Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Cf: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/

I remember it was back in '76 when I began to notice a subtle shift of
focus in the computer science journals I was reading, from discussing X
to discussing Information About X, or X → Info(X) as I came to notate it.
I suppose this small arc of revolution had been building for years but it
struck me as crossing a threshold to a more explicit, self-conscious stage
about that time.

And thereby hangs a number of tales ...

Jon

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[Jon Awbrey]

Ken,

Thanks for the comment. It made me realize that the notation Info(X) is
probably not the best. It tends to mislead us into thinking we already
have X in hand, in other words, that we already have perfect information
about X and are merely abstracting Info(X) as some derivative of it.
But that is not the sort of situation we are concerned with here.

It might be better to say that Info is all the information we have at
a given moment of investigation and X abstracts the portion of Info
that has to do with X. That might lead us to notate it as X(Info).
This brings to mind the way we speak of observables in physics,
as operators on the total state or wave function or whatever.

If I had to concoct an informal linguistic example — which I'd do solely by way
of rough analogy to the formal mathematical situations we'd have much hope of
resolving in our lifetimes — I'd say the sorts of X we're facing here are what
used to be called “definite descriptions” like “Desdemona's infidelity” or
“Manafort's guilt on the 10 mistried counts”.

In those sorts of situations, discussed to death in years gone by,
what a modicum of pragmatic-semiotic insight adds to the mix is that
all descriptions are indefinite to some degree, all syntax is lax to
some extent.

There are, as usual, clear foresights of that insight in Peirce.
And that is what I'll be getting around to prescently.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/21/2018 6:10 PM, Ken Lloyd wrote:
> When speaking of most things, say x, we are indirectly referencing
> all the meta-levels of x - meta signifying beyond which can include
> higher levels of abstraction as well as lower levels of realizations.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: syss...@googlegroups.com [mailto:syss...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Tuesday, August 21, 2018 1:41 PM
> To: Ontolog Forum @ GG <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>;
> SysSciWG <syss...@googlegroups.com>;
> Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>
> Subject: [SysSciWG] Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
>
> Cf: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/
>
> Ontologists, Systers, Modelers,

[Jon Awbrey]

Systems Science, Structural Modeling,

Here's my blog rehash of a couple earlier comments on the Ontolog list that
may help to explain my use of the term "pragmatic semiotic information".
I forgot that I hadn't shared those comments here, so sorry about that.

Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Re: Ontolog Forum • Bruce Schuman
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/ontolog-forum/vo8CmL8jt30/2zAl5v_zDQAJ

I would call that the pragmatic-semiotic point of view
and not find anything shocking in it.

One can find earlier foreshadowings — Plato’s Cratylus and the Stoic lekton
are often mentioned in this connection — but the clearest precursor of the
pragmatic-semiotic perspective occurs in Aristotle’s recognition of the
triadic sign relation, most succinctly in his treatise On Interpretation.

Here’s the little essay Susan Awbrey and I wrote on that, tracing
the continuities of pragmatic semiotics from Aristotle up through
Peirce and Dewey and teasing out the intimate relationship between
the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry.

Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting section of your paper:

"We discuss the role of the interpreter in the activity of interpretation. 

Aristotle assumes that objects and impressions in the mind are constant across all interpreters. 

Confronting this assumption with the needs of hermeneutic and educational practice, we argue that a comparative 

and developmental understanding of interpreters is required. This in turn demands the more complete theory of 

signs envisioned by Peirce and Dewey, which continues to be developed in the semiotic and pragmatic traditions."

We are working on a paper that addresses different kinds of languages, each that have a 

different type of interpreter.  The augmented model-exchange isomorphism (AMEI) provides a

framework in which the semantics of a given natural language relationship may be evaluated and 

explored to identify a common isomorphic expression across all thee language types.

The ability to convert a informal language (natural language) into a formal language in an isomorphic

manner is very valuable for a number of reasons.

At this time we are addressing three natural language relationships that are at the heart of systems science and systems engineering.  These three natural language relationships are:

  1) Part-of  (Necessary to discuss a system with more than one part, part <=> whole)

  2) Precedes (Necessary to discuss a time based process, like creating a system)

  3) Influence (Necessary for the evaluation of system interaction.)

The plan is to have the paper up on Research Gate in a  few days and present the paper contents 

at the September 1st Structural Modeling Project video conference at 9 AM Pacific time.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
the question, “What Is Systems Science?”. I haven't found the
free time to join in yet but it is very interesting to me on
account of the fact my work on Inquiry Driven Systems for the
last 30 years or so can be seen to ask the converse question,
“How Is Science A (Cybernetic or Dynamic) System?”.

The idea that the sciences operate as (some order of) cybernetic systems
is of course nothing new but there is a lot of work to do detailing that
insight and especially building intelligent software systems that assist
scientific research by availing themselves of that task and user model.

Regards,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Many interesting view points and aspects associated with the methods, goals and artifacts associated with science.

Our next focus is the refactoring and refinement of the existing structural modeling software.

Things are moving along slowly, but moving in the right direction.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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Joe Simpson

“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

[John F Sowa]

On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.

Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
to which they are applied.

The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
egotistical. The names that are given to things depend on changing
circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.

For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?

Answer: It all depends on which textbook you use.

However, there is one basic distinction: all sciences, whether
the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.

Fundamental reason: Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
observation. Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.

See the attached cspsci.gif. Note that formal logic and formal
semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.

John

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting point of view and approach.

Another interesting approach was taken by John Warfield.

John's approach explored the minimal, necessary context needed to support the activity of science.  The necessary contextual, environmental components are:

 1) Human beings (more than one)

 2) Language

 3) Reasoning through relationships

 4) Archival representation of artifacts.

These four components are given as the "Universal Priors to Science," in Chapter 2 of "A Science of Generic Design."

The ability of a given group of human beings to clearly communicate and reason has a significant impact on the development of any type of science.

It may be that expending effort on refining and developing these contextual components will have a great impact on the quality and quantity of science produced.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 7:20 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

Ontologists, Systems Scientists, Structural Modelers,

What I find lacking in these ontological bat-capping games is the
dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry,
the process that produces the product.  If sciences are bodies
of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools,
focusing on the states of systems and how they change over time.

When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations
actually do and optimally ought to update that state of info over time?”

For ease of reference, here is my blog rehash of my last post,
seeing as how the main point of it somehow got snipped out:

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/09/02/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-2/

Regards,

Jon

On 9/4/2018 8:07 AM, joseph simpson wrote:
 > Aleksandar:
 >
 > You wrote:
 >
 > "Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
 > also known as the Sowa Diamond?"
 >
 > http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.html
 >
 > Great question.

 >
 > Sowa wrote:
 >
 > "However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
 > the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
 >
 > Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
 > observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
 > use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena."
 >

 > It seems that there needs to be some empirical observation somewhere in the
 > mix.
 >
 > Take care and have fun,
 >
 > Joe
 >
 > On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 3:17 AM Aleksandar Malečić <ljma...@gmail.com>
 > wrote:
 >
 >> Aren't all sciences versions of applied Knowledge Representation Ontology
 >> also known as the Sowa Diamond?
 >>
 >> http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm
 >>
 >> Aleksandar
 >>
 >> On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 12:05 AM joseph simpson <jjs...@gmail.com> wrote:
 >>
 >>>
 >>> FYI ..

 >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
 >>> From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>
 >>> Date: Mon, Sep 3, 2018 at 12:01 PM
 >>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
 >>> To: <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> On 9/2/2018 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 >>>> I've been following the discussion on the SysSci list that asks
 >>>> the question, “What Is Systems Science?”.
 >>>

 >>> Systems science, like every other science, is applied semiotic.
 >>> The primary difference between the sciences is the subject matter
 >>> to which they are applied.
 >>>
 >>> The reason for differences in terminology is historical and
 >>> egotistical.  The names that are given to things depend on changing
 >>> circumstances, historical accidents, popular fads, and egotistical
 >>> desires by people who want to claim that they made a novel discovery.
 >>>
 >>> For example, where are the boundary lines between psychiatry,
 >>> psychology, behavioral science, cognitive science, social science,
 >>> sociology, educational psychology, and anthropology?
 >>>
 >>> Answer:  It all depends on which textbook you use.
 >>>
 >>> However, there is one basic distinction:  all sciences, whether
 >>> the scientists know it or not, are versions of applied mathematics.
 >>>
 >>> Fundamental reason:  Pure mathematics does not depend on any empirical
 >>> observation.  Every other subject, including so-called common sense,
 >>> use math (formal or informal) to analyze some observable phenomena.
 >>>
 >>> See the attached cspsci.gif.  Note that formal logic and formal
 >>> semiotic are two names for the same branch of pure mathematics.
 >>> The distinction is whether you call logic a subset of semiotic or
 >>> semiotic a subset of logic -- if undecided, flip a coin.
 >>>
 >>> John
 >>>

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[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists,

There were some problems with email delivery, so reposting this from Sept 4.

Re: John Sowa
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/ontolog-forum/WsdtHpkRvbI/XKoNu5N1BQAJ

What I find lacking in these static ontological hierarchies is the

dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry, the

process that produces the product known as knowledge. If sciences are

bodies of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools, focusing
on the states of systems and how they change over time.

When we apply that systems perspective to information systems,
knowledge systems, systems of belief, received opinion, whatever,
the state under investigation is a state of information, knowledge,
and so on, and the question becomes, “What influences and operations

actually do and optimally ought to update that state of information
over time?”

[John F Sowa]

On 9/9/2018 10:36 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Re: John Sowa

>
> What I find lacking in these static ontological hierarchies is the
> dynamic, functional, transformational side of scientific inquiry, the
> process that produces the product known as knowledge.  If sciences are
> bodies of organized knowledge, what is the physiology of those bodies?
> That is the variety of systems theory I learned in my schools, focusing
> on the states of systems and how they change over time.

I agree. But you seem to be disagreeing with me, and I can't see
any contradiction. For the record, see below for a copy of my
previous note and the attached cspsci.gif.

But I admit that my short answer to "What is systems science?"
was too short: "Systems science, like every other science,
is applied semiotic." That's true, but it doesn't say in what
way systems science differs from any other science.

What I should have added is that systems science is a cross-
disciplinary study of the dynamic aspects of all possible
processes -- all the ways that anything may develop, grow.
or interact with anything else.

In fact, Whitehead's process ontology is one of the few that
is compatible with modern science. Everything in nature is
a process that comes to be, develops, and passes away. The
things called objects are just slowly changing processes.

Like every science in cspsci.gif, systems science is an application
of pure mathematics and its semiotic branches. Those branches
include logic and semiotic as well as mathematical theories that
specify processes, motion, interaction, causality, etc.

> the question becomes, “What influences and operations actually do
> and optimally ought to update that state of information over time?”

I agree. I also agree that versions of ontology that focus only
on static patterns that distinguish one type of entity from another
are just narrow, special-case microtheories.

General systems theory (Bertalanffy et al.) is a more fundamental
theory of process in comparison to the static parts of mereology.
GST is like a 4D virtual reality compared to the static "snapshots"
of mereology.

Recommendation for generalizing static ontologies: Replace mereology
with a version of General Systems Theory.

John

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018
From: John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net>

[Doug McDavid]

Thanks, John. It’s really good to hear you say that.

Sent from my iPhone

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> <cspsci.GIF>

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontologists,

{Resending another msg that didn't get distributed to the list.}

A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,
brought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,
variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.

⁂

Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.

If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”.  Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”.  This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.

⁂

Regards,

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

It is not so simple. 

There are generally two kinds of signs: conventional and natural.

Mental ideas and images are also signs, natural signs, being themselves meanings and intentions, or "mental words".

Natural signs are causally related.

Natural signs are the source of meaning for conventional signs.

Thus the mind is the medium through which words signify things. 

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:55 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:

Ontologists,

{Resending another msg that didn't get distributed to the list.}

A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,

bought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,

variables, and the measurements that give systematic state variables their values.
My current focus being what it is, I couched my answer in pragmatic semiotic terms.

⁂

Measurement is an extension of perception.
Measurement gives us data about an object
system the way perception gives us percepts,
which we may consider just a species of data.

If we ask when we first became self-conscious about this
whole process of perception and measurement, I don't know,
but Aristotle broke ground in a very articulate way with his
treatise “On Interpretation”.  Sense data are “impressions”
on the mind and they have their consensual, communicable
derivatives in spoken and written “signs”.  This triple
interaction among objects, ideas, and signs is the
cornerstone of our contemporary theories of signs,
collectively known as “semiotics”.

⁂

Regards,

Jon

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[Jon Awbrey]

Azamat, All,

Of course it's not that simple. I called it a cornerstone
not a whole building but it gives us a starting point and
a first approach to a pragmatic semiotic architecture
still being built as we speak.

There is more detail and a trace of semiotic's later development in this paper:

• Awbrey and Awbrey (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry

We began by quoting the founding paragraph from Aristotle:

<QUOTE>

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of
the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is
speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which
these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also
the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images,
copies (homoiomata). (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).

</QUOTE>

We used the following Figure to highlight the structure of the triadic
relation among objects (pragmata), affections or impressions (pathemata),
and symbols or signs (symbola, semeia) as given in Aristotle's account:

• Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/awbrey-awbrey-1995-figure-1.png

The triadic nexus marked “R” in the Figure is what graph theorists
would call a node or point of degree 3 and it provides a graphical
picture of a relational triple that can be taken in any convenient
order so long as we keep it constant throughout a given discussion.
For example, we could take Aristotle's object, sign or symbol, and
impression in the order (o, s, i), mostly just because I find that
convenient in later developments.

Diagrams of that sort, whether triangular or tri-radial in form, have long been
in common use for conveying the properties of triadic sign relations. But the
intervening years have taught me to my dismay that people tend to be led astray
by pictures like that, often getting stuck on square one, or rather triangle one.
That is, they get stuck on single triples of sign relations rather than grasping
them as they should, as prototypical examples of a whole class of ordered triples.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/10/2018 3:23 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> It is not so simple.
> There are generally two kinds of signs: conventional and natural.
> Mental ideas and images are also signs, natural signs, being themselves
> meanings and intentions, or "mental words".
> Natural signs are causally related.
> Natural signs are the source of meaning for conventional signs.
> Thus the mind is the medium through which words signify things.
>
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:55 AM Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> Ontologists,
>>

>> A question arising on another blog, perhaps incidentally, perhaps of the essence,

>> brought to mind recent discussions in these forums regarding the nature of systems,

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting collection of concepts and insights.

It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study.

I find that the analysis of the languages supported by the "Talking Drums" of Africa help me understand the signaling process at a deeper level.

John Carrington produced some work in this area in the 1940's.

See:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/bq/36-8_396.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Carrington

A key feature of these "sign exchanges" or "communication events" is the use of redundant signs or "signal phrases" to eliminate the uncertainty associated with the information exchange.

The physical medium of communication (drum, impact vibration, air pressure) is different between human speech and drum speech.

Human speech has much greater pitch control and tonal variability than "drum speech."  The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner.

For example, assume drum speech can not make a clear distinction between the words baby and tree.  

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a tree then there would be statements like, 'Go climb high in the XXX' or 'The fruit is on the XXX."

If the drummer wanted to communicate about a baby the there would be statements like, 'Feed the XXX' or 'The XXX is little and smart."

This type of redundant sign transmission may be used to achieve the semantic goals of the communication. 

However, the redundant sign transmission is just preparing the state of the interpreter.

There are interesting connections between Shannon's information theory and Carrington's analysis of the talking drums.

It would be interesting to map these different views of information exchange to the components of your Figure 1 - The Sign Relation in Aristotle.  Another task to add to the very long "to do" list.

Given the structure of your Theme One Program, you may have already given this type of approach some consideration.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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[joseph simpson]

This section above:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interrupted in a specific manner."

Should read:

"The information loss associated with the restricted drum mechanics is compensated for by repeating many phrases that only make logical sense if they are interpreted in a specific manner.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

The subject of natural languages and their relation to formal languages,
for example, logical calculi, logical graphs, and programming languages,
has come up periodically in our discussions and I've been struggling to
arrive at something both cogent and coherent to say about it. But what
the heck, here's a few thoughts off the cuff.

We naturally use our mother tongues as metalanguages to talk among ourselves
in fora like these, not only about well-formalized object languages but also
about the object domains that supply them with semantic substance, in a word,
“meaning”. Nothing about that makes “the natural language of the individual
conducting the inquiry ... the main object of study”. At least, that is not
how I'd personally understand the main task at hand.

I started using the run-on formula “pragmatic-semiotic point of view” during
a few exchanges with Bruce Schuman and John Sowa as a way of alluding to the
line of thinking about signs stretching from Aristotle to Peirce, Dewey, and
pragmatists of that stripe. Here's a link to my blog rehash of that episode:

• Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 5
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/19/inquiry-driven-systems-%e2%80%a2-comment-5/

Have to break here ... to be continued ...

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

My phrase:

"pragmatic semiotic information when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry is the main object of study."

Is cryptic and may not convey my original meaning (semantics), but I think it is close.

The drum example is designed to highlight a small number of ideas and aspects of communication. Two of these aspects are:

1) Multiple language encoding processes combined with two or more communication channels.

2) One communication channel having a higher rate of uncertainty that the other communication channels.  How does the rate of sign (or symbol) uncertainty impact the form and semantics of a specific message.  With an uncertain channel, the message form can be changed to support the intended semantics.  

Next, I will outline another  example based on highway signs.

During a construction and repair event involving a draw bridge and a number of interconnecting surface roads, temporary road signs were placed along the roadway. The existing permanent signs were covered with black plastic to block out the sign messages.  This specific work area was congested and contained many permanent traffic signs among which the temporary traffic signs were dispersed. 

The combined collection of temporary and permanent signs created a situation where the existing "blanked out" permanent signs blocked some areas of the temporary signs.  When I was driving down the road a temporary sign displayed the following:

"Reduce speed to 'blocked out'  5."

So what is the new speed limit?  The speed limit can not be read from the sign.

However, the new speed limit can be estimated using the following contextual information:

Speed limits are given in steps of 5 miles an hour.

The current speed limit is 40 miles an hour.

Traffic ahead appears to b going over 20 miles and hour.

So, the new speed limit is either, 25 or 35 miles an hour.

The information from the road signs is combined with:

Known rules,

Current observations,

Analytical process,

to produce the highest valued estimate of the new speed limit.

So the new speed limit is either 25 or 35 miles an hour.

In this case, the interpreter selects the relevant decision elements from existing the existing knowledge base and contextual facts and makes a decision to reduce speed.  The only question is how much to reduce speed.

In this case symbols exist but the message is incomplete.

Information theory allows some insight in to the value of the message.

These ideas are not well formed yet, but I wanted to send out an initial message to capture these first ragged thoughts.

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

JS: It appears to me that it is very difficult to fully grasp the

fundamental issues associated with pragmatic semiotic information
when the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry
is the main object of study.

That one took me a double take, but if I understand the “when” clause
as a hypothetical condition, not the assertion of a fixed intention
then I'd naturally agree:

IF the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry

is the main object of study

THEN it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues
associated with pragmatic semiotic information.

It is naturally worth the effort to reflect on the properties of our
embedding languages but we normally meet with limited, partial, and
well-circumscribed success on any given trial. That is why we study
formalized object languages as microcosms of the enveloping spheres.

So we'll continue on that understanding ...

Regards,

Jon

On 9/11/2018 10:39 PM, joseph simpson wrote:

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Great restatement and comments.

I have three general communication event types that I need to describe.

The Talking Drums communication event is Type One. (Preliminary description of this event is in progress.)

The Draw Bridge Sign event is Type Two. (First cut at describing this event is complete.)

The Native American Language event is Type Three. (This event is not described yet.)

Natural language derives meaning from contextual information.  The Talking Drums and Draw Bridge events are designed to help establish a rich event context that is needed to explore the impact of changing context information on event semantics.

Formal language derives meaning from two sets of rules: 1) Syntax rules detailing allowable symbols and 2) Semantic rules that detail the meaning of the symbols.

My goal is the establishment and refinement of three standard event communication types to serve as a rich contextual foundation that supports natural language to formal language analysis.  The event descriptions are simple stories that provide context.  

The ideas associated with the events and event descriptions are just forming now so, things may be in a dynamic state for a short while.

We will see if these ideas prove useful.

[John F Sowa]

On 9/14/2018 4:48 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> IF   the natural language of the individual conducting the inquiry
>     is the main object of study
> THEN it is very difficult to fully grasp the fundamental issues
>     associated with pragmatic semiotic information.

Linguists have always derived grammars from large corpora of
examples. There were no native speakers of ancient Greek,
Latin, or Egyptian, but there were thousands of documents
in Greek and Latin, including more examples of how they
evolved over the centuries.

For Egyptian, they discovered the Rosetta Stone, which had
parallel texts in Greek, hieroglyphics, and a later notation
for Egyptian called demotic.

As a starting point, they made a guess that the Coptic language,
which was still in use for church services evolved from ancient
Egyptian. That proved to be true. And they were able to derive
the meaning, the grammar, and even the pronunciation of Egyptian.
Of course, their pronunciation would be closer to Coptic than the
they way the Pharaohs actually spoke. But it's good enough.

For dictionaries of ancient and modern languages, lexicographers
have always started with citations of the words in context. From
those citations, they derive their definitions.

Today, linguists use the enormous resources of the WWW. That
gives them an immense amount of examples of all the variations
of grammar and meanings.

John

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All,

The concept of a triadic sign relation, say L ⊆ O × S × I where O
is the object domain (think “universe of discourse”) and S and I
are domains of signs (think “channels” or “languages”) that we
are using to talk and think about O, is most often applied in
one of two ways.

1. S and I are really the same channel, language, medium, set of signs,
or state space of a system we are using to convey information about O.
In cases where S = I we are often concerned with transformations taking
place within a single set of signals and we may write I = S′ to signify
our focus on sign relational triples of the form (o, s, s′) where s′ is
a sign that follows s in a logical or temporal sequence, in short, where
s′ is the “next state” of s.

2. S and I are two different channels, languages, media, sets of signs,
or state spaces of systems being used to convey information about O.
In this case the issue is one of translation or “interoperability”.

So I think I'd start out viewing your “drum” example under the second case,
but when you really think about it you realize the first case is there, too.

Your “highway sign” example sounds like a traffic control version
of the issues they study in the subject of error correcting codes.

Regards,

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Thanks for your detailed reply.

I have had a few interruptions, in the last couple of days, and have not had time to provide the third case as a story or think about your response.

However, I think these context rich "stories" will help communicate the fundamental aspects of formal languages, natural languages and the communication process.

In any case, I hope to have a better response in a day or two.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[joseph simpson]

All:

It has obviously been more than a couple of days and I still am engaged in a process that has expanded to requiring that we move out of our home for a couple of weeks.  Contractors need to address some damage to our home and this has been much more disruptive than I had  anticipated.  

Bottom line:  We will be in a disrupted state until late November.

My top priority is working the OSSMTools requirements development and conceptual code development.

See Github repo at:

https://github.com/jjs0sbw/OSSMTools

I will return to the development of these three rich context examples when and as I get time.

However, it looks like it will be between a few weeks to a couple of months.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe (and all),

I am sorry to hear of the difficulties on your home front.
I know we all wish you the quickest of returns to comfort.

I'll also be experiencing intermittent interruptions from
now until the moving vans come and probably a while after
but I'm hoping things will settle down by Thanksgiving.

For the moment I'll just post a few links to matters I've
been trying to get back to and hope to develop further as
time goes by.

The topic named in the subject line is the same thing I used to call
just Semiotic Information but I added the Pragmatic to emphasize the
continuity with Aristotle's pragmata and to point up the intentional
or object-directed dimension of semiotics. Various excursions along
those lines are linked on the following Survey page:

• Survey of “Semiotic Theory Of Information” (STOI)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/30/survey-of-semiotic-theory-of-information-%e2%80%a2-3/

Regards,

Jon

On 10/1/2018 8:28 PM, joseph simpson wrote:
> All:
>
> It has obviously been more than a couple of days and I still am engaged in
> a process that has expanded to requiring that we move out of our home for a
> couple of weeks. Contractors need to address some damage to our home and
> this has been much more disruptive than I had anticipated.
>
> Bottom line: We will be in a disrupted state until late November.
>
> My top priority is working the OSSMTools requirements development and
> conceptual code development.
>
> See Github repo at:
>
> https://github.com/jjs0sbw/OSSMTools
>
> I will return to the development of these three rich context examples when
> and as I get time.
>
> However, it looks like it will be between a few weeks to a couple of months.
>
> Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,
>
> Joe
>

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/11/20/pragmatic-semiotic-information-•-discussion-10/

Artem Kaznatcheev posted an interesting discussion on his blog under the title “Models as Maps and Maps as Interfaces” that I regarded as fitting more or less under this head. A reader of Peirce may recognize that he has rediscovered certain aspects of pragmatic thought. I added the following brief comment that I hope to expand on when I get more time:

The use of map and “mirror of nature” metaphors takes us a good distance in understanding how creatures represent their worlds to themselves and others. But from a pragmatic semiotic point of view we can see how these metaphors lock us into iconic forms of representation, overstretching dyadic relations, and thus falling short of the full power of triadic symbolic relations that support practical interaction with the world.

Regards,

Jon

[Jon Awbrey]

Everything was in confusion in the Oblonskys' house.

Also the Awbrey house ...

Too much going on at present to reply in detail. But here’s a link to one of my earliest attempts to find common ground between Peirce’s and Shannon’s theories of information. 

Semiotic Information

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Nov 22, 2018, at 10:13 AM, <kall...@gmail.com> <kall...@gmail.com> wrote:

Perhaps a different approach that should be investigated is represented here:

http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/8/6/20180041.full

 

 

From: syss...@googlegroups.com <syss...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Wednesday, November 21, 2018 11:35 AM
To: Sys Sci Discussion List <syss...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [SysSciWG] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)

 

Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 10

 

Artem Kaznatcheev posted an interesting discussion on his blog under the title “Models as Maps and Maps as Interfaces” that I saw as fitting under this head  A reader of Peirce may recognize critical insights of pragmatic thought cropping up toward the end of his analysis, prompting me to add the following comment:

 

Map and “mirror of nature” metaphors take us a good distance in understanding how creatures represent their worlds to themselves and others.  But from a pragmatic semiotic point of view we can see how these metaphors lock us into iconic forms of representation, overstretching dyadic relations, and thus falling short of the full power of triadic symbolic relations that support practical interaction with the world.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
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[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting analysis and viewpoint.

An interesting question associated with this topic is:

"What happens when a sign (or message) does not reduce uncertainty?"

Uncertainty is not reduced when the message receiver (or sign interpreter) already has that information.

The same message (or sign) could provide information for one sign interpreter ( or message receiver) and provide no information to a different message receiver (or sign interpreter.)

We use the absence of information to reduce both computational complexity and cognitive complexity.

For example:

Using a binary matrix to assign connections between and among objects, empirical and/or logical information is needed to determine if a specific matrix cell should be occupied with a one (1) or a zero (0.)

Once an initial matrix configuration is developed, then the task is to determine the highest value matrix configuration.  If the matrix of interest has rows or columns that are either completely filled or completely empty, then these specific rows and columns may be removed from the matrix.  These rows and columns are removed from the configuration analysis because the final configuration for these rows and columns are already known.  No amount of computation or configuration analysis will add additional information.

After these no-information rows and columns are removed, the remaining matrix components may be analyzed to select the highest value configuration.  The no-information rows and columns may then be recombined with the  selected matrix configuration using a variety of recombination rules and approaches.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

 

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Joe Simpson

“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

Git Hub link:

https://github.com/jjs0sbw

Research Gate link:

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joseph_Simpson3

Web Site:

https://systemsconcept.org/

[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All —

If I recall correctly from a long ago coding theory course, in dealing with transmission through a noisy channel the simplest sort of error-reducing code amounts to simply repeating the bit or message again since the probability of getting the same error twice is lower.  Of course, more efficient error-reducing codes are possible but the principle of exploiting redundancy is the same. 

When you really think about it, the measures of uncertainty and information used in this application remain within the purely syntactic sphere and something more is required to address the object-referent dimension of pragmatic semiotics. 

More on that when I get more time …

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

[John Bottoms]

Joseph,

Your appraisal starts with a closed world assumption and then your solution goes to open world. Or so it seems.
If I ask my GPS to drive me to the North Pole, it will fail and you are then right, "No amount of computation or configuration analysis will add additional information." That is a closed world observation.

But then you proceed to find some "hidden data" somewhere. That sounds very open world.
Perhaps you are inferring that the agent should move from a specified domain to an alternate domain or a larger context? Perhaps one that can provide ways to solve the problem.

-John Bottoms
 Concord, MA

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[joseph simpson]

John:

Interesting point of view.  

I may not have been clear enough in my original post.

There are generally two sequential tasks:

  1 - Identify the objects that create a system.

  2 - Evaluate the value of any given collection (object configuration) of system objects (once these objects are known.)

When you start with an unknown system structure, the first step is to identify the objects in the system using a system structuring relationship.

Then, once the system structure is known, the second step is to discover the highest value system object configuration.

A paper that presents a bit more detailed background is located here:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279205089_Objects_Relations_and_Clusters_for_System_Analysis

The data (highest value configuration) is not necessary hidden (except in the vast number of possible system configuration permutations) just not obvious without a detailed evaluation.

So, first you discover the system structure and then you find the highest value structure.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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[Jon Awbrey]

Joe, All —

Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/11/20/pragmatic-semiotic-information-•-discussion-10/

The thing that interested me about AK’s blog post was that practical reflection on map metaphors in his field led him to the threshold of fundamental insights about the role of signs in inquiry that we find in Peirce’s logic, pragmatism, semiotics. 

In my current understanding (and insufficiencies thereof) there are many open questions about Peirce’s approach to information and how it relates to Shannon’s.  When I get past my current preoccupations, closing on the sale of a house and all that fuss, I’ll be returning to my last breakpoint in that effort.  There are some hints of how far I got in the series of blog posts beginning here:

Information = Comprehension × Extension

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/05/18/information-comprehension-x-extension/

Later,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Nov 23, 2018, at 1:04 AM, joseph simpson <jjs...@gmail.com> wrote:

Jon:

It appears that I was not clear in my original post.

Two properties of information are being addressed.

The first property is the amount of information (number of transmitted messages or signs.)

The second property is the value of information (impact on the message receiver or sign interpreter.) 

If we consider discrete messages in a noiseless channel, then a quantitative measure of the amount of information in a message may be constructed.

However, the value of information in a discrete, noiseless message is dependent on the state and context of the message receiver. The value measure could be different for each message receiver.

Take care and have fun,

Joe

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Thanks for the additional information.

Take care and have fun,

Joe

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

This topic reminded me of a couple of pages in the Peirce's Logic Notebook.

Some interesting calculations and a reference to 'constant information.'

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

[Jon Awbrey]

A comment I made in another discussion blending cybernetics and semiotics may help to clarify the overarching objective here  

I think the broader question here is the nature of scientific inquiry.  As I read them, classical cyberneticians appreciated the analogy between simple regulators adapting to their environments and the often halting but still advancing progress of scientific knowledge about the universe. Today a lot of that knowledge is stored in computational knowledge bases and the question is how best to apply our scientific methods to improve the objective grasp of these symbol systems.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

[Jon Awbrey]

Continuing ...

We have our object systems of interest and we have our software systems —
our brains, our computers, our various community and cultural resources —
that we use to study them. The pragmatic semiotic “laboratory frame”,
if you will, has three dimensions, the object system is called O, and
the “semiotic plane” takes up two dimensions, S for one space of signs
and I for another space of signs called interpretant signs, more often
just interpretants for short. The semiotic plane S × I serves to keep
track of the various interactions, translations, or transitions between
signs in the relevant sign process, or semiosis, of the moment. There
are many different kinds of sign process involved in scientific inquiry,
processes of analysis, argumentation, communication, data collection,
inferences of many types (abductive, deductive, inductive, analogical),
to mention just a few.

Battery running low ... more later ...

Jon

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

[Jon Awbrey]

Steve, All —

This is a question that arises in any field where we have to use language (codes, images, symbols) to analyze language in its most general sense and its relation to things outside language. How can we use our sign-using faculty to analyze itself without pulling the rug out from under ourselves and getting snared in a vicious loop? So the issue you raise is not peculiar to semiotics but arises in linguistics, logic, mathematics, programming, and similar pursuits.

As it happens, I’ve written at length about this bootstrapping or “meta” issue … I’ll go look some of my previous efforts up and see if I can make them clearer and less lengthy this time around.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Nov 27, 2018, at 11:35 AM, Steven Krane <sk5...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Thanks Jon. Are the “the set of things under discussion” also Signs; Always/Sometimes/Never ?
>
> It seems to me that in many discussions O is just more S, if you look carefully. It takes some work and careful dialog to get past that. Is that the object of Ontology? Sorry if these are dumb questions. I’m more curious than educated.
>
>
>
>> On Nov 26, 2018, at 7:12 PM, Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net> wrote:
>>
>> Steve,
>>
>> The object domain O is the set of things under discussion at a given time, in other words, what is ordinarily called a universe of discourse. The elements of O, S, and I are distinguished by the roles they play in a given context, not necessarily by any distinctions of essence.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>>
>>> On Nov 26, 2018, at 8:07 PM, Steven Krane <sk5...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon,
>>>
>>> What is the (sharp) distinction between O and S x I? Does O imply an objectively knowable universe, or is O a cognitive state.
>>>
>>> Steve

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[Jon Awbrey]

Steve, All —

In the experimental sciences, which are after all just more deliberate and
disciplined extensions of our everyday experience in the world, we interact
with some fraction of the world, assisted by apparatus and instruments that
extend our senses, and we record the data of observation and measurement in
the computational media that extend our memories of the phenomena the world
impresses on our minds. Toiling over that soil we cultivate narratives and
theories that guide us in future interactions with the world as we traverse
its many trials.

Observers focused on the intermediate grounds of that whole undertaking,
the mere archives of data records, or the literatures of narratives and
theories growing out of them, may be tempted to object, “We see nothing
but signs here! Where are the objects?” They may then raise the issue
“symbol grounding”, as if the action begins on a free-floating platform
of symbols and we have to find some sorts of hooks to anchor symbols in
the ground of objects below. But that is a false problem, arising from
an overly myopic or absent-minded point of view, forgetting how symbols
are always already born in the world of objects, objectives, and action.

Regards,

Jon

[Nadin, Mihai]

Dear colleagues,
The lack of precision in our use of concepts can result in wasted effort. I tried to make this clear in respect to the definition of the sign. My note was simply brushed aside. No problem. This is not about us as individuals, it is about how we use our knowledge in ontology engineering.

I am reading now:

>symbols are always already born in the world of objects, objectives, and action.<

No, this is no longer lack of precision. It is false. Symbols are not born. The sign itself is a construct. Peirce's definition is one possible construct. If you know of others that better support your efforts, use it. If you stick to Peirce, respect the foundation.

The notion of symbol is grounded in the understanding of the function of representation of signs. Symbolic representations are based on agreements (conventions) in the act of representations. The symbolic is only a possible form of representation, but not all representations are symbolic.
Sorry for acting on behalf of C.S. Peirce--the ethics of terminology is a necessary condition for his pragmatics.

Mihai Nadin

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[Jon Awbrey]

Steve, All —

Too late for detailed reply, so just by way of quick clarification …

The process I described began and ended with pragmatic action in the world. The intermediate phases were “the mere archives of data records, or the literatures of narratives and theories growing out of them”, all of which take place on the plane of signs.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

[Ferenc Kovacs]

You may find this source very useful and relevant

https://triz-journal.com/contradiction-analogy-basis-inventive-thinking/

Ferenc Kovacs

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[John F Sowa]

On 11/29/2018 11:53 AM, Ferenc Kovacs wrote:
> You may find this source very useful and relevant
> https://triz-journal.com/contradiction-analogy-basis-inventive-thinking/

Thanks for that reference. I changed the subject line to emphasize
the theme of an article I just finished, which is related to topics
in the Triz article: http://jfsowa.com/temp/diagram.pdf

From page 13 of diagram.pdf
> In conclusion, mental models, diagrammatic reasoning, and existential
> graphs are three aspects of the same theory of cognition. They cover
> a continuum in methods of reasoning from a vague guess or impression
> to the most precise and elaborate theories of science. Existential
> graphs without diagrams are precise, but two-dimensional diagrams are
> easier to show than to describe in any linear notation. Therefore,
> EGIF is convenient as a linearization that represents only the seman-
> tically significant features of an EG. When the diagrams are as
> precise as Euclid’s, diagrammatic reasoning with EGs can be as precise
> as any linear method. But the option of including continuous, informal,
> or even blurred images, also enables EGs to represent a wide range of
> heuristic or commonsense methods.

C. S. Peirce coined the term 'diagrammatic reasoning', and he also
emphasized the importance of analogy. As line 3 of that paragraph
says, Peirce insisted on a continuum of reasoning methods from the
most vague to the most precise. In fact, the unification algorithm
in automated theorem provers is just a disciplined version of analogy.

But the *discovery* of what theorems are worth proving depends on
a broader, looser version of analogy -- or diagrammatic reasoning.

I agree with the opening paragraph of the Triz article, but I would
change the phrase "Western science" to "Western teaching":

> In Western science, the formative years of our training are tradition-
> ally based on Newtonian abstraction. The methods we are taught do not
> make us comfortable with relating to, or resolving, contradictory
> information or modes of thought. They teach us, instead, to screen out
> one of the options. They force us to eradicate apparently extraneous
> data and opinion, in the interests of over-simplicity, predictability
> and economic or temporal efficiency, just as soon as they seem
> irrelevant to our original aim.

The best scientists and mathematicians have always known and used
analogy. Instead of blaming Newton, who used analogy extensively,
I would blame the downfall of "Western teaching" in the 20th century
on four linear thinkers who did not understand the full range of
human thought and reasoning: Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine.

Those four happened to be prominent logicians. But three other
logicians, who understood the full range of human thought, were
Peirce, Whitehead, and the later Wittgenstein. For his first book,
Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Frege and Russell. But
in his _Philosophical Investigations_, Wittgenstein criticized the
"grave errors" in his first book and in the writings by his mentors.

Whitehead was a far better mathematician and logician than Russell,
but Russell was a more prolific writer, who managed to take credit
for everything. I strongly agree with the way Whitehead introduced
Russell, who was invited to present a series of lectures at Harvard:

> “This is my friend Bertrand Russell. Bertie thinks that I am
> muddleheaded, but then I think that he is simpleminded” (Lucas
> 1989:111). That remark is consistent with a statement attributed
> to Russell: “I’d rather be narrow minded than vague and wooly”
> (Kuntz 1984:50).

For an overview of the way creative mathematicians use analogy
(without going into all the gory details), see the slides of a
talk on "Peirce, Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics,
and geometry": http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .

For the article diagram.pdf, I suggest that readers start with
the abstract and the first paragraph of Section 1. Then skip to
Section 4 (pp. 9 to 13). The other sections go into details of
existential graphs, which are important for understanding the
full range of issues. But you can skip them for a first reading.

For the quotation by Whitehead about Russell, see "Signs, processes,
and language games": http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.htm

There is much more to say about all these issues. See the references
(most of them with URLs) in ppe.pdf, diagram.pdf, and signproc.htm.

John

[Jon Awbrey]

Ferenc,

Thanks for the article and other links, very apropos.
I see that an English rendering of TRIZ might be TIPS,
also very apt.

One of the insights coming out of Peirce's work is the fact that negative operations
are more powerful than positive operations in the sense that negative operations can
generate all possible operations while positive operations by themselves do not suffice.
This is epitomized by his discovery of the amphecks as sole sufficient operators for
propositional logic.

Amphecks
• http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Ampheck
• https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Ampheck

The propositional logic algorithm I wrote for my Theme One program
turns this principle to good effect in two ways:

1. The graph-theoretic syntax is based on a graph-theoretic operator,
interpreted as a type of controlled negation, that generalizes
Peirce's graph-theoretic operator for negation. See this page:

Minimal Negation Operator
• http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Minimal_negation_operator
• https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator

2. It turns out that recognizing contradictions quickly
makes for a high degree of efficiency in finding the
“models”, that is, the satisfying interpretations of
a propositional formula.

Relations of contradiction are also critical in statistical inference,
but I'll need to save that for another time.

I'll share a few thoughts about analogy next time.

Regards,

Jon

[Ferenc Kovacs]

Jon and all,

Admitting that formal logic in those abstract spheres above is far beyond me, I would like to add one more reference material on useful analogies in clarifying some concepts associated with explanation in ontologies. This is a youtube lecture jokingly entitled "The Quantum Conspiracy.."

It is Lecturer Ron Garret’s philosophically and mathematically inclined account of what measurement is in case of a two state system. The author’s novel idea is that information entropy is not restricted to the range (0, 1) and he claims that measurement is a continuum. He also quotes that "the particle-like behaviour of quantum systems is an illusion created by incomplete observation of a quantum (entangled) system with a macroscopic number of degrees of freedom." Focus on Minutes 46, 49 and 51. The Quantum Conspiracy: What Popularizers of QM Don't Want You to Know

I wonder if you can also see further analogies with respect to contradiction-analogy and concepts forming in ontologies to serve as explanations.

The Quantum Conspiracy: What Popularizers of QM Don't Want You to Know Google Tech Talk January 6, 2011 Presented by Ron Garret. ABSTRACT Richard Feynman once famously quipped that no...

Ferenc Kovacs

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[John F Sowa]

On 12/1/2018 5:12 AM, 'Ferenc Kovacs' via ontolog-forum wrote:
> I would like to add one more reference material on useful analogies

> in a youtube lecture jokingly entitled... The Quantum Conspiracy:

> What Popularizers of QM Don't Want You to Know

> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc&t=29s

That is a good lecture about QM, which Ron Garret presents very nicely.

Short summary: Physicists believe QM mathematics with wave functions
defined by differential equations and complex numbers. But they can't
explain the math without using the math. Any attempts to explain QM
math without using any math just make QM mysterious.

Ron G. found a good way to explain QM in terms of classical physics.
But to understand RG, you need to know a fair amount about classical
entropy and complex numbers. That's why authors who popularize QM
without using any math can't present a non-mysterious explanation.

> I wonder if you can also see further analogies with respect to
> contradiction-analogy and concepts forming in ontologies to serve
> as explanations.

As I said in my previous note,
> Mental models, diagrammatic reasoning, and existential graphs are

> three aspects of the same theory of cognition. They cover a
> continuum in methods of reasoning from a vague guess or impression
> to the most precise and elaborate theories of science.

I gave informal arguments to explain how analogies relate mental
models and diagrammatic reasoning. But as soon as you bring up the
notion of contradiction, you get into logic. It's possible to give
a lot of examples. But we can't really explain one version of math
without getting into some other math. If we're lucky, we can use
a simpler math to explain the more complicated math.

> Admitting that formal logic in those abstract spheres...

I suggest the first 11 slides of the following lecture. They don't
use any notation for logic: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

Slide 12 shows one of Peirce's existential graphs, which has a direct
mapping to RDF and to English. If you understand RDF, EGs are a very
simple graphic notation for RDF. But the translation of the EG to
the usual version of predicate calculus (also on slide 12) shows why
many people call logic unreadable.

But RDF does not have any notation for negation. You can't talk
about contradiction without talking about negation. As soon as
you do that, you get into logic. When dealing with negation,
Buddhist logic and Chinese logic become just as complicated as
any version of Western logic. There's no way to avoid it.

Peirce's existential graphs for negation and other operators are
simpler than other notations, East or West. Following is an
introduction to EGs that has more examples:
http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf

Peirce's notation for truth (his only axiom) is the simplest possible:
a blank sheet of paper. That's the empty graph, which says nothing
false or even doubtful. Silence is golden.

His notation for contradiction is also the simplest possible:
a shaded oval with nothing in it. That is a denial of truth.
To state a proposition p and the negation of p, you write p on
a blank sheet of paper and also write a copy of p in a shaded oval.

Complications arise when you try to say something complex. There's
no way to avoid them. But some ways are simpler than others.

John

[Ferenc Kovacs]

John,

Thank you for your time and patience with educating explanations. I find it difficult to connect all the points, but I have some sparse ideas to present as comments.

1."But as soon as you bring up the notion of contradiction, you get into logic." Contradiction may be just one way of saying that you experience difference, polarity or tension between extremes that may or may not be in the reasoning domain, but included in volition, emotion, and abstractions that do not stem in any kinds of logic.

2. I am unable to retrieve this and other links of you http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf for some unclear reason

3. "You can't talk about contradiction without talking about negation.  As soon as you do that, you get into logic." For me as a linguist there is a triad of human utterances starting with a question branching out into answer 1 (assertion) and answer 2 (negation). Questions may also be written as imperatives and object or instruction and data. The basis of analysis however word clusters, of which there are two: titles (headings and labels) and messages.,Logic comes a far way from most of the human parlance, including scientific publications.

4. The issue of representation - of objects - of tangible nature and otherwise should not require separate languages for logic, math, etc.but should be returned to NLP, for one reason being that it is normally the ambition of computer scientists to make themselves understood by the machines by using natural languages as an interface, including touching and pointing, the oldest, crudest and simplest media of communication.

5. Therefore you need a paradigm that accounts for operations (instructions) and data (ontologies) deprived of anything but named entities and class/category names) and the replacement of the contain (mereology) (verb=relation) relation. Otherwise that level of thinking reflects learning  experience of the teenage students but made obscure on purpose as most language of most professions and trade to screen prospective practitioners. 

The Catalyst: The Biological Basis of Thinking and Learning

The Catalyst: The Biological Basis of Thinking and Learning

Ferenc Kovacs

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[John F Sowa]

On 12/1/2018 12:17 PM, 'Ferenc Kovacs' via ontolog-forum wrote:
> The issue of representation - of objects - of tangible nature and
> otherwise should not require separate languages for logic, math, etc.but
> should be returned to NLP, for one reason being that it is normally the
> ambition of computer scientists to make themselves understood by the
> machines by using natural languages as an interface, including touching
> and pointing, the oldest, crudest and simplest media of communication.

Absolutely! Every version of logic is a *simplified* version of NLs.
In fact, every artificial notation of any kind is based on a stylized
version of NLs that is tailored for a specific range of applications.

The plus sign "+" is a simplified ampersand "&", which is an
abbreviation for the Latin "et". The equal sign "=" shows two
same length sticks, side by side. The sentence "2 + 2 = 4" is
an abbreviation for "Two and two is four" (or other NL versions).

In any NL, you can express first-order logic with just six words
(and, or, not, if, some, every) together with some selection of
nouns, verbs, and adjectives for the subject matter. You've been
speaking first-order logic since you were a child.

But a three-year-old child uses much more sophisticated logic
than just FOL. For examples of the logic that a child can use
in everyday speech, look at the excerpts and discussion below.

> Therefore you need a paradigm that accounts for operations
> (instructions) and data (ontologies) deprived of anything but
> named entities and class/category names) and the replacement
> of the contain (mereology) (verb=relation) relation.

Yes, of course. NLs are a superset of any and every notation
for every branch of mathematics, science, engineering, business,
government, literature, and everyday life. Two people who
work in the same profession can communicate everything over the
telephone without using any special symbols or notations. But
if they want to talk about art, they need to draw it, and if
they talk about music, they need to sing, hum, or play it.
See http://jfsowa.com/pubs/

> I am unable to retrieve this and other links of you
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf for some unclear reason

Check with the systems people for your internet provider. It's
possible that they might have some kind of filter or block on the
website. (I use bestweb.net to host my files.) If you still can't
download the files, I can try sending them by email.

John
_____________________________________________________________________

From "Pursuing the goal of language understanding", pages 11 and 12 of
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/pursuing.pdf

The following sentences were uttered by a child named Laura at 2 years,
10 months (Limber 1973):

Here’s a seat. It must be mine if it’s a little one.

I went to the aquarium and saw the fish.

I want this doll because she’s big.

When I was a little girl, I could go “geek geek” like that,
but now I can go “This is a chair.”

Forty years ago, the goal of AI was to meet or exceed all human
intellectual abilities. Today, reaching the level of Laura would be
a major achievement. Laura’s sentences contain implications (if),
causal connections (because), modal auxiliaries (can and must),
contrast between past and present tenses, metalanguage about her
own language at different times, and parallel stylistic structure.

Combining modal, temporal, causal, and metalevel logic and reasoning
in a single formalism and using it to interpret and generate natural
language is still a major research topic. Even though she couldn’t
prove theorems as fast as Wang’s program, Laura used all those
operators before the age of three.

The assumption that formal logic is the foundation or prerequisite
for language understanding seems unlikely. Some linguists and
philosophers have been searching for an elusive “natural logic” that
underlies language. Yet there is no sharp boundary between ordinary
language and any formal logic. When two logicians talk on the telephone,
they can convey the most abstruse ideas with a few words added to
ordinary language. A better assumption is that formal logic is a
language game played with symbols and patterns abstracted from natural
languages. Formal logic may sound unnatural to the uninitiated, but
that is true of the language games of any specialized field.

[Kingsley Idehen]

On 12/1/18 11:31 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> But RDF does not have any notation for negation.  You can't talk
> about contradiction without talking about negation.  As soon as
> you do that, you get into logic.  When dealing with negation,
> Buddhist logic and Chinese logic become just as complicated as
> any version of Western logic.  There's no way to avoid it.

Hi John,

RDF doesn't need to handle negation. Why? Because that's a feature
offered by Query Language e.g., SPARQL. Even better,  by way on an
Ontology, it can also be used a Rules Language that scales massively,
subject to engine implementation.

Our Virtuoso product handles all of what I outline above.

Links:

[1]
https://medium.com/virtuoso-blog/magic-sets-and-custom-inference-rules-in-virtuoso-8-x-db783f8d98d2
-- Virtuoso and SPARQL as a Custom Inference Rules Language via Spin
Ontology terms

[2]  https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/#negation -- SPARQL Negation

--
Regards,

Kingsley Idehen
Founder & CEO
OpenLink Software
Home Page: http://www.openlinksw.com
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[John F Sowa]

On 12/2/2018 7:24 PM, Kingsley Idehen wrote:
> RDF doesn't need to handle negation. Why? Because that's a feature
> offered by Query Language e.g., SPARQL. Even better,  by way on an
> Ontology, it can also be used a Rules Language that scales massively,
> subject to engine implementation.

I was responding to Ferenc K., who was talking about Eastern vs Western
ways of thinking. He discussed analogies and contradiction, and he also
mentioned RDF. I just wanted to note that if you want to talk about
contradiction, you need get into negations.

Re RDF: It's an extremely simple, but important version of logic.
That version, which uses only two operators (AND and Existence) can
express every possible observation. That semantics is the foundation
for all databases of any kind. I might object to the syntax, but I
would never object to using that semantics for a DB.

The other logical operators (not, if, or, every) can never be
observed directly. They can only be inferred indirectly.

Re queries: The SQL Select statement is equivalent to "Find every"
with some WHERE-clause to state the conditions that every item
must satisfy. Every can be defined as not-exists-not.

John

[Ferenc Kovacs]

Further to Garret's points see: https://www.quantamagazine.org/frauchiger-renner-paradox-clarifies-where-our-views-of-reality-go-wrong-20181203/?mc_cid=32b871777a&mc_eid=4b81c9d25f

Ferenc Kovacs

Cell phone: 36-70-6784000 

Landline:36-87-782831

On Saturday, December 1, 2018, 5:31:20 PM GMT+1, John F Sowa <so...@bestweb.net> wrote:

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[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 12
• https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/02/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-12/

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

Peter Smith, on his Logic Matters blog, queried readers about the type/token distinction
and its possible origins before Peirce. I shared a few thoughts and afterwards thought
they more or less belonged under the heading of pragmatic semiotics. So FWIW ...

It doesn't help with the question of semiogenesis, which is no doubt lost to
the mists of history, but Peirce being Peirce naturally discerned three shades
of signs in this respect: Tone, Token, Type. I collected a few excerpts here:

• Tone, Token, Type
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/Tone,_Token,_Type

The distinction between Original and Copy figures frequently in Plato,
with echoes of still more ancient voices. Aristotle on Categories gives
an example where a word meaning both a live animal and its true-to-life
image must be shorn of ambiguity prior to appearing in a court of logic.
Aristotle on Interpretation distinguishes objects from their copies,
images, likenesses in the mind:

<QUOTE>

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or
impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words
are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech
not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections
themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia),
are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects
(pragmata) of which those affections are representations or

likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata). (De Interp. i. 16a4).

</QUOTE>

From a Peircean semiotic perspective we can distinguish an object domain
and a semiotic plane, so we can have three types of type/token relations:
(1) within the object domain, (2) between objects and signs, (3) within
the semiotic plane. We could subtilize further but this much is enough
for a start.

Type/token relations of type (1) are very common in mathematics and go back
to the origins of mathematical thought. These days computer science is rife
with them. I've seen a lot of confusion about this in Peircean circles as it's
not always grasped that type/token relations are not always all about signs.
It can help to speak of types versus instances or instantiations instead.

Aristotle covers type/token relations of types (2) and (3) in De Interp.,
the latter since he recognizes signs of signs in the clause, “written words
are the signs of words spoken”.

Regards,

Jon

[Jon Awbrey]

Ontolog Forum, Systems Science, Structural Modeling —

After a year of all but all-consuming chaos on the re-homesteading front,
topped off by a bout of seasonal ills, it will take me a while to get my
trains of thought up to speed again — in the meantime, by way of getting
organized again, I put together a survey of previous blog and wiki posts
on the subject of Pragmatic Semiotic Information:

Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/

Regards & Happy 2019 —

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

I look forward to your insights in this area.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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“Reasonable people adapt themselves to the world. 

Unreasonable people attempt to adapt the world to themselves. 

All progress, therefore, depends on unreasonable people.”

George Bernard Shaw

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[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/

Thanks, Joe, I've been looking at the record of past discussions and
thinking about what I'd like to accomplish this year.  Just off hand,
I see a lot of discussion points I didn't get a chance to give their
due at the time and it looks like many of those are worth revisiting.
Some of the more troublesome points may seem tangential at first but
they have a tendency to recur if not dealt with, so it's critical to
address them as best one can.

More to the main arc of this thread, I need to keep developing the
implications of Peirce's ideas about information, in particular, the
way information integrates the extensional and intensional aspects
of logic and thus helps to solve many old puzzles about the nature
of scientific inference and inquiry in general.

Onward!

Jon

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 13
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/13/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-13/

Thanks, Kent, let me just clear up a couple of technical points
about Peirce's terminology before getting to the main business.

Here I'm using extension and intension in the conventional sense that concerns
the extension and intension of a concept or term. We define a concept or term
in extension by giving all the things falling under it. We define a concept
or term in intension by giving all the properties it implies or falls under.
The parallel morphology of “extension” and “intension” is pleasing enough to
ear and eye that we usually just let it go at that, but punctilious pedants
long ago noticed the fly in the ointment that an extension is a many, a set
of things, while an intension is a one, a single property or quality, and so
they insist on the technical term “comprehension” to signify a collection of
intensions. In practice, of course, context of application will determine
how picky we need to be.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/13/2019 3:20 PM, Kent Palmer wrote:
> James--
>
> Thank you very much for forwarding the thread.
>
> I note the comment by Jon Awbrey:
>
> * “More to the main arc of this thread, I need to keep developing

> the implications of Peirce's ideas about information, in particular,
> the way information integrates the extensional and intensional aspects
> of logic and thus helps to solve many old puzzles about the nature of

> scientific inference and inquiry in general.” *
>
> I glanced over this
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/05/18/information-comprehension-x-extension/
>
> and
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension
>
> I think this is really important. I did not know that Peirce had this idea.
> It is a great insight. Not sure how it fits in with everything else. But I
> can make a wild guess. But I need to study this text to attempt to confirm
> I understand what Peirce is saying here.
>
> In general analytic philosophy has been obsessed with extension and has had
> problems with intention because that leads to possible worlds theory. But
> beyond intension is hyperintension which is equivalent to doubt and other
> types of noetic transformations that we perform. Best on this Pavel Tichy
> is https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Transparent_Intensional_Logic. And also
> there are those that are studying impossible worlds based on
> counterfactuals which seems the ultimate end of this series which I call
> Wild Intension. I think this hierarchy of the scopes of comprehension is
> analogous to the meta-levels of Being in Fundamental Ontology.
>
> Now in everything I have read on this subject no one has said Intension X
> Extension = Information. But that makes sense. Intension is the fact that
> morning star and evening star is both Venus. This is something that we have
> to comprehend that goes beyond the given to our senses. It is not learned
> through pure analytic substitution of terms for other terms. So if
> Comprehension X Extension = Information can be seen as Intension X
> Extension = Information then we have to ask where this series goes.
>
> *Signs X Appearances = Given*
> *Extension X Signs = Data*
> *Intension X Extension = Information*
> *Hyper-Intension X Intension = Knowledge*
> *Wild-Intension X Hyper-Intension = Wisdom*
> *Ultra-Intension X Wild-Intension = Insight*
>
> Where Extension means externality to each other of terms. Both signs and
> what they represent are external to each other and have no connection in
> their exteriority to each other. Heidegger treats this problem in Being and
> Time and discusses the odd Being of signs. They are ready-to-hand but
> prominent rather than reticent like all other tools. In Peirce the sign has
> three parts. There is the Representamen which is the indicated object of
> the sign.There is the sign itself which is external to the thing indicated
> but has its own existence despite its reference to something else. And
> there is the interpretant which is the meaning that is attributed to the
> sign in its relation to the object. Object is a First (isolata). Sign is a
> Second (relata). Interpretant is a Third (continua). Sign is thus a Second
> that contains First and Thirds within its constitution. Symbols are
> continua (Thirds) themselves that contain Firsts (objects referred to) and
> Seconds (signs that refer to objects) as structural elements. Peirce is
> trying in all his work to show how Logic is related in a practical way to
> the World we live in. But it turns out that this relation is complicated
> and this produces his complex semiotic theory of types of signs that goes
> way beyond that of Saussure. Extension is related to Pure Being.
>
> Where Intension means Possible Worlds of David Lewis. Intension is related
> to Process Being.
>
> Where Hyper Intension is what Pavel Tichy calls Transparent Hyperintension
> in his critique of Frege. Hyper Intension is related to Hyper Being. It is
> related to Noesis like doubt rather than Noema in Husserl's Terminology.
>
> Where Wild Intension = Impossible worlds (extreme counterfactuals) related
> to Wild Being. An example of this is Alice in Wonderland that Deleuze
> treats seriously in *Logic of Sense*.
>
> Where Ultra Intension = Nonsensical Non-world related to Ultra Being (pure
> illusion) as singularity in Existence between emptiness and void. In the
> film *Inception* this was called "Limbo".
>
>
> [image: image.png]
>>From Schemas Theory Tutorial at http://schematheory.net
>
> Now this is a speculation without carefully studying what Peirce is saying
> but it is immediately what comes to mind that puts this formula into a
> broader context that is already known to be important. We might call these
> scopes of comprehension.
>
> [image: image.png]
>>From Schemas Theory Tutorial at http://schematheory.net
>
> These are the scopes of emergence. Notice that the most important of these
> scopes is knowledge because knowledge is the most persistent thing in
> experience.
>
> If this speculative leap has any value then it might explain the generation
> of these scopes of comprehension on the right hand side that the emergent
> events on the left had side correspond. Scopes of Comprehension on the
> Right had side are in the individual while the scopes of emergent events
> are social and cultural complexes in the tradition that change in an
> emergent way i.e. discontinuously. These are the refinements of Spirit in
> Hegel by which consciousness advances in its understanding of the world
> where the ultimate refinement is Absolute Spirit.
>
> It is amazing that Peirce had the idea of doing a cartesian cross product
> of intension and extension when we have not found that anywhere else in the
> literature. In his text there are some very clear explanations of what that
> means. So the question that we are speculating about is whether we can do
> cartesian crosses of the other levels of intension and whether that leads
> to the different levels of comprehension. If that works out then that would
> be a major advance in our understanding of how these things are related to
> each other through their emergent series that is interleaved between the
> sociocultural and the individual understandings.
>
> It is worth putting time into Peirce's text to try to understand it better
> to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis of our speculation (abduction)
> concerning what Peirce means and its implications for current debates of
> these issues.
>
> I have said that we need a Peirce Appreciation Club in Incose.org not just
> because he was a genius as this new (unknown to me) text attests but
> because the things he explains are pertinent to the problems of systems
> engineers which are practical and need practical philosophy to attempt to
> deal with which Peirce gives us in abundance. Did I mention that Heidegger
> was influenced by Peirce via Emil Lask. In other words *Being and Time* is
> meant to be a pragmatic philosophy. This is why Heidegger emphasizes signs
> in his text. When you bring back Heidegger to reinterpret the pragmatism of
> Peirce you get some pretty interesting contrasts that are fascinating to
> contemplate. Maybe we can suggest a Peirce reading group as a way to get
> started.
>
> Kent Palmer
> http://kdp.me
> http://schematheory.net
> https://independent.academia.edu/KentPalmer
> http://emergentdesign.net
> http://nondual.net
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 13, 2019 at 7:40 AM James Martin <mart...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Kent,
>>
>> There has been quite a bit of discussion lately on semiotics and how it
>> relates to SS. The thread below already has 75 messages in the chain.
>>
>> I suspect you don't pay attention to the SSWG discussion list. But in this
>> case you might want to take a look and start contributing since it has a
>> direct correlation to all that you are doing.
>>
>> We need to start bringing more of Peirce's ideas into the SS and SE
>> community as I believe this can lead to some major breakthrough. I know
>> that John Sowa has been doing this for a while in the software community
>> but very few SE's are up on Sowa's work.
>>
>> James

>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Jon Awbrey <jaw...@att.net>
>> Date: Sun, Jan 13, 2019 at 10:24 AM
>> Subject: [SysSciWG] Re: Pragmatic Semiotic Information (Ψ)
>> To: Structural Modeling <structura...@googlegroups.com>, Ontolog
>> Forum <ontolo...@googlegroups.com>, SysSciWG <
>> syss...@googlegroups.com>
>>
>>
>> Re: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4
>>
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/
>>
>> Thanks, Joe, I've been looking at the record of past discussions and
>> thinking about what I'd like to accomplish this year. Just off hand,
>> I see a lot of discussion points I didn't get a chance to give their
>> due at the time and it looks like many of those are worth revisiting.
>> Some of the more troublesome points may seem tangential at first but
>> they have a tendency to recur if not dealt with, so it's critical to
>> address them as best one can.
>>

>> * More to the main arc of this thread, I need to keep developing the

>> implications of Peirce's ideas about information, in particular, the
>> way information integrates the extensional and intensional aspects
>> of logic and thus helps to solve many old puzzles about the nature

>> of scientific inference and inquiry in general. *

[Jon Awbrey]

Kent, All —

FWIW, here's a gloss on “comprehension”
I copied from Runes some years ago, plus
a bit of commentary I added at the time:

Information = Comprehension × Extension • Incidental Note 13
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Incidental_Note_13

Comprehension. The sum of characteristics which connote a class notion symbolized
by a general term. Also, the features common to a number of instances or objects.
Thus, the connotation (qv) or intension (qv) of a concept. (Otto F. Kraushaar,
in D.D. Runes (ed.) Dictionary of Philosophy, 1962).

Regards,

Jon

[Azamat Abdoullaev]

It is rather: 

Meaning = Comprehension (Intentsion) × Extension 

Information = Data + Meaning

Regards,

Azamat 

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[John F Sowa]

On 1/15/2019 11:08 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:
> Meaning = Comprehension (Intentsion) × Extension
> Information = Data + Meaning

Simple and general: Semantics is what you perceive, feel, or act on.

That sentence is independent of any notation, representation, or theory.
And it includes special cases for formal (model-theoretic) semantics,
commonsense semantics, and computational semantics.

John

[John Bottoms]

The Gettier Definition

This paper is a brief overview of philosophers Gettier's solution to the question of meaning. It is necessary but not sufficient.
What additions to it would you make?

Please consider "The Papier-Mâché Cow in the Field".

http://jsomers.net/blog/gettiers

-John Bottoms
 Concord, MA USA

On 1/15/2019 11:08 AM, Azamat Abdoullaev wrote:

[Jon Awbrey]

Thanks, Kent, as a general rule Peirce avoided in advance many of the
problems bedeviling later philosophies of science in the 20th Century.
Doing so came rather naturally to him as he rarely succumbed to the
cycloptic species of reductionism afflicting so many modern isms.

In particular, it's not so much that Peirce sought a way to jam together
the extensions and intensions of concepts and other symbols, the stuffs
empiricism and rationalism are made on, as he grasped the whole body of
information, the “synthetic unity of apperception” of which extensions
and intensions are but the facets or lower dimensional projections.

That integral core of information borne by signs is the prize we'll keep
in view, stereoscopically, as we make our way into the texts of the 1860s.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/15/2019 7:29 PM, Kent Palmer wrote:
> Jon--
>
>
>
> De Tienne, André (2006), “Peirce's Logic of Information”, Seminario del
> Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos, Universidad de Navarra, 28 Sep 2006.Online.
>
>
>
> This is a great article. It delves into the issues in an interesting
> way. And your notes are very informative.
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Incidental_Note_13
>
> - "My affliction with OSSD (obsessive syntactic symmetry disorder) made
> it difficult for me to switch from the equal temperaments of
> extension/intension, but I have the sense that Peirce is making a technical
> distinction between “an intension”, as being any one property of an object
> of a concept, and “the comprehension”, as being the collection or the
> conjunction of “all” of the properties of the object that are relevant to
> some context of discussion."
>
> I must admit that on my first reading I was thinking about these terms
> not in a technical way but in a more general way related to their
> connotations. And particularly my understanding of them from reading some
> of the various stages of meta-intension that have occurred in the debate
> concerning intension/extension in Analytical Philosophy.
>
> I discern meta-levels in that argument that has proceeded over the
> decades as at each stage they try to stifle the problems of intension with
> respect to the attempt to reducing everything to extension.
>
> But in the process they produce something very much like the meta-levels
> of Being that are found in Continental Philosophy. And that is what I am
> interested in.
>
> Completely separately I came up with a formulation of the levels of
> possible emergence and saw that these had both an individual and a social
> side to them and that they were as two series interleaved.
>
> When I saw the formulation of Peirce that connected extension and
> intension with Information and Comprehension this caused me to realize that
> there might be a connection between the meta-levels of intension emanating
> from extension and the forms of individual comprehension that include data,
> information, knowledge and wisdom. And then it occurred to me that these
> different types of comprehension (taken in a wider sense) might be directly
> related to the meta-levels of intension. And that is what I put in my
> original post to the email group.
>
> But then I noticed I had transformed Peirce's formulation in order to
> make that connection and I was struck by doubt. Notice doubt is at the
> level of hyper-intension defined by Tichy. In fact, it is interesting that
> doubt is Cartesian and Husserl attempts to clarify doubt and refine it with
> his Epoche and Bracketing strategy. But doubt is noetic not a noema. Doubt
> is in the Husserlian hierarchy. I turns out that doubt is fairly low in the
> Husserl's noetic Hierarchy because he starts with Meaning as Intentional
> Morphe forming hyle and comes down from there, exactly the opposite of
> Analytic Philosophy that starts with Extension and begrudgingly adds each
> level of intension. Intentional morphe with hyle splits into noesis and
> noema. Notice that the schema here is Form.
>
>
> Anyway, this connection between the meta-levels of intension and the
> meta-levels of comprehension (data, information, knowledge) via the
> equation *Intension X Extension = Information* is something that is a
> hypothesis worth exploring further. We can see this in a hierarchy of
> similar equations related to data and knowledge and that leads to some
> interesting consequences like the relation I saw to the Divided Line. It
> makes me think that the Divided Line in its structure is not arbitrary as I
> had thought previously.
>
> Anyway, it is interesting to go deeper into what Peirce means by his terms
> in a more technical sense than I was projecting on to them. Where ever you
> go in Peirce's work insights abound. And I am very happy to have found this
> work of yours trying to make Peirce's work more available for others to
> take into account in their own research.
>
> Thanks for your good work in this area.
>
> Kent Palmer
> http://kdp.me
>

[John F Sowa]

Jon A and John B,

JA

> as a general rule Peirce avoided in advance many of the problems
> bedeviling later philosophies of science in the 20th Century.

Yes indeed. In particular, he solved the Gettier problems long
before Gettier imagined them.

JB

> Gettier's solution to the question of meaning.

Gettier's problems raise issues about truth, not about meaning.
Classical definition: "Knowledge is justified true belief."

JB

> Please consider "The Papier-Mâché Cow in the Field".

Problem:

1. You see a Papier-Mâché Cow in a field, and you mistakenly
believe that there is a cow in the field.

2. There was an actual cow in that field, but you didn't
happen to see it.

3. Your belief is therefore true, but what you thought was
the justification happened to be wrong.

This example does not show any problem with meaning, but it does
show that a single observation -- or even multiple observations
without sufficient testing -- can be insufficient justification.

Peirce had long experience in experimental science, and he had
much stronger criteria for "justification" than Gettier.

He was well aware of optical illusions, experimental errors,
transient mishaps, side effects, equipment with systematic
biases, different viewpoints by different observers...

He said that science requires extensive observation, induction
from multiple examples, hypothesis formation (abduction), deduction
to make predictions, further observations to test the predictions,
and repeat from the beginning -- indefinitely.

He also maintained that most of our well-tested beliefs are
sufficiently justified that we're willing to be our lives on their
truth. We are -- usually -- justified in calling them knowledge.
But there is always a small chance that we could be wrong.

For example, every time you drive a car, you bet your life on the
assumption that other drivers value their lives as much as you
value yours. Therefore, they are not about to swerve into your
lane and cause a head-on collision.

But you know that there is a small chance that some unusual
circumstances might occur. Therefore, it's important to stay
alert and be prepared for unusual events.

Summary: Peirce's solution to the Gettier problem is the recognition
that at all knowledge is fallible, but much of it is sufficiently
well established that you are justified in betting your life on it.

Re cow in the field (or bugs in your software): Don't bet on them
without further testing. I wouldn't bet on anybody's self-driving car.

John

[Jon Awbrey]

Kent —

The best way to get at what Peirce meant by his formula,

• Information = Comprehension × Extension,

will be to study a suitable sample of critical passages
from his Lectures of 1865–1866 on the Logic of Science.
In my experience the most instructive texts are those
where he illustrates the abstract forms with concrete
materials and simple examples, just complex enough to
flesh out the most significant dimensions of the case.

I'll be getting to that directly ...

But I wanted to flag the following paragraph of yours for future discussion,
as doubt and uncertainty are fundamental themes in the intersection between
Peirce's theory of inquiry and the revolution in our concept of information
brought on by Shannon's groundbreaking work.

On 1/15/2019 7:29 PM, Kent Palmer wrote:
> But then I noticed I had transformed Peirce's formulation in order to make
> that connection and I was struck by doubt. Notice doubt is at the level of
> hyper-intension defined by Tichy. In fact, it is interesting that doubt is
> Cartesian and Husserl attempts to clarify doubt and refine it with his Epoche
> and Bracketing strategy. But doubt is noetic not a noema. Doubt is in the

> Husserlian hierarchy. It turns out that doubt is fairly low in Husserl's

> noetic Hierarchy because he starts with Meaning as Intentional Morphe forming
> hyle and comes down from there, exactly the opposite of Analytic Philosophy
> that starts with Extension and begrudgingly adds each level of intension.
> Intentional morphe with hyle splits into noesis and noema. Notice that
> the schema here is Form.

Regards,

Jon

[joseph simpson]

Jon:

Interesting material.

I would like to highlight the fact that there are four basic types of definition:

1) Definition by naming (weakest form of definition)

2) Definition by extension

3) Definition by intension

4) Definition by relationship (strongest form of definition)

In the construct:

Information = Comprehension × Extension 

Information is defined using a relationship between comprehension and extension ( the x operator relationship).

Definition by relationship appears to be the most powerful  type of definition.

Structural modeling uses definition by relationship to define the structure of an unknown or poorly defined system.

Take care, be good to yourself and have fun,

Joe

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[joseph simpson]

This article supports the idea that humans use dimensional maps to define and remember concepts.

https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-brain-maps-out-ideas-and-memories-like-spaces-20190114/

These ideas appear to have a direct relationship to the dimensions and spaces defined by Warfield.

Take care and have fun,

Joe

[John Bottoms]

Joe,

I saw that article, and while impressive, the content is a bit dated and missing a few key element.
This capitulates a good bit of earlier research, maybe at least 15 years old.
The breakthrough tome is "Maps of Meaning", Roughledge 2002.

https://jordanbpeterson.com/maps-of-meaning/

We work in this field and have some expertise in the linguistic aspects of the topic.
PM me if you are interested in an offline discussion, it goes well beyond ontologies and their uses.

-John Bottoms
 Concord, MA
 jo...@FirstStarSystems.com
 T: 978-505-9878

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[John F Sowa]

On 1/18/2019 8:55 PM, John Bottoms wrote:
> This capitulates a good bit of earlier research, maybe at least 15 years
> old.

> The breakthrough tome is "Maps of Meaning", Routledge 2002.

> https://jordanbpeterson.com/maps-of-meaning/
> We work in this field and have some expertise in the linguistic aspects
> of the topic.

It is indeed important, but the basic ideas of analyzing and relating
mythology to understanding human nature are closer to 2500 years old
rather than 15 years old. Note that the author cites C. G. Jung, who
based many of his ideas on traditional mythologies. And you can trace
the practice back to Heraclitus, Lao Zi, and Gautama Buddha.

But who is the "we" who are working in this field? And why?

John

[John Bottoms]

Well, it's actually a taxonomy, but it is still interesting and raises a few questions.

The graphic is quite dense so it is best to visit the website rather than posting the image here.
The author distilled over 55,000+ papers in philosophy including those commenting on the Big Names in philosophy.
A supplement to this approach might allow one to click on each area or authors for more information.
For the Onto-Nerds: the Nature of Philosophy section is in the lower right and includes authors "Van Fraassen, Kuhn, Hacking, Glymore, Hempel".
Onomastics are at the 4:00 position and Reactions to Popper and Quine are around the 3:00 position.

https://homepage.univie.ac.at/noichlm94/posts/structure-of-recent-philosophy-iii/

-John Bottoms
 Concord, MA USA

 (A chilly -16 deg C)

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf : Pragmatic Semiotic Information : Discussion 18
At : http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/10/03/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-18/

Returning to a recurring issue ...

Re: Peirce Society Facebook Page
At: https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/
Re: John Corcoran
At: https://www.facebook.com/groups/peircesociety/permalink/1698956433573675/

To address "Was ist und was soll Information sein?" in a Peircean context
we need to grasp or at least try to grapple with Peirce's inklings about
information. As it happens, I've been engaged in that quest for a number
of years. Pilgrims moved by a similar spirit may find my travel logs
of use on their way --

Cf: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information
At: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/

Regards,

Jon

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Pragmatic Semiotic Information : Discussion 19
At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/01/22/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-discussion-19/

Re: Differential Logic and Dynamic Systems
::: https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_and_Dynamic_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Tables_of_Propositional_Forms
Re: FB | Systems Sciences
::: https://www.facebook.com/groups/2391509563/permalink/10157664331129564/
::: Kenneth Lloyd
::: https://www.facebook.com/groups/2391509563/permalink/10157664331129564/?comment_id=10157666770404564

An exchange on Facebook took me back to recent discussions of pragmatic truth
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/01/06/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-21/ )
and long-running discussions of pragmatic semiotic information
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/08/21/pragmatic-semiotic-information-%cf%88/ ) .
Just by way of a note to myself and anyone who's interested, I'll record my comment
and a few links here by way of keeping the relevant gray cells warm.

Concepts of belief, fact, knowledge, opinion, etc. look rather different
from a Peircean pragmatic perspective, in other words, when analyzed
in terms of the pragmatic maxim. In time the traditional conceptions
begin to strike us as increasingly clumsy tools, better supplanted by
Peirce's concept of information.

Resources
=========

* Pragmatic Maxim
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/ )

* Pragmatic Theory Of Truth
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Pragmatic_Theory_Of_Truth )

* Differential Logic and Dynamic Systems
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_and_Dynamic_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Overview )

* Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information
( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-%e2%80%a2-4/ )

* Information = Comprehension × Extension
( https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension )

Regards,

Jon

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey

facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 20
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/09/30/pragmatic-semiotic-information-discussion-20/

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/about-me/
::: IBM Conference on the Informational Lens
https://rjlipton.wordpress.com/2020/09/27/ibm-conference-on-the-informational-lens/

A little bit of history recoded ...

It may be worth noting the Information Revolution in our understanding of
science began in the mid 1860s when C.S. Peirce laid down what he called
the "Laws of Information" in his lectures on the "Logic of Science" at
Harvard University and the Lowell Institute. Peirce took up "the puzzle
of the validity of scientific inference" and claimed it was "entirely
removed by a consideration of the laws of information".

Here's a collection of excerpts and commentary I assembled on the subject.

* Information = Comprehension × Extension

https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Resource
========

* Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2019/01/08/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-4/

Regards,

Jon

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 5
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/11/01/survey-of-pragmatic-semiotic-information-5/

Happy Día de Muertos, Everybody!

I've been doing a mass of light editing and link repair on my blog,
due largely to the sad demise of the InterSciWiki where I used to
keep most of my work. At any rate, here's a link to the updated
Survey of posts related to "Pragmatic Semiotic Information".

Blurb
=====

This is a Survey ( https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/surveys/ ) of
previous blog and wiki posts on the Semiotic Theory Of Information.
All my projects are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry
is more open-ended than most. The question is:

|| What is information and how does it
|| impact the spectrum of activities
|| answering to the name of inquiry?

The rest can be found at the above link.

[Jon Awbrey]

Pragmatic Semiotic Information • Discussion 21
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/02/08/pragmatic-semiotic-information-discussion-21/

Re: FB | Medieval Logic
https://www.facebook.com/groups/medievallogic/permalink/1673571576178674

On the question of what Peirce anticipated and when did he anticipate it,
my studies are more focused on the points where he overleapt the FOL-Bildungs
of Mid Century Modern (MCM) Analytic Philosophy, so much default of all our
false problematics today, and saw through to developments we'd not see again
until the theories of categories, computation, and information began to make
their impact on our conceptions of logic. I'll dig up some links along those lines …

Resources
=========

• Information = Comprehension × Extension
https://oeis.org/wiki/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

• Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Overview

•• Part 1
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Part_1

•• Part 2
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Part_2

•• Part 3
https://oeis.org/wiki/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives_%E2%80%A2_Part_3

• Functional Logic

•• Inquiry and Analogy
https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Inquiry_and_Analogy

•• Higher Order Propositions
https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Higher_Order_Propositions

•• Quantification Theory
https://oeis.org/wiki/Functional_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Quantification_Theory

• Precursors Of Category Theory
https://oeis.org/wiki/Precursors_Of_Category_Theory

Regards,

Jon