On 2020-09-21 9:55 PM, thinbluemime2 wrote:
> Previously on, "Ohhhh Shhhhit"
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https://groups.google.com/d/msg/rec.arts.tv/bEwXOoLUjms/c97fOc5JBQAJ
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> What did the U.S. military know about the disruptive and deadly effects
> of COVID-19 and when did they know it? In April, the Pentagon denied a
> report that the National Center for Medical Intelligence was concerned
> about a potential pandemic as far back as last November. But there may
> be more to the story.
> On Wednesday, Gen. Robert Ashley, who runs the Defense Intelligence
> Agency — NMCI’s parent agency — said that the agency “did what we were
> supposed to” and that a bigger story would come out eventually.
The NCMI’s job...is predictive in nature—not to explain what is
happening, but rather “what we believe is going to happen.” To do this,
NCMI has access to the resources of the totality of the intelligence
community, including intercepted communications, satellite imagery, and
sensitive human intelligence, including covert sample collection.
The coronavirus was clearly part of the NCMI’s remit. And yet its first
Infectious Disease Risk Assessment for COVID-19 was issued on January 5,
2020, reporting that 59 people had been taken ill in Wuhan, China. This
report was derived not from any sensitive intelligence collection effort
or independent biosurveillance activity, but rather from a report issued
to the WHO by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, dated January 5, 2020.
The next day the CDC warned American citizens to take precautions if
traveling to China, followed a day later with the activation of a
COVID-19 incident management team within the CDC Emergency Management
System. This, however, is not the kind of predictive analysis that U.S.
policymakers needed if they were going to get ahead of the coronavirus
pandemic. Unlike 2009, when the NCMI provided a full two months heads up
about the threat of a Swine Flu pandemic, in 2020 the Trump
administration was taking its cues from the WHO, which waited until
January 30, 2020 to declare a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC). The NCMI had been relegated to a mere observer, having
failed in its mission to provide timely, predictive analysis of pending
epidemiological threats.
Almost everything the NCMI knew about the current situation in Wuhan
came from the WHO, which had been working very closely with Chinese
authorities from the Chinese Center of Disease Control (CCDC) to
determine the origin and nature of the coronavirus outbreak. While a
great deal of attention has been paid to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale
Market in the city of Wuhan, which sells live poultry, fish, and several
kinds of wild animals to the public, a detailed investigation by the
Joint Field Epidemiology Investigation Team, a specialized task force
working under the auspices of the Chinese Center for Disease Control
(CCDC), found that the COVID-19 epidemic did not originate by
animal-to-human transmission in the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, as
originally believed, but rather human-to-human transmission totally
unrelated to the operation of the market.
Moreover, by analyzing the characteristic of some 27 genomes of the
COVID-19 virus provided by the Chinese and published by the Global
Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GSAID), research scientists
were able to determine that the “most recent common ancestor” for the
coronavirus could be dated back to as early as October 1, 2019.
The importance of this date as it relates to the NCMI is that in
mid-October 2019 a delegation of 300 U.S. military athletes arrived in
Wuhan to participate in the 2019 Military World games. China has
suggested that these personnel might have introduced the coronavirus
infection to Wuhan, citing their own research that suggests that the
virus was introduced into China from elsewhere, and Japanese and
Taiwanese studies that point to the U.S. as the likely source of the
virus. There is, however, no independent evidence to support these
allegations.
The importance of the U.S. military athletes rests in the fact that the
NCMI is responsible for conducting threat briefs for all deployments of
military personnel world-wide, which meant that a Wuhan-specific
Infectious Disease Risk Assessment would have necessarily been prepared
in support of this deployment. Infectious Disease Risk Assessments are
the bread-and-butter intelligence product produced by the NCMI’s
Infectious Disease Division, one in which the totality of the medical
intelligence collection and analytical capabilities would be utilized.
The production of a Wuhan-specific Infectious Disease Risk Assessment
would have created a window of opportunity for the NCMI to have
collected the kind of medical intelligence that could have provided
early warning about the existence of the coronavirus. Moreover, these
athletes should have been subjected to screening upon return as part of
the national biosurveillance program, providing yet another opportunity
for early detection of the coronavirus if anyone had been exposed to it
during their travel.
The Staggering Collapse Of U.S. Intelligence On The Coronavirus
An agency tasked with tracking future bio threats fell down on the job,
causing us to wonder what else we don't know.
MARCH 24, 2020 SCOTT RITTER
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-staggering-collapse-of-u-s-intelligence-on-the-coronavirus/
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/rec.arts.tv/bEwXOoLUjms/tenY7GZyAgAJ