Pilots would rather quit The Force than continue to fly F-22s.
hcobb
him safe from combat deployments and he'd still rather quit and take
his chances in a wobbly economy than continue to fly that aircraft.
Quite an endorsement for the F-22, wouldn't you say?
-HJC
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/10/airforce_pilot_retentionbonus_102108w/
The fighters with the lowest retention rates were A-10s at 53 percent,
F-16s at 51 percent and F-22s at 43 percent. Retention rates for other
fighters were 81 percent for F-15Es and 68 percent for F-15s.
Rob Arndt
left up to UAVs and some Predators, Reapers, and helos. In Afghanistan
you can carpet bomb and precision bomb them all day, but all you will
achieve is moving the piles of rock and dirt around! You can't bomb a
nation back to the stone age that actually lives IN the stone age
already! Same for Iraq. No modern a/c climbed into the air to meet
even our older, reliable fighters in OIF.
So now the US is going the German WW2 route; instead of hundreds or
thousands of decent reliable weapon systems, we want a few hundred
uberwaffen that can't be easily massed produced, replaced, nor
repaired with replacement parts in any real conflict with a real
fighting nation (Russia and China).
We also have not fought any real wars with opponents with serious SAMs
since Vietnam. Iraq's few in ODS were a joke not worth mentioning.
They are nowhere near Russian superior S-300 and S-400 systems that
can be sold to any of the US enemies around the globe- nations like
China and even terrorist sponsor Iran.
The 183 F-22s ultimately to be produced could not even counter a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Super Hornets will have to tackle that
one up against Su-35s, that's IF the US carriers aren't nuked already
and laying at the bottom of the Straight...
With the F-35 at least 5 years away and low numbers as well, the US is
fucked while Russia rebuilds it AF and China continues to modernize
its military forces at an alarming rate.
Even attacking Iran is no cake-walk anymore or else the Israelis would
have already destroyed Iran's nuke facilitiers, ADN, Command Centers,
and infrastructure.
If McCain gets elected he promises to axe bad, expensive military
programs. F-22 would definately be on that list.
Rob
Matt Wiser
and start flying F-51s or F-86s again. That's what you want them to do, it
seems, so why not come out and admit it?
"hcobb" <henry...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:b9b029b9-1c5e-463b...@k7g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
hcobb
> Still beating the anti-USAF drum, I see. Too bad the AF won't listen to you
> and start flying F-51s or F-86s again. That's what you want them to do,
It's not what I want. It's what the F-22 pilots want.
And they want to bail out.
When will The Force start listening to them?
-HJC
Rob Arndt
The USAF already KNOWS it dumped way too much money into the F-22
money pit in that insane fund-before-flying program. F-22 has been
constantly delayed, plagued by cost overruns, assigned multiple roles,
and continues to have numerous problems that STILL have not been
worked out, while having no capability to fight asymmetrical warfare.
It is inferior to evolving UAV-UCAV co-operation operations with real
time strike and damage assessment capabilities and may not even
deliver on its CLAIMED air-to-air superiority capabilities either
against the Eurocanards or current Chinese and Russian developments.
Can it get past the S-300 and S-400 missile systems either- especially
those linked to anti-stealth systems and possessing anti-stealth
seekers?
Probably not, and in daytime strike mode against a real fighting
enemy- the Russian missile systems and Flankers will probably kill it.
Its 183 maximum production isn't shit in any real war- good luck with
replacements and spare parts too.
And for anyone to make a blanket statement that we will never fight
Russia nor China is a fool.
We could have been fighting Russia this summer over Georgia if they
were included in NATO. The US backed down. See, it was a real fighting
nation and US claimed technological superiority meant nothing to the
Russians who laughed and spit in our faces when we vowed to help our
democratic Georgian ally by all means. Had any F-22s showed up the
Russians would have sent Flankers and missiles up to meet them head
on. Again, the US backed down and turned away. Had this been Venezuela
under Chavez we might have done something, but against Russia we
tucked our tails and cowered back home.
F-22 isn't shit, it's all hype for the most expensive US fighter in
history that has little more real applicable capabilities than a
modified three-surface F-15 with minimal RAM coatings for $150 mil
less!!! And YES that platform could carry AMRAAMs too ;)
The Craptor is an obscenity and I hope either President Obama or
McCain axes the program ASAFP.
Rob
p.s. Not being unpatriotic either, just realistic,logical, and
taxpayer conscious. We gotta either get UCAVs into mass production or
figure out how to develop fighter a/c that cost no more than $80 mil
that can be produced in significant numbers to actually replace the
aging F-15s for pure air superiority role. It shouldn't take 2 decades
to design, build, and get a new fighter operational.
frank
Actually this problem comes up from time to time. I'd like to hear
Ed's take on this one, being a real pilot. i.e. something that didnt'
have a chemical toilet in the back.. (no coffee maker..real rough).
Thing is, you look at what you fly, how many are in the fleet, how
many other pilots there are in the Force and where the heck you're
going from this cushy assignment pushing a stick. If you don't want to
push a desk when you're going for your 20, you get out. And not only
that, the probability of not getting RIF'd on the way to the 20 and
what options you're going to miss out on and what would be available
when you're out at 15 or 18 years of service.
There are also other problems, you get older with a wife and kids,
moving every so ofter gets old.
Being an integral part of defending the nation is great at 20. Start
getting 35 or so, the glamor wears off. Alerts, TDYs, all that. You
start losing the edge.
Typhoon502
>
> http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/10/airforce_pilot_retentionbon...
> The fighters with the lowest retention rates were A-10s at 53 percent,
> F-16s at 51 percent and F-22s at 43 percent. Retention rates for other
> fighters were 81 percent for F-15Es and 68 percent for F-15s.
I knew there was more to the story...reading on, I found:
"The numbers for the Raptor are puzzling, given that it is the jewel
of the fleet and a prized assignment, but Lt. Col. Dewey DuHadway,
chief of rated force policy, noted that only 15 F-22A pilots became
eligible for the bonus this fiscal year, which began in October 2007.
It’s hard to draw conclusions from such a small sample, he said."
So in other words, you're talking about six pilots (based on 43% of
15) deciding not to re-up. Six ..
OOOOH, CRISIS!!!
Ed Rasimus
<dhssres...@netscape.net> wrote:
>Actually this problem comes up from time to time. I'd like to hear
>Ed's take on this one, being a real pilot. i.e. something that didnt'
>have a chemical toilet in the back.. (no coffee maker..real rough).
>
>Thing is, you look at what you fly, how many are in the fleet, how
>many other pilots there are in the Force and where the heck you're
>going from this cushy assignment pushing a stick. If you don't want to
>push a desk when you're going for your 20, you get out. And not only
>that, the probability of not getting RIF'd on the way to the 20 and
>what options you're going to miss out on and what would be available
>when you're out at 15 or 18 years of service.
>
>There are also other problems, you get older with a wife and kids,
>moving every so ofter gets old.
>
>Being an integral part of defending the nation is great at 20. Start
>getting 35 or so, the glamor wears off. Alerts, TDYs, all that. You
>start losing the edge.
I was never so fortunate as to have been offered a six-figure bonus
for either getting out or staying in. There have been force management
programs going both ways over the years since my tenure.
There can be a lot of factors driving the decision. One that I
seriously doubt would be dissatisfaction with the aircraft.
An obvious factor would be the op tempo. Deployments can really strain
a family, particularly at the rank/age period in question. Combat ops
would be a minor factor, since we've pretty much eliminated the issue
of combat losses among the tactical force.
Less obvious would be the career objective issues. Rotation out of the
cockpit becomes very likely at the junior major point (eight years
cockpit service and ten years of total service). Staff jobs are
important to career development but not favored by folks who joined to
fly. Also there is the potential UAV assignment hanging over their
heads. Nobody I've ever met wanted a slice of that pie.
Still another subtle issue is the question of personnel policies that
assigned folks to the new jet. It isn't always the warrior who goes to
those high visibility jobs. Quite often it is the careerist who sees
the job as a stepping stone to higher rank. When it becomes a grind of
flying, deploying, training, long-hours, no week-ends and holidays,
etc. etc. then it loses the luster.
Bottom line with regard to Raptor specific numbers on this is you're
dealing with small group statistics, hence very subject to
extraordinary swings.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
www.thundertales.blogspot.com
www.thunderchief.org
Ken S. Tucker
With all there is to learn flying 5th gen jets maybe the
USAF should start training at age 15, so the pilots are
in jets at 20.
Ken
eyeball
How are you going to find them at that age? At least wait until
they're weaned.
eyeball
They tell you personally? Or is this a voice only you hear?
hcobb
> An obvious factor would be the op tempo. Deployments can really strain
> a family, particularly at the rank/age period in question.
What op tempo? This is the aircraft that doesn't deploy.
And it's so easy that even AWOL from his desk while The Force burned
Jumper could fly it.
The hand picked top pilots in The Force are walking away from not just
this aircraft but the entire Force.
Are jobs in civilian aviation so easy to get these days after the
triple Bushwhackings of high oil prices, increased insecurity and an
economy that has lost all the gains of the Bill "Peace and Prosperity"
Clinton years?
-HJC
Matt Wiser
them to fly.
Besides, the F-15s won't be around forever, and I'd rather have our guys and
gals flying the deadliest, most efficient killing machines in the air.
Something you seem to be against for some incomprehensible reason. F-22 and
F-35 are the way to go, short of reopening the F-15 line and going ahead
with mass buy of F-16Es that the UAE operates. Let me guess: you were a sore
loser when the YF-23 lost. Tough luck.news:518f4f65-155a-4488...@t65g2000hsf.googlegroups.com...
Matt Wiser
against his pet peeve. Besides, how much you want to bet those 6 wind up in
the ANG or AFRES, anyway?
"Typhoon502" <jeb....@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:059f720d-c1b6-4cb7...@64g2000hsu.googlegroups.com...
Ken S. Tucker
I'll bet 8 to 5 odds most jet pilots new that's what
they wanted to do at <15, so qualify and stream
them. Most education, apart for the 3R's is crap
propaganda to employ teachers to baby sit brats,
so why not permit a useful technical education?
Ken
150flivver
Stick to posting pictures of WWII aircraft. You have no expertise to
discuss the F-22 or any other current aircraft. So we didn't go to
war against Russia in Georgia must be definitive proof in your eyes
that the F-22 would not fair well--maybe someone smarter than you
decided it was not in our interest to go to war against Russia over
Georgia. War is supposed to be a last resort not the first response.
The existence of the S300/400 is exactly why the F-22/F-35 is needed.
I hope we never need to use the capability but just having it makes
diplomacy that much more effective. It may be an expensive capability
but the cost of not having it will be far greater.
As for applicability in the "War" on terrorism or the "War" on drugs,
poverty, illegal immigration, etc: Just appending the word "war" to
something doesn't make it so. Politicians use the word to tap into
the DoD budget to fund their pet crusade. We must not lose sight of
the fact that war is something nation states are prone to engage in
when diplomacy doesn't work. Spending our defense dollars to fund a
pseudo-war loses sight of the bigger picture that could have much
greater implications to our continued existence as a world leading
nation state.
Eeyore
Rob Arndt wrote:
Has Duncan Sandys prophesy finally come true ? Just 50 years late !
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duncan_Sandys
" He was appointed Minister of Defence in 1957 and quickly produced the
1957 Defence White Paper that proposed a radical shift in the Royal Air
Force by ending the use of fighter aircraft in favour of missile
technology. "
And those missiles needn't be very expensive.
Graham
Eeyore
Matt Wiser wrote:
> Still beating the anti-USAF drum, I see. Too bad the AF won't listen to you
> and start flying F-51s or F-86s again. That's what you want them to do, it
> seems, so why not come out and admit it?
Who needs a fighter any more ?
Graham
Rob Arndt
Not so.
Like you, I just posted my opinion and offered no expertise on
anything.
I note that you evaded on many of my valid points I made concerning
the entire F-22 program with its delays, obscene price tag, UCAV
competition, and insufficient numbers to replace our aging aerial
fleet of fighters for the next REAL wars.
Also, my comment on the War On Terror is totally valid as the
Administration, Pentagon, and USAF are the sources of that topic. Care
to argue with them?
So who the fuck are you to tell me to stick to posting on WW2 a/c,
asshole?
What the fuck are your credentials, you moron?
All you posted was your lousy opinion and pure speculation.
You might recall that Bush and the US vowed to use ALL means to remove
the Russian presence in Georgia. Funny, no military power was used at
all. As I stated and affirm, IF Georgia was a NATO ally, then by
treaty the US and Europe would have been obligated to come to their
aid militarily and the Russians could have cared less. They laughed in
our faces and no doubt would have rolled in S-300/400 sysytems as well
as their best fighters to counter US air assets.
We backed down and left Georgia high and dry. Democracy and US
military supremacy failed utterly in that test. And more tests will
come in the next administration.
F-22 is a joke and a bad one at that.
Rob
Dan
Aren't, has it ever occurred to you many problems can be solved
without going to war? I know you despise the U.S., but do you really
want to see U.S. bodies coming home in boxes as a solution to all your
problems? Would you personally have volunteered to go fight for Georgia?
It's amazing how often you call for war yet were never prepared to
put your own hide on the line for your own country.
Vulgarity noted.
Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired
guy
wrote:
>
> " He was appointed Minister of Defence in 1957 and quickly produced the
> 1957 Defence White Paper that proposed a radical shift in the Royal Air
> Force by ending the use of fighter aircraft in favour of missile
> technology. "
>
> And those missiles needn't be very expensive.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
IIRC in 1944 (maybe '45) he told Roly Beamont 'Of course in the future
it will all be done by missiles' - referring to shooting downn of V1s
Guy
Eeyore
guy wrote:
> IIRC in 1944 (maybe '45) he told Roly Beamont 'Of course in the future
> it will all be done by missiles' - referring to shooting downn of V1s
Given time he would probably have been right.
The destruction rate of V1s escalated hugely as soon as radar controlled guns with proximity fused shells were
brough into action. I actually have some figures somewhere from MoD records in the excellent book 'Radar Days'.
Didn't even need missiles.
Had the V2 problem continued longer, maybe we'd have had the Patriot system some 40-50 years earlier.
Graham
Jeff Dougherty
wrote:
>Given time he would probably have been right.
>
>The destruction rate of V1s escalated hugely as soon as radar controlled guns with proximity fused shells were
>brough into action. I actually have some figures somewhere from MoD records in the excellent book 'Radar Days'.
>
>Didn't even need missiles.
I think he would have been right *if* the technology on the offensive
side had remained relatively static- but it didn't. V-1s were easy
prey for radar-directed guns, true, but they also lacked any evasive
or countermeasure capability. SAMs of the time would probably have
done a lot of damage to a bomber box formation, but once people start
coming in at low altitude or using jammers they run into trouble.
I don't think Sandys deserves the villification he often gets,
though. Pretty much *everyone* at the time was thinking in terms of a
high-altitude formation bombing threat, and if that's what you're
trying to defend against Sandys is probably right- missiles can do the
job just as well as aircraft, and probably cheaper. It's hard to
blame him for not having the foresight to predict future tactics when
nobody else at the time was managing it either.
>
> Had the V2 problem continued longer, maybe we'd have had the Patriot system some 40-50 years earlier.
I'm not sure about that. I'm willing to stipulate that the Allies
could have built a rocket of similar performance if the need had been
there, but I'm not sure what you'd use as a guidance system, or for a
computer to control the intercept- there are a lot of calculations you
have to do, and not a lot of time in which to do them. The intercept
problem wasn't solved until the early 70s with Safeguard and Galosh,
and even then the only way to get an acceptable Pk was to use a
nuclear warhead, although arguably an ICBM warhead is a much more
difficult target than a V-2.
Mind you, it's fun to think about interceptor rockets being
painstakingly fueled and then launched under the control of some super-
powered cousin of the Bletchley Park machines, but I don't think it
would actually happen. :-)
-JTD
Eunometic
wrote:
Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
dispersion). Nevertheless even with radar directed guns, using
electronic analog computer 'predictors' directly driving servo powered
guns and radio proximity fuzes the number of shells required to down a
V1 was still in the hundreds. Incidently the V1's RLM desigination
was Fiesler Fi 103, its covername was FZG 76 (suggesting a FLAK
training drone) and its code name was Kirschkern (Cherrystone).
Overall the resources the allies expended against the V1 was greater
than that used by the Germans to produce and launch it. This alone
makes it a success.
The first V1's were simply launched from their ramps at which point
they made a change in direction to target. The missile entered its
terminal dive sequence when a windmill geared worm drive drove
together a pair of electrical contacts.
Because the allies were back tracking multiple final radar mapped V1
paths to the launch zone the Germans introduced the ability for the
missile to do at least one in flight course change, which made it much
harder to find the launch ramps.
About 5% of the early V1's had a radio beacon in order allow
triangulation of the impact point and to correct for wind drift.
Despite this the Germans never seem to have become aware of opperation
double cross in which British double agents misreported the impact
points of the V1's in order to move the impact point out of greater
London. The inconsistencies were regarded as aberrations. The final
series of V1's had a radio beacon rate of 50% perhaps suggesting that
the Germans were working through the problem. (Osprey book on the V1
covers all this)
There were plans for a mid course update based radio navigation system
using a magnetic tape loop which would have been used to produce a
highly jam resistant command system by correlating multiple commands,
several additional V1's were supposed to track a beacon in the main
'master' radio controlled V1. Clearly a mixture of guided V1's
'hidden' in a mass of unguided V1's would have been disguised the high
value units.
Evasion of allied AAA defenses probably would have been accomplished
by installation of the FuG 101a radar altimeter which was accurate to
better than 5m and had been around since 1940 and was standard on
German night fighters, bombers etc. It was cheap enough to produce.
Had the RAF had it for the dambusters less Lancasters would have been
lost.
Nevertheless
Geoffrey Sinclair
news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
> course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
> dispersion).
This rather ignores the height band problem, too high for the light
AA guns and too low for the heavier guns, particularly given the
V1 speed.
> Nevertheless even with radar directed guns, using
> electronic analog computer 'predictors' directly driving servo powered
> guns and radio proximity fuzes the number of shells required to down a
> V1 was still in the hundreds.
To quote R V Jones, "in the first few weeks of proximity fuse
operations the average number of rounds to destroy a bomb
was 77."
The Germans too photographs of the AA guns in action and they
were puzzled why the dispersion of the burst was so narrow, unlike
time fused flak.
Jones notes for 28 August 1944, of 97 V-1s that approached England,
13 were shot down over the sea, 65 by the AA guns, 10 more by
fighters behind the guns, 2 collided with balloons, 3 fell outside London
leaving 4 to reach the city.
The post war count was some 10,492 V-1s launched against the UK,
around 1,600 from aircraft, some 7,488 were observed by the UK
defences, 3,957 destroyed by the defences with around 231 by balloons
the rest almost exactly split between the guns and the fighters. This
left 3,531 that eluded the defences, of which 2,419 reached London.
There were 3,403 V-1 "incidents" outside London, generally 1 bomb
per incident, but these include damage from shot down bombs.
The V-1s killed 6,184 civilians.
Jones notes the campaign cost the allies more than the Germans.
V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
civilians killed.
This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
> Evasion of allied AAA defenses probably would have been accomplished
> by installation of the FuG 101a radar altimeter which was accurate to
> better than 5m and had been around since 1940 and was standard on
> German night fighters, bombers etc. It was cheap enough to produce.
Ah, yet another thing the Germans did not do but Eunometic decides
to enhance history again.
> Had the RAF had it for the dambusters less Lancasters would have been
> lost.
The accuracy requirement for the dam buster drop was much less than
5 metres, and they were down to 60 feet off the water, or around 18
metres.
Also let us see about the losses, the flight was made at low level,
2 hit high tension cables on the inward flight
1 by flak over Holland, outbound
2 by flak off the Dutch coast as they were leaving.
1 hit by flak in target area
1 hit by flak then crippled by its own bomb blast,
1 crippled by its own bomb blast then hit by flak on the return journey.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.
Alistair Gunn
> "Eunometic" <euno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> > by installation of the FuG 101a radar altimeter which was accurate to
> > better than 5m and had been around since 1940 and was standard on
> > German night fighters, bombers etc. It was cheap enough to produce.
> Ah, yet another thing the Germans did not do but Eunometic decides
> to enhance history again.
How hard would it have been for the German's to modify the V1 design to
build in a certain amount of evasion capability? I suppose getting a
left/right dodge to work (and still hit London afterwards!) would've been
quite hard, but a certain amount of semi-random up/down movement might
have made the job of the fighters and guns a bit harder?
I'm thinking of using the distance counter to work out when you're over
the channel and then starting to adjust your height by +/- 50-100ft until
you reach London, then dive as normal ...
--
These opinions might not even be mine ...
Let alone connected with my employer ...
Jeff Dougherty
> How hard would it have been for the German's to modify the V1 design to
> build in a certain amount of evasion capability? I suppose getting a
> left/right dodge to work (and still hit London afterwards!) would've been
> quite hard, but a certain amount of semi-random up/down movement might
> have made the job of the fighters and guns a bit harder?
>
> I'm thinking of using the distance counter to work out when you're over
> the channel and then starting to adjust your height by +/- 50-100ft until
> you reach London, then dive as normal ...
The V-1 used a pendulum and gyro system to damp out pitch oscillation,
so I suppose in theory you could cut a cam to throw in ascents and
descents at certain intervals by effectively changing the pitch
damping forces. Whether or not it would work in practice I don't
know, since I don't know how stable the V-1 actually was on that
axis. You'd probably need to experiment with a number of different
cam designs before you got one that didn't send the missile into a
tumble.
Of course, the big disadvantage of that system is that it doesn't
"know" where the ground is, so if there's something in your flight
path that's taller than you think you also might do the Doodlebug
equivalent of CFIT.
-JTD
Eunometic
wrote:
> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>
> news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>
> > Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
> > course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
> > dispersion).
>
> This rather ignores the height band problem, too high for the light
> AA guns and too low for the heavier guns, particularly given the
> V1 speed.
The latter claim you make in this is that the radar directed proximity
fuze reduced the
rounds fired to get a kill down to below 100 rounds. Therefore this
isn't inconsistent.
The Light AAA does seem to have been pretty ineffective though.
>
> > Nevertheless even with radar directed guns, using
> > electronic analog computer 'predictors' directly driving servo powered
> > guns and radio proximity fuzes the number of shells required to down a
> > V1 was still in the hundreds.
>
> To quote R V Jones, "in the first few weeks of proximity fuse
> operations the average number of rounds to destroy a bomb
> was 77."
Maybe, maybe not:
The straight and level path of the intruders made them relatively easy
targets, and after a learning curve, fewer and fewer of the V-1s got
through to London. In the end, statistics showed that it took 156
proximity-fuzed shells to kill a flying bomb, which may not sound good
except in comparison with the 2,800 conventional anti-aircraft shells
required to accomplish the same trick. Incidentally, the proximity
fuze had been designed to engage larger flying machines than the V-1,
and so the fuzes supplies to the defenders were "recalibrated"
following tests against a static V-1 model back in the US.
>
> The Germans too photographs of the AA guns in action and they
> were puzzled why the dispersion of the burst was so narrow, unlike
> time fused flak.
>
> Jones notes for 28 August 1944, of 97 V-1s that approached England,
> 13 were shot down over the sea, 65 by the AA guns, 10 more by
> fighters behind the guns, 2 collided with balloons, 3 fell outside London
> leaving 4 to reach the city.
>
> The post war count was some 10,492 V-1s launched against the UK,
> around 1,600 from aircraft, some 7,488 were observed by the UK
> defences, 3,957 destroyed by the defences with around 231 by balloons
> the rest almost exactly split between the guns and the fighters. This
> left 3,531 that eluded the defences, of which 2,419 reached London.
> There were 3,403 V-1 "incidents" outside London, generally 1 bomb
> per incident, but these include damage from shot down bombs.
>
> The V-1s killed 6,184 civilians.
>
> Jones notes the campaign cost the allies more than the Germans.
>
> V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
> civilians killed.
>
> This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
V2 unit production costs was considerable less than a single engined
fighter and 1/6th the cost of a Lancaster. Production cost were
expected to more than halve or even quarter. The program costs was
enormously expensive mainly due to the massive R+D program to gain
know how and in terms of the low numbers of V2 actually completed.
>
> > Evasion of allied AAA defenses probably would have been accomplished
> > by installation of the FuG 101a radar altimeter which was accurate to
> > better than 5m and had been around since 1940 and was standard on
> > German night fighters, bombers etc. It was cheap enough to produce.
>
> Ah, yet another thing the Germans did not do but Eunometic decides
> to enhance history again.
There were a large number of improvements planed for the V1 in many
areas.
Better pulse jets, better guidence, radio guidence, disposable
turbojets
etc.
>
> > Had the RAF had it for the dambusters less Lancasters would have been
> > lost.
>
> The accuracy requirement for the dam buster drop was much less than
> 5 metres, and they were down to 60 feet off the water, or around 18
> metres.
FuF 101a accuracy was actually 3m (6ft) at that height. It was good
enough to
aim the bombs. Communicating the convergence of two spot lights
orally by intercom was after all not without its accuracy limitations
either. It drew attention to the bombers.
http://www.dornier24.com/pages/equipment/FuG101.html
A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
rendering it less visible and probably allowed lower flying.
The US had radar altimeters that were passed on, the British units
apparently weren't much good.
>
> Also let us see about the losses, the flight was made at low level,
>
> 2 hit high tension cables on the inward flight
> 1 by flak over Holland, outbound
> 2 by flak off the Dutch coast as they were leaving.
> 1 hit by flak in target area
> 1 hit by flak then crippled by its own bomb blast,
> 1 crippled by its own bomb blast then hit by flak on the return journey.
A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
rendering it less visible during its attack run and probably allowed
lower, safer flying for those lost.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastise
Geoffrey Sinclair
> On Nov 6, 12:23 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> wrote:
>> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>>
>> news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> > Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
>> > course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
>> > dispersion).
>>
>> This rather ignores the height band problem, too high for the light
>> AA guns and too low for the heavier guns, particularly given the
>> V1 speed.
>
> The latter claim you make in this is that the radar directed proximity
> fuze reduced the rounds fired to get a kill down to below 100 rounds.
> Therefore this isn't inconsistent.
The reality is as R V Jones notes the Germans deliberately chose
a height band designed to make it hard for the heavy AA guns to
accurately track the V-1 and be out of effective light AA range
as well.
> The Light AAA does seem to have been pretty ineffective though.
Because of the height band deliberately chosen.
>> > Nevertheless even with radar directed guns, using
>> > electronic analog computer 'predictors' directly driving servo powered
>> > guns and radio proximity fuzes the number of shells required to down a
>> > V1 was still in the hundreds.
>>
>> To quote R V Jones, "in the first few weeks of proximity fuse
>> operations the average number of rounds to destroy a bomb
>> was 77."
>
> Maybe, maybe not:
I note no source. It is lifted from
http://www.vectorsite.net/ttwiz_05.html
> The straight and level path of the intruders made them relatively easy
> targets, and after a learning curve, fewer and fewer of the V-1s got
> through to London. In the end, statistics showed that it took 156
> proximity-fuzed shells to kill a flying bomb, which may not sound good
> except in comparison with the 2,800 conventional anti-aircraft shells
> required to accomplish the same trick. Incidentally, the proximity
> fuze had been designed to engage larger flying machines than the V-1,
> and so the fuzes supplies to the defenders were "recalibrated"
> following tests against a static V-1 model back in the US.
So we have two different sources it would be interesting to see
the original statistics.
As noted the V-1 was a hard target for the heavy AA guns to
track, given its altitude and speed.
>> The Germans too photographs of the AA guns in action and they
>> were puzzled why the dispersion of the burst was so narrow, unlike
>> time fused flak.
>>
>> Jones notes for 28 August 1944, of 97 V-1s that approached England,
>> 13 were shot down over the sea, 65 by the AA guns, 10 more by
>> fighters behind the guns, 2 collided with balloons, 3 fell outside London
>> leaving 4 to reach the city.
>>
>> The post war count was some 10,492 V-1s launched against the UK,
>> around 1,600 from aircraft, some 7,488 were observed by the UK
>> defences, 3,957 destroyed by the defences with around 231 by balloons
>> the rest almost exactly split between the guns and the fighters. This
>> left 3,531 that eluded the defences, of which 2,419 reached London.
>> There were 3,403 V-1 "incidents" outside London, generally 1 bomb
>> per incident, but these include damage from shot down bombs.
>>
>> The V-1s killed 6,184 civilians.
>>
>> Jones notes the campaign cost the allies more than the Germans.
>>
>> V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
>> civilians killed.
>>
>> This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
>
> V2 unit production costs was considerable less than a single engined
> fighter and 1/6th the cost of a Lancaster.
Six V2s, 6 tons of bombs, average Lancaster bomb load per bombing
mission for the war just under 5 tons.
Average Lancaster lifetime, 156,192 sorties for 3,677 losses, including
crashes on operations, so around 42.5 missions, so over 200 tons of
bombs.
I note no attempt to deny the V2 costs.
> Production cost were
> expected to more than halve or even quarter.
The Eunometic bonus card in play again.
> The program costs was
> enormously expensive mainly due to the massive R+D program to gain
> know how and in terms of the low numbers of V2 actually completed.
For an ineffective weapon. And it rather ignores all the other problems,
like the short time allowed to use a new missile.
>> > Evasion of allied AAA defenses probably would have been accomplished
>> > by installation of the FuG 101a radar altimeter which was accurate to
>> > better than 5m and had been around since 1940 and was standard on
>> > German night fighters, bombers etc. It was cheap enough to produce.
>>
>> Ah, yet another thing the Germans did not do but Eunometic decides
>> to enhance history again.
>
> There were a large number of improvements planed for the V1 in many
> areas. Better pulse jets, better guidence, radio guidence, disposable
> turbojets etc.
Ah, yet another thing the Germans did not do but Eunometic decides
to enhance history again.
>> > Had the RAF had it for the dambusters less Lancasters would have been
>> > lost.
>>
>> The accuracy requirement for the dam buster drop was much less than
>> 5 metres, and they were down to 60 feet off the water, or around 18
>> metres.
>
> FuF 101a accuracy was actually 3m (6ft) at that height.
Fascinating, given the accuracy was 60 feet plus or minus a couple of
feet, not 10 feet.
> It was good enough to aim the bombs.
No. Aiming was via the nails on a stick method, the height was an
important part of ensuring the correct bomb movement.
> Communicating the convergence of two spot lights
> orally by intercom was after all not without its accuracy limitations
> either.
But more accurate than the claimed replacement idea.
> It drew attention to the bombers.
>
> http://www.dornier24.com/pages/equipment/FuG101.html
>
> A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
> rendering it less visible and probably allowed lower flying.
The short answerer here is Eunometic is once again trying to
push fiction. How low do you think the aircraft were if they
hit power lines?
> The US had radar altimeters that were passed on, the British units
> apparently weren't much good.
Now there is a surprise, the Eunometic declaration of good.
>> Also let us see about the losses, the flight was made at low level,
>>
>> 2 hit high tension cables on the inward flight
>> 1 by flak over Holland, outbound
>> 2 by flak off the Dutch coast as they were leaving.
Correction, one in, one out.
>> 1 hit by flak in target area
>> 1 hit by flak then crippled by its own bomb blast,
>> 1 crippled by its own bomb blast then hit by flak on the return journey.
>
>
> A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
> rendering it less visible during its attack run and probably allowed
> lower, safer flying for those lost.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastise
Ah repeating the fiction in the hope it becomes fact. And a site that
does not state the lights caused a shoot down.
I like this, the height was set by the bomb characteristics. Not the
altimeters carried. Furthermore the attack was by its nature quite
predictable for the gunners. Hence Gibson's and Martin's decisions
to fly in along with the attacking bomber.
Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
life ones have limitations.
Peter Skelton
<gsinc...@froggy.com.au> wrote:
>> The straight and level path of the intruders made them relatively easy
>> targets, and after a learning curve, fewer and fewer of the V-1s got
>> through to London. In the end, statistics showed that it took 156
>> proximity-fuzed shells to kill a flying bomb, which may not sound good
>> except in comparison with the 2,800 conventional anti-aircraft shells
>> required to accomplish the same trick. Incidentally, the proximity
>> fuze had been designed to engage larger flying machines than the V-1,
>> and so the fuzes supplies to the defenders were "recalibrated"
>> following tests against a static V-1 model back in the US.
>
>So we have two different sources it would be interesting to see
>the original statistics.
>
>As noted the V-1 was a hard target for the heavy AA guns to
>track, given its altitude and speed.
The importance of the number of shells it took to down an
aircraft was the way it affected how many guns it could fly
within range of before it was shot down.. Heavy AA fired in the
range of 10-15 rpm, had a radius of effectiveness of three miles
or so depending on altitude, so a single gun didn't get very many
shots at a V1.
Peter Skelton
Eunometic
> On Nov 5, 11:13 am, Alistair Gunn <palmerspe...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > How hard would it have been for the German's to modify the V1 design to
> > build in a certain amount of evasion capability? I suppose getting a
> > left/right dodge to work (and still hit London afterwards!) would've been
> > quite hard, but a certain amount of semi-random up/down movement might
> > have made the job of the fighters and guns a bit harder?
>
> > I'm thinking of using the distance counter to work out when you're over
> > the channel and then starting to adjust your height by +/- 50-100ft until
> > you reach London, then dive as normal ...
>
> The V-1 used a pendulum and gyro system to damp out pitch oscillation,
> so I suppose in theory you could cut a cam to throw in ascents and
> descents at certain intervals by effectively changing the pitch
> damping forces. Whether or not it would work in practice I don't
> know, since I don't know how stable the V-1 actually was on that
> axis.
When the Germans became aware of the RAF tactic of sending a V1
tumbling by flying wing tip to wing tip with them to in order to
disturb them they increased the authority or control limits of the
autopilot. I came across that in a little known book by Fritz
Trenkle on German WW2 guidence systems. It was certainly capable of
improvement. I see no reason that the nut moving on a threaded rod
that was used to initiate switches that caused heading changes
couldn't be used to instigate an evasive pattern of maneuvers: turns
and height changes as the flying bomb passed over vulnerable areas (eg
channel coast), using a rotating cam, as you suggest. David Mindel
book "Between human and machine" notes that they often took several
hits and that the autopilot was stable enough to right itself after
inversion. (somewhat inconsistent with the stories of pilots knocking
them tumbling with the wing tip method).
The reason I suggest a radar altimeter would have made them a tougher
targets is:
1 Very low approach over the sea means early warning is reduced to
below 20 miles (say 3 minutes)
with a height as low as 10m probably being feasible.
2 Height change is then required in preparation for crossing the
coast;
3 Much lower cruise height is then possible over land.
The low height will allow masking behind terrain, possible loss of the
missile in ground clutter, reduction of range due to ground clutter
returns reducing signal to noise ratio. The low height allows less
guns to be brought on to the target.
The SCR 584 radar and M9 director combination has some defects;
firstly the operators had absolutely no view of the outside world and
couldn't use visual cues in a complex situation. They were isolated
inside the van. This had been done for psychological reasons.
Secondly the unit was based on a single radar and could not both track
a target while scanning for others.
Like most predictors the M9 director assumed a straightline path for
the target; the differences being is that it used an electronic
implementation of the M7 prediction algorithm instead of mechanical.
This made it cheaper, potentially faster but not more accurate. The
implementation actually had a 'defect' in that the designers had
preceded without a lot of rigor and the flight path of the target was
determined by electronic differentiation. This turned out to be noise
prone if there was any jitter in tracking eg as the beam moved from
one part of the aircraft to another forcing delay filters which then
degraded response. The properly "Hendrik Bode" designed T-15
directors used mechanical subtraction to calculate the flight path and
was over twice as accurate. It could have been produced but the M9
was already further on the path.
My point being that a low flying, evasively moving target would start
to bring out defects in the SCR-594/M9 combo.
The V1 also had a dispenser behind the wing root that ejected
propaganda leaflets. I see no reason a chaff dispensor with a roll of
rapid blooming chaff couldn't be dumped at critical periods to break
the lock of tracking radars or pull it of target.
http://www.psywarrior.com/V1RocketLeaf.html
Allied radars were just as vulnerable to window chaff as the German
ones. The problem for the Germans was that their smaller aircraft and
smaller raids didn't drop enough tonage of it to disrupt the system.
Apart from being able to create spoof raids when there is enough chaff
in the air multiple foil to foil reflections from the side lobes make
the problem even worse.
> You'd probably need to experiment with a number of different
> cam designs before you got one that didn't send the missile into a
> tumble.
>
> Of course, the big disadvantage of that system is that it doesn't
> "know" where the ground is, so if there's something in your flight
> path that's taller than you think you also might do the Doodlebug
> equivalent of CFIT.
True; unless a radar altimter is added to make the path changes
relative or unless the ability
to change barometric height is made more flexible (through multiple
switch points on the threaded rod) in order to allow use of
topographic knowledge.
Eunometic
wrote:
> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>
> news:24fdf9dd-1145-409c...@r36g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > On Nov 6, 12:23 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> > wrote:
> >> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>
> >>news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> > Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
> >> > course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
> >> > dispersion).
>
> >> This rather ignores the height band problem, too high for the light
> >> AA guns and too low for the heavier guns, particularly given the
> >> V1 speed.
>
> > The latter claim you make in this is that the radar directed proximity
> > fuze reduced the rounds fired to get a kill down to below 100 rounds.
> > Therefore this isn't inconsistent.
>
> The reality is as R V Jones notes the Germans deliberately chose
> a height band designed to make it hard for the heavy AA guns to
> accurately track the V-1 and be out of effective light AA range
> as well.
>
> > The Light AAA does seem to have been pretty ineffective though.
It would have been even more ineffective had the V1's come in at say
80m. Few of them
could have been brought on to the target which I doubt would have
compensated for their
the lower altitude that would have been presented to a smaller number
of guns.
Light AAA is for point defense.
Lancaster began operating in an area of allied air supremacy against
weakened defenses.
Lancasters needed airfields, airfield defenses, support aircraft
(jammers, night fighters)
and put 7 crew at risk. Statistically a daylight bomber would have
been worse.
The reality is that if you gave the Luftwaffe 100 crewed Lancaster in
September 1944 they would be mostly shot down on their first raid over
Britain with the loss of 700 crew in a few ops.
>
> I note no attempt to deny the V2 costs.
Unit production cost were well below that of a single engine fighter
and were set to more than halve as exotic materials were removed and
production know how improved.
>
> > Production cost were
> > expected to more than halve or even quarter.
>
> The Eunometic bonus card in play again.
It's simply true.
Too low, poor altimeters cause that problem.
>
> > The US had radar altimeters that were passed on, the British units
> > apparently weren't much good.
>
> Now there is a surprise, the Eunometic declaration of good.
>
> >> Also let us see about the losses, the flight was made at low level,
>
> >> 2 hit high tension cables on the inward flight
> >> 1 by flak over Holland, outbound
> >> 2 by flak off the Dutch coast as they were leaving.
>
> Correction, one in, one out.
>
> >> 1 hit by flak in target area
> >> 1 hit by flak then crippled by its own bomb blast,
> >> 1 crippled by its own bomb blast then hit by flak on the return journey.
>
> > A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
> > rendering it less visible during its attack run and probably allowed
> > lower, safer flying for those lost.
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastise
>
> Ah repeating the fiction in the hope it becomes fact. And a site that
> does not state the lights caused a shoot down.
>
> I like this, the height was set by the bomb characteristics. Not the
> altimeters carried. Furthermore the attack was by its nature quite
> predictable for the gunners. Hence Gibson's and Martin's decisions
> to fly in along with the attacking bomber.
>
> Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
> life ones have limitations.
The FuG 101a altimeters when set to the 0-150m scale have an error of
10% of displayed scaled which at 18m is 1.8m, a systematic error of 2m
makes accuracies better than 2m impossible and the display limitation
is about 2m-3m.
Geoffrey Sinclair
> On Nov 6, 11:52 pm, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
> wrote:
>> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>> news:24fdf9dd-1145-409c...@r36g2000prf.googlegroups.com...
>> > On Nov 6, 12:23 am, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclai...@froggy.com.au>
>> > wrote:
>> >> "Eunometic" <eunome...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>> >>news:41c610bf-8855-477d...@g17g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> >> > Targeting a For V1 was a perfect task for AAA as it didn't change
>> >> > course didn't fly particularly high (thus eliminating shell
>> >> > dispersion).
>>
>> >> This rather ignores the height band problem, too high for the light
>> >> AA guns and too low for the heavier guns, particularly given the
>> >> V1 speed.
>>
>> > The latter claim you make in this is that the radar directed proximity
>> > fuze reduced the rounds fired to get a kill down to below 100 rounds.
>> > Therefore this isn't inconsistent.
>>
>> The reality is as R V Jones notes the Germans deliberately chose
>> a height band designed to make it hard for the heavy AA guns to
>> accurately track the V-1 and be out of effective light AA range
>> as well.
>>
>> > The Light AAA does seem to have been pretty ineffective though.
>
> It would have been even more ineffective had the V1's come in at say
> 80m.
At 80 metres the AA guns have a shot, given they can be sited near
the coast or up high. The V-1s flew predictable paths.
> Few of them could have been brought on to the target which I doubt
> would have compensated for their the lower altitude that would have
> been presented to a smaller number of guns.
Yes we know the Eunometic penalty cards for non German technology.
> Light AAA is for point defense.
And the V-1s flew in predictable corridors, thanks to the launching
system and target.
>> >> V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
>> >> civilians killed.
>>
>> >> This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
>>
>> > V2 unit production costs was considerable less than a single engined
>> > fighter and 1/6th the cost of a Lancaster.
>>
>> Six V2s, 6 tons of bombs, average Lancaster bomb load per bombing
>> mission for the war just under 5 tons.
>>
>> Average Lancaster lifetime, 156,192 sorties for 3,677 losses, including
>> crashes on operations, so around 42.5 missions, so over 200 tons of
>> bombs.
>
> Lancaster began operating in an area of allied air supremacy against
> weakened defenses.
I like this, someone is declaring the RAF had air supremacy over
German in 1942 and 1943, not to mention the first half of 1944.
> Lancasters needed airfields, airfield defenses, support aircraft
> (jammers, night fighters)
The V-2s needed launchers, launch defences, support as well
> and put 7 crew at risk. Statistically a daylight bomber would have
> been worse.
Actually the USAAF bombers delivered overall lower losses, as did
the Bomber Command day raids in 1944 and 1945.
> The reality is that if you gave the Luftwaffe 100 crewed Lancaster in
> September 1944 they would be mostly shot down on their first raid over
> Britain with the loss of 700 crew in a few ops.
Which says nothing about the economics of the weapon system and
everything to do with the quality of UK defences.
>> I note no attempt to deny the V2 costs.
>
> Unit production cost were well below that of a single engine fighter
> and were set to more than halve as exotic materials were removed and
> production know how improved.
Translation Eunometic decrees these advances, and their costs, just
ignore the slave labour factor, since that helped keep official costs
down, even though the V-2 work force suffered large numbers of
deaths.
>> > Production cost were
>> > expected to more than halve or even quarter.
>>
>> The Eunometic bonus card in play again.
>
> It's simply true.
Yes it is true the Eunometic bonus card is in play again.
>> >http://www.dornier24.com/pages/equipment/FuG101.html
>>
>> > A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
>> > rendering it less visible and probably allowed lower flying.
>>
>> The short answerer here is Eunometic is once again trying to
>> push fiction. How low do you think the aircraft were if they
>> hit power lines?
>
> Too low, poor altimeters cause that problem.
Eunometic does not bother to read the references Eunometic uses,
like the fact the moon was out and the pilots were deliberately flying
quite low in reasonable visibility. Navigation was the problem, given
the power lines would have been marked on the maps.
>> I like this, the height was set by the bomb characteristics. Not the
>> altimeters carried. Furthermore the attack was by its nature quite
>> predictable for the gunners. Hence Gibson's and Martin's decisions
>> to fly in along with the attacking bomber.
>>
>> Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
>> life ones have limitations.
>
> The FuG 101a altimeters when set to the 0-150m scale have an error of
> 10% of displayed scaled which at 18m is 1.8m, a systematic error of 2m
> makes accuracies better than 2m impossible and the display limitation
> is about 2m-3m.
I note Eunometic does not bother to note the accuracy had to be feet,
not metres.
I also note the bomber had to be flying at 240 mph, which was rather
fast for a Lancaster at low level, plus stay on course, plus stay at the
correct height. The pilot required help to do this.
Eunometic
Only if they were sited almost directly beneath the V1's flight path
would they have an opportunity
to fire. By flying lower this changes of this happening are reduced.
By flying very low the light AAA must be sited very close to the
missile and therefore the number of guns that can fire on a particular
V1 is vastly reduced. Higher crossing speeds also would reduce the
guns effectiveness. Fire control equipment for the bofors 40mm is also
vastly less sophisticated than for the SCR 584/M9 combined with the
Radio proximity fuse and the dramatic improvements seen with the
SCR-584/M9/Prox-fuze combo won't be mirrored in light or medium AAA.
>
> > Few of them could have been brought on to the target which I doubt
> > would have compensated for their the lower altitude that would have
> > been presented to a smaller number of guns.
>
> Yes we know the Eunometic penalty cards for non German technology.
Just try and argue your point on the basis of logic and facts.
Introducing rhetoric and 'attack the opponent' type statements is
indication of weak arguments.
>
> > Light AAA is for point defense.
>
> And the V-1s flew in predictable corridors, thanks to the launching
> system and target.
Latter V2's were capable of multiple (at least 2) in flight path
changes.
This was done to prevent back tracking of radar tracks to the launcher
via
triangulation. Effectively V1's were flying dog leg paths that were
less
"predictable". V1 range had been increased considerably by reduction
of
the warhead loads thereby potentially allowing more evasive approach
paths
but there were also improvements in the Argus pulse jet that were
increasing
speed and range.
Another planed stage was the Porche 109-005 disposable turbojet
increased
not only speed and range but the lack of vibration was expected to
increase
accuracy.
Either way there were options to increase speed and range, improve
navigation
to make more difficult the task of shooting down a V1.
>
>
>
> >> >> V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
> >> >> civilians killed.
>
> >> >> This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
>
> >> > V2 unit production costs was considerable less than a single engined
> >> > fighter and 1/6th the cost of a Lancaster.
>
> >> Six V2s, 6 tons of bombs, average Lancaster bomb load per bombing
> >> mission for the war just under 5 tons.
>
> >> Average Lancaster lifetime, 156,192 sorties for 3,677 losses, including
> >> crashes on operations, so around 42.5 missions, so over 200 tons of
> >> bombs.
>
> > Lancaster began operating in an area of allied air supremacy against
> > weakened defenses.
>
> I like this, someone is declaring the RAF had air supremacy over
> German in 1942 and 1943, not to mention the first half of 1944.
If attrition rates of Lancasters was consistently somewhere between
6%-10% the type would have been withdrawn from service and missions
stopped as the crews were killed, not replaced or became insane.
>
> > Lancasters needed airfields, airfield defenses, support aircraft
> > (jammers, night fighters)
>
> The V-2s needed launchers, launch defenses, support as well
Nowhere near as much as a conventional bomber.
No V2 launch site was ever detected and attacked successfully
despite a great effort by the allies to do so.
It needed a clearing in the road rather than whopping great
big permanent airfield with hangers, radar, landing aids etc.
No tons of chaff, jamming aircraft (that don't carry offensive loads)
pathfinders, ELINT aircraft and night fighter escorts. Subtract
that from Lancaster or B-17 effectiveness.
>
> > and put 7 crew at risk. Statistically a daylight bomber would have
> > been worse.
>
> Actually the USAAF bombers delivered overall lower losses, as did
> the Bomber Command day raids in 1944 and 1945.
Lower losses in terms of tonnage/aircraft, crew/aircraft or aircraft
lost? A USAAF bomber carried
ten crew. The B-24 was a bad aircraft to escape from, the B-17
better.
A V2 carried no crew. No crew lives were lost.
I suspect that support costs (daylight escort fighters) for US
aircraft may have been higher.
>
> > The reality is that if you gave the Luftwaffe 100 crewed Lancaster in
> > September 1944 they would be mostly shot down on their first raid over
> > Britain with the loss of 700 crew in a few ops.
>
> Which says nothing about the economics of the weapon system and
> everything to do with the quality of UK defences.
Apart from the quality of weapons it says a lot about the massive size
of Bomber Command: they relied on saturating German defenses with
shear numbers
of targets as well as with hundreds of tons of window and jamming.
>
> >> I note no attempt to deny the V2 costs.
>
> > Unit production cost were well below that of a single engine fighter
> > and were set to more than halve as exotic materials were removed and
> > production know how improved.
>
> Translation Eunometic decrees these advances, and their costs, just
> ignore the slave labour factor, since that helped keep official costs
> down, even though the V-2 work force suffered large numbers of
> deaths.
The simple answer to that is that costs work out irrespective of
whether
'man hours' or 'Reichs Marks' are used. This annuls your 'clutching
at
straw' claim.
The costs are also stated relative to that of a single engined fighter
or
an aircraft engine, both of which also had a significant input of
impressed
labor. This furhter anuls your calim.
Basically this is a non argument.
Impressed labour was also charged out at the same rate as normal labor
by the 'supplying' organization.
A v2 was cheaper to produce than a single engined fighter.
A V2 used about the same material as a fighter but consumed a lot less
machine tool time since it didn't require an elaborate piston engine.
The missile was in itself extremely simple. Production processes
improve
and engineering changes eliminate costly steps or costly materials.
Impressed labor was used for all sorts of activities in Nazi Germany:
repairing roads,
dams, canals, railways and bridges damaged by allied attacks.
Impressed labor was used to provide farm labor and to do coal mining.
In many cases it was better to volunteer for labor than to wait to be
conscripted: like
a Dutch neighbor of mine who became an apprentice baker in Germany
rather than wait
for a potentially worse deal. The apprenticeship worked out and he
was pleased with what the
employer taught him.
Once might even refer to Norweigen, Dutch and Danish SS units as
'slave labour' since
they were drafted or joined to get their families better rations.
It was used to excavate tunnels and build bomb proof underground
factories.
The preparation of underground facilities was a particularly onerous
and task
in the case of V2 production, since Hans Kammler had taken over was
the main
among the main source of slave labor deaths, these unfortunates being
worked to death without any doubt.
Forced evacuation marches, allied bombardment were particularly high
'causes' of
forced labour deaths at dora. Executions for quality problems or
sabotage were
common but not the direct cause of many deaths.
The term 'slave labor' doesn't distinguish between the various
grades of drafted or impressed labor. There were many
levels of impressed labour ranging from those who were paid at
varying
rates. A significant number received wages equivalent to German
labour,
through to the majority who received rates half that, thence to POW's
down to those who were effectively in a concentration camp and paid
nominal to nothing . There were considerable costs associated with
barracking and guarding some people the were impressed on the other
hand many were free to move around towns but were restricted to
say a few kilometers of town centre.
The conditions at the Dora facilities were among the worst. The worst
of the worst was excavation of the underground facilities, the
slave laborers truely being worked to death. However counting
labor used to produce bomb proof factories or repair them
is not part of V2 production. Even though executions as a result
of 'quality problems' or 'sabotage' were common.
I doubt Impressed labor, forced labour, slave labour whatever grade it
was
made anything any cheaper. Read Adam Tooze. What slave labour did
do
was vastly increase the supply of labour to make war.
At Henschell Konrad Zuse developed an electronic digital process
controller
to automate the calipering of missile dimensions (Hs 293) for proper
aerodynamic alignment, at Messerschmitt a rivieting robot to
automatically locate
and place a rivet on any portion of an aicraft was in use. These
devices required
heavy engineering input yet it was considered neccesary to try and
overcome labour
shortages. In effect Saur transfered labour from eastern europe &
france to
germany where it might be put to better use than leaving it at home in
the
face of Speers objections who wanted to 'normalise relations'
>
> >> > Production cost were
> >> > expected to more than halve or even quarter.
>
> >> The Eunometic bonus card in play again.
>
> > It's simply true.
>
> Yes it is true the Eunometic bonus card is in play again.
>
> >> >http://www.dornier24.com/pages/equipment/FuG101.html
>
> >> > A reliable radar altimeter could have save at least one aircraft by
> >> > rendering it less visible and probably allowed lower flying.
>
> >> The short answerer here is Eunometic is once again trying to
> >> push fiction. How low do you think the aircraft were if they
> >> hit power lines?
>
> > Too low, poor altimeters cause that problem.
>
> Eunometic does not bother to read the references Eunometic uses,
> like the fact the moon was out and the pilots were deliberately flying
> quite low in reasonable visibility. Navigation was the problem, given
> the power lines would have been marked on the maps.
So how high is a high voltage power line? 100ft? A radar altimeter
would help maintain
low altitude with enough tolerance avoid power line collisions even in
good moonlight as it gives the pilot more confidence that he is not
too high to loose protection nor to low to
hit obstacles. One inward bound Lancaster even hit the sea and had
to abort.
>
> >> I like this, the height was set by the bomb characteristics. Not the
> >> altimeters carried. Furthermore the attack was by its nature quite
> >> predictable for the gunners. Hence Gibson's and Martin's decisions
> >> to fly in along with the attacking bomber.
>
> >> Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
> >> life ones have limitations.
Good ones have less limitations.
>
> > The FuG 101a altimeters when set to the 0-150m scale have an error of
> > 10% of displayed scaled which at 18m is 1.8m, a systematic error of 2m
> > makes accuracies better than 2m impossible and the display limitation
> > is about 2m-3m.
>
> I note Eunometic does not bother to note the accuracy had to be feet,
> not metres.
20 yards = 18 meters = 60ft.
FuG 101a accuracy in its 'fine' or 0-150m mode is
1 systematic error of 2m
2 or display error of 10% of the displayed height.
Effectively the unit could be trusted to 3m during landings and at
very low altitude.
Thus for the Lancasters attacking the dams at 60ft the error at 18m
would have been 18m +/- 3 meters.
This equates to 18%.
The required attack altitude was 60ft with the FuG 101a being able to
provide 60ft +/- 10ft.
>
> I also note the bomber had to be flying at 240 mph, which was rather
> fast for a Lancaster at low level, plus stay on course, plus stay at the
> correct height. The pilot required help to do this.
"After intensive low flying at 150 feet at various speeds the aircrews
were told that they would now have to fly at 232 mph at the
dangerously low height of 60 feet in order that the bomb did not to
disintegrate on impact with the water. No altimeter could accurately
judge that distance, but an imaginative boffin came up with the idea
of having a light fore and aft of the Lancaster, carefully positioned
so that the two beams intersected at exactly 60 feet."
Geoffrey Sinclair
I really like this, Eunometic is busy telling us all how ineffective
light flak is, you know the system the Germans invested so much
time and effort in.
The maximum range of the 40mm Bofors was around 6 miles, effective
range was less of course.
> By flying very low the light AAA must be sited very close to the
> missile and therefore the number of guns that can fire on a particular
> V1 is vastly reduced. Higher crossing speeds also would reduce the
> guns effectiveness. Fire control equipment for the bofors 40mm is also
> vastly less sophisticated than for the SCR 584/M9 combined with the
> Radio proximity fuse and the dramatic improvements seen with the
> SCR-584/M9/Prox-fuze combo won't be mirrored in light or medium AAA.
Translation, Eunometic really likes the V1 so time to write down
the effect of light AA in general and on the preferred weapon in
particular.
Just ignore the weapon had known approach routes.
>> > Few of them could have been brought on to the target which I doubt
>> > would have compensated for their the lower altitude that would have
>> > been presented to a smaller number of guns.
>>
>> Yes we know the Eunometic penalty cards for non German technology.
>
> Just try and argue your point on the basis of logic and facts.
Eunometic is deciding few V1s would be brought down, but of course
it is a what if, which count as Eunometic facts.
> Introducing rhetoric and 'attack the opponent' type statements is
> indication of weak arguments.
Eunometic is looking in the mirror again.
>> > Light AAA is for point defense.
>>
>> And the V-1s flew in predictable corridors, thanks to the launching
>> system and target.
>
> Latter V2's were capable of multiple (at least 2) in flight path
> changes.
I presume this should be V-1, and the claim is they deviated from
the launch ramp for a while then made a correction to head to London.
So which source says this and what is later defined as?
Just not getting through is it? The launchers and the target were fixed.
It channels the attack. Deviations require fuel and more guidance systems.
Nor for that matter the reality the invasion ports should have been the
target if the V1 could change course and was accurate.
> This was done to prevent back tracking of radar tracks to the launcher
> via triangulation. Effectively V1's were flying dog leg paths that were
> less "predictable".
Yes they were less predictable versus straight approaches, no they were
not as much as the Eunometic would prefer given the limitations in
technology, payload and cost.
> V1 range had been increased considerably by reduction
> of the warhead loads thereby potentially allowing more evasive approach
> paths but there were also improvements in the Argus pulse jet that were
> increasing speed and range.
Yes folks, just remember, the V-1 Eunometic, bigger, brighter and better
just not a WWII weapon.
Now go look at Antwerp which was hit by about as many V-1s as
London was not to mention the V-2 bombardment, not to mention the
front line was largely in the city's northern suburbs for a long time, so
point blank range. Now tell us how come the allies could unload
hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies at Antwerp over the final
months of the war.
> Another planed stage was the Porche 109-005 disposable turbojet
> increased not only speed and range but the lack of vibration was
> expected to increase accuracy.
>
> Either way there were options to increase speed and range, improve
> navigation to make more difficult the task of shooting down a V1.
Note as usual the Germans do not use historical weapons, they use
Eunometic improved weapons, with Eunometic declared effects.
Meantime there is the USN, building the 3 inch 50 calibre
weapons as the new light AA piece as the 40mm was beginning
to reach the end of its life. Note the post war cut backs meant
the 3 inch 50 entered service in 1948, rate of fire up to 50 rounds
per minute. I know it is not a WWII weapon but then neither is
the Eunometic V1 or V2. The difference being I know it was not
a WWII weapon.
>> >> >> V-2 figures were 1,403 launches, 1,115 arrivals in the UK, 2,754
>> >> >> civilians killed.
>>
>> >> >> This campaign cost the Germans more than the allies.
>>
>> >> > V2 unit production costs was considerable less than a single engined
>> >> > fighter and 1/6th the cost of a Lancaster.
>>
>> >> Six V2s, 6 tons of bombs, average Lancaster bomb load per bombing
>> >> mission for the war just under 5 tons.
>>
>> >> Average Lancaster lifetime, 156,192 sorties for 3,677 losses,
>> >> including
>> >> crashes on operations, so around 42.5 missions, so over 200 tons of
>> >> bombs.
>>
>> > Lancaster began operating in an area of allied air supremacy against
>> > weakened defenses.
>>
>> I like this, someone is declaring the RAF had air supremacy over
>> German in 1942 and 1943, not to mention the first half of 1944.
>
> If attrition rates of Lancasters was consistently somewhere between
> 6%-10% the type would have been withdrawn from service and missions
> stopped as the crews were killed, not replaced or became insane.
Note what we have here is Eunometic up to quadrupling the historical
Lancaster loss rate. The real V-2 cannot compete with the real
Lancaster.
Not to mention the Lancaster could strike at over 3 times the distance
of the V-2, the sort of improvements that cost.
The reality is the competitor in terms of range and payload to the
V-2 is something like a Typhoon, P-47 or P-51, and they were
quite survivable and tended to be more accurate.
The Lancaster at 200 miles could be carrying 14,000 pounds of
bombs for example and take much fewer casualties.
>> > Lancasters needed airfields, airfield defenses, support aircraft
>> > (jammers, night fighters)
>>
>> The V-2s needed launchers, launch defenses, support as well
>
> Nowhere near as much as a conventional bomber.
I just like the way the costs are ignored.
> No V2 launch site was ever detected and attacked successfully
> despite a great effort by the allies to do so.
Actually if you read the Fighter Command reports it is clear they
figured out the launch vehicles were usually too hard to find, not
the fixed launch sites, they were quickly identified and abandoned.
So the objective was to go after storage and command and control
facilities. The German radio traffic at times gave around 1 hour
notice a battery would fire but not which launchers in the battery
would be firing.
By the way, the Germans switched to firing V-2s mainly by night,
80% in mid December 1944. And that was with winter weather
helping the Germans. In February 1945 it was back to 60%
daylight.
The RAF measured successes by the rates of fire, cross checked
against pilot reports and reconnaissance photographs. Storage
areas were hit.
> It needed a clearing in the road rather than whopping great
> big permanent airfield with hangers, radar, landing aids etc.
Just a good transport system that could fire the V-2 within days
of its manufacture.
> No tons of chaff, jamming aircraft (that don't carry offensive loads)
> pathfinders, ELINT aircraft and night fighter escorts. Subtract
> that from Lancaster or B-17 effectiveness.
By the way, remember how the V-1 was cost economical because of the
cost of the allied counter measures?
Note how Eunometic does not factor in the cost to the Germans of the
flak defences and the day and night fighter forces?
>> > and put 7 crew at risk. Statistically a daylight bomber would have
>> > been worse.
>>
>> Actually the USAAF bombers delivered overall lower losses, as did
>> the Bomber Command day raids in 1944 and 1945.
>
> Lower losses in terms of tonnage/aircraft, crew/aircraft or aircraft
> lost? A USAAF bomber carried ten crew. The B-24 was a bad
> aircraft to escape from, the B-17 better.
Is this Lancaster raids alone? The USAAF bomber crews generally
had a higher survival rate, partly due to design, partly due to the nature
of the attack, night fighters at point blank range tended to cause more
catastrophic damage than a day fighter pass.
It is simple enough, Lancasters are supposed to have dropped
around 608,000 long tons of bombs losing 3,431 aircraft on
operations according to the Bomber Command War Diaries,
plus others on accidents.
The Bomber Command Losses series says the combat units lost
3,893 Lancasters on operations to all causes, 216 not on operations
and 36 on the ground. This is from 135,445 effective sorties.
The USAAF lost some 8,314 heavy bombers on operations
in the Mediterranean and Europe dropping around 1.1 million
short tons of bombs in around 423,000 effective sorties.
Lancasters win the bombs per loss category, and loses the
losses per sortie.
> A V2 carried no crew. No crew lives were lost.
For worse accuracy at shorter range.
Now go compare it to the fighter bombers which had the same
payload and range.
> I suspect that support costs (daylight escort fighters) for US
> aircraft may have been higher.
Note by the way in typical Eunometic calculation the costs to the
Germans of mounting defences against the bombers, and fighters is
simply ignored.
>> > The reality is that if you gave the Luftwaffe 100 crewed Lancaster in
>> > September 1944 they would be mostly shot down on their first raid over
>> > Britain with the loss of 700 crew in a few ops.
>>
>> Which says nothing about the economics of the weapon system and
>> everything to do with the quality of UK defences.
>
> Apart from the quality of weapons it says a lot about the massive size
> of Bomber Command: they relied on saturating German defenses with
> shear numbers of targets as well as with hundreds of tons of window
> and jamming.
Yes folks, the Germans were only defeated by numbers in the Eunometic
world.
Eunometic simply ignores the historical results, a preferred loss rate has
to be invented to make the V-2 look good.
>> >> I note no attempt to deny the V2 costs.
>>
>> > Unit production cost were well below that of a single engine fighter
>> > and were set to more than halve as exotic materials were removed and
>> > production know how improved.
>>
>> Translation Eunometic decrees these advances, and their costs, just
>> ignore the slave labour factor, since that helped keep official costs
>> down, even though the V-2 work force suffered large numbers of
>> deaths.
>
> The simple answer to that is that costs work out irrespective of
> whether 'man hours' or 'Reichs Marks' are used. This annuls your
> 'clutching at straw' claim.
Ju88A-4 cost in 1942, around 170,000 marks, not necessarily fully
equipped. A single engined fighter would be maybe a third of that.
(Pre war the German export price for a bulk Bf109 order was
130,000 marks each fully equipped) Given the improvements
made in production costs during the war and eliminating the rather
large profit margin the 1944 Bf109 would be under 100,000 marks.
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/v2.htm
For a V2 unit price of US $17,877.
The US dollar bought 2.5 marks in 1941, so about 45,000 marks.
The B-24 1944 cost of $215,516.
A P-51 came in at almost exactly three times the price, the B-17
at about 11 times the price in 1945.
Note about a third of the V-2s basically failed, rejected has being
unsuitable to launch or came down well short of the target.
The V2,
http://www.v2rocket.com/start/makeup/design.html
"Before launch, the empty V2 weighs 10,000 lbs (4539 kg), it is filled
with fuel, alcohol, liquid oxygen, hydrogen peroxide en sodium
permanganate (catalyst). The air batteries and nitrogen batteries are
filled up to 200 bar, and the rocket now weighs 28,000 lbs (12700 kg). "
"When launched against targets close to the operational range of the
vehicle, the deviation between target and impact was normally 4 to
11 miles (7-17 km away from target). "
The Germans expend over 8 tons of consumables to use the V2,
under 4 tons of fuel and under 5 tons of liquid oxygen , the Ju88
fuel capacity was around 1,600 litres or 1.2 tons. The fuels are not
strictly comparable of course but you gain an idea of the consumables
cost of the V2. Not to mention the volumes of fuel needed. Liquid
oxygen transport, storage and so on.
> The costs are also stated relative to that of a single engined fighter
> or an aircraft engine, both of which also had a significant input of
> impressed labor. This furhter anuls your calim.
I note the attempt to ignore the difference between the forced workers
and slave labour.
> Basically this is a non argument.
No.
> Impressed labour was also charged out at the same rate as normal labor
> by the 'supplying' organization.
Note what we have here is an attempt to wish away the slave labour
and forgetting the SS version of economics.
I really like the idea the SS was paid normal German pay rates
for slave labour.
> A v2 was cheaper to produce than a single engined fighter.
Short answer is Eunometic previously says the V2 cost 120,000 Marks,
the pre war Bf109E export price, with healthy profit margin, was 130,000
marks. The above web site thinks the fully equipped V2 came in at around
45,000 marks.
The US may be rather better than others at mass production but the P-40
cost $59,500 in 1942 and $45,000 in 1944 to give an idea in the drop
in unit costs.
> A V2 used about the same material as a fighter but consumed a lot less
> machine tool time since it didn't require an elaborate piston engine.
Of course the improvements in time and materials used per engine
is being ignored. Note the rocket engine was not as simple as being
assumed here.
> The missile was in itself extremely simple. Production processes
> improve and engineering changes eliminate costly steps or costly
> materials.
Just ignore similar steps for aircraft.
> Impressed labor was used for all sorts of activities in Nazi Germany:
> repairing roads, dams, canals, railways and bridges damaged by allied
> attacks.
> Impressed labor was used to provide farm labor and to do coal mining.
Now we move into an attempt to try and ignore slave labour Nazi
style and drop into the usual attempt to minimise the Nazi methods
when it came to workers.
Eunometic tends to include this if pushed on the V2.
> In many cases it was better to volunteer for labor than to wait to be
> conscripted: like a Dutch neighbor of mine
I wonder if the Dutch neighbour knows Eunometic's views on WWII.
> who became an apprentice baker in Germany rather than wait
> for a potentially worse deal. The apprenticeship worked out and he
> was pleased with what the employer taught him.
Yes folks, find a good story somewhere and pretend it was the normal
experience, and yet again the Eunometics (Germans) are the great
teachers. Time for a laughter break.
> Once might even refer to Norweigen, Dutch and Danish SS units as
> 'slave labour' since they were drafted or joined to get their families
> better rations.
Now of course things become serious, Eunometic decides the Nazi
apologia line is the one to run. Pretend the slave labor system either
did not exist or was not so bad by pretending SS troops were
slave labour. It is good to know though the above countries had no
volunteers for the SS as such, it was all about being drafted and food.
Says much about Nazi food distributions. Says a lot about the Nazis
idea of conscription, taking people from conquered countries.
> It was used to excavate tunnels and build bomb proof underground
> factories.
SS troops did this?
> The preparation of underground facilities was a particularly onerous
> and task in the case of V2 production, since Hans Kammler had taken
> over was the main among the main source of slave labor deaths, these
> unfortunates being worked to death without any doubt.
Had a look at the death rates in the eastern camps, the ones set up for
work rather than instant death?
> Forced evacuation marches, allied bombardment were particularly high
> 'causes' of forced labour deaths at dora.
So tell us all the allied raids that did this.
So tell us all why the Nazis force marched people across the country
in conditions that caused them to die.
This is from the last time Eunometic tried to run away from what really
happened at the Dora complex.
"I like the use of impressed, it hides the fact so many of the people
making V2s were slave labour. Note "real" V2 costs are predicated
on this labour cost.
http://www.v2rocket.com/start/chapters/mittel.html
It seems the 4,575 V2s built at the Mittelwerk plant cost the lives
of around 26,500 workers. It seems more workers were killed there
making the rockets than the rockets killed when they were used."
> Executions for quality problems or sabotage were
> common but not the direct cause of many deaths.
As opposed to over work and SS summary justice for other crimes or
simply being an official enemy.
> The term 'slave labor' doesn't distinguish between the various
> grades of drafted or impressed labor.
Oh yes it does, it is quite clearly defined as the Nazi concentration
camp system and things like the Thai Burma Railway, where killing
the workers or working them to death or simply not supplying medical
care or enough food was a part of the system.
Then comes the forced labourers, generally looked after and paid.
Manu civilians but including things like PoW workers for example.
Then comes the "volunteers", who understood it was necessary if
they wanted better conditions for them or their families.
Then came the real volunteers.
> There were many levels of impressed labour ranging from those who
> were paid at varying rates. A significant number received wages
> equivalent to German labour,
Note Eunometic is simply decreeing the numbers here, no hard data,
"significant number" is an attempt to pump up the numbers..
> through to the majority who received rates half that,
But of course the money being paid to the workers has no effect on the\
cost of weapons in the Eunometic world.
> thence to POW's
> down to those who were effectively in a concentration camp and paid
> nominal to nothing .
The western allied PoWs were usually not in concentration camps and
were paid for work. The Soviet PoWs were in effective concentration
camps and were not paid.
> There were considerable costs associated with
> barracking and guarding some people the were impressed on the other
> hand many were free to move around towns but were restricted to
> say a few kilometers of town centre.
How about that, Eunometic is always telling us how bad it was for the
Germans, they had to guard their slaves. They paid less regard to their
impressed workers.
> The conditions at the Dora facilities were among the worst. The worst
> of the worst was excavation of the underground facilities, the
> slave laborers truely being worked to death. However counting
> labor used to produce bomb proof factories or repair them
> is not part of V2 production.
Not when Eunometic wants to rig things in favour of the V2 and
it production system anyway.
Amazingly though in the economics of aircraft production it seems like
the fixed costs are counted.
> Even though executions as a result
> of 'quality problems' or 'sabotage' were common.
Go read the real story, others have.
> I doubt Impressed labor, forced labour, slave labour whatever grade it
> was made anything any cheaper.
Paying lower wages does make things cheaper.
Working people to death tends to up costs.
> Read Adam Tooze.
As opposed to the Eunometic interpretation.
Tooze covers things like the Nazi hunger plan, others would starve
it necessary to feed Germany.
> What slave labour did do
> was vastly increase the supply of labour to make war.
Actually slave labour in Nazi Germany was all about working the
enemies to death. The peak in the extermination program was in
1942 and 1943 after which the Nazis finally figured out the need
for workers, but only after they had killed millions.
Now it is time to give a Eunometic list of wonder German labour
saving devices.
> At Henschell Konrad Zuse developed an electronic digital process
> controller to automate the calipering of missile dimensions (Hs 293)
> for proper aerodynamic alignment, at Messerschmitt a rivieting robot
> to automatically locate and place a rivet on any portion of an aicraft
> was in use.
If it was so good where was the post war use?
> These devices required
> heavy engineering input yet it was considered neccesary to try and
> overcome labour shortages.
Killing millions of people tends to create labour shortages, as does
trying to fight most of the world.
> In effect Saur transfered labour from eastern europe & france to
> germany where it might be put to better use than leaving it at home in
> the face of Speers objections who wanted to 'normalise relations'
Saur did a lot more than transfer labour, hence his post war punishment.
Still not getting it at all.
Go read the stories again and note the deliberate choice to fly low.
> One inward bound Lancaster even hit the sea and had to abort.
It was testing its lights and made a very bad mistake, relying on the
lights and missing them.
>> >> I like this, the height was set by the bomb characteristics. Not the
>> >> altimeters carried. Furthermore the attack was by its nature quite
>> >> predictable for the gunners. Hence Gibson's and Martin's decisions
>> >> to fly in along with the attacking bomber.
>>
>> >> Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
>> >> life ones have limitations.
>
> Good ones have less limitations.
Simply put the Eunometic radar altimeter can do anything, the real
life ones have limitations
>> > The FuG 101a altimeters when set to the 0-150m scale have an error of
>> > 10% of displayed scaled which at 18m is 1.8m, a systematic error of 2m
>> > makes accuracies better than 2m impossible and the display limitation
>> > is about 2m-3m.
>>
>> I note Eunometic does not bother to note the accuracy had to be feet,
>> not metres.
>
> 20 yards = 18 meters = 60ft.
So far so good.
> FuG 101a accuracy in its 'fine' or 0-150m mode is
> 1 systematic error of 2m
> 2 or display error of 10% of the displayed height.
Which means not accurate enough.
> Effectively the unit could be trusted to 3m during landings and at
> very low altitude.
So now we are at 10 feet.
> Thus for the Lancasters attacking the dams at 60ft the error at 18m
> would have been 18m +/- 3 meters.
So now we are at 10 feet.
> This equates to 18%.
>
> The required attack altitude was 60ft with the FuG 101a being able to
> provide 60ft +/- 10ft.
Which means not accurate enough.
>> I also note the bomber had to be flying at 240 mph, which was rather
>> fast for a Lancaster at low level, plus stay on course, plus stay at the
>> correct height. The pilot required help to do this.
>
> "After intensive low flying at 150 feet at various speeds the aircrews
> were told that they would now have to fly at 232 mph at the
> dangerously low height of 60 feet in order that the bomb did not to
> disintegrate on impact with the water. No altimeter could accurately
> judge that distance, but an imaginative boffin came up with the idea
> of having a light fore and aft of the Lancaster, carefully positioned
> so that the two beams intersected at exactly 60 feet."
Glad to know Eunometic agrees there were no altimeters capable of the
accuracy.