ANN: Split Browser (disposable Tor Browser, persistent bookmarks/logins)

[Rusty Bird]

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"Everyone loves the Whonix approach of running Tor Browser and the tor
daemon in two separate Qubes VMs, e.g. anon-whonix and sys-whonix.

Let's take it a step further and run Tor Browser (or other Firefox
versions) in a DisposableVM connecting through the tor VM (or through
any other NetVM/ProxyVM), while storing bookmarks and logins in a
persistent VM - with carefully restricted data flow.

In this setup, the DisposableVM's browser can send various requests to
the persistent VM:

- Bookmark the current page
- Let the user choose a bookmark to load
- Let the user authorize logging into the current page

But if the browser gets exploited, it won't be able to read all your
bookmarks or login credentials and send them to the attacker. And you
can restart the browser DisposableVM frequently (which shouldn't take
more than 10-15 seconds) to 'shake off' such an attack."

... continued at https://github.com/rustybird/qubes-split-browser

Rusty
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[Chris Laprise]

On 11/30/2016 12:12 PM, Rusty Bird wrote:
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> Hash: SHA512
>
> "Everyone loves the Whonix approach of running Tor Browser and the tor
> daemon in two separate Qubes VMs, e.g. anon-whonix and sys-whonix.
>
> Let's take it a step further and run Tor Browser (or other Firefox
> versions) in a DisposableVM connecting through the tor VM (or through
> any other NetVM/ProxyVM), while storing bookmarks and logins in a
> persistent VM - with carefully restricted data flow.
>
> In this setup, the DisposableVM's browser can send various requests to
> the persistent VM:
>
> - Bookmark the current page
> - Let the user choose a bookmark to load
> - Let the user authorize logging into the current page
>
> But if the browser gets exploited, it won't be able to read all your
> bookmarks or login credentials and send them to the attacker. And you
> can restart the browser DisposableVM frequently (which shouldn't take
> more than 10-15 seconds) to 'shake off' such an attack."
>
> ... continued at https://github.com/rustybird/qubes-split-browser
>
> Rusty

This looks very interesting... will be trying it our soon. Thanks!

Chris

[Andrew David Wong]

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On 2016-11-30 09:12, Rusty Bird wrote:
> "Everyone loves the Whonix approach of running Tor Browser and the tor
> daemon in two separate Qubes VMs, e.g. anon-whonix and sys-whonix.
>
> Let's take it a step further and run Tor Browser (or other Firefox
> versions) in a DisposableVM connecting through the tor VM (or through
> any other NetVM/ProxyVM), while storing bookmarks and logins in a
> persistent VM - with carefully restricted data flow.
>

> [...]

This looks extremely cool. Thanks, Rusty. Tracking potential
integration here:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2469

Also added to the community-developed feature tracker:

https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/

- --
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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