of limitations, murders
before 1984 were not tried by the court.
The trial of the terrorist suspects commenced in Athens on March 3,
2003. On December 8, fifteen of the accused, including Giotopoulos and
Koufodinas, were found guilty; another four were acquitted for lack of
evidence. The convicted members were sentenced on December 17, with
Giotopoulous sentenced to 21 life terms-the heaviest sentence in
modern Greek legal history. Koufodinas received 13 life terms. The
prosecutor has proposed that Christodoulos Xeros receive 10 life terms;
Savvas Xeros six; Vassilitis Tzortzatos four; Iraklis Kostaris one.
Lesser sentences are proposed for the remaining nine, in the light of
extenuating circumstances.
Defense lawyers of the defendants as well as several civil rights
groups has stressed the highly irregular character of the trial. The
trial was conducted by a special court with closed doors and the use of
television cameras was prohibited. People sympathetic to their causes
believe that this was so that it would be easier to condemn all the
accused despite very little non-circumstantial evidence. Many of the
accused, notably Alexandros Giotopoulos, denied their participation
until the end of the year long trial. According to Giotopoulos, he was
framed so that the image of a terrorist organization led by a clear
leader could be presented. The accused that did admit participation to
the group, notably Dimitris Koufondinas who took "full political
responsibility for all of the group actions", presented a picture of a
loose horizontally organized structure with small cells and decisions
taken by discussion and consensus.
Under Greek law, one life term is equal to a 25-year term and a convict
may apply for parole after 16 years. If sentenced to more than one life
term, he or she must serve at least 20 years before being eligible for
parole. Other sentences will run concurrently, with 25-year terms being
the maximum and with parole possible after three-fifths of this term
are served.
On September 17, 2004, the imprisoned started a hunger strike
protesting the especially harsh conditions of their imprisonment and
their sensory isolation. According to their statements, "bourgeois
democracy" takes revenge on them by enclosing them in "a prison within
a prison".
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The most violent terrorist organization in the world, Greece:
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a veracious appetite for innocent
Turkish blood and brain-washed with Anti-Turkish hatred, never stop in
their relentless dreams of massacring all Turks everywhere in the
World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK terrorists think
repeating anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over legitimize their
rape, torture and murder of innocent and defenceless Turkish human
beings.
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
On Cyprus
by Ahmet Cosar
Cyprus formed part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1914, when it was
formally annexed by Great Britain at the beginning of World War I. In
1950s the revival of "Hellenism" and the ideal of re- building the
great "Hellen Empire" started a bloody struggle in Cyprus, Enosis, in
other words the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The religious leader of
Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios, was the head of the movement and
there were massive terrorist attacks on British rulers and Turkish
Cypriots who didn't share this "ideal". The numbers show that between
1955 and 1960, 508 people were murdered and 1,260 people were wounded
in these attacks by EOKA, a Greek Cypriot terrorist organization, under
the leadership of an ex- colonel from the Greek army, Grivas[2].
By 1958 it had become clear that it was not possible to achieve Enosis.
Turkish Cypriots, just like Greek Cypriots, wanted self- determination
and freedom and they didn't want to be a mere "minority" which, soon
after independence, would be "persuaded" to leave Cyprus. In 1959 the
Greek side accepted the formation of an independent republic in which
Turkish Cypriots would be one of the two equal partners. However, what
Greek side understood from "independence" was merely "a step before
Enosis" as it was soon discovered. Knowing the Greek aim of Enosis, the
Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 with a detailed Constitution
which strictly forbade the annexation of Cyprus by any country.
Furthermore permanent guarantees were written in the Constitution of
Cyprus so that the "independent democracy" would not turn into a
"dictatorship of majority"[3]. Nevertheless, beginning right after the
foundation of Cyprus in 1960, the Greek Cypriots made it clear that
they had not given up the struggle for Enosis. Makarios, also first
President of Cyprus, made the following public declaration:
"The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this
struggle, but, at the same time, are a starting point for further
struggles, with the object of capitalising on what has been achieved
for further conquests",
on 5 January 1962. On 15 August 1962, in Kykko monastery, he reiterated
that Enosis was his aim and said:
"Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work
began by the EOKA heroes."
He also made the following provocative remark at his native village of
Panayia on 4 September 1962:
"Until this small Turkish community that forms part of the Turkish race
which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty to
the heroes of EOKA cannot be considered as terminated."
In 1962, Polykarpos Yorkadjis, Minister of Interior, declared that:
"There is no place in Cyprus for anyone who is not Greek, who does not
think Greek and who does not constantly feel Greek."
Meanwhile, the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation regularly broadcast
virulently anti-Turkish plays. In one play, a mother asks her son what
her son wants to become; the boy replies:
- "a hero."
When she asks him,:
- "What will you bring to us?",
he answers:
- "I am going to bring seven Turkish heads to you [4]."
In fact the Akritas plan, published by Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris
on 21 April 1966, was a clear proof of the fact that Greek Cypriot side
deliberately tried to prove the constitution as unworkable and to
replace it with a settlement in order to re-open the way to Enosis. It
was disclosed that Archbishop Makarios had assumed responsibility for
the implementation of the plan and he had appointed Polycarpos
Georkadjis to be the "Chief Akritas". In an interview with the Italian
journalist Oriana Fallaci, Makarios said how Ioannides (a Greek officer
in the Greek contingent on Cyprus) and Nikos Sampson, a bloody EOKA
terrorist leader responsible from the "execution squads" of EOKA, came
to him one day in 1964 and told:
"Your Beatitude, here is my project. To attack the Turkish Cypriots on
the island, and eliminate them to the last one [5]."
Ioannides was the leader of the fascist Greek Junta in 1974 and Nikos
Sampson was declared the "president" with the Coup organized by Athens,
and their plan was still as revealed by Makarios. Knowing these facts
it is easy to understand the reasons behind the Turkish fears for the
security of Turkish Cypriots and the decision for intervention. In fact
after the intervention it was found out that in Sandallaris village the
whole population of 57, and at Maratha village 82 Turkish Cypriots were
massacred and buried in mass-graves, among the victims were babies,
women, and elderly people. In Tokhni village all able-bodied male
Turkish inhabitants (50 in number) were taken by the Greek Cypriot
National Guard soldiers to the outskirts of Ayia Phyla village in
Limassol district where they were massacred and buried in a pre-opened
pit together with about 40 Turks from Tatlisu (Mari)[6].
Greek people, repeating the official Greek claim, tell us that more
than 2,000 Greek Cypriots were/are "missing". For some strange reason
they forget to tell us that a Greek Cypriot Priest, Father Papatsetsos,
made a declaration to Greek newspapers saying that he had personally
buried 127 people, 10 of them were Turkish Cypriots, and all of them
were murdered by EOKA-B terrorists and the Greek National Guard(there
were violent clashes between left-wing and right-wing Greek Cypriots
after the Coup in 1974)[7] . On 23 July 1974, The Times of London
quoted the American wife of Dr. Lyssarides (head of the EDEK party)
saying that many supporters of Makarios had been massacred during and
after the coup. On 25 July 1974 Combat published in Belgium, reported:
"it has been confirmed that during the days following the coup at least
2,000 of Makarios's supporters have either been killed in the fighting
or executed."
A report in Washington Star News said similar things:
"Bodies littered the streets and there were mass burials."
Until this day Greek Cypriot Government has rejected to open these
mass-graves and to reveal the identities of these people, mainly to
continue the Greek propaganda of "missing Greeks". The fact is that,
the question of missing persons was investigated by International
Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC representative stated
categorically in the presence of the UN Secretary-General's Special
Representative in Cyprus that all POWs were delivered to the Greek
side. This fact was also confirmed in the report of the head of the
ICRC dated 18 March 1977. At the time there were only 23-24 cases
pending investigation, and the Turkish side is ready to investigate
these cases along with hundreds of Turkish Cypriots who are missing
since 1963[8]. As for the "atrocity stories" made up by Greek side, a
report by the Study Mission of the Sub-committee of the Judiciary of
the US Senate (October 1974), about the first phase of the Turkish
military operation, said:
"Whenever and wherever the Study Mission talked with Greek Cypriot
refugees, the story was basically the same: people moved the instant
they saw or thought the Turkish army was advancing towards their town
or village."
About the second phase of the operation, the report says:
"Greek Cypriots fled the moment there was rumor or sight of military
forces - creating a virtual vacuum into which the Turkish army could
and did move without resistance and without the presence of people."
Since 1974 there have been many series of negotiations between Greek
and Turkish Cypriots. All of these negotiations have been fruitless
because of the Greek side's unwillingness to accept Turkish Cypriots'
equality and the guarantee of their rights by Turkey. The Greek Cypriot
side has been enjoying hundreds of millions of dollars of help from UN
and EEC while the Turkish Cypriots have been denied all of their
citizenship rights and share. What is worse, these helps have been used
by Greek Cypriots for their military expenses which rose to $500
Million between 1977-87 and $762 Million are envisaged for 1990-93
period. Today there are less than 20,000 Turkish soldiers in Cyprus as
opposed to more than 15,000 Greek mainland troops and the Greek
National Guard includes 21,000 troops and with reserves reaches 85,000.
Former EOKA members are still in powerful government positions and not
a single Greek Cypriot has been punished for their acts during 1974
Coup. Even Nikos Sampson has been allowed to leave Cyprus, with the
pretext of being treated, and has not returned from France for years
and when he did he was greeted as a "hero". Finally, I am finishing my
article with the words of the Greek Cypriot Defense Minister, Mr.
Alonetis, on 11 March 1989:
"At the first opportunity we get, the Greek Cypriot National Guard will
attack and regain by force of arms our occupied lands."
Therefore, nobody was surprised when Greek Cypriots began moving their
forces to the Turkish Cypriot border during the recent Gulf-Crisis,
hoping that Iraq would attack Turkey.
I believe the latest UN-Resolution in the Cyprus Problem must guide
both Greeks and Turks to the correct path:
Resolution 649, 1990
[...]
"Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts
to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the
establishment of a federation that will be BI-COMMUNAL as regards the
constitutional aspects and BI-ZONAL as regards the territorial aspects
in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 agreements,
and to co-operate, on an EQUAL FOOTING, with the Secretary-General in
completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of
an overall agreement, as agreed in june 1989."
[...]
References
[1] Sir H. Luke, Cyprus Under the Turks, pp. vi-xi.
[2] L. Stern, The Wrong Horse, pp. 160-177.
[3] J. Reddaway, The British Connection with Cyprus Since
Independence, pp. 1-23.
[4] L. Stern, ibid, pp. 92-93.
[5] P. Oberling, The Cyprus Tragedy, pp.4-5.
[6] A. H. Rizvi, Cyprus: The Tale of an Island, pp. 38-39.
[7] R. R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle, 1982, pp. 145-148.
[8] R. R. Denktash, ibid, pp. 92-95.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
These people were killed just because they were Turkish Cypriots.
The horrifying fate of a Turkish Cypriot mother, Ülfet Osman (21) and
her daughter and a teenage girl in the hands of a Greek Cypriot driver
who deceived them with a promise to transport them to the Turkish
controlled region of Cyprus on November 12, 1974.
Foreign Journalists at Ayios Vasilios mass grave establishing evidence
of Greek-Greek Cypriot Barbarism
Picture above shows the Turkish Cpriot victims of a mass grave near the
village of Maratha which was discovered by the Turkish authorities on
September 2, 1974
Devastated Turkish Cypriot houses at Omorphita (a suburb of Nicosia)
---------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
THE CYPRUS QUESTION
by Okan Baysan
As a response to the recent posting concerning Cyprus in this
newsgroup, I would like to present the Turkish Cypriot
perspective
so that one can have the opportunity to listen to both North
and
South Cyprus before reaching a healthy conclusion.
HOW AND WHY DID THE CYPRUS ISSUE START?
Cyprus has been conquered and governed by various nations in
its
history as a result of its strategic location in the eastern
Mediterranean. Among these were the Egyptians, Assyrians,
Byzantines,
Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and the British. When the
island
gained its independence from the British in 1960, a partnership
government was established between the Turkish and Greek
Cypriot
communities of the island.
Since the Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1820's,
the people who call themselves Greek Cypriots today thought
that
they could obtain a similar independece, and eventually annex
the
island to Greece with the hope of resurrecting the once
Byzantine
Empire, by acquiring the permanently 'lost lands' (Megali Idea
=
Great Dream/Idea). This desire of union with Greece, ENOSIS,
constitutes the entire roots of the Cyprus question today and
is
in fact still alive among the majority of Greek Cypriots in
South
Cyprus.
After the British extended their rule to Cyprus, starting in
1878,
the desire for ENOSIS -union of Cyprus with Greece - started
to show its presence among the members of the Greek Cypriots,
and
in late 1940's and early 1950's their struggle became more
obvious
all over Cyprus. Their primary target was the British, and with
the import of guns and weapons from Greece, Greek Cypriot
agitation
for ENOSIS turned into an armed struggle, which resulted in the
killing of scores of innocent lives.
GREEK CYPRIOT ARMED STRUGGLE FOR ENOSIS & INDEPENDENCE FROM
BRITAIN
In 1955, a Greek Cypriot terrorist organization, EOKA, was
established in order to carry out these attacks in a more
organized
manner, and soon, the British realised that the island had to
be
granted to its actual owners, the Turkish Cypriots, whose
origin
dates back to the Ottoman Conquest of the island in 1571, and
the
Greek Cypriots, who have chosen to identify themselves as such
even though their roots do not lie in Greece.
The first president of the Republic of Cyprus was a Greek
Cypriot,
Makarios, who publicly promoted ENOSIS, and the first Vice
president,
a Turkish Cypriot, Fazil Kucuk. United Kingdom, Turkey, and
Greece
signed a Treaty of Guarantee which gave them the obligaton to
protect and defend the island against any external attack that
was
likely to come to Cyprus. The partnership republic also had a
7:3 ratio in its administrative organs, and it appeared to
function well in its early stages. The Greek Cypriot agitation
for ENOSIS, which had never dwindled after the bi-communal
republic was established, became more obvious than before, but
this time, the primary target was the Turkish Cypriots, the
co-partners of the 1960 Republic. With the so-called 13 point
proposals of Makarios, which would alter the 1960 constitution,
remove the Vice President's veto power, take away the rights
of the Turkish Cypriot community, and speed up the annexation
of
Cyprus to Greece, ENOSIS, brought the partnership to an
end, and indeed, the Turkish Cypriots were denied their most
basic rights, and forced to live under inhumane conditions in
their own homeland.
1963-1974 was the worst decade in the history of the island,
and
hundreds of innocent Turkish Cypriots were massacred, taken
away
from their homes never to be seen again, buried in massgraves,
and relentlessly and barbarically attacked by their
co-partners,
the Greek Cypriots and their sponsors, Greeks of mainland
Greece.
And all this was the result of the sheer greed and the
so-called
'civilised' respect of the Greek Cypriots towards their
co-partners
and neighbours. In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots established
their own administration, the Turkish Cypriot transitional
Administra-
tion in late 1960's in order to take care of the urgent needs
of
the Turkish Cypriot community all over the island.
15 JULY 1974 GREEK INVASION & 20 JULY 1974 TURKISH PEACE
OPERATION
Eleven entire years of untold suffering and ethnic cleansing of
the
Turkish Cypriots, just because they constituted a barrier to
the
fulfillment of the Greek Cypriot desires for ENOSIS, reached
its
peak with the invasion of GREECE on 15 July 1974, when the
military
government then ruling Greece finally decided to annex the
island
officially.The colonels of Greece organized a Coup D'etat on
this
day and installed a criminal and a murderer as the puppet
president
of Cyprus, remotely controlled by Athens. This criminal was in
fact
the butcher of many Turkish Cypriots for more than a decade.
Death toll reached unbelievable numbers in Cyprus and hundreds
of
Turkish and Greek Cypriots paid the cost of the Greek invasion
with
their very lives.
Turkey, as one of the Guarantor powers, asked United Kingdom to
act together and bring the order in Cyprus back to what it was
in 1960. Refusing to cooperate, Turkey was forced to act alone
and intervene the situation in order to protect the lives and
rights of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, as well as put an
end to the Greek expansionism and aggression in the island. So
5 days after the Greek Invasion, Turkish Peace Operation of
20 July 1974 was started with the orders of the then prime
minister
of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit. It was the most important day in the
lives of the Turkish Cypriots to see the Turkish Peace troops
coming to their rescue, and it was the most exciting day that
they waited to see during the preceeding 11 entire years of
Greek suppression and aggression. Their dreams came true with
the arrival of Turkish Peace troops on 20 July, and they
regained
their FREEDOM in their own homeland.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1974
When the Peace Operation was victoriously completed and the
Turkish
Cypriots were freed from Greek barbarism during the preceeding
decade, their political evolution started to accelerate. In
1975
the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was established in the
Turkish Cypriot controlled of northern Cyprus, and the first
Turkish Cypriot national assembly was formed. In the meantime,
various agreements were signed between Turkish Federated State
of
Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot administration in south Cyprus,
which still identified itself as the so-called Republic of
Cyprus
and illegally and unconstitutionally continued to enjoy the
recognition and financial aid of the United Nations even though
this administration should, according to the 1960 constitution,
consist of the Turkish Cypriot members as well. Among these
were the Population Transfer Agreements signed by the leaders
of both communities in order to allow Greek Cypriots in the
north
to move to south, and Turkish Cypriots in the south to move to
north for their own safety and security. This resulted in the
creation of two homogeneous communities each of which had a
different
religion, culture, language, ethnic background, and values.
Continued negotiations to reunite the island and establish a
federal government hopelessly continued during the following
years
despite the fact that the Greek Cypriot claims over the entire
island
have not showed any change whatsoever.
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS
As a result of the failure in the negotiations and the
continued
support of United Nations for the Greek Cypriot demands, and
their
accepting the Greek Cypriot administration as the only
so-called
government in Cyprus, as well as their non-recognition of the
existence of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, the
national
assembly of the Turkish Federated State in the north
unanimously
voted for the establishment of the TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN
CYPRUS on 15 November 1983. This was to assert the Turkish
Cypriots'
existence and their demands in the establishment of a future
just and fair federal republic in Cyprus. Even though TRNC
enjoys
Turkiye's recognition only as of now, it does have trade
relations
with European, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries and it also
maintains consulates or representative offices in various
countries.
INALIENABLE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS
In order to appreciate fully the Turkish Cypriot position,
it should be noted that the very survival of the Turkish
Cypriots
living as a free people, and in security, in their own
homeland,
depends on adherence to, and respect for, the following
principles:
(a) the equal political status of the two national Communities,
(b) bi-zonality,
(c) the security of the Turkish Cypriot people,
(d) the continuation of the adequate and effective guarantee of
Turkiye, which the Turkish Cypriots regard as teh only
effective
guarantee of their right to live, of their very existence
and
of their security,
(e) the participation of the two peoples, as politically equal
entitites, with equal effectiveness and right of say, in
decisions of the Legislature and the Executive,
(f) the so-called "three freedoms" to be regulated and applied
in
such a way as to ensure that the security of the Turkish
Cypriot
people is not endangered in any way and that the bi-zonal
structure of the proposed federation is not impaired,
(g) the federal government to hav eonly the powers and
functions
agreed to be assigned to it by the federated states, and
the
residual powers to remain within the federated states.
Turkiye has not territorial claims in Cyprus. On the contrary,
it
is Greece, which is expansionist. Greece is the party which
wants
to annex Cyprus, and thereby to condemn the Turkish people of
Cyprus to annihilation.
Turkiye's intention is quite clear: It is to ensure and protect
the
survival and rights of the Turkish Cypriot people. Nobody
should
expect Turkiye to allow the Turkish Cypriot people to be
abandoned
to death and oppresion, once again.
GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION, and their SYSTEMATIC,
DECEIVING and FAKE PROPAGANDA
The Greek Cypriots tried and managed to convince the world with
their relentless political propaganda that the Cyprus issue
started in 1974 with the "invasion", as they call it, of
Turkey.
Somehow, they don't see the FACT that there has been no
gunshot,
no killing, no massacres, and no more massgraves in Cyprus with
the conclusion of Turkish Peace troops.
They also artificially created a "missing people" issue with
the
blame on the Turkish side. In fact, the Greek military regime
who organised the Coup D'etat on 15 July 1974 is responsible
for
the missing and all the unaccounted people. Rumors that Turkey
hold some Greek Cypriot prisoners of war are nothing more than
intentional creations of Greek Cypriot fake propaganda in order
to make political gains in the international arenas against
Turkey
and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. There are also more
than
800 Turkish Cypriot missing people and the families of those
people came to believe that they will never see their loved
ones
again, and returned to normal lives eventually.
Refugee problem is another artificially created propaganda
material
for the Greek Cypriot politcal gains because all population
transfers
were made based on the international agreements for the safety
and
security of each community. The leaders or both communities
signed
these agreements. Let's also not forget the FACT that one third
of the Turkish Cypriot population also had to move, for their
own
security , but the Turkish Cypriot administrations have never
made
a political propaganda out of this even today.
The Greek Cypriot administration of South Cyprus imposed
political,
cultural, economic and sports embargo on Northern Cyprus and
they are trying to achieve what they could not achieve with
arms,
that is, ENOSIS -union of Cyprus with Greece - at the dawn of
the 21st century.
===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== =====
=====
(* (* (* (* (* (* (* (* (* (* (* (*
(*
===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== ===== =====
=====
*APPENDICES
(1) Enosis Claims of the Greek Cypriot leaders with their own
words
(2) Greek official's statement on the missing people issue
(3) Population Transfer Agreement
(4) Proof of Greek Invasion on 15 July 1974, with Makarios's
own words.
*(1)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The noble struggles of the people never come to an end. These
struggles
although undergo transformation, are never terminated. The struggle of
the
people of Cyprus too will go on.
The Zurich and London Agreements form a landmark in the course of this
struggle, but at the same time, are a starting point and bastion for
further
struggles, with the object of capitalizing on what has been achieved
for
further conquests."
From Makarios's speech delivered on 01/05/1962
"Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work
began by
the EOKA heroes... The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will
go
until we achieve our goal..."
From Makarios's sermon at Kykko Monastery on
08/15/1962
"The aim of the Cyprus struggle was not the establishment of a
Republic. These
agreements only laid the foundations."
From Makarios's statement made on 03/13/1963
"Union of Cyprus with Greeceisan aspiration always cherished within the
hearts
of all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this
aspiration by
establishing a Republic."
From Makarios's statement to the correspondent
of London
TIMES on 04/09/1963
"It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus to
Greece."
From Makarios's interview published in the Uusi
Suomi of
Stockholm on 09/05/1963
"... No power is able to close the Cyprus question. We shall keep it
open and
will never close it under any circumstances or conditions... until we
close it
through our union with Greece, a genuine Enosis without exchanges..."
From Makarios's public speech at Larnaca on
05/16/1965
"Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or [it will]
become a
a holocaust... The road to the fulfillment of national aspirations may
be
full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal -which is Enosis-
alive
or dead."
From Makarios's speech, at Rizokarpasso,
05/26/1965
"Freedom for us means only the integration of this southern outpost of
Hellenism into the national entity..."
Tasos Papadopoulos on U.N. day in Limassol,
10/23/1967
"... I shall never violate my oath, and I shall never deviate from my
goal.
I have desired ENOSIS, and I have never struggled for anything else
other
than its achievement."
Makarios, in an interview with Eleftheros Kosmo
and Ta Simerina, Athens, 08/19/1970
"Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of its history, and
will remain Greek.
Greek and undivided we have taken it over.
Greek and undivided we shall preserve it.
Greek and undiveded we shall deliver it to Greece."
Makarios, in a speech at Yialousa on 03/14/1971
"Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we
shall
preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece."
Makarios, Yialousa, 03/14/1971
"The struggle of Cyprus is the struggle of all Hellenism. Cyprus, where
the
Greek virtue is being tested, is today the place where the Greek
history and
Greek struggle are continuing."
Spyros Kyprianou at a meeting in Limassol on
03/24/1971
to celebrate the Greek Independence Day
"I am in favour of ENOSIS. ENOSIS is the national aspiration of Greek
Cypriots."
Makarios, in an interview withthe ITN
correspondent,
Mr. Robert Southgate, published on 09/21/1971
"If your aim is the launching of a struggle for ENOSIS, then both I and
the people of Cyprus are ready to enter such a struggle provided it is
backed by the Greek Government."
Makarios, in his reply to the Greek
Government's
note of 02/11/1972 as reported in the Greek
Cypriot
press on 03/16/1972
"Those who disagree with the way of handling Cyprus' national problem
and
call themselves ENOSISTS accuse and call the others, the overwhelming
majority of the Greek Cypriot people, anti-ENOSISTS. The charge is
false
and inadmissible. All Greek Cypriots are and will be ENOSISTS.
Makarios, in a speech at the unveiling if the
statue
of EOKA man Michalakis Savva at Akaki village
on
11/05/1972
"I have struggled for union of Cyprus with Greece, and ENOSIS will
always
be my deep national aspiration as it is the aspiration of all Greek
Cypriots. My national creed has never changed and my career as a
national
leader has shown no inconsistency or contradiction. I have accepted
independence instead of ENOSIS because certain external conditions and
factors have not allowed a free choice.
If I had any ambitions, my greatest ambition would be for my name to
be
associated with ENOSIS."
Makarios, in an interview with Mme Maria Rejane
of the French Magazine "Le Point", published on
02/19/1973
"ENOSIS has always been for the Greek Cypriots a deep rooted national
aspiration. To me independence is a compromise. In other words, if I
had
a free choice between independence and ENOSIS, I would support ENOSIS."
Makarios, in an interview with the
correspondent
of Frankfurter Rundshau as published in the
Cyprus
Mail on 05/16/1974
"The Cyprus State should be dissolved only in the event of ENOSIS."
Makarios, in a letter to General Gizikis,
President
of Greece, dated 07/02/1974
"The Greek Cypriot leadership prepared the AKRITAS PLAN in order to
knock the
Turks out and realize ENOSIS -union of Cyprus with Greece- ..."
Aristos Katsis, a Greek historian, in his
article
published by the Greek Cypriot daily
Phileleftheros on
11/10/1979
"My first goal will be to get rid of the concessions and promises given
by
Vasiliou. Our goal is the same. [It is] to liberate Varosha,
Pentadaktylons,
Kyrenia, Morphou, Karpasia, Cyprus."
Glafkos Klerides, Eleftherotipia, 02/13/1993
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*(2)
Statement of Greek Minister on Greek Cypriot Missing Persons
Source: The Tragedy of Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons in Cyprus -Third
Decade-
June 1989
Mr Evangelos Yannopolos, the then Greek Minister of Maritime
Affairs,
said on 4/7/1988 the following which was published in Eleftherotipia
newspaper in Nicosia.
"The two myths in Cyprus must be exposed as lies. The first
myth
is the case of missing persons and the second is the myth of the
invasion
of Cyprus by Turkey. The Greek Cypriots presented as missing persons
were
actually the victims who were killed during the Sampson Coup. As
regards the
invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, it was the Greek military that staged the
coup and toppled Makarios at a time when he was an internationally
recognized
President of Cyprus. How is it possible to topple Makarios and start
slaughtering the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and impose a mad
man
like Sampson to head the Cyprus Government and yet expect no reaction
from
Turkey."
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*(3)
VOLUNTARY REGROUPING OF POPULATIONS
On 2 August 1975, at the third round of the Vienna Talks, an
Agreement was reached between the representatives of the two
peoples of Cyprus, President Denktas and Mr. Clerides, for the
Voluntary Regrouping of Populations. (U.N. Document, S/11789,
2 August 1975)
This Agreement, reached under the auspices of the U.N.
Secretary
General and implemented in September 1975 under U.N.
supervision,
consolidated the peace reached as the result of the Turkish
Peace
Operation. The voluntary regrouping of populations made it
possible for the two peoples of Cyprus to live in complete
security in their respective zones. No intercommunal fighting
or
acts of violence took place in Cyprus since the implementation
of the Agreement of 2 August 1975. The peace achieved by the
Turkish Peace Operation became a permanent feature in the
Island.
Source: The Crux of the Cyprus Question
Turhan Feyzioglu, Necati M. Ertekun
Population Exchange Agreement
Signed on August 2, 1975.
(1) The Turkish Cypriots at present in the south of the island will be
allowed,
if they want to do so, to proceed north with their belongings under
an
organized programme and with the assistance of the United Nations
Peace
keeping Force in Cyprus.
(2) Mr. Denktas reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots
at
present in the north of the island are free to stay and that they
will be
given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for
education
and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by
their
own doctors and freedom of movement in the north.
(3) The Greek Cypriots at present in the north who, at their own
request and
without having been subjected to any kind of pressure, wish to move
to the
south, will be permitted to do so.
(4) The United Nations will have free and normal access to Greek
Cypriot
villages and habitations in the north.
(5) In connexion with the the implementations of the above agreement,
priority
will be given to the reunification of families, which may also
involve
the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the
south, to
the north.
Source: U.N. Document S/11789
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*(4)
MAKARIOS ADDRESSING THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL Official Records
1780th Meeting: 19 JULY 1974
New York
18.
...It is clearly an invasion from outside, inflagrant violation
of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.
The so-called coup was the work of the Greek officers staffing
and
commanding the National Guard.
19.
... the Greek officers serving with the National guard....
recruited many members of the terrorist organization EOKA-B.
21.
The coup caused much bloodshed and took a great toll of human
lives...
...It was an invasion which violated the independence and
sovereignty of the Republic. And the invasion is continuing
so long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus.
25.
It may be said that it was the Cyprus Government which invited
the Greek officers to staff the National Guard. I regret to say
that it was a mistake on my part...
32. As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not
constitute
an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus
are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion,
and
from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both
Greeks and Turks.
Source: U.N. Security Council Official Record of the 1780th meeting.
"Makarios' address on 19 July 1974"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
Interview & the Testimony of the Greek Cypriot Priest, Papatsetsos,as
Published in Local Greek Newspaper, Ta Nea on 28 February 1976
PAPATSETSOS:
Two days after the coup, on 17 July, I witnessed something which has
perhaps never been witnessed by any mortal before. I saw a young Greek
Cypriot buried alive. That was when two Junta officers came to my house
and ordered me to accompany them to the cemetery. I taught they were
going to kill me, but they said they only wanted me for burying some
dead people.
In the cemetery there were two open graves and two bodies lying beside
them. I went to see if I could recognise them. One was dead. But the
other, a curly haired, fair-com- plexioned, 18 year-old youth, was
moving. Startled, I turned back and shouted:'But officer, this man is
alive!'
'Shut up you dirty priest, or I will shut you up for good', the officer
retorted. Then the youth was pushed into the open grave which was
filled with earth. I swear to God that they buried this youth while he
was still alive!
[Pointing at the cemetery, Papatsetsos said] Here people were buried
like dogs by the Junta. There were also bodies which had been dumped
outside the cemetery. They were not identified, and not claimed. As a
priest my conscience is troubled, but they were holding a pistol to my
head at the time.
I remember the day they first came to me. They said 'Father, we have
some dead bodies which we want you to bury'. 'Certainly', I replied and
asked how many bodies they had. SEVENTY-SEVEN they said. An hour later
a lorry arrived and I heard someone order: 'Dump them outside.' They
were the dead bodies; they were all put in one common grave, without
waiting for identification by their relatives. The Junta men produced
some small crosses(seven only), wrote some names on them and put them
on the grave.
The Junta men scornfully called persons loyal to Makarios 'Muskos
supporters', and wanted to bury them 'like dogs', in a sheep fold
outside the cemetery. And that is what they did in the end. They dug
two graves with excavators-one inside and the other outside the
cemetery. They buried their own dead (27) inside the cemetery and
others(5) outside.
TA NEA: Father, about the youth man buried alive, could he have been
saved?
PAPATSETSOS: Of course he could have been saved. He had a wound in the
right leg. I went to the hospital and asked a doctor there, if a dead
man could move. The doctor laughed, and said 'No'. But I was not the
one who had buried him alive.
TA NEA: Could you recognise any of the Junta men?
PAPATSETSOS: THEY HAD ALL COME FROM GREECE FOR THE COUP. They were
looting, and even broke into my house. They entered houses on the
pretext of searching for deserters but actually stole valuable articles
from them.
TA NEA: Have you witnessed any other atrocities?
PAPATSETSOS: I listened to telephone conversations between Junta men.
In one case they were talking about the people resisting at Kaimakli
suburb, and saying:'SHOOT THEM ALL, HAVE NO MERCY AT ALL!' I also
noticed that in the hospi- tal they were giving polluted water to the
sick.
TA NEA: Father, could you swear that you have not secretly buried dead
Turks in the cemetery?
PAPATSETSOS: Only about 10. We did not know who they were and where
they were found.
TA NEA: How many bodies did you bury during the coup?
PAPATSETSOS: 127. Fifty of them were collected from the streets and
they were buried outside the cemetery; the other 77 were buried inside.
TA NEA: If the Turkish invasion had not taken place, would more Greek
Cypriots have been killed in the coup?
PAPATSETSOS: OH YES, MANY MORE. They wanted to kill me too. It is
rather a hard thing to say, but it is true, that the Turkish
intervention saved us from a merciless internecine war. They had
prepared a list of all Makarios supporters and they would have
slaughtered them all.
TA NEA: Now, father tell me sincerely, were people brutally killed in
those days?
PAPATSETSOS: YES, MY SON. MASSACRES were committed outside Kykko
Monastery and in Limassol. I heard with my own ears the order. 'ALL OF
THEM, TO THE LAST MAN, MUST BE KILLED TONIGHT.'
THOSE WHO HAVE WITNESSED THESE CRIMES ARE AFRAID TO SPEAK. AS A MATTER
OF FACT MOST OF THEM ARE GRIVAS SUPPORTERS AND THEY WILL NEVER SPEAK.
---------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
Greek's confession of the massacre
The ex-Prime Minister of Greece, Mitsotakis, announced that Cypriot
Greeks had slaughtered Turks mercilessly under Makarios' bad
administration.
Terrible massacres carried out by the Cypriot Greeks against the
Turkish population of the island 26 years ago has been confirmed by
Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the ex-Prime Minister of Greece. The Cypriot
Greeks, who killed Turks brutally at that time, were denying these
massacres on the international arena up till now. Konstantinos
Mitsotakis said that "under Makarios' administration, Cypriot
Greeks carried out killings of Turks to reach the goal of abolishing
the signed agreements". These remarkable statements of the ex-Prime
Minister to the daily Greek newspaper Ta Nae have also been published
on Fileleftheros, the newspaper with the highest circulation in South
Cyprus. In his statements, Mitsotakis accused Archbishop Makarios with
criminal mistakes. Mitsotakis said that Makarios had dragged Cyprus
into bloody events in order to abolish the agreements signed personally
by himself and that this process had led Cypriot Greeks to commit
undeniable murders against the Turkish side. Mitsotakis also criticized
Konstantin Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister of the period and said
that "if I were in place of him I would accept the proposals made by
the Turks after the operation of 20th July,1974 and would prevent the
second operation".
_________________________________________________________-
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
From: WASHINGTON POST, 17.02.1964
"...the fanatic Greeks are gradually approaching to ethnic genocide..."
From: Statement by Archbishop Makarios, August 1964
"...If Turkey comes in order to save Turkish Cypriots, Turkey will find
no Turkish Cypriots to save..."
From: A speech by Makarios made on the occasion of the visit of the
Defense Minister of Greece - on 27 October 1964 - As reported by all
Greek Cypriot newspapers on 28 October 1964
"...Greece has come to Cyprus, and Cyprus is Greece. I firmly believe
that the Pan-Hellenic struggle for the union of Cyprus with motherland
Greece will shortly be crowned with success. this success will be the
beginning of a new era of Greek grandeur and glory."
From: HERALD TRIBUNE, NEW YORK, 16 SEPTEMBER 1964
".....degrading, sub-human standard of life in Cyprus for Turks...",
"....economic restrictions being imposed upon the Turkish community in
Cyprus were in some instances so severe as to be a siege..."
From: UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT NO.s/610 of 12 December 1964, Annex
II
20. "At present no mail is being delivered to areas under Turkish
Cypriot control..."
From: A statement by Makarios as quoted in the Greek Cypriot Press of
17 March 1965
"...We shall keep the Cyprus question open and will never close it
under any circumstances or conditions...until we close it through union
with Greece, a genuine ENOSIS without exchanges."
From: CYPRUS MAIL - Statement of Makarios on 28 March 1966
"No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for
the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements (Referring
to Zurich-Longon Agreements which led for the Creation of the Republic
of Cyprus) have created a State but not a Nation."
----------------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
From: DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) 15.02.1964 EDITORIAL
"...If the Turkish Army has not already landed reinforcements to its
Treaty Force in Cyprus, that is simply proof of the patience of Turkey.
Its right to do so cannot be denied. If international treaties mean
anything, Turkey can protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from further
massacre. It is radical discrimination in its most bestial form.
Although there have been efforts to cloud the issue by suggesting that
both Cypriot communities are to blame, by far the heaviest guilt is
that of the Greek Cypriot force known as EOKA or EDMA..."
From: LE FIGARO (PARIS) 15-16.02.1964 REPORT BY MAX CLOS
"...It is a military operation that the Greeks launched against the six
thousand inhabitants of the Turkish quarter yesterday morning. A
spokesman of the Greek Cypriot Government has recognized this
officially... It is hard to conceive, how Greeks and Turks may
seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened.."
From: National Review, 12.06.1995, by Brian Cozier
"Greek Cypriot terrorist movement led by political bandit called George
Grivas had one simple aim: Enosis or union with Greece." ....
"In my view, the Turkish intervention of 1974 was not an invasion, as
widely accepted, but a morally justified rescue operation." .....
"I regret the Greek rejection of a federal solution, which alone makes
sense to me." .....
"Greek Cypriots are trying to make life uncomfortable for Northern
Cyprus by cutting of gas and electricity daily." .....
"There are warning signs today in the Greek Cypriot Republic..."
...for months past, a Russian Mafia and ex-KGB presence has been
building up there. There is a massive arms build-up as well... There
are also reliable reports on a still more sinister development, with
the training of anti-Turkish, leninist terrorists of the PKK in the
South (Greek Cypriot)..."
From: PERIODIKA, 6.2.1994 (Greek Cypriot weekly magazine) From an
interview with Mr. Ayionatitis, the leader of the Greek Political Party
"Ergatikei Demokratika Association"
"Greek Cypriot leadership says that the Cyprus problem began in 1974;
but it began long before this and even before the independence
(1960)...Power-holders on our side were oppressing Turkish Cypriots
before 1974..."
"...We should not forget that before 1974 Turkish Cypriots had been
treated like Negroes...Turks were doing the worst work but receiving
the least money. Turks had not had any control over the island's
economy."
"Reverting to the state of affairs before 1974 would not be a justified
move at all. Turks will never agree to this. And we have to admit one
more thing: If Turkey arrived in 1974 to save the Turkish Cypriots, the
latter were really in need of being saved. No one could know what the
coupists would do if they took over. Turkish Cypriots were concerned
about their fate in case Cyprus was united with Greece and they were
justified with their concern. It is because of this concern that
Turkish Cypriots have been fighting against Enosis since 1945. Under
this climate, there remains to be no justification for refugees to
return to their homes."
From: THE WIND BLOWS MEMOIRS OF SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HUME, FORMER PRIME
MINISTER OF THE UK
"...I was early convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring
himself to treat the Turkish Cypriots as human beings, he was inviting
the invasion and partition of the island."
From: VOICE OF GERMANY, 30.07.1974
(FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH MS INGRID HEBIL, A GERMAN TOURIST IN CYPRUS)
"...the human mind cannot comprehend the Greeks butchery. Greek
National Guard ... entering the Turkish homes, ruthlessly rained
bullets on women and children, they cut the throats of many Turks;
rounding up the Turkish women, they ... raped them all ..."
From: THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 20.08.1974
"...Every hour new ditches and numerous corpses are being discovered.
It is very difficult to endure the job..."
From: NBC, NATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 29.07.1974 JOHN PALMER
REPORTING:
"...In the Turkish village of Aleminio, the Turks were collected in
front of a wall and the Greek national army shot them all and killed
them indiscriminately..."
From: THE WASHINGTON POST, 23.07.1974
"...In a Greek raid on a small village near Limassol, 36 people out of
the population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said they had been given
orders to kill the inhabitants before the Turkish forces arrived.."
From: UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (upi), USA, 23.07.1974
"...the Greeks killed many women and children in Limassol. I have seen
the bodies of 20 children lying on the road...some were wounded and
crying...the Greek soldiers are waiting for their turn to enter in the
Turkish homes and kill the women..."
From: THE LONDON TIMES, 22.07.1974
"In the island, thousands of Turks were held as hostages. turkish women
were raped and Turkish children killed on the streets. The Turkish
Quarter in Limassol was burnt down. The incidents have been confirmed
by Greek Cypriots."
From: EVENING STANDARD, 19.07.1974
"...today, early in the morning Greek ships boarded on Famagusta (the
main seaport of Cyprus) port and discharged Greek soldiers fully
furnished with modern arms...soon after the discharge, atrocities
started to take place ... Cyprus is not a soverign state
anymore...Widespread massacre is taking place all over the island..."
"...At the main police station, one witness saw people tied to each
other....they were later executed.."
From: IL GIORNO, 14.1.1964 REPORTED BY GIORGIO BOCCO
"In Cyprus the terror continues. Right now we are witnessing the exodus
of Turks from villages. Thousands of people are abandoning their homes,
lands, herds: Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of
the Hellens and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up their
barbaric and ferocious behavior. At four o'clock in the afternoon
curfew is imposed on the Turkish villages. Threats, shootings, and
attempts of arson start as soon as it becomes dark. After the massacre
during the past Christmas that spared neither women, nor children, it
is difficult to put up any resistance..."
From: A STATEMENT BY MAKARIOS AS QUOTED IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS OF
17 MARCH 1965
"...We shall keep the Cyprus question open and will never close it
under any circumstances or conditions....until we close it through
union with Greece, a genuine ENOSIS without exchanges."
From: WASHINGTON POST, 16.02.1964 ARTICLE BY ROBERT H. ESTABROOK
"...Archbishop Makarios, robed adn bearded cleric who serves as
President of Cyprus, has a Byzantine talent for equitation....his
Government deliberately provoked the clashes and is bent upon the
extermination of the Turkish population..."
From; EVENING POST, 15.1.1964 REPORTED BY JOHN WHITE FROM NICOSIA,
CYPRUS
Background to the London Conference
"This week 2,000 miles from that dusty Cypriot road, men are meeting
round a table in london to try to sort out the tragedy of Cyprus. Their
aim will be to find a solution to a problem which has produced
wide-spread murder, arson, looting and kidnapping. It is profoundly to
be hoped they discover such a solution. But very few people I met in
Cyprus last week have much faith in this painfully arranged Conference.
As the Greek Cypriot taxi man who drove me around Nicosia said: "The
conference will solve nothing. It is just words."
When I asked him for his solution he said "If the Turks want to stay -
O.K. But they can't have any rights. they should not have the good
jobs. They are the minority and must do what we say."
"Some Greeks are more extremist than the taxi man. They don't merely
wish to deprive the Turks of all rights. They want to deprive them of
the right to live. I have heard men say all Turks should die and these
were men with nervous trigger fingers."
" Many Greek and Turkish Cypriots are embittered - understandably - and
some are apparently resigned to everlasting conflict. 'I would like to
live peaceably with the Greeks' said one Turk, 'But I do not see how it
can be done.' Possibly he spoke for many others."
"The British Army in Cyprus have been playing a most difficult role.
One of their jobs has been to try and build confidence between Greeks
and Turks."
"Last Thursday hundreds of soldiers were drafted into a suburb of
Nicosia to safeguard Turkish families coming back to their homes and
'restore confidence'. I saw more Turks going than coming back. As one
of them said 'My four your old daughter was shot by my next door
neighbor. I don't want to return and be killed.'.."
From: THE GUARDIAN, 02.04.1988 (FROM THE 'SECRET" REPORT OF COMMANDER
PACKARD, WHO WAS A HIGH RANKING BRITISH OFFICER IN CYPRUS DURING
1963-64)
" One of Packard's first tasks was to try to find out what had happened
to the Turkish hospital patients. Secret discussions took place with a
Greek Minister in the collapsed government. After a brief
investigation, he was able to confirm local rumors. it appeared that
greek medical staff had slit the Turkish patients' throats as they lay
in their beds. Their bodies were loaded onto a truck and driven to a
farm north of the city where they were fed into mechanical choppers and
ground into the earth."
---------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
The following is a list of Greek Cypriot Organizations which promoted
ENOSIS -union of Cyprus with Greece- through armed assaults,
killings, and terrorism all over the island.
(Source: The Cyprus Revolt by Nancy Crawshaw)
AKEL Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou
Reform Party of the Working People
ANE Alkimos Neolaia Tis EOKA
Valiant Youth of EOKA
AON Anorthotiki Organismos Neolaias
Reform Youth Organisation
EAM Ethnikon Apeleftheritikon Metopon
National Liberation Front
EAS Ethnikos Apeleftherotikos Synaspimos
National Leberation Coalition
EDMA Eniaion Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiurgias
United Democratic Reconstruction Front
ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos
People's National Liberation Army
EMAK Ethnikon Metopon Apeleftheroseos Kyprou
Cyprus National Liberation Front
EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
KEM Kypriakon Enotikon Metapon
Cyprus Enosis Front
OAE Organosis Aristeron Ethnikophronon
Left-wing Nationalists' Organisation
OAP Organosis Aristeron Patrioton
Left-wing Patriots' Organisation
OHEN Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon
Orthodox Christian Union of Youth
PEAEK Panellinikos Epiropi Agonos Enoseos Kyprou
Panhellenic Committee for the Struggle for the Union of Cyprus
PEK Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou
Panagrarian Union of Cyprus
PEKA Politiki Epiropi Kypriakou Agonos
Political Committee of the Cyprus Struggle
PEO Pankyprios Ergatiki Omospondia
Pancyprian Federation of Labour
PEOM Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Mathiton
Pancyprian National Organisation of Pupils
PEON Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaisas
Pancyprian National Organisation of Youth
SEK Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou
Confederation of Cypriot Workers
SEKA Syndonistiki Epitropi Kypriakos Agonos
Coordination Committee of the Cyprus Struggle
AKEL, ANE, AON, EAM, EAS, EDMA,ELAS, EMAK, EOKA, KEM, OAE, OAP, OHEN,
PEAEK, PEK, PEKA, PEO, PEOM, PEON, SEK, SEKA
ANE's wide range of duties included surveillance and intimidation...
Later, on demonstrating proficiency as gunmen, they were promoted to
full membership of EOKA. [p. 255]
AON ... the communist youth organisation... [p. 54]
EAS immediately offered to support the Church plebiscite on condition
that it was a 'genuine' plebiscite for Enosis [p. 47]
EDMA ..., the potential successor to EOKA was formed out of ex-fighters
in support of Makarios [p. 352]
ELAS ... the overwhelmingly superior forces of ELAS... [p.92]
EMAK ... a secret revolutionary organisation, well organised and fully
armed, which aimed at Enosis... [p.111]
KEM... a plot by KEM to assasinate Makarios and start civil war in the
island... [p. 353]
OAE & OAP ... The two new organisations,..., sought to capture the
loyalties of the moderate leftists and claimed to represent
Akelists...[p.306]
OHEN ... had exercised a pernicious influence over Cypriot youth
through OHEN
and had frequently preached sedition in recent years [p. 169]
PEAEK ... This organisation, according to its own accord, had issued
over 3
million anti-British pamphlets printed by departments of the Greek Army
and
Government [p. 219]
PEK ... its subversive activities were in any case notorious and its
links
with Greece essentially political. [p. 128]
PEKA ... [EOKA]'s political wing... [p. 242]
PEON ...since its prescription in 1953, had functioned underground...
[p. 101]
SEKA... pledged to self-determination and Enosis.. [p. 384]
----------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE ALWAYS HARBOURED PKK AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
TERROR GROUPS
Greek Cypriot support given to the PKK terrorist organisation, known as
one of the most dangerous international terror groups in the world, has
once been proven, when a Cypriot passport issued by the Greek Cypriot
Administration in South Cyprus was found in the possession of PKK
leader Abdullah OCALAN who was recently captured and arrested by the
Turkish security officers.
The Turkish Government has stated that the passport found in OCALAN's
possession bore the name of LAZAROS MAVROS, the current President of
the Committee for Solidarity with Kurdistan, operating in south Cyprus
with the purpose of securing all sorts of support to PKK in this part
of the island.
Despite the Greek Cypriot sides desperate denials of its role in this
passport issue, its link with PKK in particular and international
terrorism in general has been proven with various reports, press
articles and other official documents.
Indeed, not only the Greek Cypriot officials but also other non- or
semi-official figures or organisations have, at times, been reported to
have been supporting and harbouring morally and materially, PKK and
other terror groups, such as ASALA. The prevailing mentality has always
been The enemy of my enemy is my friend, that has finally backfired, as
seen in the recent Kurdish violence against the Greeks in connection
with the arrest of CALAN and his subsequent bringing to Turkey.
SAMPSON
An ex-EOKA militant and the man installed for a few days as the Greek
Cypriot President in July 1974 by the Greek coupists who toppled over
Makarios Nicos SAMPSON is one of the Greek Cypriot figures who has been
linked to many acts of terrorism after 1974.
During those days when he was in the jail in South Cyprus, he planned a
series of terrorist acts against Turkey. The most striking aspects of
these acts were that their origin was Europe and that third parties
were employed.
Year 1976 was one when the Armenian and Arab terrorists chose France as
a base for their acts. French intelligence agency permitted PLOs
terrorist groups to be settled in France with the condition of not
giving any harm to the French interests both in and outside the
country.
In the years after 1975, during which international terrorism and
terror acts against Turkey were escalating, a report from Cyprus did
not draw much attention. Greek Cypriot President gave partial amnesty
to Nicos Sampson, a cancer patient, to go to France for treatment.
Sampson flew to Paris for treatment.
About four years after Sampsons arrival in Paris, ie. in 1980 when
terror turned Europe into a blood-lake, certain information reached
INTERPOL. The information was about a bomb blast on 3 October 1980 at a
synagogue in Copernicus Street in Paris that caused the death of many
people. Explosives were implanted in a Suzuki 125 model car and was
exploded with an electronic device. The car had been bought from a
used-car gallery for 1000 dollars at Grand Arme Avenue on 23 September.
In his deposition to the police, the gallery owner said that the car
was bought by a short, thin man with a moustache wearing blue jeans and
a leather jacket. For the preparation of the cars documents a Greek
Cypriot passport issued in South Cyprus was used. The passport was
issued under the name of Alexanders Panariou. Embassy of the Greek
Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus in Paris claimed that the
passport was fake.
According to the police Spanish terrorist Ernesto Mila Rodriguez was
behind this incident. Rodriguez had been caught, shortly before this
incident, while trying to smuggle Ingram sub-machine guns.
Names of four other Spanish terrorists were also mentioned in
connection with the synagogue explosion. While the investigation into
the issue was under way, the perpetrators had relations with Nicos
Sampson and some other Greek Cypriots living in Paris and frequently
visited South Cyprus. The passports of these Spanish terrorists caught
by the police contained many entry-exit visa stamps to and from South
Cyprus and Beirut. Also an address reading, Rue de la Pane, 100 was
found in the terrorists possession. This was Nicos Sampsons home
address in Paris.
French police found out that Sampson had occasional meetings with
suspected Greek Cypriots, Greek diplomats, Armenian businessmen and
Arabs. The most striking activity of Sampson was to rent houses and
provide cars for certain Arabs known as terrorists, using Greek Cypriot
names. He especially had very close relations with Syrians and Libyans.
He was supplying them with Greek Cypriot passports to use for their
acts and helping them to leave the country with planes of South Cyprus.
LYSSARIDES
Besides Sampson Dr Vassos Lyssarides, the leader of the Socialist EDEK
Party in South Cyprus, has been actively and seriously involved in
anti-Turkish terrorism both before and after 1974.
Lyssarides is the founder of the the Committee for Solidarity with
Kurdistan, established with the aim of supporting and harbouring PKK in
South Cyprus. His name is also linked with ASALA and other Arab terror
groups. He has constantly worked to bring such terrorist groups to the
island, give them all sorts of support and assistance and unleash them
on to the Turkish targets from their Southern Cyprus base.
In his speeches delivered during anti-Turkish rallies in Athens and
Paris in 1976, Lyssarides openly declared that they were preparing for
a second Vietnam War in order to expel the Turks from the island.
For 40 years, Vassos Lyssarides has been playing the same game over the
island of Cyprus. His relations with certain persons have drawn the
attention of foreign intelligence agencies. He has also served as an
adviser to the Palestinian, Libyan and Syrian terrorists.
Being well aware of the hostile feelings of Greek Cypriots against the
Turks and wishing to exploit this for its own ends, the Syrian
intelligence agency Mukhaberat has managed to turn the island into a
base for international terrorism, by using Lyssarides as a tool. By the
end of 1970s, in more than 30 camps in South Cyprus, Greek, Greek
Cypriot, Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish (Communist militant) terrorists, as
well as terrorists from various other countries were under the training
of Cuban, Libyan, Palestinian and Greek army officers.
That Greece transported arms and ammunition to PKK and ASALA terrorists
through South Cyprus was revealed by the Israeli intelligence agency,
Mossad. Moreover, Israeli patrol ships, at times, searched South Cyprus
and Greece registered ships off the Lebanon to find large quantities of
Kalashnikov guns. In the meantime, it was found out that Lyssarides and
his men often went to Lebanon and Syria and met Majeed Sharar, known as
the coordinator of terrorist acts against Turkey, terrorist leaders
Abou Nidal, and George Habbash.
By 1983, acts by the Greek-Greek Cypriot trio against Turkeys security
have been noticeably intensified. In the meantime, Turkish intelligence
units obtained information to the effect that Greek and Greek Cypriot
agents established contacts with Kurdish and Turkish terrorists who
fled to West Germany, Switzerland and Sweden after committing crimes in
Turkey.
News arriving from South Cyprus also confirmed these reports. It was
also reported that about 50 terrorists who fled Turkey on 20 September
1980 agreed to collaborate with Greece and South Cyprus.
All the contacts and links were forged by Lyssarides and his men.
Lyssarides has a dark past. In his book entitled, AKEL: The Communist
Party of Cyprus (A Stanford University publication), researcher T.W.
Adams gives the following information about Lyssarides:
Lyssarides. He established the Cyprus Representation of Asian-African
Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). It was Makarios who wanted
most the establishment of ties with this organisation. He thought
differently from Lyssarides who wished to make Cyprus Communist. His
aim was to infiltrate into the third-world countries in order to gain
strength. Lyssarides who was elected MP and Parliament Speaker in 1981
is so merciless that he had his men kill AAPSOs Secretary General,
during a General Assembly meeting of the organisation in Nicosia, just
because the latter prevented his appointment to a high-level post
within the organisation as he knew his (Lyssaridess) true personality.
Lyssarides has a private armed group that has links with terror groups.
Greek Cypriot press gave, in mid-1980s, introduced Lyssarides as Libyan
leader Qaddafis man and gave interesting information about him. For
instance, it was written that the Cypro-Libya company operating in
South Nicosia was a cover-up firm that laundered the money he was given
to feed terrorist groups. The firm was also used as a base of Libya and
Syria for their acts in Western Europe and the U.S. One of the most
important activities of Cypro-Libya was drugs and arms-smuggling.
Lyssarides still nurtures international and anti-Turkish terrorism and
pursues an adamant and militant policy against Turkey. He has recently
pulled out from a coalition Government under Clerides, because the
latter has agreed not to deploy the S-300 missiles in South Cyprus.
Lyssarides is reported to have lent support to pro-PKK demonstrators in
South Cyprus who carried out a number of frenzied demos in protest of
Abdullah calans capture.
ROLANDIS
Nicos Rolandis, a former Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot
Administration in South Cyprus, is among the Greek Cypriot high-ranking
officials who are linked with support to international terrorism.
INTERPOL has found out that business partners of Rolandis, namely
Moassil from Kuwait and Joseph Sambi from Lebanon were involved in arms
and heroin smuggling and supplied arms to separatist terrorist
organisations in South Cyprus. Rolandis, Moassil and Joseph were known,
between 1981-84, as linkages of drug-trafficking to the Middle and
Western Europe via South Cyprus. While drugs were sent to the West
through Cyprus and smuggled arms arriving from the West, to the East.
Rolandis and his partners were loading arms aboard Cyprus-registered
ships at Varna Port in Bulgaria, storing them at Larnaca port in south
Cyprus and there, in return for the drugs they took over, they were
smuggling to the East, through Cyprus, the arms arriving from the West.
The drugs, on the other hand, were being sent to Europe in diplomatic
courier sacks aboard the planes of the national flag carrier Cyprus
Airways.
Concerned about the whole affair, the Greek Cypriot press in the South
occasionally raised the issue and informed the public opinion about the
situation in a way that confirmed the INTERPOL findings. The papers
frequently reported that the then Foreign Minister Nicos Rolandis,
using his diplomatic immunity, sent heroin in diplomatic courier sacks,
in collaboration with his Arab partners. No-one attempted to deny all
this.
BENJAMIN
Christodulos Benjamin is known as an organiser, coordinator and patron
of terror in South Cyprus too. For many years he has served as the
Minister of Interior or Defence and he is known for his close relations
with all the terror groups in the world. Benjamin has never taken the
pains of covering up or denying these dark relations. He was known for
his fanaticism against the Turks before 1974 as well. During the era of
Makarios, he is known to have been securing contacts between KGB and
the Syrian Mukhaberat and South Cyprus.
An incident between Deputy Police Chief Paulos Stokkos and then
Interior Minister Christodulos Benjamin is an example of the latters
role in terrorism.
During those days when ASALA terrorist organisation was assassinating
the Turkish diplomats one after the other, it was Benjamin who
harboured the ASALA terrorists in South Cyprus and kept them away from
sights. There were rational persons who did not welcome Benjamins
turning the island of Cyprus into a base for terrorism and who were
concerned about this. One of these people was Paulos Stokkos, Deputy
Police Chief of the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus.
Stokkos thought that state protection granted to ASALA that committed
murders in Europe could create serious problems for South Cyprus and
did not want to allow the Armenians to stay in South Cyprus.
Thats why the two men were at loggerheads. He opposed to Benjamins
orders on the issue and resisted the stationing of the Armenian
terrorists in the South.
In order to weaken Stokkos and dismiss him from his post, Benjamin
slandered that he was a spy working for Israel and using his men as
false witnesses accused Stokkos and had him arrested. He was charged of
high treason.
When foreign diplomats in South Cyprus showed considerable interest in
the trial and Stokkos revealed Benjamins entire relations with
international relations, Interior Ministry, headed by Benjamin,
demanded the trial to be held in closed session, on the grounds of
national security. But things revealed with all the legal evidence and
documentation during the open session of the trial revealed that South
Cyprus was a base for international terrorism.
Moreover, in July 1990, it was discovered that a firm named Orbit,
belonging to an Armenian from Limassol, supplied arms to PKK, that the
then Interior Minister Benjamin organised these activities and that
arms and ammunition coming from third countries were packed in Greece
and brought to Limassol in containers belonging to Orbit company.
COMMITTEE ON SOLIDARITY FOR KURDISTAN
It is known by all that ever since 1990, Greek Cypriot administration
in South Cyprus, has been openly harbouring, abetting and accommodating
the PKK terrorist organisation, besides its previous support to other
terror groups. It is especially noteworthy that through certain
associations and organisations that it has established under the cover
of respect and advancement of human rights, the Greek Cypriot
administration has been granting logistic support to PKK.
In order to organise and manipulate these activities the Greek Cypriot
Press and Information Office and EDEK Socialist Party under Vassos
Lyssarides formed the Committee on Solidarity with Kurdistan in 1989.
In a press conference held on 4 February 1990, the then Chairman of the
Committee Theophilos Georghiades, an agent from the Greek national
intelligence agency wearing the mask of a Press and Information
Officer, revealed that the committee also had members from among the
members of parliament from various political parties in South Cyprus.
In yet another meeting organised by the Committee on 19 March 1990,
Georghiades delivered a speech on the Kurdish movement, stating that
they would support the struggle of the Kurdish people on every occasion
and by all means.
Following the Committees formation and the launch of its activities,
financial support to the Kurds has been extended in various ways.
On 12 November 1990, according to a report broadcast by the Greek
Cypriot state TV RIK-1, a group consisting of four MPs from DIKO, AKEL,
EDEK and ADISOK, as well as members of the Committee on Solidarity for
Kurdistan, as well as journalists went to the Beqaa Valley and met
Abdullah calan. RIK-1 also showed scenes filmed from the Beqaa Valley,
headquarters of PKK. Those scenes showing the Greek Cypriot MPs
embracing and kissing the PKK murderers were especially striking.
On 30 November 1990, RIK-1 held an open panel discussion on PKK. The
participants of the programme were the MPs who visited PKKs camp at
Beqaa Valley and the members of the Committee on Solidarity for
Kurdistan. The programme was concluded in the following remarks: PKK
has become a well-organised army and that it was imperative for the
Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus to give support to this
struggle if the Turks were to be expelled from Cyprus.
In the meantime, PKK supporters, Greek Cypriots and Armenians, bearing
flags of Kurdistan, Armenia and Greece, began to demonstrate in the
streets.
Yet in another demo, organised in south Nicosia by the Committee on
Solidarity with Kurdistan on 21 February 1991, placards were carried
and slogans were shouted to the effect that Turkey violates the rights
of the Kurdish people.
On 2 March 1991, a club was opened for the PKK militants based in South
Cyprus. Funds necessary for the building the premises of the club were
provided by the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan.
Activities aimed at nurturing PKK in South Cyprus were continued with
the establishment of an Association on the Support for the Kurdish
People by the Committee on Solidarity with Kurdistan and EDEK party.
The fact that EDEK leader Vassos Lyssarides chairs the frequently held
meetings of the Association clearly reveals the identity of the circles
who nurture the subversive activities aimed at Turkey.
One regularly observes that the Greek Cypriot community, bombarded by
the Committees pro-PKK propaganda, is sent to the streets for protests
against Turkey, bearing flags of PKK and Greece and burning the Turkish
national flag.
PKK members based in South Cyprus do not hesitate either in exploiting
the sentiments of the Greek Cypriot people in order to win their
sympathy. Between 21-26 April 1992, ten PKK militants staged a hunger
strike at Eleftheria Square in south Nicosia. This show was organised
by the Committee on Solidarity with Kurdistan. Greek Cypriot
politicians and associations also attended this event that amounted to
a festival. During this show, financial assistance was raised for PKK
and the magazine named the Voice of Kurdistan, published in Greece in
the Greek language as a propaganda material against Turkey and released
free of charge, was sold for money to the passers-by through
compulsion.
A folk-dance troupe from South Cyprus participated in the Kurdistan
Festival held by PKK in Bochum in Germany in August 1992. The troupe
was taken to Germany by Theophilos Georghiades.
Using the events in rnak as a pretext, the Committee had the Kurds in
the island organise a demo against Turkey in South Nicosia in August
1992. This demo was again a stage for collecting funds for PKK, under
the cover of humanitarian assistance. Leaflets were distributed, in
which the Greek Cypriot people were invited to deposit funds at bank
accounts at the Banks of Cyprus and Laiki, to be transferred to PKK.
Meanwhile, a representative of ARGK, the military wing of PKK, took
part in a meeting that was also participated in by Vassos Lyssarides
and Theophilos Georghiades. During the meeting, formation of sabotage
and assassination teams that would operate against the targets in
Turkey and their training and manipulation in South Cyprus were
discussed and decided upon. Georghiades was appointed as the
coordinator of this operation.
GEORGHIADES
Theophilos Georghiades was the founder and first chairman of the
Committee on Solidarity with Kurdistan. He formed a special terrorist
group, consisting of the Kurds chosen from among pro-PKK fugitives
based in Greece and Syria, that would carry out terrorist acts in
Turkey, for South Cyprus.
Eight PKK militants were caught in Turkey a few years ago, who
explained in detail how they had been trained in South Cyprus by the
officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard to carry out terrorist
acts in Turkey.
Theophilos Georghiades were shot dead in 1994. In contrary to the
claims put forward by the Greek Cypriot administration that he had been
killed by the Turks, the truth into Georghiadess murder finally came to
surface. The truth was much more different than the Greek Cypriot
allegations.
In order for the PKK, an essentially Marxist-Leninist group, to
survive, and thus buy arms, it deals with drug-smuggling and
trafficking. This is a fact known by all.
South Cyprus is a centre from where PKK distributes its narcotics since
1988. It is in the reports of INTERPOL that Greek Mafia, the majority
of whom are ship-owners, carry PKKs drugs to Europe and America and
market them there. The ex-Chairman of the Committee on Solidarity with
Kurdistan Georghiades had established a link between the Greek Cypriot
Mafia and Abdullah calans men for the formers transporting and selling
of PKKs drugs.
In this manner, drugs transported from Syria to South Cyprus were
distributed to the rest of the world from this point. But the amount of
drugs deposited by PKK in South Cyprus rose considerably, requiring the
drop of prices proportionately. Naturally, this angered other Greek
Cypriot drug-smugglers who were dealing with the same business through
different channels. When they began to oppose PKK, Georghiades caused
the Greek and Greek Cypriot intelligence agencies, of whom he was a
member, and the police to confront these traffickers who aimed at
blocking PKKs drug-trafficking. This was a declaration war by
Georghiades on others. But this challenge cost him his life.
Indeed, one year after Georghiadess death, Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos
Clerides himself declared that the Former had been killed by three
Greek Cypriot drug-smugglers who were executed. But for one year,
Turkey was blamed falsely by the Greek Cypriot administration and the
issue was even taken to international platforms and Turkey was tried to
be unjustly cornered.
It was Lyssarides who reacted most strongly to Georghiadess murder. He
asked the Ministry of Interior to pay compensation to his family on the
grounds that he was killed while he was on duty and called on the
parliament to use the issue as a propaganda material against Turkey on
the international arena.
After a few months after Georghiadess death, that was followed by
statements and slogans of revenge on the Turks, a Turkish diplomat
named mer Sipahiolu was killed in Athens. Greek Cypriot press used
headlines reading, the Turkish diplomat was assassinated in retaliation
to Theophiloss murder.
GEORGHIDESS PRESS INTERVIEWS SHEDS AMPLE LIGHT TO GREEK CYPRIOT SUPPORT
TO PKK TERROR
Before his assassination, Theophilos Georghiades was quite active in
promoting the cause of PKK terror group. He has been interviewed by a
number of newspapers and given a considerable idea about the Greek
Cypriot support to PKK.
The Greek Cypriot daily Agon, for instance, published an interview on 2
February 1994 on the issue.
Among other things, Georghiades said: "We have a joint enemy with the
Kurds: the Turks".
The Kurds will not only be able to form their own state but also will
contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Following the defeat
of the Turkish state, the Hellenes can also capitalize on the new
opportunities that would emerge from the readjustment of the
territories in the Asia Minor.
The Kurds are helping enough (South) Cyprus. Turkish armys fight with
the Kurds with 350 thousand troops is an enough help to us (Greek
Cypriots). The Turkish army fully fights the Kurds. This shows that it
cannot dare to start a second war on Greece.
As we (Greek Cypriots) cannot fight (Turkey), we should, at least, help
those who fight for us. If Turkeys problems multiply and the number of
wars she fights increases and thus she extends her battleground, the
Turkish army will either be isolated in Cyprus or will be forced to
withdraw.
The Kurds will continue to strike the Turkish tourism so as to dry up
the economic sources of the country. As far as I see and know, the
Turkish tourism will be razed to the ground in 1994.
OTHER GREEK CYPRIOT ADMIRERS OF PKK AND OCALAN
Retired Greek Army General Matafias has been known so far as PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan in Greece. Matafias has repeatedly gone to Beqaa Valley
where he has met Ocalan and made joint plans for acts of terrorism and
murders to be committed in Turkey. He has constantly taken part in
meeting and demos held by and for the Kurds in Athens and South Cyprus.
General Matafias is known as an ardent admirer of calan, as the latter
has done to the Turks that Greece has never dared to do: ie killing the
Turks in cold-blood. Meanwhile, a recent report published in the Greek
Cypriot press has written that Retired Greek General Matafias has
become an adviser to Vassos Lyssarides. As their common denominator is
PKK, no-one has been taken surprise by the news. Matafias was among the
participants of Georghiadess funeral.
Greek Navy Retired Admiral Andonis Naksakis is known as Abdullah
Ocalans representative in Greece and his linkage to the Greek
Government. Taking part in Georghiadess funeral, as Abdullah calan,
Naksakis made a speech, saying, Until the Turkish state gives its final
breath and until Cyprus and Kurdistan gains their independence, our
struggle will continue and we will take our revenge on Georghiades.
After the death of Theophilos Georghiades, the Committee on Solidarity
with Kurdistan has been taken over by Lazaros Mavros, a journalist.
Mavros, whose name was found in the passport found in Abdullah calans
possession, is very well-known by its articles praising PKK and
Abdullah calan. While Mavros keeps silent over the passport issue,
another leading member of the Committee Lakis Pigguras are indignant
towards Greece relating to the arrest of calan. In a recent TV
programme, Pigguras accused the Greek Government of treachery for
handing over calan to the Turkish officials for trial.
Vassos Lyssaridess wife Barbara Lyssarides, Communist AKEL party MP
Andreas Philippou, EDEK MP Dimitris Eliades, EDEK official Takis
Christodoulou, former MPs Andreas Panaiotou, Christos Betas and
Georghios Savvides are the main leading figures who have devoted
themselves to the support of the PKK cause and all sorts of assistance
to the PKK terrorists and militants in South Cyprus.
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GREEKS THE DEMOCRATS WHO ARE NOT
Prepared by: K.N. Raif
page 5, Introduction
[...]
During my childhood, our Greek neighbors used to love me as if I was
their own child; and I remember their children playing happily in our
backyard.During my boyhood, I played football with my Greek friends and
at flirting age we ran together after the most alluring girls of our
town.
I remember taking our special dish of "Kadayif" to our Greek neighbors
during our "Bayram" festivities and receiving in reciprocation their
special "Pilavuna" during their "Easter" festivities.
When we grew up we enjoyed many feasts around the same tables and
frequented the same night-clubs. We attended to each other's funerals
and wedding ceremonies so many times that we knew exactly how to behave
on those occasions. And at maturity, we worked together at the same
government offices and jointly attended the same international seminars
and meetings of technical nature. What I mean is, I know Greeks as good
as I know Turks. They are great company, especially when it comes to
enjoy life together.
Then, what makes Greeks the way they are: so unfair, so cruel, so
unjust, so one-sighted and so undemocrat when it comes to politics,
religion and ideologies?
It seems to me that this is in their blood. However, there is no doubt
that the Greek educational structure and the Greek political parties
are highly influential in this regard.
Another factor I know for sure that is responsible for this phenomenon
is the Greek Orthodox Church. I will give an example for this from my
life experience.
One Sunday morning, my Greek friends collected me from my home for a
picnic. We were teenagers then. They said we had to pass by the church
because their parents would not allow them to go for picnic if they did
not attend the morning prayers. So, we went together to the church
which was also within our neighborhood.
The priest was preaching. the final words of the priest are still in my
ears:"...a good Greek is the one who is fortunate enough to kill a Turk
and bring his head to our church-yard. When the time comes you will all
be asked to do so. We will now pray for this time to come...soon..."
"This time" came during the Noel of 1963.
During this Noel, the Turkish community witnessed with great pain and
bewilderement that all their good Greek friends suddenly became
professional fighters running after their heads. Where and when these
people were mentally prepared and physically trained for such a cruel
and inhuman mission? Who were behind this hatred?
One final note for the reader: It is a historical fact that before the
Island entered under the Ottoman rule in 1571, there existed no
influential Greek community in the Island. The Island was then under
the Venecian rule and the Catholic leadership kept under severe
suppression the Greek population which was sparsely scattered on the
Island. After 1571, the Ottomans allowed the construction of new
Orthodox Churches at every settlement and granted autonomy to the Greek
Archbishopship. It is extremely sad that this very Archbishop, in years
to come, professed to its followers the genocide of the Island's Turks.
[...]
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http://www.turkses.com/index.asp
20 July 1974 Turkish Happy Peace Operation
As the 24th anniversary of the Greek Coup d'Etat of 15 July, 1974 and
Turkey's legitimate intervention five days later on 20 July, 1974
approaches, it is important to recall several fundamental points which
reflect the true nature of the Cyprus question.
The enmity and mistrust between the two peoples; Turkish and Greek
Cypriots are rooted in history and are mainly the result of the ethnic
cleansing which the Greek and Greek Cypriots staged against the Turkish
Cypriots between 1963 and 1974 for achieving Enosis (the union of
Cyprus with Greece). These attempts to bring Cyprus under Greek
domination and particularly the coup staged by the Athens Junta on 15
July 1974 compelled Turkey as one of the Guarantor Powers of the Cyprus
settlement under the Treaty of Guarantee to intervene on 20 July 1974
in order to stop the ethnic cleansing of our community.
The Turkish Cypriot people are grateful to Turkey for the effective
security guarantees whiich are vital for the preservation of peace and
stability on the island. The practical consequences of the events of
1963-1974 have been the emergence of parallel administrative, judicial
and legislative organs for each of the two peoples. The institutional
organisation of the Turkish Cypriot people developed through various
stages and culminated in 1983 in the setting up of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish Cypriot people in the meantime,
are leading their own life under their own flag, in peace and security
within the territories of the TRNC. In spite of this, in the
international field the Turkish Cypriots are denied the full exercise
of their basic rights and freedoms.
The Greek Cypriot administration has embarked on a massive propaganda
effort in misleading world public opinion on all aspects pertaining to
the Cyprus issue. By perpetuating the fallacy of treating the illegal
Greek Cypriot regime as the legitimate government under the false
pretence of "Republic of Cyprus", the Greek Cypriot side reaps the
benefits of satehood, engage in inhuman practices of embargoes against
the Turkish Cypriots and benefit from practically all international aid
originally given for both peoples of the island. Naturally they have
shown no real interest in any kind of settlement which should be based
on two sovereign states.
Most recently the efforts to deploy the S-300 missiles, putting into
effect a joint military doctrine, the construction of air and naval
bases for use by the Greek armed forces are the latest examples of
their aggressive move. Despite the warnings of the Turkish Cypriot side
and other countries and the UN, they went ahead and purchased the S-300
missile system from the Russian Federation. The S-300 missiles which
would alter the military balance in the region dramatically, are a
direct threat to the security of the Turkish Cypriot people and to that
of Turkey. Naturally, Turkey as a Guarantor Power and the TRNC will
take all the necessary measures to preserve the military balance.
Consequently, I can say that we as Turkish Cypriot people, are
determined to defend our rights of equality, sovereignty, our
independent state, the TRNC and Turkey's guarantorship no matter what
trick the Greek Cypriots play.
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The Secrets in the Cypriot Graves
When Turkish Peace Force landed on the island not only Cypriot Turks
were being killed. There was a slaughter between Greek Cypriots who are
for a coup supported by Greece and who are for a Cyprus cleansed from
its Turkish population.
Turkish Peace Force brought peace to the whole of the island and to all
groups living there. This peace has been lasting for 25 years.
Southern Cypriot Greek Administration had hastily done away with the
corpses remaining from the war between Cypriot Greeks and for 25 years
he said to the relatives of the victims, who are its own people, that
"they were killed or abducted by Turks".
There were some who knew the reality. But for wearing the common enemy
down they kept themselves silent by burying their sorrow inside. There
was a law of nature which they forgot : Truth certainly comes to light
sooner or later.
For learning the truth please read the below text. If you want to
confirm it, please look at the news article of June, 12, 1999 on The
Guardian's internet site :
(http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,57601,00.htm)
*****
Cypriot graves reveal secrets
Wives of the 'missing' from the 1974 war have won the right at last to
know what really happened
Helena Smith in Nicosia
Saturday June 12, 1999
The Guardian
The war cemetery of Lakatamia seems to be respectable. For 25 years
Greek Cypriots have visited its precisely aligned rows of graves to
honour those who died fighting to defend their island from the invasion
by Turkish forces in the summer of 1974.
But the well-tended surface of the cemetery conceals a very different
story, as the wives of those missing or dead discovered officially this
week when the graves were exhumed to reveal piles of bodies
unceremoniously buried together.
"If those bones could speak, their stories would send shivers down the
spines of those who live," said Maroulla Siamisi, who lost her husband
Andreas that summer.
She discovered the truth about the cemetery, which is close to the
capital Nicosia, one hot morning in August 1974, 17 days after Andreas
went missing behind enemy lines.
"I got a bulldozer to dig up the graves, and couldn't believe what I
saw. Bodies stacked one on top of another. I went through all of them -
limbs, I'll never forget, dropping off in my hands. I was determined to
find Andreas. I felt I owed it to our children."
She did not find him. Nearly a quarter of a century later she is still
waiting to hear the truth about the 2,000-plus Greek and Turkish
Cypriots who have not been seen since the war.
Although there have been repeated rumours of Greek Cypriot PoWs being
held in Turkish jails and Anatolian salt mines, none has ever been
found.
Mrs Siamisi said: "There were faces there.They could easily have been
identified. Why deny there were lots of bodies in there? Why mock us
for 25 years?"
Mrs Siamisi, 33 when Andreas disappeared, is not alone: an estimated
1,619 Greek Cypriot civilians and soldiers vanished in 1974.
The wives and fiancees left behind are known as Penelopes by a society
that has expected them to remain faithful to their hero-husbands.
But unlike Homer's heroine, who waited for more than 20 years for
Odysseus to return from the Trojan war, these Penelopes have run out of
patience.
"We've lost our womanhood, we've lost our looks, we've lost our years
but my God are we going to get to the bottom of the truth," said
58-year-old Androulla Palma.
She last heard her husband's voice on August 8 1974.
They are angry that since the invasion, which partitioned the island on
religious and ethnic lines, successive Cypriot governments have used
them at huge rallies to denounce the Turks for concealing the fate of
the missing.
They now believe that their own government may have been involved in
the hurried disposal of bodies in the chaotic aftermath of the war.
Last summer Mrs Palma and Mrs Siamisi took pickaxes to one of the
graves. In six hours they dug knee-deep into the tomb.
"We did it in desperation, to put pressure on the government to close
this painful chapter," said Mrs Palma. "We are sure our husbands are
somewhere in there. I was told mine was dead in 1993. If that is the
case I want to see bones."
At last, it seems, that moment may have come. For the first time
President Glafkos Clerides's government seems determined to crack the
mystery of Cyprus's missing.
This week Physicians for Human Rights, a non-governmental organisation
with experience in Rwanda, Somalia, Croatia and Bosnia, began exhuming
bodies from the cemetery's pits. Forensic scientists hope to be able to
identify the remains by DNA testing.
"It's still unclear how many bodies are there but what is sure is that
they were buried very hastily," said William Haglund, who is leading
the team of 20.
"Some bodies were buried very close together and some on top of each
other. None were in coffins or boxes."
Laid out on wooden desks in a laboratory in Nicosia are the skeletal
remains of seven people. Professor Haglund says the relatives will be
brought in to see the remains.
"After 25 years," he said, "it will be a privileged glimpse of the
dead."
The exhumation process is expected to be long and drawn out and it will
not be possible to identify all the bodies.
But it may be embarrassing to the Greek Cypriot government. Many of the
bodies could turn out to be those of men listed as missing. The list
has long been used by the Greek Cypriots to raise sympathy for their
plight.
Greek Cypriot officials hope that by putting their own house in order
the Turkish Cypriots - who claim that 803 of their community
disappeared during the inter-communal strife - will be encouraged to
follow suit.
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ATTEMPTED GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN CYPRUS
This article is written for a daily newspaper by former British
Parliamentarian (1992-1997) Michael STEPHEN
Former British Parliamentarian Michael STEPHEN reminds Mr. Michael B.
Christides, The Charge D'affaires of the Greek Embassy in Ankara, and
many others who appear to have forgotten what indeed the case in Cyprus
from 1963 to 1974.
The assertion by Mr. Christides (May 10, 1999) that there was no ethnic
cleansing or attempted genocide of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots
is ridiculous. Until influential Greek Cypriots come to terms with the
appalling behavior of their community toward the smaller Turkish
Cypriot community and stop trying to persuade themselves and world that
each side was as much to blame as the other, there will be no
reconciliation in Cyprus.
In his memoirs, American Undersecretary of State George Ball said:
"Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention
so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring
Turkish Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that." The fact is,
however, that neither the United States, the United Kingdom, nor the
United Nations, nor anyone, other than Turkey ever took effective
action to prevent it. On Feb. 17, 1964 the Washington Post reported
that "Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide."
Former British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home said, "I was
convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to treat
the Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and
partition of the island." On July 28, 1960 Makarios, the Greek
Cypriot president, said: "The independence agreements do not form the
goal - they are the present and not the future. The Greek Cypriot
people will continue their national cause and shape their future in
accordance with THEIR will."
In a speech on Sept. 4, 1962 at Panayia Makarios said, "Until this
Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race that has been the
terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA
can never be considered terminated."
In November 1963 the Greek Cypriots demanded the abolition of no less
than eight of the basic articles that had been included in the 1960
agreement for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish
Cypriots, naturally, refused to agree. The aim of the Greek Cypriots,
was to reduce the Turkish Cypriots people to the status of a mere
minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending
ultimate destruction or expulsion of the Turkish Cypriots from the
island.
When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the ammendment of the
Constitution, Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriots
attack began in December 1963," wrote Lt. Gen. George Karayiannis of
the Greek Cypriot militia ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The general
was referring to the notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the
blueprint for the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots and the
annexation of the island to Greece.
On Christmas Eve 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia attacked Turkish
Cypriots communities across the island. Large numbers of men, women,
and children were killed and 270 mosques, shrines and other places of
worship were desecrated.
On Dec. 28, 1963, the Daily Express carried the following report from
Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot quarter
of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last
five days. We were the first Western reporters there, and we have seen
sights too frigthful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that
the people seemed stunned beyond tears."
On Dec. 31, 1963, The Guardian reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as
the Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting
between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot
people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes,
including the wife and children of a doctor - allegedly by a group of
40 men, many in army boots and greatcoats." Although the Turkish
Cypriots fought back as best they could and killed some militia, there
were no massacres of Greek Cypriot civilians.
On Jan.1, 1964, the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the
Turkish Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the
walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have
created more devastation. Under roofs which had caved in I found a
twisted mass of bed springs, children's cots, and grey ashes of what
had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighboring village
of Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were
all Turkish Cypriot. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to
any Greek Cypriot house."
On Jan. 2, 1964, the Daily Telegraph wrote: "The Greek Cypriot
community should not assume that the British military presence can or
should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the
Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
On Jan. 12, 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote in a
telegram to London: "The Greek (Cypriot) police are led by extremists
who provoked the fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities. They
have recruited into their ranks as 'special constables' gun-happy
young thugs. They threaten to try and punish any Turkish Cypriot police
who wishes to return to the Cyprus Government... Makarios assured Sir
Arthur Clark that there will be no attack. His assurance is as
worthless as previous assurance have proved.
On Jan. 14, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot
inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on Dec. 26, 1963 and
reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red
Cross. A further massacre of Turkish Cypriots, at Limasol, was reported
by the Observer on Feb. 16, 1964; and there were many more.
On Feb. 6, 1964, a British patrol found armed Greek Cypriot police
attacking the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Sozomenos. They were unable to
stop the attack.
On Feb. 13,1964, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish
Cypriot quarter of Limassol with tanks, killing 16 and injuring 35. On
Feb. 15, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported: "It is a real military
operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the 6,000
inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot quarter yesterday morning. A
spokesman for the Greek Cypriot government has recognized this
officially. It is hard to conceive how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may
seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened."
On Sep. 10, 1964, the U.N. Secretary-General that, "UNFICYP carried
out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout the island
during the disturbances. ...it shows that in 109 villages, most of them
Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed while
2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and
shops have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita
suburb of Nicosia, 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a
further 240 have been partially destroyed there and in adjacent
suburbs."
The U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed
the Cyprus question in 1987,and reported unanimously on July 2 of that
year that "although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been
merely seeking to 'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the
extent dictated by the necessities of the situation,' this claims
ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963
the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of enosis and
actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and related treaties
to facilitate this ultimate objective."
The committee continued: "Moreover, in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot
legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favor of enosis, in
blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. 1
of the Treaty of Guarantee prohibited any action likely to directly or
indirectly promote union with any other state partition of the island,
and Art. 185 (2) of the Constitution is to similar effect.)
Prof. Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus, told Die Welt on Dec. 27, 1963:
"Makarios bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility for the
recent tragic events. His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of
their rights." In an interview with the UPI press agency on Dec. 30,
1963 he said, "All this happened because Makarios wanted to take away
all constitutional rights from the Turkish Cypriots."
The United Nations not only failed to condemn the forceable usurpation
of the legal order in Cyprus, but actually rewarded it by treating the
by then wholly Greek Cypriot administration as if it were the
government of Cyprus (Security Council Res. 186 of 1964). This
acceptance has continued to the present day, and reflects no credit to
upon the United Nations, nor upon Britain, nor the other countries who
have acquiesced.
On Aug. 12, 1964, the U.K. representative to the United Nations wrote
to his government in London as follows:
"What is our policy and true feelings about the future of Cyprus and
about Makarios? Judging from the English newspapers and many others,
the feeling is very strong indeed against Makarios and his so-called
government, and nothing would please the British people more than to
see him toppled and the Cyprus problem solved by the direct dealings
between the Turks and the Greeks. We are of course supporting the
latter course, but I have never seen any expression of the official
disapproval in public against Makarios and his evil doings. Is there an
official view about this, and what do we think we should do in the long
run? Sometimes it seems that the obsession of some people with 'the
Commonwealth' blinds us to everything else and it would be high
treason to take a more active line against Makarios and his henchmen.
At other times the dominant feature seems to be concern lest active
opposition against Makarios should lead to direct conflict with the
Cypriots and end up with our losing our bases."
Thereafter Turkish Cypriot MPs, judges, and other officials were
intimidated or prevented by force from carrying out their duties.
According to the Select Committee, "The effect of the crisis of
December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of government
into the hands of the Greek Cypriots alone. Claiming to be acting in
accordance with 'the doctrine of necessity,' the Greek Cypriot
members of the House of Representatives enacted a series of laws which
provided for the operation of the organs of governments without Turkish
Cypriot participation."
The report of the Select Committee contiued: "Equally damaging from
the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they concidered to be their
effective exclusion from representation at and participation in the
international fora where their case could have been deployed... An
official Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene
virtually disappeared overnight." It is not therefore surprising that
the world has been persuaded to the Greek Cypriot point of view.
More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still missing without trace from
these massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful events were not the
resposibility of "the Greek Colonels" of 1974 or an
unrepresentative handful of Greek Cypriot extremists. The persecution
of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of policy on the part of the Greek
Cypriot political and religious leadership, which has to this day made
no serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.
The U.K. Commons Select Committee found that "there is little doubt
that much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the
total or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the
displacement of about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population
was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek
Cypriot leadership."
The U.N. secretary-general reported to the Security Council: "When
the disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the
first part of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled their homes,
taking with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge
in safer villages and areas."On Jan. 14, 1964, "Il Giorno" of
Italy reported: "Right now we are witnessing the exodus of Turkish
Cypriots from the villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, land,
herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is relentless. This time the rhetoric of
the Hellenes and the statues of Plato do not cover up their barbaric
and ferocious behavior."
The Greek Cypriots sometimes allege that it was they who were attacked,
by the Turkish Cypriots, who were determined to wreck the 1960
agreements. However, the Turkish Cypriots were not only outnumbered by
nearly four to one; they were also surrounded in their villages by
armed Greek Cypriots; they had no way of protecting their women and
children, and Turkey was 40 miles away across the sea. The very idea
that in those circumstances the Turkish Cypriots were the aggressors is
absurd.
There were further attacks on the Turkish Cypriots in 1967. In 1971,
General Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again
commited to making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to
Greece. In a speech to the Greek Cypriot armed forces at the time
(quoted in "New Cyprus", May 1987) Grivas said: "The Greek forces
from Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the
Greeks of Cyprus upon the Turks. We want ENOSIS, but the Turks are
aginst it. We shall impose our will. We are strong, and we shall do
so."
By July 15, 1974, a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had
assembled in Cyprus and with their backing, the Greek Cypriot National
Guard owerthrew Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as
"president." On July 22, the Washington Star News reported:
"Bodies littered the streets and there were mass burials... People
told by Makarios to lay down their guns were shot by the National
Guard."
On April 17, 1991, Ambassador Nelson Ledsky testified before the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "most of the 'missing
persons'disappeared in the first days of July 1974, before the
Turkish intervention on the 20th. Many killed on the Greek side were
killed by Greek Cypriots in fighting between supporters of Makarios and
Sampson."
On Nov. 6, 1974, Ta Nea reported that dates from the graves of Greek
Cypriots killed in the five days between July 15-20 were erased in
order to blame these deaths on the subsequent Turkish military action.
On March 3, 1996, the Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail wrote: "(Greek)
Cypriot governments have found it convenient to conceal the scale of
atrocities during the July 15 coup in an attempt to downplay its
contribution to the tragedy of the summer of 1974 and instead blame the
Turkish invasion for all casualties. There can be no justification for
any government that failed to investigate this sensitive humanitarian
issue. The shocking admission by the Clerides government that there are
people buried in Nicosia cemetery who are still included in the list
of the 'missing' is the last episode of a human drama which has been
turned into a propaganda tool."
On Oct. 19, 1996, Mr Georgios Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the
foreign Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London... I
deeply apologize to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing
persons. I misled them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the
government of Cyprus... today it seems that the credibility of Cyprus
is nil."
Turkish Cypriots appealed to the guarartor powers for help, but only
Turkey was willing to make any effective response. On July 20, 1974
Turkey intervened under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The
Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos
Sampson on Feb. 26,1981 in which he said, "Had Turkey not intervened
I would not only have proclaimed enosis, I would have annihilated the
Turks in Cyprus."
The Times and The Guardian reported on Aug. 21, 1974 that in the
village of Tokhni on Aug. 14, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between
the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were
taken away and shot.
There were also reports that in Zyyi on the same day all the
Turkish-Cypriot men aged between 19 and 38 were taken away and were
never seen again and that Greek-Cypriots opened fire on the
Turkish-Cypriot neighborhood of Paphos killing men, women and children
indiscriminately.
On July 23, 1974, the Washington Post reported that "in Greek raid on
a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of
200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to
kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces
arrived." The Times and The Guardian also reported on the killings.
"The Greeks began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees
said. Kazan Dervis, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been
staying with her uncle. The (Greek Cypriot) National Guard came into
the Turkish sector and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other
relatives taken away as prisoners, and later heard her uncle had been
shot." (Times 23.7.1974)
On July 28, 1974 the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot
men had been shot in Alaminos. On July 24, 1974 France Soir reported
that "the Greeks burned Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes
in the villages around Famagusta. Defensless Turkish villagers who have
no weapons live in an atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their
homes and go and live in tents in the forests. The Greeks' actions
are a shame to humanity."
On July 22, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit called upon the United
Nations to "stop the genocide of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared,
"Turkey has accepted a ceace-fire, but will not allow
Turkish-Cypriots to be massacred."
The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on Aug. 30, "The massacre of
Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified
the Turks were to undertake their intervention." "Turkish Cypriots,
who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963, called on the
guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the island. When
Britain did nothing Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied its northern
part. Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their side and
understandably fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish army
withdraws." the Daily Telegraph wrote on Aug. 15, 1996.
Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the
Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12
years since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord
Willis (Labor) told the House of Lords on Dec. 17, 1986. On March 12,
1977, Makarios declared, "It is in the name of enosis that Cyprus has
been destroyed."
The United Nations, the Commonwealth and the rest of the world have put
political expediency before principle and failed to condemn this
appalling behavior.Greek Cypriots are guilty of attempted genocide but
no action has ever been taken against them. Instead they have been
rewarded by recognition as the government of all Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots by contrast were frozen out of the United Nations, the
Commonwealth and the almost every other international organization.
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OFFICIAL GREEK CYPRIOT REPORT ON EDUCATION:
SCHOOLS IN SOUTH CYPRUS AIM TO SPUR MILITANCY
Students in South Cyprus are systematically encouraged by Greek Cypriot
authorities to take part in demonstrations against the TRNC along the
borders. Schools officially close in order to allow children to
participate and teachers along with officials typically make speeches
which incite children to acts of violence and hatred. On many occasions
teenager students have clashed with UNFICYP personnel inside the
buffer-zone. They have chanted anti-Turkish slogans and thrown rocks
etc. towards the North.
A recently published report on education in 1997 has revealed that: The
primary aim of education in South Cyprus is to teach children not to
forget the "occupation". One educational programme is entitled "I get
to know, I do not forget, I struggle against the occupation".
The Greek Cypriot government's programme to remember the "invasion" is
the primary objective in schools. The report states that: "The
programme formed the spine of militancy in schools and the route of the
people of Cyprus for achieving its visions."
"The main target is to keep alive the memory of our land still under
occupation, to foster and strengthen optimism, confidence and militancy
for freedom and return to our fatherland."
Greek Cypriot authorities described the aim of the programme as
educating children to "wake up and see Pentadactylos (mountain-range in
Northern Cyprus) and not to forget about their villages in the occupied
areas."
Some examples of text books used in Junior High Schools in South Cyprus
which contain elements inciting enmity are given below:
"Cyprus Geography", Nicosia, 1991, Min. of Education Portrays Cyprus as
an Hellenic island. Urges struggle to liberate the "occupied
territories." There is no mention of the Turkish population on the
island. One photograph depicts "enslaved youth" in 1974. Underneath it
says "the population of Greeks has dropped following the Turkish
occupation resulting in 5000 dead and 1619 missing." (p.24)
Pentadactylos is portrayed as a symbol of the "struggle to return
home."
"It is our primary responsibility to struggle with determination and
vigour in order to remove the danger threatening our Pentadactylos and
other territories under occupation. Only then Pentadactylos will
breathe freely and embrace its own folk." (p.42)
"Byzantine Period-Cyprus History", Nicosia, 1991, Min. of Education
Designed to portray Cyprus as an Hellenistic island populated by
Cypriots of Christian origin.
"Middle Ages-Cyprus History", Nicosia, 1992, Min. of Education Depicts
Turks as Christians who were forced to adopt Islam under pressure. The
book claims that in 1881 an insignificant part of the population spoke
Turkish. EOKA activities are described in detail.
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GREEK CYPRIOT MP DISCLOSES LARGE SCALE ARMS TRANSFERS FROM GREECE TO
SOUTH CYPRUS
It has been reported in the Greek Cypriot press that following a
meeting of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives Defence
Committee, its Vice- Chairman Mr. Andonis Karas disclosed that lately
Greece has been sending sophisticated weaponry valued at hundreds of
millions of dollars to South Cyprus, including tanks operated by Greek
personnel (Greek Cypriot dailies, Fileleftheros and Simerinidated 8
January, 1999).
The Cyprus Weekly of 8 January 1999 establishes a linkage between the
aforesaid development and the recent decision of the Greek Cypriot
administration regarding the S-300 missiles. The Cyprus Weekly reports
that "in return for taking over the Russian missiles, Greece is said to
have sent ?arge amounts' of modern weapons to the island, worth
millions of pounds".
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, Mr. Yannakis
Cassoulides, who appeared on Greek Cypriot TV on 7 January made the
following remarks in the light of the systematic implementation of the
Joint Military Doctrine between Greece and the Greek Cypriot
administration, which includes the construction of air and naval bases
in South Cyprus for use by the Greek Armed Forces: "The Greek- Greek
Cypriot Joint Military Doctrine is not confined to the S-300 missiles
alone. Greece has a formidable military presence on the island".
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Greek Cypriot Administration Approves New Arms Purchases
It has been reported in the Greek Cypriot press of 18 December 1998
that the Greek Cypriot Council of Ministers has approved the release of
178 million Greek Cypriot pounds (approximately 350 million U.S
dollars) for a new round of military procurement within the context of
the Joint Military Doctrine between the Greek Cypriot administration
and Greece.
The Greek Cypriot newspaper Mahi (18 December 1998) reports that this
new round of military procurement will include the purchase of at least
a squadron of warplanes, possibly Mirage fighters, and CSH-2 Roovihalk
assault helicopters from South Africa. The Greek Cypriot administration
will also reportedly consult with the Greek naval construction company
Skaramanga', with a view to ordering two warships capable of delivering
Exocet missiles.
This further military build-up comes at a time when tensions are
already high due to the construction of air and naval bases in South
Cyprus for use by Greece and the imminent deployment of the S-300
missile system. Moreover, this decision to expand the Joint Military
Doctrine comes in the wake of the call made upon the two sides by the
UN Secretary-General "to avoid any actions which might increase
tension, including by further expansion of military forces and
armaments"
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LARGE-SCALE ICON THEFT IN SOUTH CYPRUS UNCOVERS GREEK CYPRIOT
HYPOCRISY
The recent discovery of many stolen icons in South Cyprus in the
possession of Greek Cypriot persons has uncovered the true state of
affairs with regard to the protection of cultural heritage in the
island. The Greek Cypriot administration who has made a habit of
falsely accusing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of plundering
historical monuments, is now fully answerable for these large-scale
illegal acts taking place in South Cyprus.
According to Greek Cypriot daily Fileleftheros of 23 September 1998,
two Greek Cypriots were taken into custody in connection with the theft
of icons from churches in the Limassol area in South Cyprus. Greek
Cypriot police found 32 icons in a house belonging to one of the
suspects. Cyprus Mail of 24 September reported that a third Greek
Cypriot involved in the same case was arrested by the Greek Cypriot
police. In Paphos, three other Greek Cypriots were remanded in
connection with theft of icons from churches in that area. Police in
South Cyprus will reportedly conduct a further investigation in an
attempt to recover large number of historic icons believed to be in the
possession of certain Greek Cypriots residing in Nicosia and
Peristerona.
The Greek Cypriot side would be well advised to stop exploiting the
issue of preservation of cultural property but rather concentrate its
efforts towards the prevention of theft and smuggling of objects of
archaeological value from its territory. The Turkish Cypriot side
within its limited budget effectively administers measures to control
and preserve the cultural wealth of the island.
(Cyprus Mail 24 Dec 1980) STOLEN MOSAIC RECOVERED IN LONDON;
Cyprus Weekly, 24-30 January 1986 ARREST MADE OVER ICONS -
ANDREAS COSTA KYRIAKOU OF PAPTHOS WAS ARRESTED, AND IS
HELD IN CONNECTION WITH A BREAK IN INTO THE CHAPEL OF ST
GEORGE TERATSIOLIS NEAR AVGOROU.
CYPRUS PLEA TO INTERPOL - INTERPOL IS ASKED TO APPREHEND
YIANGOS SOLOMOU, A GREEK CYPRIOT RESIDENT OF BRITAIN,
RECENTLY LIVING IN AVGTHOROU, IN CONNECTION WITH THE
THEFT OF A NUMBER OF ICONS AND GOLD PLATED OIL CANDLE
HOLDERS FROM A CHAPEL
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They are trying to change the ethnic composition of Cyprus
>From the articles appearing on the Southern Cyprus press, it has been
learned that the Greek Cypriot administration is applying all kinds of
methods for changing the ethnic composition in Cyprus and has settled
Russians, who are claimed to be of Greek origin, to Cyprus by bringing
them from Russia and Ukraine.
The number of the Russians, who have brought to Cyprus in this way and
who have been accommodated in the Island after being baptized by the
Greek Cypriot Church, has exceeded 10.000. At present, more than 4.000
Russians are living only in Baf.
On the other hand, the number of those, who came from Greece for not
fulfilling their military service there and who were accepted to the
Greek Cypriot citizenship, has also reached thousands.
At a discussion program, which has been broadcasted by the television
station ANT-1 on October 20, 1999, it has been stated that there are
major problems between the Greek Cypriots living in Baf and the
Russians, who have been settled in the island since 1983, and that
there did not exist safety of life and property anymore.
Again from the Southern Cyprus press it has been learned that a letter
has been left to the Baf television station by an organization called
"Golden Dawn", and on this letter it has been required that "all the
Greek Cypriots, who are living in the same building with the Russians,
should leave all the places they are staying until the year 2000", and
it is added that "otherwise, they will be burnt alive together with the
Russians".
The conclusion which is to be drawn from these news is as follows :
The Southern Cypriot Greek Administration is accepting everyone, who
claims being from Greek descend, to the southern Cypriot citizenship
for altering the ethnic composition in Cyprus in favor of the Greek
Cypriots and for using this as a means to obtain some rights.
If those people, who are brought from Ukraine and Russia, are of Greek
origin, then the organized and illegal activities in Baf should be a
shame for others of Greek origin.
The Island is being made a shelter for those Greeks, who are escaping
the laws in Greece, for the sake of changing the population ratios in
their favor.
The letter, which is left to the Baf television station, is proving
Greek Cypriots' extreme nationalism, racism and intolerance towards
other people who are not from their own ethnic origin; and is
constituting a good example for exposing how Cyprus problem have been
led to the current circumstances. The Turkish inhabitants of the
island, who were living quietly and without any illegal tendencies
unlike the Russian immigrants, were slaughtered by the Greek Cypriot
bands between the years 1960 and 1974, by the same methods which have
been described on the above-mentioned threatening letter.
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Keeping on Enosis
For quarter of a century, Greek Cypriot Representatives have opposed
to every kind of division forming as either a separate state or a
federation or confederation in the international meetings arranged to
solve the Cyprus problem. Have Greek Cypriots opposed to the condition
of being divided of Island with humane sense or by believing that they
can live with Turkish Cypriots together? Of course not. They just
consider running after Enosis (Annexation of Cyprus to Greece as a
whole). They are also under strict control in order to prevent the
divison of Island by Greeks who have the idea of Enosis. Because Enosis
with just Southern Cyprus is not sufficent for Greece. To be reached
the idea of Enosis all at once, Greeks want that Cyprus should
absolutely be stay as a whole.
The below news about the remembrance ceremony of the 26th anniversary
of colonel Grivas's death in which Klerides, the leader of Greek
Cypriot Community, and who charge Mr. Denktas, The President of TRNC,
with stubbornness, also attended proves the evil desire of Greece and
Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus.
The Oath of "Keeping on Enosis"
Lefkose (A.A) - In the ceremony of the 26th anniversary of the death of
Yorgos Grivas Digenis, the founder leader of terror organization-EOKA,
it was taken the oath of "Keeping on Enosis".
In the ceremony arranged in Aya Nikolau Church in Limasol yesterday,
where Glafkos Klerides who is the leader of Greek Cypriot, Archbishop
Hrisostomos, Lieutenent-General Dimitrios Dimu who is the commander of
Greek Cypriot Army, Kiriakos Rodusakis who is the ambassador of Greece
to Southern Cyprus and politicians attended, the oath so-called
"Keeping on struggling to reach of the ideal of Enosis (Annexing Cyprus
to Greece)" was taken.
Avgerinos Papares, secretary general of the "Limasol Eoka Strugglers
Association", pointed out in the ceremony that Grivas's constant ideal
is to annex Cyprus to Greece, and also said "Grivas did not struggle
for the solution suggesting a confederacy or a Turk President. Grivas
struggled to save Cyprus and to become fact the ideal of annexing it to
homeland Greece." Nikos Samson, the leader of the 1974 coup and the
military service friend of Grivas, said that he himself prevented the
corpse of Grivas from taken away to and buried in Greece.
After the ceremony in the church, by going to the shelter where the
tomb of Grivas placed, a ceremony was also arranged in there. Klerides
and other officials placed a wreath on the tomb of Grivas.
Date: 24/01/00
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AKRITAS PLAN
TOP SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown
the course which our national problem will take in near future.
As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be
concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite
chronological
limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development
in
national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the
light of
developments which take place and conditions that arise from
time to
time, and measures to be taken, as well as their implementation
and
timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external
political
conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through
various stages because factors which will affect the final
conclusion
are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to
know,
however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a
study and
that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures.
Also,
it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is
a
first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and
unalterable national objective which is the full and
unconditional
application of the right of self-determination.
As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be
dwelt
upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that
objective.
This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and external
(international) tactics because the methods of the presentation
and
handling of our cause within and outside the country are
different.
A. METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE
In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus
problem
had been presented to the world public opinion and to
diplomatic
circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the
right of
self-determination. But the question of Turkish minority had
been
introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal
clashes
had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that
it
was impossible for the two communities to live together under a
united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the
eyes
of many international circles, by the London and Zurich
Agreements,
which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations
and
agreements between the contending parties.
(a) Consequently our first aim has been to create the
impression
in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not
been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
(b) The creation of the following impressions has been
accepted
as the primary objective:
(i) that the solution which has been found is not
satisfactory
and just
(ii) that the agreement which has been reached is not the
result of the free will of the contending parties.
(iii)that the demand for the revision for the agreements
is not
because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to
dishonor
their signature, but an imperative necessity of
survival
of them.
(iv) that the co-existence of the two communities is
possible, and
(v) that the Greek majority, and not the Turks,
constitute the
strong elements on which foreigners must rely.
(c) Although it was most difficult to attain the above
objectives,
satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic
missions have already come to believe strongly that the
Agreements
are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed
as a
result of pressures and intimidations without real
negotiations,
and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been
an
important trump in our hands that the solution brought by
the
Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the
people; acting
wisely in this respect, our leadership avoided holding a
referandum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely
approved
the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959.
Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the
adminis-
tration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and
that the
Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.
(d) Having completed the first stage of our activities and
objectives
we must materialize the second stage on an international
level.
Our objective in this second stage is to show:
(i) that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the
Turks but
only to remove unreasonable and unjust provisions of
the
administrative mechanism;
(ii) that it is necessary to remove these provisions right
away
because tomorrow may be too late;
(iii)Omitted
(iv) that this question of revision is a domestic issue
for
Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of
intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
(v) that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just
and
safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
(e) Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the
international
opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially
against
oppresion of minorities. The Turks have so far been able
to
convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus
with
Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these
circumstances
we stand a good chance of success in influencing world
public
opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-
determination. But in order to be able to exercise the
right
of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must
first
get rid of the Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Gurantee,
the
Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions in the
Constitution which will inhibit the free and unbridled
expression
of the will of people and which they carry dangers of
external
intervention. For this reason, our first target has been
the
Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be
cited
as not being recognized by the Greek Cypriots.
When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral
force
will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a
plebiscite.
It will be understood from the above explanations that it
is
necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in
order
to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and
developments failed to materialize, our future actions would
be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we
would
be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences.
Actions
to be taken are as follows:
(a) The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements
and
the consequent de facto nullification of the Treaties of
Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the
necessity of amending the negative aspects of any
Agreement is
generally acceptable internationally and is considered
reasonable
(passage omitted) whereas an external intervention to
prevent
the amendment of such negative provisions is held
unjustified
and inapplicable.
(b) Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right
of
intervention) will become legally and substantially
inapplicable.
(c) Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance
which restrict the exercise of the right of
self-determination
are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to
express
and apply its will.
(d) It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police
Force)
and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist
legitimately
any intervention internally or from outside, because we
will then
be completely independent.
It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (a)
to (d)
to be carried out in the order indicated.
It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have
any chance
of success in the international field, we cannot and should not
reveal
or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage
is
completed. For instance, it is accepted that the above four
stages
constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious
that
it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (a) if stage
(d)
is revealed, because it would then be rediculous for us to seek
the
amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these
amendments
are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the
Agreements.
The above are the points regarding our targets and aims,
and the
procedure to be followed in the international field.
B. THE INTERNAL ASPECT
Our activities in the internal field will be regulated
according
to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to
them in
the world and according to the effect of our actions on our
national
cause.
1- The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the
possibility of a forceful intervention. This danger, which
could be
met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the
political damage that it could do rather than the material
losses
that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage
(c),
then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if
not
entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both
internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many
similar
incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of
intervention,
even if legally excusable, has the attacker been removed by
either
the United Nations or the other powers without significant
concessions
to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the
attack
on Suez Canal by Israel, which was condemned by almost all
members of
the United Nations and for which Russia threatened
intervention, the
Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to
keep
the port of Eliat in the Red Sea. There are, however, more
serious
dangers in the case of Cyprus.
If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall
make
under stage (a) above, we will see, on the one hand, that
intervention
will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have
every
support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot
take
place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor
Powers, that
is, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e. at
the stage
of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need
international
support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments
proposed by us
seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be
extremely
careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose.
The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of
intervention
by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be
followed:
(Omitted)
2- It is evident that for intervention to be justified there
must
be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than
simple
Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:
(a) The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c)
(b) Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a
massacre
of Turks.
The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn
up for
the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of
intercommunal strife. We do not intend to engage, without
provocation,
in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section
omitted)
the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife,
or falsely
stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create
the
impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that
intervention
is imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our
actions
for amending the Constitution will not be secret; we would
always appear
to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take
any
provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place
will be
met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security
Forces,
according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.
3- (Omitted)
4- It is, however, naive to believe that it is impossible
for us to
proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution,
as a first
step towards our more general Plan as described above, without
expecting
the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this
reason,
the existence and the strengthening of our Organization is
imperative
because: (a) if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the
Turks, our
counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a
panic
created among the Greeks, in towns particular. We will then be
in
danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks,
while
if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and
forcefully, then
they will probably be brought to their senses and restrict
their
activities to insignificant, isolated incidents. (b) In case of
a
planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be
staged or not
it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest
possible
time, since, if we manage to become masters of the situation
within
a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible,
probable or
justifiable. (c) The forceful and decisive suppressing of any
Turkish
effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for
further
Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to
apply
these without the Turks being able to show any reaction.
Because they
will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction
without
serious consequences for their Community. (d) In case of the
clashes
becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately
through
actions (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of
ENOSIS,
because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in
diplomatic
activity.
5- In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of
enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not
know or
cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the
reactionary
elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through
at least
four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and
intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national
duty for
everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is
vitally
essential for our success and survival. This, however, does not
prevent
the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging
in false
patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would
provide them
with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the
effect that
the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the
amendment
of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out
Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the
prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All
this must
not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy,
street
politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our
undeniable
justification. In any case owing to the fact that, for
well-known
reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne
fruit long
before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with
self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have.
Parallel
with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the
present unity
and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this
only by
properly enlightening our members so that they in turn
enlighten the
public.
Before anything else we must expose the true identity of
the
reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and
opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are
unsuccessful,
negative and antiprogressive elements who attack our leadership
like
mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and
practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our
activities we need a strong and stable government, up to the
last
minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are
good for
nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite
actions
or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling
weaklings. A
typical example of this is that even at the present stage they
have no
better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have
recourse
to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they
should be
isolated and kept at a distance.
We must enlighten our members about our plans and
objectives ONLY
VERBALLY. Meetings must be held at the sub-headquarters of the
Organization to enlighten leaders and members so that they are
properly
equipped to enlighten others. NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY
SORT IS
ALLOWED. LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE
ABOVE IS
EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON. There can be no action that would
inflict
a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the
contents of
the present document or the publication of this by the
opposition.
Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our
activities, and our publications in the press in particular,
must be
most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only
responsible
persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements
and will
refer to this Plan only generally under their personal
responsibility
and under the personal responsibilty of the Chief of
sub-headquarters
concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be
done only
after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters
who will
control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or
statement MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY
OTHER
PUBLICATION.
The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to
enlighten
our members and the public VERBALLY. Every effort must be made
to show
ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing,
or
any reference in the press or in any document is strictly
prohibited.
Responsible officials and other responsible persons will
continue
to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting
spirit
without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or
otherwise.
NOTE: The present document should be destroyed by burning under
the
personal responsibilities of the Chief of the sub-headquarters
and in
the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its
being
received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole
or any
part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may
have it in
their possession only under the personal responsibility of the
Chief
of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take
it out
of the office of sub-headquarters.
The Chief
AKRITAS
----------------------------------------------
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc never stop in their relentless dreams of
massacring all Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human
Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate
propaganda over and over legitimize their rape, torture and murder of
innocent and defenceless Turkish human beings.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm#P40_767
January 1999 Vol. 11, No. 1 (D)
GREECE
THE TURKS OF WESTERN THRACE
Order online
SUMMARY
RECOMMENDATIONS
GREECE'S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
DEMOGRAPHICS
POSITIVE STEPS BY THE GREEK STATE
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
APPENDICES
SUMMARY
This report examines the situation of the ethnic Turkish minority of
Thrace, a region of Greece. It serves as a follow-up to two earlier
reports issued by Human Rights Watch, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The
Turks of Greece (August 1990) and "Greece: Improvements for Turkish
Minority; Problems Remain" (April 1992).
Ethnic Turks have resided in Thrace since at least the fourteenth
century, and they are Greek citizens. In 1923, under the Treaty of
Lausanne, the Turkish minority of Thrace was granted a wide array of
rights to ensure protection of their religion, language, culture, and
equality before the law.1 In addition, as Greek citizens, ethnic Turks
also enjoy the protection of Greek law, as well as of the European
Convention of Human Rights.
Despite such protections, however, ethnic Turks suffer a host of human
rights violations. The Greek state has for the most part been unable to
accept the fact that one can be a loyal Greek citizen and, at the same
time, an ethnic Turk proud of his or her culture and religion. Turks
are viewed by the state with suspicion, the strength of which largely
reflects the state of Turkish-Greek relations.
Greece's attitude toward the ethnic Turkish minority is nowhere more
evident then in its continued official denial of the Turkish identity
of the community. Greece only accepts the existence of a "Muslim"
minority in Thrace and aggressively prosecutes and bans organizations
and individuals who seek to call themselves "Turkish." While it is
indeed true that much of the minority is of mixed ethnic origins, it
overwhelmingly claims an ethnic Turkish identity and wants to be
referred to as such. The Greek government points to the Treaty of
Lausanne which, it is true, speaks only of a "Muslim minority."
Past state policy, however, negates such a justification. In the early
1950s, during a period of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, the
Greek government itself ordered the use of "Turk" and "Turkish"
to refer to the minority, rather than "Muslim."
A number of discriminatory measures have been enacted either to force
ethnic Turks to migrate to Turkey or to disrupt community life and
weaken its cultural basis. The most egregious example was Article 19 of
the Citizenship Law, which, until it was abolished in 1998, allowed the
state to revoke the citizenship of non-ethnic Greeks unilaterally and
arbitrarily. Between 1955 and 1998, approximately 60,000 lost their
citizenship under the article. As a result of Article 19 and other
discriminatory measures, the ethnic Turkish minority today numbers
approximately 80-120,000.2 In 1951, forty-seven years ago, the official
census reported 112,665. Given an annual 2 percent growth rate, not
high for a poorly-educated and rural community, the Turkish minority,
using 1951 as a base, would have been expected to number closer to
300,000 today.3
Religion has been another battleground. A 1990 law granted the state
wide-ranging powers in appointing the mufti, the community's
religious leader who also serves as an Islamic judge in civil matters.
The previous law, in contrast, had allowed the community to elect the
muftis. In defiance of the 1990 law, which violates the intent of the
Treaty of Lausanne to allow the minority to manage its own religious
affairs, the community has continued to elect its religious leaders,
who have been prosecuted and imprisoned by Greek authorities. In
addition, the repair of mosques is sometimes blocked by state
authorities, and those involved in the repair are prosecuted.
The state has also struck at private charitable foundations, known as
Vak1flar, that support education and religious institutions. A law
passed in 1980 and a presidential decree issued in 1990 effectively
transferred management of the Vak1flar from elected committees-a
right assured under the Treaty of Lausanne and preceding Greek
legislation-to state officials, who were granted an iron hand over
budgetary matters. More ominously, the 1980 law struck directly at the
financial holdings of the foundations by ordering that any property for
which an official deed could not be presented would be confiscated by
the state. While innocuous-sounding, the regulation presented
insurmountable challenges to foundations that had holdings as old as
500 years.
Human rights violations in the education field affect the largest
number of individuals and have done the most to foster the Turkish
minority's relative underdevelopment. Schools are overcrowded and
poorly funded compared to those attended by ethnic Greeks. The quality
of teachers is low. Ethnic Turks educated in Turkish universities,
which the minority believes are the best qualified to teach, have not
been hired for a number of years. On the other hand, graduates of the
Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy (EPATH)-the job candidates preferred
by the Greek state-are poorly educated and have a weak command of
Turkish. Furthermore, community members claim, not without some
justification, that the EPATH-trained teachers act as "ideological
overseers." Textbooks are decades out of date because Greece and
Turkey have been unable to implement a 1968 protocol that would have
allowed each country to supply textbooks to their respective minority.
The two Turkish-language high schools can provide only a fraction of
the needed places, resulting in a disproportionate drop-out rate. Greek
officials fall back on the Treaty of Lausanne, which only obligates
them to provide primary education in Turkish, ignoring the fact that
Greek law mandates a minimum of nine years of education. State
repression takes other forms as well. Members of the ethnic Turkish
minority also complain of police surveillance, discrimination in public
employment, and restrictions on freedom of expression. Representatives
from Human Rights Watch and the Greek Helsinki Monitor were trailed by
police operatives in Thrace while conducting research for this report.
Only a handful of Turks are employed by the municipal or state
bureaucracies, almost always in the most menial tasks. A local
journalist known as a community activist has become the subject of
several prosecutions in an effort to limit his
internationally-protected right to free expression.
Despite continued human rights violations, there have been some major
improvements since Human Rights Watch began monitoring the situation in
1990. Several of the most egregious laws, such as those that deprived
ethnic Turks of basic rights of property and occupation, have been
repealed. Since our 1990 report, ethnic Turks can now buy and sell
houses and land, repair houses, obtain car, truck and tractor licenses,
and open coffee houses and machine and electrical shops. As noted
earlier, the government abolished Article 19 of the Citizenship Law,
though not retroactively. Restricted zones along the Bulgarian border
inhabited by members of the Turkish minority have been opened up,
although only to Greek citizens. There have also been efforts to
improve education, such as creating a quota for ethnic Turks in the
state university system. Finally, the 1994 decision to allow the
election of provincial governors and municipal councils appears to be a
positive step. These elected officials appear to be more responsive to
the needs of the Turkish minority than their state-appointed
predecessors. Unfortunately, the Greek state changed the boundaries of
two provinces to prevent the election of an ethnic Turkish or
pro-Turkish governor from an exclusively ethnic Turkish election list.4
1 The ethnic Greek minority in Istanbul was granted identical rights
under the treaty.
2 Informed outside observers put the number closer to the 80,000 range,
while, paradoxically, both the Greek state and the minority community
claim upwards of 120,000.
3 In 1923, the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne left some 106,000
ethnic Turks in Thrace.
The ethnic Greek minority of Istanbul, also protected under the Treaty
of Lausanne, has also shrunk in size because of state discrimination,
from 110,000 in 1923 to an estimated 2,500 today. See Denying Human
Rights & Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey, March 1992.
4 Though ethnic Turks ran-and continue to run-on the lists of other
Greek parties and have won election to parliament.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-01.htm#P67_9018
RECOMMENDATIONS
While there have been some improvements since the publication of our
last report in 1992, many of the major problems remain. As we did in
1990 and 1992, Human Rights Watch recommends that the Greek government
abide by its obligations under international and national law,
especially the Treaty of Lausanne, to protect the Turkish minority's
fundamental rights.
To the government of Greece:
· Acknowledge the existence of the Turkish minority, as has been done
in the past, most recently in the 1950s, and grant ethnic Turks all the
civil and political rights enjoyed by other Greek citizens; this should
include the right to call themselves and their associations and
schools, if they so choose, "Turkish." End prosecutions and punitive
actions against those who called themselves "Turkish";
· Accord the Turkish minority the freedom to leave Greece and return
without hindrance or fear and immediately grant citizenship to those
individuals deprived of their citizenship under Article 19 who reside
in Greece as stateless individuals. Pending granting of citizenship,
issue identification cards and travel documents to all such
individuals;
· Return powers concerning the Turkish minority to the elected
provincial governors (Nomarcs) that were removed from their authority
in 1996 and transferred to the state-appointed secretary-general. Such
powers included the right to approve land sales and to repair mosques;
· Guarantee the Turkish minority equal rights to business and
professional life and equal access to civil service employment;
· Accord the Turkish minority freedom of expression, including full
access to radio, television, and publications from Turkey; end the
harassment of the Turkish minority press;
· Enforce international agreements forbidding degrading treatment of
the Turkish minority, including harassment by Greek authorities;
· Guarantee freedom of religion to the Turkish minority, including the
freedom to select muftis and the control of private charitable
foundations (vak1flar). Repeal Law No. 1920 of 1990 concerning the
selection of muftis as well as Law No. 1091 of 1980 and Presidential
Decree No. 1 of 1991 concerning management of the vak1flar. Cease
prosecution of the so-called "elected muftis." Allow the minority
to repair and build mosques without state impediment.
· Accord the Turkish minority the right to control its schools,
including the right to build, enlarge, and repair schools, to appoint
teachers for the Turkish language curriculum, to set the class size for
secondary schools, and to obtain and use current schoolbooks in the
Turkish language. Institute a curriculum of teaching Greek as a second
language in primary schools. Where needed and desired, institute the
teaching of Turkish as a second language to Pomak and Roma children;
and
· Ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities.
To the member states of the European Union:
· Raise the issue of the Turkish minority of Thrace, especially the
Greek government's denial of their ethnic identity, in bilateral
meetings with Greece and in the E.U. as a whole;
· Ensure that the annual E.U. transfer to Greece of 387 ecu per person
(4.1 billion ecu or U.S.$4.8 billion) is, in proportion to their
numbers, invested in and used for the needs of the Turkish minority;
· Monitor the situation of the minority and publicly report on
findings of discrimination or other human rights abuses; and
· Address the problems of discrimination against the Turkish minority
in Greece identified in this report, in connection with the Council of
Minister's monitoring procedure, the on-going monitoring and
consultative activities of the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance, and current consideration of this subject by the
Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.
To the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):
· Through the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the
Representative on Freedom of the Media, work with the government of
Greece and the Turkish minority community in Greece to address problems
identified in this report, including discrimination against the Turkish
minority with respect to citizenship rights, employment, freedom of
expression, religious practice, language, and education.
To the government of the United States:
· Raise the issue of the Turkish minority with the Greek government;
and
· Continue to monitor the situation of the minority.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-02.htm#P108_13482
GREECE'S INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
The Greek government's obligations to respect the rights of the
Turkish minority, including its right to a nationality, are well
established under international law. Numerous international
conventions, resolutions, and declarations recognize and protect the
rights of members of national minorities. Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), notable
among these, accords specific protection to minority group members,
declaring that they "shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language."5
An additional source for understanding the content and scope of
minority rights is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.6
Although the declaration lacks the binding legal force of a treaty, it
constitutes an authoritative explication of existing treaty norms
protecting the rights of minority group members. The declaration
mandates, in particular, that states "protect the existence and the
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of
minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage
conditions for the promotion of that identity."7 Other provisions
relevant to the situation of the ethnic Turkish minority in Greece are
those stating that members of minorities have "the right to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to
use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without
interference or any form of discrimination . . . the right to establish
and maintain their own associations . . . the right to establish and
maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts . . .
across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related
by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties."8
Besides these international protections, Greece has, by ratifying the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne, acquired a number of specific obligations with
respect to its Turkish minority. Articles 37 through 45 of the treaty,
described as "fundamental laws," set forth the obligations of the
Greek and Turkish governments to protect the Greek and Turkish
minorities on their territories.9 Each country has agreed to ensure:
· protection of life and liberty without regard to birth, nationality,
language, race or religion;
· free exercise of religion;
· freedom of movement and of emigration;
· equality before the law;
· the same civil and political rights enjoyed by the majority;
· free use of any language in private, in commerce, in religion, in
the press and publications, at public meetings and in the courts;
· the right to establish and control charitable, religious, and social
institutions and schools;
· primary schools in which instruction is given in both languages; and
· full protection for religious establishments and pious foundations.
In 1951 and 1968, moreover, the Greek and Turkish governments signed
additional protocols issued by a Greek-Turkish cultural commission.
Among other things, the protocol guaranteed that each country would
respect the religious, ethnic, and national consciousness of the Greek
or Turkish minority within its borders and allow an exchange of
textbooks and educators.
Finally, Greece is not free under international law to discriminate
against members of the Turkish minority by depriving them of Greek
citizenship. Although states enjoy considerable leeway in determining
who their citizens are, the rules on citizenship and nationality are
not entirely left to state discretion. Most fundamentally, Article 15
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights bars states from
"arbitrarily" depriving someone of his nationality, as does the
European Convention on Nationality, which Greece has signed but not yet
ratified.10 The deprivation of nationality on the basis of ethnicity is
addressed in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which Greece ratified in 1970. Article 5 of the CERD,
in particular, prohibits states from discriminating on the basis of
ethnic origin with regard to the right to nationality.11
5 Greece acceded to the ICCPR on May 5, 1997.
6 G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 3d Comm., Annex, U.N. Doc.
a/47/678/Add.2 (1992).
7 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, art. 1.
8 Ibid, art. 2. Similar protections are contained in the Council of
Europe's 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, which Greece signed in 1997 but as of October 1998 had not
yet ratified. The European Convention forthe Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), in contrast, does not
include a specific provision on the protection of minorities, although
it does contain a reference to the enjoyment of convention rights
without discrimination on grounds of "association with a national
minority." European Convention, art. 14. Greece ratified the European
Convention in 1974.
9 G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 3d Comm., Annex, U.N. Doc.
a/47/678/Add.2 (1992).
10 Greece signed the European Convention on Nationality on November 11,
1997, the day that it opened for signature. As of November 1998, the
treaty had not yet entered into force.
11 Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
also bars states from depriving anyone of his nationality on ethnic
grounds. Although Greece is not a party to this treaty, the principles
embodied in it are authoritative in that they reflect an international
consensus on minimum legal standards on the question of nationality.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-03.htm#P147_19255
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The areas referred to by Turks today as Western Thrace and by Greeks as
Thrace came under Ottoman control in 1363-1364 with the rout of a
combined Serb, Bosnian, and Hungarian army in 1364 on the Maritsa river
near the city of Edirne.12 Murat, the Ottoman Sultan of the period,
settled Turkomans from Anatolia in the newly-won region while at the
same time granting Christians a protected if inferior status under the
traditional Islamic policy of tolerance towards zimmis, people of the
book.13 Later, in the second half of the nineteenth century,
Circassians and Tartars fleeing the Tsarist empire moved to the region.
Thrace remained under Ottoman control until the First Balkan War of
1912-13, during which time the armies of Montenegro, Greece, Serbia,
and Bulgaria attacked the Ottoman Empire and ejected it from almost all
of its European holdings. In 1913, as a result of the war, the Treaty
of Bucharest granted most of Western Thrace to Bulgaria, which
administered the territory until the end of the First World War. From
1919-20, a mixed Allied-Greek administration ruled the area. In 1920,
Western Thrace was granted to Greece, and the territory remains part of
the Republic of Greece.
In January 1923, Greece and Turkey signed the Convention Concerning the
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.14 The convention was signed
in the wake of Greece's failed invasion of Turkey's Anatolian
mainland and Turkey's repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920.
The Treaty of Sèvres granted Izmir to Greece, then known as Smyrna, as
well as a large tract of territory surrounding the city.15 To prevent
further irredentist Greek claims, Turkey demanded repatriation of
ethnic Greeks residing in the Anatolian areas of the former Ottoman
Empire in exchange for the return of ethnic Turks living in the Kingdom
of Greece.16 In exchange, Turkey allowed those ethnic Greeks residing
in Istanbul before October 1918-some 110,000-to remain, along with
the Orthodox Patriarchy; reciprocally, Greece would allow a similar
number of ethnic Turks, estimated at between 105,000-120,000, to remain
in Thrace.17
In November 1923, Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which put an
official end to the Greco-Turkish War and secured international
recognition, with minor changes, of Turkey's present borders. In
addition, Articles 37-45 of the treaty obligated both Turkey and Greece
to grant and respect a broad array of rights for the Greek minority of
Istanbul and the Turkish minority of Thrace. Such rights included
equality before the law, free exercise of religion, free use of its own
language including in primary schools, and control over religious
affairs.18
Since 1923, reciprocal treatment of the Greek minority in Istanbul and
the Turkish minority in Thrace has largely reflected the state of
Greco-Turkish relations. Despite some friction, both minorities
benefitted from therapprochement in inter-state relations, that was
engineered by two former rivals, the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk and the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos. It lasted
roughly from 1930 to 1955.19
In the face of possible aggression from fascist Italy, both countries
signed a Friendship Pact in September 1933. After World War II, facing
Soviet expansion, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia joined together in a
treaty of friendship and assistance, followed by the short-lived Balkan
Pact one year later.20 In 1954, while on a state visit to Greece, then
Turkish President Celal Bayar called Greco-Turkish relations "the
best example of how two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other
for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a
result of recognition of the realities of life."21
Since 1955, however, the conflict in Cyprus has adversely affected the
fate of the Turkish minority in Thrace and the Greek minority in
Istanbul. Attempts by Greek Cypriots to break free of British colonial
rule and unite with Greece, so-called Enosis, often resulted in bloody
attacks against the minority Turkish Cypriot community, which numbered
about 20 percent of the island's population and opposed union with
Greece.22 These attacks triggered tit-for-tat countermeasures against
the Greek minority in Istanbul. Wide-scale violence against the Greek
community of Istanbul, believed to have been engineered by the Turkish
government of then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, destroyed an
estimated 3-4,000 shops and precipitated the exodus of thousands of
ethnic Greeks from the city in 1955.23 Continued communal violence in
Cyprus after independence in 1960-including massacres of members of
the Turkish community in December 1963-led to the Turkish
government's cancellation of residence permits for 12,000 Greek
citizens living in Istanbul as well as the confiscation of their
property. In July 1974, as a guarantor power under the Treaty of
London, Turkey invaded Cyprus after a coup by Nicos Sampson ousted the
elected Makarios government in an effort to unite the island with
Greece. Turkey eventually occupied close to 40 percent of Cyprus.
In the post-1955 period, Greek pressure against the Turkish minority of
Thrace was, if less violent, no less deleterious. Land held by ethnic
Turks was illegally expropriated, professional licenses were denied,
individuals were forced to emigrate by the unilateral revocation of
their citizenship, and religious freedoms were curtailed-in short, a
general policy of discrimination against the minority was implemented.
By the mid-1980s, the discriminatory practices had resulted in a civil
rights movement of the Turkish minority led by the late Dr. Sad1k
Ahmet.
12 Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,
Volume I:Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman
Empire, 1280-1808 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp.
18-19.
13 Ibid.
14 For a full copy of the text, see Appendix A.
15 Greece faced nationalist Turkish forces under the command of Mustafa
Kemal in a three-year war (1919-1922) to oust the Greek army from
Turkey. It had occupied Izmir in May 1919 and then pushed west in an
attempt to create a Greek state in Anatolia, the so-called Megali idea.
Turks refer to the conflict as the "War of Salvation" (Kurtulus
Savas1).
16 By 1923, many ethnic Greeks had already fled with the retreating
Greek army. One scholar puts the number of ethnic Greeks repatriated
from Turkey under the convention at 188,000. According to him, 388,000
ethnic Turks returned to Turkey from Greece. See Tozun Bahçeli,
Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 (Boulder: Westview Press), 1990, pp.
11-13.
Another scholar cites figures of 638,253 ethnic Greeks and 348,000
ethnic Turks. See Ath. Angelopoulos, "Population distribution of
Greece According to Language, National Consciousness, and Religion,"
Balkan Studies, Volume 20, 1979.
17 Bahçeli, pp. 170-71.
18 See Appendix for a full text of the relevant articles of the Treaty
of Lausanne.
19 Bahçeli, pp. 14-15 and p. 171. The period was not without friction.
Greece's settlement in Thrace of Greek refugees from Turkey, which
disturbed the demographic balance to the detriment of the Turkish
minority, and Turkey's institution of the so-called "wealth tax"
(Varl1k Vergisi),unsettled the situation. Introduced in 1942, the
"wealth tax" was a misguided attempt to strike at war profiteers
and speculators. The act, however, quickly degenerated into a campaign
against businesses and wealth held by non-Muslims. In March 1944, under
pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States, Turkey repealed
the law.
20 Bahçeli, p. 16.
21 Ibid.
22 The Greek guerilla group EOKA, led by George Grivas and Nicos
Sampson, committed much of the violence against ethnic Turks. The
Turkish-led TMT underground group also carried out attacks against
ethnic Greeks.
Christopher Hitchens argues that British colonial authorities soured
community relations in the island by employing a disproportionate
number of ethnic Turks in the pre-independence security forces. See
Hostage to History (London: Verso, 1997), p. 46-47.
23 See, Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey,
Human Rights Watch, March 1992.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-04.htm#P181_27379
DEMOGRAPHICS
The discriminatory policies of the Greek state led to a general
diminution of the Turkish population. Independent estimates in 1912, on
the eve of the Balkan Wars, gave the Turkish-Muslim population in
Thrace a slight majority of around 53.5 percent (120,000 out of
224,000).24 Even after the population dislocations caused by the two
Balkan Wars and World War I, a census conducted by the Allied
administration in 1920 still granted the Turkish-Muslim population a
clear plurality of around 42.4 percent (87,000 out of a total
population of around 205,000), a drop of around 27 percent from the
1912 figures.25 A special commission set up to determine the population
of the Greeks of Istanbul and the Turks of Thrace under the 1923
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations
determined the Turkish population of Thrace to be 106,000. The 1928
Greek census put the number of Muslim Turkish speakers at 126,017, a
figure that grew to 140,090 in the 1940 census.26 According to the 1951
census, there were 112,665 Turks, though many believe that decrease can
be attributed to the fact that many Turks fled Greece, especially
Thrace which was under Bulgarian control, during World War II, and did
not return at war's end.27
Today the Turkish minority of Thrace, depending on estimates, numbers
between 80-120,000, roughly the same as the number in the 1951 census.
Given a 2 percent growth rate-and some estimates have put the growth
rate of the Turkish minority as high as 2.8 percent-the Turkish
population today would be expected to number 291,472 using the 1951
census data as a base figure or 444,945 using the 1940 census data.
Trends in land ownership have followed demographics. Although no
independent figure exists, it appears that most land in 1923 was owned
by Turks in the form of estates held by Turkish nobles. Although
believed to be somewhat inflated, figures from Turkish sources claim
that 84 percent of the land was owned by Turks, 10 percent by
Bulgarians, and only 5 percent by Greeks; there are no available Greek
figures.28 By the early 1990s, as a result of the expropriation of land
for public works that was disproportionately targeted against ethnic
Turks, the Turkish minority held between 20 and 40 percent of the
land.29 Since the majority of Turks are involved in agriculture, the
loss of land equals the loss of their livelihood.
24 Other groups in the region included Greeks (60,000), Bulgarians
(40,000), and "others" (4,000). Even Greek estimates of the time
admitted a Turkish-Muslim plurality of around 47 percent out of a total
population of 239,000, while citing a Greek population of 87,000 (39
percent). Information provided by the Greek Helsinki Monitor, based on
a 1994 study by Dalegre.
25 Ibid. The 1920 census reported 56,000 Greeks, a decrease of 10
percent compared with independent 1912 estimates, 54,000 Bulgarians, a
jump of 35 percent, and 8,000 others, an increase of 100 percent.
Bulgarian administration between 1913-1920 led to an influx of
Bulgarians and an outflow of Turks and, to a lesser extent, of Greeks.
26 See Angelopoulos, p.126.
Under the 1928 census, 191,254 individuals stated that Turkish was
their mother tongue, though 65, 237 of these were Greeks from Turkey
who arrived as a result of the population exchange. It appears that
Angelopoulos arrived at the figure for Turkish Muslims by subtracting
the number of Muslims in the 1928 census, 126,017, from the total
number of Turkish speakers. According to the 1940 census, there were
229,075 Turkish speakers and 141,090 Muslims.
27 After the 1951 census, the Greek National Service of Statistics
stopped asking questions concerning national/ethnic origin, language
use, or religion. According to the 1951 census, there were 92,443
Turcophones, 7,429 Gypsies, and 18,671 Pomaks, for a total of 118,533.
The difference between that figure and the 112,665 Muslim total can be
explained by the fact that some of the Turkish speakers were probably
ethnic Greek Orthodox who came to Greece from Anatolia as a result of
the 1923 population exchange.
Figures from Christos L. Rozakis, "The international protection of
minorities in Greece," in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis, eds,
Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan
disintegration? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 98.
28 Unpublished manuscript on the Turkish minority by the Greek Helsinki
Monitor, data from Dalegre, 1994.
29 Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, August 1990, pp. 2,
35-36 and Human Rights Watch, "Greece: Improvements for Turkish
Minority; Problems Remain," April 1992, p. 5.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-05.htm#P196_32031
POSITIVE STEPS BY THE GREEK STATE
Since May 1990, when Human Rights Watch began monitoring the condition
of the Turkish minority of the Thrace region of Greece, the Greek
government has taken certain steps to address the human rights
violations we documented in our first report, Destroying Ethnic
Identity: The Turks of Greece, published in August 1990. In that study,
we noted that,
The many abuses of human rights documented in this report reveal a
pattern of denying the Turkish minority the rights granted to other
Greek citizens; the pattern includes outright deprivation of
citizenship; denials of the right to buy land or houses, to set up
businesses or to rebuild or repair Turkish schools; restrictions on
freedom of expression, movement and religion; and degrading treatment
of ethnic Turks by government officials. 30
In a follow-up report two years later, however, we observed that,
Ethnic Turks can now buy and sell houses and land, repair houses and
mosques, obtain car, truck and tractor licenses, and open coffee houses
and machine and electrical shops. None of these was possible in past
years, as Helsinki Watch reported in Destroying Ethnic Identity: The
Turks of Greece in August 1990.31
But the Turkish community reports that important problems remain,
chiefly involving education; expropriation of land; the selection of
muftis, the religious leaders of the Moslem minority; and control of
the wakfs (charitable foundations). Moreover, the Greek government
continued during 1991 to deprive hundreds of ethnic Turks of their
Greek citizenship. In addition, police harassment of ethnic Turks
continues, although to a lesser degree. Associations and schools still
cannot call themselves "Turkish," Turkish language newspapers, books
and magazines cannot be brought from Turkey into Western Thrace, and
Turkish television is still jammed. Moreover, ethnic Turks are
discriminated against in employment and in the provision of services.
Improvements achieved came as the result of initiatives launched by the
government of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis.
In the intervening six years since publication of the last report, the
Greek government has taken some additional positive steps, most
importantly:
· The non-retroactive June 1998 abolition of Article 19 of the
Citizenship Law, which used ethnic origin to deprive arbitrarily
non-ethnic Greeks of their citizenship. Between 1955-1998,
approximately 60,000 Greek citizens, the majority ethnic Turks, lost
their citizenship as a result of the article;
· In 1995, restrictions for entry into zones along the Bulgarian
border, areas where Muslim Pomaks reside, were abolished for all Greek
citizens;32
· In 1995, the government launched an initiative to improve education
in minority schools and instituted a university quota for students from
the Turkish minority. In 1997-98, 334 places were set aside, 120
members of the minority took the entrance exam, and 114 were accepted.
In 1996-97, 74 minority members entered university under the program;
· In 1994, to bring Greece in line with E.U. standards, the government
instituted the election of previously state-appointed provincial
governors and municipal councils. In meetings with Human Rights Watch,
the elected governors appear more open to consider the needs and
requests of the Turkish minority, upon whose votes they depend. More
importantly, they recognize the mistake of the past state policy of
discrimination against the Turkish minority and appear willing to use
development funds to improve infrastructure in minority regions.33
30 Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, p. 1.
31 "Greece: Improvements for Turkish Minority; Problems Remain."
32 Pomaks are Muslim ethnic Slavs whose native tongue is a form of
Bulgarian. They, however, consider themselves culturally and
linguistically part of the Turkish minority and most are bilingual, if
they speak Pomak at all.
Border restrictions reportedly remain for foreigners, though a Human
Rights Watch representative entered the region without incident in
September 1997.
33 Unfortunately, the districts of Xanthi and Rodopi were joined to
adjacent districts to prevent the election of a Turkish governor or
pro-Turkish provincial councils. Furthermore, in 1996, the government
diluted their power vis-a-vis the minority by transferring
responsibility for oversight of rights guaranteed to the Turkish
minority under the Treaty of Lausanne to a government-appointed
secretary general;
Other elected officials also appear reform-minded. The mayor of
Komotini, George Papadriellis, told Human Rights Watch that, "We have
come to understand that economic development in particular is not
possible without the cooperation of all of the communities living
here." Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-06.htm#P225_36797
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
Denial of Ethnic Identity
While many of the improvements that the Greek government has made are
substantive and not merely cosmetic, the Turkish minority continues to
face a number of serious problems. At the root of these problems is the
Greek government's attitude toward the Turkish minority as somehow
alien to Greece, as an outside threat that must be minimized or
isolated. The most obvious sign of this is the continued state policy
of denying the ethnic identity of the minority, which, whether acquired
by birth or through acculturation, is undoubtedly Turkish. Greece
officially recognizes but one minority, the Muslim minority as defined
in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Consequently, it has adopted a militant
fear of any group, whether Macedonian or Turkish, that claims
otherwise.
While it is indeed true that the minority is mixed on an
ethnolinguistic basis, being made up of ethnic Turks, Pomaks (Muslim
Slavs who speak a Bulgarian dialect), and Romas, the group
overwhelmingly identifies itself as Turkish.34 Indeed many Pomaks and
Romas will, especially to outsiders, even deny their ethnolinguistic
origin in the belief that being called "Pomaks" or "Romas" is
merely a state artifice to suppress them.35 One commentator noted that,
"Due to the uniform way in which Greek authorities and local
communities have treated Gypsies and Pomaks, the latter tend to
identify with the stronger elements of the minority in Thrace, who are,
of course, the Muslim Turcophones."36
The government of Greece justifies its refusal to accept the Turkish
identity of the minority on the Treaty of Lausanne, which only mentions
a "Muslim minority." Others within the government point to the fact
that "Turkish" refers to state identification, rather than to an
ethnicity. Mr. Yannos Kranidiotis, the deputy foreign minister, stated
that,
In Greece we do not speak of a Turkish minority; we call it Muslim
minority. We feel this term, Turkish, gives them an ethnic character of
Turkish while downgrading other elements that are not Turkish [such as
Pomaks and Gypsies]. We have ratified the code of ethnic self-identity.
We will wait for the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights....We have been tolerant and are becoming even more tolerant.
Stricto sensus if one wants to interpret the Lausanne treaty they must
be called Muslims...We are respecting however the different elements of
the Muslim minority. We would like to see what the Commission and what
the Court of Human Rights will say, if we should call them Turks.37
Mr. Stavros Kambellis, the state-appointed secretary general for
Thrace, argued that the term "Turkish" refers to the Republic of
Turkey, not a specific minority. He stated that,
A person is free to express himself in whatever identity he desires. No
one has come to me to complain about the freedom to express one's
religious or linguistic identity. The problem is raised with the use of
the term Turkish. According to all international conventions they are
Muslim. When they name their associations with the name of another
state, this has no meaning here. It does not express anything.38
The government's refusal to accept the minority's Turkish identity
has ranged from banning civic organizations bearing the adjective
"Turkish" in their titles to prosecuting individuals who publicly
identified the minority as "Turkish."39 Greek courts have outlawed
the use of the word "Turkish" to describe the Turkish minority. In
November 1987, the Greek High Court affirmed a 1986 decision by the
Court of Appeals of Thrace in which the Union of Turkish Teachers of
Western Thrace and the Union of Turkish Youth of Komotini were
dissolved. The court held that the word "Turkish" referred to citizens
of Turkey and could not be used to describe citizens of Greece, and
that the use of the word "Turkish" to describe Greek Muslims endangered
public order.40 More recently, in August 1996, Mr. Rasim Hid, a teacher
at a minority primary school, was transferred by the state-appointed
secretary general of the region from the city of Xanthi to a mountain
region of Rodopi for using the term "Turkish school" in a
teachers' meeting.41 In June 1997, twelve ethnic Turkish teachers
were given a suspended sentence of eight months, pending appeal,
because they signed a union document that included the term, "Turkish
Teachers of Western Thrace."42 They had been indicted under Articles
188 ("participating in an association the aims of which are contrary
to criminal provisions") and 192 ("inciting citizens to commit acts
of violence upon each other") of the Greek Penal Code.43
The most notorious case in recent memory involves the late Doctor Sad1k
Ahmet, a former parliamentarian and communal leader. In January 1990,
Dr. Ahmet was found guilty of disrupting public peace (diataraxi koinis
eirinis) under Article 192 of the penal code. In October 1989, while
campaigning for parliament, he had distributed leaflets that spoke of
"Turks," "Turkish Muslims," and the "Turkish Muslim minority
of Western Thrace."44 Doctor Ahmet was imprisoned from January to
March 1990, when the Court of Appeals of Patras upheld the sentence but
converted it into a fine with time served. On February 15, 1991, the
Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos) rejected Dr. Ahmet'sappeal of this
conviction. The court ruled that, "In this manner the appellants had
deliberately attempted to describe as 'Turks' the Greek Muslims of
Southern Rodopi....moreover, they knew that there was no Turkish
minority in Western Thrace...."45
Dr. Ahmet then applied to the European Commission of Human Rights,
which declared his case partially admissible in 1994. In April 1995,
the commission in its Article 31 report declared that Greece had
violated Dr. Ahmet's right of free expression under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and forwarded the case to the
European Court of Human Rights. On November 15, 1996, however, the
court dismissed the case because Dr. Ahmet had not exhausted domestic
legal remedies.46
The Greek state's obstinate denial of the Turkish minority's ethnic
identity short-circuits any hope of real reconciliation. Minority
members consistently ranked the denial of their ethnic identity as the
main stumbling block to improving their lot in Greek society and
trusting the Greek state. In meetings with Human Rights Watch, the
Turkish minority demanded nothing more than recognition of its Turkish
identity and equal treatment within the framework of Greek citizenship
and loyalty to Greece. Mr. Birol Akifo_lu, a deputy from The New
Democracy party, stated that,
First of all there is the problem of the non-recognition of its ethnic
identity, its Turkish origin, a problem from which derive all the other
problems of the minority. The significance of the notion of a citizen
is of course above the religious or the ethnic identity one may have.
We are first of all Greek citizens. Our religious and ethnic identity
should not be the reason that they see us as second class citizens. All
of the minority is Turkish and the differentiations that are being made
(Romas, Muslims, Pomaks) do not derive from the minority itself and
consequently are not recognized by it. The name Turkish for
associations is not being recognized and it is forbidden. In November
1987 we had the first restriction by a higher court when an association
used the name Turkish. It must be understood that one thing is Turkism
or Turanism and another thing is to be a Greek citizen and to have a
Turkish identity.47
Mr. Adem Bekiro_lu, president of the board of the Minority Scientists'
Association, explained that,
We are denied our [right] of self-identity. "Muslim minority" does
not mean anything to us. We speak and learn Turkish, we feel that we
are Turks, therefore, we ought to be recognized as Turks. The Greek
government after it agreed with Turkey about a Turkish minority ought
to recognize us as a Turkish minority. We cannot accept the Greek
President's position, who speaks of Turkish individual identity but who
refuses to recognize a Turkish collective identity...During the
registration of the minority, it was called Turkish in spite of the
fact that in the Lausanne treaty of 1923 [the group] was referred to as
a "Muslim minority."48
Despite claims that the Treaty of Lausanne only allows reference to a
"Muslim minority," official Greek state policy has fluctuated
regarding the identity of the minority and appears largely to be a
function of Greco-Turkish relations. Professor Christos Rozakis, a
former deputy foreign minister of Greece, commented that,
In Greece....two schools of thought have emerged on the semantics of
the word "Muslim minority"....the one, which is enunciated mainly
during periods of crisis in relations between the two States, attempts
to limit the nature of the minority to its religious constitutive
aspect....The other looks at the minority as an ethnic group....It is
not surprising the latter school flourishes in the rare periods of
rapprochement between the two countries...49
After the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in the 1930s,
according to Rozakis, "the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos
accepted that the minority was a secular and not only a religious
one."50 This switch came as Greek policy began to favor Kemalists
within the minority over Islamist traditionalists.51 During the early
years of the Cold War up until 1955, the Greek state actually began to
use the term "Turkish" to describe the minority in place of the
generic "Muslim." For example, Law No. 3065 of 1954, dubbed the
"Marshal Papagos Law" by the Turkish minority, ordered the use of
the term "Turkish" in naming primary schools.52 A December 1954
order sent by the General Administration of Thrace to mayors and other
government bodies in the region ordered that, "Following the order of
the President of the Government (Prime Minister), we ask you that from
now on and in all occasions the terms 'Turk-Turkish' are used
instead of the terms 'Muslim- of Muslim.'"53 In May 1955, the
General Administration of Thrace again directed state agencies to use
the term "Turkish" to describe the minority, explaining, "In
spite of the strict orders of the government to replace the terms
'Muslim-of Muslim' and use from now on the terms
'Turk-Turkish', in the village Aratos on the public road connecting
Komotene and Alexandroupole there exists a very prominent sign with the
words 'Muslim School.'"54
For its part, the Turkish community has documented this politically
motivated duality in government policy. It has gathered the following
evidence:
· photographs of Turkish elementary schools showing:
a Turkish school in the village of Kalhandos in Komotini about thirty
years ago, in which a sign identifies the school as a Turkish
elementary school, and in which the name appears written in both Greek
and Turkish;
a Turkish school in the village of Makre in Evros taken about twenty
years ago, in which the school is called a Turkish school, but the name
is written only in Greek; the Turkish Central elementary school of
Xanthi, taken in 1967, in which the name is written only in Greek;
in contrast, a current Turkish elementary school, in which the name
"Turkish" does not appear in either Turkish or Greek.
· A geography book dated 1933, written in Turkish, and described as a
"Turkish book";
· protocols for the program in Turkish elementary schools for the
school year 1957-1958, in which the schools are referred to as "Turkish
schools";
· an elementary school diploma dated June 10, 1957, written in both
Greek and Turkish, in which Hatice Iman, thirteen years old, is
identified as a "Turk";
· two emergency orders dated 1954 and 1955 in which the chief
administrator of Thrace orders municipalities to change all signs from
"Muslim minority" to "Turkish minority" (see Appendix C).55
Forced Deprivation of Citizenship: The Legacy of Article 19
Past Practices
In a positive step, the Greek government repealed Article 19 of the
1955 Citizenship Law (No. 3370) on June 11, 1998. The repeal, however,
did not apply retroactively. It had been used arbitrarily to deprive
ethnic Turks (and other non-ethnic Greeks) of their citizenship.
Furthermore, the Greek government promised that all those made
stateless under Article 19 who still resided in Greece would be granted
citizenship.
However, for forty-three years, successive Greek governments, including
the present one, used Article 19 in an attempt to alter the demographic
balance in Thrace in favor of ethnic Greeks. In clear violation of the
guarantee of equality before the law under Articles 1 and 2 of the
Greek constitution and Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Article 19
differentiated between ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greeks:
A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the
intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek
nationality. This also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin
born and domiciled abroad. His minor children living abroad may be
declared as having lost Greek nationality if both their parents or the
surviving parent have lost the same. The minister of the interior
decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the National
Council.
One scholar noted that, "The Greek Constitution does not directly
create distinctions on the basis of ethnic origin. Yet....one must
examine the application of certain rules in the Code of Citizenship
which facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by those who
belong to the nation (omogeneis) and its loss by those who do not
(allogeneis)."56
According to the Greek government, between 1955 and 1998, approximately
60,000 individuals were deprived of their citizenship under Article
19.57 Of these 60,000, approximately 7,182 lost their citizenship
between 1981 and 1997.58
Mr. Orhan Haciibram, a lawyer in Xanthi who took on many cases of
non-ethnic Greek citizens deprived of their citizenship, complained
that,
It must be said here that the revocation of citizenship is not an
administrative act of a public servant; it is a state policy
implemented in Greece for citizens of Thrace since 1955 and applied by
all the governments that came into power. The most massive revocation
of citizenship took place in the 1980s, which led a lot of people to
leave Greece or to remain in Turkey because they could not return.
After 1989 the article has been less implemented than before.59
The process of depriving an individual of his citizenship usually began
when the police informed the Directorate of Citizenship that an
individual and his family had purportedly moved away or had left the
country for an extended period of time. There was no obligation to
inform the individual in question of the effort to strip him of his
citizenship, and consequently the person generally learned of it ex
post facto. Mrs. Karagianidou, the director of the Directorate of
Citizenship, asserted that,
To revoke their citizenship it has to be proven that they had also sold
off all of their resources and holdings in Greece and that they had not
left behind any members of their family. The police would inform the
Directorate of Citizenship that they had sold all of their property. It
is the police who confirmed such information....If there was
insufficient evidence we requested further investigation. Even if one
person rests behind we were reluctant to implement Article 19.60
Mr. Mavrikas, a legal advisor on citizenship affairs to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, added that,
When we come to revoke the citizenship of some people it is because we
consider that they have given evidence that they don't want any more
the Greek citizenship. They have shown that they do not have any
contact with Greece....Information where they may be is unavailable
precisely because we do not know where they are. We simply inform all
our embassies and if some day they decide to go to the local embassy
they are informed about it.61
Although by law individuals deprived of citizenship had two months from
the time of revocation of their citizenship to appeal to the Council of
State, few managed to meet the deadline because, as Mr. Mavrikas points
out above, it was often difficult to contact them. Mr. Haciibram, the
lawyer, noted that,
Nobody is warned that his citizenship will be revoked. People find out
about it when they have to go ask for official documents from a state
organization. Usually a letter follows to the state body making the
request that it made an error. An appeal must be made (it must be done
within two months of the revocation) while one is waiting for the
minister's answer that no error is made.62
The case of the Ramadano_lu family, barred from entering Greece in May
1996 after their Greek citizenship was secretly revoked in November
1992, clearly refutes explanations put forth by Greek officials on why
citizenship is revoked.63 In 1990, Mr. Husseyin Ramadano_lu traveled to
Frankfurt, Germany, along with his wife and new-born daughter Pelin to
find work. In 1992, while in Germany, a son, Yusuf, was born. Mr.
Ramadano_lu twice renewed his passport at the Greek Consulate in
Frankfurt; and his wife renewed her passport once. His daughter also
held a valid passport, and his son's birth was registered with the
Greek Consulate. The Ramadano_lus regularly visited Greece, sent money
back to family members, including their parents, who still live in the
country. In short, they maintained regular and proper contacts with the
Greek state and its offices abroad.
Despite this, they fell victim to Article 19. In April 1996, they
arrived in Greece for a vacation, and then traveled to Turkey to visit
relatives holding valid passports duly issued by Greek authorities. On
their return to Greece in May, at the Ipsala border gate, Greek
immigration officials confiscated their passports and refused to grant
them "heimatslos" (stateless) documents so they could return to
their homes in Germany.
Reports of large numbers of stateless individuals still residing in
Greece-former Greek citizens deprived of their citizenship under
Article 19-also refutes the claim by Mrs. Karagianidou of the
Directorate of Citizenship that, "it was proven that they [those
deprived of their citizenship under Article 19] have also sold off all
of their resources and holdings in Greece and that they have not left
behind any members of their family." Mrs. Karagianidou even
contradicted herself, admitting that some stateless individuals were
still residing in Greece under a "state of tolerance."64 Estimates
of the number of such stateless range from 1,000 to 4,000.65
Remaining Problems: Stateless Persons
As noted, the repeal of Article 19 does not have retroactive force.
Those who remain stateless within Greece (1,000-4,000) and those who
adopted the nationality of another country after losing Greek
citizenship and having left Greece (the vast majority) have no right
under Greek law to regain Greek nationality. In August 1998, the Greek
foreign minister, Mr. Pangalos, promised that within one year all
former Greek citizens who had lost their citizenship under Article 19
and remain in Greece would be granted citizenship, yet no steps have
been taken to date.
Stateless individuals have difficulty receiving social services like
health care and education and-until December 1997-were even denied
the protection of the 1954 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, which Greece ratified in 1975. Mr. Haciibram, the
lawyer, outlined the legal no-man's land in which the Article 19
stateless find themselves:
The stateless are neither Greek nor foreign citizens nor refugees. They
are registered nowhere. They cannot get a driver's license nor can
they officially exercise a profession. Social security takes
contributions from them, but when it has to give a pension to a
stateless individual, of course, it refuses to do so because he does
not have an identity card. When the father is stateless, like the
grocery man of Ehinos, Huseyin Zeibek, the children's names cannot
appear in the community's register. They can get married but the
registrationof their marriage is not possible. They cannot have a
passport nor a stateless certificate. Legally these people do not
exist.66
Mrs. Karagianidou of the Directorate of Citizenship denied such a state
of affairs existed. She argued that, "In our courts there has never
been a case of a stateless person who claims to have been maltreated
and his rights not recognized. They are treated exactly like
foreigners, and they have a permit of residence and a work permit. On
substantial legal basis the state of tolerance treats them as all
non-E.U. foreigners residing in Greece."67
Individuals whom Human Rights Watch interviewed paint a picture at odds
with Mrs. Karagianidou's account. Mr. Mustafa, the Coalition of the
Left deputy, acknowledged that since 1974 some of the stateless had
been given temporary residence permits, but reported that such permits
do not grant the right to work.68 An elderly ethnic Turk interviewed by
Human Rights Watch in Komotini, Mustafa Salio_lu, reported that he had
been able to work even after his citizenship was revoked on June 15,
1964. But without a national identity card, he is unable to collect his
pension despite the fact that he paid premiums during all his adult
working life. According to him,
My citizenship was revoked on the 15th of June 1964. In 1960-61, I went
to Turkey to work, and I left and returned without a passport. Since
1961, however, I have never left Komotini. Now I cannot get my pension
because I have no identity card of any sort to prove who I am, although
I have paid into the system for thirty years. My appeal to get a
disability pension was accepted by the board, but I am unable to get
any money because I have no ID card as a stateless individual. In
February 1997, I appealed this decision, but the appeal was rejected
because I could not provide sufficient evidence of my identity.69
The case of the Zeybek family highlights both the predatory nature of
Article 19 as well as the plight of the stateless.70 In January 1984,
the Zeybek family went on a vacation to Turkey with valid passports.
While there, the father, Huseyin Zeybek, lost his passport and went to
the Greek consulate for a replacement. He was told to come back several
times over the next three weeks. Finally, he was informed that he had
lost his citizenship under Article 19. His family returned to Greece
with their valid passports, and later Mr. Zeybek was smuggled back into
Greece. Upon his arrival at home, however, police officials confiscated
the passports of all family members, whose citizenship was eventually
revoked as well. According to Mr. Zeybek,
I went to my village...The police chief took away all our passports. I
tried to get a license to open a store. I got it, but then the police
came and took it away because, as a non-citizen, I have no right to
operate a business. I was constantly fined for running a shop without a
license. This went on for almost fifteen years. They took away the
license plates of my car. I have no property in my name...I don't
have health insurance because I am not a citizen. The company that
provides the service would not register me. My daughter wants to get
married to a boy in Turkey. She cannot travel there because she has no
passport. All but my youngest daughter could not study past primary
school because we are not citizens. And all the while, I still pay
taxes.
As a result of pressure from the Greek Helsinki Monitor, around one
hundred ethnic Turks made stateless under Article 19 have received
identity documents from Greek authorities in accordance with the 1954
Stateless Convention. In August 1998, Mr. Theodore Pangalos, the
foreign minister of Greece, stated that within the year most or all of
thestateless residing within Greece would be offered Greek citizenship,
but to date the government has taken no steps to carry out this
promise.71
Selection of Muftis
Although the Treaty of Lausanne clearly grants the Turkish minority the
right to organize and conduct religious affairs free from government
interference, since 1985 the government of Greece has directly
appointed-against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of ethnic
Turks-the community's religious leaders (mufti).72 In December
1990, this policy was codified by Law No. 1920. Greek officials argue
that the mufti performs both religious and civil functions and
consequently his appointment must be state regulated.
Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne, however, states that, "All
inhabitants...shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which
shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals." Article
40 further outlines the right of the Muslim minority to exercise their
religion: "In particular, they shall have an equal right to
establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable,
religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments
for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language
and to exercise their own religion freely therein."
In addition, earlier legislation, both an international treaty and
Greek law, allowed the Turkish minority to choose its religious
leaders. The Treaty of Athens of November 1913, which confirmed Greek
sovereignty of former Ottoman territories in Epirus, Macedonia, and the
Aegean, allowed muftis to be elected by the Muslim population.73 Greek
Law No. 2345 of 1920, which regulated matters pertaining to the mufti
and the vak1flar (private charitable foundations), did so as well.
Under Article 6 of Law No. 2345, the muftis were to be elected by the
Muslim population after a list of candidates had been approved by both
the head mufti, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the governor
general and/or prefect of the region.74 The chief mufti was to be
appointed by the state from three candidates nominated by all Greek
muftis "appointed or acknowledged by the Greek government." In
addition to carrying out Islamic law, the duties of the muftis under
the law also included supervision, in conjunction with community
boards, of education and the vak1flar.
In the past, the minority and the state had apparently worked out a
modus vivendi, that, while not implementing fully Law No. 2345,
generally respected the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne. Leaders from
the minority were consulted and nominated a candidate for mufti, which
state authorities then confirmed in office. 75
In 1984, however, at the height of state pressure against the Turkish
minority, the mufti of Komotini, Hüseyin Mustafa Efendi, died of a
heart attack after a long illness. In his place the Greek government
appointed Mr. RüstüEthem as acting mufti, without consulting the
minority.76 The minority objected to the appointment and, citing the
1913 Treaty of Athens and Law No. 2345, petitioned the governor, but to
no avail. In 1990, the Turkish community held unofficial elections for
mufti, electing Mr. Mehmet Emin A_a in Xanthi and Mr. Ibrahim Serif in
Komotini.77
On December 24, 1990, the Greek government countered with Decree No.
182. It ended the previously informal, if irregular, system of electing
muftis, and repealed Law No. 2345. The decree was approved by
parliament on January 26, 1991, and became Law No. 1920.
Law No. 1920 effectively removes selection of the mufti from the
community and grants it to the state. Article 1.5 allows the
state-appointed secretary general of the region to name an
eleven-member commission, headed by the "relevant prefect" and
including "Greek Muslim religious officers and outstanding Greek
Muslim members of the district." The committee then nominates a list
of candidates, which is forwarded to the state-appointed secretary
general of Thrace, who submits it to the Ministry of Education and
Religious Affairs. The ministry makes the final appointment pending
presidential confirmation. Clearly anticipating opposition and a
possible boycott from the Turkish minority, a provision of the law
states that, "The committee will convene legally with the president
and any number of its members." Furthermore, in Article 5 of the law,
"Duties of the Mufti," supervision of the vak1f property is
omitted, a radical change from Law No. 2345. Finally, Article 7 of the
new law stipulates that all written correspondence by the mufti must be
conducted in Greek; Law No. 2345 had exempted from such provisions
"correspondence with other Muslims and Muslim communities."
The members of the Turkish minority continue to reject overwhelmingly
the new system and the so-called "appointed muftis." They support
their own muftis, the so-called "elected muftis" and for the most
part shun the appointed muftis. A leader of the ethnic Turkish
community, Adem Bekiro_lu, stated that,
Because the government wouldn't arrange an election for the mufti, we
were forced to make our own election. We set a date for the
election-December 28, 1990. Just before our election, on December
24th, the government (the cabinet) announced a new law-Law No.
1920-that said that muftis are to be appointed by the government for
ten-year terms. In February [sic] the parliament passed it. In
accordance with the new law, the Nomarch of Xanthi appointed Mehmet
Sinikoglu the new mufti, displacing Mufti A_a. The Nomarch of Komotini
appointed Mufti Cemali as the new mufti, but the Turkish minority
elected _brahim Serif the new mufti on December 28, 1990. Now there are
two muftis in each community-one appointed by the government and one
elected by the Muslim community.78
Most of the minority members recently interviewed by Human Rights Watch
believe that the manner in which muftis are selected is undemocratic
and deprives the minority of its voice. A member of the Minority
Scientists Association summed up this feeling in stating that, "We
feel that an expressed consensus of the minority is necessary in the
selection of the mufti...the minority does not feel bound by the 1990
decree, for which it was never consulted."79 One of the elected
muftis, Mehmet Emin A_a, who was jailed for his role as an "elected
mufti," believes that the state should revert to the old system by
which it consults the community and then pro forma appoints the
community's choice. He stated that, "The government should consult
the local people, and religious and political representatives of the
people will recommend someone."80
The Greek government argues that the mufti must be appointed because he
is paid by the state and, in addition to his religious duties, carries
out official state duties.81 It also claims that the minority community
is consulted before a mufti is appointed. Moreover, the appointed mufti
for Komotini, Mr. Cemali, told Human Rights Watch that the old law on
electing muftis was never applied. He stated that,
One of the major problems is the ongoing controversy around the
selection of the muftis. Law No. 2345 of 1920 relating to the selection
of the muftis speaks about the election of all the muftis. However,
never in Greek history was a mufti elected. In fact since 1400 in the
Islamic world no mufti was ever elected....I think the law of 1990 is a
very good one in fact. The old system was not so good although the law
was good, but it was never applied. On the contrary the new law is good
precisely because it is being applied.82
Consequently, the Greek government has repeatedly prosecuted the
elected muftis for "usurping authority" because they use the title
of mufti. Mr. Mehmet Emin A_a, the elected mufti of Xanthi, and Mr.
_brahim Serif, the elected mufti of Komotini, have faced prosecution on
the following occasions:
· Mr. A_a was tried on December 14, 1998, in the single-member
criminal court of Xanthi on charges of "usurping the title of
mufti" for messages he released on Islamic holidays in 1997. He was
sentenced to seven months of imprisonment, but was released pending his
appeal of the verdict.
· On December 11, 1997, Mr. A_a was sentenced to sixteen months of
imprisonment by the single-member criminal court of Lamia on charges of
"usurping the title of mufti" for releasing messages on the
occasion of Islamic holidays in 1996. The decision has been appealed;
· On April 7, 1997, Mr. A_a was sentenced to twenty months
imprisonment by the single-member court in Lamia for "usurping the
title of mufti" in messages he released on the occasion of religious
holidays in 1995 and 1996. The three-member criminal court of Lamia
upheld the conviction on appeal, but reduced the sentence to fourteen
months, converted into a fine. Mr. A_a paid the fine and appealed the
case to the Court of Cassation.
· On October 21, 1996, _brahim Serif, was convicted in Thessaloniki
for "usurping the title of mufti" because he had used the title of
mufti. He was sentenced to six months, but was released on appeal.
· On June 28, 1996, Mehmet Emin A_a was sentenced to twenty months of
imprisonment by the criminal court of Agrinio on charges of "usurping
the title of mufti". The charges were brought because of messages he
released on the occasion of Islamic holidays in January and April 1993
and in January and February 1994. Upon appeal, the criminal court of
Agrinio upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to six months of
imprisonment, to be converted into a fine. Mr. A_a paid the fine and
appealed the case to a higher court;
· On May 7, 1996, Mr. A_a was given a sentence of twelve months by the
single-member criminal court of Thessaloniki for "usurping the title
of mufti" for various messages he gave in 1994 and 1995 on Islamic
holidays. On November 5, 1998, his sentence was reduced to eight
months.
· On April 12, 1994, the three-member criminal court of Xanthi
sentenced Mr. A_a to ten-months of imprisonment for "usurping the
title of mufti." Upon appeal, the Court of Cassation upheld the
conviction, and Mr. A_a was sent to jail. After serving six months of
the sentence, he was released because of health problems and the
remaining four months of his sentence was converted into a fine.
Control of Vak1flar (Private Charitable Foundations)
In another violation of the Treaty of Lausanne, the government of
Greece has interfered with the administration of Vak1flar, private
charitable foundations used to support education, minority activities,
and social welfare. Law No. 1091, passed in 1980, and Presidential
Decree No. 1 of January 1, 1991, both aim to weaken the Vak1flar
financially as well as dilute the community's control over them.
Article 40 of the treaty, however, clearly grants the right to control
the foundations to members of the minority, stating that, " In
particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and
control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social
institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and
education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise
their own religion freely therein." In addition, Article 12 of the
Treaty of Athens of 1913 obligated the Greek government to respect
Vak1f property. Furthermore, Article 10 of Law No. 2345 of 1920
stipulated that the muftis would supervise the Vak1flar, which would
be, under Article 12 of the same law, administered by councils elected
for three years by Muslim voters.83
Attacks on the independence of the Vak1flar first began in 1967, when
the Colonels' junta seized power in Greece, and have continued to the
present. The coup leaders dismissed the members of the community boards
that supervised the foundations and replaced them with individuals from
government agencies; in 1973, a non-Muslim was even appointed as
chairman of one such board.84 Even after the return to civilian rule,
the situation did not improve-in fact, it worsened. In August 1979,
the Karamanlis government presented a bill to parliament further
restricting the activities of the Vak1flar and the Turkish minority's
right to administer them. The bill was enacted on November 12, 1980, as
Law No. 1091, provoking widespread outrage in the minority community
and from the Turkish government.
While Law No. 1091 preserves a facade of elections by the minority of
the boards that run the foundations, in effect it arrogates to the
state not only a greater hand in running the Vak1flar, but also
undermines their very financial basis. Consequently, while Article 5 of
the law provides for elections for members of the Vak1f boards, Article
11 allows the then state-appointed prefect of the region to create a
single Vak1f board in an area where there is more than one
foundation.85
The law also struck at the financial existence of the foundations.
Article 20.1 stipulates that, "The existing Managing Committees,
boards or where lacking, the acting Mutawils, are obligated to submit a
statement of the vak1f's properties and those that it administers to
their localities' Financial Tax Offices, within the revocation
deadline of a year from the enactment of the present law."86 While
such a requirement may seem innocuous, in reality it is a daunting task
given that much of the property owned by the Vak1flar was acquired
during the 500 years of Ottoman rule of the region, when book-keeping
was primitive at best and records often destroyed during wars and
dislocations. Furthermore, Article 16 of Law No. 1091 gives the prefect
and his office wide-ranging control over budgetary matters. Article
16.1 and 16.2, for example, respectively state that, "Regardless of
size, the budget and statement areapproved by an instrument of the
local prefect...," and, "No modification or transfer of credit may
be allowed without the Prefect's approval, and no expenditure may be
allowed without being recorded in the approved budget."
Faced with continued protest from the community, the law was never
implemented. Consequently, the Greek government issued Presidential
Decree No. 1 of January 3, 1991, that contained most of the fundamental
provisions of Law. No 1091 but added loopholes allowing the state to
appoint the members of the Vak1f managing boards in certain situations.
Article 25 grants the state the right to make appointments outright if
elections are not held. It states that,
In the case of a member of the managing committee's declination of
appointment, death, resignation or dismissal and lacking a substitute
member, the said member is replaced by another, selected by the prefect
from the ranking table. If the table is exhausted or all recorded
individuals refuse, the prefect appoints a Greek Muslim citizen
possessing the proper qualifications. In the case that the elections
fail to produce a result or the appointment stipulated above does not
occur for any reason or in the case of any appointed member's
resignation, death or dismissal, the prefect appoints the local
financial tax inspector as manager.
Ahmet Keyha Ihsan, a PASOK municipal councillor in Rodope province,
sums up the situation in the following way:
The boards which manage the Vak1flar are appointed by the Greek state
and not elected by the minority in spite of the fact that we had
restoration of democracy. The minority has refused to apply the new law
of 1980 which limits the administration and financial autonomy of the
Vak1flar. Even the muftis were not informed when this law was
established arbitrarily... Also all Vak1flar had to submit papers to
the revenue office stating their assets or else they would lose them;
they have no such papers. This law eventually was not applied with few
exceptions because the minority protested too strongly. 87
At present, according to the U.S. State Department Report on Human
Rights for 1997, a 1996 presidential decree puts the Vak1flar under the
administration of a committee for three years pending a solution to the
impasse.
Education
Of all the problems facing the Turkish minority, short-comings in the
education system affect the largest number of individuals and have the
greatest long-term impact on the community. According to the Greek
government, there are officially 230 minority primary schools with
8,500 students; two minority junior high schools with 200 students; two
minority senior high schools with approximately 400 students; and two
Muslim religious schools (Medrese) with 200 students.88 The curriculum
in the minority primary schools is bilingual. Greek, history,
geography, civics, and environmental education are taught in Greek.
Mathematics, physics, chemistry, religion, Turkish, art, and physical
education are taught in Turkish. If the school is large enough, English
instruction is provided. The overwhelming majority of minority children
attend minority primary schools.89
Although Articles 40 and 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne grant the
minority both the right to education in its native language as well as
autonomy in managing educational institutions, Greece's respect for
these provisions hasbeen the exception, not the rule.90 Mustafa
Mustafa, an ethnic Turk and parliamentarian from the Coalition of the
Left, summed up the educational dilemma of the minority as follows:
It is noteworthy to mention that most minority students have not even
passed high school. There is an asphyxiating situation of controls by
the Greek state over the minority schools. Education in minority
primary schools is of a very low level and does not correspond at all
to the requirements for their progress to secondary education. The idea
behind the minority schools is to control them and to influence rather
than to provide the appropriate education.91
Seventy-five years of spotty implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne
has left a hodge-podge, neglected, and woefully inadequate educational
system for the Turkish minority. The Cultural Agreements signed in
1951-2 and 1968 have, like the Treaty of Lausanne, been largely
violated or not implemented by Greek authorities. Major problems
include a mixed system of administration, a poorly-educated teaching
staff, a lack of secondary schools, inadequate and outdated textbooks,
and the absence of a curriculum to teach Greek as a second language.
Mixed Administration
Under the Treaty of Lausanne, the minority has the right to run its own
educational institutions. In practice, however, the Greek government,
through the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, has
wide-ranging control over all schools, whether it concerns hiring
teachers, distributing textbooks, or building or repairing schools.
Mihalis Lambakis, the coordinator for minority schools in Thrace, noted
that,
All primary schools are private schools. They belong to the school
boards elected every two to three years by the parents, which then
function as owners of the schools. Nevertheless, it must be recalled
that all schools in Greece are under the responsibility of the Ministry
of Education. Here the Christian teachers are paid by the Greek state;
some have organic posts and others are hired on a temporary basis. Also
the Greek Muslims who come from the Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy
are paid by the Greek state. They have organic or temporary posts. The
rest of the Muslim teachers are paid by the school board-we are not
interested where they get their money from. The Greek state subsidizes
the functioning of these schools to a large degree; for the rest they
are responsible. Often in fact when the Greek state authorizes
subsidies for various repairs, the minority refuses them.92
According to Mr. Lambakis, a similar situation exists regarding high
schools:
The Xanthi high school is private while the Celal Bayar high school of
Komotini has a mixed system. All Christian teachers are paid by the
Greek state and have automatically renewable contracts (monimoi). The
Muslim teachers are paid according to a private law contract (symvasi
idiotikou dikaiou). So all teachers coming from Turkey are paid by the
Turkish state; the Muslim staff who are Greek citizens are paid by
theschool board. In Xanthi, where the high school is entirely private,
the Christian staff is paid by the state and the Muslim staff is paid
by the owner of the school. In fact the school is a private enterprise.
You have in fact two legal situations in the administration of the
minority high schools: some function completely as a private business,
others are in a bastard situation.93
The minority, however, views this mixed status as a major detriment: it
allows the state to manipulate affairs to its liking without providing
the necessary means of support. Birol Akifo_lu, an ethnic Turk and
parliamentarian, complained that,
Minority schools in practice have the status of half state-managed
schools and half private schools. For the hiring and the firing of
school personnel, these Muslim private schools are under the same
stipulations concerning all permanent/organic public servants working
in public schools (Article 32-1566). Therefore the minority cannot hire
qualified teachers as it would like to do. Yet, it must be noted that
the spirit of the article is contrary to the Lausanne Treaty. What
happens in fact is that the teachers selected by the state all come
from the EPATH and are not qualified for teaching Turkish minority
students. It is necessary that the minority children enjoy the right to
learn correctly their mother tongue, about their civilizations,
religion....According to the law minority schools should be private
schools but they have come to acquire a kind of mixed status - both
private and public; this permits the state's intervention on matters of
minority education. Consequently, the state never asks the minority
when it decides to build a school, whose status in fact ought to be
private; they build it and then they intervene.94
Teachers
Members of the Turkish minority were nearly unanimous in their belief
that the quality of most teachers in the minority system was woefully
inadequate.95 No uniform standard exists for hiring teachers,
reflecting the fact that the development of the minority educational
system has been driven as much by political calculations as by sound
pedagogical methodology. One member of the Minority Scientists'
Association complained that, "There are five or six different kinds
of teachers. There are those who are graduates of educational
universities in Turkey, or from the Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy
(EPATH), or of the Muslim religious schools (medreses), or high school
and even only elementary school graduates. In the last years all new
teachers come from the EPATH."96
The sharpest criticism, in fact, was directed at graduates of the
Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy (EPATH), which was founded in 1968 to
train members of the minority as teachers in minority schools.97 Many
in the minority believe-not without some justification-that the
EPATH was founded to control the minority and push it away from its
Turkish roots. Prima facia evidence of this, many claim, is the fact
that the language of instruction at the EPATHis Greek, even though the
teachers will be providing instruction in Turkish.98 Ahmet Emin, a New
Democracy Party prefecture councilman of the Orgoni community,
complained that,
Primary schools-if they are truly to deserve that name-must be
upgraded and the teachers there, who come from the Thessaloniki
Pedagogical Academy (EPATH), should stop practicing a policy of
assimilation through education. In fact, the ideology which was
transmitted for so many years is that they should forget Turkish and
speak only Greek because they are Islamized Greeks. Only recently has
the EPATH become a little more tolerant and recognizes the Pomaks as an
indigenous population of Thrace. If any teacher, they explain, says
something that is beyond what is written in the books he can in fact be
denounced. The teachers from the EPATH give the general impression that
they are willing to play the politics of assimilation. Most of them
come from lower class and poor families who are ready to play this role
in order to get a post.99
A graduate of a minority high school who had attended a minority
primary school echoed this opinion. He quipped that, "The quality of
our teachers was very low and most of them tried to do propaganda in
the school. During the composition lesson our teachers would do history
and mythology. Besides, most of them were unqualified to teach in
Turkish."100 Even Dimitris Chalkiotis, the executive secretary for
education of Greeks abroad and intercultural education, admitted that
the EPATH teachers were not among the best qualified.101 A Western
scholar who has studied the educational system of the minority
commented that efforts like founding the EPATH constituted an "effort
to create an incompetent Hellenised teachers' corps isolated from the
mainstream of Turkish culture and civilization."102
Greek officials, on the other hand, argue that the minority does not
accept the EPATH-trained teachers because it views them as traitors to
the minority. Mihalis Lambakis, coordinator of the minority schools of
Thrace, acknowledged the low level of the teaching staff in the
minority schools presented a problem, but added that,
The minority does not accept those teachers who are not of Turkish
origin because it considers them unqualified to teach. I don't think
this is the problem because in fact teachers of Turkish academies have
ten years of education, Greek Muslim teachers have eleven and the EPATH
teachers have fourteen. All candidates at EPATH are now senior high
school graduates. The EPATH graduates are attacked by the minority
because apparently they do not know sufficiently well Turkish in order
to teach, but also for being organs of the Greek state. The Turkish
consul of Thrace fought against them relentlessly. When the Greek
Muslim teachers started teaching in the minority schools they were
viewed as minority defectors.103
Most minority members whom Human Rights Watch interviewed believe that
ethnic Turks from Thrace who have studied at Turkish universities
should be the primary teaching staff in the minority schools. A
cultural protocol signed between Turkey and Greece on April 20, 1951,
was intended to foster educational exchanges between the two countries
and allow the mutual recognition of diplomas received in each others
countries. Consequently, many ethnic Turks from Greece went to Turkey,
received teaching degrees, and then returned to work in minority
schools. Birol Akifo_lu, the parliamentarian, stated that,
I believe the education of the teachers in minority schools should be
based on the interstate cultural agreement of 1951 which allows
minority members to study in Turkey and to prepare as teachers for the
minority schools. Already there are such teachers who have studied in
Turkey. Celal Bayar High School is a product of this agreement. In 1958
the Turkish consul had notified them that whoever wanted could register
to study in Turkish schools. By 1963-4, many of them had completed
their studies and returned; they were immediately hired by the Greek
state. There is a total number of 500 such teachers who studied in
Turkey and who then returned to teach in the minority schools. By 1970
the last ones came back....104
While many teachers in the system presently have such a background, no
new hires from this pool have been made in recent memory despite the
fact of willing and qualified candidates.105 One member of the Minority
Scientists' Association complained that, "there is a constantly
rising number of "not appointed teachers" even though there is a
strong need for more teachers. Presently there are twenty-seven
teachers who are waiting to be appointed and every day they hear
promises which are not realized."106 Mr. Akifo_lu added that he knew of
at least one hundred individuals trained as educators in Turkey who
were qualified to teach in the minority system. The state-appointed
secretary general of the region, Mr. Stavros Kambellis, agreed that
there was a shortage of teachers in minority schools but denied that
qualified teachers from the minority were not being hired. He stated
that,
I agree that there is a need for more teachers for the minority
schools.... At the moment all teachers coming from the minority who are
unemployed, if they have the qualifications of Greek teachers, they may
follow the process followed by all Greek teachers and apply to be
accepted in Greek schools. 107
Ethnic Turkish teachers working in minority schools need not follow the
same procedures for other schools nor have the same qualifications, so
the secretary general's suggestion is somewhat misleading and not
really a solution to their plight.108
Teachers who come from Turkey on a yearly basis, the so-called "quota
teachers," are another source of educators.109 Over the past several
years, however, their numbers have been declining. Under a 1951
education protocol and the 1968 cultural protocol, Greece and Turkey
may each exchange thirty-five teachers to provide instruction in
minority schools. Greece, however, has limited their number to sixteen,
the number of teachers needed by the Greek minority schools in
Istanbul.110 The secretary general of the region explained that, "The
agreement which exists stipulates that there must be a balance between
those teachers who come here and those we send to Turkey for the Greek
minority."111 Tacan _ldem, minister counselor at the Turkish Embassy
in Athens, argued that need, not numbers, should set the criterion for
reciprocity. He explained that,
Thirty-five more teachers are necessary. Because, however, only sixteen
are needed in Istanbul, Greeks allow only sixteen in spite of the
population difference. There are here 150,000 as against 2,500 persons
in Turkey. There are six high schools in Istanbul. Given the number of
the minority, you cannot stick to numbers in order to establish the
principle of reciprocity. The implementation of reciprocity is a
concept and not a number.112
Human Rights Watch was also told that teachers coming from Turkey, i.e.
Turkish citizens, rarely came before the academic year had
commenced-and often several months after that-because of work and
residency permit problems. Ahmet Faiko_lu, a PASOK deputy from
1985-1989, complained that, "the fact...that these teachers are able
to get a visa to come only in December can not be explained by
objective reasoning; obviously the reason is political."113
Secondary Schools
The low level of minority education is also evident in the number of
high schools that provide a bilingual curriculum. There are only two
minority high schools, one in Komotini and one in Xanthi. They provide
places for approximately 400 students despite the fact that there are
8,500 pupils attending minority primary schools.114 The Greek
government argues that under the Treaty of Lausanne it must only
provide a bilingual education through primary school; the secretary
general of the region stated that, "I must clarify that we are
required to provide minority education, according to the treaties
signed, only at the primary school level. Whenever, however, there is
demand for minority higher education we subvert [the treaty] and
support the creation of such schools."115
Despite the fact that Article 2 of the law regulating Celal Bayar High
School states that "entering, promotional, and graduating
examinations of the High School...will be conducted in the same manner
and date as those of other Private High schools," the state
determines how many students can attend that school as well as the
Xanthi high school.116 Upon a recommendation of the coordinator of
minority schools, the secretary general determines the number of
students that both high schools can receive in any given year. For the
1997-98 school year, approximately one hundred places were recommended,
a modest increase over the year before, and three rooms were added to
the Celal Bayar school in Komotini.
The shortage of spaces in the two minority high schools has effectively
resulted in many children of the community not completing the mandatory
nine years of education, not to speak of graduating from high school.
Adem Bekiro_lu, the chairman of the Minority Scientists' Association,
argued that the situation regarding secondary schools is worse than in
primary schools, stating that,
The situation at the secondary level of minority education is even
worse. There are first of all only two of them, [and] students are
chosen after their name is drawn from a lottery. There are forty-five
places in Xanthi and forty-five to sixty-five in Komotini....So we have
more than 1,000 children graduating every year from the primary
minority schools of Xanthi and Komotini. Of these, only 150 in Komotini
and one hundred in Xanthi can apply to go to minority high schools.
Most of the others stop their education, very few go to Greek high
schools and a few more go to ones in Turkey. As a result the nine year
mandatory education for all children in Greece is not applied for most
of the minority children....In the past many more were able to enter
high school. Since the secretary-general of the region determines the
number of those who will be able to enter minority high schools, in the
last years he justifies the limited number of students entering by
arguing that there are not enough classes available. But in the past we
had the same building functioning both in the morning and in the
afternoon and thus accommodating a larger number of students.117
Ahmet Emin, a New Democracy Party prefecture councilman for the Orgoni
municipality, stated that the shortage of spaces in minority high
schools disproportionately affected girls. He stated that, "because
there are only two minority high schools, those who want to continue in
many cases must go to Christian schools because there are not enough
places in the minority high schools for all. In most cases they choose
to drop out. This is a rule in the case of girls, since a Muslim
minority family rarely would allow the female child in the family to
attend a non-Muslim school."118
Textbooks
The 1968 "Protocol of the Ankara and Athens Meetings of the
Turkish-Greek Cultural Commission" regulates the production and use
of textbooks in minority schools for both the Turkish minority of
Thrace and the Greek minority of Istanbul. Under the protocol, each
country has the right to publish textbooks for its respective minority
in the other country, dependent on the review and final approval of the
other country. Article 15 of the protocol regulates the process by
which books are to be exchanged. It states that,
a) By September 30, books or drafts of books will be forwarded through
diplomatic channels to the respective authorities....
b) Books or drafts of books must not contain any subjects that cause
harm to relations between the two countries. The relevant authorities
will remove every subject that conflicts with this principle from the
drafts of texts or from pictures;
c) The examination of the texts will be completed by February of the
following year and the relevant parties will be informed of which
subjects are to be removed....
d) Two copies of the printed books will be sent by diplomatic channels
no later than the end of July for the process of final approval;
e) Final approval will be announced by September 1;
f) Books that are approved will reciprocally, by means of the
respective consulates, be sent to relevant authorities and after they
place an approval stamp on them, the books will be sent for the use of
all minority schools no later than September 15....119
The protocol is also based on the principal of reciprocity.
The protocol has largely not been implemented, and consequently the
Turkish-language textbooks used in the minority schools are old and
out-of-date, some dating from the 1950s. Human Rights Watch was given
photocopied editions of old books used in primary schools. Mihalis
Lambakis, the coordinator of minority schools in Thrace, reported that
of recent memory only one book had been exchanged under the protocol.
According to him, "The only book approved of which I am aware is that
of mathematics. It is a recent book which was updated and approved in
1993-4. All the other books are still editions of the 1950s. They are
the books approved in 1954."120
Each side blames the other for the failure of the protocol. Mr.
Lambakis argues that the textbooks Turkey sends are inappropriate for
Greek citizens and should be rejected. He reported that, "The Turkish
texts are retrograde and old-fashioned....the Turkish books are for
students in Turkey; they contain several nationalist tones which of
course could never be accepted."121 The minority and Turkish
officials, on the other hand, argue that the books that Greek officials
rejected were corrected and sent back for final approval. Ahmet
Faiko_lu, a former deputy from PASOK between 1985 and 1989, reports
that he personally transported the books from the Turkish consulate to
Greek authorities:
I believe with some good will the problem of the school books may be
quickly resolved. There are books which have been sent from Turkey;
they must be distributed. In fact it was myself who took the books from
the Turkish embassy and gave them to the Greek government when I still
was a deputy of PASOK. I believe that Greece does not approve them in
the same way it does not implement the 1968 Protocol because it wants
to cut all links between Turkey and the minority. 122
A member of the Association of Minority Scientists relates a similar
story. According to him, the last time the cultural protocol was
activated was in 1989-1990, when Turkey sent fifty-six books for the
Turkish curriculum; the Greek government requested that some changes be
made, and the corrected books were sent a long time ago but are still
not available.
In the absence of new textbooks provided within the framework of the
protocol, two attempts were made to alleviate the shortage. First, a
Greek author, Zegiris, produced several books, but these were in large
part rejected by the minority community as assimilationist and as not
reflecting their ethnic and religious heritage. More recently, some
within the community proposed that they themselves prepare the
textbooks, an idea that Mr. Lambakis, the minority schools coordinator,
seemed to give conditional support. One ethnic Turk complained that,
"New books should be prepared by the minority in order to fill the
needs until new official school texts can become available once the
Greek-Turkish conflict is resolved. If they cannot finally agree then
they should come and ask us to take this on: On the one side we have
Greeks who argue that they never received them and on the other Turks
argue that Greeksdid not distribute them."123 But some within the
minority believe that the issue is bilateral, and must be solved under
the protocol.
Teaching Greek as a Second Language
At present, Greek is not taught as a second language in minority
schools. In fact, the curriculum does not differ from that taught to
Greek students whose mother tongue is Greek.
One student who successfully graduated from a Greek high school noted
that, "A major problem is that when you finish primary school and you
go to high school the Greek you have been taught is inadequate. We are
taught Greek as if it is our mother tongue."124 Consequently, many
minority students who are forced into the mainstream Greek system often
fail because of poor preparation due to the low standards of minority
primary schools and because of language difficulties. The problem is
even more acute for Pomaks, who often have to learn two languages when
they enter school: Turkish and Greek.
Greek authorities seem slowly to be realizing the shortcomings of this
method and appear to be taking steps to introduce the teaching of Greek
as a second language in the minority school system. Dimitris
Chalkiotis, the executive secretary for education of Greeks Abroad and
for cross cultural education, stated that, "The new educational
policy for minorities is to demarginalize minority students by
improving their knowledge of Greek. [We will] produce new text books so
the Greek language is taught as a second language."125 He even
suggested teaching Turkish to Pomaks as a second language. The
secretary general of Thrace also seemed to support efforts to begin
teaching Greek as a second language to minority students.
Police Surveillance
Community leaders from the Turkish ethnic minority reported being under
clandestine police surveillance. Birol Akifo_lu, a deputy from the New
Democracy party, reported that police officials called him to inquire
when he was meeting with members from Human Rights Watch and the Greek
Helsinki Monitor in September 1997. Mr. Akifo_lu reported that he does
not feel that he is followed all the time, but thinks it "very
possible" that his phone is tapped. Mr. Mehmet Emin A_a, the elected
mufti of Xanthi, was of the strong belief that he is followed by the
police on a regular basis. A representative of Human Rights Watch and
two members of the Greek Helsinki Monitor experienced such surveillance
first hand while conducting interviews in Thrace in September 1997. The
three were followed for two days in the area around Komotini by two
separate Greek security organizations. When a Human Rights Watch
representative confronted the surveillance teams, the operatives became
angry. Only after both groups complained to uniformed police officials
and Interior Ministry officials were the police tails removed.126 Given
state suspicion of the ethnic Turkish minority, such surveillance is
not surprising.
Restrictions on Freedom of Expression
Apart from the restrictions on self-expression concerning identity, the
small Turkish-language press in the Thrace region has also suffered
state persecution. Most of the state's efforts have been targeted
against Mr. Abdulhalim Dede, who has operated a radio station and a
newspaper. Oddly enough, Mr. Dede is known for his opposition to both
official Greek and Turkish state policy toward the Turkish minority of
Thrace.127 Repression against him has included the following:
· In 1997, Mr. Dede was put on trial for the illegal operation of his
Turkish-language radio station, Is1k [Light], based in Komotini,
between August 1, 1994, and September 15, 1995. According to the Greek
Helsinki Monitor, all private radio stations were forced to operate
without a license because of the failure of authorities to issue proper
licenses, but Mr. Dede was the only individual prosecuted. The case
ended in acquittal.
· In 1997, Mr. Dede was given a six-month suspended sentence in a
trial for an article that appeared in his now defunct Turkish-language
newspaper, Trakya'n1n Sesi (Voice of Thrace). For alleging that
ethnic Greeks from Turkey were carrying out a campaign against Turks in
Thrace with the connivance of local authorities, he was charged with
"spreading false information that may cause public unrest or shake
the people's faith in the Greek state."128
· In September 1998, Mr. Dede was sentenced by a Xanthi court to eight
months of imprisonment for trying to install a radio antenna in his
backyard. He was kept overnight in prison, which, according to the
Greek Helsinki Monitor, is a rarity in such cases. The sentence has
been suspended pending appeal.
Discrimination in Public Employment
Although they comprise a substantial minority in Thrace, few members of
the ethnic Turkish community work in the civil service, either at the
municipal or state levels. While low education levels and poor Greek
may explain part of this, outright discrimination plays a large role.
In our 1990 report, we pointed out that, according to official
admission, no ethnic Turks worked in the governorships of Komotini or
Xanthi.129 In our follow-up report two years later, the situation had
remained largely the same, with only a handful of ethnic Turks hired as
street cleaners.130 In September 1997, state-appointed secretary
general of Thrace, Mr. Stavros Kambellis, stated that,
There existed an expanded discrimination policy at all levels except in
the last years where one observes a general improvement. My policy and
the instruction that I give is to apply complete equality before the
law. This will expressed by the government is visible to all the
citizens. As for the mountainous areas, whether they are inhabited by
the minority or not, a special program of steady development is
implemented....We have elaborated a special program for the development
of the mountainous areas of Rodope which covers the infrastructure,
public works, securing job opportunities.131
While Human Rights Watch welcomes the secretary general's admission
of past discrimination, the situation largely remains unchanged. The
elected governor of Xanthi, Mr. Panagiotis Saltouros, stated that only
one ethnic Turk, the president of the Oraio community, is employed by
the governorship, in the veterinary services department.132 The mayor
of Komotini, Mr. George Papadreilis, told Human Rights Watch that,
"There is no one in the municipality besides the seasonal workers who
are from the minority.133
Repair of Mosques
The Turkish minority continues to face trouble repairing and/or
building mosques despite the fact that Article 40 of the Treaty of
Lausanne clearly grants them this right. It states that they "shall
have an equal right to establish, manage, and control at their own
expense, any...religious institution." In our 1990 report, we
presented several cases in which the community was unable to obtain
permits to repair mosques and, in one case, the state destruction of
asix-hundred-year-old house of worship.134 The situation had improved
somewhat by 1992, and in a follow-up report issued that year we noted
that one new mosque had been built and three repaired.
Despite these positive steps, the community still must navigate a
bureaucratic maze and overcome serious obstacles, including state
prosecution, to repair or build mosques. Often, they fail. The case of
the Kimmeria mosque is illustrative of this painful process.135
In September 1996, the Xanthi Urban Planning Directorate (UPD) issued a
building license for "an annex to a mosque (extension of ground floor
and minaret)." As soon as work started, however, ultra nationalists
and the local media criticized the height of the minaret. Shortly
thereafter, the UPD ordered a work stoppage because it decided that a
"technical soil study" was necessary.136 In December 1996,
twenty-three individuals were arrested by the police for "arbitrary
construction with violations." According to Greek sources,
"arbitrary construction" is rampant in Greece and almost never
results in arrest. On January 3, 1997, the Kimmeria imam was sentenced
to two four-month prison sentences and seventeen workers from the
minority were each given 35-day sentences. All were released on appeal.
Later, the state-appointed secretary general of the region announced
that the UPD had no right to issue a building permit without his
approval.
The elected prefect of Xanthi, Mr. Panagiotis Saltouros, told Human
Rights Watch that,
The problem with the Kimmeria mosque is that although the prefecture
and the urban planning office (UPD) gave them a license to expand and
build a minaret, it turned out to be illegal. Since May 1996 a new law,
which we also ignored, stipulated that any development or work on the
vak1f holdings requires the permission of the secretary general of the
region (SGR). Nevertheless, it must be specified that the denouncements
made by the inhabitants of Kimmeria led to the discovery of this law.
Their denouncements were based on the argument that the constructions
that were going on in the mosque were violating what was described in
the license. Thus they had to stop for two reasons, because of the
alleged infractions and because they needed the permission of SGR. What
followed was that the committee of the vak1f refused to submit a new
request. When our offices gave them a license to go ahead and expand,
we did it with very liberal intentions in mind.137
In mid-1997, however, upon an oral directive, the imam and his crew
were allowed to finish the mosque repair, though not to build the new
minaret to the desired height. The act underscores the political nature
of the stop order, as no mention was made in the oral directive about a
"technical soil study."
34 While no exact figures exist, the minority, on an ethnic basis, is
believed to be 65 to 75 percent Turkish, 15-25 percent Pomak, and 5-10
percent Roma.
35 Information based on an unpublished manuscript on Turkish minority
of Thrace written by the Greek Helsinki Monitor.
36 Rozakis, p. 113.
37 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
38 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
39 The state in recent years has come to accept that the group is "of
Turkish origin" (Tourkogeneis). Information provided by the Greek
Helsinki Monitor.
40 In spite of this holding, the courts have still on occasion used the
word "Turkish" in relation to the Turkish minority. For example, a 1988
order from the President of the Areios Pagos, the Greek High Court, in
File Number 473, refers to Dr. Sadik Ahmet as a "Turkish doctor" from
the "Turkish minority."
41 1997 International Helsinki Federation For Human Rights Annual
Report (Internet Edition). Under Legal Decree 1109/72 and Laws No. 694
and 695/77, schools for the Turkish minority are to be officially
called "minority schools."
42 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights for 1997 (Internet
Edition).
43 1997 IHF Annual Report.
44 European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 18877/91, Sad1k
Ahmet against Greece, Report of the Commission, April 4, 1995, p. 11.
45 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Ahmet Sadik v. Greece
(46/1995/552/638), Strasbourg, 15 November 1996, Internet edition, p.
11.
46 "Case of Ahmet Sadik v. Greece," Greek Helsinki Monitor, Press
Release, July 13, 1998. Greece has been convicted ten times by the
European Court of Human Rights for violating the rights of minorities
living within Greece, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Catholics, Protestants, and Macedonians.
47 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. Turanism is an ideology that
arose at the end of the Ottoman Empire. It propounded the union of all
Turks and Turkic peoples into one state.
48 Interview, Komotini, September 1997. Hülya Emin is now the
president of the group, which voted in October 1998 to rename itself
the "Turkish Scientists' Association."
49 Rozakis, p. 105. Mr. Rozakis, who became vice-president of the
European Court of Human Rights in July 1998, puts himself in the latter
camp, writing that, "These complex elements of origin, religion, and
linguistic options, as well as of cultural and political ties, make
this minority an ethnic minority, and not solely a religious or
linguistic one."
Mr. Rozakis wrote the article before he became deputy foreign minister,
though the book was published during his tenure in the foreign
ministry.
50 Rozakis, 1996, p. 116, cited in an unpublished manuscript on Turkish
minority by the Greek Helsinki Monitor.
51 Ibid. The Islamist traditionalist would, naturally, identify
themselves in religious terms, while the Kemalists would see themselves
in ethno-national terms, as Turks.
52 Bask1n Oran, Türk-Yunan _liskilerinde Bat1 Trakya Sorunu (The
Western Thrace Question in Turco-Greek Relations), (Ankara: Bilgi
Yay1nlar1, 1991), p. 120.
53 See Appendix C for a full text of the directive.
54 Ibid.
55 This evidence was presented to Human Rights Watch in 1990 and first
published in Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, pp.
15-16.
56 Stephanos Stavros, "Citizenship and the protection of
minorities," in Featherstone and Ifantis, Greece in a Changing
Europe.
57 Greek Helsinki Monitor, Press Release, January 28, 1998. The
government claims that most of the 60,000 "asked" to be deprived of
their Greek citizenship.
58 Information provided by Deborah R. Mennuti, second secretary, United
States Embassy, Athens, Greece, who received the data from the Greek
government, and by the Greek Helsinki Monitor. According to the Greek
Helsinki Monitor, 12,882 individuals lost their citizenship under
Article 19 between 1976 and 1997. The Greek Helsinki Monitor bases its
data on information released by Mr. Alekos Papadopoulos, minister of
the interior.
According to the Greek Helsinki Monitor, the deprivation of citizenship
peaked in the period 1976-79, as many ethnic Turks who had fled to
Turkey after the Cyprus crisis had their citizenship revoked, and again
in 1986, as an organized civil rightsmovement gained speed in the
ethnic Turkish community.
The State Department Report on Human Rights for 1997 provided the
following information: between 1981 and 1991, Article 19 was applied an
average of 570 times a year; between 1992-1996, an average of 164
times.
59 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
60 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
61 Interview, Athens, September 1997. When asked why the same criteria
did not apply to the Greek diaspora, many of whose members spend
decades outside of Greece, Mr. Mavrikas argued on purely ethnic terms,
stating that, "The difference with Greek-Americans is that they keep
their ties with Greece through the Orthodox religion, through their
Greek associations, the Greek embassy, culture and the archbishop. On
the contrary, with non-ethnic Greeks we have people who have no ties
with Greek culture."
62 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
63 Information in this paragraph comes from Greek Helsinki Monitor,
Press Release, June 12, 1996.
64 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
65 Mr. Florentis, an advisor to the Ministry of Public Order, estimated
that there were 2,000 such stateless individuals. Interview, Athens,
September 1997. Mustafa Mustafa, an ethnic Turkish deputy from the
Coalition of the Left Party, gave an estimate of 1,500-2,000, though he
suggested that some calculations go as high as 4,000. Interview,
Xanthi, September 1997. Mr. Panagiotis Saltouros, the Nomarc of Xanthi,
estimated that there were 200-250 stateless in Xanthi. Interview,
Xanthi, September 1998. Birol Akifo_lu, a deputy from the New Democracy
Party, estimated that 800 stateless individuals resided in his
district. Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
66 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
67 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
68 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
69 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
70 Interview with the family and its lawyer, Xanthi, September 1997.
71 Information from an unpublished manuscript on the Turkish minority
by the Greek Helsinki Monitor.
72 The mufti fulfills the role both of religious leader and Islamic
judge, performing marriages and divorces and overseeing property
disputes. Muslim Greek citizens, however, also have the right to deal
with these matters in civil courts.
There are two muftis, one in Xanthi and one in Komotini, and an
assistant in Evros.
73 Under the Treaty of Athens, the chief mufti was to be chosen by the
state from among three candidates selected by the muftis. All muftis
were civil servants under the treaty. The accord also promised respect
for vak1f property. See Oran, pp. 159-161 and an unpublished manuscript
on the Turkish minority written by the Greek Helsinki Monitor.
74 The chief mufti, however, was last in line in the vetting process,
which was first conducted by the governor general and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs. Article 6.3 states that the governor general
forwards applications for the post he receives "along with his
remarks" to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which can "reject
those deemed unsuitable for the position."
75 A notable exception to this state of affairs occurred during the
years of the military junta (1967-74), when in 1973 authorities
appointed an unqualified Roma Muslim, Ahmet Damato_lu, as the mufti of
Dimotoka. See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in
Conflicts (London: Minority Rights Publications), 1993, p. 184.
76 Oran gives a detailed account of the struggle over the muftiate
after the death of the Mufti of Komotini in 1984. See pp. 160-72.
77 The elections were conducted at the mosques.
78 Quotation taken from, Improvements for the Turkish Minority;
Problems Remain, p. 6.
79 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
80 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
81 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights for 1992, p. 793.
82 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
83 Article 10.1 states that,
Apart from their purely religious duties in accord with Sharia, the
Muftis will supervise the religious and educational officials of the
Muslim communities in their prefectures, as well as supervise the
administration of these communities' Vak1f property...
Article 12.1 states that,
An administrative committee of seven to twelve members will be
organized in each Mufti prefecture for the purpose of governing and
administering the Muslim communities' property....
The members of the committees were elected under supervision of the
minister of religious affairs.
84 See Bahçeli, p. 181; Oran, pp. 270-76; and Poulton, p. 184.
85 Such was the case in many areas. While the prefect was bound to
chose members of the remaining board from the elected board members,
the end result was that the prefect, and not the voters, made the final
decision. Furthermore, minority members complained about the reduction
in the number of Vak1f boards.
86 Article 21.5 stipulated confiscation to the state if ownership could
not be verified.
87 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
88 Interview with Mihalis Lambakis, state coordinator of the minority
schools in Thrace, Xanthi, September 1997. Information concerning the
curriculum and the status of the schools was provided by Mr. Lambakis.
89 According to Mr. Lambakis, about 98 percent of the minority youth
attend minority primary schools. No more than 2 to 3 percent of
minority children attended non-minority primary schools. Approximately
1,000 minority students, however, attended non-minority, Greek-language
high schools because of the limited number of places in the two
minority high schools.
90 Article 40 grants the Turkish minority "an equal right to
establish, manage and control at their own expense . . . any schools
and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right
to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely
therein." Article 41 further states that, "As regards public
instruction, the [Greek] Government will grant in those towns and
districts, where a considerable proportion of [Muslim] nationals are
resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools
the instruction shall be given to the children of such [Greek]
nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will
not prevent the [Greek] Government from making the teaching of the
[Greek] language obligatory in the said schools."
91 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
92 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. The system is so mixed, however,
that even Greek education officials were unclear of the status of the
minority schools. Mr. Dimitris Chalkiotis, the executive secretary for
education of Greeks abroad and intercultural education, reported that
the primary schools were state schools and only the high schools were
private. Interview, Athens, September 1997.
93 Ibid.
94 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
95 An exception to this was teachers who had been educated at Turkish
universities.
96 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. In his study, Oran categorizes
into four groups the non-ethnic Greek teachers working in the minority
system: teachers without formal pedagogical training (formasyonsuz
ö_retmenler); quota teachers, and i.e. Turkish nationals sent from
Turkey; ethnic Turks of Greek nationality trained in Turkey; teachers
from the pedagogical academy in Thessaloniki. See pp. 143-45.
97 Oran, p. 124. Birol Akifo_lu, a deputy from the minority, states
that the EPATH was founded because the mufti of Xanthi was displeased
with the Kemalist and leftist orientation of many teachers trained in
Turkey in the 1950s and 1960s. He reported that, "The mufti of Xanthi
and his son protested at the time because apparently these teachers had
been inculcated with a Kemalist secular education and Marxist
tendencies. So Muslims wanting a Muslim education rather than a
Kemalist education request the protection of the Greek state. With a
royal decree, the Greek military regime of that period established the
well known EPATH. The intention was to create additional minority
schools which would provide a Muslim education, a religious
education."
98 The school recruits many Pomaks, whose mother tongue is often not
Turkish.
99 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
100 Interview with members of the Union of the University Youth of
Thrace, Xanthi, September 1997.
101 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
102 F. De Jong, "The Muslim Minorities in Western Thrace," in
Georgina Ashworth, (ed.), World Minorities, Volume 3, (Sunbury,
England: Quartarmaine House, Ltd., 1980), p. 98.
103 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
104 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
105 Oran states that according to one source, no new teachers have been
hired since 1973. In addition, some ousted during the Colonels' junta
that ruled Greece from 1967-74 were not reinstated. See Oran, p. 144.
106 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
107 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
108 In a letter to the Greek Helsinki Monitor dated October 15, 1998,
Minister of Education Arsenis stated that all ethnic Turkish teachers
with recognized degrees would be hired immediately for employment in
minority schools and those without recognized degrees would benefit
from an accelerated recognition of their degrees.
109 These individuals, Turkish citizens, should not be confused with
the ethnic Turks of Greece who studied in Turkey and returned to the
region to teach.
110 Article 4 of the law creating one of the two minority high schools,
the Celal Bayar High School in Komotini, also states that,
"Instructors of Turkish descent who are not Greek Citizens may
teach...classes...during the present Legal Decree's initial period of
execution and for a renewable period of five years for lack of
instructors who are Greek citizens of Turkish descent."
111 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
112 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
113 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
114 Data on school attendance provided by Mihailis Lambakis, state
coordinator of the minority schools in Thrace, Xanthi, September 1997.
According to Oran's study published first in 1986 and updated in
1991, the two minority high schools have a capacity of 637. See Oran,
p. 145.
The high school in Xanthi is privately owned, though it is regulated by
the Greek state. The school in Komotini, named in honor of the then
Turkish president, Celal Bayar, was founded in 1952 as a result of the
Cultural Accord of 1951. The school has teachers sent yearly from
Turkey, as well as teachers who are Greek citizens paid by the state of
Greece. A special law, Legal Edict 2203 of August 1952, regulates the
operation of the school.
115 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. Greek law stipulates nine years
of mandatory education. In 1923, a primary school education was the
norm in most of the industrialized world. In 1998, a high school
education is considered the standard in the United States, Japan, and
Europe.
On the other hand, the coordinator of minority schools in Thrace,
Mihalis Lambakis, believed that the capacity of minority secondary
schools should correspond to that of minority primary schools.
116 Article 1 of the law, however, gives the state the right to
"oversee" the school. The school in Xanthi is private. See section
on "Mixed Administration."
117 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. Mr. Lambakis, the minority
school coordinator, confirmed that there is a very high level of
students among the minority who never complete the nine-year mandatory
schooling and drop out after primary school.
118 Interview, Komotini, September 1997.
119 Protokol, Türk-Yunan Kültür Komisyonu Ankara ve Atina
Toplant1lar1 (Protocol of the Ankara and Athens Meetings of the
Turkish-Greek Cultural Commission), Milli E_itim Bas1mevi, 1969.
120 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. Minority leaders agreed with
this assessment, though Takan _ldem of the Turkish Embassy in Ankara
believed that nine books had been distributed.
121 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
122 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
123 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
124 Interview, The Union of the University Youth of Thrace, Xanthi,
September 1997.
125 Interview, Athens, September 1997.
126 Oddly enough, the Human Rights Watch representative was not stopped
from going to the restricted border zone, but was informed that the
visit was "tolerated" and should not be repeated.
127 Until recently, Mr. Dede was barred from entering Turkey by Turkish
authorities. Likewise, his brother, who resides in Istanbul, was barred
from entering Greece by Greek officials.
128 Interview with Mr. Dede, Komotini, September 1997.
129 Destroying Ethnic Identity, p. 37-8.
130 Greece: Improvements for Turkish Minority, p. 12-13.
131 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
132 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997. He added, however, that all
hiring is done through competitive examination for which all Greek
citizens are eligible.
133 Interview, Komotini, September 1997. He noted that the deputy mayor
was an ethnic Turk.
134 Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 27-8.
135 Information from Greek Helsinki Monitor, Press Release, January 1,
1997, and meetings with community leaders. Human Rights Watch also
visited the site of the mosque in September 1997.
136 The mosque sits next to a small stream.
137 Interview, Xanthi, September 1997.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-07.htm#P626_125956
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was researched and written by Christopher Panico, then a
research associate in the Europe and Central Asia division of Human
Rights Watch, based on a mission to Greece in September 1997. The
report was edited by Holly Cartner, executive director of the Europe
and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch, Jeri Laber, Senior
Advisor to Human Rights Watch, and parts were edited by Elizabeth
Andersen, Advocacy Director. Invaluable production assistance was
provided by Alexander Frangos, Alexandra Perina, and Josh Sherwin,
associates, Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch would like to express our deep appreciation to the
Greek Helsinki Monitor/Minority Rights Group, and in particular to
Panayote Dimitras and Nafsika Papanikolatos, who participated in the
factfinding mission, shared their own research, and provided invaluable
assistance, guidance, and comment on the draft report. We would also
like to thank the many individuals who gave testimony for this report,
as well as lawyers, journalists, and government officials in Greece who
provided information for this report.
Human Rights Watch
Europe and Central Asia Division
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of
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development director; Reed Brody, advocacy director; Carroll Bogert,
communications director; Cynthia Brown, program director; Barbara
Guglielmo, finance and administration director; Jeri Laber, special
advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Patrick Minges,
publications director; Susan Osnos, associate director; Jemera Rone,
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Nations representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board.
Robert L. Bernstein is the founding chair.
Its Europe and Central Asia division was established in 1978 to monitor
and promote domestic and international compliance with the human rights
provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. It is affiliated with the
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Vienna, Austria. Holly Cartner is the executive director; Rachel Denber
is the deputy director; Elizabeth Andersen is the advocacy director;
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http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-08.htm#P652_129471
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.
Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923.
The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Greek
Government have agreed upon the following provisions:
Article 1.
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange
of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in
Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion
established in Greek territory.
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively
without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek
Government respectively.
Article 2.
The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided
for in Article 1:
a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople
b) The Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace.
All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918,
within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as
defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of
Constantinople.
All Muslims established in the region to the east of the frontier line
laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as
Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace.
Article 3.
Those Greeks and Muslims who have already, and since the 18th October,
1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which
are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered as included in
the exchange provided for in Article 1.
The expression "emigrant" in the present Convention includes all
physical and juridical persons who have been obliged to emigrate or
have emigrated since the 18th October, 1912.
Article 4.
All able-bodied men belonging to the Greek population, whose families
have already left Turkish territory, and who are now detained in
Turkey, shall constitute the first installment of Greeks sent to Greece
in accordance with the present Convention.
Appendix B
Treaty of Lausanne
Section III. Protection of Minorities
Article 37.
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44
shall be recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no
regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these
stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action
prevail over them.
Article 38.
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without
distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether
in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance
of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.
Non-Muslim minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of
emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of
the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the
Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of
public order.
Article 39.
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the
same civil and political rights as Muslims.
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall
be equal before the law.
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any
Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or
political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments,
functions and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries.
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish
national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion,
in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate
facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech
for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.
Article 40.
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the
same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish,
manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and
social institutions, any schools and other establishments for
instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and
to exercise their own religion freely therein.
Article 41.
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in
those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of
non-Muslim nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring
that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the
children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own
language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from
making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said
schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities, these minorities
shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of
the sums whichmay be provided out of public funds under the State,
municipal, or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable
purposes.
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of
the establishments and institutions concerned.
Article 42.
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Muslim
minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status,
measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance
with the customs of those minorities,
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of
each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of
divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of
Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst
European lawyers.
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the
churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of
the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will
be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and
charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in
Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation
of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary
facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that
nature.
Article 43.
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall not be
compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their
faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any
disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to
perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from
such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals
for the preservation of public order.
Article 44.
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section
affect non-Muslim nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute
obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the
guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without
the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The
British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold
their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form
assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations
shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any
infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and
that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such
directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of
law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish
Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other
Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held
to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby
consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto
demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the
same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.
Article 45.
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the
non-Muslim minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece
on the Muslim minority in her territory.
Appendix C
Kingdom of Greece
General Administration of Thraka
Interior Office
Number of Protocol A1043
Komotene, 27/12/1954
URGENT
TO: The Mayors and Presidents of the Communes of the Prefecture of
Rodope.
Following the order of the President of the Government (Prime Minister)
we ask you that from now on and in all occasions the terms
"Turk-Turkish" are used instead of the terms "Muslim- of Muslim".
The General Administrator
of Thraka
G. Fessopoulos
Kingdom of Greece
General Administration of Thraka
Interior Office
Number of Protocol A202
Komotene, 5/2/1955
In spite of the strict orders of the government to replace the terms
"Muslim-of Muslim" and use from now on the terms "Turk-Turkish", in the
village Aratos on the public road connecting Komotene and
Alexandroupole there exists a very prominent sign with the words
"Muslim School".
It, as well as any other such signs that might exist in the area of the
Prefecture of Rodope, should be replaced immediately.
The General Administrator
of Thraka
G. Fessopoulos
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The most violent terrorist organization in the world, Greece:
http://faculty.menlo.edu:8080/~jhiggins/tcvoices/trnchist/trnccr60.html
The Independence Years: 1960 - 1963.
During the 1960 - 1963 period, the Greek Cypriot leadership, through
numerous statements
exposed their ulterior motives by stating that they viewed independence
as a stepping
stone to ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with Greece):
Makarios: "Independence was not the aim and purpose of the EOKA
struggle. Foreign factors
have prevented the achievement of the national goal, but this should
not be a cause for
sorrow. New bastions have been conquered and from this the Greek
Cypriots will march on to
complete the final victory (ENOSIS)."
16.08.1960
Greek Cypriot Press
Makarios: ". . . Until this small community that forms part of the
Turkish race which has
been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the
heroes of EOKA cannot be
considered as terminated."
04.09.1962
Panayia Village
Makarios: "It is true that the goal of our struggle is to annex Cyprus
to Greece."
05.09.1963
Interview Published
in Uusi Suomi, Stockholm
Makarios: "If I have any ambition, it is to link my name with the union
of Cyprus with
Greece. The expansion of Greece's boundaries up to the shores of North
Africa, through
ENOSIS."
Interview with "Apoyevmatini"
September 8th, 1964
"The assertion by Mr. Christides (May 10, 1999) that there was no
ethnic cleansing or
attempted genocide of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots is ridiculous.
Until influential
Greek Cypriots come to terms with the appalling behavior of their
community toward the
smaller Turkish Cypriot community and stop trying to persuade
themselves and the world
that each side was as much to blame as the other, there will be no
reconciliation in
Cyprus."
Michael Stephen, British
Parliamentarian (1992-97)
"Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so
that he and his
Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots.
Obviously we would never
permit that. "The fact is, however, that neither the United Nations,
nor anyone, other
than Turkey ever took effective action to prevent it."
George Ball
American
Undersecretary of State
"Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide."
the Washington Post, Feb. 17,
196
"I was convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to
treat the Turkish
Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and partition of
the island."
Sir Alec
Douglas-Home
Former British
Prime Minister
On July 28, 1960 Makarios, the Greek Cypriot president, said: "The
independence agreements do not form the goal they are the present and
not
the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their national cause
and
shape their future in accordance with THEIR will."
In a speech on Sept. 4, 1962 at Panayia Makarios said, "Until this
Turkish
community forming part of the Turkish race that has been the terrible
enemy
of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be
considered terminated."
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the
Constitution,
Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot attack began
in
December 1963," wrote Lt. Gen. George Karayiannis of The Greek Cypriot
militia ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The general was referring to the
notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for the annihilation
of
the Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the island to Greece.
On Dec. 28, 1963, the Daily Express carried the following report from
Cyprus: "We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot quarter of
Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last
five
days. We were the first Western reporters there, and we have seen
sights too
frightful to be described in print. Horror was so extreme that the
people
seemed stunned beyond tears."
On Dec. 31, 1963, The Guardian reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as
the
Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting between
armed
men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot people were
brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the
wife
and children of a doctor-allegedly by a group of 40 men, many in army
boots
and greatcoats." Although the Turkish Cypriots fought back as best they
could and killed some militia, there were no massacres of Greek Cypriot
civilians
On Jan. 1, 1964, the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the
Turkish
Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the walls they
just
did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have created more
devastation. Under roofs springs, children's cots, and gray ashes of
what
had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighboring village
of
Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were
all
Turkish Cypriot's. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to
any
Greek Cypriot house."
On Jan. 12, 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote in a
telegram
to London: "The Greek [Cypriot] police are led by extremist who
provoked the
fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities. They have recruited
into
their ranks as 'special constables' gun-happy young thugs. They
threaten to
try and punish any Turkish Cypriot police who wishes to return to the
Cyprus
Government... Makarios assured Sir Arthur Clark that there will be no
attack. His assurance is as worthless as previous assurances have
proved."
On Jan. 14, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot
inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on Dec. 26, 1963 and
reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red
Cross. A further massacre of Turkish Cypriots, at Limassol, was
reported by
The Observer on Feb. 16, 1964; and there were many more.
On Feb. 15, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported: "It is a real military
operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the 6,000
inhabitants of
the Turkish Cypriot quarter yesterday morning. A spokesman for the
Greek
Cypriot government has recognized this officially. It is hard to
conceive
how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may seriously contemplate working
together
after all that has happened."
On Sept. 10, 1964, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that "UNFICYP"
carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout
the
island during the disturbances... It shows that in 109 villages, most
of
them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been destroyed
while
2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In Ktima 38 houses and
shops
have been destroyed totally and 122 partially. In the Orphomita suburb
of
Nicosia, 50 houses have been totally destroyed while a further 240 have
been
partially destroyed there and in adjacent suburbs."
The U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed
the
Cyprus question in 1987 and reported unanimously on July 2 of that year
that
"although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been merely seeking
to
'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the
necessities of the situation,' this claim ignores the fact that both
before
and after the events o#, December 1963 the Makarios Government
continued to
advocate the cause of ENOSIS and actively pursued the amendment of the
Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate
objective."
The committee continued: "Moreover, in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot
legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favor of enosis, in
blatant
contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. I of the
Treaty
of Guarantee prohibited any action likely to directly or indirectly
promote
union with any other state or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2)
of
the Constitution is to similar effect.)
Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus, told Die Welt on Dec. 27, 1963:
"Makarios
bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility for the recent tragic
events.
His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of their rights". In an
interview with the UPI press agency on Dec. 30, 1963 he said, "All this
happened because Makarios wanted to take away all constitutional rights
from
the Turkish Cypriots."
More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still missing without trace from
these
massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful events were not the responsibility
of
"the Greek Colonels" of 1974 or an unrepresentative handful of Greek
Cypriot
extremists. The persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of
policy on
the part of the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, which
has
to this day made no serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.
The UK Commons Select Committee found that "there is little doubt that
much
of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or
partial
destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a
quarter
of the total Turkish Cypriot population was either directly inspired
by, or
connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership."
The UN secretary-general reported to the Security Council: "When the
disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first
part
of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled their homes, taking with
them
only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in safer
villages and
areas."
On Jan. 14, 1964, "ll Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are
witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands
of
people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is
relentless.
This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of Plato do not
cover
up their barbaric and ferocious behavior."
There were further attacks on the Turkish Cypriots in 1967. In 1971,
General
Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again committed to
making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to Greece. In a
speech
to the Greek Cypriot armed forces at the time (quoted in "New Cyprus,"
May
1987) Grivas said: "The Greek forces from Greece have come to Cyprus in
order to impose the will of the Greeks of Cyprus upon the Turks. We
want
ENOSIS but the Turks are against it. We shall impose our will. We are
strong, and we shall do so."
By July 15, 1974, a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had
assembled in
Cyprus and with their backing, the Greek Cypriot National Guard
overthrew
Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as "president." On July 22,
the
Washington Star News reported: "Bodies littered the streets and there
were
mass burials... People told by Makarios to lay down their guns were
shot by
the National Guard."
On Oct. 19 1996, Mr. Georgios Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the
Foreign
Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London... I deeply
apologize to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing persons. I
misled
them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the government of Cyprus .
....
today it seems that the credibility of Cyprus is nil."
The Times and The Guardian reported on Aug. 21, 1974 that in the
village of
Tokhni on Aug. 14, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between the ages of
13
and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were taken away and
shot.
There were also reports that in Zyyi on the same day all the
Turkish-Cypriot
men aged between 19 an 38 were taken away and were never seen again and
that
Greek-Cypriots opened fire on the Turkish-Cypriot neighborhood of
Paphos
killing men, women, and children indiscriminately.
On July 23, 1974, the Washington Post reported that "in a Greek raid on
a
small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of
200
were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill
the
inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived."
The
Times and The Guardian also reported on the killings.
"The Greeks began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees
said.
Kazan Dervis, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been staying
with
her uncle. The [Greek Cypriot] National Guard came into the Turkish
sector
and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other relatives taken away as
prisoners, and later heard her uncle had been shot." (Times 23.7.74)
On July 28, 1974 the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot
men had
been shot in Alaminos. On July 24, 1974 France Soir reported that "the
Greeks burned Turkish mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the
villages
around Famagusta. Defenseless Turkish villagers who have weapons live
in an
atmosphere of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in
tents
in the forest. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity."
The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on Aug. 30, "The massacre of
Turkish
Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the
Turks
were to undertake their intervention."
"Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963,
called
on the guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the island. When
Britain did nothing Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied its northern
part.
Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their side and
understandably
fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish army withdraws", the Daily
Telegraph wrote on Aug. 15, 1996.
"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the
Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12
years
since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord Willis
(Labor)
told the House of Lords on Dec. 17, 1986.
On March 12, 1977, Makarios declared, "It is in the name of ENOSIS that
Cyprus has been destroyed."
markt...@yahoo.com
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent and
defenceless Turks and thugs
of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a constant
huge appetite for
innocent Turkish blood, never stop in their relentless dreams of
massacring all Turks
everywhere in the World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK
terrorists think repeating
anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over legitimize their rape,
torture and murder of
innocent and defenceless Turkish human beings.
++++++++++++++++++
OBSERVATIONS BY FOREIGNERS
The Mathiati Massacre
The brutality in Mathiati village of Nicosia where 208 Turks
lived was
expressed as below by Gibbons:
"(...) three Turks were seriously injured at the first minutes.
When
Turks burst out of their white, small houses into the streets, the
screaming
and cursing crowd began to push and kick them along the way. The
terrified
Turks who fell down on the floor as a result of riffle butt strikes
were
dragged across the streets while the crowd stormed into houses, pulled
burning logs out of the furnaces and set curtains and beds on fire. The
old
wooden roof beams were surrounded by smoke and then flames. Barefoot
women
mostly in nightgowns were also pushed here and there on the burning
streets,
either holding tight their terrified little babies or with their
toddlers
catching the ends of their nightgowns or trousers and following them
together with others dragging their injured away.
Greek youngsters host at the houses hysterically and yelled madly
with
hoarse voices. Before the flames completely covered the houses, they
materialized into the houses, broken things and grabbing valuable
goods. The
wild sounds coming from the back of the houses attracted he attention
of the
assailants to the animals of Turks. They stomped into the barns and
raked
cows, sheep and goats with machine guns. They threw the chickens into
the
air and shot them while they desperately cackled and struggled. Their
bodies
broke into pieces and feathers covered everywhere.
The crowd screamed and yelled in a bloodthirsty manner. Turks
were
dragged through the frozen streets out of the village. They were left
in
pain around Kochatis, another Turkish village. The Kochatis villagers
hurried out of their houses to help their neighbors while the crowd
headed
back to Mathiati to continue the plunder and all the madness". (H.
Scott
Gibbons, Peace Without Honor, Ankara, 1969, p. 31).
Ayvasýl Massacre
Gibbons observations on the Ayvasýl (Ayios Vasilios) village
massacre
quotes as follows:
"Weapon sounds were heard. They broke locked doors with rifle
butts
and dragged people onto the streets. A 70 year-old Turk awoke to the
sound
of its broken front door. He teetered out of his bedroom before he was
asked
if he had any children by many youngsters with arms. Dumbfounded, he
pronounced "Yes". "Send them out" they ordered. Tow sons of his, 19 and
17,
and her only daughter, 10 got dressed hurriedly and followed the armed
men
out.
They were lined up near the farm fence and shot dead with machine
guns
by those armed men. In another house, they found a 13 year-old boy,
tied his
hands at his back, knelt him down. They plundered the house, kicked and
raped the boy and shot him at the head.
That night, 12 Turks were slaughtered in Ayios Vasilios. Others
were
gathered and pushed out of the village to take refuge in Turks in
Skylloura.
Barefooted, with their pajamas and nightgowns on, they teetered to
proceed
in the cold. The Greek cypriots fired at them in the dark.
The armed men headed for the Turkish houses. They plundered and
destroyed the houses and when they got exhausted, they set the houses
on
fire. Nine more Turks that lived in the surrounding farmhouses were
killed
in the same region". (H. Scott Gibbons, Peace Without Honor, p. 73).
The Kumsal Massacre
Gibbons wrote as follows about the Kumsal massacre:
"Armed men broke the doors and stormed into Turkish houses,
kicking,
beating, punching and cursing at them. The retreat from Kumsal began.
Once
more, dazed and appalled families that resembled those facing debacle
in
Europe by Nazi attacks were on cold streets rifles burst and machine
guns
raffled.
They were slipping and falling down. They began to run away,
seeking
support from one another. The screams of a woman echoed on the street,
who
squealed "Is not there anyone to help, Gor God's sake?"
159 inhabitants of Kumsal Turks could not make it to run away
that
night. Four people in the bathroom were killed apart from the landlady
and
four other people. 150 people were taken hostage. No one ever saw some
of
the hostages again. (H. Scott Gibbons, Peace Without Honor, p. 74).
Observations by an Italian Journalist
In January 1964, an Italian journalist in Cyprus made the
following
observations:
"Right now, we are witnessing the migration of Turks from their
villages. The Greek cypriot Terror is ruthless; thousands of people are
leaving their houses, lands and flocks. The Hellenistic claims and
Plateau
can not conceal these savage and barbarous behaviors. Curfew starts in
Turkish villages everyday at 16:00 p.m. As soon as darkness falls,
threats,
weapon sounds and attempts of arson begin. Any resistance seems
impossible
after the Christmas slaughter which spared neither women nor kids
(Giorgio
Bocca, Ýl Giorno, 14 January 1964).
Observations by an American Journalist
Time Journalist Robert Ball wrote the following about the
incidents in
Ayios Sozomenos village of Nicosia:
"The most severe clash took place at the western side of the
village
on which Greek cypriots had attacked by taking advantage of the dense
round
olive trees. The window of an adobe house which sheltered 9 Turks was
blown
up with a bazooka shell and its second floor was riddled because of
bullet
holes.
A Turkish shepherd who desperately raced to the river bed to
escape
was shot a few steps away from the door. Another tried to attack the
Greeks
pointlessly with a pitchfork in his hand and was killed immediately".
(Robert Ball, Time, 14 February 1964).
Observations by an British Journalist
"After Cyprus was occupied, hundreds of Cypriot Turks were taken
hostage by National Guardsmen, Turkish women were raped, kids were
killed on
the streets and Turkish quarters in Limasol were totally burned down".
(David Leigh, The Times, London, 23 July 1974).
Observations by a German Tourist
"Human mind can not comprehend the barbarism of Greeks... Greek
National Guardsmen represented extraordinary examples of brutality.
They
broke into Turkish houses; they ruthlessly shot women and children; cut
the
throats of many Turks and gathered and raped Turkish women...
(Germany's
Voice, 30 July 1974).
Quotes from Crushed Flowers
"Greek cypriots behaved barbarously in the 20th Century and
exercised
massacres. They not only slaughtered Turks in a bloodthirsty manner but
also
buried them half alive. Many corpses in this mass grave unfolds the
Greek
brutality to the people of the world. The corpses disentombed out of
the
mass graves were evident of how vile Greeks were and the feudal laws
that
had been applied by them for years..." (James Rayner, Crushed Flowers,
Nicosia, 1982, p. 25).
Voice of Germany Radio: (30.7.1974)
"Mind of the humankind cannot accept the execution made by Greece
in
Cyprus. Greek and Greek Cypriot Guards were breaking into the houses
inhabited by Turks and firing on women and children, strangling adults
and
raping all the women they seized..."
France Soir Paper's Correspondent in Cyprus, Witness:
(24.07.1974)
"I witnessed extreme acts of violence. Greek Cypriots set Turkish
mosques on fire, and those in the villages near Famagusta as well.
Turkish
villages not having arms or any other defense mechanism are living in
the
brutal atmosphere created by Greek Cypriot pillagers... Greek Cypriots
having bazookas cause great chaos in Turkish villages. These acts of
Greek
Cypriots are disgraceful on behalf of humanity."
Aligis (Greek Cypriot), Voice of Germany Radio, Witness:
(24.07.1974)
"I was in Limasol. There were 14 Turks who took shelter in a
school.
Greek Cypriot National Guards surrounded the school and when the Turks
surrendered they executed them by shooting."
Kurt Lariken, Die Welt Paper's Correspondent, Witness:
(24.07.1974)
"Greek Cypriot National Troops were killing civilian men, women
and
children in Turkish villages and towns brutally."
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
The sub-human anti-Turkish hatred fabricators, murderers of innocent
and defenceless Turks and thugs of Armenian/Greek/PKK/KADEK
anti-Turkish Hatred Inc., with a veracious appetite for innocent
Turkish blood, never stop in their relentless dreams of massacring all
Turks everywhere in the World. The sub-human Greek/Armenian/PKK/KADEK
terrorists think repeating anti-Turkish hate propaganda over and over
legitimize their rape, torture and murder of innocent and defenceless
Turkish human beings.
++++++++++++++++++
http://aegeantimes.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1065&mode=thread&order=0
Greek Cypriot Investigates Massacre of Turks in 1974
BY: Mete
The Greek Cypriot press imposed a broadcasting embargo on a Greek
Cypriot investigating author, who said that the realities in Cyprus
were hidden from the Greek Cypriot public and that the murderers still
alive should be tried.
The Greek Cypriots massacred 126 people, the most of which were
children and women, collectively at three Turkish Cypriot villages in
1974. Some murderers are alive. Not only the Greek Cypriot
Administration, but also all Greek Cypriot public shall apologize from
Turkish Cypriots. Compensation shall be paid to the relatives of the
victims and the murderers shall be tried.
Having made the massacre by the Greek Cypriots at the three Turkish
Cypriot villages in 1974 as a TV documentary, Greek Cypriot author
Antonis Angastiniyotis was excommunicated in his country.
Antonis Angastiniyotis, made a documentary of the collective massacre
of 126 Turkish Cypriots at Murataga, Sandallar and Atlilar villages
during the Turkish Peace Operation in 1974. After producing his
documentary entitled, "Barbarism to the Turkish Cypriots and the Other
Side of the Medallion", the journalist answered the questions of
Hurriyet and explained the reasons why he prepared a "Greek massacre
documentary" as a Greek Cypriot.
He said, "I was seeing the photos of these massacres at the Turkish
side every time I passed to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC). However, these were never being explained at our side. When I
researched, I also saw the other side of the medallion. Therefore, I
decided to prepare a documentary. The blood and pain do not have a
nationality and flag. I search for the realities. One should come out
and say these.
The Greek Cypriot TV's did not broadcast the documentary." He added,
"If the Greek Cypriot Administration presses me too much, I will come
and live in TRNC."
Memory (Score: 1)
by Mete (mca...@mynet.com) on Nov 06, 2004 - 01:07 PM
(User info | Send a Message)
I have just watched a documentary on CNN Turk which is a turkish news
channel. And a retired officer who took part in the Cyprus war as a
lieutenant ,was telling his memories during the war. One part was that,
They capture 163 Greek civilians and he ordered to keep that at a safe
place. And he says they were hungry and thirsty.Turkish soldier had
food for 3 days with them. The lieutenant calls his sub officer and
says him to tell the soliders if they want to share their food with the
greeks, he will be happy but it wasnt an order..Then Turkish soldiers
started to leave food for them.
The lieutenant goes to check the greeks and see that noone touhced
them.He calls a gil who was speaking english and she says the priest
told them that Turks wanted to posion them. Then he got mad and he eats
from the food . Then he says the greeks rushed to the food..and it was
a sad part for my life.
markt...@yahoo.com
Greeks' bloody past is as brutal as their bloody present:
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/1029165/posts
Former British parliamentarian Michael Stephen reminds Mr. Michael B.
Christides, the Charge d'affaires of the Greek Embassy in Ankara and
many others who appear to have forgotten what indeed was the case in
Cyprus from 1963 to 1974.
MICHAEL STEPHEN
The assertion that there was no ethnic cleansing or attempted genocide
of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots is ridiculous. Until influential
Greek Cypriots come to terms with the appalling behavior of their
community toward the smaller Turkish Cypriot community and stop trying
to persuade themselves and the world that each side was as much to
blame as the other, there will be no reconciliation in Cyprus.
In his memoirs, American Undersecretary of State George Ball said:
"Makarios's central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so
that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish
Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that."
The fact is, however, that neither the United States, the United
Kingdom, nor the United Nations, nor anyone, other than Turkey ever
took effective action to prevent it.
On Feb. 17, 1964 the Washington Post reported that "Greek Cypriot
fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide."
Former British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home said, "I was
convinced that if Archbishop Makarios could not bring himself to treat
the Turkish Cypriots as human beings he was inviting the invasion and
partition of the island."
On July 28, 1960 Makarios, the Greek Cypriot president, said: "The
independence agreements do not form the goal -- they are the present
and not the future. The Greek Cypriot people will continue their
national cause and shape their future in accordance with THEIR will."
In a speech on Sept. 4, 1962 at Panayia, Makarios said, "Until this
Turkish community forming part of the Turkish race that has been the
terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA
can never be considered terminated."
In November 1963 the Greek Cypriots demanded the abolition of no less
than eight of the basic articles that had been included in the 1960
agreement for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish
Cypriots, naturally, refused to agree. The aim of the Greek Cypriots
was to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere
minority, wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots, pending
ultimate destruction or expulsion of the Turkish Cypriots from the
island.
"When the Turkish Cypriots objected to the amendment of the
Constitution, Makarios put his plan into effect, and the Greek Cypriot
attack began in December 1963," wrote Lt. Gen. George Karayiannis of
the Greek Cypriot militia ("Ethnikos Kiryx" 15.6.65). The general was
referring to the notorious "Akritas" plan, which was the blueprint for
the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots and the annexation of the
island to Greece. On Christmas Eve 1963 the Greek Cypriot militia
attacked Turkish Cypriot communities across the island. Large numbers
of men, women, and children were killed and 270 mosques, shrines and
other places of worship were desecrated. On Dec. 28, 1963, the Daily
Express carried the following report from Cyprus: "We went tonight into
the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300
people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first
Western reporters there, and we have seen sights too frightful to be
described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned
beyond tears."
On Dec. 31, 1963, The Guardian reported: "It is nonsense to claim, as
the Greek Cypriots do, that all casualties were caused by fighting
between armed men of both sides. On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot
people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes,
including the wife and children of a doctor -- allegedly by a group of
40 men, many in army boots and great coats."
Although the Turkish Cypriots fought back as best they could and killed
some militia, there were no massacres of Greek Cypriot civilians.
On Jan. 1, 1964, the Daily Herald reported: "When I came across the
Turkish Cypriot homes they were an appalling sight. Apart from the
walls they just did not exist. I doubt if a napalm attack could have
created more devastation. Under roofs which had caved in I found a
twisted mass of bed springs, children's cots, and grey ashes of what
had once been tables, chairs and wardrobes. In the neighboring village
of Ayios Vassilios I counted 16 wrecked and burned out homes. They were
all Turkish Cypriot. In neither village did I find a scrap of damage to
any Greek Cypriot house."
On Jan. 2, 1964, the Daily Telegraph wrote: "The Greek Cypriot
community should not assume that the British military presence can or
should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the
Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers."
On Jan. 12, 1964, the British High Commission in Nicosia wrote in a
telegram to London: "The Greek [Cypriot] police are led by extremists
who provoked the fighting and deliberately engaged in atrocities. They
have recruited into their ranks as 'special constables' gun-happy young
thugs. They threaten to try and punish any Turkish Cypriot police who
wishes to return to the Cyprus Government.... Makarios assured Sir
Arthur Clark that there will be no attack. His assurance is as
worthless as previous assurances have proved."
On Jan. 14, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported that the Turkish Cypriot
inhabitants of Ayios Vassilios had been massacred on Dec. 26, 1963 and
reported their exhumation from a mass grave in the presence of the Red
Cross. A further massacre of Turkish Cypriots, at Limassol, was
reported by The Observer on Feb. 16, 1964; and there were many more.
On Feb. 6, 1964, a British patrol found armed Greek Cypriot police
attacking the Turkish Cypriots of Ayios Sozomenos. They were unable to
stop the attack.
On Feb. 13, 1964, the Greeks and Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish
Cypriot quarter of Limassol with tanks, killing 16 and injuring 35.
On Feb. 15, 1964, the Daily Telegraph reported: "It is a real military
operation which the Greek Cypriots launched against the 6,000
inhabitants of the Turkish Cypriot quarter yesterday morning. A
spokesman for the Greek Cypriot government has recognized this
officially. It is hard to conceive how Greek and Turkish Cypriots may
seriously contemplate working together after all that has happened."
On Sept. 10, 1964, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that "UNFICYP
carried out a detailed survey of all damage to properties throughout
the island during the disturbances. ...it shows that in 109 villages,
most of them Turkish-Cypriot or mixed villages, 527 houses have been
destroyed while 2,000 others have suffered damage from looting. In
Ktima 38 houses and shops have been destroyed totally and 122
partially. In the Orphomita suburb of Nicosia, 50 houses have been
totally destroyed while a further 240 have been partially destroyed
there and in adjacent suburbs."
The U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reviewed
the Cyprus question in 1987 and reported unanimously on July 2 of that
year that "although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been
merely seeking to 'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent
dictated by the necessities of the situation,' this claim ignores the
fact that both before and after the events of December 1963 the
Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of << enosis >> and
actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related
treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective." The committee
continued: "Moreover, in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature
unanimously passed a resolution in favor of <> in blatant contravention
of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution." (Art. 1 of the Treaty of
Guarantee prohibited any action likely to directly or indirectly
promote union with any other state or partition of the island, and Art.
185(2) of the Constitution is to similar effect).
Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the neutral president of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Cyprus, told Die Welt on Dec. 27, 1963:
"Makarios bears on his shoulders the sole responsibility for the recent
tragic events. His aim is to deprive the Turkish community of their
rights." In an interview with the UPI press agency on Dec. 30, 1963 he
said, "All this happened because Makarios wanted to take away all
constitutional rights from the Turkish Cypriots." The United Nations
not only failed to condemn the forceable usurpation of the legal order
in Cyprus, but actually rewarded it by treating the by then wholly
Greek Cypriot administration as if it were the government of Cyprus
(Security Council Res. 186 of 1964). This acceptance has continued to
the present day, and reflects no credit upon the United Nations, nor
upon Britain, nor the other countries who have acquiesced.
Holdwater says: No different than today! The Greek Cypriots are
regarded as "Cyprus," while the Turkish Cypriots are treated as though
they don't exist.
On Aug. 12, 1964, the U.K. representative to the United Nations wrote
to his government in London as follows: "What is our policy and true
feelings about the future of Cyprus and about Makarios? Judging from
the English newspapers and many others, the feeling is very strong
indeed against Makarios and his so-called government, and nothing would
please the British people more than to see him toppled and the Cyprus
problem solved by the direct dealings between the Turks and the Greeks.
We are of course supporting the latter course, but I have never seen
any expression of the official disapproval in public against Makarios
and his evil doings. Is there an official view about this, and what do
we think we should do in the long run? Sometimes it seems that the
obsession of some people with 'the Commonwealth' blinds us to
everything else and it would be high treason to take a more active line
against Makarios and his henchmen. At other times the dominant feature
seems to be concern lest active opposition against Makarios should lead
to direct conflict with the Cypriots and end up with our losing our
bases."
Thereafter Turkish Cypriot MPs, judges, and other officials were
intimidated or prevented by force from carrying out their duties.
According to the Select Committee, "The effect of the crisis of
December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of government
into the hands of the Greek Cypriots alone. Claiming to be acting in
accordance with 'the doctrine of necessity,' the Greek Cypriot members
of the House of Representatives enacted a series of laws which provided
for the operation of the organs of government without Turkish Cypriot
participation." The report of the Select Committee continued: "Equally
damaging from the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they
considered to be their effective exclusion from representation at and
participation in the international fora where their case could have
been deployed.... An official Turkish Cypriot presence in the
international political scene virtually disappeared overnight."
It is not therefore surprising that the world has been persuaded to the
Greek Cypriot point of view. More than 300 Turkish Cypriots are still
missing without trace from these massacres of 1963/64. These dreadful
events were not the responsibility of "the Greek Colonels" of 1974 or
an unrepresentative handful of Greek Cypriot extremists. The
persecution of the Turkish Cypriots was an act of policy on the part of
the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership, which has to this
day made no serious attempt to bring the murderers to justice.
The U.K. Commons Select Committee found that "there is little doubt
that much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the
total or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the
displacement of about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population
was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek
Cypriot leadership."
The U.N. secretary-general reported to the Security Council: "When the
disturbances broke out in December 1963 and continued during the first
part of 1964, thousands of Turkish Cypriots fled their homes, taking
with them only what they could drive or carry, and sought refuge in
safer villages and areas."
On Jan. 14, 1964, "Il Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are
witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands
of people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is
relentless. This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of
Plato do not cover up their barbaric and ferocious behavior."
The Greek Cypriots sometimes allege that it was they who were attacked,
by the Turkish Cypriots, who were determined to wreck the 1960
agreements. However, the Turkish Cypriots were not only outnumbered by
nearly four to one; they were also surrounded in their villages by
armed Greek Cypriots; they had no way of protecting their women and
children, and Turkey was 40 miles away across the sea. The very idea
that in those circumstances the Turkish Cypriots were the aggressors is
absurd.
There were further attacks on the Turkish Cypriots in 1967. In 1971,
General Grivas returned to Cyprus to form EOKA-B, which was again
committed to making Cyprus a wholly Greek island and annexing it to
Greece. In a speech to the Greek Cypriot armed forces at the time
(quoted in "New Cyprus," May 1987) Grivas said: "The Greek forces from
Greece have come to Cyprus in order to impose the will of the Greeks of
Cyprus upon the Turks. We want << enosis >> but the Turks are against
it. We shall impose our will. We are strong, and we shall do so."
By July 15, 1974, a powerful force of mainland Greek troops had
assembled in Cyprus and with their backing, the Greek Cypriot National
Guard overthrew Makarios and installed one Nicos Sampson as
"president."
On July 22, the Washington Star News reported: "Bodies littered the
streets and there were mass burials.... People told by Makarios to lay
down their guns were shot by the National Guard."
On April 17, 1991, Ambassador Nelson Ledsky testified before the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "most of the 'missing persons'
disappeared in the first days of July 1974, before the Turkish
intervention on the 20th. Many killed on the Greek side were killed by
Greek Cypriots in fighting between supporters of Makarios and Sampson."
(Holdwater: How many Greeks killed? See Greek source, below)
On Nov. 6, 1974, Ta Nea reported that dates from the graves of Greek
Cypriots killed in the five days between July 15-20 were erased in
order to blame these deaths on the subsequent Turkish military action.
On March 3, 1996, the Greek Cypriot Cyprus Mail wrote: "(Greek) Cypriot
governments have found it convenient to conceal the scale of atrocities
during the July 15 coup in an attempt to downplay its contribution to
the tragedy of the summer of 1974 and instead blame the Turkish
invasion for all casualties. There can be no justification for any
government that failed to investigate this sensitive humanitarian
issue. The shocking admission by the Clerides government that there are
people buried in Nicosia cemetery who are still included in the list of
the 'missing' is the last episode of a human drama which has been
turned into a propaganda tool."
On Oct. 19 1996, Mr. Georgios Lanitis wrote: "I was serving with the
Foreign Information Service of the Republic of Cyprus in London.... I
deeply apologize to all those I told that there are 1,619 missing
persons. I misled them. I was made a liar, deliberately, by the
government of Cyprus. ...today it seems that the credibility of Cyprus
is nil."
Turkish Cypriots appealed to the guarantor powers for help, but only
Turkey was willing to make any effective response.
Holdwater says: Where were YOU, Great Britain?
On July 20, 1974 Turkey intervened under Article IV of the Treaty of
Guarantee.
Holdwater says: Get it now? It was not an invasion. It was a legal
intervention. (Not to mention, more importantly, a moral one.) Had
Turkey been scared off as she was by the Americans in 1964, there would
probably be no Turkish Cypriots alive on the island today.
The Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia published an interview with Nicos
Sampson on Feb. 26, 1981 in which he said, "Had Turkey not intervened I
would not only have proclaimed << enosis,>> I would have annihilated
the Turks in Cyprus."
Holdwater says: REAL GENOCIDE!
The Times and The Guardian reported on Aug. 21, 1974 that in the
village of Tokhni on Aug. 14, 1974 all the Turkish Cypriot men between
the ages of 13 and 74, except for eighteen who managed to escape, were
taken away and shot. There were also reports that in Zyyi on the same
day all the Turkish-Cypriot men aged between 19 and 38 were taken away
and were never seen again and that Greek-Cypriots opened fire on the
Turkish-Cypriot neighborhood of Paphos killing men, women, and children
indiscriminately.
On July 23, 1974, the Washington Post reported that "in a Greek raid on
a small Turkish village near Limassol 36 people out of a population of
200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to
kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces
arrived."
The Times and The Guardian also reported on the killings. "The Greeks
began to shell the Turkish quarter on Saturday, refugees said. Kazan
Dervis, a Turkish Cypriot girl aged 15, said she had been staying with
her uncle. The [Greek Cypriot] National Guard came into the Turkish
sector and shooting began. She saw her uncle and other relatives taken
away as prisoners, and later heard her uncle had been shot." (Times
23.7.74)
On July 28, 1974 the New York Times reported that 14 Turkish-Cypriot
men had been shot in Alaminos.
On July 24, 1974 France Soir reported that "the Greeks burned Turkish
mosques and set fire to Turkish homes in the villages around Famagusta.
Defenseless Turkish villagers who have no weapons live in an atmosphere
of terror and they evacuate their homes and go and live in tents in the
forests. The Greeks' actions are a shame to humanity."
On July 22, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit called upon the United
Nations to "stop the genocide of Turkish-Cypriots" and declared,
"Turkey has accepted a cease-fire, but will not allow Turkish-Cypriots
to be massacred."
THE WORD FROM GREECE
>b> Athens Court of Appeal dtd. March 21, 1979: The court decision
reads as follows:
"The Turkish intervention in Cyprus, which was carried out in
accordance with the London-Zurich agreements, was legal. Turkey had, as
one of the Guarantor Powers, the right to fulfill her obligation. The
true guilty ones were the Greek Officers, who organised the coup and
thereby created the conditions for an intervention."
Holdwater: Mother of Mercy! Did the Greek court actually and correctly
use the word "intervention," instead of INVASION?
The German newspaper Die Zeit wrote on Aug. 30, "The massacre of
Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified
the Turks were to undertake their intervention."
"Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from physical attacks since 1963,
called on the guarantor powers to prevent a Greek conquest of the
island. When Britain did nothing, Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied
its northern part. Turkish Cypriots have constitutional right on their
side and understandably fear a renewal of persecution if the Turkish
army withdraws," the Daily Telegraph wrote on Aug. 15, 1996.
"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the
Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit it has done just that. In the 12
years since, there have been no killings and no massacres" Lord Willis
(Labor) told the House of Lords on Dec. 17, 1986.
On March 12, 1977, Makarios declared, "It is in the name of << enosis
>> that Cyprus has been destroyed."
The United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the rest of the world have
put political expediency before principle and failed to condemn this
appalling behavior. Greek Cypriots are guilty of attempted genocide but
no action has ever been taken against them. Instead they have been
rewarded by recognition as the government of all Cyprus. The Turkish
Cypriots by contrast were frozen out of the United Nations, the
Commonwealth and almost every other international organization. *
The author Michael Stephen was a member of the British Parliament from
1992-1997.
Holdwater says: Of course, it's dangerous to generalize. If one implies
a race is entirely made up of devils or angels, then one shows one's
racist stripes. (As with many of the testimonies you can read about in
this web site... where the Gladstones, Morgenthaus, Lloyd Georges,
George Hortons, and practically every Greek and Armenian, who would
have you believe the Turks are a race of devils.) So I'd like to remind
the reader that men and women of honor and integrity certainly exist
among the "Orthodox peoples."
sosiasmonos
Variety TurkisshitPsychopath like mark Rivers" - has, however, hardly
begun. Very little is known about subcriminal Turkish psychopathy.
However, some researchers have begun to seriously consider the idea
that it is important to study psychopathy not as an artificial clinical
category but as a general personality trait in the Turkish community at
large. In other words, psychopathy is being recognized as a more or
less a "different type of human species from the Central Asian
Steppes."
AttilaAtaman
are a fucking moron with an IQ below 60,who can't even speak
properly,sosiasmonos moronos idiotis!
PUHAHAHAHA!!!!!
Sean O'Kilfoyle
AttilaAtaman
if you are the real sean,you are not a MAN either....
Frappe Boy
Rhodes and other forms of ecoterrorism. I want him caught and
interrogated. No buts.