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SHA-1 serverAuth cert issued by HydrantID (QuoVadis) in January 2017

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Rob Stradling

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Feb 15, 2017, 6:13:34 PM2/15/17
to dev-secur...@lists.mozilla.org
This currently unrevoked cert has the serverAuth EKU and
dNSName=qvsslrca3-v.quovadisglobal.com:
https://crt.sh/?id=83114602

Its issuer is trusted for serverAuth by Mozilla:
https://crt.sh/?caid=1333

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

Stephen Davidson

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Feb 16, 2017, 1:38:22 PM2/16/17
to dev-secur...@lists.mozilla.org, Rob Stradling, Kathleen Wilson
Incident Report

On February 15, Rob Stradling identified a SHA-1 certificate issued on
January 27, 2017 under the QV hierarchy.

dNSName: qvsslrca3-v.quovadisglobal.com:
Serial Number: 29:9d:21:5a:7c:0e:16:d4:6b:c4:13:f6:79:72:eb:22:0c:ec:c9:2c
https://crt.sh/?id=83114602

Background

QuoVadis maintains examples of valid, expired, and revoked TLS/SSL
certificates to assist clients and application providers in testing.
"qvsslrca3-v.quovadisglobal.com" is one of those test certificates, and it
was renewed on January 27.

The "HydrantID Client ICA" is managed by QuoVadis, and final RA performed by
QuoVadis. Due to the non-routine hierarchy, it was not possible to renew
the certificate using our usual Trust/Link interface, which enacts controls
for Baseline Requirements and other standards. QuoVadis CA administrators,
with multiple authorisations, accessed the Intermediate CA and renewed the
certificate using the same policy under which the expiring certificate was
generated, instead of the current SHA256 policy on the Intermediate CA.

The TLS certificate was provided manually to the Server administrator and
installed on the QuoVadis-operated webserver.

Simply, this was an operator error, exacerbated by the nature of the test
certificate, the non-routine hierarchy, and bypass of the Trust/Link
automated checks against TLS misissuance.

Actions

Following notification, the certificate was immediately revoked (CRL number
is 0D0B).

The SHA1 TLS policy was retired from the Intermediate CA.

QuoVadis has now reviewed all valid TLS certificates under our hierarchies
confirming that no other SHA1 TLS have been issued since January 5, 2016.

At the time of the Baseline Requirements prohibition of SHA1, SHA1 policies
for TLS had been retired on our routinely used hierarchies. QuoVadis has
confirmed that no SHA1 policies for TLS remain enabled on any QV-operated
Intermediate CAs.

QuoVadis CA and Server administrators have been advised of additional
procedures to ensure all checks which would normally be carried out on
commercial certificate issuance are adhered to for internal requests.

QuoVadis WebTrust auditors have been informed of the misissuance.

Regards,

Stephen Davidson
QuoVadis Group
_______________________________________________
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dev-secur...@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Gervase Markham

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Feb 20, 2017, 6:47:54 AM2/20/17
to mozilla-dev-s...@lists.mozilla.org
Hi Stephen,

On 16/02/17 18:37, Stephen Davidson wrote:
> Incident Report

Thank you for your prompt and detailed incident report. It seems to me
that this highlights the particular extra care that needs to be taken by
all CAs regarding manual issuances which do not use the normal software
into which checks are built.

Group participants: would it make sense for the next CA Communication to
remind CAs of this, pointing at the cablint tool as something they could
run over manually-issued certs before distributing them to make sure no
rules were accidentally broken?

Gerv
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