Introducing the new SSLed, signing, dancing wiki server!
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Joanna Rutkowska
Jul 16, 2014, 8:54:26 AM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com
So, after 4+ years of using a plain http-based wiki, we have moved today
to a new, properly SSLed wiki server! It uses an SSL cert signed by a
StartSSL CA.
Even though the cert is signed by a 3rd-party CA, they haven't got
access to our private key -- they just signed our public key, I
generated in one of my many VMs.
However, the cert's private key is stored on the wiki server and is
accessible to anyone who:
1) Can compromise the server and gain root or kernel access there,
OR
2) To Amazon admins who can always read our VM server's memory (this is
always possible and requires no exploitable bug of any sorts).
In other words, always assume the bad guys/gov have compromised this
cert and/or the wiki server itself.
Also note that Qubes OS installation ISOs are *not* served from our wiki
server -- they are distributed via sf.net[*] and we have absolutely no
control over what happens with them on sf.net serves (either due to
their admins or attackers modifying them). Thus:
ALWAYS CHECK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ON DOWNLOADED ISO!
ALWAYS TRY TO OBTAIN QUBES MASTER KEY FINGERPRINTS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES!
Also note that our git repos are also not served from our wiki server
either. Our git/gitweb server does not use SSL, however all the repos
use digital signing to assure code authenticity and integrity. Our
qubes-builder automatically attempts to verify these signatures on every
pull. This provides a significantly higher security than any SSL server
could provide, because the signatures are made on developer's computers
(in dedicated devel VMs), so the private keys are not stored on any 3rd
party server.
The same applies to updates for Qubes OS which are distributed as signed
rpm packages (also from non-SSLed server, whose security is irrelevant
thus).
So, there are few security benefits with this new SSLed server, but at
least it now Looks Nice (TM). Also it now provides for a somehow more
reliable way to get the Qubes Master Singing Key fingerprints (but not
much more reliable because of the lack of control over the server as
explained above).
However, the absolutely jaw-dropping new feature is HTML-based user
authentication and registration. No longer will we need to manually
update htpasswd via ssh whenever new wiki user is to be registered.
Today the users can register themselves via a Web form!
Of course, conservative as we are, we still don't allow just anybody to
register a usable account on Qubes Wiki. For this reason we have removed
the Registration link from the wiki. Of course people can still type in
the registration URL (which I even copy below) and register, but their
accounts won't get approved by us. So, in other words, please don't.
Please who used to have accounts on the old wiki server, are requested
to register using this link:
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/register
Please use the same username as on the old wiki and also please use the
same email address as the one you use to post on our mailing lists and
to which you once got invitation for wiki access. (Yes, I know,
authenticating people via ability to send and respond from a specific
email address is not a very strong one, so to say, but then again, it
should be good enough for our wiki, which is, as explained above, not
very security critical...).
The new wiki is available under the same URL, although https is now
enforced (if you access via old http:// paths those should be
automatically redirected to https://-ed ones).
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki
You might need to wait for the DNS caches to update.
Cheers,
joanna.
[*] Arguably, while it might provide some security benefit to also serve
installation ISO from our now-properly-SSLed wiki server instead of from
sf.net, especially to the proverbial grandparents, we can't afford to
host it on our rented serves because of the high bandwidth costs, which
might easily go into thousands of $ per month.
to a new, properly SSLed wiki server! It uses an SSL cert signed by a
StartSSL CA.
Even though the cert is signed by a 3rd-party CA, they haven't got
access to our private key -- they just signed our public key, I
generated in one of my many VMs.
However, the cert's private key is stored on the wiki server and is
accessible to anyone who:
1) Can compromise the server and gain root or kernel access there,
OR
2) To Amazon admins who can always read our VM server's memory (this is
always possible and requires no exploitable bug of any sorts).
In other words, always assume the bad guys/gov have compromised this
cert and/or the wiki server itself.
Also note that Qubes OS installation ISOs are *not* served from our wiki
server -- they are distributed via sf.net[*] and we have absolutely no
control over what happens with them on sf.net serves (either due to
their admins or attackers modifying them). Thus:
ALWAYS CHECK DIGITAL SIGNATURES ON DOWNLOADED ISO!
ALWAYS TRY TO OBTAIN QUBES MASTER KEY FINGERPRINTS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES!
Also note that our git repos are also not served from our wiki server
either. Our git/gitweb server does not use SSL, however all the repos
use digital signing to assure code authenticity and integrity. Our
qubes-builder automatically attempts to verify these signatures on every
pull. This provides a significantly higher security than any SSL server
could provide, because the signatures are made on developer's computers
(in dedicated devel VMs), so the private keys are not stored on any 3rd
party server.
The same applies to updates for Qubes OS which are distributed as signed
rpm packages (also from non-SSLed server, whose security is irrelevant
thus).
So, there are few security benefits with this new SSLed server, but at
least it now Looks Nice (TM). Also it now provides for a somehow more
reliable way to get the Qubes Master Singing Key fingerprints (but not
much more reliable because of the lack of control over the server as
explained above).
However, the absolutely jaw-dropping new feature is HTML-based user
authentication and registration. No longer will we need to manually
update htpasswd via ssh whenever new wiki user is to be registered.
Today the users can register themselves via a Web form!
Of course, conservative as we are, we still don't allow just anybody to
register a usable account on Qubes Wiki. For this reason we have removed
the Registration link from the wiki. Of course people can still type in
the registration URL (which I even copy below) and register, but their
accounts won't get approved by us. So, in other words, please don't.
Please who used to have accounts on the old wiki server, are requested
to register using this link:
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/register
Please use the same username as on the old wiki and also please use the
same email address as the one you use to post on our mailing lists and
to which you once got invitation for wiki access. (Yes, I know,
authenticating people via ability to send and respond from a specific
email address is not a very strong one, so to say, but then again, it
should be good enough for our wiki, which is, as explained above, not
very security critical...).
The new wiki is available under the same URL, although https is now
enforced (if you access via old http:// paths those should be
automatically redirected to https://-ed ones).
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki
You might need to wait for the DNS caches to update.
Cheers,
joanna.
[*] Arguably, while it might provide some security benefit to also serve
installation ISO from our now-properly-SSLed wiki server instead of from
sf.net, especially to the proverbial grandparents, we can't afford to
host it on our rented serves because of the high bandwidth costs, which
might easily go into thousands of $ per month.
Joanna Rutkowska
Jul 16, 2014, 9:04:40 AM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com
server:
1) Attacks subverting the content of the wiki on the fly (MitM), while
it is served to the reader, e.g. in Starbucks over insecure wifi, should
now be hard.
2) Even if an attcker gets access to the private SSL key, they might
still be cought while using this stolen key to serve the wiki content.
This is especially true to people accessing the wiki over tor (trageted
attacks would be difficult then).
In practice, the most severe attacks on the wiki content would be those
replacing the real Qubes Master Key fingerprint with a fake one, as e.g.
given on this page:
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/VerifyingSignatures
Of course it's also thinkable that the attacker could inject some
offending instructions and convience the user to execute them, e.g. in
order to fix some innocent technical problem with Qubes OS (e.g. broken
sound virtualization).
Unfortunately in order to allow potential attackes to get cought when
using stolen Qubes cert or session key even (and serving fake content)
some form of monitoring infrastrucutre would need to be established.
joanna.
Joanna Rutkowska
Jul 16, 2014, 9:08:54 AM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com, qubes...@googlegroups.com
[user@work-admin qubes-wiki]$ openssl x509 -in
wiki.qubes-os.org-cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
SHA1 Fingerprint=84:AC:9F:01:D2:B7:83:C6:2C:6C:49:79:70:CF:29:74:4C:24:AB:DA
joanna.
Joonas Lehtonen
Jul 16, 2014, 1:07:11 PM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
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> The new wiki is available under the same URL, although https is
> now enforced
I would suggest to make use of HSTS header.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf
> (if you access via old http:// paths those should be automatically
> redirected to https://-ed ones).
You probably want to do that only on domains/vhosts for which you
actually have a valid certificate.
Your current config generates a certificate warning
because you redirect users from
http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://www.qubes-os.org
instead of
http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://qubes-os.org
or
http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
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> The new wiki is available under the same URL, although https is
> now enforced
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf
> (if you access via old http:// paths those should be automatically
> redirected to https://-ed ones).
actually have a valid certificate.
Your current config generates a certificate warning
because you redirect users from
http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://www.qubes-os.org
instead of
http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://qubes-os.org
or
http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
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Joonas Lehtonen
Jul 16, 2014, 1:09:05 PM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA512
> instead of http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://qubes-os.org or
> http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
should be:
> http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://wiki.qubes-os.org
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J.M. Porup
Jul 16, 2014, 1:42:59 PM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
distribution as part of Qubes?
>
> Unfortunately in order to allow potential attackes to get cought when
> using stolen Qubes cert or session key even (and serving fake content)
> some form of monitoring infrastrucutre would need to be established.
>
> joanna.
>
> + signature.asc
> 1k (application/pgp-signature)
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Jul 16, 2014, 3:56:13 PM7/16/14
to Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
On 16.07.2014 19:08, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>> instead of http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://qubes-os.org or
>> http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
> should be:
> http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://wiki.qubes-os.org
Fixed, thanks.
>> instead of http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://qubes-os.org or
>> http://www.qubes-os.org -> http://wiki.qubes-os.org
> should be:
> http://www.qubes-os.org -> https://wiki.qubes-os.org
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Jul 16, 2014, 3:59:47 PM7/16/14
to J.M. Porup, qubes...@googlegroups.com
https://wiki.qubes-os.org/wiki/DomZeroTools
J.M. Porup
Jul 16, 2014, 6:16:20 PM7/16/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
Joonas Lehtonen
Jul 17, 2014, 6:36:12 AM7/17/14
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
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> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
Which package does one have to install to get them?
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Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Jul 17, 2014, 6:39:16 AM7/17/14
to Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>
> Which package does one have to install to get them?
qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>
> Which package does one have to install to get them?
Ted Brenner
Jul 18, 2014, 12:37:43 PM7/18/14
to Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
I just installed Qubes and I don't seem to have qubes-core-dom0-doc. Or any man pages. I downloaded the ISO probably a week ago.
--
Sent from my Desktop
Sent from my Desktop
Axon
Mar 7, 2015, 11:25:33 PM3/7/15
to Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
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Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>
>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>
>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package:
[axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-start
No manual entry for qvm-start
[axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-run
No manual entry for qvm-run
[axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-backup
No manual entry for qvm-backup
[axon@dom0 ~]$ sudo yum info qubes-core-dom0-doc
Error: No matching Packages to list
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David Hobach
Mar 8, 2015, 5:37:55 AM3/8/15
to Axon, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
On 08.03.2015 05:25, Axon wrote:
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> Hash: SHA512
>
> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>
>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>>
>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>>
>
> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package:
>
> [axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-start
> No manual entry for qvm-start
> [axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-run
> No manual entry for qvm-run
> [axon@dom0 ~]$ man qvm-backup
> No manual entry for qvm-backup
> [axon@dom0 ~]$ sudo yum info qubes-core-dom0-doc
> Error: No matching Packages to list
Joonas Lehtonen
Mar 8, 2015, 5:47:52 AM3/8/15
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
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> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>
>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
>
> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package
what does
Hash: SHA512
> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>
>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
>
> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package
sudo qubes-dom0-update install qubes-core-dom0-doc
say?
btw: I still find it irritating that the program package doesn't
include the manpages.
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Joonas Lehtonen
Mar 8, 2015, 5:49:34 AM3/8/15
to qubes...@googlegroups.com
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Joonas Lehtonen:
Hash: SHA512
>> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>>
>>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
>>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
>
>> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
>> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package
>
> what does sudo qubes-dom0-update install qubes-core-dom0-doc say?
remove 'install' from that line ;)
>>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>>
>>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>
>>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>
>
>> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
>> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package
>
> what does sudo qubes-dom0-update install qubes-core-dom0-doc say?
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David Hobach
Mar 9, 2015, 1:24:13 PM3/9/15
to Joonas Lehtonen, qubes...@googlegroups.com
On 08.03.2015 10:49, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
>
>
> Joonas Lehtonen:
>>> Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>>> On 17.07.2014 12:35, Joonas Lehtonen wrote:
>>>>>> There are man pages for qvm-* tools.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which package does one have to install to get them?
>>
>>>> qubes-core-dom0-doc, it should be installed by default.
>>
>>
>>> On my fully updated system, I have man pages for all of the usual
>>> Linux commands, but none for qvm-* commands and no doc package
>>
>> what does sudo qubes-dom0-update install qubes-core-dom0-doc say?
>
> remove 'install' from that line ;)
Thanks.
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