One of These Days
Richard
One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
fully contained in microchips.
The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his
reality consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying
algorithms? Might he not deduce that somewhat else was required in order
to "run" those programs. Isn't it in fact true that there would be no
substantive distinction whatsoever between his perceived objective
universe and his subjective universe, both being, as it were, algorithms
run on the same computer?
Isn't it possible then, that our thoughts are no less real than the
objective universe that we perceive, both being constructed of the same
substance? And yet it if this is so, which seems to be a perfectly valid
conjecture, then there would yet remain the requirement of a reality
that was quite beyond our observable or even ponderable reach, within
which both subjective and objective reality are given their singular
substance?
--
Richard Perry
Electromagnetism: First Principles
(A correct variation of the Weber/Gauss synthesis,
derived from what else? First Principles, i.e. from the empirical
evidence.)
http://www.cswnet.com/~rper
htm. and pdf. versions
Bob Kolker
Richard wrote:
>
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
Nope. A finite computer cannot model an infinite regression. If what you
say is true, then the computer will model itself modeling itself, as it
models itself .... ad infinitim.
The universe must have more parts than the computer which is a very
small subset of the universe. How can a finite entity model an infinite
decreasing cluster of sets.
Bob Kolker
Richard
It is unnecessary to model infinity Bob. Do you perceive infinite data?
I should think not. The program need only be as complex as the
consciousness that it generates. IOW the his virtual objective universe
need not even be contained on the computer, and he would be none the
wiser.
Uncle Al
>
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
Bullshit.
Given n particles, the number of unique binary interactions is
n(n-1)/2. A cubic inch of water at 39 degrees Fahrenheit holds
1.5x10^47 binary interactions. If you had one silicon atom modeling
one binary interaction in a cubic inch of water (wildly optimistic,
that), your microprocessor would weigh in at 7x10^18 metric tons, plus
wiring. That is 1% of the entire Earth's mass (less the wiring).
Water has more than binary interactions; the universe is bigger than a
cubic inch of water.
Any crackpot spew that is defeated by arihtmetic is particularly
inferior.
Heterodox science has high standards of creativity and quantitative
falsifiability,
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/eotvos.htm
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" The Net!
Richard
LOL:-)
Do all those calculations take place in your head every time you think
about water Al? You missed the boat, goose. It is unnecessary to
simulate those complexities in order to simulate your belief in them as
objective realities. Our minds work on the digital system, simply
because we cannot but think in terms of discreet "things", from whence
originates our conception of "quantities" and from there "set theory".
Nature is not however obliged to comply to your fancies.
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: alt.philosophy.debate; on Sun, 28 Apr 2002 16:30:11 -0500
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> Uncle Al wrote:
> >
> > Richard wrote:
> > >
> > > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> > > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
> > [snip]
> >
> > Bullshit.
> >
> > Given n particles, the number of unique binary interactions is
> > n(n-1)/2. A cubic inch of water at 39 degrees Fahrenheit holds
> > 1.5x10^47 binary interactions. If you had one silicon atom modeling
> > one binary interaction in a cubic inch of water (wildly optimistic,
> > that), your microprocessor would weigh in at 7x10^18 metric tons, plus
> > wiring. That is 1% of the entire Earth's mass (less the wiring).
> > Water has more than binary interactions; the universe is bigger than a
> > cubic inch of water.
> >
> > Any crackpot spew that is defeated by arihtmetic is particularly
> > inferior.
> >
>
> LOL:-)
> Do all those calculations take place in your head every time you think
> about water Al? You missed the boat, goose. It is unnecessary to
> simulate those complexities in order to simulate your belief in them as
> objective realities. Our minds work on the digital system, simply
> because we cannot but think in terms of discreet "things", from whence
> originates our conception of "quantities" and from there "set theory".
> Nature is not however obliged to comply to your fancies.
Great rebuttal.
--
Friar Broccoli
Robert Keith Elias (Quebec, Qc, Canada) By: kelias (from) clic.net
Best programmer's & all purpose text editor: http://www.semware.com
--------- I consider ALL arguments in support of my views ---------
Mark Fergerson
>
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
>
> The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his
> reality consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying
> algorithms? Might he not deduce that somewhat else was required in order
> to "run" those programs. Isn't it in fact true that there would be no
> substantive distinction whatsoever between his perceived objective
> universe and his subjective universe, both being, as it were, algorithms
> run on the same computer?
>
> Isn't it possible then, that our thoughts are no less real than the
> objective universe that we perceive, both being constructed of the same
> substance? And yet it if this is so, which seems to be a perfectly valid
> conjecture, then there would yet remain the requirement of a reality
> that was quite beyond our observable or even ponderable reach, within
> which both subjective and objective reality are given their singular
> substance?
Don't hold your breath; even the perceived Universe is a
lot richer than it seems. Investigate the startling results
of psychedelic drug usage. It essentially turns off (or
rather unresricts) the normal filtering our minds use to
shield themselves from the flood of raw data we'd otherwise
have to cope with. Remember that all that data is there
whether we notice it or not. But if it isn't there when we
look...
Since your replies seem to indicate you don't want an
quantitative answer, go read _Entoverse_ by Hogan. It's a
SciFi treatment of exactly what you describe.
Mark L. Fergerson
Dirk Van de moortel
"Richard" <no_mail@no_spam.com> wrote in message news:3CCC69E3.F36425D7@no_spam.com...
Your boat has sunk before it hit the water.
Think about the numbers before you decide to ignore them.
No way out.
> It is unnecessary to
> simulate those complexities in order to simulate your belief in them as
> objective realities.
A belief is slightly more complicated than that simple
cubic inch of water.
Think about the numbers again.
> Our minds work on the digital system, simply
> because we cannot but think in terms of discreet "things",
We prefer to think in *continuous* things because that's the
way we can easily differentiate and integrate.
> from whence
> originates our conception of "quantities" and from there "set theory".
And then we can't wait to start defining stuff, in order to
finally arrive at continuity to be able to start modelling and
do the job we need to do.
> Nature is not however obliged to comply to your fancies.
Not obliged. I just does.
No way out.
Dirk Vdm
Richard
Make that a gaggle;-) No offense, but you are just not grasping the
argument. If you were, you would see the irony in your reply.
Richard
I did not imply that it isn't there when we look, but it isn't provable
either that its substance is anything other than our impression of it.
>
> Since your replies seem to indicate you don't want an
> quantitative answer, go read _Entoverse_ by Hogan. It's a
> SciFi treatment of exactly what you describe.
>
> Mark L. Fergerson
I need look no further than usenet; this is no new conundrum. It was
just for fun;-)
X
> > > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
I'm not often one who says something can't be done, but accounting for all the
phenomena in the universe is pretty much as close to an impossible task as I can
imagine. We know next to nothing, except for the most superficial picture of
the universe, and some conjecture based upon our very imperfect facts. From the
scope of truth our sciences look as relevant and superficial Ancient Egypt's.
-X
Uncle Al
Uncle Al offered you some rope and you tied a noose. We proceed with
the hanging: I obviously referred to molecules interacting in that
cubic inch of water. But molecules don't mean diddly squat to
modeling their own interaction. You must start at a sub-atomic basis
to get any kind of decent molecular numbers out computationally.
Again assigning one silicon atom per binary interaction... Oh dear,
your computer for modeling a single cubic inch of water EXACTLY now
weighs more than the entire Milky Way galaxy, and you haven't even
wired the microprocessor's (talk about an oxymoron) vias. Bet yer
gonna suffer line delays as data travels.
But wait! You are going to save on computation by modeling it
semi-empirically! Boy, that certanly reduces the size of the
microprocessor. Now your RAM is bigger than the Milky Way galaxy.
Uncle Al calls this "a big improvement."
My boy, you are the ruderal along humanity's intellectual road.
Richard
Make that "rudder".
You still don't grasp the argument. Perhaps a short refresher in phsych
101 will remind you that all you have to go on, all that you have to
formulate arguments about, are the pieces of trivia that constitute your
mind. We are relegated to our subjective interpretations, of which the
limiting process is one. Correspondence of concepts to objective reality
is synonymous with correspondence to "perception" of reality, simply
because that's as close as we can come to it.
Richard
>
> > > > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> > > > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
>
> I'm not often one who says something can't be done, but accounting for all the
> phenomena in the universe is pretty much as close to an impossible task as I can
> imagine. We know next to nothing, except for the most superficial picture of
> the universe, and some conjecture based upon our very imperfect facts. From the
> scope of truth our sciences look as relevant and superficial Ancient Egypt's.
>
But then that would be from "your" scope; from where I stand the true
algorithms have already been derived. Maybe one of these
days.........;-)
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: alt.philosophy.debate; on Sun, 28 Apr 2002 15:33:35 -0500
Concerning "One of These Days";
A few comments, mostly intended to add to the general confusion. I
will eventually get to a couple of points that will indirectly touch on
the potential capacity of the computer involved, and provide a
plausible (well maybe) explanation of why such a virtual universe might
have been constructed.
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
First, this is not an original argument. The Irish Bishop, George
Berkeley (1685-1753) first dreamed up this idea. (OK, he was just
first to write it down.) He didn't have a computer handy, so he used
God (who is widely believed to have quite a lot of processing power)
instead.
Not wanting to be left out, the biologists got into the picture with
"brain-in-a-bath". Try proving you're not a brain-in-a-bath. I guess
that one could be traced back too Mary Shelley (1797-1851) who wrote
Frankenstein. If you feed it the right signals, a brain has no way of
knowing whether it's in a body or in a bath. You don't require much
computing power to do the job either.
In philosophy (I am writing from a philosophy group) this is the
extreme end of the sense perception problem. How can we know that the
information provided to us by our senses is valid? As any police
officer who interviews witnesses to a crime can tell you ... you can't.
A few years ago Scientific American (this was before they started
fighting to attract the 12 year old reader, and before it was
discovered that the rate of cosmic expansion is increasing) ran an
article modelling the fate of the universe out to 10^100 years (1
followed by 100 zero's for the 12 year olds).
As I recall from memory, starting from where we are at 10^10, things
are already going to be pretty cold and miserable by 10^12 years (or
there abouts). Mostly, we will be warming our hands around brown
dwarfs, which will be just about the only heat source left. At 10^15
organic life will probably be long past, and at 10^20 it will be
completely out of the question ... background tempertures of -200C
(73K) or something like that.
At this point, the only conscious life that will be around will be
inside computers. The SA article talked a lot about low temperature
superconductors and similar technologies, and crazy schemes for
collecting energy from objects as they fall into black holes. I got
the impression that everything would be just fine out to 10^50 or
10^80, after which things become REALLY bleak, (but mom tells me not
to dwell on such negative thoughts.)
I'M GETTING TO THE POINT.
Anyway the period between 10^20 and 10^50 years represents a duration
that is 10^40 times the current age of the universe. So I am imagining
planet size groups of quantum computers wandering around space, and the
consciousnesses inside (some of whom might once have been human) are
getting REALLY bored, so they start creating virtual universes within
which they can forget their mundane existences. (I can imagine other
motivations for running such simulations, but for this discussion,
boredom will do.)
An important point to note here is that, if (for some silly reason)
they actually wanted to model EVERY atom on and in the planet, they
could do so, not because of their computing power, but because of the
time available. If they needed a hundred million years to model a day
on earth, why not. We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
time subjectively.
I had intended to spend the weekend saving the world
By writing DOE about the need to extract hot water
energy from the super volcano below Yellow Stone
national park. But I guess, I'll have to save the
world next weekend.
Cordially;
Richard
An excellent observation, and not overlooked, but merely assumed to be
obvious;-)
Boris Mohar
(Robert Keith Elias) wrote:
Snip...
> We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
> of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
> time subjectively.
>
Do we have the means for determining the "speed of time" in this
reality? I am not talking about relative measurements but what if the
rate of passage of time is changing?
X
> algorithms have already been derived. Maybe one of these
> days.........;-)
I woudn't underestimate my scope.........;-)
--
Email X at: xus...@hotmail.com
Thomas McDonald
this guy's thesis is that time is merely the perception/experience of
motion, and does not exist apart from us:
--tom
Richard
Another interesting observation, very interesting. I am impressed!
Richard
>
> time may not exist 'outside' of our perception/experience.
>
> this guy's thesis is that time is merely the perception/experience of
> motion, and does not exist apart from us:
I concur.
>
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195145925/qid=1020045464/sr=2-1/ref=sr_2_1/103-5052548-4527837
>
> --tom
>
> Boris Mohar wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 Apr 2002 21:33:04 -0400, REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net
> > (Robert Keith Elias) wrote:
> >
> > Snip...
> >
> >
> >
> >> We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
> >>of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
> >>time subjectively.
> >>
> >
> >
> > Do we have the means for determining the "speed of time" in this
> > reality? I am not talking about relative measurements but what if the
> > rate of passage of time is changing?
> >
> >
> >
> >
Russ Rose
To the "cubic inch of water" math wizards: Simulations do not require a
reproduction of position, vector, and velocity of each and every subatomic
particle to appear "real".
The human mind is only dimly aware of the biochemistry occurring at any
given time, and always on a macroscopic level. The mind also fills in any
gaps in the data with what it expects to see or feel. Similarly the memory
retained over a lifetime is miniscule relative to what actually occurred.
For a computer to simulate a human mind in real time should be achievable in
the next decade or so.
The good thing for your question is, if we are attempting to simulate a
universe to a simulated mind in that universe, it does not have to happen in
real time. The entire process could be slowed down by a factor of a
thousand, billion, etc. without the simulated "person" realizing the
difference. For a single mind you only need to provide data to the five
senses, some two dimensional characters, a little scenery, and the most
difficult part - the illusion of free will. Certainly the more "free will"
minds you attempt to simulate at the same time, the more of a need for
resources you will have, but this can always be compensated for by slowing
down "time".
Knowing whether it is real from within the simulation would depend on the
skill of the programmer. The more direct question: is your mind simply a set
of algorithms running on God's iMac? If so, he's one hell of a programmer -
pun intended.
My question, as with the question of free will, would it matter if this was
only a simulation? Would you live your life differently?
Your question was well explored in the STNG episode #138 "Ship In A Bottle".
"The Matrix" and "The Truman Show" are similar explorations of what is real.
"Richard" <no_mail@no_spam.com> wrote in message
news:3CCC5C9F.17180229@no_spam.com...
Bill Taylor
|> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
|> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
No it won't! Never.
|> evolution within [such an approximate] virtual universe [may] yield
|> a virtual conscious entity,
It may, but fiddling in an external design would be waaaaay faster and safer.
More "standard" AI seems yet a lot easier to acheive, however, especially for...
|> The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his reality
|> consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying algortihms
One thing I learned from a religious apologetics book, maybe the only thing,
was to beware of "nothing-buttery". Lovely term. But whenever somone says
that something is "nothing but" something else, you're about to have the wool
pulled over your eyes.
It could even be said that the only thing that makes us really human is
"nothing but" a series of self modifying algortihms. The fact is that being
"a series of self modifying algorithms" is not very *mere*, it is THE GOODS.
The rest of your post is rendered irrelevant due to the negative response to
the first remark above.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The universe is its own fastest simulator.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dirk Bruere
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
http://www.simulation-argument.com/
Dirk
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: alt.philosophy.debate; on Sun, 28 Apr 2002 21:28:56 -0500
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> Thomas McDonald wrote:
> >
> > time may not exist 'outside' of our perception/experience.
> >
> > this guy's thesis is that time is merely the perception/experience of
> > motion, and does not exist apart from us:
>
> I concur.
Me too (I think).
> >
> > http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195145925/qid=1020045464/sr=2-1/ref=sr_2_1/103-5052548-4527837
> >
> > --tom
> >
> > Boris Mohar wrote:
> > > On Sun, 28 Apr 2002 21:33:04 -0400, REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net
> > > (Robert Keith Elias) wrote:
> > >
> > > Snip...
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
> > >>of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
> > >>time subjectively.
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > > Do we have the means for determining the "speed of time" in this
> > > reality? I am not talking about relative measurements but what if the
> > > rate of passage of time is changing?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
>
> --
> Richard Perry
> Electromagnetism: First Principles
> (A correct variation of the Weber/Gauss synthesis,
> derived from what else? First Principles, i.e. from the empirical
> evidence.)
> http://www.cswnet.com/~rper
> htm. and pdf. versions
--
Spaceman
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
You have never heard of The Sims huh?
It's getting there.
but,
Virtual worlds will need to remove time dialtion effects
or the virtual ships will crash into the virtual planets.
virtual worlds use real speed addition.
or they don't work correctly.
<LOL>
How do I know
I build virtual worlds for a hobby!.
Starships too for the virtual world.
and.
I'll tell ya!
don't listen to relative clocks or you'll crash into
something that could care less about time <G>
<LOL>
Charles Moeller
>(Robert Keith Elias) wrote:
>
> Snip...
>
>> We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
>> of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
>> time subjectively.
>>
>
> Do we have the means for determining the "speed of time" in this
>reality? I am not talking about relative measurements but what if the
>rate of passage of time is changing?
>
It does not matter what the "speed of time" is because it is the order of
events,
not the spacing between them that ultimately determine the character of the
universe.
Regards,
Charlie
Charles Moeller
>Richard wrote:
>>
>> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
>> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
>
>Nope. A finite computer cannot model an infinite regression. If what you
>say is true, then the computer will model itself modeling itself, as it
>models itself .... ad infinitim.
>
>The universe must have more parts than the computer which is a very
>small subset of the universe. How can a finite entity model an infinite
>decreasing cluster of sets.
>
Then there is the matter of discrete vs. continuous.
A computer is an assemblage of discrete operations operating on
discrete objects, whereas the Universe is an assemblage of continua
that contain assemblages of discrete objects.
The discrete computer may model the discrete, but can't fully model
the continua.
Regards,
Charlie
X
or Jean Grey turning into the Phoenix, feeding on suns and destroying solar
systems? More seriously how do you account for the unknown phoneme, wild
cards that definitely exist, less dramatically interesting, but just as
random? You'd have to account for what you couldn't possibly know and what
would now be considered science fiction. Any model you'd come up with would
be completely superficial.
-X
Richard wrote:
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
>
> The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his
> reality consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying
> algorithms? Might he not deduce that somewhat else was required in order
> to "run" those programs. Isn't it in fact true that there would be no
> substantive distinction whatsoever between his perceived objective
> universe and his subjective universe, both being, as it were, algorithms
> run on the same computer?
>
> Isn't it possible then, that our thoughts are no less real than the
> objective universe that we perceive, both being constructed of the same
> substance? And yet it if this is so, which seems to be a perfectly valid
> conjecture, then there would yet remain the requirement of a reality
> that was quite beyond our observable or even ponderable reach, within
> which both subjective and objective reality are given their singular
> substance?
>
> --
> Richard Perry
> Electromagnetism: First Principles
> (A correct variation of the Weber/Gauss synthesis,
> derived from what else? First Principles, i.e. from the empirical
> evidence.)
> http://www.cswnet.com/~rper
> htm. and pdf. versions
--
Email X at: xus...@hotmail.com
Dirk Van de moortel
"Richard" <no_mail@no_spam.com> wrote in message news:3CCC89A2.A6921C84@no_spam.com...
> Uncle Al wrote:
> >
> > My boy, you are the ruderal along humanity's intellectual road.
>
> Make that "rudder".
>
> You still don't grasp the argument. Perhaps a short refresher in phsych
> 101 will remind you that all you have to go on, all that you have to
> formulate arguments about, are the pieces of trivia that constitute your
> mind. We are relegated to our subjective interpretations, of which the
> limiting process is one. Correspondence of concepts to objective reality
> is synonymous with correspondence to "perception" of reality, simply
> because that's as close as we can come to it.
Remains the fact that "the pieces of trivia that constitute your
mind" are still more than slighly more complicated than that
cubic inch of water.
Calling it LOL, gaggle or rudder won't make it go away.
Dirk Vdm
Neil W Rickert
>Bob Kolker wrote:
>> Richard wrote:
>> > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
>> > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
>> Nope. A finite computer cannot model an infinite regression. If what you
>> say is true, then the computer will model itself modeling itself, as it
>> models itself .... ad infinitim.
>It is unnecessary to model infinity Bob. Do you perceive infinite data?
I think you missed the point. Kolker is pointing out
that your hypothesis implies infinitude.
Richard
Any program adheres to specific rules of engagement, we call that the
"code". If the virtual Universe differed that would not negate the fact
that the rules by which it operated could be deduced by observation.
Moreover, I'd like to know where the randomness comes in? Programs are
always perfectly determinate.
X
> "code". If the virtual Universe differed that would not negate the fact
> that the rules by which it operated could be deduced by observation.
> Moreover, I'd like to know where the randomness comes in? Programs are
> always perfectly determinate.
>
That's what I mean you're program will be perfectly determinate where reality will
not. It's healthy for you to try but it's also somewhat of a fools errand.
-X
-X
Richard
>
> > Any program adheres to specific rules of engagement, we call that the
> > "code". If the virtual Universe differed that would not negate the fact
> > that the rules by which it operated could be deduced by observation.
> > Moreover, I'd like to know where the randomness comes in? Programs are
> > always perfectly determinate.
> >
>
> That's what I mean you're program will be perfectly determinate where reality will
> not. It's healthy for you to try but it's also somewhat of a fools errand.
Yes you are correct on that last note, only a fool would look at the
predictability, repeatability, regularity, and orderliness of events in
our universe and say, hey!, there is nothing determinate about what's
taking place here, it must be a completely randomized and unregulated
system I'm looking at.
Zagan
"Mark Fergerson" <mferg...@cox.net> wrote in message
news:3CCC743E...@cox.net...
> Richard wrote:
> >
> > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> > unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> > virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> > respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> > fully contained in microchips.
> >
> > The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his
> > reality consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying
> > algorithms? Might he not deduce that somewhat else was required in order
> > to "run" those programs. Isn't it in fact true that there would be no
> > substantive distinction whatsoever between his perceived objective
> > universe and his subjective universe, both being, as it were, algorithms
> > run on the same computer?
> >
> > Isn't it possible then, that our thoughts are no less real than the
> > objective universe that we perceive, both being constructed of the same
> > substance? And yet it if this is so, which seems to be a perfectly valid
> > conjecture, then there would yet remain the requirement of a reality
> > that was quite beyond our observable or even ponderable reach, within
> > which both subjective and objective reality are given their singular
> > substance?
>
> lot richer than it seems. Investigate the startling results
> of psychedelic drug usage. It essentially turns off (or
> rather unresricts) the normal filtering our minds use to
> shield themselves from the flood of raw data we'd otherwise
> have to cope with. Remember that all that data is there
> whether we notice it or not. But if it isn't there when we
> look...
>
> quantitative answer, go read _Entoverse_ by Hogan. It's a
> SciFi treatment of exactly what you describe.
>
> Mark L. Fergerson
[Zagan]
I would also recommend "Realtime Interrupt" by the same author, James P.
Hogan. ISBN 0-555-57455-0.
// Jim
--
|| Free Science Fiction
|| The Keepers of Forever
|| Read reviews & download Novel
|| www.atlantic.net/~jcd
Zagan
"X" <cont...@thisgroup.com> wrote in message
news:3CCC8532...@thisgroup.com...
> > > > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual
universe
> > > > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
>
> I'm not often one who says something can't be done, but accounting for all
the
> phenomena in the universe is pretty much as close to an impossible task as
I can
> imagine. We know next to nothing, except for the most superficial picture
of
> the universe, and some conjecture based upon our very imperfect facts.
From the
> scope of truth our sciences look as relevant and superficial Ancient
Egypt's.
>
> -X
<snip>
[Zagan]
I'm not sure what to intended to say here about artificial reality, but your
point does indicate that a perfect simulation of the universe is not
necessary to create an artificial reality that could be mistaken of reality
itself. While a simulation of our incomplete knowledge will itself be a
tremendous task, I have no doubt it will one day be achieved. Likely none of
us will be alive to see it, but I expect it will happen. I disagree with the
original poster quoted above, but as you have pointed out, perfect knowledge
is not required, just enough to convince us.
Of course, I could be wrong. :^)
Zagan
"Boris Mohar" <borism-no...@sympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:mr9pcu4dqkm48nbi5...@4ax.com...
[Zagan]
As a previous poster pointed out, the rate of time is subjective. Should the
creators of such a computer/program decide to upgrade the processor to a
faster one, the program would stop for the realtime required. The
inhabitants of the artificial reality would not notice this nor would they
notice the speed-up since their notion of time is deternined by the
computer's clock. There would be no way for them to notice this since their
perception would not have changed. They have no way to compare their
subjective time to real physical time. In the real physical world, time
could be changing rates, but we'd never notice it since time governs our
biological processes, and more importantly our perception of such.
Zagan
"Thomas McDonald" <tmn...@optonline.net> wrote in message
news:3CCCAE2F...@optonline.net...
> time may not exist 'outside' of our perception/experience.
>
> this guy's thesis is that time is merely the perception/experience of
> motion, and does not exist apart from us:
>
>
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195145925/qid=1020045464/sr=2-1/ref=
sr_2_1/103-5052548-4527837
>
> --tom
>
> Boris Mohar wrote:
> > On Sun, 28 Apr 2002 21:33:04 -0400, REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net
> > (Robert Keith Elias) wrote:
> >
> > Snip...
> >
> >
> >
> >> We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
> >>of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
> >>time subjectively.
<snip>
[Zagan]
I agree.
Zagan
> How do you account for Gallactus the planet eating monster, the Death
Star,
> or Jean Grey turning into the Phoenix, feeding on suns and destroying
solar
> systems? More seriously how do you account for the unknown phoneme, wild
> cards that definitely exist, less dramatically interesting, but just as
> random? You'd have to account for what you couldn't possibly know and
what
> would now be considered science fiction. Any model you'd come up with
would
> be completely superficial.
>
> -X
>
<snip>
[Zagan]
What does Gallactus or the Death Star have to do with anything? The fact is,
we cannot prove conclusively that we, ourselves, are not living within a
computer created reality. Assuming that we are real physical beings, the
current state of computer technology cannot, in my opinion, produce such an
artificial reality. But this is not true of the future. We cannot predict
what computers may do in the future, and thus cannot rule out the notion
that we may, indeed, be "simulations."
Zagan
[Zagan]
This is true of current computers. But what about future computers yet to be
created? You are correct in stating that current computers are
deterministic. But what about a computer that generates random numbers using
radioactive decay? According the GM, you can't get more random than that.
Zagan
> X wrote:
> >
> > > Any program adheres to specific rules of engagement, we call that the
> > > "code". If the virtual Universe differed that would not negate the
fact
> > > that the rules by which it operated could be deduced by observation.
> > > Moreover, I'd like to know where the randomness comes in? Programs are
> > > always perfectly determinate.
> > >
> >
> > That's what I mean you're program will be perfectly determinate where
reality will
> > not. It's healthy for you to try but it's also somewhat of a fools
errand.
>
> Yes you are correct on that last note, only a fool would look at the
> predictability, repeatability, regularity, and orderliness of events in
> our universe and say, hey!, there is nothing determinate about what's
> taking place here, it must be a completely randomized and unregulated
> system I'm looking at.
[Zagan]
We are already able to provide computers with perfectly random events. It's
called radioactive decay.
Richard
>
> "Richard" <no_mail@no_spam.com> wrote in message
> news:3CCDCDE7.65156E5B@no_spam.com...
> > X wrote:
> > >
> > > > Any program adheres to specific rules of engagement, we call that the
> > > > "code". If the virtual Universe differed that would not negate the
> fact
> > > > that the rules by which it operated could be deduced by observation.
> > > > Moreover, I'd like to know where the randomness comes in? Programs are
> > > > always perfectly determinate.
> > > >
> > >
> > > That's what I mean you're program will be perfectly determinate where
> reality will
> > > not. It's healthy for you to try but it's also somewhat of a fools
> errand.
> >
> > Yes you are correct on that last note, only a fool would look at the
> > predictability, repeatability, regularity, and orderliness of events in
> > our universe and say, hey!, there is nothing determinate about what's
> > taking place here, it must be a completely randomized and unregulated
> > system I'm looking at.
>
> [Zagan]
> We are already able to provide computers with perfectly random events. It's
> called radioactive decay.
Does the program respond randomly to external input? I think not.
Now all that I need do is prove to you that radioactive decay is a
deterministic event. I have already posted the arguments to the
philosophy groups some time back, and they are, not to boast,
unassailable. Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the
term "possible" that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to
our cognitive lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur,
given initial conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial
parameters, and sufficient computational power every event becomes
"perfectly" determinable. So then, that we cannot determine when a
particular specimen will fission is a matter of only an ignorance of the
details leading up to that event. When we roll a die we can at first
utilize precisely tuned machinery and surface to produce what ever roll
desired, from the simplest event of simply sliding the die without
rotation to up to a couple of turns about a particular axis. At what
point does the final outcome transmute from determinism to randomness?
Only at the point were our intelligence gathering ceases to be
sufficient to make that determination.
In order to assail this argument, you must define that turning point, if
you can indeed locate such, and then you must provide the reason why it
always happens to correspond to our level of information of the original
system but yet be independent of it?. Good luck. Above all I value
sound logic, and the soundness of this argument should be quite apparent
even to the most logically challenged, it is quite obviously
unassailable.
Richard Herring
In message <3CD02A0B.6B85C9C1@no_spam.com>, Richard
<no_mail@no_spam.com> writes
>Now all that I need do is prove to you that radioactive decay is a
>deterministic event. I have already posted the arguments to the
>philosophy groups some time back, and they are, not to boast,
>unassailable.
However sound the chain of reasoning, the conclusion is no better than
its premises.
> Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the
>term "possible" that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to
>our cognitive lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur,
>given initial conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial
>parameters, and sufficient computational power every event becomes
>"perfectly" determinable.
That sounds remarkably like a local hidden-variables theory of QM. Such
theories have measurable consequences.
--
Richard Herring
Michael Crowe
impossibility in the question of the computer. But I think a major part of
the point Richard was making was more to do with conciousness and
metaphysics - if we could possibly be a simulation. The answer from a purely
scientific view as you put the question is no. For this reason:
+ The simulation is self consistant in every, by definition
+ This means the people inside the simulation cannot influence the computer
+ Without an effect that can be done on the computer (*experiment*) then
there is no relevant cause (you cannot cause nothing)
+ The computer is outside the causality of the simulation people
+ Anything outside causality is, by Occams razor, outside of science.
Reallity is a slippery concept, but by saying something is by definition not
observable or detectable then it can play no role in the universe.
The reason I say "as you put the question" is that if you were to propose an
imperfect simulation, then there could be inconsistencies that would allow a
person to theoretically deduce the existance of the computer. We could exist
in this system, because knowledge of the computer would increase our
understanding.
Some metaphysicists would argue that this proves that a perfect simulation
could never be built. This being a more powerful assertion than that on
other posts because this asserts that you cannot simulate a perfectly self
conistent, closed universe whether it be the same as ours, or different
(i.e. smaller).
Mike Crowe
"Richard" <no_mail@no_spam.com> wrote in message
news:3CCC5C9F.17180229@no_spam.com...
>
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
>
> The question is: Could he conceivably deduce by any means that his
> reality consisted of truly nothing more than a series of self modifying
> algorithms? Might he not deduce that somewhat else was required in order
> to "run" those programs. Isn't it in fact true that there would be no
> substantive distinction whatsoever between his perceived objective
> universe and his subjective universe, both being, as it were, algorithms
> run on the same computer?
>
> Isn't it possible then, that our thoughts are no less real than the
> objective universe that we perceive, both being constructed of the same
> substance? And yet it if this is so, which seems to be a perfectly valid
> conjecture, then there would yet remain the requirement of a reality
> that was quite beyond our observable or even ponderable reach, within
> which both subjective and objective reality are given their singular
> substance?
>
Richard
Yes, and for one, the particular and unique rate of decay of a given
specimen.
I didn't intend to contradict the hidden variable theory, but to support
it. Complexity has been confused with randomness, but regardless of the
degree of complexity, the determinate behavior is evident in the
predictability of events on the macroscopic level. In a truly randomized
universe there would be no macroscopic structuring. The number of
parameters tends to infinity as the system is increased in complexity,
but it never quite gets there, and cannot do so (given that the
definition of infinity forbids its realization). We are left with the
illusion of randomness, or at least most are;-)
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard Herring <richard...@baesystems.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: sci.physics; on Thu, 2 May 2002 14:23:04 +0100
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> > Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the
> >term "possible" that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to
> >our cognitive lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur,
> >given initial conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial
> >parameters, and sufficient computational power every event becomes
> >"perfectly" determinable.
>
> That sounds remarkably like a local hidden-variables theory of QM. Such
> theories have measurable consequences.
I am very interested in this question. I read several articles about
the Bell Theorem (I believe that's what it was called) and didn't
understand a word.
I think my problem was that the articles talked all around the issue,
and then finally just asserted that "local hidden-variables" would have
measurable consequences, without presenting evidence that I could
understand that this was true.
I also note, that Bell was fashionable before string theory became
popular. Detecting hidden variables through 7 extra dimensions strikes
me as about as plausible as a princess detecting a pea through a pile
of a hundred mattresses. Also, I forget how small strings are supposed
to be, but I believe I read that the size of a string is to an atom,
what the atom is to the earth (or something insane like that).
Obviously this too leaves a lot of space in which information can be
lost or distorted.
Do you know enough to deal with any of these questions, even a little
bit?
Thanks for any thoughts;
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: sci.physics; on Wed, 01 May 2002 12:46:51 -0500
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> > > Yes you are correct on that last note, only a fool would look at the
> > > predictability, repeatability, regularity, and orderliness of events in
> > > our universe and say, hey!, there is nothing determinate about what's
> > > taking place here, it must be a completely randomized and unregulated
> > > system I'm looking at.
> >
> > [Zagan]
> > We are already able to provide computers with perfectly random events. It's
> > called radioactive decay.
>
> Does the program respond randomly to external input? I think not.
> Now all that I need do is prove to you that radioactive decay is a
> deterministic event. I have already posted the arguments to the
> philosophy groups some time back, and they are, not to boast,
> unassailable.
I hope my keyboard letters will stop sticking when they dry out. (I
was drinking coffee when I read this.)
> Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the term "possible"
> that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to our cognitive
> lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur, given initial
> conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial parameters, and
> sufficient computational power every event becomes "perfectly"
> determinable.
This is just plain false, and it does not matter how you interpret
the uncertainty principle. The most mechanical interpretation of
uncertainty works from the fact that you cannot know both the position
and the energy/momentum (I don't really know what momentum means but
it looks impressive) of a quantum particle. The underlying reality
appears to be much messier, but on this question, there is no need to
go there.
The problem is that we can only examine quantum events by using other
quantum events, so if I want to examine an electron, I have to use a
photon, or another electron, or something like that. If I use a
photon to determine the position of the electron, the photon will add
energy to the electron, so I will not know its energy and vice versa.
So the problem is not our ability to understand, the problem is that
we have no possible way of ever knowing, even in principle, what the
starting conditions were.
Note also, that a philosophy group is not the place to be discussing
facts. You would have gotten a better response from a sex group, or
maybe a right-to-bear-arms newsgroup.
Broccolism
The thinking mans religion
Cordially;
Russ Rose
"Michael Crowe" <mj...@cam.ac.uk> wrote in message
news:aarmv1$avn$1...@pegasus.csx.cam.ac.uk...
> As pointed out by lots of people there is a theoretical and practical
> impossibility in the question of the computer. But I think a major part of
> the point Richard was making was more to do with conciousness and
> metaphysics - if we could possibly be a simulation. The answer from a
purely
> scientific view as you put the question is no. For this reason:
>
> + The simulation is self consistant in every, by definition
Missing a word?
> + This means the people inside the simulation cannot influence the
computer
A simulated person is a program, and a program can be written to be
adaptive, intelligent, and relatively unpredictable if randomness is used. A
"guiding" subroutine which influences this randomness could be as hidden
from the simulated person as is our subconcious mind. If this does not
qualify as "influencing the computer" then please ignore this post.
au...@detroit.freenet.org
and that's part of the physics math problem:
the universe, by any correct definition, is truly cosmic in proportion,
humans' computers only go up to about a googol or whatever they do without
getting too slow to use,
the universe won't be defined correctly soon except by those in on the know,
because the current all-inclusive mathematic system quite honestly doesn't
fit: the numbers
you, any one, can use with it are too puny, too small to be useful in
defining
something as hughmongous as the universe. universe is way over a googol
years old,
in fact,
mankind's definition of the universe is far and away too skewed, overall to
be useful,
they're stuck in linear time in these discussions, and the lies of omission
and commission
are more prevalent than the truth. some learning. it's just so much like
learning lies, and who wants to do that?
no one sane wants to learn lies, that's what!
the answer is as i've said before in effect:
1. include all of time and space and every thing else in your definition of
the universe
2. correct use of the relaively new concept of zero lielessly errorlessly,
3. correct errorless use of + and - infinities
(which are even newer concepts in a way), (it happens when there's a
divide-by-zero numerically)
which is what happens when you divide for example legal right by where
you have no legal rights
where someone else destroyed them entirely : divide by zero where the
national security failed.
calibration and metrology can straighten out all the error in the whole
universe, really, this is not a lie,
but in order for that to happen, one has to start getting the numerics right
even though computers won't
go (numeric range wise) up to numbers big enough to diametrically represent
the universe, and zero
and infinity in these universe-representational endeavor must be
diametrically errorlessly handled,
or else there'll be a diametric mistake in the whole representation therein
of the whole universe,
by definition. (like today).
people have to stop counting apples on a table with differentisal and
integral calculus coming up with
the wrong numerics in the wrong diametric (diametric!) else national
security, physics, the universe
will never be diametrically defined correctly by definition, including inner
workings of the political
infra-structure.
in the modeling of the universe, whether it's for that computing project
or just for correct definition of stuff that's physical (physics),
if the numerics aren't handled diametrically right the whole thing is
DIAMETRICALLY flawed because
the lies of omission and commission, as in our english lingual syntax
qualify the definition of "universe", qualify reality
much like the word "not"... resulting in diametric error in whatever the
thing is.
like "error": "error" is one thing, but if you stick in one lie of omission
or commission, the meaning is "not error",
that's some difference, and this has to be resolved errorlessly in physics
before there's success, by definition!
the perhaps long-winded point is that lies of omission and commission
qualify reality no matter who they really belong to,
and the result is bad for physics per se, and also incidentally national
security, non-sequitor (all flavors), and independently
of where in the universe you're in, where in the universe you are. the
answer is errorless empirical, intuitive, and other
numerics, in effect, including sign diametrically +/-, and functional is
good enough. numerics do not have to be excessively
well-defined to work well, nor do they have to be on an electronic digital
computer. just the opposite! the very, very best
functional numerics are in nature, intrinsically, and in our minds.
well, so much for my long-winded discourse.
the good errorless ramifications of it are hughmongous, though.
it's profound, objective-sufi thought, an errorless conclusion under unified
field dynamics/parallell physics errorless (ufd/ppe) (errorless!)
so fucking simple, yet so fucking true.
--
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
au...@detroit.freenet.org "all is meow when said in kitten"
perfect peace be upon you forever salami/salam
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
"Robert Keith Elias" <REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net> wrote in message
news:QLKz8Uyb...@clic.and.this.net...
>
> Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
>
> This is a public reply to your message posted:
> From group: alt.philosophy.debate; on Sun, 28 Apr 2002 15:33:35 -0500
> Concerning "One of These Days";
>
> A few comments, mostly intended to add to the general confusion. I
> will eventually get to a couple of points that will indirectly touch on
> the potential capacity of the computer involved, and provide a
> plausible (well maybe) explanation of why such a virtual universe might
> have been constructed.
>
> > One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> > whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> > unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> > virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> > respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> > fully contained in microchips.
>
> First, this is not an original argument. The Irish Bishop, George
> Berkeley (1685-1753) first dreamed up this idea. (OK, he was just
> first to write it down.) He didn't have a computer handy, so he used
> God (who is widely believed to have quite a lot of processing power)
> instead.
>
> Not wanting to be left out, the biologists got into the picture with
> "brain-in-a-bath". Try proving you're not a brain-in-a-bath. I guess
> that one could be traced back too Mary Shelley (1797-1851) who wrote
> Frankenstein. If you feed it the right signals, a brain has no way of
> knowing whether it's in a body or in a bath. You don't require much
> computing power to do the job either.
>
> In philosophy (I am writing from a philosophy group) this is the
> extreme end of the sense perception problem. How can we know that the
> information provided to us by our senses is valid? As any police
> officer who interviews witnesses to a crime can tell you ... you can't.
>
>
> A few years ago Scientific American (this was before they started
> fighting to attract the 12 year old reader, and before it was
> discovered that the rate of cosmic expansion is increasing) ran an
> article modelling the fate of the universe out to 10^100 years (1
> followed by 100 zero's for the 12 year olds).
>
> As I recall from memory, starting from where we are at 10^10, things
> are already going to be pretty cold and miserable by 10^12 years (or
> there abouts). Mostly, we will be warming our hands around brown
> dwarfs, which will be just about the only heat source left. At 10^15
> organic life will probably be long past, and at 10^20 it will be
> completely out of the question ... background tempertures of -200C
> (73K) or something like that.
>
> At this point, the only conscious life that will be around will be
> inside computers. The SA article talked a lot about low temperature
> superconductors and similar technologies, and crazy schemes for
> collecting energy from objects as they fall into black holes. I got
> the impression that everything would be just fine out to 10^50 or
> 10^80, after which things become REALLY bleak, (but mom tells me not
> to dwell on such negative thoughts.)
>
> I'M GETTING TO THE POINT.
>
> Anyway the period between 10^20 and 10^50 years represents a duration
> that is 10^40 times the current age of the universe. So I am imagining
> planet size groups of quantum computers wandering around space, and the
> consciousnesses inside (some of whom might once have been human) are
> getting REALLY bored, so they start creating virtual universes within
> which they can forget their mundane existences. (I can imagine other
> motivations for running such simulations, but for this discussion,
> boredom will do.)
>
> An important point to note here is that, if (for some silly reason)
> they actually wanted to model EVERY atom on and in the planet, they
> could do so, not because of their computing power, but because of the
> time available. If they needed a hundred million years to model a day
> on earth, why not. We (inside the virtual reality) would have no way
> of knowing at what rate "real" time was passing, because we experience
> time subjectively.
>
>
> I had intended to spend the weekend saving the world
> By writing DOE about the need to extract hot water
> energy from the super volcano below Yellow Stone
> national park. But I guess, I'll have to save the
> world next weekend.
Richard Herring
<no_mail@no_spam.com> writes
>Richard Herring wrote:
>>
>> [alt groups snipped by server]
>>
>> In message <3CD02A0B.6B85C9C1@no_spam.com>, Richard
>> <no_mail@no_spam.com> writes
>>
>> >Now all that I need do is prove to you that radioactive decay is a
>> >deterministic event. I have already posted the arguments to the
>> >philosophy groups some time back, and they are, not to boast,
>> >unassailable.
>>
>> However sound the chain of reasoning, the conclusion is no better than
>> its premises.
>>
>> > Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the
>> >term "possible" that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to
>> >our cognitive lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur,
>> >given initial conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial
>> >parameters, and sufficient computational power every event becomes
>> >"perfectly" determinable.
>>
>> That sounds remarkably like a local hidden-variables theory of QM. Such
>> theories have measurable consequences.
>
>Yes, and for one, the particular and unique rate of decay of a given
>specimen.
>
>I didn't intend to contradict the hidden variable theory, but to support
>it.
Then you'll have some testable predictions that differ from standard QM,
yes?
>Complexity has been confused with randomness, but regardless of the
>degree of complexity, the determinate behavior is evident in the
>predictability of events on the macroscopic level.
Which is *not* evidence for determinism on the microscopic scale. Look
at statistical thermodynamics. It doesn't take a very large population
before the law of large numbers kicks in and mere probability becomes
for-all-practical-purposes certainty.
In fact, statements which require quite subtle reasoning to prove in
classical thermodynamics become tautologies in statistical thermo. "A
system is overwhelmingly likely to be found in its most probable state"
for example.
>In a truly randomized
>universe there would be no macroscopic structuring. The number of
>parameters tends to infinity as the system is increased in complexity,
>but it never quite gets there, and cannot do so (given that the
>definition of infinity forbids its realization). We are left with the
>illusion of randomness, or at least most are;-)
>
--
Richard Herring
Richard Herring
<REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net> writes
>
> Hi Richard Herring <richard...@baesystems.com>;
>
>>
>> That sounds remarkably like a local hidden-variables theory of QM. Such
>> theories have measurable consequences.
>
> I am very interested in this question. I read several articles about
> the Bell Theorem (I believe that's what it was called) and didn't
> understand a word.
>
> I think my problem was that the articles talked all around the issue,
> and then finally just asserted that "local hidden-variables" would have
> measurable consequences, without presenting evidence that I could
> understand that this was true.
>
> I also note, that Bell was fashionable before string theory became
> popular. Detecting hidden variables through 7 extra dimensions strikes
> me as about as plausible as a princess detecting a pea through a pile
> of a hundred mattresses. Also, I forget how small strings are supposed
> to be, but I believe I read that the size of a string is to an atom,
> what the atom is to the earth (or something insane like that).
> Obviously this too leaves a lot of space in which information can be
> lost or distorted.
>
> Do you know enough to deal with any of these questions, even a little
> bit?
I *know* a little bit, but if you've read articles and not understood
them, I doubt if my attempts to explain would be any better.
Did you find this one? http://www.telp.com/philosophy/qw3.htm
If you ignore the philosophical arguments, the first part gives quite a
clear explanation of the EPR paradox and Bell's inequality.
As for string theory, I don't think it changes much. The problem Bell
raises is not so much about the hidden variables as the non-locality (ie
the apparent faster-than-light communication between entangled
particles), which is a problem however you propose to hide the
information.
--
Richard Herring
Michael Crowe
"Russ Rose" <russ...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:oroA8.219624$CH1.145723@sccrnsc02...
>
> "Michael Crowe" <mj...@cam.ac.uk> wrote in message
> news:aarmv1$avn$1...@pegasus.csx.cam.ac.uk...
> > As pointed out by lots of people there is a theoretical and practical
> > impossibility in the question of the computer. But I think a major part
of
> > the point Richard was making was more to do with conciousness and
> > metaphysics - if we could possibly be a simulation. The answer from a
> purely
> > scientific view as you put the question is no. For this reason:
> >
> > + The simulation is self consistant in every, by definition
>
> Missing a word?
Indeed well spotted!
(missing word - "way")
>
> > + This means the people inside the simulation cannot influence the
> computer
>
> A simulated person is a program, and a program can be written to be
> adaptive, intelligent, and relatively unpredictable if randomness is used.
A
> "guiding" subroutine which influences this randomness could be as hidden
> from the simulated person as is our subconcious mind. If this does not
> qualify as "influencing the computer" then please ignore this post.
I know you said ignore the post but it is a good comment its own right so I
thought I say I agree, it is an excellent explanation of subconcious in this
thought experiment. However, i agree that this was not what i meant by
influence the computer, this merely alters his reallity, like if we were to
find a way to change the gravitational constant. I meant a more physical
affect on the computer.
Regards
Mike
Roy Anderson
>> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe.
>
>Bullshit.
>
>Given n particles, the number of unique binary interactions is
>n(n-1)/2. A cubic inch of water at 39 degrees Fahrenheit holds
>1.5x10^47 binary interactions. If you had one silicon atom modeling
>one binary interaction in a cubic inch of water (wildly optimistic,
>that), your microprocessor would weigh in at 7x10^18 metric tons, plus
>wiring. That is 1% of the entire Earth's mass (less the wiring).
>Water has more than binary interactions; the universe is bigger than a
>cubic inch of water.
>
>Any crackpot spew that is defeated by arihtmetic is particularly
>inferior.
>
>Heterodox science has high standards of creativity and quantitative
>falsifiability,
>http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/eotvos.htm
Hmm.
Your point is compelling, however you assume the usage of modern day
comp equipment. Assume a comp system (which is not too far away,
technologically speaking) which is completely optical. No wires, no
harddrive, no ROM, all memory is RAM.
The "weight" and mass issue would be irrelevant, yes?
-Roy Anderson (no degrees, no certifications, just idea after idea
after idea...)
Richard
Let me reiterate "you cannot know". Isn't this what I said?
> both the position
> and the energy/momentum (I don't really know what momentum means but
> it looks impressive) of a quantum particle. The underlying reality
> appears to be much messier, but on this question, there is no need to
> go there.
>
> The problem is that we can only examine quantum events by using other
> quantum events, so if I want to examine an electron, I have to use a
> photon, or another electron, or something like that. If I use a
> photon to determine the position of the electron, the photon will add
> energy to the electron, so I will not know its energy and vice versa.
>
> So the problem is not our ability to understand, the problem is that
> we have no possible way of ever knowing, even in principle, what the
> starting conditions were.
My argument has nothing to do with our ability to know, other than to
show that inability to know is equivalent to quantum uncertainty, i.e.
that there is no other meaning of the term. The causality and certainty
of interactions really couldn't care less what you can or cannot know
about them. The conservation laws also require the mechanical regularity
of all events, they don't however require you to have an exhaustive
knowledge of them.
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: sci.physics; on Fri, 03 May 2002 18:31:37 -0500
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> > > Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the term "possible"
> > > that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to our cognitive
> > > lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur, given initial
> > > conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial parameters, and
> > > sufficient computational power every event becomes "perfectly"
> > > determinable.
> >
> > This is just plain false, and it does not matter how you interpret
> > the uncertainty principle. The most mechanical interpretation of
> > uncertainty works from the fact that you cannot know
>
> Let me reiterate "you cannot know". Isn't this what I said?
No you did not explicitly say that, however rereading your argument in
the light of this reply I now (believe I) understand that you were
trying to say something like;
If we could know what we cannot know, and
if we had more computing power than will ever be possible
(and assuming our universe is real - a question in this thread)
then everything could be determined.
(the remainder of my own previous reply is deleted)
> My argument has nothing to do with our ability to know, other than to
> show that inability to know is equivalent to quantum uncertainty, i.e.
> that there is no other meaning of the term. The causality and certainty
> of interactions really couldn't care less what you can or cannot know
> about them. The conservation laws also require the mechanical regularity
> of all events, they don't however require you to have an exhaustive
> knowledge of them.
This is a position that I PRIVATELY agree with, however if I
understand what the "Copenhagen Interpretation" as reinforced by
"Bell's Inequality" proof is asserting, then the best current
scientific thinking is that I am wrong; ie. true randomness does exit
at the quantum level.
The fact that I cannot image (and privately do not believe in) truly
random events is of no concern to nature, and of course I could be
wrong. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that I can make
any argument that works from the assumption that true randomness does
not exist in the quantum world.
In an argument about freewill/determinism (where this issue is often
raised) the best I can do is point out that my actions may be
determined by events that are themselves random or determined. In
either case MY actions are determined. (Actually, I believe in
freewill, but that's too far off track)
In closing, please accept my apologies for the tone of my last post to
you in this thread. I frequently expect people to accept behavior
from me that I would be offended by if the positions were reversed.
Robert Keith Elias
Hi Richard Herring <richard...@baesystems.com>;
This is a public reply to your message posted:
From group: sci.physics; on Fri, 3 May 2002 10:50:20 +0100
Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
> > Do you know enough to deal with any of these questions, even a little
> > bit?
>
> I *know* a little bit, but if you've read articles and not understood
> them, I doubt if my attempts to explain would be any better.
>
> Did you find this one? http://www.telp.com/philosophy/qw3.htm
> If you ignore the philosophical arguments, the first part gives quite a
> clear explanation of the EPR paradox and Bell's inequality.
I agree, and am still digesting it. I want to ask you some followup
questions, but only after I have a clear idea about what I think I
don't understand.
Since followup may be weeks into the future, would you mind if I
emailed a copy of my publically posted questions, so that you are
aware of the post?
> As for string theory, I don't think it changes much. The problem Bell
> raises is not so much about the hidden variables as the non-locality (ie
> the apparent faster-than-light communication between entangled
> particles), which is a problem however you propose to hide the
> information.
This statement was very useful. I had completely missed this central
point.
Cordially;
Rich Cooper
> that your hypothesis implies infinitude.
I think his response was well formed; subjective
experience is vastly short of infinity, and therefore
its only necessary to simulate the experience, not
the infinity of reality.
Its like Chomsky's claim that syntax provides
a capability for generating infinitely long sentences.
Maybe so, but not necessary, because no one has
ever spoken an infinitely long sentence, and never
will.
Infinity is merely a convenient mathematical
concept that helps think about certain kinds of
things, such as recursive sets. But the concept
is not the reality.
Rich
au...@detroit.freenet.org
times distance should tell everyone that!
it's just saying, that things don't just happen from nothing, there's a
cause: no perpetual watts-out-of-nowhere motion.
the u.s. patent office does the same thing. if it doesn't work, it gets
squicked. working stuff is all-okay.
what everybody is going to find out, however, is that ufd/ppe (unified field
dynamins/parallel physics errorless (errorless) (errorless)
is really the errorless truth, not what the (badly biased) politicians say:
ww1 was not, causally, (causationally in the long(est) run (diametrically))
the "war to end all wars", as it was touted to be,
there was ww2, and in-future, ww3, even, already, vietnam, korea, and
malfeasance from this side "galore"!
it's like sucking a butt, right up the hole, it stinks, and no-one sane
likes it! yow!
in any, every case, if people just retain their minds and remember what
ERRORLESS truths all they have learnt,
no one will experience any trubble whatsoever...
it is better to be honorable than to be dishonorable,
the real errorless physics will be along the lines of this,
and to say other-wise is to assert that conservation of mass and energy is
possible where it ai'n't,
which is a major error in the taught science of "physics" today.
watts-outa-nowhere is a psychosis, andit's to be avoided, whether in the
taught science of physics,
national security, nonsequitor (everyone in the universe), or any thing that
REALLY exists:
if they can be deployed positively (in the positive diametric)
they'll work just fine,
with EVERYONE sitting perfectly,
with their dominatrix,
in a system that works,
so unlike the system of today.
{[( ref: mark-spec. planet(s) clause, "mark brown's eight-point
analysis of 1993" "8-8 version" (full),
on file in some records dimension with n.s.a., copyrighted,
original version, it works. )]}
to say otherwise is to say that fresh 1.5-volt cells don't work in
flashlights real.
--
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
au...@detroit.freenet.org "all is meow when said in kitten"
perfect peace be upon you forever salami/salam
\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
"Robert Keith Elias" <REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net> wrote in message
news:6TI18Uyb...@clic.and.this.net...
>
> Hi Richard <no_mail@no_spam.com>;
>
> This is a public reply to your message posted:
> From group: sci.physics; on Fri, 03 May 2002 18:31:37 -0500
> Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
>
> > > > Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the term
"possible"
> > > > that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to our cognitive
Richard
Yes, it is a perfectly mechanical and regular tendency of a system to
tend towards equilibrium. I see this as no contradiction to determinism,
but rather as yet another argument in its favor.
>
> >In a truly randomized
> >universe there would be no macroscopic structuring. The number of
> >parameters tends to infinity as the system is increased in complexity,
> >but it never quite gets there, and cannot do so (given that the
> >definition of infinity forbids its realization). We are left with the
> >illusion of randomness, or at least most are;-)
--
Bill Taylor
|> I am very interested in this question. I read several articles about
|> the Bell Theorem (I believe that's what it was called) and didn't
|> understand a word.
I don't blame you! Along with Godel's theorem this is one of the most
poorly written-about topic known to man! I have written an equivalent
version below, which may help you out.
That is, it may help you understand what the weirdness is, but won't
help you understand how to sort it out! I'm hoping someone else here
will do that for both of us! It is often said that the many-worlds
interpretation of QM can help explain it, but it hasn't done for me, so far.
This should really be in a physics forum, of course, but I've sent it to two
of those, both respectably moderated, but haven't got any helpful replies
from either one. (I have got one helpful reply privately, but it is a cure
almost worse than the disease, so shall not relay it here.)
Mind you, I'm not really surprised to draw a blank from a physics forum.
The trouble is, nature doesn't care how confused we get, and feels under
no obligation to make things comprehensible to us, or even to appear logical.
So maybe some logicianms can help out better than physicists can.
Here 'tis...
----------------------------
Some otherworldly physicists have come up with this very odd
experimental situation.
They have a mysterious machine, which can shoot out pairs of gaskets
in opposite directions, impossible to detect except by special detectors
which thereby destroy the gasket.
The detecting devices can be set in only one of three possible settings.
On setting 1, they measure a gasket as having either property A or B.
On setting 2, they measure a gasket as having either property C or D.
On setting 3, they measure a gasket as having either property E or F.
The two detectors will be placed very far apart, so that there can be no
causal influence on the detection/measurement of either one by the other.
They find the results are seemingly random; so that when either detector
is considered alone, on setting 1 there are about 50% each of A or B;
on setting 2, 50% each of C or D; on setting 3, 50% each of E or F.
But whenever the two detectors are on the SAME setting, they register
the SAME property. (This seems to suggest that the A-F properties involved
have some concrete reality.) But...
They also find that if one detector is on setting 1, and the other on 2:-
there are 50% AC detections, and 50% BD detections, (never AD or BC).
With settings 1 and 3, there are 50% AE and 50% BF, (never AF or BE).
With settings 2 and 3, there are 50% DE and 50% CF, (never DF or CE).
They note that there does not seem to be any locally realistic way
to account for these results. But then someone comes up with this
theory involving "many worlds" which he claims can explain them...
-----------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
How many universes can dance on the head of a photomultiplier?
===============================================================================
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
===============================================================================
No-one really understands QM if they are unaware of its incomprehensibility
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evgenij Barsukov
(UTC) by mat...@math.canterbury.ac.nz (Bill Taylor)
>|> I am very interested in this question. I read several articles about
>|> the Bell Theorem (I believe that's what it was called) and didn't
>|> understand a word.
You probably mean Bell's unequality? This unequality brings
together relativity and casuality.
It checks if the information flows keeping parts of
system together adhere to special relativity, e.q. if
equality is satisfied means
- nothing moves faster than speed of light inside system
- there is no violation of causality, no random events
caused by nothing
or another way around, if it is NOT satisfied, at least one
of the above two things DOES happen.
So, the funny thing is that world is sufficiently weird and
experiments show that QM-events involving entangled
particles DO NOT satisfy Bells unequality. Chose one of the
above which you like more. Common point of view between
physist is that second happens - violation of causality,
acausal or say "physically random" events.
Bells inequality is much stronger than Heisenbergs
uncertainty principle, because later could be explained by
some distortion by measurement or hidden variables.
Differently, Bells inequality relais on integral properties
of the system which are independent on particular
measurement or existance of observer at all, therefore
convincingly killing both this notions and presenting the
violation of causality in all its strange beauty.
Regards,
Evgenij
Alan Stern
> experimental situation.
>
> They have a mysterious machine, which can shoot out pairs of gaskets
> in opposite directions, impossible to detect except by special detectors
> which thereby destroy the gasket.
>
> The detecting devices can be set in only one of three possible settings.
>
> On setting 1, they measure a gasket as having either property A or B.
> On setting 2, they measure a gasket as having either property C or D.
> On setting 3, they measure a gasket as having either property E or F.
>
> The two detectors will be placed very far apart, so that there can be no
> causal influence on the detection/measurement of either one by the other.
>
> They find the results are seemingly random; so that when either detector
> is considered alone, on setting 1 there are about 50% each of A or B;
> on setting 2, 50% each of C or D; on setting 3, 50% each of E or F.
> But whenever the two detectors are on the SAME setting, they register
> the SAME property. (This seems to suggest that the A-F properties involved
> have some concrete reality.) But...
>
> They also find that if one detector is on setting 1, and the other on 2:-
>
> there are 50% AC detections, and 50% BD detections, (never AD or BC).
>
> With settings 1 and 3, there are 50% AE and 50% BF, (never AF or BE).
> With settings 2 and 3, there are 50% DE and 50% CF, (never DF or CE).
>
> They note that there does not seem to be any locally realistic way
> to account for these results. But then someone comes up with this
> theory involving "many worlds" which he claims can explain them...
In the version of this thought experiment familiar to me (the one
written by David Mermin in his column in Physics Today), the detection
probabilities are somewhat different from the values above. Using the
same notation:
With settings 1 and 2, there are 12.5% AC, 12.5% BD, 37.5% AD, and
37.5% BC.
With settings 1 and 3, there are 12.5% AE, 12.5% BF, 37.5% AF, and
37.5% BE.
With settings 2 and 3, there are 12.5% CE, 12.5% DF, 37.5% CF, and
37.5% ED.
(The way Mermin described it, instead of showing results A,B, C,D, and
E,F, each measuring apparatus either lights up red or green. Red
corresponds to A,C, and E, while green corresponds to B, D, and F.
Then whenever the two settings are the same, the same lights turn on.
Whenever the settings are different, the same lights turn on only 25%
of the time.)
Presented this way, the conundrum is not quite so obvious; you have to
do a little calculation to see why the results are inconsistent with
local realism. The advantage is that these are the probabilities you
would actually get in a real experiment using polarizers offset at
120-degree angles from each other.
Alan Stern
Richard Herring
<REMOVE.k...@clic.and.this.net> writes
>
> Hi Richard Herring <richard...@baesystems.com>;
>
> This is a public reply to your message posted:
> From group: sci.physics; on Fri, 3 May 2002 10:50:20 +0100
> Concerning "Re: One of These Days";
>
>> > Do you know enough to deal with any of these questions, even a little
>> > bit?
>>
>> I *know* a little bit, but if you've read articles and not understood
>> them, I doubt if my attempts to explain would be any better.
>>
>> Did you find this one? http://www.telp.com/philosophy/qw3.htm
>> If you ignore the philosophical arguments, the first part gives quite a
>> clear explanation of the EPR paradox and Bell's inequality.
>
> I agree, and am still digesting it. I want to ask you some followup
> questions, but only after I have a clear idea about what I think I
> don't understand.
Don't ask me, ask the group...
>
> Since followup may be weeks into the future, would you mind if I
> emailed a copy of my publically posted questions, so that you are
> aware of the post?
You'd do much better posting them to the newsgroup. There are people
here who know far more than I do about it, and can explain it better.
Working out who they are is left as an exercise for the reader ;-)
--
Richard Herring
Richard Herring
>Richard Herring wrote:
>>
>> In message <3CD1C163.44D41C41@no_spam.com>, Richard
>> <no_mail@no_spam.com> writes
>> >> > Namely we incorporate a semantic interpretation of the
>> >> >term "possible" that is quite unjustifiable. This term only relates to
>> >> >our cognitive lack of certainty that an event will or will not occur,
>> >> >given initial conditions x,y,z...etc. Given all of the initial
>> >> >parameters, and sufficient computational power every event becomes
>> >> >"perfectly" determinable.
>> >>
>> >> That sounds remarkably like a local hidden-variables theory of QM. Such
>> >> theories have measurable consequences.
>> >
>> >Yes, and for one, the particular and unique rate of decay of a given
>> >specimen.
>> >
>> >I didn't intend to contradict the hidden variable theory, but to support
>> >it.
>>
>> Then you'll have some testable predictions that differ from standard QM,
>> yes?
No answer?
>>
>> >Complexity has been confused with randomness, but regardless of the
>> >degree of complexity, the determinate behavior is evident in the
>> >predictability of events on the macroscopic level.
>>
>> Which is *not* evidence for determinism on the microscopic scale. Look
>> at statistical thermodynamics. It doesn't take a very large population
>> before the law of large numbers kicks in and mere probability becomes
>> for-all-practical-purposes certainty.
>>
>> In fact, statements which require quite subtle reasoning to prove in
>> classical thermodynamics become tautologies in statistical thermo. "A
>> system is overwhelmingly likely to be found in its most probable state"
>> for example.
>
>Yes, it is a perfectly mechanical and regular tendency of a system to
>tend towards equilibrium. I see this as no contradiction to determinism,
>but rather as yet another argument in its favor.
>
Well, if you don't see the logical flaw, you don't see it.
Microscopic non-determinism => macroscopic regularity. Manipulate that
proposition however you like, and you will never produce one that
finishes with => microscopic determinism.
--
Richard Herring
Bill Taylor
|> written by David Mermin in his column in Physics Today), the detection
|> probabilities are somewhat different from the values above. Using the
|> same notation:
|> With settings 1 and 2, there are 12.5% AC, 12.5% BD, 37.5% AD, and 37.5% BC.
Yes exactly. The real paradox is obscured by the quantum randomness in this
more accurate rendition, but it is still there, as you noted. I wanted to
remove this essential irrelevance (to the logic) by making it more stark.
And I note that no-one has yet proferred a MWI realistic interpretation of
the result.
Mermin also noted the following much simpler, though logically inequivalent
pretend experiment, which has the same kind of realistic inexplicability.
Presumably a many-worlds approach could allegedly explain (away?) this one
too, though I have never seen it attempted.
Mermin's simple pretend experiment is thus:
------------
There is a machine that is full of red and blue balls, (we can see them
in the hopper, slowly being used up). The machine can detect the balls'
colours, and distributes them into 3 draw-trays according to some internal
procedure which the otherworldly physicists are trying to discover & explain.
Always, it drops one ball into each tray, which remain concealed. Any two
trays can then be pulled out to inspect, but never all three simulataneously.
(Any attempt to do so too forcefully results in all balls being dropped into
a sink and invisibly mulched up.) One tray alone can be inspected, and the
results appear to be random, with 50% each of red and blue balls detected.
And when two trays are pulled out simultaneously, we ALWAYS see that the two
balls are of opposite colours! Again they appear to be random, and it doesn't
seem to depend on which two trays we pull out. As soon as the two are pulled
out, the content of the third draw is dropped below and mulched. When the
trays are returned, the contents (if any remain) are mulched, and we can
hear and feel (but not see) three new balls dropping into the trays.
How can this all be so!? Especially if the trays are several light-minutes
apart, and the draws are carefully timed to be simultaneous (in some frame).
How can we possibly get 50% each from any tray but NEVER get two the same?
------------
As I say, neither this simple case, nor the simplified EPR I described earlier,
(nor its original form), can be explained locally-realistically.
It is claimed they can be explained by MWI.
I don't believe it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In quantum mechanics tiny physical systems do things that would be difficult
or impossible to explain using quantum mechanics. (John Baez, with typo)
Reply: In typo veritas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sandy Hodges
Alan Stern wrote:
>
[clip]
>
> In the version of this thought experiment familiar to me (the one
> written by David Mermin in his column in Physics Today), the detection
> probabilities are somewhat different from the values above. Using the
> same notation:
>
> With settings 1 and 2, there are 12.5% AC, 12.5% BD, 37.5% AD, and
> 37.5% BC.
> With settings 1 and 3, there are 12.5% AE, 12.5% BF, 37.5% AF, and
> 37.5% BE.
> With settings 2 and 3, there are 12.5% CE, 12.5% DF, 37.5% CF, and
> 37.5% ED.
>
> (The way Mermin described it, instead of showing results A,B, C,D, and
> E,F, each measuring apparatus either lights up red or green. Red
> corresponds to A,C, and E, while green corresponds to B, D, and F.
> Then whenever the two settings are the same, the same lights turn on.
> Whenever the settings are different, the same lights turn on only 25%
> of the time.)
>
> Presented this way, the conundrum is not quite so obvious; you have to
> do a little calculation to see why the results are inconsistent with
> local realism. The advantage is that these are the probabilities you
> would actually get in a real experiment using polarizers offset at
> 120-degree angles from each other.
>
> Alan Stern
My understanding of the MWI, such as it is, goes like this.
When a random event happens (take the throwing of a die for
illustration) the world splits into as many worlds as there are outcomes
(6, for the die). When another random event happens, such as the
throwing of a second die, each world splits again, so there are now
36. In classical probability, we can choose to consider sets of
outcomes as a single outcome: for example, if we don't know which die
landed first, we can group 3,4 with 4,3. When we do this, the
probability of the grouped outcome is just the sum of the individual
probabilities. In MWI, the grouping of outcomes is an actual physical
event. Worlds merge. In MWI, as in classical probability, each
individual outcome has a probability. Unlike classical probability,
each outcome also has a phase. When outcomes merge, the probability of
the merged outcome is not the sum (as in classical probability), but is
found by vector addition (the length of the vector is the square root of
the probability, the direction is the phase). This vector addition
yields the probability and the phase of the merged outcome. If we are
in the world where the 3,4 outcome has merged with the 4,3 outcome, then
we can never tell which die landed first.
The MWI says that outcomes having phases, and probabilities adding by
vectors, is the way our world is. The laws of classical probability
are not the true laws which govern our world. They seem to apply to
our macroscopic world, because the classical laws are the consequence of
the true QM laws, when events are so complex that we can treat phases as
randomized. I don't know if Bill Taylor will wish to count this as
MWI explaining the Bell's inequality results. But if the world is
really like this (and it seems to be) then it's not clear why an
explanation of quantum probability in terms of classical probability
should be expected, any more than an explanation of special relativity
in terms of Newtonian mechanics. The actual probabilities given in
the Mermin article can be explained by MWI probability theory (I've seen
it done, anyway), but not (I think) the simplified ones Bill
supplied. The outcomes Bill described could not occur I think.
Here is a MWI account of the two slit experiment: An electron is emitted
from a heated bit of metal. It can go in any direction, so there is a
world for each direction. Two are of interest: toward slit A or toward
slit B. The probabilities of these two worlds are equal. The phase
depends on the distance from the bit of metal to the slit - the phase
makes one complete revolution over a distance called the wavelength of
the electron. Having passed through a slit, the electron can go in
any direction on the other side. We will consider two directions,
those toward points C and D on a screen behind the slits. So
altogether, there are four worlds we consider: slit A then point C, slit
A then point D, slit B then point C, and slit B then point D. We have
designed the experiment so that once the electron has hit the screen, we
can't tell which slit it passed through. If this has been done
correctly, then the (slit A, then point C) world will merge with the
(slit B, then point C) world. Also the two worlds where the electron
hits point D will merge. If true merger takes place, then the
probability of the electron landing at point C will be found by vector
addition of the two worlds which merged. The probabilities of all four
unmerged worlds are the same. But the phases will depend on the
distances: (bit of metal to slit A to point C), vs. (bit of metal to
slit B to point C). Suppose point C has been chosen that the distances
are the same, or differ by an even number of electron wavelengths.
Then the vectors will be in the same direction. If the probability of
(slit A, point C) is x, the vector length will be square root of x. The
vectors will add, being in the same direction, so the vector for the
merged world (point C) will be twice the square root of x. So the
probability of point C will be 4x. Point D was chosen so the distances
to it are different by just half an electron wavelength. Thus the
vectors which sum to make event (point D) are in opposite directions,
and the probability of D is zero.
Quantum probability can even explain why electrons travel in straight
lines in empty space.
-- ----- ------ - - --Sandy Hodges / Alameda, California, USA
Mail to Sandy...@attbi.com will reach me.
Bill Taylor
|> > In the version of this thought experiment familiar to me, the detection
|> > probabilities are somewhat different from the values above.
|> > With settings 1 and 2, there are 12.5% AC, 12.5% BD, 37.5% AD, and 37.5% BC.
Yes, these are the exact values for the scenario I described; but I just
wanted to make the case starker *without* changing the logical nature of it.
The figures you quote are, of course, well within the Bell inequality bounds
which ensure that it is "effectively the same" as the case (with its certainties)
that I described.
|> My understanding of the MWI, such as it is, goes like this.
|> When a random event happens ... the world splits into as many worlds
This is one way of speaking of it; but from my readings of the mailing list
about this, many folk seem to prefer to say that all the worlds were there
all the time (though indistinguishable) and there was never any actual
"split". Indeed, some of them get quite ratty about the idea of a "split",
especially at the thought of this split "propagating" at the speed of light,
carrying information about the random event "with it", but in some unspecified
and mysterious way.
Of course, it's just wordy debate of no scientific value to argue about
pure interpretation... whether worlds split or were there before. But then,
the whole idea of (such philosophical) interpretations IS to play with words,
hoping to agree on some language that makes some kind of intuitive logical
sense, and also corresponds somehow with scientific reality.
For me, the MWI makes no sense UNLESS it is agreed that *there are* splits
(as you also think), and that *they do* propagate at luminal speed,
splitting apart the multiverse as they go, like a block of firewood
being snapped apart by an axe blow.
I still await EITHER an explanation of the EPR experiment in this explanatory
environment, OR an alternative (but still intuitively logical) verbal
environment in which it *can* be explained.
Neither has ever been presented to me, except in one case, by a correspondent
who inplicitly seemed to agree that the "mechanisms" involved were far
more repellant than any attempted explanation would be hoped for.
|> The MWI says that outcomes having phases,
Yes, I am more or less aware of this aspect of things. But again, it seems
part of the math rather than part of the verbal explanation. Unless one is
to say that photons etc go along "carrying" a definite changing phase with them.
But this directness seems anathema to physicists, and indeed does not seem
to fit with various experiments (including EPR).
|> and probabilities adding by
|> vectors, is the way our world is. The laws of classical probability
|> are not the true laws which govern our world.
Yes, I am fully aware that the real world is under no obligation to be
explicable to us. But I would still hope that there may be *some* verbal
explanation of these effects which at least has logical sense. And if this
is not the case, that physicists and philosophers at least admit so.
|> But if the world is
|> really like this (and it seems to be) then it's not clear why an
|> explanation of quantum probability in terms of classical probability
|> should be expected,
I don't hope for *that*, indeed I see how it is not possible. But I *do*
hope for some verbal explanation that has some *internal logical consistency*.
To my mind, as yet, I have not seen one. I am well aware that this may
be a deficiency of *me*, not the whole science-philosophical community.
But I doubt it... I'm not *that* stupid, and many other clever people
still have their own reservations about all this too.
|> any more than an explanation of special relativity
|> in terms of Newtonian mechanics.
A parallel often made; and one I like, because it illustrates my point exactly!
The fact is, I *do* understand how the (mathematical & experimental) results
of relativity *can be* explained with internal logical consistency. I am
also aware that almost every layman's book on the topic fails to *do* this,
to some extent. (I bet I could write a much better one myself!)
And for decades I have been hoping and expecting that someone would do the same
for quantum mechanics, for me. And indeed, that can be done and has been done,
for all the results up to BUT NOT including the EPR experiment. That one still
seems to me to defy all attempts at a logical (but local realistic) explanation.
I continue to see claims that MWI in particular can provide this; but I have
never actually been presented with such an explanation! I still keenly await.
|> Here is a MWI account of the two slit experiment:
Yes, your explantion of this is familiar to me, and very good; (if perhaps
a little too technical to qualify as a verbal one, unless the phases of the
electron are regarded as fully locally physical - which I think they are not).
I see that the 2-slit experiment can be explained *either* by many-worlds,
*or* by a pilot wave.
BUT:- AFAICS neither of these explantions can extend logically to the EPR
experiment. MWI people insist that though pilot waves cannot, nonetheless
MWI *can*. It is this last point I dispute. I cannot understand the
alleged MWI explanations of EPR. Please try again for me, I beseech you.
(Or someone else - Daryl? - Mike O?)
I hope at least you will agree with me, that the EPR situation has more
spooky mystery in it than the other ones:- two-slit, cloud-chamber tracks,
diffraction, interference and so forth. All these latter ones are explicable,
by pilot waves *or* MWI. But I still do not see how EPR is explicable by MWI.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
They travel as waves but arrive as particles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Daryl McCullough
>For me, the MWI makes no sense UNLESS it is agreed that *there are* splits
>(as you also think), and that *they do* propagate at luminal speed,
>splitting apart the multiverse as they go, like a block of firewood
>being snapped apart by an axe blow.
Could you explain why you think MWI doesn't make sense unless there
really are splits?
I wouldn't say that MWI doesn't make sense, I would say rather that
it seems that there is something missing. It doesn't seem to provide
a complete explanation.
You can get halfway to MWI without much problem: Given a wave
function Psi describing the entire universe, you can decompose
it into a superposition
Psi = A_1 Psi_1 + A_2 Psi_2 + A_3 Psi_3 + ...
where each of the Psi_j represent macroscopically
distinguishable states of the universe. Because
of the way quantum mechanics works, we know that
the sum |A_1|^2 + |A_2|^2 + ... must be equal to 1.
So, it makes mathematical sense to interpret each term
|A_j|^2 as a probability. But there is an explanation
gap in understanding first, what am I in this picture,
and second, why do I observe things happening with
these probabilities. A third question (connected to
the first two) is why should I see a macroscopically
sensible universe, at all? That is, why does it appear
that big objects have more or less definite positions
and velocities.
The thing that's weird about quantum mechanics is that,
while it seems that there must be something extra to
explain everything, at the same time it seems that there
is in practice nothing left unexplained. We use quantum
mechanics without worrying too much about the metaphysics,
and it works like a charm.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
Richard
Suppose that the photon is not a particle, but a wave, in the ordinary
sense. Now as two complementary photons are emitted from the source
(e.g. mercury), the blueness of photon 1 and the greenness of photon 2
are just a doppler shifting of a single wave front as perceived in each
direction respectively, i.e. due to the motion of the emitting molecule
at the time of emission. The polarization affects both photons because
it occurs over in the same field, i.e. the photons were never
independent of one another. Any failure of like-polarization is due to
local superposition of other fields (photons). And yes the communication
between parts of the photon "field" are instantaneous, and are just the
induced motional phase differences in the electrons in the surrounding
environment: All of it.
Below is a link to an electromagnetic theory (Just a corrected form of
classical theory BTW) that supports the conclusions of EPR. And although
I haven't really though about it yet, I suppose that this theory
actually predicts the outcome of EPR.
Sandy Hodges
Bill Taylor wrote:
>
[snip]
>
> |> My understanding of the MWI, such as it is, goes like this.
> |> When a random event happens ... the world splits into as many worlds
>
> This is one way of speaking of it; but from my readings of the mailing list
> about this, many folk seem to prefer to say that all the worlds were there
> all the time (though indistinguishable) and there was never any actual
> "split". Indeed, some of them get quite ratty about the idea of a "split",
> especially at the thought of this split "propagating" at the speed of light,
> carrying information about the random event "with it", but in some unspecified
> and mysterious way.
>
> Of course, it's just wordy debate of no scientific value to argue about
> pure interpretation... whether worlds split or were there before. But then,
> the whole idea of (such philosophical) interpretations IS to play with words,
> hoping to agree on some language that makes some kind of intuitive logical
> sense, and also corresponds somehow with scientific reality.
>
> For me, the MWI makes no sense UNLESS it is agreed that *there are* splits
Two ways of speaking make sense to me: a three dimensional world that
changes in time, and a four dimensional picture (which can't be called
changing, nor static). What doesn't make sense is to take a four
dimensional view and then have a "now" which moves. Similarly, you
can have a three dimensional world where random events happen (so there
are things which could have happened but did not), or a four dimensional
picture of a branching tree. But if you use the four dimensional
picture, you must not speak of one branch as the one that happened, any
more than you may speak of a moving now. (Each branch is actual to the
people on it though).
Since quantum mechanics (under MWI) has worlds that merge, it does imply
that branches other than our own are (in some sense) real. Not only
electrons in bench versions of the two slit experiment, but photons that
travel millions of light years, show interference. We can think of
such a photon while it is traveling through two different paths (which
later merge). In the MWI, there is a world where the photon takes one
route and another world where it takes another. Each of these worlds
has versions of us, thinking about the photon (I use the astronomical
rather than the bench example to allow time for thinking). When the
two beams are rejoined, and interference shows that merger happened,
then the two versions of us become one - each version of us is equally
in our past. Thus, if each version of us thought "we are the only real
examples of us, everything else is just a convenient fiction", then each
version of us in fact merged with a version of us we regarded as
fictional. So versions of us that will merge with us are real.
(Something that has real causal effects is real). It can hardly be the
case that one real version of us ceases to be real if someone decides
not to bring the beams of light together. Thus versions of us that,
in the future, become quite different from us are real. The
probability that two versions will merge becomes less and less, without
a sudden transition to zero.
> (as you also think), and that *they do* propagate at luminal speed,
> splitting apart the multiverse as they go, like a block of firewood
> being snapped apart by an axe blow.
I certainly like the propagating version rather than the one (used by
opponents of MWI) where a random event on Earth causes there to be, in
that instant, multiple copies of every galaxy in the universe.
I have a crazy notion that what we call elementary particles are in fact
the propagating cracks-tips between splitting worlds.
>
> I still await EITHER an explanation of the EPR experiment in this explanatory
> environment, OR an alternative (but still intuitively logical) verbal
> environment in which it *can* be explained.
Not clear what you want. Do you want to know why, when worlds merge,
the probability of the merged world depends on phase? If so, what do
you count as known facts which (in a satisfactory explanation) would
imply the phase-probability account?
> Neither has ever been presented to me, except in one case, by a correspondent
> who inplicitly seemed to agree that the "mechanisms" involved were far
> more repellant than any attempted explanation would be hoped for.
>
> |> The MWI says that outcomes having phases,
>
> Yes, I am more or less aware of this aspect of things. But again, it seems
> part of the math rather than part of the verbal explanation. Unless one is
> to say that photons etc go along "carrying" a definite changing phase
It's certainly hard to talk to physicists. Few subscribe to the MWI in
any case. So they often say something like "superposed states". Take
polarized light. An unpolarized beam is called a superposition of the
possible directions of polarization (I think). So in MWI, there are
separate worlds (I presume), in each of which the light has a
direction. If light passes through a polarizing filter, then worlds
merge, and probabilities (hence quantity of light) depend on the angle
between the directions. So I think if an MWI physicist can be found,
he will allow the photon to "carry" the phase. What little I
understand of this is from Feynman: Strange theory of light and matter -
he doesn't call a state a "world" but he treats phase as a more-or-less
real quality of states.
Also - does a world need to "carry" its phase any more or less than it
"carries" its probability amplitude?
> [snip]
>
> I hope at least you will agree with me, that the EPR situation has more
> spooky mystery in it than the other ones:- two-slit, cloud-chamber tracks,
> diffraction, interference and so forth. All these latter ones are explicable,
> by pilot waves *or* MWI. But I still do not see how EPR is explicable by MWI.
Well I thought I understood it when I last looked into it a long time
ago. At least as well as the two-slit experiment (I don't feel the
force of your objection to phases as math rather than verbal). But I
can look into it again and perhaps see what you are getting at in
claiming that EPR is spookier than two slit. Could you elaborate a
little on what the problem is? EPR is creating a pair of particles,
sending one to alpha centauri, and doing measurements on them and
getting certain correlated probabilities (isn't it?). For example,
passing the particles through polarizing filters (with various angles
between the Earth filter and the Alpha Centauri filter) and seeing
whether they make it through or not.
So an MWI account presumably begins by saying that when the pair of
particles is produced, the world is split into as many copies as there
are directions for the particles to have. When the particles are
passed through their respective filters, then things which we could have
decided to measure, we didn't measure. So worlds merge (as long as it
can still happen that a measurement is made telling which of two worlds
we are in, they cant merge). Merged worlds have probabilities
according to phase. If such an account can be given, where is it
spookier than the two-slit account?
(I suppose the choice of what filter orientation to use can be made
randomly on each planet - thus producing more worlds to merge).
P.S. What I find spooky is renormalization.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> They travel as waves but arrive as particles.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- ----- ------ - - --Sandy Hodges / Alameda, California, USA
Alan Stern
...
> I still await EITHER an explanation of the EPR experiment in this explanatory
> environment, OR an alternative (but still intuitively logical) verbal
> environment in which it *can* be explained.
>
> Neither has ever been presented to me, except in one case, by a correspondent
> who inplicitly seemed to agree that the "mechanisms" involved were far
> more repellant than any attempted explanation would be hoped for.
> But I *do*
> hope for some verbal explanation that has some *internal logical consistency*.
> To my mind, as yet, I have not seen one. I am well aware that this may
> be a deficiency of *me*, not the whole science-philosophical community.
> But I doubt it... I'm not *that* stupid, and many other clever people
> still have their own reservations about all this too.
> I see that the 2-slit experiment can be explained *either* by many-worlds,
> *or* by a pilot wave.
>
> BUT:- AFAICS neither of these explantions can extend logically to the EPR
> experiment. MWI people insist that though pilot waves cannot, nonetheless
> MWI *can*. It is this last point I dispute. I cannot understand the
> alleged MWI explanations of EPR. Please try again for me, I beseech you.
> (Or someone else - Daryl? - Mike O?)
>
> I hope at least you will agree with me, that the EPR situation has more
> spooky mystery in it than the other ones:- two-slit, cloud-chamber tracks,
> diffraction, interference and so forth. All these latter ones are explicable,
> by pilot waves *or* MWI. But I still do not see how EPR is explicable by MWI.
Bill:
I haven't followed everything you've written on this topic, but you
did mention pilot waves several times above. How familiar are you
with Bohmian mechanics? It is basically a modernized version of the
pilot wave model. (There was a very nice description by Sheldon
Goldstein published in the April 1998 issue of Physics Today.) Unlike
many of the other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics,
Bohmian mechanics does have "internal logical consistency" because it
is entirely mechanical; that is, it explains our observations in terms
of a model that describes what actually is happening at the
microscopic level.
It does have some undesirable parts (as Bell showed that any version
of QM must). It is explicitly non-local, and it relies on the genuine
existence of a wave function that propagates in a high-dimensional
"configuration space". To my mind, this is somewhat preferable to the
requirements laid out by the Many-Worlds interpretation.
And finally, Bohmian mechanics _does_ explain the EPR experiment
(contrary to what you wrote above). Indeed, for non-relativistic QM
it generates predictions that are identical to those of the standard
theory. Briefly, in the Bohmian picture, the choice of measurement
made by one observer affects the wave function, which non-locally
propagates that effect to alter the behavior of the particle at the
other observer's site.
Alan Stern
Matt Roberts
news:3CCC5C9F.17180229@no_spam.com:
Hmm. This is strangely reminiscent of the first few chapters of
Baudrillard's _Simulacra and Simulation_.
Here's a quote:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
(Jean Baudrillard, _Simulacra and Simulation_, pg 1-2, 1994)
If once we were able to view the the Borges fable in which the
cartographers of the Empire drew up a map so detailed that it ends up
covering the territory exactly (the decline of the Empire witnesses the
fraying of this map, little by little, and its fall into ruins, ... this
fable has now come full circle for us, and possesses nothing but the
discrete charm of second-order simulacra. Today abstraction is no longer
that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is
no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It
is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a
hyperreal. The territory no longer preceds the map, nor does it survive
it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory. ... It is
with this same imperialism that present-day simulators attempt to make
the real, all of the real, coincide with their models of simulation. ...
It is all of metaphysics that is lost. No more mirror of being and
appearences, of the real and its concept.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good comments, Richard. Baudrillard's criticism is one of the most
fascinating things I have read in contemporary philosophical literature.
The quote above provides a somewhat "Neo-Heideggerian" look at computers
and simulation. Like Heidegger, he provides a critique of this
ontological, metaphysical paradigm presented before us. It seems that
Baudrillard indicts metaphysics on the level that the map we draw
precedes the way we act. We render the periphery how we think it should
be rendered and attempt to act within it, creating an imperialism.
Again, good comments.
-Matt
Oh, by the way: If you have seen The Matrix, you might recognize the
title. It's where Neo keeps the disk. :) I thought that that was cool,
given the subject of the movie. (Baudrillard's book is largely
considered to be the inspiration for the movie)
>
> One of these days computer simulation will lead to a virtual universe
> whose elements perfectly mirror those of the real universe. It is not
> unlikely that evolution within that virtual universe will yield a
> virtual conscious entity, e.g. a virtual human, identical in every
> respect to real humans with the singular exception that his reality is
> fully contained in microchips.
>
Bill Taylor
da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
|> mat...@math.canterbury.ac.nz (Bill Taylor) says...
|>
|> >For me, the MWI makes no sense UNLESS it is agreed that *there are* splits
|> >(as you also think), and that *they do* propagate at luminal speed,
|> >splitting apart the multiverse as they go, like a block of firewood
|> >being snapped apart by an axe blow.
|>
|> Could you explain why you think MWI doesn't make sense unless there
|> really are splits?
Well, this is more or less an impossible question! One can't say why
an account of something is a bit silly, without having it in front of you.
After all, there are almost as many variants of MWI as there are of MWIlders.
So, Daryl, (or anyone else), if you would like to submit a brief outline
of how you fancy a realistic MW account should be, (one *without* any
discernable "splitting" concept), I'll explain w-o that. I'm not asking
for the moon, here! - just a small paragraph, or as much more as you feel
necessary to cover the key points. In particular with reference to the
classic (Causer/Aspect) EPR scenario.
And please notew, I'm asking for an *interpretation*, but one that makes
realistic physical sense. i.e. that is "local" both in the sense that things
are explained as they happen in small regions, and also in the technical
sense of no FTL influences. And being "an interpretation" essentially
means an explanation in fairly everyday language, with no more math than
a smart high-school kid might know (unlike the rest of the post I reply to here).
Could that be managed, do you think?
In particular, no bras and kets and Hilbert spaces and their bases!
Something along the lines of David Deutsch's chapter 2 of his Fabric of Reality
book, where he (IMHO successfully) adduces the necessity of "shadow photons".
He also explicates their sufficiency, EXCEPT FOR the knotty problem of EPR
which he avoids almost completely.
Again, I stress that I'm well aware that all my requirements may not be
*achievable* - that the universe is under no obligation to make such
everyday sense to us. But if this IS unachievable, I would at least like
to hear MWI proponents admit it - AFAICT some insist that a Deutsch-like
explanation is possible. I strongly doubt it, but am eager to see one!
Could that be managed, do you think?
Oh wait a minute - I've just this minute noticed a new thread with almost
this exact title! I'm very hopeful, but we'll see. Anyway, please Daryl
(or elseone) have a go as well.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Taylor W.Ta...@math.canterbury.ac.nz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elementary particle: Pure being contracted to a point. - Heisenberg
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Claude Chaunier
> da...@cogentex.com (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> |> mat...@math.canterbury.ac.nz (Bill Taylor) says...
> |>
> |> >For me, the MWI makes no sense UNLESS it is agreed that *there are* splits
> |> >(as you also think), and that *they do* propagate at luminal speed,
> |> >splitting apart the multiverse as they go, like a block of firewood
> |> >being snapped apart by an axe blow.
> |>
> |> Could you explain why you think MWI doesn't make sense unless there
> |> really are splits?
> So, Daryl, (or anyone else), if you would like to submit a brief outline
> of how you fancy a realistic MW account should be, (one *without* any
> discernable "splitting" concept), I'll explain w-o that.
I like to think of Multi-World Interpretations in the following simple
terms (from Greg Egan's novels). Play you favorite Cellular Automaton on
your computer, for example Conway's Game of Life, but imagine there is
room for special random albeit rigourously defined events in its very
rules - or there is room for the user's choice, for what it matters.
Imagine those unpredictable local events may occur at the same time but
they are distant and it takes time/cpu cycles for any event to have full
consequence on any remote places, because some dynamic rules/laws are
local, as in current Physics. You can play along these lines with some
programs out there, cliking on some cells on the screen to magically turn
them on while the whole mini-universe is running on.
Now your computer may be limited to run only one mini-universe at a time.
But you may stop playing with it at any time and save its current state
for later. The mini-universe wouldn't 'notice' any break once you run it
again. Actually it wouldn't even notice any definitive stopping!
Furthermore, you may make some choice, run its consequences for a while,
then take back an earlier backup and make some other choice. Alternate
between alternatives. Or buy more computers and run alternatives
simultaneously.
Whatever you do, and whether rigorous mathematical objects exist in some
platonic world or not, whether their creators/discoverers go on thinking
about them or not, MWI looks perfectly valid here... and has no
consequences.
And although no propagating splitting has ever been explicitly introduced
in the automata rules, propagation and choice have. They obviously result
in the consequences of any choices to propagate and meet along the local
dynamic rules. No way out of it, is there?
Claude