Archived: CIABASE: CIA Support of Death Squads

[Rich Winkel]

(found this by searching for
"el salvador" "green beret" torture
on google's copy of misc.activism.progressive -rw)

From: Ralph McGehee <rmcg...@igc.apc.org>
Subject: CIABASE: CIA Support of Death Squads
Date: 1997/01/11
Message-ID: <5b8cv6$1j...@news.missouri.edu>

/* Written 5:07 AM Jan 8, 1997 by rmcgehee in igc:alt.pol.org.ci */
/* ---------- "CIA Support of Death Squads" ---------- */
I am re-posting this item on deathsquads supported by the CIA.
Supposedly, the CIA's Inspector General is investigating the Agency's
role with death squads in Honduras, if so he may find some of
this information useful.

Ralph McGehee
CIABASE
1/8/97

This post revisits an early post on Death Squads supported by
the CIA. Also given below are details on Watch Lists prepared by
the Agency to facilitate the actions of Death Squads. This list
was originally provided to assist the CIA to obey the order to give
Congress sensitive secrets -- "Fifteen years after Congress
ordered the CIA to share all of its important secrets, the spy
agency has finally established rigorous internal procedures....
As a result Congress recently has been notified for the first time
about some serious human rights abuses..." Washington Post 10/11/95 7.

Hopefully details of the reported human rights abuses given below
will be included in CIA submissions to Congress.

Ralph McGehee
10/11/95

Sample entries:

Honduras: Death Squads

Honduras, 1981-87. Florencio Caballero, who served as a torturer and
a member of a death squad, said he was trained in Texas by the CIA. He
said he was responsible for the torture and slaying of 120 Honduran and
other Latin American citizens. The CIA taught him and 24 other people in
a army intelligence unit for 6 months in interrogation. psychological
methods -- to study fears and weaknesses of a prisoner, make him stand
up, don't let him sleep, keep him naked and isolated, put rats and
cockroaches in his cell, give him bad food, throw cold water on him,
change the temperature. Washington Post, 6/8/1988, B3

Honduras, circa 1982-87. Army Battalion 3/16, a special
counterinsurgency force which many considered a kind of death squad, was
formed in 1980. Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member, described
a clandestine paramilitary structure for repressing leftists. Caballero,
who studied interrogation techniques in Houston, said the CIA was extensively
involved in training squad members. NACLA 2/1988, p15, from New York Times,
5/2/1987

Watch List: Miscellaneous

Worldwide and Indonesia, 1965. CIA role in providing name lists for
assassination teams. The Nation, 9/24/1990, 296-7

Berkeley scholars developed computerized international mug file on elites
in communist countries, potential revolutionary elites in the Third World.
Trojan Parallel, 3/1979, 2

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 (Low Intensity Conflict) provides guidance
on military support to civilian law enforcement. Missions have three phases:
(1) Assault: detain suspects, seize evidence; (2) Secure: establish entry
control points; and (3) Sustain: improve quality of life. Use intelligence
and electronic warfare (IEW). Police collect and analyze major portion of
intelligence. Get intelligence on gangs, families, criminal organizations,
etc. Electronic technical data: analyze use of cellular phones, beepers,
hand-held radios, and fax machines. Compile physical descriptions of targets.
Disseminate names and descriptions of targets. Unify police and [military]
efforts. Military Intelligence, March 1995,5-11

Death Squads: Miscellaneous

CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala
(Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). The CIA created, structured
and trained secret police in South Korea, Iran, Chile and Uruguay, and
elsewhere -- organizations responsible for untold thousands of tortures,
disappearances, and deaths. Spark, 4/1985,2-4

1953-94 Sponsorship by CIA of death squad activity covered in summary
form. Notes that in Haiti CIA admitted Lt. General Raoul Cedras and other
high-ranking officials "were" on its payroll and are helping organize violent
repression in Haiti. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, has
bragged he helped Colombian army create a database of subversives,
terrorists and drug dealers." His superior in overseeing INS for
Southeastern U.S., is Gunther Wagner, former Nazi soldier and a key member
of now-defunct Office of Public Safety (OPS), an AID project which helped
train counterinsurgents and terrorism in dozens of countries. Wagner worked
in Vietnam as part of Operation Phoenix and in Nicaragua where he helped
train National Guard. Article also details massacres in Indonesia.
Haiti Information, 4/23/94, 3,4

CIA personnel requested transfers 1960-7 in protest of CIA officer
Nestor Sanchez's working so closely with death squads. Marshall, J.,
Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, 294

CIA. 1994. Mary McGrory op-ed, "Clinton's CIA Chance." Excoriates CIA
over Aldrich Ames, support for right-wing killers in El Salvador, Nicaraguan
Contras and Haiti's FRAPH and Cedras. Washington Post, 10/16/1994, C1,2

Angola: Death Squads

Angola, 1988. Amnesty International reported that Unita, backed by
the U.S., engaged in extra-judicial executions of high-ranking political
rivals and ill-treatment of prisoners. Washington Post, 3/14/1989, A20

Bolivia: Watch List

Bolivia, 1975. CIA hatched plot with interior ministry to harass
progressive bishops, and to arrest and expel foreign priests and nuns.
CIA was particularly helpful in supplying names of U.S. and other foreign
missionaries. The Nation, 5/22/1976, 624

Bolivia, 1975. CIA provided government data on priests who progressive.
Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, 259

Bolivia: Death Squads

Bolivia. Between October 1966-68 Amnesty International reported between
3,000 and 8,000 people killed by death squads. Blum, W. (1986).
The CIA A Forgotten History, 264

Bolivia, 1991. A group known as "Black Hand" shot twelve people on
24 November 1991. Killings were part of group's aim to eliminate
"undesirable" elements from society. Victims included police
officers, prostitutes and homosexuals. Washington Times 11/25/91, A2

Brazil: Watch List

Brazil, 1962-64. Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES) with
assistance from U.S. sources published booklets and pamphlets and
distributed hundreds of articles to newspapers. In 1963 alone it distributed
182,144 books. It underwrote lectures, financed students' trips to the U.S.,
sponsored leadership training programs for 2,600 businessmen, students, and
workers, and subsidized organizations of women, students, and workers.
In late 1962 IPES member Siekman in Sao Paulo organized vigilante cells to
counter leftists. The vigilantes armed themselves, made hand-grenades.
IPES hired retired military to exert influence on those in active service.
From 1962-64 IPES, by its own estimate, spent between $200,000 and $300,000
on an intelligence net of retired military. The "research group" of retired
military circulated a chart that identified communist groups and leaders.
Black, J.K. (1977). United States Penetration of Brazil, 85

Brazil: Death Squads

Brazil, circa 1965. Death squads formed to bolster Brazil's national
intelligence service and counterinsurgency efforts. Many death squad
members were merely off-duty police officers. U.S. AID (and presumably the
CIA) knew of and supported police participation in death squad activity.
Counterspy 5/6 1979, 10

Brazil. Death squads began appear after 1964 coup. Langguth, A.J. (1978).
Hidden Terrors, 121

Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads closely linked and have shared
training. CIA on at least two occasions co-ordinated meetings between
countries' death squads. Counterspy 5/6 1979, 11

Brazil, torture. After CIA-backed coup, military used death squads and
torture. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, 190

Cambodia: Watch List

Cambodia, 1970. Aided by CIA, Cambodian secret police fed blacklists of
targeted Vietnamese to Khmer Serai and Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Mass killings
of Vietnamese. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 328

Cambodia: Death Squads

Cambodia, 1980-90. U.S. indirect support for Khmer Rouge-- U.S.
comforting mass murderers. Washington Post, 5/7/1990, A10 editorial

Central America: Death Squads

Central America, circa 1979-87. According to Americas Watch, civilian
non combatant deaths attributable to government forces in Nicaragua
might reach 300, most Miskito Indians in comparison 40-50,000 Salvadoran
citizens killed by death squads and government forces during same years,
along with similar number during last year of Somoza and still higher numbers
in Guatemala. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, 101

Central America, 1981-87. Death toll under Reagan in El Salvador passed
50,000 and in Guatemala it may approach 100,000. In Nicaragua 11,000
civilians killed by 1968. Death toll in region 150,000 or more.
Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, 29

Central America. See debate carried in Harpers "Why Are We in Central
America? On Dominoes, Death Squads, and Democracy. Can We Live With
Latin Revolution? The Dilemmas of National Security." Harpers, 6/84,
35

Central America, 1982-84. Admiral Bobby Inman, former head of NSA,
had deep distaste for covert operations. Inman complained that the CIA
was hiring murderers to conduct operations in Central America and the
Middle East - eventually Inman resigned. Toohey, B., and Pinwill, W.
(1990). Oyster: the Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service,
215-6

Chile: Watch List

Chile, 1970-73. By late 1971 the CIA in near daily contact with
military. The station collecting the kind of information that would be
essential for a military dictatorship after a coup: lists of civilians
to be arrested, those to be protected and government installations
occupied at once. Atlantic, 12/82 58

Chile, 1970-73. CIA compiled lists of persons who would have to be
arrested and a roster of civilian and government installations that
would need protection in case of military coup against government. Corn,
D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 251

Chile, 1972-73. Drew up lists those to be arrested immediately, or
protected after a coup by military. Sergeyev, F.F. (1981). Chile, CIA
Big Business, 163

Chile late 1971-72. CIA adopted more active stance re military
penetration program including effort to subsidize anti-government news
pamphlet directed at armed services, compilation arrest lists and its
deception operation. CIA received intelligence reports on coup planning
throughout July, August and September 73. U.S. Congress, Church
Committee Report. (1976) v 7, 39

Chile. Chilean graduates of AIFLD, as well as CIA-created unions,
organized CIA-financed strikes which participated in Allende's
overthrow. In 1973 AIFLD graduates provided DINA, Chile's secret
police, with thousands of names of fellow unionists who were
subsequently imprisoned and tortured and executed. Counterspy 4/81, 13

Chile. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, 240

Chile, 1973-74. After 1973 coup, U.S. Embassy intelligence types gave
their files on the Chilean and foreign left to the junta's military
intelligence service (SIM). NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/74,
28.

Chile, 1973. The military prepared lists of nearly 20,000
middle-level leaders of people's organizations, scheduled to be
assassinated from the morning of the coup on. The list of some 3,000
high-level directors to be arrested. Lists detailed: name, address, age,
profession, marital status, and closest personal friends. It alleged
U.S. military mission and the CIA involved in their preparation. Moa
186. From late June on plotters began to finalize lists of extremists,
political leaders, Marxist journalists, agents of international
communism, and any and all persons participating with any vigor in
neighborhood, communal, union, or national organization. The Pentagon
had been asked to get the CIA to give the Chilean army lists of Chileans
linked to socialist countries. Names sorted into two groups: persons not
publicly known but who important in leftist organizations; and,
well-known people in important positions. 20,000 in first group and
3,000 in second. Second group to be jailed, the first to be killed.
Sandford, R.R. (1975). The Murder of Allende,195-6

CIA provided intelligence on "subversives" regularly compiled by CIA
for use in such circumstances. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten
History 194

Columbia: Watch List

Colombia. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, bragged he
helped Colombian army create a database of subversives, terrorists and
drug dealers. Haiti Information, 4/23/94, 3,4

Columbia: Death Squads

Colombia. MAS (Muerte A Secuestradores): "Death to Kidnappers,"
Colombian antiguerrilla death squad founded in December 1981 by members
of Medellin cartel, Cali cartel, and Colombian military. Scott, P. and
Marshall, J. (1991). Cocaine Politics, 261.

Colombia, 1993-94. Amnesty International called Colombia one of
worst "killing fields." U.S. is an accomplice. William F. Schultz, human
rights group's newly appointed Executive Director for the U.S., told a
news conference that using fight against drugs as a pretext - Colombian
government doesn't reign in [its forces]. About 20,000 people killed
since 1986 in one of Latin America's most "stable democracies." only 2%
political killings related to drug trafficking and 70% by paramilitary
or military. U.S. probably a collaborator and much of U.S. aid for
counternarcotics diverted to "killing fields." AI report said human meat
is sold on black market and politicians gunned down along with children,
homosexuals, and drug addicts. U.S. support because of Colombia's
strategic position. No one is safe, people killed for body parts.
Washington Times, 3/16/1994, a15

Costa Rica: Watch List

Costa Rica, 1955. Ambassador Woodward reported the government should
be urged to maintain closer surveillance over communists and prosecute
them more vigorously, and the government should be influenced to amend
the constitution to limit the travel of communists, increase penalties
for subversive activities and enact proposed legislation eliminating
communists from union leadership. Meanwhile USIA aka USIS programs "to
continue to condition the public to the communist menace" should be
maintained. Z Magazine, 11/1988, 20

Cuba: Watch List

Cuba, 1955-57. Allen Dulles pressed Batista to establish with CIA
help, a bureau for the repression of communist activities. Grose, P.
(1994). Gentleman Spy: the Life of Allen Dulles, 412

Cuba: Death Squads

Cuba, 1956-95 CIA's war against Cuba and Cuba's response. In 1956,
CIA established in Cuba the infamous Bureau for the Repression of
Communist Activities, BRAC -- secret police that became well known for
torture and assassination of Batista's political opponents. Unclassified
W/94-95 16-17

Dominican Republic: Watch List

Dominican Republic, 1965. CIA composed list of 55 communist
ringleaders of projected takeover of government. Crozier, b. (1993).
Free Agent, 58

Dominican Republic: Death Squads

Dominican Republic, cover, 1965. 18 public safety program advisers,
6 of whom CIA. Police organized La Banda, a death squad. Lernoux, P.
(1982). Cry of the People, 187

Eastern Europe: Watch List

East Europe, USSR, 1952-93. Radio Free Europe researchers have
hundreds of thousands of file cards on prominent east bloc citizens and
a staff of 160 researchers. Washington Post, 4/4/1993, A19

East Timor: Death Squads

East Timor, 1975-76. Role of U.S. Government, CIA/NSA, and their
Australian collaborators in East Timor is another example of support for
genocide which joins a long list of similar cases. Carter and Ford
administrations have been accomplices in the massacre of anywhere
between one-in-ten (Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar's latest figure)
and one-in-two Timorese. Counterspy, Spring 1980, 19

Ecuador: Watch List

Ecuador, 1962. Subversive control watch list. With agent from Social
Christian party CIA will form five squads composed of five men for
investigative work on subversive control watch list. Agee, P. (1975).
Inside the Company: CIA Diary, 240, 247

Ecuador, 1963. The CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka
the subversive control watch list. This a file that might have 50 to 500
names. People on the list were supposed to be the most important
left-wing activists whose arrest we might effect through the local
government. Would include place and date of birth, wife's name, where
they worked, and biological data on the whole family, including schools
the children attended, etc. In Ecuador the CIA paid teams to collect and
maintain this type information. Agee, (1981). White Paper Whitewash,
55

Egypt: Watch List

Egypt, Pakistan, 1993. 4/16/1993 2 teams from CIA and FBI to
Peshawar to check information given them by Egyptian intelligence
services. Egyptians reported terrorist groups based in Peshawar belong
to "Arab Afghans" with ties to fundamentalist Muslims in U.S. CIA
specialists met with officers of Mukhabarat Al-Amat who had list of
300 Egyptians believed to be hard inner core of Jihad led by Mohammed
Sahwky Islambuli. Names of various terrorists. On request by CIA and
others, 100 expulsions on 4/10. Intelligence Newsletter, 4/29/93,
1,5

El Salvador: Watch List

El Salvador, 1980-89. On TV D'Aubuisson, using military intelligence
files, denounced teachers, labor leaders, union organizers and
politicians. Within days their mutilated bodies found. Washington had
identified most leaders of death squads as members Salvadoran security
forces with ties to D'Aubuisson. Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah,
2/23/92 C4

El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with
Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard,
and Treasury Police. U.S. Government agencies maintained official
relationships with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to
acquiesce in these activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated
in forcible interrogations. U.S. Did pass "tactical" information to
alert services of action by insurgent forces. Information on persons
passed only in highly unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee,
October 5, 1984, 11-13

El Salvador: Death Squads

El Salvador, 1961-79. Vigilante organization called Democratic
National Organization (Orden) created early 1960s to further control
countryside. Created in 1961 but abolished in 1979. But quickly regained
and even surpassed former vicious role. Today its members form the core
of civil defense corps. White, R.A. (1984). The Morass, 133

El Salvador, 1961-84. During the Kennedy administration, agents of
the U.S. government set up 2 security organizations that killed
thousands of peasants and suspected leftists over the next 15 years.
Guided by Americans, these organizations into the paramilitary units
that were the death squads: in 1984 the CIA, in violation U.S. law,
continued to provide training, support, and intelligence to security
forces involved in death squads. Over the years the CIA and U.S.
military organized Orden, the rural paramilitary and intelligence net
designed to use terror. Mano Blanco grew out of Orden, which a U.S.
ambassador called the "birth of the death squads;" conceived and
organized Ansesal, the elite presidential intelligence service that
gathered files on Salvadoran dissidents and gave that information to the
death squads; recruited General Medrano, the founder of Orden and
Ansesal as a CIA agent; supplied Ansesal, the security forces, and the
General Staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance
of individuals who later assassinated by death squads; and, trained
security forces in the use of investigative techniques, weapons,
explosives, and interrogation with "instruction in methods of physical
and psychological torture. The Progressive, 5/84 20-29

El Salvador, 1963. U.S. government sent 10 special forces personnel
to El Salvador to help General Jose Alberto Medrano set up Organizacion
Democratica Nacionalist (Orden)--first paramilitary death squad in that
country. These green berets assisted in organization and indoctrination
of rural "civic" squads which gathered intelligence and carried out
political assassinations in coordination with Salvadoran military. Now
there is compelling evidence to show that for over 30 years, members of
U.S. military and CIA have helped organize, train, and fund death squad
activity in El Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly),
Summer 1990, 51

El Salvador, 1963. National Democratic Organization (Orden) formed as
pro-government organization with assistance from CIA, U.S. military
advisers, AID's police training program. Orden supervised by Salvadoran
national security agency, intelligence organization of military. CIA
chose "right hand man," Jose Medrano, to direct Orden. Orden served as
base for death squad operations and sanctioned in 1970-79 all "above
ground" unions. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central
America, 33

El Salvador, 1965-85. For a report of CIA supporting death squad
activities in El Salvador see "Spark," 4/85, 2-4

El Salvador, 1966. Developed death squads with help of green berets.
Campaign used vigilantes to employ terror. Later called civil defense
corps. White, R.A. (1984). The Morass 101-3

El Salvador, 1968. AIFLD creates Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS) which
emphasized self help for rural farmers and not peasant organizing.
Initially, UCS had support military government. By 1973 UCS seen as too
progressive and AIFLD officially expelled. U.S. funding UCS continued
through training programs and private foundations. UCS charged with ties
to Orden, organization which carried out death squad activity. With
failing pro-government union efforts, AIFLD called back to control UCS
in 1979. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America,
34

El Salvador, 1976-85. Attended conferences of World Anti-Communist
League: Roberto D'Aubuisson, El Salvador. Former major in military
intelligence; charged with being responsible for coordinating nation's
rightist death squads. Established Arena political party with
assistance of U.S. new right leaders. Anderson, J. L.. and Anderson, S.
(1986). Inside the League

El Salvador, 1979-84. House Intelligence Committee investigation of
U.S. intelligence connections with death squad activities concluded U.S.
intelligence agencies "have not conducted any of their activities in
such a way as to directly encourage or support death squad acts." House
Intelligence Committee, annual report, 1/2/85 16-19

El Salvador, 1979-88. Death squads recruited under cover of boy
scouts. Boys operated as a death squad known as Regalados Armed Forces
(FAR). They murdered union officials, student leaders and teachers
accused of being guerrilla sympathizers. Herman Torres, a death squad
member, learned that the scouts part of nationwide net based on the
paramilitary organization known as Orden and coordinated from the main
military intelligence unit known as Ansesal run by D'Aubuisson. After
coup of 1979, Orden and Ansesal officially disbanded. In 1982, when
Arena won control of the constituent assembly, the top legislative body
was turned into a center for death squads. Another death squad called
the secret anti-communist army (ESA). Bush and North in 12/11/1983 were
sent to make it clear U.S. would not tolerate death squads. Perez
Linares boasted he killed Archbishop Romero on 3/24/1980. Catholic
Church's human rights office reports 1991 death squad and government
killings in first half of 1988 double the number of 1987. Mother
Jones, 1/89 10-16

El Salvador, 1980-84. Colonel Roberto Santivanez, former chief of the
Salvadoran Army's special military intelligence unit, testified before
U.S. Senators and Congressmen. He charged that Roberto D'Aubuisson was
the principal organizer of the death squads, along with Colonel Nicolas
Carranza, the head of the country's Treasury Police. He said Carranza
also serves as a paid CIA informer. Other reports said Carranza received
$90,000 a year for providing intelligence to the CIA. Washington Post,
4/1/1984

El Salvador, 1980-84. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert
White, said the Reagan administration covered up information that
Salvadoran rightist Roberto D'Aubuisson ordered the killing of
Archbishop Romero. Washington Post, 2/3/1984, 2/7/1984

El Salvador, 1980. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert White, said
D'Aubuisson presided over a lottery to select which Salvadoran military
officer would assassinate Archbishop Romero, gunned down on 3/24/1980.
White said the U.S. Embassy received an eyewitness account of the 3/22
meeting that plotted Romero's murder. Washington Post from Associated
Press, 3/1984

El Salvador, 1981-83. Colonel Carranza, leader of Salvador's infamous
Treasury Police, oversaw the government reign of terror in which 800
people were killed each month. Carranza received $90,000 a year from the
CIA from 1979-84 Reportedly living in Kentucky. The Nation, 6/5/1988,
780

El Salvador, 1981-84. House Intelligence Committee concluded "CIA did
not directly encourage or support death squad killings. Report added
that "some intelligence relationships with individuals connected with
death squads" may have given the impression that the CIA condoned,
because it was aware of, some death squad killings." Washington Post,
1/14/1985, A20

El Salvador, 1981-84. Senate Intelligence Committee reported several
Salvadoran security and military officials have engaged in death squads
acts. Large numbers of low-level personnel also involved. Death squads
have originated from the Treasury Police and the National Guard and
police. Washington Post, 10/12/1984

El Salvador, 1981-84. The CIA and military advisers have helped
organize, trained, financed and advised Salvadoran army and intelligence
units engaged in death squad activities and torture. Information from
two well-informed sources in Salvadoran government. Christian Science
Monitor, 5/8/1984, 1

El Salvador, 1981-88. Discussion of the use of death squads in El
Salvador (No indication of direct CIA participation). The Nation,
5/8/1989, 625

El Salvador, 1986. Despite extensive government labor clamp down
(including National Guard raid of hospital workers strike), Irving
Brown, known CIA and head AFL-CIO's Department of International Affairs,
issues report claiming "a shift away from violent repression and an
improvement in human rights." Statement incredible in light of death
squad attacks on unionists. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in
Central America 35

El Salvador, 1987. Central American death squads reported operating
in the Los Angeles area. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 6/87
4-5

El Salvador, 1988. Americas Watch in September said the military
killed 52 civilians in first 6 months, compared with 72 in all of 1987.
In 1988 the Salvadoran rebels have stepped up the war. Washington Post,
11/26/88 A1&18

El Salvador. AID public safety advisors created the national police
intelligence archive and helped organize Ansesal, an elite presidential
intelligence service. Dossiers these agencies collected on
anti-government activity, compiled with CIA surveillance reports,
provided targets for death squads. Many of 50,000 Salvadorans killed in
1981-85 Attributable to death squad activity. National Reporter, Winter
86 19

El Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly)
12:14-15;12:5-13.

El Salvador. Medrano "the father of the death squads, the chief
assassin of them all," according to Jose N. Duarte. On 23 March 1985,
Medrano was assassinated. Medrano in 1984 admitted he had worked for the
CIA in 1960-69. The Progressive, 6/85 11

El Salvador. Administration sources said at height of rightist death
squad activity, Reagan administration depended on commanders of right
wing death squads. The U.S. shared some intelligence with them. U.S.
intelligence officers developed close ties to chief death squad suspects
while death squads killed several hundred a month and totaling tens of
thousands. Washington Post, 10/6/88, A 39,43

El Salvador. Article contrasting results of Senate Committee 1984 news
accounts of official cooperation between CIA and Salvadoran security
officers said to be involved in death squad activities. First
Principles, 12/84 2-4

El Salvador. CIA supplied surveillance information to security
agencies for death squads. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History,
321, 327

El Salvador. Falange mysterious death squad comprising both active and
retired members security forces. Conducts death squad activities. Covert
Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/84 14

El Salvador. Formation of Organisation Democratica Nacionalista Orden
Formed in 1968 by Medrano. Forces between 50,000 and 100,000. From
1968-79, Orden official branch of government. First junta attempted to
abolish, but group reorganized as National Democratic Front. Example of
Orden death squad acts. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly),
4/1981, 14

El Salvador. See Dickey article re slaughter in El Salvador in New
Republic, 12/13/1983, entitled "The Truth Behind the Death Squads." fn
Dickey, C. (1985). With the Contras, 286

El Salvador. The CIA and U.S. Armed forces conceived and organized
Orden, the rural paramilitary and spy net designed to use terror against
government opponents. Conceived and organized Ansesal, the presidential
intelligence service that gathered dossiers on dissidents which then
passed on to death squads. Kept key security officers with known links
to death squads on the CIA payroll. Instructed Salvadoran intelligence
operatives "in methods of physical and psychological torture."
Briarpatch, 8/1984 30 from the 5/1984 Progressive

El Salvador. UGB (Union Guerrilla Blanca) (white warriors union).
Headed by D'Aubuisson, who trained at International Police Academy.
D'Aubuisson claims close ties CIA. Former ambassador White called
D'Aubuisson a "psychopathic killer." Covert Action Information Bulletin
(Quarterly), 4/1981, 14

El Salvador, 1979-88. See "Confessions of an Assassin," article.
Herman Torres Cortez is the assassin who was interviewed and tells of
death squad operations in El Salvador. Mother Jones, 1/1989, 10

El Salvador, 1983. Vice President Bush delivered an ultimatum to
Salvadoran military to stop death squad murders. Mother Jones, 8/1986,
64

El Salvador, 1987. Assassins, certainly sponsored by and probably
members of Salvadoran security forces, murder Herbert Ernesto Anaya,
head of Salvadoran civil rights commission and last survivor of
commission's eight founders. Prior harassment of Anaya solicited neither
protest nor protection from Duarte or U.S. administration. Contrary to
popular opinion, death squad activity has not waned. "Selective killings
of community leaders, labor organizers, human rights workers, rural
activists and others have replaced wholesale massacres" since signing of
Arias plan. Los Angeles organization "El Rescate" has compiled
chronology of human rights abuses. The Nation, 11/14/1987, 546

El Salvador. CIA took more than two years 1980-83 begin seriously
analyzing papers captured from D'Aubuisson. ICC 242. Papers said reveal
death squad supporters, atrocities. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and
Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, 22

El Salvador, 1988. Death squad activity surged in El Salvador in
1988 after a period of relative decline. Amnesty International report
"El Salvador: Death Squads -- A Government Strategy," noted in NACLA
(magazine re Latin America) 3/1989, 11

El Salvador, 1989. Although human rights monitors consistently link
death squad acts to the Salvadoran government, many U.S. media report on
death squads as if they an independent or uncontrollable force. Extra,
Summer, 1989, 28

El Salvador, 1989 Member of Salvadoran army said first brigade
intelligence unit army troops routinely kill and torture suspected
leftists. First brigade day-to-day army operations carried out with
knowledge of U.S. military advisers. CIA routinely pays expenses for
intelligence operations in the brigades. U.S. has about 55 advisers in
Salvador. Washington Post, 10/27/1989, A1,26

El Salvador, circa 1982-84. Ricardo Castro, a 35 year old Salvadoran
army officer, a West Point graduate, said he worked for the CIA and
served as translator for a U.S. official who advised the military on
torture techniques and overseas assassinations. Castro personally led
death squad operations. The Progressive, 3/86 26-30

El Salvador, domestic, 1986-87. Article "The Death Squads Hit Home."
For decades they terrorized civilians in El Salvador, now they are
terrorizing civilians in the U.S. The FBI shared intelligence about
Salvadoran activists in the U.S. with Salvador's notorious security
services. The Progressive, 10/87 15-19

El Salvador. Office of Public Safety graduate Colonel Roberto Mauricio
Staben was, according to journalist Charles Dickey "responsible for
patrolling--if not contributing to--the famous death squad dumping
ground at El Payton a few miles from its headquarters." also, Alberto
Medrano, founder of El Salvador's counterinsurgency force Orden, was an
operations graduate. Finally, Jose Castillo, who was trained in 1969 at
the U.S. International Police School, later became head of National
Guard's section of special investigations which helped organize the
death squads. The Nation, 6/7/86 793

El Salvador. Former death squad member Joya Martinez admitted death
squad operations carried out with knowledge and approval 2 U.S. military
advisers. LA Weekly, 1/25/1990

El Salvador. DCI report to House Intelligence Committee re CIA
connections with death squads. National security archives listing.

El Salvador. FBI's contacts with the Salvadoran National Guard.
Information in Senate Intelligence Committee Report, 7/1989,104-5

El Salvador. Former San Francisco police officer accused of illegal
spying said he worked for CIA and will expose CIA's support of death
squads if he prosecuted. Tom Gerard said he began working for CIA in
1982 and quit in 1985 because he could not tolerate what he saw. He and
Roy Bullock are suspected of gathering information from police and
government files on thousands of individuals and groups. Information
probably ended up with B'nai B'rith and ADL. CIA refused to confirm
Gerard's claim. Gerard said there is proof CIA directly involved in
training and support of torture and death squads in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala during mid 1980s. Proof in his briefcase San
Francisco police seized. Gerard said several photos seized by police
show CIA agents attending interrogations, or posing with death squad
members. Washington Times, 4/28/1993, A 6

El Salvador, 1963-90. In 1963 U.S. sent 10 Special Forces to help
General Madrano set up Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (Orden), a
death squad. Evidence this sort activity going on for 30 years.
Martinez, a soldier in First infantry brigade's department 2, admitted
death squad acts. Said he worked with two U.S. Advisers. Castro, another
soldier, talks about death squads and U.S. contacts. Rene Hurtado,
former agent with Treasury Police, gives his story. Covert Action
Information Bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, 51-53

El Salvador, 1973-89. El Salvador's ruling party, Arena, closed off
fifth floor of National Assembly building to serve as HQ for national
network of death squads following Arena's 20 March 1988 electoral
victory. Hernan Torres Cortez, a former Arena security guard and death
squad member, said he was trained and recruited by Dr. Antonio Regalado
under orders of Roberto D'Abuisson intelligence service, Ansesal, in
1973. Official network was broken up in 1984 following Vice President
Bush's visit, but was reinstated in 1988. Intelligence Newsletter,
1/18/91 5

El Salvador, 1979-90. A detailed discussion of Salvador's death
squads. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El
Salvador, 41-3

El Salvador, 1980-84. Expatriate Salvadorans in U.S. have provided
funds for political violence and have been directly involved in
assisting and directing their operations. Senate Intelligence Committee,
October 5, 1984, 15

El Salvador, 1980-84. Numerous Salvadoran officials involved in
death squad activities - most done by security services - especially the
Treasury Police and National Guard. Some military death squad activity.
Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, 15

El Salvador, 1980-89. D'Aubuisson kept U.S. on its guard. Hundreds of
released declassified documents re relationship. Washington Post,
1/4/1994, A1,13

El Salvador, 1980-89. Declassified documents re 32 cases investigated
by United Nations appointed Truth Commission on El Salvador reveal U.S.
officials were fully aware of Salvadoran military and political leaders'
complicity in crimes ranging from massacre of more than 700 peasants at
El Mozote in 1981 to murder of 6 Jesuit priests in 1989, and thousands
of atrocities in between. Lies of our Time 3/1994, 6-9

El Salvador, 1980-89. President Reagan and Vice President Bush
instituted polices re fighting communists rather than human rights
concerns. From 11/1980 through 1/1991 a large number of assassinations -
11/27, 5 respected politicians; 12/4, rape and murder of 3 American nuns
and a lay workers; 2 American land reform advisers on 1/4/1981.
Archbishop Romero killed 3/1980. There clear evidence D'Aubuisson's
involvement but Reagan administration ignored. On TV, D'Aubuisson, using
military intelligence files, denounced teachers, labor leaders, union
organizers and politicians. Within days their mutilated bodies found.
Washington had identified most leaders of death squads as members
Salvadoran security forces with ties to D'Aubuisson. With U.S. outrage
at bloodshed, U.S., via Bush, advised government slaughter must stop.
Article discusses torture techniques used by security forces.
Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah, 2/23/1992, C4

El Salvador, 1980-90. COL Nicolas Carranza, head of Treasury Police,
on CIA payroll. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provocateurs, 32

El Salvador, 1980-90. State panel found that mistakes by U.S.
diplomats, particularly in probing 1981 massacre of civilians at El
Mozote, undercut policy during Salvador's civil war. Findings in 67-page
study ordered by Secretary of State Christopher. Sen. Leahy said report
"glosses over...the lies, half-truths and evasions that we came to
expect from the State Department during that period." Sen. Dodd said
"report is sloppy, anemic and basically a whitewash..." Washington
Times, 7/16/1993, A12 and Washington Post, 7/16/1993, A16

El Salvador, 1980-91. Truth Commission report says 19 of 27
Salvadoran officers implicated in 6 Jesuit murders were graduates of
U.S. Army's School of Americas in Fort Benning, Ga. Almost three
quarters of Salvadoran officers accused in 7 other massacres were
trained at Fort Benning. It called school for dictators. Since 46 it has
trained more than 56,000 Latin soldiers. Graduates include some of
region's most despicable military strongmen. Now, when U.S. wants to
build democracy, school an obstacle. Newsweek investigation turned up
hundreds of less than honorable grads. At least 6 Peruvian officers
linked to a military death squad that killed 9 students and a professor
were graduates. Four of five senior Honduran officers accused in
Americas Watch report of organizing a death squad, Battalion 316, were
trained there. A coalition charged 246 Colombian officers with human
rights violations; 105 were school alumni. Honored graduates include
General Suarez, a brutal dictator of Bolivia; General Callejas
Ycallejas, chief of Guatemalan intelligence in late 1970s and early
1980s, when thousands political opponents were assassinated; and
Honduran General Garcia, a corrupt person; and, Hernandez, armed forces
chief of Colombia suspected of aiding Colombian drug traffickers.
Newsweek, 8/9/1993, 36-7

El Salvador, 1980-92. "Secret of the Skeletons: Uncovering America's
Hidden Role in El Salvador." Pathologists uncovered 38 small skeletons
in El Mozote. In 1981 soldiers of ACRE, immediate reaction infantry
battalion created by U.S., herded children into basement and blew up
building. U.S. officials denied any massacre had taken place and kept on
denying for years. About 800 residents killed. Armed service leaders
said they conducted war on part of Reagan and Bush administrations
with bi-partisan support Congress since 1984; received daily
assistance from State Department, DOD and CIA. Truth Commission
investigating via U.S. Government interagency committee. State and CIA
not cooperating with commission. CIA not giving one document on
formation of death squads, prepared in 1983 for congressional
intelligence committees. Kidnap-for-profit ring against Salvadoran
business community. With U.S. Encouragement, Salvadoran government
arrested several members of ring. One was a death squad assassin,
Rudolfo Isidro Lopez Sibrian, who implicated in deaths of 2 American
labor advisers. Washington Post, 11/15/1992, C1,2

El Salvador, 1980-93. 11/5/1993 release of thousands pages of
intelligence reports shows every U.S. diplomat, military officer, and
intelligence operative who worked with El Salvador's military and
political leaders in 1980s knew most of those involved in organizing
death squads. State Department officials lied to Congress. Intelligence
reports detailed precise information on murder, kidnapping, and coup
plots, and death squad funding, involving people like VP Francisco
Merino and current Arena candidate Armando Calderon Sol. At least 63,000
Salvadoran civilians - equivalent of 3 million Americans were killed -
most by government supported by U.S. The Nation, 11/29/1993, 645

El Salvador, 1980-93. Approximately 50-page article on the massacres
at El Mozote. Article by Mark Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993

El Salvador, 1980-93. Article by Jared Toller, "Death Squads Past,
Present & Future." discusses recent cases of FMLN members being murdered
by resurgent death squads. Only left is calling for full implementation
of UN Truth Commission's recommendations - purging armed forces, full
investigation into death squads, etc. Truth Commission had recommended
U.S. make it files available. U.S. Had refused to turn over 1983 FBI
report on death squads organization in Miami. Salvadoran government is
the death squads. Member of a death squad now imprisoned and seeking
amnesty, Lopez Sibrian, explained participation of Arena luminaries in
kidnappings, bombings and attacks on National University. He implicated
the mayor of San Salvador in various acts. Link between phone service,
Antel, and national intelligence police. Antel records calls of left and
passes them to police. (The secret anti-communist Army, a former death
squad, were regulars of now-disbanded Treasury Police). Upcoming
elections may have generated increase in death squad activity. Z
magazine, 1/1994, 14-5

El Salvador, 1980-93. Colman McCarthy comments of UN's Truth
Commission report and the Reagan-Abrams "fabulous achievement."
Washington Post, 4/6/1993, D22

El Salvador, 1980-93. Letter to editor by Thomas Buergenthal of law
school at George Washington U., who was a member of the Truth Commission
for El Salvador. He denies news story that there was a chapter in the
report that dealt with the structure and finances of the groups was
withheld. He bemoans the ability of the commission to thoroughly
investigate all aspects. Washington Post, 11/30/1993, A24

El Salvador, 1980-93. Report of UN's Truth Commission re enormous
crime of a government that killed upwards of 70,000 civilians between
1980-92. Report refutes official statements made by Reagan and Bush
administrations - when officials denied leaders of Salvadoran armed
forces were using execution, rape and torture to sustain their power -
reports says they were. We need a truth report on our own government per
Rep. Moakley. Truth report adds growing body evidence U.S. Government
officials may have participated in perpetuation of atrocities in El
Salvador. In 1960s, CIA advisers helped create a nationwide informant
net. In 1981, team of military advisers led by Brig. Gen. Frederick
Woener sent to determine "rightist terrorism and institutional
violence." Salvadorans generally dismissed notion that terror was a bad
idea. One of Colonels, Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, was one covering up
rape and murder of four churchwomen. Woener recommended U.S. proceed and
give $300-400 million aid. U.S. officials claimed churchwomen had run a
roadblock and there was no massacre at El Mozote. Neil Livingstone, a
consultant who worked with Oliver North at NSC concluded, "death squads
are an extremely effective tool, however odious, in combating terrorism
and revolutionary challenges." op-ed by Jefferson Morley, an Outlook
editor. Washington Post, 3/28/1993, C1,5

El Salvador, 1980-93. Salvador's ruling party moved to declare
amnesty for those named in United Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission.
Investigators said 85% of complaints laid to government death squads.
Discusses D'Aubuisson's implication in Archbishop Romero's
assassination. Washington Post 3/17/1993 a25

El Salvador, 1980. Ten former death squad members were ordered
killed in Santiago de Maria on 27 December 1980 by Hector Antonio
Regalado, who felt they knew too much. Intelligence Newsletter,
10/4/1988, 6

El Salvador, 1981-84. There are two versions of first page of a CIA
report, "El Salvador: Dealing With Death Squads," 1/20/1984. CIA
released first version in 1987, among congressional debate over aid to
El Salvador. Second version, which contradicts first, declassified by
CIA in 11/1993. As recently as 10/1992, CIA continued to release
censored version in response to FOIA requests. Redacted version implies
death squad problem overcome - non censored version show this is not
true. New York Times, 12/17/1993, A19

El Salvador, 1981-89. Salvadoran atrocity posed agonizing choice for
U.S. COL Rene Ponce, chief of staff of Salvador's armed forces, has been
accused of ordering murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and
her daughter at Central American University. Newly available U.S.
documents show U.S. knowingly and repeatedly aligned themselves with
unsavory characters during 1980s while defending them to U.S. Public.
Diplomatic cables found among more than 10,000 recently declassified
State, Pentagon and CIA documents, reveal extent U.S. policy makers
chose to overlook Ponce's brutality. U.S. officials long labeled Ponce a
right-wing extremist tied to death squads. But documents make clear U.S.
played down unsavory side of Ponce. Details from correspondence between
Ambassador Walker and Baker. In 10/1983, CIA prepared a "briefing paper
on right-wing terrorism in El Salvador" that described Ponce as a
supporter of death squads. Impact Bush's visit in 1984 to push for human
rights was minimal. By 7/1989, CIA reported that Ponce "espouses
moderate political views." Ponce refused repeated requests to pursue
those responsible for deaths of Jesuits. Washington Post, 4/5/1994, A13

El Salvador, 1981-90. Government operation at El Mozote consisted of
Army, National Guard and the Treasury Police in operation rescue. By
early 1992, U.S. spent more than 4 billion in civil war lasting 12
years and that left 75,000 dead. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, 53

El Salvador, 1981-90. In 1981 over 10,000 political murders
committed by Salvadoran military and its death squads. In 1990 there
were 108 such murders. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency
Doctrine and El Salvador, 23

El Salvador, 1981-92. Article "Death-Squad Refugees," discusses case
of Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, extradited by Bush to El Salvador to
face murder charges for being part of a death squad that he claims
operated with knowledge of defense minister Ponce and other top
officials. FOIA documents show U.S. helping prepare extradition request
for Salvadoran government. Truth Commission's report vindicates Joya.
Texas Observer (magazine), 3/26/1993, 9-10

El Salvador, 1981-92. Some U.S. special operations soldiers in El
Salvador during civil war want Pentagon to admit they more than
advisers. They say they also fought. Army memo given Newsweek says,
"most personnel serving in an advisory capacity were directly engaged in
hostile action." Newsweek, 4/5/1993

El Salvador, 1981-92. Truth Commission report implicates top
Salvadoran officials in ordering or covering up murders of four U.S.
churchwomen and six Jesuit priests; and Salvadoran troops massacred many
hundreds at El Mozote. Four Dutch journalists killed 3/17/1982 were
deliberately ambushed by Salvadoran army. Denials by then top U.S.
government officials now exposed. U.S. government supported war with $6
billion. The Nation, 4/12/1993, 475

El Salvador, 1981-93. 12 years of tortured truth on El Salvador -
U.S. declarations undercut by United Nations. Commission report. For 12
years, opponents of U.S. policy in Central America accused Reagan and
Bush administrations of ignoring widespread human rights abuses by the
Salvadoran government and of systematically deceiving or even lying to
Congress and people about the nature of an ally that would receive $6
billion in economic and military aid. A three-man United
Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission released a long-awaited report on 12
years of murder, torture and disappearance in El Salvador's civil war.
Commission examined 22,000 complaints of atrocities and attributed 85
percent of a representative group of them to Salvadoran security
forces or right-wing death squads. It blamed remainder on guerrilla
Farabundo Marti National Liberation front (FMLN). In May 1980, for
instance, when Carter was still President, security forces seized
documents implicating rightist leader D'Aubuisson in the murder of
Archbishop Oscar Romero. In Fall of 1981, Army Brig. Gen. Fred Woerner
supervised preparation of a joint U.S.-Salvadoran internal military
"Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team," which
noted that "the (Salvadoran) armed forces are reluctant to implement
vigorous corrective actions for abuses in the use of force." One reason
so many people found it hard to believe U.S. officials could not have
known more about rights abuses and acted more aggressively to curb them
is that the U.S. was deeply involved in running the war, from
intelligence gathering to strategy planning to training of everyone from
officers to foot soldiers. By 1982, U.S.. military advisers were
assigned to each of the six Salvadoran brigades, as well as each of 10
smaller detachments. The U.S. put tens of millions of dollars into
developing the ultra-modern national intelligence directorate to
coordinate intelligence gathering and dissemination. U.S. military and
CIA officials participated in almost every important meeting. Most
brigades had a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to them, as well as a
U.S. liaison officer. U.S. advisers regularly doled out small amounts of
money, usually less than $1,000 at a time, for intelligence work. The
U.S. was not informed of arrests or captures Unless they specifically
asked. "They never asked unless there was a specific request because
someone in Washington was getting telegrams." El Mozote, the report
said, was work of U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion, part of a days-long
search-and-destroy sweep known as "Operation Rescue." In fact, the
report said, the soldiers massacred more than 500 people in six
villages. In El Mozote, where the identified victims exceeded 200, "the
men were tortured and executed, then women were executed and finally,
the children" Washington Post, 3/21/1993

El Salvador, 1981-93. A discussion of the media's treatment of the
El Mozote massacres and the U.S. media's treatment of that story. Lies
of our Time, 6/1993, 3-4

El Salvador, 1981-93. Thomas Enders, former Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs from 1981-83, writes op-ed defending
U.S. officials' testimony re massacre at El Mozote as now confirmed by
UN's Truth Commission report. Washington Post, op-ed 3/29/1993, A19

El Salvador, 1981-93. United Nations. Commission on Truth to release
report on crimes committed against civilians in Salvador's 12-year
civil war. Defense Minister Ponce already resigned. Washington Post
Outlook, 3/14/1993, C1,2

El Salvador, 1981-94. Armando Calderon Sol considered shoo-in to win
Presidency in impending elections. Calderon began his political career
as a member of a seven-man, neo-fascist group under D'Aubuisson's
guidance that supported death squad operations. Calderon has all worst
elements of D'Abuisson without any redeeming qualities. When D'Abuisson
running death squads out of his office, Calderon was his private
secretary and a loyal soldier in a terrorist cell - Salvadoran National
Movement (MNS). In 1981, D'Abuisson unified MNS into Arena party.
Washington Post, Outlook, 4/17/1994, C1,3

El Salvador, 1981. Detailed article on "The Truth of El Mozote," by
Mark Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, pages 51 and ending on page 103

El Salvador, 1981. Skeletons verify killing of Salvadoran children of
El Mozote, El Salvador. Washington Times, 10/21/1992, A9 and Washington
Post, 10/22/1992, A18

El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with
Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard,
and Treasury Police. U.S. government agencies maintained official
relationships with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to
acquiesce in these activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated
in forcible interrogations. U.S. did pass "tactical" information to
alert services of action by insurgent forces. Information on persons
passed only in highly unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee,
October 5, 1984, 11-13.

El Salvador, 1982-84. "Recent Political Violence in El Salvador,"
Report of Senate Intelligence Committee. Committee found ample evidence
that U.S. policy was to oppose political violence. U.S. government
accorded high priority to gathering intelligence on political
violence. President Bush and his demarche in 1983. P8. U.S. government
Relationship with Robert D'Aubuisson - bio on him. U.S. Government
contact with him limited. Roberto Santivanez, director of Ansesal
1978-79. He claimed he himself had engaged in death squad activity and
had a relationship with U.S. through CIA and that COL Carranza had ties
to CIA. Colonel Nicolas Carranza had extensive ties to Arena and
National Conciliation (PCN) parties. He involved in various activities
of interest to U.S. in various positions. Senate Intelligence
Committee, October 5, 1984, 1-11

El Salvador, 1983-90. Former Salvadoran army intelligence agent who
applied for political asylum in U.S. convicted in court of entering
country illegally. Joya-Martinez's request for political asylum still
pending. Washington Post, 9/19/1990, A5

El Salvador, 1985. In 2/1985, CIA reported that behind Arena's
legitimate exterior lies a terrorist network led by D'Aubuisson using
both active-duty and retired military personnel..." main death squad was
"the Secret Anti-communist Army," described by CIA as the paramilitary
organization of Arena - from the National Police and other security
organizations. These were funded directly from Washington. Death squads
became more active as 1994, election approached. Columbia, possibly
leading terrorist state in Latin America, has become leading recipient
of U.S. military aid. Since 1986, more than 20,000 people have been
killed for political reasons, most by Colombian authorities. More than
1,500 leaders, members and supporters of the Labor Party (UP) have been
assassinated since party established in 1985. Pretext for terror
operations is war against guerrillas and narcotraffickers. Former a
partial truth, latter a myth concocted to replace the "communist
threat." Pmers works hand-in-hand with drug lords, organized crime, and
landlords. National Police took over as leading official killers while
U.S. aid shifted to them. Targets include community leaders, human
rights and health workers, union activists, students, members of
religious youth organizations, and young people in shanty towns. Sale of
human organs. Case of Guatemala. Shift of 1962, under Kennedy
administration from hemispheric defense to "internal security:" war
against the internal enemy. Doctrines expounded in counterinsurgency
manuals. Internal enemy extends to labor organizations, popular
movements, indigenous organizations, opposition political parties,
peasant movements, intellectual sectors, religious currents, youth and
student groups, neighborhood organizations, etc. From 1984 through 1992,
6,844 Colombian soldiers trained under U.S. International Military
Education and Training Program (MET). Z Magazine, 5/1994, 14 pages

El Salvador, 1986-87. See article "Death Squad Update, Investigating
L.A.'s Salvadoran Connection." Los Angeles Weekly, 8/7/1987

El Salvador, 1986-89. Joya Martinez, former death squad member, who
said two U.S. advisers attached to his unit and gave funds of 9500
month. Article names other Salvadoran death squad members. Unclassified,
7/1990

El Salvador, 1986. In 1986, Salvadoran authorities, with help of
FBI, cracked a kidnap-for-hire ring in which death squads posing as
leftist rebels kidnapped some of nation's wealthiest businessmen.
Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador,
28

El Salvador, 1987-89. Jesuit labeled ardent communist two years
before by Salvadoran, U.S. officials. Religious News Service, 5/9/1990,
1

El Salvador, 1987-89. Salvadoran woman defecting to U.S. said she
worked for death squad and provided information on six people who
killed. Her claims back up those of her supervisor, Cesar Joya Martinez,
who linked death squad acts to U.S. funding. Boston Globe, 3/16/1990,
in First Principles, 4/1990, 10

El Salvador, 1988-89. Joya Martinez, former member intelligence
department 1st army Brigade of Salvador's army. Said U.S. advisers
funded their activity, but unaware of death squad. Washington Post,
11/19/1989, F2

El Salvador, 1988. Amnesty International report of 26 October 1988
noted "black list" are supplied to Salvadoran media by Salvadoran
intelligence services. During first six months of 1988, number of
murders by death squads tripled over same period of previous year. Most
prominent victim was Judge Jorge Alberto Serrano Panameno who was shot
in May 1988. Increase reflects rise to power of 1966 class from national
military school. Class members include Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, new
chief of staff of armed forces as well as director of Treasury Police.
They command five of country's six brigades, five of seven military
detachments, three security forces as well as intelligence, personnel
and operations posts in high command. Intelligence Newsletter,
11/16/1988, 5,6

El Salvador, 1989-91. According to confidential Salvadoran military
sources, decision to murder six Jesuit priests was made at a 15 November
1989 meeting of senior commanders (CO) at the Salvadoran military
school. Those allegedly present were: Colonel Benavides, CO of the
school; General Juan Rafael Bustillo, then CO of Salvadoran Air Force -
in 1991 assigned to embassy in Israel; General Emilio Ponce, then chief
of staff - in 1991 minister of defense; and Colonel Elena Fuentes, CO of
1st brigade. Initiative for murders came from Colonel Bustillo. For a
listing of direct and circumstantial evidence supporting allegation, see
statement of Rep. Joe Moakley, Task Force on El Salvador, 11/18/1991

El Salvador, 1989. CIA officer visited bodies of dead priests.
Officer was senior liaison with (DNI) the national intelligence
directorate. U.S. probably knew Salvadoran military behind
assassinations but did not say anything for seven weeks. State
Department panel did not review actions of CIA or DOD. Washington Post,
7/18/1993, C1,4

El Salvador, 1989. Congressman criticized a 11/ 1987 report in which
Latin American and U.S. military leaders accused Rev. Ignacio Ellacuria
and several other theologians of supporting objectives of communist
revolution. Father Ellacuria, Rector of Jesuit university in San
Salvador, was murdered on 11/16/ 1989. Religious News Service,
5/11/1990, 1

El Salvador, 1989. Joya Martinez and Jesuit murders. Martinez says
his unit which played major role in 12/1989 murder of Jesuit priests had
U.S. government advisors. INS trying to deport Martinez. Unclassified,
9/1990, 6

El Salvador, 1989. Salvadoran Archbishop Rivera accused U.S.
officials of subjecting a witness to the slaying of 6 Jesuit
intellectuals to brainwashing and psychological torment. Washington
Post, 12/11/1989, A23,24

El Salvador, 1989. U.S. military adviser Benavides told FBI, later
recanted, that Salvadoran army chief of staff and others knew of plan to
kill six Jesuit priests. Washington Post, 10/29/1990, A17,21

El Salvador, 1990. Amnesty International reported a significant
surge in number of killings by army-supported death squads this year. 45
people killed between January and August this year, compared with 40
reported in 1989. Washington Post, 10/24/1990, A14

El Salvador, 1990. Cesar Vielman Joya-Martinez, former member
Salvadoran First brigade death squad, sentenced to 6 months in jail for
illegally reentering U.S. 6 years after he deported. Washington Post,
12/8/1990, A22

El Salvador, 1991. Salvadoran minister of defense and other top
generals attended 1989 meeting where decision was made to murder six
Jesuit priests, according to confidential sources. Allegation was made
by an attorney working for Rep. Moakley (D-MA), whose task force
released a six page statement directly linking Salvadoran high command
to slayings. Washington Times, 11/18/1991, A2

El Salvador, 1991. Summary executions continued in El Salvador
despite the presence of Onusal, the UN observer mission monitoring human
rights violations. In a 1991 report, Onusal noted government made few
attempts to investigate slayings. Report also accused FMLN for
recruiting fifteen-year-olds. Washington Times, 12/3/1991, A8

El Salvador, 1992. Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, former Salvadoran
death squad member, to be deported. Washington Post editorial,
10/23/1992, A20

El Salvador, 1993. Right-wing death squads undermining fragile peace
per UN chief in campaign for March 1994 elections. Washington Times,
11/25/1993, A15

El Salvador, Central America, 1981-1993. Salvadoran death squads set
up as a consequence of Kennedy administration decisions. Killers were
Treasury Police and the military who were trained in intelligence and
torture by U.S. U.S. personnel staffed military and intelligence
apparatus. Generals selected and trained by U.S. were most notorious
killers. 1984 FBI report on death squads never released. For savage
expose of School of Americas' killers, see Father Roy Bourgeois's School
of the Americas Watch, Box 3330, Columbus Ga. 31903; (706) 682-5369. The
Nation, 12/27/1993, 791

El Salvador, 1989-1990. Joya Martinez testified role played by U.S.
officials in death squad killings carried out by U.S. trained first
infantry Brigade's intelligence unit. Two U.S. military advisers
controlled intelligence department and paid for unit's operating
expenses. His unit performed 74 executions between April and July 1989.
Washington Post confirmed U.S. advisers work in liaison with First
brigade and CIA pays expenses for intelligence operations in the
brigades. Martinez said his first brigade unit attached to U.S.-trained
Atlacatl battalion, which slaughtered the Jesuit priests. Member of his
unit, Oscar Mariano Amaya Grimaldi has confessed to slayings. In These
Times, 8/14/1990, 17

Europe: Watch List

Europe, 1945-92. Operation Gladio. First scandal was discovery of
assassination teams in 1952 linked to Bundes Deutscher Judged - a
right-wing political organization in Hesse, Germany. They prepared list
of German politicians who [might cooperate with Soviets]. BBC (1992).
Gladio - Timewatch (Transcript of 3 part program), 19-20

Georgia: Watch List

Georgia, 1993. Woodruff worked for 2 months as CIA's Tbilisi station
chief posing as a State Department regional-affairs officer. He to help
Guguladze upgrade Georgian intelligence service and to monitor factional
struggle. Newsweek 8/23/1993, 18

Germany: Watch List

Germany, 1950-54. In about 1950 pacifist ideas to be eradicated.
U.S. formed German youth league (Bund Deutscher Jurgend (BDJ)) in
Frankfurt. Psychological indoctrination given by Paul Luth. BDJ was a
militant organization, a counterweight to communist-run free German
youth (FDJ) run from East Berlin to infiltrate w. German youth. BDJ
passed letters and brochures through Iron Curtain and pasted slogans on
walls. Chancellor Adenauer wanted cold war and wanted to use the BDJ.
Otto John told by State official Zinn that it had uncovered neo-Nazi
unit BDJ run by Peters, that was organizing secret firing exercises and
training for partisan warfare in the Odelwald. BDJ had drawn up a
blacklist of left-wing socialists who were to be arrested or even
murdered in event of attack from east. [early version of Gladio
political and staybehind operation]. John, O. (1969). Twice Through the
Lines: the Autobiography of Otto John, 210-15

Germany, 1950-90. Bonn officials said government to disband secret
resistance net Operation Gladio. Section consisted of former Nazi SS and
Waffen-SS officers as well as members of an extreme right-wing youth
group that drew up plans to assassinate leading members of Socialist
Democratic Party in event of USSR-invasion. "Statewatch" compilation
filed June 1994, 11

Germany, 1952-91. CIA's stay-behind program caused scandal in 1952
when West German police discovered CIA working with a 2,000-member
fascist youth group led by former Nazis. Group had a black list of
people to be liquidated in case of conflict with the USSR. Makeup of
lists. Lembke case. The Nation, 4/6/1992, 446

Germany, 1953. (Stay-behind operation Gladio?). In 1953 mass arrests
of neo-Nazi militant organization within ranks of German youth
fellowship (BDJ) discovered. Group held secret night maneuvers in
Odenwald with CIA instructors. They preparing for war with East Germany
and prepared lists of communists, left-wing sympathizers and pacifists
who were to be arrested in case of emergency. Members encouraged to
infiltrate East German youth league (FDJ). Operation exposed in press
and scores of youths arrested in East Germany as spies, propagandists or
provocateurs, and sentenced to terms of up to nine years of hard labor.
Hagan, l. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, 78

Germany, 1953. U.S. Intelligence officer told Otto John, head of
BFV, one of its agents in East Germany to defect with a list of East
German agents in West. 35 Communist spies arrested after Easter. Later
it found many of those arrested were innocent. Arrests followed with
apologies. Disaster caused by over-zealous U.S. intelligence officer.
West German businessmen as consequence afraid to do business with east.
This a goal of U.S. Policy - was this a deliberate "mistake?" Hagan, l.
(1969). The Secret War for Europe, 81

Greece: Watch List

Greece, 1967. After CIA-backed coup, the army and police seized
almost 10,000 prisoners, mostly left-wing militants, though political
leaders of all shades taken including prime minister Kanelopoulos and
members of his Cabinet, trade union members, journalists, writers, etc.
The lists had been provided by the sympathizers in the police and the
secret service. Final lists kept up to date by COL George Ladas. Details
of fate of the arrestees. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript).
Strategy of Terror, 13-8

Guatemala: Watch List

Guatemala, 1954. Death squads and target lists. Schlesinger, S., &
Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit 197, 207-8, 221

Guatemala, 1954. Goal of CIA was apprehension of suspected communists
and sympathizers. At CIA behest, Castillo Armas created committee and
issued decree that established death penalty for crimes including labor
union activities. Committee given authority declare anyone communist
with no right of defense or appeal. By 11/21/1954 committee had some
72,000 persons on file and aiming to list 200,000. Schlesinger, S., &
Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit, 221

Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. Ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz
government, gave lists of radical opponents to be eliminated to Armas's
government. NACLA 2/83 4. The military continued up to at least
1979 to use a list of 72,000 proscribed opponents, drawn up first in
1954. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/83 13

Guatemala, 1954. After Armas made president, labor code forgotten and
worker organizers began disappearing from united fruit plantations.
Hersh, B. (1992). The Old Boys, 353

Guatemala, 1954. Department of State Secretary Dulles told
Ambassador Peurifoy to have the government scour the countryside for
communists and to slap them with criminal charges. A few months later
the government began to persecute hundreds for vague communist crimes.
The Nation, 10/28/1978, 444

Guatemala, 1954 U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy, after Arbenz resigned,
gave Guatemalan army's chief of staff a list of "communists" to be shot.
The chief of staff declined. The Nation 6/5/1995, 792-5

Guatemala, 1981-89. Israeli Knesset member General Peled said in
Central America Israel is 'dirty work' contractor for U.S. Helped
Guatemala regime when Congress blocked Reagan administration. Israeli
firm Tadiran (then partly U.S.-owned) supplied Guatemalan military with
computerized intelligence system to track potential subversives. Those
on computer list had an excellent chance of being "disappeared." It was
"an archive and computer file on journalists, students, leaders,
leftists, politicians and so on." Computer system making up death lists.
Cockburn, A. & Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, 219

Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between
Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba. CIA passed the information to U.S.
military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition.
Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10

Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991
was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about
$5 million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with
Guatemalan military. His job included placing and keeping senior
Guatemalan officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who
recruited for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and
is accused by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave
Guatemalan army information on guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11

Guatemala: Death Squads

Guatemala, 1953-84. For 30 years the CIA has been bankrolling a man
reported to be behind right-wing terror in Central America. The CIA's
protigi, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, former Vice President Of Guatemala, now
heads the National Liberation Movement (NLM) founded in 1953 by CIA as a
paramilitary force to overthrow Arbenz. By mid-1960s Sandoval emerged as
head of the organization. The White Hand or La Mano Blanco with close
ties to the NLM was responsible for as many as 8000 deaths in the 1960s
plus more in the 1970s. Sandoval a pillar of the World Anti-communist
League. The CIA still funds Sandoval. Jack Anderson, Washington Post,
1/30/1984

Guatemala, 1954-76. Effect of CIA coup organized labor all but wiped
out. Union membership dropped 100,000 to 27,000 immediately and
continued decline thereafter, in part due to death squad activity.
Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, 21

Guatemala. Police trained by AID public safety program murdered or
disappeared 15,000 people. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People,
186

Guatemala, 1954-84. See Jack Anderson column "Links Reported Among
Latin Death Squads." Washington Post, 1/12/1984, N. VA., 15

Guatemala, 1970-72. Under Arana presidency, with Mario Sandoval
Alarcon and others involved in right-wing terrorism, Arana unleashed
one of the most gruesome slaughters in recent Latin American history
(only in Chile, following the coup against Allende was the degree of
violence greater). The New York Times reported in June 1971 that at
least 2000 Guatemalans were assassinated between 11/1970 and 5/1971;
most corpses showed signs of torture. Most of killing attributed to the
officially supported terrorist organizations Ojo Por Ojo (an eye for an
eye) and Mano Blanca. Jones, S., and Tobis, D. (Eds.). (1974).
Guatemala, 202-3

Guatemala, 1970-87. Violence by security forces organized by CIA,
trained in torture by advisors from Argentina, Chile. Supported by
weapon, computer experts from Israel. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and
Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, 133

Guatemala. 1960-82. Trained military death squads who used "terror
tactics" from killing to indiscriminate napalming of villages. Special
Forces almost certainly participated in operations despite Congressional
prohibition. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The
Iran-Contra Connection, 193

Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz
government, gave lists to Armas of radical opponents to be eliminated.
NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/1983, 4

Guatemala, 1985. The World Anti-communist League's point man, Mario
Sandoval Alarcon, remains a League member even after exposed as a
death squad patriarch who was on the CIA payroll. Jack Anderson,
Washington Post, 8/9/1986

Guatemala, 1989. Climate of terror grips Guatemala. Killers, bombers
said to target civilian rule. Washington Post, 9/29/1989, A 45

Guatemala, circa 1968-70. U.S. counterinsurgency program turned
area into bloody war zone taking the lives of thousands of peasants.
Formed Mano Blanca or White Hand. Plan used through out country in
1970. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 3/74, 19

Guatemala. Article by Gary Bass and Babette Grunow on the Guatemalan
counterinsurgency forces. Lies of our Time, 6/1993, 11-13

Guatemala. At least three of recent G-2 chiefs were paid by CIA.
Crimes are merely examples of a vast, systematic pattern; [the guilty]
are only cogs in a large U.S. government apparatus. Colonel Hooker,
former DIA chief for Guatemala, says, "it would be an embarrassing
situation if you ever had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army
who ever collected a CIA paycheck." Hooker says CIA payroll is so large
that it encompasses most of Army's top decision-makers. Top commanders
paid by CIA include General Roberto Matta Galvez, former army chief of
staff, head of presidential General Staff and commander of massacres in
El Quiche department; and General Gramajo, defense minister during the
armed forces' abduction, rape and torture of Dianna Ortiz, an American
nun. Hooker says he once brought Gramajo on a tour of U.S. Three recent
Guatemalan heads of state confirm CIA works closely with G-2. Gen. Oscar
Humberto Mejia Victores (military dictator from 1983 to 1986) how
death squads had originated, he said they started "in the 1960s by CIA."
General Efrain Rios Montt (dictator from 1982 to 1983 and the current
congress president), who ordered main high-land massacres (662 villages
destroyed, by army's own count), said CIA had agents in the G-2. CIA
death squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995

Guatemala. CIA works inside a Guatemalan army unit that maintains a
network of torture centers and has killed thousands of Guatemalan
civilians. G-2, since at least 60s, has been advised, trained, armed and
equipped by U.S. undercover agents. One of American agents who works
with G-2, is Randy Capister. He has been involved in similar operations
with army of neighboring El Salvador. A weapons expert known as Joe
Jacarino, has operated through out Caribbean, and has accompanied G-2
units on missions into rural zones. Jacarino [possibly a CIA officer].
Celerino Castillo, a former agent of DEA who dealt with G-2 and CIA in
Guatemala, says he worked with Capister as well as with Jacarino.
Colonel Alpirez at La Aurora base in Guatemala Denied involvement in
deaths of Bamaca and Devine. He said CIA advises and helps run G-2. He
praised CIA for "professionalism" and close rapport with Guatemalan
officers. He said that agency operatives often come to Guatemala on
temporary duty, and train G-2. CIA gives sessions at G-2 bases on
"contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to
"fortify democracy." During mid-1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack
McCavitt, then CIA station chief. CIA "technical assistance" includes
communications gear, computers and special firearms, as well as
collaborative use of CIA-owned helicopters that are flown out of piper
hangar at La Aurora civilian airport and from a separate U.S. Air
facility. Guatemalan army has, since 1978, killed more than 110,000
civilians. G-2 and a smaller, affiliated unit called Archivo have long
been openly known in Guatemala as the brain of the terror state. With a
contingent of more than 2,000 agents and with sub-units in local army
bases, G-2 coordinates torture, assassination and disappearance of
dissidents. CIA Death Squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995

Guatemala, 1954-95. For at least five years, Colonel Alpirez was
also a well-paid agent for CIA and a murderer, a U.S. Congressman says.
Alpirez has been linked to the murder of Michael Devine, an American
innkeeper who lived and worked in the Guatemalan jungle, and the torture
and killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a leftist guerrilla who was the
husband of Jennifer Harbury. CIA ties began in 1954, when Alpirez was
about five years old. The CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala that
overthrew a leftist president and installed a right-wing military
regime. CIA's station in Guatemala began recruiting young and promising
military officers who would provide information on the left-wing
guerrillas, the internal workings of Guatemala's intertwined military
and political leadership, union members, opposition politicians and
others. Alpirez was sent in 1970 to School of the Americas (SOA), an
elite and recently much-criticized U.S. Army academy at Fort Benning,
Ga. Human-rights groups and members of congress point out that SOA's
graduates include Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of death squads in El
Salvador; 19 Salvadoran soldiers named in the 1989 assassination of six
Jesuit priests and three soldiers accused of the 1980 rape and murder of
four U.S. church workers; Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedars and other leaders of the
military junta that ran Haiti from 1991 to 1994; General Hugo Banzer,
dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978, and General Manuel Antonio
Noriega of Panama, now imprisoned in U.S. In 1970s Alpirez was an
officer in a counterinsurgency unit known as Kaibiles. Kaibiles became
notorious in the early 1980s, known as scorched earth years, when tens
of thousands of Indians were killed as military swept across rural
Guatemala, systematically destroying villages. Guatemalan government's
own count, campaign left 40,000 widows and 150,000 orphans. In late
1980s, Alpirez served as a senior official of an intelligence unit
hidden within the general staff and became a paid agent of CIA who paid
him tens of thousands of dollars a year. Intelligence unit, known as
"Archivo," or archives, stands accused of assassination, infiltration of
civilian agencies and spying on Guatemalans in violation of the nation's
Constitution. Archivo works like the CIA. "It was also working as a
death squad." New York Times, 3/25/1995

Guatemala, 1954-95. U.S. Undercover agents have worked for decades
inside a Guatemalan army unit that has tortured and killed thousands
of Guatemalan citizens, per the Nation weekly magazine. "working out of
the U.S. Embassy and living in safe houses and hotels, agents work
through an elite group of Guatemalan officers who are secretly paid by
CIA and implicated personally in numerous political crimes and
assassinations ''unit known as G-2 and its secret collaboration with CIA
were described by U.S. and Guatemalan operatives and confirmed by three
former Guatemalan heads of state. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez,
Guatemalan officer implicated in murders of guerrilla leader Efrain
Bamaca Velasquez -- husband of an American lawyer -- and rancher Michael
Devine discussed in an interview how intelligence agency advises and
helps run G-2. He said agents came to Central American country often to
train G-2 men and he described attending CIA sessions at G-2 bases on
"contra-subversion'' tactics and "how to manage factors of power'' to
"fortify democracy'' the Nation quoted U.S. and Guatemalan intelligence
sources as saying at least three recent G-2 chiefs have been on CIA
payroll -- General Edgar Godoy Gatan, Colonel Otto Perez Molina and
General Francisco Ortega Menaldo. `It would be embarrassing if you ever
had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA
paycheck,'' report quoted Colonel George Hooker, U.S. DIA chief in
Guatemala from 1985 to 1989, as saying. Human rights group Amnesty
International has said Guatemalan army killed more than 110,000
civilians since 1978 with G-2 and another unit called Archivo known as
main death squads. Reuters, 3/30/1995

Guatemala, 1960-90. Human rights groups say at least 40,000
Guatemalans "disappeared" in last 3 decades. Most were poor Indians.
Anthropologists, led by Clyde snow, dug away at a village site. Maria
Lopez had a husband and a son in one grave. She said on morning of
valentine's day 1982, members of anti-guerrilla militia took her husband
and others. They had refused to join militias known as civil
self-defense patrols and were killed. Six unknown clandestine graves in
San Jose Pacho. Human rights groups blame most disappearances on
army-run civil self-defense patrols set up under presidencies of
General Lucas Garcia and brig. Gen. Rios Montt. There are hundreds of
clandestine graves filled with victims of the militias, right-wing death
squads and brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Washington Times,
8/5/1992, A9

Guatemala, 1970-95. Jennifer Harbury's story. Time, 4/3/1995, 48

Guatemala, 1981-95. DIA reports re MLN particularly disturbing, as
they raise grave questions about extent of U.S. knowledge of MLN
activities in earlier years when MLN leader Mario Sandoval Alarcon was
tied to Reagan Administration's efforts to support Contras. Having come
to power in 1954 with the CIA-backed overthrow of Colonel Jacobo
Arbenze, MLN leader Sandoval was accused in 1980 by Elias Barahona,
former press secretary to the Guatemalan Interior Minister, of having
worked for CIA. Head of National Congress from 1970 to 1974, at which
time he was made vice president, a position he kept until his term
expired in 1978, Sandoval is widely regarded as father of Latin
America's "death squads." In 1970's, he had a close relationship with
Roberto D'Aubuisson, deputy chief of El Salvador's national security
agency (Anseal). D'Aubuisson reportedly was behind El Salvador's death
squads. Sandoval was so close to Reagan administration that he was one
of only two Guatemalans invited to attend Reagan's inauguration.
Intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in
France, 4/24/1995, 1

Guatemala, 1984-95. Article, "Murder as Policy." Washington was
supporting Guatemalan army in a number of ways: green berets trained
Kaibul massacre force, the army's self-proclaimed "messengers of death."
U.S. openly sold weapons to Guatemala - used in massacre in Santiago
Atitlan. Hundreds of U.S. troops (mostly National Guard) helped civic
action and road building in massacre zones. The Nation, 4/24/1995,
547-8

Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between
Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba - CIA passed the information to U.S.
military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition.
Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10

Guatemala, 1985-95. Bombings against military-reformist Christian
Democratic Party (DCG) of then President Vinicio Cerezo to topple
Cerezo, who perceived as being too soft on rebels. A 10/1988 DIA
intelligence report alerted American authorities that MLN, which was
involved in "plotting a coup against Cerezo in the past," is "now
apparently prepared to use violent tactics to undermine DCG government."
MLN "is reportedly planning a bombing campaign directed against members
of ruling DCG. MLN intends to use recently obtained explosives to target
personal vehicles of DCG Congressional representatives in order to
frighten them. After assessing their impact, MLN will consider
initiating a second stage of its anti-DCG campaign that will include
killing of various individuals. MLN has selected potential targets in
Guatemala city. U.S. Army and DIA, getting regular, high-level
intelligence from senior Guatemalan army officers and other sources
about crimes, notably murder, being committed by Guatemalan army
personnel. Source and depth of intelligence raises questions about what
U.S. Government actually knew about Guatemalan army complicity in
civilian murders in that country throughout the 1980s, including alleged
involvement of Guatemalan Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, then a CIA
agent, in 1990 and 1992 murders of American innkeeper Michael Devine and
guerrilla fighter Efrain Bamaco Velazquez, husband of an American,
Jennifer Harbury. Intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter
published in France, 4/24/1995, 1

Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991
was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5
million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan
military. His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan
officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited others
for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused
by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army
information on the guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11

Guatemala, 1989. 25 students in two years killed by squads. Entire
university student association has been silenced. U.S. backed
governments in virtual genocide have more than 150,000 victims. AI
called this genocide a "government program of political murder." The
Nation, 3/5/1990, cover, 308

Guatemala, 1990-95. Member of House Intelligence Committee, Robert G.
Torricelli (D- NJ.) said, in letter to President Clinton, that a
Guatemalan military officer who ordered killings of an American citizen
and a guerrilla leader married to a North American lawyer was a paid
agent of CIA. CIA knew of killings, but concealed its knowledge for
years. Another member of House Intelligence Committee confirmed
Torricelli's claims. Torricelli wrote in letter to President that the
"Direct involvement of CIA in the murder of these individuals leads me
to the extraordinary conclusion that the agency is simply out of control
and that it contains what can only be labeled a criminal element."
Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Bamaca, and Michael Devine. Tim Weiner,
New York Times, 3/23/1995

Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, El Buki's Tale - Murder of Michael
Devine. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1995,
32-37

Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, The Agency, Off Target. Two Deaths, a
Rogue CIA Informant and a Big Pot of Trouble. Re deaths of Michael
Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez - Harbury's husband. CIA paid Colonel
Alpirez $43,000 after it learned of cover up of deaths. U.S. News &
World Report, 4/10/1995, 46

Guatemala, 1990-95. Assassin of Michael Devine and of the husband of
Jennifer Harbury, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was on CIA's payroll
and had attended School of Americas (SOA) on two separate occasions. In
January 1995 when State and NSC pieced together what CIA knew, the
ambassador demanded removal of CIA's station chief. CIA fought to stop
disclosure of its relationship with the Colonel. Administration
officials began to mistrust what CIA was saying about the case. The
Colonel first came to U.S. In 1970 as an army cadet at SOA. He returned
to SOA in 1989, to take year long Command and General Staff course when
he was already on CIA payroll. In 1990, Michael Devine, who ran a hotel,
apparently stumbled on a smuggling operation involving Guatemalan
military. He was killed. New York Times, 3/24/1995, A3

Guatemala, 1990-95. CIA last month removed its station chief in
Guatemala for failing to report promptly information linking a paid CIA
informer to the slaying of a Guatemalan guerrilla fighter married to
Jennifer Harbury. Guatemalan army Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was
paid $44,000 by CIA in 1992 for secretly supplying intelligence on the
civil war. At time of payment CIA had evidence linking him to the
slaying of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (after he found about a military
smuggling operation or because he had a weapon). Washington Post,
3/25/1995, A1,20

Guatemala, 1990-95. Clinton has threatened to fire anyone in CIA who
withheld information from him about activities of its informant in
Guatemala, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez. What is more likely to be
agency's undoing is its failure to tell congress that only six months
after he graduated from command-level courses at School of Americas
Colonel Alpirez, a member of military intelligence on agency's payroll,
ordered murder of a U.S. citizen, William Devine, and then
torture-murder of husband of an American woman. White House officials,
and President Clinton in particular, were very angry about Guatemalan
affair but NSC Anthony lake was arguing that there is no evidence that
CIA tried to deceive president. Los Angeles Times reported that late
last year State Department found information about Devine murder in its
files that appeared to have originated with CIA and had not been passed
on to White House. This discovery prompted State Department and White
House to ask CIA for more information. State initially asked CIA for
information on rebel Commandante Efrain Bamaca Velasquez and received a
few modest files. Several weeks later, State again asked CIA for
information but this time on "Commandante Everardo," which was
Commandante Bamaca's well-known nom de guerre. Only then did CIA
produced incriminating data that it held solely under that name. CIA has
tried to ease situation with a rare "leak" about itself to press. On
3/24, Los Angeles Times quoted "CIA sources" as saying Agency was only
told after the fact that its Guatemalan informant, Colonel Alpirez, was
present at killing in 1990 of Devine, a U.S. citizen who ran a popular
tourist resort in Guatemala. CIA insisted to the paper that it cut
ties with Colonel at that point, but, significantly, sources did not put
a date on rupture. That gave it "wiggle room" to say it didn't find out
about Colonel's involvement in March 1992 torture-murder of Bamaca until
early this year. CIA gave Colonel Alpirez a "final payment" of $44,000
at about time of Bamaca's murder. Per National public radio commentator
Daniel Schorr, CIA station chief in Guatemala has been fired for failing
to relay information. But New York Times says he was reassigned to
Langley in January, after U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala accused him of
withholding information. CIA has assigned its inspector General, Fred
Hitz, to investigate. CIA station chief in Switzerland, who held a top
position at Department of Operations (DO) Latin American Division from
1990 to 1992, is now being questioned, as is Jack Devine, who headed
division from January 1983 until last October. He was appointed
Associate Deputy Director of Operations in October after John MacGaffin
was removed from that post for secretly giving an award to a senior
operative who had just been disciplined in Ames case. Devine's
successor is a woman, first to direct a DO division. She is in her 50s,
was previously station chief in El Salvador, and is said by officials
outside CIA to be very forthcoming about case. Intelligence - a
computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 3/27/1995,
30

Guatemala, 1990-95. Guatemalan soldiers killed Michael Devine under
orders from Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan, per convicted soldier, Solbal.
He killed as the army convinced he had bought a stolen rifle. They
tortured him before killing him. Solbal says Colonel Alpirez gave food
and shelter to the killers. Washington Times, 5/15/1995, A13

Guatemala, 1990-95. Letter from Congressman Torricelli to President
Clinton about involvement of CIA in two murders in Guatemala. 3/22/1995

Guatemala, 1990-95. Rep. Robert Torricelli, D-NJ., who is on the
HPSCI, has requested an investigation from the Justice Department on
role of the CIA in the murder of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca
Velasquez. Request was made in a letter to President Clinton. Guatemalan
intelligence officer who ordered the murders, Colonel Julio Roberto
Alpirez, was a paid agent of the CIA. Torricelli claims that the NSA,
CIA, State Department., and NSC covered up the involvement of a paid
agent in the murders. Devine, who was killed in 1990, was an American
citizen and Velasquez, who was killed in 1992, was married to an U.S.
Citizen. CNN Headline News, 3/23/1995 and AP, 3/23/1995

Guatemala, 1990-95. Revelations about a CIA informer linked to two
murders (Devine and Bamaca) in Guatemala helped exhume embarrassing
relationship between U.S. military and intelligence personnel and a
Central American regime notorious for human rights violations.
Washington Post, 4/2/1995, A29

Guatemala, 1990-95. Tim Weiner article "A Guatemalan Officer and the
CIA." Colonel is recalled as a "good soldier" and a murdering spy. New
York Times, 3/26/1995

Guatemala, 1990-95. Two colonels suspended in Guatemala for covering
up 1990 killing of Michael Devine. One was a paid CIA informant at time
of killing. Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan also suspended. Washington
Post, 4/27/1995, A29

Guatemala, 1990-95. Wife of Michael Devine discusses slaying of her
husband. New York Times, 3/28/1995, A1,6

Guatemala, 1991-94. State Department reported in 1991, that
"military, civil patrols and police continued to commit a majority of
major human rights abuses, including extrajuridicial killings torture
and disappearances." Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign devised by
U.S. counterinsurgency experts Caesar Sereseres and Colonel George
Minas. Former served as a consultant to RAND Corporation and State
Department's Office of Policy Planning. Minas served as military attache
in Guatemala in early 1980s. Both encouraged population control such as
Vietnam-style military-controlled strategic hamlets and civilian defense
patrols. Today Guatemala is largest warehouse for cocaine transshipments
to U.S. Drug trade run by military which tries to blame the leftists.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Spring 1994, 28-33

Guatemala, 1991-95. U.S. Had information in 10/1991 linking a paid
CIA informer in slaying of a U.S. citizen. Colonel Roberto Alpirez was
dropped from CIA's payroll but remained a contact through 7/1992 -- when
he allegedly ordered another killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez -
husband of Jennifer Harbury. Washington Post, 3/24/1995, A1,27

Guatemala, 1992. Rights abuses in Guatemala continue, paramilitary
civilian patrols - self defense patrols - accused of campaign of terror,
control rural areas. Patrols answer to military. Washington Post,
10/4/1992, A35

Guatemala, 1995. President Clinton said he would dismiss any CIA
official who withheld information on death of Jennifer Harbury's
husband. Rep Torricelli said CIA withheld information for years.
Washington Times, 3/25/1995, A3

Guatemala, 1970-95. Discussion of Torricelli, Harbury, Devine,
Bamaco, etc. The death of husband of Harbury not a rogue operation. This
was standard operating procedure in El Salvador and Guatemala and
elsewhere around the globe. CIA organized death squads, financed them,
equipped them, trained them, etc. That's what the CIA does. Once in a
decade the U.S. public hears about this. CIA should be abolished. The
CIA mislead Congress about the Devine case. Getting rid of CIA is not
enough - the CIA did not act alone. The National Security Agency and the
Army may have been involved in Guatemala. The Progressive, 5/1995,
8,9

Haiti: Watch List

Haiti, 1986-93. In 1986 the CIA funded the national intelligence
service (SIN) under guise of fighting narcotics - but SIN never
produced drug intelligence and used CIA money for political operations.
Sin involved in spying on so-called subversive groups...they doing
nothing but political repression...they targeted people who were for
change. CIA used distorted data to discredit Aristide. NACLA (Magazine
re Latin America), 2/1994, 35

Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit
squad, worked for CIA and U.S. intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's
dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that
maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 458

Haiti, 1990-94. U.S. officials involved in refugee policy have
backgrounds suggestive of Phoenix-like program activities. Luis Moreno,
State Department, has background in counterterrorism. Gunther Wagner,
senior intelligence officer at INS's southwest regional office, assigned
to investigate repression against repatriated refugees. Wagner had
served as public safety adviser to Vietnamese National Special Branch
for 5 years and later advised Somoza's National Guard. INS database on
all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State
Department unrestricted access to all interview files. U.S. Officers
hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all Haitians
being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN),
who's de facto primary function was a war against popular movement -
including torture and assassination - a fact admitted by a CIA officer
to an official in Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics
intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, 21

Haiti, 1991-94. Asylum-promoting project gets family information
that fed into a computer project that could be used to target for
repression. The Progressive, 9/1994, 19-26

Haiti, 1991-94. Seven chief attaches arranged killings and brought
victims to houses. Four of the seven worked for Centers for Development
and Health (CDS), funded by U.S. AID. One was Gros Sergo, and other was
Fritz Joseph who chief FRAPH recruiter in Cite Soleil. Two others are
Marc Arthur and Gors Fanfan. CDS files track every family in Cite
Soleil. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 461

Haiti, 1994. AID programs for Haitian popular groups; Immigration
and Naturalization service, with computerized files on 58,000
political-asylum applicants and army intelligence S-2 section of 96th
Civil Affairs Battalion assigned to monitor refugees at Guantanamo Bay.
Per Capt. James Vick, unit develops networks of informants and works
with marine corps counterintelligence in "identifying ringleaders of
unrest and in weeding out troublemakers." 96th's files enter military
intelligence system. Gunther Wagner, a former Nazi, served with U.S. In
Phoenix operation in Vietnam, and in Nicaragua - now heads State
Department's Cuba-Haiti task force. Pentagon's Atlantic command
commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton, to devise a computer model of
Haitian society. Results of study given. Priority of study to build an
"organized information bank...." no change expected in ruling clique of
Haiti. Article by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 10/3/1994, 344-48

Haiti: Death Squads

Haiti. CIA officer assigned 1973-75 Coordination with Ton-Ton Macoute,
"Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad. Covert Action Information
Bulletin (Quarterly), 9/1980, 16

Haiti, 1985-93. CIA created an intelligence service in Haiti:
National Intelligence Service, (SIN) from its initials in French, to
fight cocaine trade, but unit became instrument of political terror
whose officers engaged in drug traffic, killings and torture. Unit
produced little drug intelligence. U.S. cut ties to group after 1991
military coup. New York Times, 11/14/1993 1,12

Haiti, 1986-93 INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo.
INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all
interview files. U.S. officers hand Haitian authorities computer
print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded
service intelligence nacionale (SIN), who's de facto primary function
was a war against popular movement - including torture and
assassination - a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an official in
Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with
Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, 21

Haiti, 1990-94. Clinton administration denied report CIA helped set
up Haiti's pro-army Militia - FRAPH. Officials refused to comment
whether FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant was a paid CIA informant.
"Nation" article said Constant worked for both the CIA and the DIA.
Colonel Collins of DIA and Donald Terry of CIA were his contacts.
Collins urged Constant to set up FRAPH. Mr. Constant, per Washington
Times, was a paid U.S. Informant on Haitian political activities and
assisting anti-drug efforts. Relationship broken off early this year.
FRAPH has been linked to murders, public beatings and arson. CIA
officers in past worked with Haiti's national intelligence service.
Washington Times, 10/7/1994, A16

Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit
squad, worked for CIA and U.S. Intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's
dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that
maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. In 10/3/1994, issue of Nation
carried Nairn's article "The Eagle is Landing," he quoted a U.S.
official praising Constant as a young republican that U.S. Intelligence
had encouraged to form FRAPH. Constant confirmed that account. He first
said his handler was Colonel Patrick Collins, DIA attache in Haiti, and
later claimed another U. S. official urged him to form FRAPH. Collins
first approached Constant while he taught a course at HQs of CIA-run
national intelligence service (SIN) and built up a computer data base at
Bureau of Information and Coordination. FRAPH originally was called
Haitian Resistance League. Constant was working for the CIA at SIN while
it attacked the poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 458

Haiti, 1991-94. Emmanuel Constant (son of a Duvalier general), who
had been on the CIA payroll since the mid-'1980s. With U.S. intelligence
advice, formed FRAPH, a political front and paramilitary death squad
offshoot of the Haitian army, that began to systematically target
democratic militants and hold the country hostage with several armed
strikes. On 10/11/1993, day U.S.S. Harlan County and U.S. and Canadian
soldiers were to land, even though CIA had been tipped off, FRAPH
organized a dockside demonstration of several dozen armed thugs. Ship
turned around. U.S. asylum processing program hand-picked and exported
almost 2,000 grassroots leaders. In three years after coup, 7,000-man
army and its paramilitary assistants killed at least 3,000 and probably
over 4,000 people, tortured thousands, and created tens of thousands of
refugees and 300,000 internally displaced people. Covert Action
Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1994/1995, 7-13

Haiti, 1991-94. Haitian paramilitary chief spied for CIA. Emmanuel
"Toto" Constant, head of Haiti's notorious FRAPH, secretly provided
information to U.S. intelligence while his group killed people.
Constant paid by CIA for giving intelligence officers information about
Aristide beginning shortly after Aristide ousted in 9/1991 coup. CIA
dropped him last Spring. Constant's organization blamed for killing
hundreds of supporters of Aristide - and organizing demonstration that
drove off U.S. troop-carrying Harlan County last October. In "Nation"
article, U.S. Defense Attache, Colonel Patrick Collins, had encouraged
Constant to form FRAPH. U.S. intelligence agencies had extensive
penetration of Haitian military and paramilitary groups. Using Constant
as source may explain why CIA's reporting on Aristide was skewed. FRAPH
not formed until 8/1993, 9 months after Collins left Haiti. Washington
Post, 10/9/1994, A1,30

Haiti, 1993. Young men kidnapped by armed thugs seldom reappear.
Under de facto government, as many as 3000 may have been killed.
Aristide negotiating his return with UN. The Nation, 5/3/1993, 580

Haiti, 1995. Interview with Allan Nairn, April 1995 "Criminal
Habits." Z Magazine 6/1995, 22-9

Honduras: Death Squads

Honduras, 1981-87. Florencio Caballero, who served as a torturer and
a member of a death squad, said he was trained in Texas by the CIA. He
said he was responsible for the torture and slaying of 120 Honduran and
other Latin American citizens. The CIA taught him and 24 other people in
a army intelligence unit for 6 months in interrogation. psychological
methods -- to study fears and weaknesses of a prisoner, make him stand
up, don't let him sleep, keep him naked and isolated, put rats and
cockroaches in his cell, give him bad food, throw cold water on him,
change the temperature. Washington Post, 6/8/1988, B3

Honduras, circa 1982-87. Army Battalion 3/16, a special
counterinsurgency force which many considered a kind of death squad, was
formed in 1980. Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member,
described a clandestine paramilitary structure for repressing leftists.
Caballero, who studied interrogation techniques in Houston, said the CIA
was extensively involved in training squad members. NACLA 2/1988, 15,
from New York Times, 5/2/1987

Honduras, March 1986. Apart from CIA training of a battalion
implicated in death squad activities and torture, Honduran army defector
said CIA arranged a fabricated forced "confession" by kidnapped prisoner
that he headed a guerrilla front and had planned attacks against U.S.
installations. This in operation truth. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture
of Terrorism, 239

Honduras. General G. Alvarez Martinez, CIA-Contra point man in
Honduras, had death squad operation run by Ricardo Lau. Alvarez
godfather to new CIA Chief of Station's daughter. Marshall, J., Scott
P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, 78-9

Honduras, 1982-86. Zuniga told congressional staffers about the 316
Battalion established with the knowledge and assistance of the U.S.
Embassy. By 1984 more than 200 Honduran teachers, students, labor
leaders, and opposition politicians had been murdered. The CIA had
knowledge of the killings. Zuniga killed in 9/1985. Mother Jones,
4/1987, 48

Honduras. Capt. Alexander Hernandez, a graduate of U.S. International
Police services training program, has played a central role in Honduran
death squad activities and the war in Nicaragua. Early 1986 New York
Times reports that CIA was providing "training and advice in
intelligence collection" to Hernandez' unit "as part of a program to cut
off arms shipments from Nicaragua to leftist rebels in Honduras and El
Salvador." New York Times also says that CIA knew of the assassinations
but "looked the other way." The Nation, 6/7/1986, 793

Honduras, circa 1981-84. Honduran government established a secret unit
that seized, interrogated, tortured, and murdered more than 130 people
between 1981-84. Unit named Battalion 316. Unit operated with CIA
supervision and training and received U.S. instruction in interrogation,
surveillance and hostage rescue. Commander of unit in first years was a
graduate of International Police Academy. NA, 2/20/1988, 224-5 The
clandestine houses and command post of 316 were visited by CIA agents.
Nation, 1/23/1988, 85

Honduras, Nicaragua, 1982. A Contra commander with the FDN admitted he
helped organize a death squad in Honduras with the approval and
cooperation of the CIA. Honduran government agreed to host the death
squad and provide it with cover, since the group would kill Honduran
dissidents at the government's request. The commander admitted he
participated in assassinations. CIA "Colonel Raymond" congratulated the
squad. The Progressive, 8/1986, 25

Honduras, Nicaragua, 1984-85. Honduran army investigators report that
Contras have been involved in death-squad killings in Honduras. At least
18 Hondurans and an unknown number of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have
been killed by the Contras. Washington Post, 1/15/1985, A12

Honduras, 1980-83. Agents of Battalion 316, a Honduran death squad,
received interrogation training in Texas from CIA in 1980. CIA agents
maintained contact with unit in early 1980's, visiting detention centers
during interrogation and obtaining intelligence gleaned from torture
victims. See Americas Watch "Human Rights in Honduras" (May 1987).
Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, 101

Honduras, 1980-83. Gustavo Alvarez, formerly head of police, in 1981
a general running entire armed forces. Worked closely with U.S. on
Contras. Alvarez had organized military intelligence Battalion 316 -
first Honduran death squad. Argentines sent 15-20 officers to work with
Alvarez on Contras. Senior officer Osvaldo Riveiro. Garvin, G. (1992).
Everybody Has His Own Gringo, 41

Honduras, 1980-89. CIA and State Department worked with a Honduran
military unit called Battalion 316 during the 1980s. Unit was
responsible for cracking down on dissidents. AP, 6/12/1995. Honduran
special prosecutor for human rights asking the U.S. to turn over
classified information on Ambassadors John Negroponte and Chris Arcos
and several CIA agents connected to the disappearance of dissidents in
the 1980s. AP, 6/13/1995

Honduras, 1980-89. Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martinez shot to death in
1989. Alvarez spent years networking with fascists and ultra right
terrorists who in World Anti-communist League and its sister
organization, the Latin American Anti-communist Confederation, or CAL.
He most famous for streamlining Honduras's death squads and uniting them
under his control. Alvarez gathered together the National Front for the
Defense of Democracy, the Honduran Anti-communist Movement (MACHO), and
the Anti-communist Combat Army --death squads all-- and combined them
with several governmental forces, including the Fuerzas de Seguridad
Publica (FUSEP), Departmento Nacional de Investigaciones (DIN), and
Tropas Especiales Para Selva y Nocturnas (TESON). With Director of
Central Intelligence Casey, Alvarez and Negroponte turned Honduras into
a staging ground for Contra incursions into Nicaragua. Honduran Congress
issued Decree 33, which declared terrorist anyone who distributed
political literature, associated with foreigners, joined groups deemed
subversive by the government, damaged property, or destroyed documents.
Alvarez's forces murdered upwards of 500 people. He ousted as Honduras's
dictator in 1984 and became special consultant to RAND Corporation. Lies
of our Time, 3/1994, 3-5

Honduras, 1980-89. Eleven senior officers who are believed to have
been involved with Battalion 316 have been convicted on charges of
kidnapping, torturing and attempting to murder six students in 1982.
Officers include one general, nine colonels, and one captain. AP,
7/25/1995

Honduras, 1980-89. See entry in Liaison from Baltimore Sun,
6/11-18/1995

Honduras, 1980-93. CIA-trained death squad issue in presidential
campaign. In early 1980s, Battalion 3-16, of Honduran military whose
members instructed by and worked with CIA "disappeared" scores of
activists. Both candidates accusing other of connections to Battalion
3-16. In 1980 25-Honduran officers to U.S. for training per sworn
testimony in International Court by Honduran intelligence officer who
participated - Florencio Caballero. Group trained in interrogation by a
team from FBI and CIA. Training continued in Honduras. U.S. Trainers
joined by instructors from Argentina and Chile - sessions focused on
surveillance and rescuing kidnap victims. Battalion 3-16 engaged in a
program of systematic disappearances and murder from 1981 to 1984. By
March 1984, 100-150 students, teachers, unionists and travelers picked
up and secretly executed. Squads, according to Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, belonged to 3-16. Squads modus operandi included weeks of
surveillance of suspects followed by capture by disguised agents using
vehicles with stolen license plates, interrogation, torture in secret
jails followed by execution and secret burial. CIA's connection to 3-16
confirmed by General Alvarez, who created and commanded squad from 1980
through 1984. He later became chief of police and then head of the armed
forces. Alvarez said CIA "gave good training, lie detectors,
phone-tapping devices and electronic equipment to analyze intelligence."
CIA men informed when 3-16 abducted suspected leftists. When bodies
found, 3-16 put out story they killed by guerrillas. CIA looked other
way. Ambassador Negroponte in 1982 denied existence of death squads.
State Department was attacking as communist, anti-democratic and a
terrorist group, Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Honduras that
was exposing 3-16. In a barracks coup, Alvarez forced into exile in
Miami and became paid consultant to Pentagon writing study on
low-intensity conflict. Members of 3-16 still in positions of power in
government. Congressional intelligence committee in 1988 looked into
CIA's role with 3-16, but findings never published. Op-ed by Anne
Manuel. Washington Post, 11/28/1993, C5

Honduras, 1982-83. Ex-guard Benito "Mack" Bravo reportedly killed
dozens of Contra recruits at his La Ladosa training base near El
Paraiso. Mack suspected many were Sandinista infiltrators. In one case,
FDN ordered four ex-guardsmen executed for insubordination and allegedly
selling arms to El Salvador's FMLN. They also had been accused of
killing recruits. Honduran military participated in the execution.
Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, 118-124

Honduras, 1988. Director human rights commission in Honduras and
associate killed by assassins. The Progressive, 2/1990, 46

Honduras, 1988. Honduran human rights leader Ramon Custodio Lopez
accused Battalion 3-16 of murdering a politician and a teacher on 14
January 1988. Custodio relied on testimony by former battalion member
sergeant Fausto Caballero. In 11/30/1988. Honduras was condemned by
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988 for disappearance of Angel
Manfredo Velazquez. Battalion 3-16, along with DNI (Directorate of
National Intelligence), and FUSEP (National Police) were implicated, all
of which have received training from CIA. Intelligence Parapolitics,
9/1988, 8

Honduras, 1988. Jose Isaias Vilorio, an intelligence officer and
former death squad member, was shot dead on 1 January 1988. Isaias was
to testify before Inter-American Court on Human Rights (New York Times,
20 January 1988). Human rights leader and legislator Miguel Pavon was
killed on 14 January 1988 after testifying before Inter-American Court.
Also killed was Moises Landaverde, a teacher who was riding in Pavon's
car at the time of attack. Intelligence Parapolitics, 3/1988, 12

Honduras, Argentina, 1980-89. A survivor tells her story: treatment
for a leftist - kicks and freezing water and electric shocks. In
between, a visitor from CIA. CIA worked closely with the Honduran
military while the military tortured and killed dissidents during the
1980s, human rights groups said. A government official also said
Argentine military advisers, with U.S. support, were brought in to help
monitor leftist activism. "At least nine Argentine military (officers),
supported by the CIA, trained many Honduran officers to prevent
communism from entering Honduras," said Leo Valladares of the
government's human rights commission. Bertha Oliva, head of committee of
relatives of the disappeared, claimed CIA knew of disappearances by
Honduran security forces and that "the U.S. Embassy had absolute power
in this country." in the first of a series of four articles, the
Baltimore Sun reported Sunday that CIA and the State Department
collaborated with a secret Honduran military unit known as Battalion 316
in the 1980s in cracking down on Honduras dissidents. Following a
14-month investigation. In order to keep up public support for Reagan
administration's war efforts in Central America, U.S. officials misled
congress and the public about Honduran military abuses. Collaboration
was revealed in classified documents and in interviews with U.S. and
Honduran participants. Among those interviewed by the Sun were three
former Battalion 316 torturers who acknowledged their crimes and
detailed the battalion's close relationship with CIA. Ramon Custodio,
president of non-government human rights commission, said a former
member of Battalion 316, Florencio Caballero, disclosed that CIA in
early 1980s took 24 soldiers to the U.S. for training in anti-subversive
techniques. At the time, Custodio said, "Honduras' policy was oriented
to detaining and summarily executing those who did not please the
government or the military." Battalion 316 was created in 1984 and its
first commander was General Luis Alonso Discua, current armed forces
chief. A government report subsequently blamed it in the cases of 184
missing people. Baltimore Sun, 6/15/1995

Honduras, Israel. During Contra war Honduran military intelligence
officers on double salary from CIA and Colombian drug cartels, who saw
advantage of using Honduran airstrips for transiting cocaine under cover
of war effort. Israelis also trained Honduran death squads. Cockburn, A.
and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, 225

Honduras, Assassinations, 1980-84. CIA and Contras accused of
running Honduran death squads, killing over 200. CIA officials "looked
the other way" when people disappeared. Violence tapered off after
ouster of CIA backed military commander Alvarez. Ricardo Lau running
Contra intelligence, also death squads. Accused arranging assassination
Archbishop Romero in El Salvador. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter,
J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, 132-3

Indonesia: Watch List

Indonesia, 1963-65. U.S. trained unionist spies laid groundwork for
post 1965 coup gestapu massacre of leftists by gathering intelligence on
leftist unionists. Counterspy, Winter 1979, 27

Indonesia, 1965-66. "U.S. officials' lists aided Indonesian blood
bath in '60s." U.S. officials supplied the names of thousands of members
of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the army that was hunting them
down and killing them in a crackdown branded as one of the century's
worst massacres, former U.S. Diplomats and CIA officials say. Robert J.
Martens, Former member of embassy's political section said, "it really
was a big help to the army.... They probably killed a lot of people..."
Martens said. He headed an embassy group of state Department and CIA
officials that spent two years compiling the lists. He said he delivered
them to an army intermediary. The lists were a detailed who's who of the
leadership of the PKI that included names of provincial, city and
other local PKI members and leaders of mass organizations. Ambassador
Marshall Green, his deputy Jack Lydman, and political section chief
Edward Masters admitted approving the release of the names. Army
intermediary was an aide to Adam Malik. The aide, Tirta Kentjana
Adhyatman, confirmed that he had met with Martens and received lists of
thousands of names...given to Sukarno's HQs. Information on who captured
and killed came to Americans from Suharto's HQs, according to former CIA
deputy chief of station Joseph Lazarsky. Lazarsky said "we were
getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up,"..."the
army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 to 5,000 people." Lazarsky
said the check-off work was also carried out at CIA's intelligence
directorate in D.C. By end of January 1966, "the checked off names were
so numerous the CIA analysts in Washington concluded the PKI leadership
had been destroyed." Washington Post, 5/21/1990, A5

Indonesia, 1965-66. In response to Kathy Kadane's May 21 article in
Washington Post, Robert J. Martens responds "it is true I passed names
of PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-communist forces during
the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate
downfall of Sukarno. The names I gave were based entirely on Indonesian
communist press and were available to everyone. This was senior cadre
system of the PKI few thousand at most out of the 3.5 millions claimed
party members. I categorically deny that I headed an embassy group
that spent two years compiling the lists." Washington Post, 6/2/1990,
A18

Indonesia, 1985. Indonesia: years of living dangerously. CIA's role
in bloody coup in Indonesia in 1965. Utne Reader. 2/1991, 38, two
pages

Indonesia: Death Squads

Indonesia, 1965-66 Indonesian generals approached U.S. for
equipment "to arm Moslem and nationalist youths for use in central Java
against the PKI." Washington responded by supplying covert aid,
dispatched as "medicines." Washington Post, 6/13/1990, A 22

Indonesia, 1965-66. Kathy Kadane's story for States News Service
disclosed part played by CIA and State Department officials in 1965-66
blood bath in Indonesia. Kadane reported that U.S. officials in Jakarta
furnished names of about 5,000 communist activists to the Indonesian
army and then checked off the names as the army reported the individuals
had been killed or captured. The Nation, 7/9/1990, 43

Indonesia, 1965. CIA and State Department officials provided name
lists to Indonesian army that killed 250,000. The Progressive,
7/10/1990, 9

Indonesia, 1965. Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for
Indonesians. San Francisco Examiner, 5/20/1990

Indonesia, 1965-66. Article by Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte;
Rustle of Ghosts. (1965 Indonesian coup). Far Eastern Economic Review,
8/2/1990, 2 pages

Indonesia, 1965-85. Death squads roam at will, killing subversives,
suspected criminals by thousands. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten
History, 221

Iran: Watch List

Iran, 1953-54. CIA gave Shah intelligence on Tudeh party facilitate
anti-Tudeh Campaign. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations
Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," 150

Iran, 1953-64. CIA station chiefs in regular contact with Shah and
working level liaison relationship with SAVAK established by 5-man
training team and smaller unit in SAVAK HQs for several years after
training team left. CIA and SAVAK exchanged intelligence including
information on Tudeh party. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security
relations between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," 255-56

Iran, 1953. CIA prepared an arrest list for the overthrow operation.
Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, 190

Iran, 1953. U.S. Army colonel working for CIA under cover of
military attache worked to organize and train intelligence organization
for Shah. Trained on domestic security, interrogation. Primary purpose
of (Bakhtiar's intelligence unit later to become SAVAK) to eliminate
threats to Shah. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between
the United States and Iran, 1953-1978" 150

Iran, 1954. Year after coup American cryptographic experts and CIA
agent played important part in rooting out conspiracy army officers
linked to Tudeh Party. Kwitny, J. (1984). Endless Enemies, 165

Iran. During Shah's reign, thousands people killed. Many killed at
Shah's directive. Rafizadeh, M. (1987). Witness, 134

Iran, 1983. CIA identifies to Iranian government 200 leftists who
were then executed. The Nation, 12/13/1986, 660

Iran, 1983. In 1983, when the Tudeh party was closed down, the CIA
gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents operating in Iran.
Two hundred suspects were executed, 18 USSR diplomats expelled and Tudeh
party leaders imprisoned. Washington Post, 1/13/1987, A1,8

Iran, 1983. To curry favor with Khomeni, the CIA gave his government
a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. The
Khomeni regime then executed 200 suspects and closed down the communist
Tudeh party. Khomeni then expelled 18 USSR diplomats, and imprisoned the
Tudeh leaders. Washington Post, 11/19/1986, A28

Iraq: Watch List

Iraq, 1963. CIA supplied lists of communists to Baath party group
that led coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated.
Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, 130

Israel: Death Squads

Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir headed a special hit squad
during his ten years in Mossad. Shamir headed the assassination unit
from 1955-64 that carried out attacks on perceived enemies and
suspected Nazi war criminals. Shamir recruited former members of the
Stern Gang. Washington Times, 7/4/1992, A8

Israel, 1992. Article, "How Israeli Commandos Are Waging an
Undercover War In Occupied Territories." In January 1992, Israeli army
launched all-out offensive to end "Red Intifadeh." Undercover units
"Arabized" produced a rash of deaths under controversial circumstances
leading to claims commando units are death squads. Since Intifadeh began
in 1987, 775 Palestinians killed; 680 more slain by their brethren
mostly for collaboration. Human-rights organizations contend Sayarot
shoot first and ask questions later. Time 8/31/1992, 49-50

Israel, 1992. Israel's assassination squad, Duvdevan or Cherry has
killed one of its own by mistake. Intelligence Newsletter, 7/23/1992,
5

Israel, 1992. Israeli army had discharged commander of undercover
unit for issuing orders to shoot at Palestine activists. Unit code-named
Samson has had three commanders fired or placed on trial within three
years. More than 30 Palestinians killed this year by undercover troops,
who usually dress as Arabs. Washington Post, 8/26/1992, A14

Israel, Honduras, 1981-89. In 1981 Leo Gleser, "co-owner" of
International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) -- a leading Israeli
"security" firm (Israeli Foreign Affairs 2/1987, 5/1987, /1987, 2/1988,
3/1989) identified repeatedly as an Israeli entity -- began building
Battalion 316, a unit of Honduran military intelligence which
disappeared, tortured, then killed its victims. Honduran General Walter
Lopez Reyes who C-I-C Honduran armed forces 1984-86, said "we had
Israeli advisers in Special Forces. They seconded to Special Forces by
Israeli mod, although they came officially as "non-governmental." Their
front they training security groups but [they really] special operations
courses on how take over bldgs, planes, hostages...Contras also taking
courses...there coordination between them and CIA. Israeli Foreign
Affairs, 4/1989, 1,4

Israel, South Africa, 1986-91. Israel trained members of Inkatha hit
squads aimed at African National Congress, a disillusioned former leader
of Zulu organization has revealed. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 2/20/1992,
3

Israel. Ranks as fifth largest exporter of arms in world, according
CIA estimates, and has become essential element global counterinsurgency
business. "Hit lists" used by death squads in Guatemala have been
computerized with Israeli assistance and Uzi machine guns the standard
weapon of death squads. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly),
Summer 1988, 5

Italy: Watch List

Italy, 1950-59. All Italian "SIFAR" counterespionage officers
collected biographies on every deputy and senator. List increased to
include Ecclesiastics: 45,000 dossiers on them alone, 157,000
altogether, 30,000 dealing with Italians in world of business and
industry. Drop copies went to CIA. De Lorenzo's outfit to become a tool
for CIA. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror,
8-12

Italy, 1959-67. Carabinieri drew up plan Piano Solo - for
paramilitary to intervene in order to restore public order. Secret
services had massive program of surveillance of Italian political and
business figures. This partly intended to identify left-wing suspects
who would be rounded up and imprisoned in concentration camps on
Sardinia. Investigation revealed creation of personal intelligence
dossiers began in 1959 and 157,000 files amassed. SIFAR (military
intelligence) dossiers emphasized unfavorable significance. SIFAR
dossiers routinely deposited at CIA HQs. SIFAR planed microphones in
Papal apartments and President's Rome residence. Operation ordered by de
Lorenzo at request of CIA station chief Colby. Some years earlier Rome
CIA station chief Thomas Karamessines had asked General de Lorenzo, then
head of SIFAR, for dossiers on [left-leaning] politicians and in
particular for Moro's circle of collaborators. Willan, P. (1991).
Puppetmasters, 35-7

Italy, 1960-70. General de Lorenzo, whose SIFAR became SID,
implemented new Gladio project to neutralize subversive elements. Known
as parallel SID, it reached into nearly every institution. Group set up
at request of Americans and NATO. Knights of Malta, as well as
freemasonry, and its most notorious lodge - Propaganda Due, or P-2, far
more influential. Licio Gelli, a knight. Joined U.S. Army's CIC. To
ferret out dissidents, they prepared watch lists on thousands. 157,000
files found in Ministry of Interior. CIA obtained duplicates. Covert
Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1994, 24

Italy, 1960-70. Operation Solo - a planned coup against a leftist
government did not occur - but it was based on Operation Gladio.
Giovanni de Lorenzo, as chief of secret services, compiled dossiers,
including tapes and photos, on some 150,000 people - priests,
politicians and unionists. He drew up plan to arrest many politicians,
take over radio and TV, seize offices and newspapers of left-wing
parties. De Lorenzo was organizing a duplicate of Operation Gladio in
case left gained too much power. "Statewatch" compilation, filed June
1994

Latin America: Death Squads

Latin America, labor. AIFLD collected detailed information about Latin
American labor leaders under pretext surveys necessary for AID-financed
worker's housing projects. AIFLD able obtain personal and political
history union members, with address and photos. Given CIA role in Chile,
Uruguay and Brazil coups, among others, it probable this information
passed to military regimes and their secret police. DL 238 from
Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. 212, 220

Liaison, 1960. Target lists maintained by all Western Hemisphere
division stations. Maintain in case local government asks for assistance
in preventive detention of dangerous persons. Agee, P. (1975). Inside
the Company: CIA Diary, 114

Latin America. CIA organizes right wing terrorist organizations that
attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others without
implicating foreign governments. Groups include "La Mano Blanco" and
"Ojo Por Ojo" (Guatemala), "La Banda" (Dominican republic), and "Death
Squad" (Brazil). Counterspy, 3/1973, 4

Latin America. CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in
Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in
Brazil. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/1974, 11

Latin America, 1953-84. The activities of the death squads, formed
under CIA sponsorship in 1954 Are loosely controlled by an
international organization known as La Mano Blanco (the White Hand). The
front group is the CAL, Latin American Anti-communist Federation, the
Latin American affiliate of the World Anti-communist League. Jack
Anderson, Washington Post, 1/13/1984

Latin America. Terrorist groups created in most countries. Groups such
as "La Mano Blanco" attack and assassinate leftist politicians and
others feared by military governments, doing so without implicating
police or military. CIA implicated in attempts to organize the right
into terrorist organizations. Counterspy, __/1973, 4

Latin America, 1960-95. Colonel Alpirez accused killer of American
innkeeper and guerrilla leader, graduated from School of Americas in
1989. Other notable alumni include: Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos,
former Panamanian strongmen; Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of Salvadoran
death squads; Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, leaders of argentine
dirty war; Michael Francois, former Haitian police chief; 19 of 27
Salvadoran officers cited for murder of six Jesuit priests; 10 of 12
Salvadoran officers involved in El Mozote massacre; 105 of 247 Colombian
officers cited for human rights violations in 1992; and, former
dictators of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Time. 4/10/1995, 20

Latin America, 1976. An Argentinean told Scherrer, legal attache
(FBI) Santiago, that Operation Condor, a nascent program among military
intelligence services of some Latin American countries designed to
locate and eliminate one another's fugitive terrorists and exiled
dissidents. Ambitious leader of Chilean DINA trying to institutionalize
process. Branch, T. and Proper, E. (1983). Labyrinth, 123

Latin America, Operation Condor, Paraguay, 1970-92. 12/1992 a
Paraguayan judge in a police station found documentary history of
decades of repression and U.S. intelligence cooperation with Paraguay
and other regional dictatorships. Archives detail fates of hundreds,
possibly thousands, of Latin Americans secretly kidnapped by right-wing
regimes of the 1970s. Paper trail revealing elusive conspiracy among
security services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and
Uruguay to eliminate foes without regard to borders. Sketchy outlines of
Operation Condor, can be partially filled in. Some of documents
already disappeared. Finders had unearthed jumbled mountain of papers
outlining police and military intelligence activities during recently
overthrown Stroessner regime. HQs of Paraguayan technical police
revealed more documents. 4 tons records. Data confirmed arrest and
killing of politicians and exchange of prisoners with Argentina, Chile
and Uruguay. Discovered documents a bombshell that led to arrest of some
of Stroessner's old regime. Southern Cone repression killed 50,000,
disappeared 30,000 - the majority in Argentina and 400,000 imprisoned.
U.S. gave inspiration, financing and technical assistance for
repression. CIA's technical services division (TSD), provided electrical
torture equipment. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Fall
1994, 7-13

Lain America, 1993. James Carroll wrote editorial about U.S. Army's
School of Americas in Fort Benning. It is "the U.S. school that teaches
militaries how to torture." Among renowned alumni are various Latin
American strongmen, including dictators in Bolivia, Argentina, El
Salvador and Panama. In Peru 6 of army officers charged with recent
murders of 9 students were School of Americas alumni. In Honduras, 4 of
the high-ranking officers who helped create "Battalion 316" death squad
graduated from the school. In Columbia, the list of officers designated
by human rights organizations as worst offenders reads like an honor
roll from Fort Benning. In El Salvador, 2 of 3 officers cited for the
assassination of Archbishop Romero, 3 of 5 convicted of killing 3
Maryknoll nuns and their lay associate, and 19 of the 26 officers
implicated by United Nations. "Truth Commission" investigation of murder
of Jesuits, were graduates. "For decades alumni of the School of
Americas have helped fill morgues and mass graves of an entire
continent." Colonel Louis Michel Francois has been most closely linked
to Haiti death squads, and he is an alumni of the school just as is
General Raoul Cedars one of those CIA agents. Z Magazine, 2/1994, 24

Mexico: Death Squads

Mexico, 1957-89. The Mexican DFS (Federal Security Directorate) like
many Western-hemisphere intelligence organizations was creation of CIA.
DFS has state of the art computer and records systems. Through DFS CIA
able to keep tabs on all embassies in Mexico City. DFS works closely
with U.S. In the suppression of leftists and political parties. In
early 1970s, Nazar created the Brigada Blanca, a right-wing death squad
that killed hundreds, probably thousands of Mexican students and
political activists. Zacaris Osorio Cruz, a member of death squad,
testified in Canada that, between 1977-82, he part of team that killed
between 60-150 people. Penthouse, 12/1989

Mexico, 1977-89. U.S. looked the other way when Nazar, head of DFS
used his infallible (interrogation) techniques on behalf American
agencies while he carried out hundreds, perhaps thousands of political
executions of Mexican leftists and political dissidents. DFS (Federal
Security Directorate) administering drug traffic. Penthouse, 12/1989

Nicaragua: Watch List

Joseph Adams, a former Marine intelligence officer, who served as
chief of security for Aldolfo Calero, helped maintain a list of
civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered Nicaragua.
The Progressive, 3/1987, 24

Nicaragua: Death Squads

Nicaragua, 1983-89. Enrique Bermudez, a Contra leader, said in
Contra raids on economic targets in northern Nicaragua, particularly
coffee plantations and farming cooperatives, any resistance brought
brutal retribution. Commandantes in field authorized to select those to
die. Bermudez ordered prisoners to have throats cut rather than waste
bullets. Terrell, J., and Martz, R. (1992). Disposable Patriot, 149

Nicaragua, 1985-89. "Death squad" reports re Sandinistas first
circulated by the CIA-funded Puebla Institute in 1991 as coming from the
UN and OAS. When checked out, this proved to be not true. Unclassified,
9/1992, 14

Nicaragua, circa 1940-79. Under name Anti-Communist League Nicaragua.
Conservative estimates say 30,000 died four decades prior 1978-79 civil
war. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. 81, 94

Norway: Watch List

Norway, 1947-90. Operation Gladio, formed in 1947, kept track of
communists and became part of intelligence service in 1948. Norwegian
branch exposed in 1978, when an arms cache discovered. "Statewatch"
compilation filed June 1994, 12

Panama: Watch List

Panama, 1989-90. U.S. says 90 prisoners now held in Panama. Most of
those detained had been picked up by U.S. Forces based on wanted lists
compiled by U.S. and Panamanian authorities. Washington Post, 1/19/1990,
A16

Panama, 1989. Several hundred people on list Endarra government
seeks to detain. They arrested by U.S. troops. Most political
activists and labor leaders were wanted. The Nation, 1/29/1990, 115

Paraguay: Watch List

Paraguay, 1972-83. The Paraguayan government expelled an author and
released a document supplied by the U.S. Embassy. The document, marked
secret, includes the author among a list of Paraguayans said to have
visited the USSR bloc. Washington Post 2/5/1983, A1,21

Philippines: Death Squads

Philippines. Article "Death Squads in the Philippines," by Doug
Cunningham. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1988
22-3

Philippines. Military used hunter killer unit called scout rangers to
find enemy and either attack or report back to battalion combat teams.
Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, 28

Philippines. Probable U.S. support for vigilante death squads in the
Philippines. Used in coordination with other programs making up a total
low intensity conflict profile. National Reporter, Fall 1987, 24-30

Philippines, 1950-54. Military man who helped Lansdale was Charles
Bohannan and Lansdale's chief Filipino associate was Colonel Napoleon
Valeriano whose "skull squadrons" beheaded suspected Huks. Karnow, S.
(1989). In Our Image, 350

Philippines, 1969-83. Marcos' land reform failed and he approved
creation of "Monkees" a group used to intimidate and even murder Marcos'
rivals. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image. 378

Philippines, 1973-83. In Philippines 1,166 persons were killed from
1972-83. Human rights groups say most of victims were opponents of
President Marcos. Washington Post, 4/12/1984, A21

Philippines, 1986-87. "Vigilante Terror" a report of CIA-inspired
death squads in the Philippines. National Reporter, Fall 1987, 24-31

Philippines, 1986. See chapter "Direct U.S. Role in
Counterinsurgency." includes psywar operations, vigilante and death
squads. USIA anti-communist campaign of distributing films and written
materials. Film "Amerika" shown. Use of Asian-American Free Labor
Institute Operations. In 1985, AAFLI spent up to $4 million on
organizational efforts, the money coming from the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED). Bello, W. (1987). U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict
in the Philippines

Philippines, March 1986. Reagan signs finding increasing CIA
involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations. New Aquino
government is allegedly perpetrating a purge of opposition, carried out
by more than 50 death squads. Ramsey Clark, who investigated death squad
activity in 1987, wrote in June that "the victims of vigilante violence
are overwhelmingly poor farmers, workers, slum dwellers, and others who
are pushing for significant land reform, wage increases and protection
workers' rights, as well as those who oppose U.S. military bases."
Upsurge in death squad activities are coincident with increased CIA aid
and was preceded by visit to Philippines by Maj. Gen. John Singlaub. The
Nation, 9/19/1987, 259-60

Puerto Rico: Watch List

Puerto Rico. FBI has institutionalized repression. It created
"subversive" lists with names of more than 150,000 "independentistas"
who often find themselves thrown out of work. FBI agents organized and
trained death squads within the Puerto Rican police department NACLA
(magazine re Latin America), 8/1990, 5

Puerto Rico: Death Squads

Puerto Rico, 1978. "Puerto Rico's Death Squad Requiem on Cerro
Maravilla: the Police Murders in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Government
Cover-up." A book by Manuel Suarez reviewed in the Progressive, 12/1988,
40-42

Russia: Watch List

Russia, 1994. FBI to open Moscow office with an eye on nuclear
trafficking. FBI has about 20 posts abroad at U.S. Embassies with its
agents serving as legal attaches. They range in size from one agent to
as many as eight, plus support staff. FBI director Freeh said the FBI
working to set up joint police/intelligence data base with authorities
in Russia and Germany. Washington Times, 5/26/1994, A3

South Africa: Watch List

South Africa, 1962. A tip from a paid CIA informant led to 1962
arrest of Nelson Mandela leader of the African National Congress. A CIA
officer claimed "we have turned Mandela over to the South African
security branch." Washington Post, 6/11/1990, A18

South Africa: Death Squads

South Africa. Article, "South African Death Squad Plot: A Missing
Piece to a Puzzle the Media Won't Solve," by Jane Hunter. Extra,
11/1992, 26 South Africa. See article "South African Death Squads."
Covert Action Information bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, 63-66

South Africa, 1980-89. Details of South Africa's death squads by a
former police Captain Dirk Coetzee. Group tracked and killed ANC
activists in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Newsweek, 11/27/1989,
56

South Africa, 1980-90. Apartheid's fiercest warriors in 1980s were
South Africa's army special forces, police force known as Koevoet
(crowbar), and Portuguese-speaking "buffalo" battalion who ran a
campaign of assassination and sabotage against the African National
Congress. Newsweek, 9/14/1992, 45

South Africa, 1991-92. 75 COSATU (labor union) members killed during
past two years by security forces. Many other attacks. Briarpatch
magazine (Canada), 10/1992, 55-6

South Africa, 1992. Slaughter in South Africa. Newsweek 9/21/1992,
57

South America: Watch List

South America, 1970-79. U.S. Legal attache Buenos Aires, FBI agent
Robert Scherrer, sent cable to D.C. Describing operation. Operation
Condor the code-name for collection, exchange and storage intelligence
re leftists, communists and Marxists. Established between cooperating
intelligence services in South America to eliminate Marxist activities.
Operation provided for joint operation against targets in member
countries...third and secret phase of operation involves formation of
special teams from member countries who travel anywhere in world to
carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists from member
countries. Special team from Operation Condor could be sent to locate
and surveil target. When located, a second team would be sent to carry
out sanction. 1979 Senate Report, based on CIA files, says "such a phase
three operation planned in 1974 and planned on killing 3 European
leftists" - one Carlos. Plot foiled when CIA discovered it and warned
host countries - France and Portugal. U.S. military officers sent under
auspices of AID oversaw formation of technical police. One folder of
archives has correspondence between Paraguayan ministers and U.S. Army
Colonel Robert Thierry, who was serving as "public administration
adviser," who supervised formation of the technical police. Letters from
FBI agent Scherrer advising Paraguayan police re targets. CIA also
worked with Paraguayans. Deputy DCI, Vernon Walters, visited country in
1976 who apparently approved abortive effort to get false passports for
2 Chilean DINA agents - Armando Fernandez and Michael Townley - who en
route to U.S. To assassinate Orlando Letelier. The case of Eugenio
Berios. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) 12, 57, 8, 9

South America: Death Squads

South America, 1976. Letelier killed by right wing Cuban exiles
called "Gusanos" who are paid and trained by CIA and "Chilean Gestapo"
DINA. Gusanos regularly engage in terrorism against Cuba and Latin
American and Caribbean countries. Tactics include blowing up airplanes,
embassies, fishing boats, and kidnappings. Gusanos connected with
police of other right wing governments such as Venezuela. Certain gusano
operations directed by CIA; Other unilateral operations of DINA.
Counterspy, 12/1976, 10

Syria: Watch List

Syria, 1949. Following CIA coup of March 1949 CIA officer reported
over "400 Commies" arrested. Middle East Journal 57

Syria, 1949. The Husni Za'im coup of 30 March result of guarantee
CIA that once firmly in power, the U.S. would give de facto recognition
with de jure to follow in a few days and pointed out targets to be
seized. Gave him a list of all politicians who might be able to rally
resistance. Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, 94

Thailand: Death Squads

Thailand, 1965. Death squads. Lobe, T. (1977). United States
national security policy and aid to the Thailand police 67-70

Thailand, 1973-76. General Saiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and
close ally of CIA, admitted that CIA was collaborating with a variety of
Thai security agencies, including CSOC. Similarly, deputy director of
police, Withun Yasawat, said he was receiving CIA advice and reports as
late as 1974. American indoctrination of CSOC and border patrol police
during 1960's produced U.S. desired objectives. "Nawaophon" created ISOC
officers who in turn has close contacts with CIA, employed covert
tactics to search out "subversive elements" within the Thai population.
Counterspy, Summer 1980, 14

Thailand, 1973-76. The Krathin Daeng (Red Guars), were groups of
rightist students with police support that had over 100,000 members
including government employees, soldiers, policemen, etc. Group received
support and assistance from the internal security command (where CIA had
a presence) and the Thai Santiban aka Special Branch. The Red Guars
implicated in numerous bombings, killings, shooting and harassment of
labor leaders, peasant leaders, etc. Indochina Resource Center Study,
1/1977

Thailand, 1976. A high-ranking official of Seni Pramoj government
told a foreign visitor few weeks before October 6 coup, both Nawapon and
the Red Gaurs were being financed by CIA. Counterspy, 12/1976, 52

Thailand, 1976. Over 10,000 students, professors, political figures,
labor and farm leaders arrested since coup. U.S. military aid increased.
New junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during
coup. 2 right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied
directly to CIA operations. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, v9 #3,
9/1977, 2

Thailand, 1976. Red Gaurs, an organization of the extreme right,
staged provocations against progressive students and assassinations of
activists of farmers' federation of Thailand. The number of
assassinations by right wingers soared in April 1976 during
parliamentary elections. Defense minister Pramarn Adireksan, leader of
right wing Thai National party, openly proclaimed the slogan "the right
kill the left." Syrokonski. (1983). International Terrorism and the CIA,
117-118

Thailand, 1976. Thai border police, element of police most involved
in counterinsurgency and which CIA concentrated most of its efforts,
carried out an assault by fire against essentially unarmed students,
killing at least 100. Counterspy, 12/1976, 52

Turkey: Watch List

Turkey, 1971. Coup carried out by counter-guerrilla, the CIA, the
Turkey military and Turkish military intelligence (MIT). CIA solely
interested in protecting American interests. CIA assisted MIT in
1960-69 in drafting plans for mass arrests of opposition figures
similar to the pattern followed in Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. In
single night generals ordered 4000 professors, students, teachers and
retired officers arrested. They tortured. Counterspy, 4/1982, 25

Uruguay: Watch List

Uruguay. CIA agent associated with death squads. Every CIA station
maintained subversive control watch list of most important left wing
activists. Gave names families and friends. Frankovich, A. (1980). On
Company Business. TV transcript, 5/9/1980, 51-3

Uruguay, liaison, 1964. Biographical data and photos. Uruguay has
national voter registration that effective identity card system. From
liaison service CIA station gets full name, date and place of birth,
parents names, address, place of work, etc. and id photos. Information
invaluable for surveillance operations, for subversive control watch
list and for a variety of other purposes. CID-361

Uruguay: Death Squads

Uruguay, 1970-72. CIA operations officer used cover of AID public
safety advisor to help set up Department of Information and Intelligence
(DII). DII served as a cover for death squad. Counterspy, 5/1979, 10

USSR: Watch List

USSR, 1990 KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov said KGB to protect
against anti-Communist forces. Said western intelligence exploiting
current instability in USSR. "Certain radical movements being
masterminded by foreign support. Certain groups had written "blacklists"
of people who must be neutralized. Washington Post, 12/12/1990, A18,20

USSR, 1990. KGB's Kryuchkov accuses CIA and other western
intelligence agencies of gathering information on workers' movements.
Washington Post, 12/23/1990, A1,22

USSR, East Germany, 1949-57. League of Free Jurists (UFJ) kept a
blacklist of offenders against justice - particularly lawyers and police
- and published their activities. Named were marked men, whether they
came to West as refugees or as accredited representatives of East
Germans. Hagan, L. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, 200

USSR, Iran, 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior KGB officer in
Tehran, defected to the British. CIA had a sharing agreement with MI6
and became privy to contents of two trunks full of documents. From those
documents CIA prepared name lists of more than one hundred people,
mostly Iranians, working as secret agents in Iran for the USSR. Casey
allowed this list be handed to the Iranians - who executed them.
Persico, J. (1991). Casey, 301

Vietnam: Watch List

Vietnam, 1965-68. U.S./Government of Vietnam create list of active NLF
for assassination. After 1968 Tet offensive, names centralized to
Phoenix coordinators. Collect names of tens of thousands NLF suspects.
Military operations such as My Lai use Phoenix intelligence. By 1973,
Phoenix generates 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam.
Counterspy, May 1973, 22

Vietnam, 1965-70. Details re Vietnam. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon
intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre
marked for assassination. Phoenix program for 1969 called for
"neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of Viet Cong targeted for
arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in
provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of Viet Cong
suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and Navy Seals
most common recruits for Phoenix program. Green Beret Detachment B-57
provided administrative cover for other intelligence units. One was
Project Cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of
collaborating with North Vietnamese, KGB. Another was Project Oak
targeted against South Vietnamese suspected collaborators. They
controlled by Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities, which worked with CIA outside of General Abrams's control.
Stein. J. (1992). A Murder In Wartime, 360-1

Vietnam, 1967-73 CIA developed Phoenix program in 1967 to
neutralize: kill, capture or make defect Viet Cong infrastructure. Viet
Cong infrastructure means civilians suspected of supporting Communists.
Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by
Vietnamese. Due process totally nonexistent. South Vietnamese who
appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without
trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 13

Vietnam, 1967-73 District Intelligence Operations Coordination
Center (DIOCC). Dien Ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x
40'. Manned by two U.S. Soldiers, 2 Census Grievance, one Rural
Development cadre, and one Special Branch. DIOCC intelligence
clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate information. Immediate
local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, Viet Cong
infrastructure and order of battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU
unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees
using informants and DIOCC's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990). The
Phoenix Program, 126

Vietnam, 1968-69. Until late 1968, Saigon had run a program under
which 500,000 ID cards were issued. Viet Cong made fake ones and many
stolen. Viet Cong during Tet assigned teams to go door-to-door to
collect them. Saigon reissued cards in 10/1968. By 1 May 1969, number of
cards issued was 1.5 million. Adams, S. (1994). War of Numbers, 181

Vietnam, 1968. Phoenix program quota of 1800 neutralizations per
month. Viet Cong Infrastructure System (VCIS) fed 3000 names Viet Cong
infrastructure into computer at Combined Intelligence Center political
order of battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon
DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 1970 computerized blacklist a
unilateral American operation. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix
Program, 259

Vietnam, 1968. U.S. advisors worked with Government of Vietnam
counterparts to establish a list of those who were active with the NLF
and who were vulnerable to assassination. Counterspy, 5/1973, 21

Vietnam: Death Squads

Vietnam. Counterterror teams aka Provincial Reconnaissance Units
(PRU). Six or dozen men carried out carefully planned forays, capturing
or killing identified communists. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The
Counterinsurgency Era 210-11

Vietnam, 1960-93. Montagnards recruited in early 1960s by Special
Forces to fight Viet Cong. Did not surrender until 1992, when they
yielded weapons to UN forces in Cambodia and brought to U.S. About 600
live in North Carolina. Paul Campbell, former SF who first American to
recruit them. Kay Reibold head of Vietnam highlands assistance project.
Montagnards live in small apartments around Raleigh with low-paying
jobs. In 10/1961 Campbell, then a SF Sergeant, sent by CIA to recruit
Montagnards. They to form village security, but soon being used for
long-range reconnaissance and in highly mobile strike forces that hunted
Viet Cong for weeks at a time. "We killed many Vietnamese." Article by
W. Booth. Washington Post, 12/27/93

Vietnam, 1965. CIA station helped create census grievance units. CIA
funded, trained and guided counter terror teams who per Chief of Station
de Silva, were "to bring danger and death to Viet Cong functionaries."
Corn, D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades 175

Vietnam, 1966-71. Phoenix operation designed to help U.S. military
reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded Viet Cong's
ability to field replacements. In April 1967, President Johnson
announced formation of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) for pacification. Robert Komer as deputy commander of
MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 1968-71. CORDS the
management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military
and civilian. By 1971, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under
CORDS. 1200 civilians by 1971. U.S. AID responsible for material aid.
State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role.
CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name Revolutionary Development
cadre. RD program formed teams of 59 South Vietnamese, divided into 3
11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6
months in a village to fulfill "Eleven criteria and 98 works for
pacification." 1. Annihilation of...cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked
village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in
villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material).
Teams helped create Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PFs). Ruff-puffs,
suffered high casualties. They represented half of South Vietnamese
government forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of
Communist casualties. Underground paramilitary effort called Phoenix,
which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All
information fed into intelligence coordination and exploitation program.
Vietnamese at Komer's request set up staff that, with CIA, was
responsible for coordinating intelligence reports on Viet Cong
Infrastructure. Information from census grievance, military, police
reports. paramilitary units, including CIA's Provincial Reconnaissance
Units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not killed when captured - taken
to Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC). Also regional prisons and a
national center. All financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and
jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated
each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). War
in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience 55-65

Vietnam, 1966. In 1966 recycled counter terrorists called Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and managed by CIA officer in CORDS RDC/O
Office. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 117

Vietnam, 1968. CIA issued two handbooks in June 1968. One "the Viet
Cong Key Organization From Central Level Down to Village and Hamlet
Levels." Second a manual of procedures from Saigon to DIOCCs. One report
said "as DIOCCs and PIOCCs have refined data bases, gained experience,
and mounted more operations against targeted individuals, the
neutralization rate... over 1000 per month for last 4 months." Gia Dinh
"has more than quadrupled monthly rate of killed, captured and rallied."
Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 190

Vietnam, 1971. William E. Colby on July 19, 1971, before Senate
Subcommittee testified that CIA's Operation Phoenix had killed 21,587
Vietnamese citizens between January 1968 and May 1971. Counterspy,
December 1978, 6

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