The Scottish medium D.D.Home often levitated pianos in trance and even himself out the window. The Brazilian medium Carlos Mirabelli once vanished in the railroad
station of Da Luz and reappeared two minutes later in Sao Vincenti (a 90 kilometres distance) and levitated in the street two metres high for three
minutes. Does this make any sense?
Being a computer scientist I don’t usually like the analogy to of consciousness to computers, but in this case I think it can illuminate something about memory. If our memory is like a computer’s memory, and consciousness is the software, then just as software is a pattern in memory, consciousness is a pattern in memory. Memory then becomes elevated to the medium of consciousness, maybe this even fits in with your membrane model Bernardo? Everything is patterns/vibrations in this medium. Sheldrake’s infinite cycle of memory and consciousness only arises if one thinks of consciousness and memory as two separate things. I think he is totally correct to point this out. If one accepts that they are two properties of something higher the cycle vanishes.
Stewart.
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I will beg to disagree here. Associative neural networks can do precisely what you describe below, and they are run as programs in regular computers. Depending on the application, a memory address can be calculated in an infinitude of different ways -- exploring different data correlations -- so to access the same information. I don't really see a problem.Gr, B.
You are taking the question way beyond its original context. Let's bring it back: Sheldrake's argument is that there is necessarily infinite regress in addressing memory. I contend that there isn't. I am not going into strong AI in my argument. All I am saying is that there is no infinite regress in addressing memory content in an algorithmic fashion. Computers are proof of it. ANNs have been shown to correlate variaties of data to arrive at the proper addresses to access information, which, if I understood your original argument correctly, was precisely what you were sceptical about.
What you've stated has got me thinking about Vallee's TEDx presentation, specifically synchronicities, which by his explanation are created by 'double causality'?? The examples he states don't seem to have any cause/effect relationship, retroactive or otherwise. I don't even understand it enough to know how to frame a coherent question.
Also, would you agree to the related idea that consciousness creates the illusion of time and space "by traversing through associations in the world of information?"
Best, pj
pj
Memory in a computer is simply a pattern. Could our memories be patterns in consciousness? Because consciousness is such a different medium from computer hardware it doesn’t necessarily have the same restrictions. In fact, everything could be described as a pattern in consciousness under idealism.
Maybe state is a better word than pattern, memory is a ‘state of consciousness’. Just like physical reality is a state of consciousness. I think memory is very closely related to imagination, which could be considered another state of consciousness.
I think we have to allow consciousness to be able to create, and this is very closely related to free will that we were talking about yesterday. If consciousness can create patterns in consciousness then a memory could be described as a temporary, or local pattern to an individual. Something that we create for ourselves, a copy of what we have experienced. It is of the same nature as the reality that we have collectively dreamed up, but it’s local to us, and somewhat temporary.
Stewart.
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Sciborg2 Sciborg2
Sent: 10 May 2014 11:11
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
But doesn't that leave Sheldrake's argument of infinite regress intact? (Braude makes the same argument in Memory Without a Trace)
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Surely the key must be in consciousness, not in the brain. The key is the thing that gives the memory meaning and meaning can’t come from the physical reality.
Also, is there any evidence that any sort of memory is stored in the brain? Maybe the receiver is just re-structuring itself to better pick up certain types of signals. Why do people with brain damage have difficulty accessing stuff, surely they wouldn’t even know it was there is the key was erased from the brain. But with effort they can remember (because the key is actually perfectly safe in consciousness) the brain just has to learn how to re-structure itself to express that key.
Regards,
Stewart.
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bernardo
Sent: 10 May 2014 11:41
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
Well, the Braude/Sheldrake argument is independent of whether computers (or brains) actually have experience or, instead, simply manipulate information blindly. What they argue is that information cannot be accessed without a 'key' that must itself already contain the information to be accessed, which leads to infinite regress. So it's not a question of experiential recall, but data access.
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I’m not familiar with Sheldrake’s argument. Is the infinite regress searching for what gives memories meaning? A memory is simply a pattern without meaning (in the brain or consciousness or whatever), and something more is needed to give that pattern meaning. If we assume memories are purely physical, then each memory would need another memory to give it meaning, but that memory itself would need another memory to give it meaning etc. thus proving that memories can’t be physical. Is that the gist of it? Seems reasonable to me.
All searches for consciousness or meaning end up in infinite regress when one looks for answers in the physical. It’s very similar to the Buddhist ‘first cause’ argument. Which also ties into the deterministic discussion we had. What is the cause of consciousness etc. The only way to get out of a cyclic thought chain is to go one level higher. If you can’t find a cause in your current world view, you must expand your world view and look at it from a higher level. Things are only cyclic if you limit your world view.
PS. I know you know this, I’m just trying to clarify and help to put into words, don’t know if I’m succeeding.
PS2 I also realise I’m taking a somewhat dualistic approach, this is simply because of the limitations of our language.
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From Sheldrake’s site
http://www.sheldrake.org/Articles&Papers/papers/morphic/morphic1_paper.html
“ However, for a retrieval system to retrieve anything, it has to know what it wants to retrieve; a memory retrieval system has to know what memory it is looking for. It thus must be able to recognize the memory that it is trying to retrieve. In order to recognize it, the retrieval system itself must have some kind of memory. Therefore, the retrieval system must have a sub-retrieval system to retrieve its memories from its store. This leads to an infinite regress. “
That’s what I was trying to say, so I think I’ve understood it. I just used the word meaning instead of retrieval system. To me it’s essentially the same thing. I don’t see the problem with this argument?
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bernardo
Sent: 10 May 2014 12:32
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
No, that's not the gist of it. Have a look at the very first post of this thread. Gr, B.
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Ok, thanks for explaining, I see now. I agree what you’re written below about retrieval. If Sheldrake’s argument really is as simple as you say then it’s obviously false.
I suspect he’s trying to get at something more subtle though. His statements are already loaded with hidden assumptions about meaning…”it has to _know”’ etc. I suspect he’s talking about ‘first cause’. What is the cause of the retrieval, what is the hidden “I” that decides to remember something. But yes, I agree that it isn’t a well formulated argument.
I’ve heard Sheldrake talk about this infinite regress before but wasn’t sure about it – thanks for clarifying.
Stewart.
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bernardo
Sent: 10 May 2014 14:45
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
Meaning is a problem, but Sheldrake is not talking about meaning; he's talking about pattern recognition and memory retrieval. A retrieval system doesn't imply meaning, since even a mechanical apparatus can be a retrieval system. Sheldrake is assuming the materialist premise that a brain is a kind of computer storing memory as material traces, and trying to show that it leads to contradiction. The problem is that any computer today is perfectly capable to know which memory segment to address in order to access the information it needs at each moment in time. You don't need to know the information you want to access in order to access it, you only need to know where it is stored (i.e. its address). To know where it is stored, simple pattern recognition -- of the type computers are perfectly capable of doing when they, e.g. recognize faces in photos -- is sufficient. A computer can automatically recognize your face and then automatically retrieve your personal information from a data-base. There is no problem there. Similarly, there is no problem in imagining that the brain could do the same, especially when we know -- as we do -- that artificial neural networks can do pattern recognition and storage addressing.
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"How does the postulated trace come to play a part in the present act of recognition or recall? Trace theorists must resist the idea that it is interpreted or read by some internal homunculus who can match a stored trace with a current input, or know just which trace to seek out for a given current purpose. Such an intelligent inner executive explains nothing (Gibson 1979, p. 256; Draaisma 2000, pp.212–29), or gives rise to a vicious regress in which further internal mechanisms operate in some “corporeal studio” (Ryle 1949/1963, p. 36; Malcolm 1970, p. 64).
But then the trace theorist is left with a dilemma. If we avoid the homunculus by allowing that the remembering subject can just choose the right trace, then our trace theory is circular, for the abilities which the memory trace was meant to explain are now being invoked to explain the workings of the trace (Bursen 1978, pp. 52–60; Wilcox and Katz 1981, pp. 229–232; Sanders 1985, pp. 508–10). Or if, finally, we deny that the subject has this circular independent access to the past, and agree that the activation of traces cannot be checked against some other veridical memories, then (critics argue) solipsism or scepticism results. There is then no guarantee that any act of remembering does provide access to the past at all: representationist trace theories thus cut the subject off from the past behind a murky veil of traces (Wilcox and Katz 1981, p. 231; Ben-Zeev 1986, p. 296).
We'll see below (section 3.3) that this dilemma recurs empirically, in the difference between supervised and unsupervised learning rules in connectionist cognitive-scientific models of memory. There, as in this general context, the natural response is to take the second prong of the dilemma, and accept the threat of solipsism or scepticism. The trace theorist must show how in practice the past can play roles in the causation of present remembering. The past is not uniquely specified by present input, and there is no general guarantee of accuracy: but the demand for incorrigible access to the past can be resisted."
I think the problem isn’t so much to do with memory, as consciousness itself? We come back to the age old problem that consciousness can’t be explained in terms of the physical, and any attempt to do so results in circular reasoning.
If one accepts that consciousness is a fundamental the problem of memory goes away doesn’t it? Or at least it’s no different from the problem of how consciousness does anything.
I’m happy to accept consciousness as a fundamental, and then to accept memories as something else that consciousness creates, but maybe I’m missing the problem that you see?
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Sciborg2 Sciborg2
Sent: 10 May 2014 18:16
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
I guess if the memory is merely encoding information about what happened, like a video camera, I don't think there's a problem. But we do recall our subjective state during past events, so I still - perhaps incorrectly - feel the problem remains...
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Yes, exactly. Totally agree with you here. That’s what confused me, I assumed they must be talking about meaning rather than retrieval, because as you say, retrieval is a trivial problem.
As so often happens meaning creeps in behind the words, so that they don’t even realise they have already implied meaning in their arguments, when that is what they are searching for. Round we go again… J
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Yes, idealism does rather turn all of the questions on their head.
I wonder whether it’s a mistake to look at memory as a passive storage. I think it probably has much closer links to creativity and imagination.
If my consciousness is a sum of everything that it creates, to remember something I need to create it in my consciousness, or maybe to expand my consciousness to contain the thing I want to remember. The things I pay no attention to are not part of my conscious world, so I don’t remember them. I guess the ‘why don’t we remember everything’ question is the same as the ‘why do I consider myself a separate entity’ question.
Stewart.
From: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com [mailto:metaphysical...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bernardo
Sent: 11 May 2014 16:42
To: metaphysical...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [Metaphysical Speculations] Re: Material traces
In my view, the problem to be resolved is why we DON'T remember everything. That's where consciousness localization comes in. So, in my worldview, the actual issue is being reversed when we talk about 'storage' of memory. Nothing needs to be 'stored.'
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Without arguing about the specific cases you bring up, I don't think the rationale about relaxing the filter constraints had to do with the abilities of the body. The body is an image of the localization process, so yes, it is expectable that relaxing the constraints has a correlate in the physical body, and that is reduction of brain activity. But to go from here to saying that bodies can, thus, levitate, is way too large a step for me, personally...Gr, B.
On Saturday, March 30, 2013 12:15:40 PM UTC+1, mr.m...@gmail.com wrote:If the constraints of localization are relaxed, what could happen to the body? St Joseph of Cupertino was remarkably unclever, but perhaps that made him able to levitate.The Scottish medium D.D.Home often levitated pianos in trance and even himself out the window. The Brazilian medium Carlos Mirabelli once vanished in the railroad station of Da Luz and reappeared two minutes later in Sao Vincenti (a 90 kilometres distance) and levitated in the street two metres high for three minutes. Does this make any sense?