Las caricaturas de la Izquierda
Adrian Longueira
caricaturizar las cosas. Ejemplos sobran y lo peor para ese sector es
que tratan de hacerlo pasar como verdad. Pero resulta tan ridicula que
los unicos perjudicados son ellos mismos.
La izquierda durante años ha hecho creer que fueron pilotos y aviones
de la Fuerza Aerea Norteamericana los que bombardearon el Palacio de
la Moneda el 11 de septiembre de 1973. Hace poco un piloto chileno que
participo durante aquella acción escribio un libro y jamás menciono
que existiera piloto alguno norteamericano participando en el
bombardeo. Menos si de aviones norteamericanos se trata, el Hawker
Hunter que es el avión que sirvio para bombardear el Palacio es de
fabricación inglesa y no norteamericana.
La izquierda tambien ha hecho creer que Salvador Allende con una
bazuca pulverizo un tanque. Esta caricatura se ha hecho muy popular en
Cuba donde un tal Jorge Timossi hizo un libro donde contaba esa farsa.
Según ese libro fueron tres los tanques destruidos, se sabe que el 11
de septiembre de 1973 ningún tanque fue reportado perdido.
La izquierda da otra farsa al decir que Allende murio acribillado y
que los defensores del Palacio leales a Allende alcanzaron a retirar
su cuerpo y cubrirlo con una bandera chilena. En este link
http://www.despiertachile.cl/sept2003/Deciamos/descla5.jpg puede verse
la farsa, sin comentarios.
La izquierda tambien ha hecho creer que el suicidio de Salvador
Allende fue un asesinato cometido por militares. Hasta la propia
familia de Allende (su esposa Hortensia Bussi y su hija Isabel
Allende) reconocen que Salvador Allende se suicido. Sin embargo el
izquierdismo pavo todavia se niega a aceptar dicha realidad.
La izquierda tambien hizo creer que el gobierno de Pinochet asesino a
miles de chilenos. Incluso hasta dijeron que la cantidad era de
30.000, no solo eso, Radio Moscu incluso dio una cifra de 700.000 o
sea el 10% de la población de Chile. Francamente ridiculo si la
comision Rettig cuyos resultados fueron dados a conocer en marzo de
1991 contabilizaron que apenas 3000 muertes se registraron entre el 11
de septiembre de 1973 y el 11 de marzo de 1990 cuando termino el
gobierno de Augusto Pinochet.
Nuevas mentiras afloraron en la izquierda ya muchos años después de
ocurrido el golpe. Una de ellas fue el atentado cometido en contra de
la comitiva presidencial de Pinochet en el sector precordillerano de
Santiago. Gente de izquierda aseguro que en realidad fue un
autoatentado del propio Pinochet, asi mismito como izquierdistas pavos
aseguran que los atentados contra las Torres Gemelas y el Pentagono
fueron provocados por el propio Estados Unidos.
Una de las mentiras favoritas de la izquierda ha sido tratar de hacer
creer que el gobierno de Pinochet tenía raices nazistas. Craso error
ya que el gobierno de Pinochet tuvo asesores judios como Sergio Melnik
que llegó a ser Ministro de la Oficina de Planificación, incluso el
gobierno de Pinochet fue el que inicio cordiales relaciones con las
Fuerzas Armadas de Israel, incluso gran parte del equipamiento de las
Fuerzas Armadas chilenas proviene de ese pais. Más gracioso es decir
que el Buque Escuela de la Armada Chilena "La Esmeralda" estaba lleno
de cuadros de Hitler y simbolos nazistas. Cualquiera sabe que la
influencia de la Armada de Chile es Inglesa y en ningun caso alemana.
Asi hasta el himno favorito de Pinochet que es Lily Marlene han
tratado de vincularlo al Nazismo siendo que la canción es incluso
anterior de la llegada de Hitler al poder.
La izquierda tambien quizo hacer creer que Estados Unidos durante el
gobierno de Pinochet probó un misil Pershing II con una carga atomica
en el desierto de Atacama. Otra mentira.
No solo eso, en la noche del 11 de septiembre del 2001 la izquierda
hizo creer que ocurrio una matanza de estudiantes en Chile, más
curioso es que ni la propia prensa de izquierda como Punto Final o El
Siglo hablaran de matanza alguna.
Estas mentiras de la izquierda ilustran el porque del fracaso de esta
no solo en Chile sino que en el mundo. Si tan solo analizamos el caso
de Chile que nos espera de Cuba donde esta el payaso Fidel, que puede
decirse de Venezuela con Hugo Chavez. El cerebro del izquierdista es
incapaz de analizar las cosas, solo absorve, no procesa.
Atentamente
Adrian Longueira
gato2002
se dispone, se sabia que iba a ocurrir.
pd:Que hay de cierto que el día del atentado a las torres, cerca de
5.000 judíos que trabajaban misteriosamente no fueron?.
Adrian Longueira escribió:
Ramoncho
1) ¿Qué coño hace esto en soc.culture.venezuela? Dejen de joder con la
crosposteadera.
2) Según esto, Isabel Allende es hija de Salvador Allende (falso, es
sobrina).
3) "Apenas" son 3000 muertos. ¿Cuántos quieres? (Claro, en Venezuela
mueren más que eso a manos del hampa cada mes, pero si nos ponemos a
comparar...)
4) El tono es del peor estilo de izquierda transnochada: muchas
"verdades" sin soporte (no quiero con esto decir que lo dicho sea falso,
pero una documentadita no le vendría mal. Por ejemplo, ¿cuál es el
nombre del libro del piloto?)
Anyway, lo importante es que dejen de joder.
Y yo por cierto, pienso que lástima que Pinochet les halla salido tan
hijoeputa. Pero es lo mejor que le ha podido pasar a Chile. (Si, ya se,
ahora me van a caer en cambote a decirme lo loco que estoy).
Y refraseando la última oración: "El cerebro del izquierdista es incapaz
de analizar, sólo repite como un loro".
Chao pescao
matus
apenas? guau
jm
J.
Ramoncho wrote:
> Yo de izquierdista, nada. Pero me asombra este escrito:
>
> 1) ¿Qué coño hace esto en soc.culture.venezuela? Dejen de joder con la
> crosposteadera.
> 2) Según esto, Isabel Allende es hija de Salvador Allende (falso, es
> sobrina).
> 3) "Apenas" son 3000 muertos. ¿Cuántos quieres? (Claro, en Venezuela
> mueren más que eso a manos del hampa cada mes, pero si nos ponemos a
> comparar...)
> 4) El tono es del peor estilo de izquierda transnochada:
De acuerdo contigo, Ramoncho. ¿Pero que tiene que ver el caricaturista
Longueira con la izquierda? Este es un pendejo racista, derechista,
pinochetista.
Saludos,
j.
Nora
"Ramoncho" <ra...@surebase.com> escribió en el mensaje
news:btseho$aiqsg$1...@ID-170870.news.uni-berlin.de...
|
| Y yo por cierto, pienso que lástima que Pinochet les halla salido
tan
| hijoeputa. Pero es lo mejor que le ha podido pasar a Chile. (Si, ya
se,
| ahora me van a caer en cambote a decirme lo loco que estoy).
|
A ver Ramoncho por favor explica el(los) por que(s) para considerar
que Pinochet es lo mejor que le ha pasado a Chile.
Saludos
Nora
Ramoncho
Nora,
Nada, nada, de Chile yo se muy poco, apenas lo que conocí en dos visitas
cortas a Santiago. No me voy a meter en esas profundidades para no
ahogarme, pero si pienso que el Allende no era lo mejor para Chile,
mejor fue Pinochet (dejando de lado la represión, y otras nimiedades)
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva
"Adrian Longueira" <al...@chile.com> escribió en el mensaje news:389ef0d.04011...@posting.google.com...
> Nuevas mentiras afloraron en la izquierda ya muchos años después de
> ocurrido el golpe. Una de ellas fue el atentado cometido en contra de
> la comitiva presidencial de Pinochet en el sector precordillerano de
> Santiago. Gente de izquierda aseguro que en realidad fue un
> autoatentado del propio Pinochet, asi mismito como izquierdistas pavos
> aseguran que los atentados contra las Torres Gemelas y el Pentagono
> fueron provocados por el propio Estados Unidos.
A propósito de atentado al Pentágono... ¿sabes que nunca se encontró ningún resto de avión? Sabes que el forado en el edificio no corresponde al dejado por un avión comercial?
Considero que hay suficiente información para considerar seriamente la posibilidad de un autoatentado.
> Una de las mentiras favoritas de la izquierda ha sido tratar de hacer
> creer que el gobierno de Pinochet tenía raices nazistas. Craso error
> ya que el gobierno de Pinochet tuvo asesores judios como Sergio Melnik
> que llegó a ser Ministro de la Oficina de Planificación, incluso el
> gobierno de Pinochet fue el que inicio cordiales relaciones con las
> Fuerzas Armadas de Israel, incluso gran parte del equipamiento de las
> Fuerzas Armadas chilenas proviene de ese pais. Más gracioso es decir
> que el Buque Escuela de la Armada Chilena "La Esmeralda" estaba lleno
> de cuadros de Hitler y simbolos nazistas.
Eso lo ley hoy en este foro... Lo escribió un personaje al que le faltan un par de tornillos. LOL.
> Cualquiera sabe que la
> influencia de la Armada de Chile es Inglesa y en ningun caso alemana.
> Asi hasta el himno favorito de Pinochet que es Lily Marlene han
> tratado de vincularlo al Nazismo siendo que la canción es incluso
> anterior de la llegada de Hitler al poder.
Y anterior a la fundación del PNS alemán, fue compuesta en 1893.
Saludos,
HV
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva
"Ramoncho" <ra...@surebase.com> escribió en el mensaje news:btseho$aiqsg$1...@ID-170870.news.uni-berlin.de...
> 2) Según esto, Isabel Allende es hija de Salvador Allende (falso, es
> sobrina).
La diputado es hija. La escritora no es pariente.
Saludos,
HV
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva
Mire para el norte nomás y vea de cuántos nos salvaron esos 3.000
Saludos,
HV
"matus" <juanma...@hotmail.com> escribió en el mensaje news:btshm0$qg9$1...@news1.nivel5.cl...
Nora
OK punto final, pero es que la represión y otras cosillas/pequeñeces
del régimen de Pinochet no se pueden dejar de lado a la hora de
analizar los pro (de haberlos) y/o contras de su gobierno. Yo tampoco
quisiera profundizar mucho ya que la información que tengo se basa en
los escritos de la historia (que por lo que leí aparentemente no son
muy fidedignos) y documentales de la época televisados, hoy mas que
nunca, (a lo mejor también son montajes mediaticos) en nuestra
Venezuela ¿para que sepamos lo que nos espera?
Saludos
Nora
GM
"Adrian Longueira" <al...@chile.com> wrote in message
news:389ef0d.04011...@posting.google.com...
karlitos
wrote:
>Si hay algo que me asombra de la izquierda es su obsesión por
>caricaturizar las cosas.
y este Longueira tien obsesión por crosspostear leseras.
> Adrian Longueira
Fortinbras
>>
>> Una de las mentiras favoritas de la izquierda ha sido tratar de hacer
>> creer que el gobierno de Pinochet tenía raices nazistas. Craso error
>> ya que el gobierno de Pinochet tuvo asesores judios como Sergio Melnik
>> que llegó a ser Ministro de la Oficina de Planificación, incluso el
>> gobierno de Pinochet fue el que inicio cordiales relaciones con las
>> Fuerzas Armadas de Israel, incluso gran parte del equipamiento de las
>> Fuerzas Armadas chilenas proviene de ese pais. Más gracioso es decir
>> que el Buque Escuela de la Armada Chilena "La Esmeralda" estaba lleno
>> de cuadros de Hitler y simbolos nazistas. Cualquiera sabe que la
>> influencia de la Armada de Chile es Inglesa y en ningun caso alemana.
>> Asi hasta el himno favorito de Pinochet que es Lily Marlene han
>> tratado de vincularlo al Nazismo siendo que la canción es incluso
>> anterior de la llegada de Hitler al poder.
>>
De las cosas que uno a la vejez se viene a enterar ...
saludos cordiales
Fortinbras
Jorge F
> Y yo por cierto, pienso que lástima que Pinochet les halla salido tan
> hijoeputa. Pero es lo mejor que le ha podido pasar a Chile. (Si, ya se,
> ahora me van a caer en cambote a decirme lo loco que estoy).
Jajaj, buena la respuesta de Ramoncho, pero resulta que Longueira (como ya
es costumbre) hace crossposting metiendo a todos en un saco. Este saco es
que para él, cualquiera que no sea ultrapinochetista es un terrorista,
marxista-leninista, vietnamita del vietcong, etc, etc...y por cierto , pino8
es el salvador de Chile. Ramoncho, esta cordialmente invitado a postear en
chile.soc.politica.
Jorge F
www.topnews.cl
xyz
By Mark Falcoff
Commentary, November 2003
The 30th anniversary of the coup d'etat that deposed Chile's Marxist
president Salvador Allende has come and gone, but not without a burst
of accusations of American complicity with--if not responsibility
for--that event. Even before the commemorations had gotten under way,
Secretary of State Colin Powell took it upon himself to apologize for
the U.S. role in Chile, though in terms so vague as to leave many
wondering exactly what he was referring to.
The fact that the coup itself took place on the very same
date--September 11--that the World Trade Center was destroyed by a
sensational terrorist attack in 2001 was a coincidence too fraught to
be overlooked. In an editorial titled "The Other September 11," the
New York Times, with characteristic condescension, reminded its
readers that "our nation's hands have not always been clean" and
managed to suggest a smoking gun ("the United States . . . laid the
groundwork for [the coup] and supported the plotters") without
actually producing one. The foreign press was more categorical. In Le
Monde, the flagship daily of anti-Americans worldwide, a front-page
cartoon on September 11 depicted a plane about to hit the World Trade
Center. But the roles of villain and victim had been grotesquely
altered: the twin towers were labeled "Chile," the plane "USA."
The name invariably linked to our Chilean involvement is that of Henry
Kissinger, today the leading survivor of the Nixon administration and
at the time the evident architect of much of its foreign policy, first
as National Security Adviser and then as Secretary of State. The case
against him has been before the public for several years now, most
notably in an article by Christopher Hitchens in Harper's that was
subsequently reproduced in Hitchens's book The Trial of Henry
Kissinger and then repeated with a wealth of lurid detail in a BBC
"documentary" in which Hitchens appears as prosecutor-in-chief. In
addition to his supposed role as the intellectual author of the coup,
Kissinger has been accused in both film and book of responsibility for
the murder of General Rene Schneider, commander-in-chief of the
Chilean army--that is, of homicide. The sons of the late general,
egged on by political sympathizers in Europe and the United States,
have even filed suit against Kissinger in hopes of recovering
substantial damages for their father's death.
Chilean politics past or present is not a particular specialty of
Americans, even Americans normally well informed about world affairs.
What people know--or think they know--about that country is often a
digest of newspaper headlines and of vague allegations, rather than
substantiated facts. But neither is Chilean politics a specialty of
Christopher Hitchens, the New York Times, or Le Monde. As we shall
see, their interests would appear to lie largely elsewhere.
II
The starting point for the Chilean drama was a presidential election
that took place in September 1970, three full years before the
military coup whose anniversary was recently marked. There were
several candidates. One--Salvador Allende, a socialist and avowed
Marxist running in coalition with the Communist party--came in first,
with 36.3 percent of the vote. Within a razor's edge behind him was
former President Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right, who
received 34.9 percent. Radomiro Tomic, of the ruling Christian
Democrats, came in third with 27.8 percent.
Such presidential elections, with no candidate receiving an absolute
majority, were common in Chile. The constitutional procedures of the
day specifically mandated that, instead of a runoff between the two
leading candidates, the winner was to be selected by the Chilean
congress, scheduled to meet several weeks hence. Although the
legislature was not strictly required to opt for the frontrunner, firm
custom suggested that it would do so. What raised the stakes in the
1970 race was the presence of Allende himself, a man with strong
Soviet-bloc and Cuban connections and even more sinister associations
within Chile's far Left. Consequently, between the election on
September 4 and the congressional vote on October 24, Chile was awash
in rumors and plots, most of them related to efforts to block
Allende's accession to power.
In Washington, meanwhile, President Richard Nixon was hardly pleased
by the prospect of an Allende presidency, and was taking steps to
prevent it. This much has been a matter of public record for nearly 30
years. The primary sources are two reports by a committee led by the
late Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, one entitled Alleged
Assassination Plots of Foreign Leaders and the other Covert Action in
Chile, 1963-1973 (both published in 1975). The findings of the Church
committee exonerate the administration of unlawful activity--a
noteworthy fact in light of the circumstances that both the chairman
and the majority of the members (and, even more, their staffs) were
unremittingly hostile to the Nixon White House and anxious, if
possible, to find embarrassing linkages between it and events in
Chile.
There is another primary source as well. In 1998, the Clinton
administration was moved by the arrest in London of Allende's
successor, the dictator Augusto Pinochet, to order the (heavily
redacted) declassification of some 17,000 official U.S. documents
relating to the period. The most important of these have been placed
on the website of the National Security Archive--a left-wing
organization not to be confused with the U.S. National Archives. They
also form the basis of a new book by the Archive's Peter Kornbluh, The
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability,
released this past September 11.[1]
Great things have been claimed for the Clinton declassifications.
Thanks to them, Christopher Hitchens has been able to boast that in
his book "I produce [government] documents that plainly show the
orchestration of a plot to murder General Rene Schneider." Likewise,
he remarks, in the suit filed by the general's family, "every paper
for the prosecution is a declassified document of the U.S.
government." In fact, however, the Clinton declassifications are less
rich in information than the findings of the Church committee, which
was able to examine the documentary record in its unexpurgated form
and also to interrogate the participants under oath. Nor do the
Clinton declassifications contribute anything particularly useful to
the case against Kissinger. Some of them actually corroborate the
findings of the Church committee, and, what is even more ironic,
support Kissinger's own version of events as laid out in the relevant
volumes of his memoirs.
That version is itself buttressed at points by other information,
especially transcripts of Kissinger's conversations with relevant
figures in Washington and elsewhere. Some of these conversations took
place by telephone. Records of Kissinger's telephone exchanges,
covering the entire span of his government service, are now in the
process of being released--they form, for instance, the primary basis
of his new book, Crisis, dealing with the Yom Kippur war and the end
of the Vietnam war. All of them have been given by him for inclusion
in the Nixon Library. Although the records relating specifically to
Chile are not yet in the public domain, they will be before long, and
he has kindly let me review them in advance.
First and foremost, these transcripts establish that Chile was not an
important part of the then-National Security Adviser's daily diet.
This point is crucial, not least because in the BBC film we are
continually being told that Kissinger micromanaged every detail of
American foreign policy. While that may have been true for subjects of
high geo-political import, Chile was not one of them. In fact, during
September and October 1970--which is to say, between the Chilean
election and the congressional vote the telephone record reveals a
Kissinger preoccupied with a full-blown Middle East crisis, Vietnam, a
Soviet submarine base in Cuba, the Black September plane hijacking,
Nixon's planned visit to Europe and to the Sixth Fleet, the defense
budget, and the Pugwash conference on U.S.-Soviet relations, but with
Chile only slightly. Thereafter, there is nothing at all until June
1973, when he and Nixon discuss a failed military revolt against
Allende, and then no further references until after Pinochet's
assumption of power with the September 11 coup.
But this is not really surprising. During much of the Allende
presidency, Kissinger was in Paris, Moscow, Beijing, or other locales
of far greater importance to the U.S. than Santiago. And even when the
subject was again broached at the time of the coup, Kissinger was
principally concerned with the possible resignation of Vice President
Spiro Agnew and preparations for his own confirmation hearings as
Secretary of State.
This is hardly to say, however, that the telephone documents are
uninformative; far from it. In what follows I shall be drawing freely
on them as well as on other pertinent sources to reconstruct the true
course of events.
III
President Nixon was indeed deeply distressed at the prospect of an
Allende presidency in Chile, and on September 15, 1970, he summoned
Kissinger, Attorney General John Mitchell, and CIA director Richard
Helms for a meeting in the Oval Office to discuss the matter. As
Helms's notes of the meeting reflect, Nixon was determined to "save
Chile" from Allende "even if the chances [were] one in ten." At this
meeting there was even loose talk about spending $10 million to
provoke a coup, and "more if necessary." Helms remonstrated with the
President that Allende would in all likelihood be chosen by the
Chilean congress and that only a "slight possibility" existed of a
move by senior elements of the country's military to block his
confirmation. "Moreover," Helms recalls in his posthumous memoir, A
Look Over My Shoulder (2003), "I noted that the [CIA] lacked the means
of motivating the military to intervene." But the President was
unmoved: "Standing mid-track and shouting at an oncoming locomotive,"
recalls Helms, "might have been more effective."
Convinced that a conventional military uprising was still not possible
in Chile, the CIA, acting with the approval of the 40 Committee--the
body charged with overseeing covert actions abroad--devised what in
effect was a constitutional coup. The most expeditious way to prevent
Allende from assuming office was somehow to convince the Chilean
congress to confirm Alessandri as the winner of the election. Once
elected by the congress, Alessandri--a party to the plot through
intermediaries--was prepared to resign his presidency within a matter
of days so that new elections could be held.
The particular charm of this ploy was that an Alessandri presidency,
even if it lasted a mere 24 hours, would render outgoing President
Eduardo Frei eligible to run again, this time in a two-headed race
against Allende. (Chile's constitution, then as now, prohibited
consecutive terms.) Under those circumstances, Frei--a Christian
Democrat and still the most popular of modern Chilean
presidents--could be reasonably expected to defeat Allende fair and
square.
This plot, known colloquially as the "Alessandri" or "Rube Goldberg"
gambit, required two things to succeed. Frei had to agree to play the
role assigned to him, and he would also have to persuade his own
followers in congress to cast their votes for Alessandri. Both
obstacles proved insurmountable. As Ambassador Edward Korry's cables
from Santiago show, though Frei was deeply troubled by the prospect of
an Allende presidency--accurately predicting that it would end in
"blood and horror"--he was extremely reluctant to lend himself to a
perversion of Chile's electoral traditions. And even had he been
amenable, he would have been unable to persuade most Christian
Democrats in Congress to vote for a conservative like Alessandri, no
matter how brief his putative rule. For, by 1970, Frei's party was
already leaning considerably further to the Left than Frei himself;
its official candidate, Radomiro Tomic, had precipitously recognized
Allende as president-elect on election night.
In the meantime, even as the U.S. embassy in Santiago was pursuing the
"Alessandri gambit," an alternative line of activity was being looked
into by the CIA station in Chile. This policy, later labeled Track II
(to distinguish it from the constitutional coup), involved finding a
general or generals who, if President Frei and the Christian Democrats
would not play the role assigned to them, would overthrow the outgoing
government, dissolve the congress, and send the president into
temporary exile. Then the interim junta would call elections (at an
unspecified but presumably early date) in which President Frei could
return and run against Allende.
Or something like that. Nixon's instructions to the CIA were simply to
forestall Allende's inauguration; he was not interested in the
details, or apparently in the kind of government that would emerge in
Allende's place.
IV
The search for a military man brought the CIA station into contact
with General Roberto Viaux, who had been cashiered from the Chilean
army in 1969 for leading a revolt against the Christian Democratic
government (ostensibly in protest over military salaries and
benefits). Since his dismissal, Viaux had continued to conspire, but
with larger ideological and political objectives in mind. In early
October, by which time Track I had run out of gas, he informed his CIA
contacts that he was planning another coup and asked for a sizable
drop of arms and ammunition.
Apart from the fact that (according to Helms) the CIA thought Viaux a
bit "far out," the notion that a group of senior army officers
required foreign arms to stage a coup did not inspire confidence.
After subsequent discussion, the CIA decided Viaux was not a good bet,
though it kept him on a long leash, disbursing some cash and even
taking out an insurance policy on his life. Another group of generals
was eventually selected for the task at hand. Before it could act,
however, a roadblock had to be removed.
The chief obstacle to Track II was General Rende Schneider,
commander-in-chief of the Chilean army. His view, simply stated, was
that since the politicians had gotten the country into the mess in
which it found itself, the politicians would have to find a way out.
This position had to be maintained sturdily throughout September and
October in the face of almost daily representations by retired
officers, politicians, and businessmen begging him to "save the
country" either by supporting a constitutional coup or by some other
means. As General Carlos Prats, his second in command, has reported
Schneider's words to him at the time, "the politicians are maneuvering
to push the army into an adventure. They should understand that we are
not so stupid as to not realize that they want to 'use' us, some to
preserve their political unity, others as a 'trampoline' for Viaux."
When Schneider proved intransigent, the intermediaries tried to
persuade Prats, again to no effect. The architects of Track II then
focused on circumventing Schneider by kidnapping him and sending him
to neighboring Argentina for a season while the political situation
was adjusted.
As far as Kissinger (and, for that matter, the White House) was
concerned, Viaux had been told to stand down, and that was presumably
the end of active American coup-plotting. As Kissinger told Nixon by
telephone on October 15, reporting on a meeting with Thomas
Karamassines of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division, "This looks
hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive
coup." The President responded, "Just tell him to do nothing." The
next day, CIA headquarters cabled its station in Santiago that
although "we are to continue to generate maximum pressure" toward a
coup, "a Viaux coup . . . would fail" and Viaux should be warned
"against precipitate action." The message was delivered through an
intermediary, leaving the CIA with the pious hope that once its wishes
had been made known, Viaux would respect them.
Unfortunately, the cashiered Chilean general was pursuing agendas of
his own. The kidnapping itself, which took place early on the morning
of October 22, was badly bungled. Schneider resisted by extracting a
handgun from his briefcase, provoking his abductors--mostly young and
inexperienced--into shooting first, wounding him in four vital areas.
Viaux's people panicked and took flight, some discarding their arms
near the scene of the crime. The general was rushed to the capital's
military hospital, where he died three days later.
V
Much has been made of the fact that between October 15, when Kissinger
ordered the Viaux coup "turned off," and the death of General
Schneider, the CIA station in Santiago continued to make preparations
for a Track II-type coup. Thus, at some point in mid-October three
submachine guns and some tear-gas canisters and gas masks were shipped
to the Chilean capital through the U.S. diplomatic pouch and passed to
Colonel Paul Wimert, an American military attache, who in turn gave
them to officers representing General Camilo Valenzuela, head of the
Santiago garrison. This was the group that had intended to kidnap
General Schneider. The exchange occurred at two in the morning of
October 22; but before any use could be made of the weaponry, General
Schneider lay dying in the hospital.
Eventually, the machine guns were returned unused to Wimert, who
discarded them in the Pacific Ocean. A Chilean military court
subsequently found that Schneider had been killed by handguns, and the
Church committee concluded that these weapons "were, in all
probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators." The
committee also noted that an unloaded machine gun had been found at
the site of the killing, but professed itself "unable to determine
whether [it] was one of the three supplied by the CIA." Schneider was
therefore killed by conspirators who, although in contact with the
CIA, were acting against its direct instruction, and apparently
without its logistical assistance.
Just why the Chilean kidnapping plot went forward after Kissinger
issued orders that General Viaux be "turned off" is not clear.
Possibly it was because Nixon's express desire to prevent Allende's
accession was so emphatic that Colonel Wimert and other CIA personnel
felt somewhat at liberty to go ahead on their own. Kissinger, at any
rate, seems to have been unaware of the second plot--that is, the one
for which the three machine guns were sent down. In 1975, after
testifying before the Church committee, Karamassines phoned the
National Security Adviser and reported that he had been "asked . . .
if I cleared everything in advance with you. I said no, you were too
busy." In the same conversation, Kissinger remarks that, although he
did not know about the second plot, he might have approved it. Then he
adds: "I thought that after we turned off that one thing [the Viaux
plot], nothing more had happened and in fact that other thing [the
Schneider kidnapping] had happened."
In short, deplore as one might the interventionist intentions of
Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA, the fact remains that General Schneider
was murdered as the result of a botched kidnapping attempt, which--as
far as the White House was concerned--had been disavowed and ordered
shut down a full week before it happened.
Even more has been made of a CIA cable dated October 16 instructing
the Santiago station to tell Viaux that, although he was to stand
down, he should "preserve [his] assets" and would "continue to have
our support" if he joined forces with others either before or after
Allende's inauguration and amplified his political planning for the
future, in fact, Viaux played no future role whatsoever in Chilean
politics. He was arrested almost immediately after Schneider's murder
and sentenced by a military court to a long prison term. In August
1973, he was released and sent to Paraguay; neither he nor any of the
officers involved in his plot was involved in the September 11 coup.
When he finally returned to Chile, six or seven years later, the
Pinochet government offered him no special consideration.
Neither Hitchens's book nor the film upon which it is based takes note
of a crucial fact: namely, that the Schneider debacle had precisely
the opposite effect of what was desired by the CIA and the Nixon
administration. It transformed its victim into a martyr of the
"constitutionalist" traditions of the Chilean army; it encouraged
other constitutionalist officers to support an orderly transfer of
power to the new Allende administration; it brought General Carlos
Prats, another officer of firm constitutionalist leanings, to the head
of the army; and it discredited right-wing cabals both inside the army
and out.
It is strange that this outcome should go unremarked by critics who
profess to care for Chile and who should presumably take comfort from
it--but, given their invincible biases, perhaps it is not so strange
after all.
VI
Kissinger has been charged with criminal responsibility not just for
Schneider's assassination. He has also been charged with criminal
responsibility for Allende's overthrow and death three years later.
The CIA's October 16 cable contained another passage that is quoted
with much relish in the BBC movie The Trials of Henry Kissinger, even
though there is no indication that Kissinger ever saw the document. In
it, the CIA enunciates its
firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup . . .
[E]fforts in this regard will continue vigorously. . . . We are to
continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every
appropriate resource.
In the movie, these highlighted words are immediately followed by
horrific images of the events of September 11, 1973, which included
the bombing of the presidential palace, the arrest and torture of
hundreds of dissidents, and the accession to power of an unusually
cruel military junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet. As it
happens, however, the quotation and the events depicted on the screen
collapse two completely different moments in U.S. policy and in the
history of Chile.
In the fall of 1970, Nixon certainly talked tough, at least in
private, telling Kissinger by phone on October 15 that if Allende were
to take office, "I am not going to do a thing for [Chile]," and that
if he dared to nationalize U.S. property, "then we cut him off." Not
surprisingly, a National Security Council memorandum (November 9,
1970), drafted several days after Allende's inauguration and released
in the Clinton declassifications, called for a "correct but cool"
public posture toward Chile while at the same time "maximiz[ing]
pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and
limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and
hemispheric interests." Specifically, the memorandum advocated
eliminating financial guarantees for U.S. private investment in Chile;
terminating existing guarantees where possible; bringing "feasible
influence" to bear at multilateral lending institutions; and offering
no new commitments of bilateral economic aid. (Humanitarian aid was to
be considered on a case-by-case basis.)
Meanwhile, however, an "options paper" on Chile (November 3, 1970),
sketching how these policies were to be implemented, included two
provisions not mentioned in the memorandum. The first was "to give
articulate support, publicly and privately, to democratic elements in
Chile opposed to the Allende regime by all appropriate means." The
second was to "maintain effective relations with the Chilean military,
letting them know that we want to cooperate but that our ability to do
so depends on Chilean government actions."
The former provision laid the groundwork for the transfer of at least
$ 6 million in covert support to non-Marxist political parties,
newspapers, radio stations, and oilier groups during the Allende
period. Thanks to these transfers, Allende found it impossible to
eliminate his political competition by confiscating the sources of
their funding or by intentionally bankrupting independent newspapers
or radio stations through politically inspired strikes. Without the
American subventions, Chile's pluralistic political system--including
an independent press and electronic media--would in all probability
have disappeared long before General Pinochet and his associates
overthrew the government and installed a dictatorship of their own. As
for the latter provision, it merely outlined a "business-as-usual"
relationship with the Chilean military while saying and doing nothing
to encourage the military's involvement in politics.
The documentary evidence is thus unambiguous: the most serious charge
that can be levied against the Nixon administration is that it
contemplated economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende
had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was
still making payments on Chile's debts. But even that envisaged policy
was never truly implemented. In spite of Nixon's decision to end all
bilateral assistance not already committed, new
appropriations--however token in proportion to the past--were
authorized during every year of the Allende government. Even after the
increasingly bankrupt country defaulted on its debts to the United
States in November 1971, "old" U.S. loans continued to be disbursed,
amounting (according to one U.S. Treasury estimate) to $200 million
for 1971 and 1972; nor was humanitarian aid withdrawn. Though Chile
nationalized American holdings in the copper industry in 1971 without
making a satisfactory arrangement for compensation--pushing the U.S.
government-funded Overseas Private Investment Corporation to the brink
of bankruptcy--the notorious Hickenlooper Amendment (requiring a
suspension of aid to any country that expropriates U.S. property
without payment) was never invoked.
Besides, Chile's default constituted a de-facto relief measure for the
Allende regime, amounting in 1972 alone to $243 million--an effective
transfer of resources greater by many orders of magnitude than that
tendered to the Frei administration at a time when the latter was
supposedly Washington's "showcase" in Latin America. In addition,
Allende was able to tap new sources of credit in Western and Eastern
Europe--in 1972, somewhere between $600 and $950 million. As a key
functionary of his finance ministry would recall, by mid-1973 "Chile
had rebuilt and diversified its system of external finance" and by
June of that year had obtained short-term credits amounting to $547
million. To this should be added the fact that between November 1970
and September 1973, Chile was able to draw slightly more than $100
million from the International Monetary Fund, presumably over the
protests of U.S. representatives there.
The one area where U.S. aid increased threefold during the Allende
period was military assistance. If this sounds sinister, two crucial
facts should be borne in mind. First, the aid relieved pressures on
the Chilean budget, allowing money that would otherwise have been used
for weaponry and training to be diverted to improved housing
allowances and other amenities for the uniformed services. Second,
Allende himself welcomed this assistance, which permitted him to
boast, truthfully, that Chile's armed forces were better off under a
Socialist-Communist government than under its Christian Democratic
predecessor. Indeed, to the end of his regime President Allende saw
the armed forces as an element on the chessboard to be used and
manipulated for his own political purposes.
VII
What, then, brought about the September 11, 1973 coup? The real causes
must he sought in the devastating collapse of the Chilean economy that
took place during the Allende presidency, as well as in Chile's
increasingly polarized political environment.
On November 4, 1970, Salvador Allende assumed the presidency in an
atmosphere of euphoria and even good will almost unimaginable in
retrospect. Apart from his own four-party coalition (Popular Unity)
headed by the Socialist and Communist parties, the new president could
count on the "critical support" of the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), which historically had questioned the possibility of
social change in Chile through peaceful electoral means. More
important still, he took office, as we have seen, at a time when the
leading opposition party, the Christian Democrats, was anxious to
compete for the labels "progressive" and even "revolutionary." After
his inauguration, Allende met with the Christian Democratic leadership
in an atmosphere of good humor and camaraderie; the chief of the
delegation even urged the president to "help us be good allendistas."
Instead, intoxicated by ideological triumphalism, Allende's people did
everything they could to split the Christian Democrats, luring the
party's left wing over to the governing coalition while wreaking
political vengeance on the rest. As Allende supporters seized
factories and farms throughout Chile, Christian Democratic workers
were dismissed and their union leaders refused access to the premises.
Political discrimination even extended to nonpolitical individuals for
family reasons; the son of President Frei, an engineer, found himself
in difficulty when his workplace passed into the hands of government
"intervenors."
The net effect of these actions was, paradoxically, to discredit the
"collaborationist" leadership of the Christian Democrats and bring
about its replacement with more conservative figures. By 1973, the
party had been pushed into a tactical electoral alliance with the
Right, a development that would have been unthinkable three years
earlier. In March 1973, in the last parliamentary election held under
Allende, the combined Christian Democratic-Conservative list won a
thumping 56 percent of the vote.
These and other ominous shifts in political allegiance were hugely
facilitated by Allende's domestic economic actions--including the
harassment of small business, planned dislocations in the country's
food supply, and the uninhibited printing of unbacked currency. The
constant threat to independent operators led to a major trucker's
strike in 1972, which then spread disastrously to other sectors of the
economy; tampering with the country's distribution system produced
widespread shortages of food; and the flooding of the country with
paper money ended in uncontrollable inflation.
One result of the ensuing chaos was that Allende found himself relying
heavily on the military just to remain in power. Several times he was
compelled to ask flag officers to serve in key ministries; in the
final phase of the regime, General Prats was functioning as his
minister of interior. These innovations introduced enormous stresses
within the armed forces; Prats's growing closeness to Allende--it
amounted to a kind of ideological seduction--undetermined his own
position in the military, and in August 1973 he was forced to go into
voluntary exile in neighboring Argentina.
VIII
By that time, Allende's problems had become so acute as to merit
notice once more by the President of the United States. The immediate
occasion was a failed military plot against Allende that had been
quashed by loyalist troops. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the matter
by telephone on July 4, 1973. Not surprisingly, the President
expressed regret that the coup failed ("if only the army could get a
few people behind them!"). For his part, Kissinger told the President
that "we had nothing to do with it." Both agreed that the prospect of
flag officers leaving the Chilean cabinet was bound to deepen the
crisis and put Allende in an even more disadvantageous position.
For the next two months, no further phone conversations took place
between Kissinger and the Nixon White House on the subject of Chile.
Not until the events surrounding the September 11 coup did they
resume.
Within hours of that event, the prestige American press was
circulating rumors to the effect that Washington had had prior word of
the plot. On September 13, for example, the New York Times carried a
headline--"U.S. Had Warning of Coup, Aides Say"--leading readers to
inter that knowledge possessed by Washington and deliberately withheld
from the Allende government had spelled the difference between its
survival and its demise. In fact, however, as Ken Rush, a White House
aide, said to Kissinger on that same day, "What [Assistant Secretary,
of State Jack] Kubish told me was that we knew nothing about it; that
we had not been told about it and it came as a complete surprise to
us." Rush added: "I didn't know that a coup was coming at any
particular date. We'd been hearing coup rumors for about a year."
Kissinger was better informed than the White House. A few days before
the coup, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis had been recalled to Washington,
not to discuss Chile per se but to be looked over as a possible
candidate for a high State Department post. As he walked into
Kissinger's office, he was asked immediately about the possibilities
of a coup. The recorded transcript of their conversation was
reproduced by Kissinger in his memoir, Years of Upheaval (1982). "In
Chile you can never count on anything," the ambassador said, "but the
odds are in favor of a coup, though I can't give you any time frame."
Kissinger: "We are going to stay out of that, I assume." Davis: "Yes.
My firm instructions to everybody on the staff are that we are not to
involve ourselves in any way. . . . Our biggest problem is to keep
from getting caught in the middle."
Davis's "information" was no secret. The truth is that every cat and
dog in Chile knew a coup was coming at some point in September 1973,
and so did Allende himself. The only questions were who would lead it,
who would replace Allende, and what ideological tendency would prevail
once the government was dissolved. During a private lunch with the
president a few days before his departure into Argentine exile,
General Prats himself warned Allende that he would be overthrown
within the next ten days. When the president asked whether Prats's
ministerial replacement, General Augusto Pinochet, would remain loyal,
Prats said he thought so but that the issue was irrelevant. "Even the
most constitutionalist of officers," he later recalled telling the
president in this most bizarre of exchanges, "will understand that a
division within the armed forces would mean civil war." In effect,
officers would either respect the decision of the coup-makers or be
swept aside.[2]
Contrary, then, to what the film The Trials of Henry Kissinger
suggests, there was no straight line between the events of 1970 and
the coup of 1973. Rather, conscious choices by Allende and his own
people drove the military into action that it would normally have been
disinclined to carry out. This was certainly the impression conveyed,
for example, by a U.S. naval attache who cabled a few days after the
coup that the "decision to remove the Allende government was made with
extreme reluctance and only after the deepest soul-searching by all
concerned."
As for President Nixon, he was evidently pleased--how could he not
have been?--but exhibited no sense of complicity with the coup-makers
themselves. As he said on the phone to Kissinger on September 16,
"Well, we didn't--as you know--our hand doesn't show on this one
though." To which Kissinger replied, "We didn't do it."
IX
The United States did play a role in Chile, though not precisely the
one ascribed to it. It attempted--unsuccessfully--to forestall
Allende's confirmation by the Chilean congress. But once he was in
office, the thrust of U.S. policy shifted to sustaining a democratic
opposition and an independent press until Allende could be defeated in
the presidential elections scheduled for 1976. To the extent that this
opposition was able to survive under extraordinarily difficult
economic circumstances--winning control of the Chilean congress in
March 1973--one might even credit the Nixon administration with
preventing the consolidation of Allende's "totalitarian project" (to
use the apt expression of Eduardo Frei).
What then followed--a right-wing dictatorship that crushed not merely
the Allende regime but Chilean democracy itself--was not and could not
have been predicted, partly because of the military's own apolitical
traditions and partly because, by mid-1973, the opposition to Allende
was dominated by forces of proved democratic provenance. To the
contrary, Washington's presumption--that in the 1976 elections, if
they were allowed to take place, the opposition would win
decisively--was amply supported by the facts. It was only the savagery
of the subsequent Pinochet dictatorship that in hindsight altered the
historical picture.
As the years passed, the contumely into which Allende and his
associates had deservedly fallen in Chile at the time of their
overthrow came to be neutralized, then canceled out, by martyrdom.
Then, too, the undifferentiated contempt with which the military
subsequently treated all political forces except those on the far
Right threw together people who in August and September 1973 had been
ready to face off in a kind of civil war. In that sense, General
Pinochet--in spite of himself--may be considered the unanticipated
progenitor of the Socialist-Christian Democratic coalition governments
that have governed Chile from 1989 to the present.
The Allende regime also benefited retrospectively from its evident
association with the old democratic order; it had, after all, been
elected. How much longer it would have remained part of that order,
which it was busily undermining, must remain a matter of controversy.
But to the day of its demise, it enjoyed a marginal legitimacy that
would elude its military successor. In this respect, too, Pinochet and
his associates played an unexpected role--rescuing for Allende and his
government a place in Chilean history they did not earn and to which
they could not otherwise have looked forward.
Such are a few of the pesky but all-important details that
"revisionists" like Hitchens and the makers of The Trials of Henry
Kissinger are at pains to avoid, if indeed they were ever aware of
them in the first place. Those who mourn the loss of a Marxist regime
in Chile are free to denounce the adversarial efforts undertaken by
Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA, as are the legions of marchers with
their placards equating American officials with Nazis and mass
murderers. Those, like the editorialists of the New York Times, who
are indifferent to the uses of anti-Americanism are likewise free to
join the chorus. But anyone with a serious concern for historical
truth--or for the long-term survival of democracy in Chile--or for the
reputation of the United States and the policy it endeavored with
honor to implement during the tortuous decades of the cold war--might
well be moved to reexamine the record.
Notes:
1. New Press, 551 pp., $29.95.
2. Prats's memoirs are of particular interest because they were
written in exile at a time when he had become, post bog a virtual
partisan of the Allende regime and was seen by many as a potential
challenger to Pinochet's military government. They were completed just
before he and his wife were killed by a car bomb in Buenos Aires
planted by Pinochet's secret police, but remained unpublished until
1985 when book censorship was ended in Chile.
Francisco Sepulveda
> "Adrian Longueira" <al...@chile.com> escribió en el mensaje news:389ef0d.04011...@posting.google.com...
>
>
>>influencia de la Armada de Chile es Inglesa y en ningun caso alemana.
>>Asi hasta el himno favorito de Pinochet que es Lily Marlene han
>>tratado de vincularlo al Nazismo siendo que la canción es incluso
>>anterior de la llegada de Hitler al poder.
>
>
> Y anterior a la fundación del PNS alemán, fue compuesta en 1893.
Aprende a leer aleman nazi al cuete, 1893 es la fecha de nacimiento del
autor, la cancion data de 1937.
http://ingeb.org/garb/lmarleen.html
--
Francisco.
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva
"Francisco Sepulveda" <fsep...@bluewin.ch> escribió en el mensaje news:4001f4d7$1...@news.bluewin.ch...
Aprende a leer tú también, comunacho.
Efectivamente, el autor nació en 1893 (Hanz Leip, Hamburgo), pero la canción la compuso en 1915. La compuso en honor de Lili, su novia
Lo que ocurrió en 1937, fue la primera vez que se publicó dentro de un compendio de poesías del autor.
Saludos,
HV
José Miguel Santibáñez
Vásquez Villanueva <super...@ve-te-erre.net> dijo:
(...)
> A propósito de atentado al Pentágono... ¿sabes que nunca se encontró
> ningún resto de avión? Sabes que el forado en el edificio no
> corresponde al dejado por un avión comercial?
Leiste el libro del francés???
(yo no he podido conseguirlo).
(...)
eso...
--
Jose M. Santibañez A.
<j...@nivel5.cl>
<http://caos.cl/jms>
Adrian Longueira
> "Adrian Longueira" <al...@chile.com> escribió en el mensaje
news:389ef0d.04011...@posting.google.com...
> A propósito de atentado al Pentágono... ¿sabes que nunca se encontró ningún
resto de avión? Sabes que el forado en el edificio no corresponde al dejado
por un avión comercial?
> Considero que hay suficiente información para considerar seriamente la
posibilidad de un autoatentado.
No se como se supondría que tendria que ser el forado de grande, pero
tampoco tiene porque coincidir exactamente con el tamaño y forma del
avión, cuya estructura es deformable, se puede partir y ademas tampoco hay
que contar conque fuera un choque perfectamente frontal. La idea es que
las alas, al impactar, se comportan como si fuera un avion de geometria
variable, doblandose hacia adentro cual tornado britanico hasta pegarse al
fuselaje. Es exactamente lo que determinaron las investigaciones sobre el
accidente de un Boeing 747 de carga de El Al en Amsterdam en el año 1992,
en ese caso tampoco coincidia el tamaño del avion con el del agujero en el
bloque de departamentos con el que indudablemente impacto.
fotos : http://homepage.ntlworld.com/steveseymour/pentagon/illusion2a.gif
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/steveseymour/pentagon/illusion1a.gif
Creo que tampoco es cierto que no hubiera restos del avión en el
Pentágono, si bien es cierto que no había grandes pedazos facilmente
identificables.
http://www.geoffmetcalf.com/pentagon/images/13.jpg
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/PENTPLANE/aedrive6.jpg
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/PENTPLANE/pa_00239.jpg
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/PENTPLANE/pentagonplanetire.jpg
No es extraño que no existieran trozos por todos lados, los aviones
comerciales son de aleaciones simples, tampoco he visto partes de los
Boeing entre los restos de las Torres Gemelas y todos vimos como chocaron
esos aviones en las torres.
Cuando un avión choca a esa velocidad contra concreto practicamente se
desintegra. Estas son pruebas de un F-4 chocando contra una pared de
concreto de 3.66 metros de grosor. El video muestra que del avión
practicamente no queda nada (estan al pie de la pagina).
http://www.sandia.gov/media/NRgallery00-03.htm
fotos:
http://www.sandia.gov/media/images/jpg/f4_image1.jpg
http://www.sandia.gov/media/images/jpg/f4_image2.jpg
http://www.sandia.gov/media/images/jpg/f4_image3.jpg
Por lo demás, soy poco amigo de teorias conspirativas y algunas de las
hipotesis no tienen ningun sentido. ¿Un misil? ¿Qué misil? ¿Un tomahawk?,
¿Algo tipo misil Tow? ¿un vulgar rpg? Podemos entrar a discutir caso por
caso, pero no le veo mucho asidero.
Pero es que ademas tenemos 4 aviones secuestrados, 4 aviones estrellados y
las victimas identificadas de esos 4 vuelos. Si lo que impacto en el
Pentagono no fue uno de esos aviones, ¿donde impacto entonces el cuarto
avion? ¿Donde esta? No tiene sentido.
Atentamente
Adrian Longueira
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva
Hay una innumerable cantidad de información que muestra lo contrario... por lo menos permítame el beneficio de la duda.
http://guardian.911review.org/Hufschmid/PentagonPlaneCrash.html
http://www.lightscion.com/no_plane_hit_pentagon.htm
http://killtown.911review.org/flight77/debris.html
Saludos,
HV
"Adrian Longueira" <al...@chile.com> escribió en el mensaje news:3NoMb.504$lc....@jagger.tie.cl...
J.
Hernán Vásquez Villanueva wrote:
> Apenas.
>
> Mire para el norte nomás y vea de cuántos nos salvaron esos 3.000
¡Miren la filosofia de este loco hijo de puta! Ubiquense los
venezolanos: este sujeto aplaudió a Carmona el Breve.
j.
J.
...Y tambien por caricaturizar.
j.
J.
Y cree, el caricaturista Longueira, que con esa ridicula 'defensa' de
Pinochet puede desmentir la evidente inspiracion nazi de su dictadura.
Por lo demas, ser judio no impide ser nazi. O neo-nazi. Y por ultimo,
¿por que no se refiere Longueira a la guarida de nazis alemanes de
Colonia Dignidad, sucursal represiva del VC? ¡Era el 'campo de recreo'
de milicos y derechistas civiles, con los que el comulga!
j.
Peter Cantropus
Me saco el sombrero.
Una demostracion académica de como se elabora una argumentacion
convincente y con conocimiento del paño. Acepte mi felicitacion, don
Longueira.
Peter Cantropus
Pelicano
Serrano en su tiempo, ningún nacionalista hubiera regalado toda la
industria nacional al extranjero.
Quizás se podría considerar nacionalista si aceptamos que su corazón lo
tiene en usa.
J. wrote:
>
>
> Fortinbras wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>> Una de las mentiras favoritas de la izquierda ha sido tratar de hacer
>>>> creer que el gobierno de Pinochet tenía raices nazistas. Craso error
>>>> ya que el gobierno de Pinochet tuvo asesores judios como Sergio Melnik
>>>> que llegó a ser Ministro de la Oficina de Planificación, incluso el
>>>> gobierno de Pinochet fue el que inicio cordiales relaciones con las
>>>> Fuerzas Armadas de Israel, incluso gran parte del equipamiento de las
>>>> Fuerzas Armadas chilenas proviene de ese pais. Más gracioso es decir
>>>> que el Buque Escuela de la Armada Chilena "La Esmeralda" estaba lleno
>>>> de cuadros de Hitler y simbolos nazistas. Cualquiera sabe que la
>>>> influencia de la Armada de Chile es Inglesa y en ningun caso alemana.
>>>> Asi hasta el himno favorito de Pinochet que es Lily Marlene han
>>>> tratado de vincularlo al Nazismo siendo que la canción es incluso
>>>> anterior de la llegada de Hitler al poder.
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> De las cosas que uno a la vejez se viene a enterar ...
>
>
> Y cree, el caricaturista Longueira, que con esa ridicula 'defensa' de
> Pinochet puede desmentir la evidente inspiracion nazi de su dictadura.
> Por lo demas, ser judio no impide ser nazi. O neo-nazi. Y por ultimo,
> żpor que no se refiere Longueira a la guarida de nazis alemanes de
> Colonia Dignidad, sucursal represiva del VC? ĄEra el 'campo de recreo'
Wilfredo Diaz
quiere decir
es que los judios sabian que las torres serian atacadas, metase la cabeza en
el culo y respire duro!.
Fred
"gato2002" <gato200...@vtr.net> wrote in message
news:btsdlv$pjn$1...@news1.nivel5.cl...
AT
"Ramoncho" <ra...@surebase.com> wrote in message
news:btseho$aiqsg$1...@ID-170870.news.uni-berlin.de...
Tick-Tock Man
como los comunistas eliminan a sus enemigos,por eso lo odian tanto,les dio
su misma medicna y ahora se quejan,mas que eso dejo el poder y permition
elecciones libres cosa que ningun puerco comunista ah hecho nunca,por eso lo
odian tanto,por salvar a Chile del comunismo,eso no se lo perdonan,ellos
quisieran ver a toda la America Latina como Cuba,esclavizada,pero se
jodieron,se le cayo la madre patria URSS y ahora son mas capitalistas que
nadie :)
"Fortinbras" <Forti...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:btsmrg$fsd$1...@rex.ip-plus.net...
Luis de Miami
Luis
"Tick-Tock Man" <ea...@dot.com> wrote in message
news:7OKMb.5150$eq....@bignews6.bellsouth.net...
usenet
Tick-Tock Man a écrit :
>
> Lo unico que cuenta es que Pinochet elimino a los comunistas ,
Exactamente lo mismo que se decia de Hitler en 1936, vea que
coincidencia...
Saludos
Mario "el franchute"
Tick-Tock Man
coincidencia no?
"usenet" <g...@vatican.com> wrote in message
news:40044E7D...@vatican.com...
<Nervio>
dejar hacer para que usa pateara traseros arabes.
"Wilfredo Diaz" <wdia...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:itWdnSBdvuq...@comcast.com...
usenet
Tick-Tock Man a écrit :
> > > Lo unico que cuenta es que Pinochet elimino a los comunistas ,
> >
> > Exactamente lo mismo que se decia de Hitler en 1936, vea que
> > coincidencia...
>
> No es coincidencia ,ademas se te olvido mencionar a Stalin y Pol Pot que
> coincidencia no?
No veo el sentido de su comentario. Usted realmente cree que alguien
dijo "lo unico que quenta es que Stalin y Pol Pot eliminaron a los
comunistas" ?
Saludos
Mario "el franchute"
Tick-Tock Man
conviene.
"usenet" <g...@vatican.com> wrote in message
news:40059C0B...@vatican.com...
Er Pipe
> Aunque el atentado a las torres gemelas, de acuerdo a la información que
> se dispone, se sabia que iba a ocurrir.
> pd:Que hay de cierto que el día del atentado a las torres, cerca de
> 5.000 judíos que trabajaban misteriosamente no fueron?.
>
Falso, revise la lista de fallecidos, diria que un 10% eran de origen judio
Er Pipe
Por que en cuanto a mentiras se trata las derechas son expertas.
Como esa que decia que allende tenia un sequito de cubanas para
servirlo o que los comunistas comian guaguas (niños pequeños) y hay
casos peores
por lo que tu articulo es claramente trasnochado y absolutamente
irrelevante
usenet
Tick-Tock Man a écrit :
>
> Los comunistas son todos iguales se fingen los ignorantes cuando les
> conviene.
En cambio, los anticomunistas no necesitan fingirlo porque lo son...
Saludos
mario "el franchute"
Tick-Tock Man
mal,vete a que te den por el culo a ver si se te quita esa pajareria.
"usenet" <g...@vatican.com> wrote in message
news:4006E96A...@vatican.com...
usenet
Tick-Tock Man a écrit :
> > > Los comunistas son todos iguales se fingen los ignorantes cuando les
> > > conviene.
> >
> > En cambio, los anticomunistas no necesitan fingirlo porque lo son...
>
> Mira jinetera no vas a tupir a mas infelices a que le rindan culto a
> mal, vete a que te den por el culo a ver si se te quita esa pajareria.
Tsk tsk tsk... temper, temper...
Saludos
Mario "el franchute"
Jorge Sendón
żLo recomienda por experiencia?
A ud. parece que es remedio le hizo bien.
El Thu, 15 Jan 2004 17:59:53 -0500, "Tick-Tock Man" <ea...@dot.com>
escribió:
>vete a que te den por el culo a ver si se te quita esa pajareria.
"Si la corbata esta muy apretada
la sangre fluye al cerebro con dificultad
y uno comienza a razonar como George W. Bush"
Robin Williams
pedro martori
cucaracha, a ti es a quien te hizo buen remedo... no hinche pelotas...que te
sabemos bien esa vieja historia con el congo Benito...y las del Muro
...contra ese mismo muro fue que traicionastes a tu amiguita idolatrada
Raulita...
y que nos cuentas de tu carrerita por el Brazil...?
segun dijeron unos brazileiros que te conocieron eras la mas popular de
todas las travestidas de Malos Aires .
"Jorge Sendón" <iorg...@satlink.com> wrote in message
news:kqrj00d61qulk1lh0...@4ax.com...
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