You do not have permission to delete messages in this group
Copy link
Report message
Show original message
Either email addresses are anonymous for this group or you need the view member email addresses permission to view the original message
to loner...@googlegroups.com
I collect the text from these ND Philosophical Reviews when there is a key word of interest in a context that I might want to later recover. The recent one with a quote from Putnam looked useful, but it led me to Andrew Beards' Method in Metaphysics where he critiques Putnam and Kripke in a context that matters, so I'll just go there if needs arise.
(Beards begins with this quote:)
"Metaphysics has survived numerous attempted assassinations. Hume's call for the burning of books has not yet been heeded except by his distant descendants the logical positivist's, whose theatrical derision of metaphysics raised a few cheap laughs. Now the show is over and serious metaphysics flourishes once more. But it has not survived unscathed. There are urgent, unanswered questions about its methods of inquiry."
Alex Oliver, 1996
The ND example:
"One difficulty in answering this question [about facts and values] is that it depends on how precisely the distinction is understood. Pulling apart the various threads is one aim of the editors' introduction. They provide a litany of notions associated with each side of the divide (1-3):
"There follows a history of this distinction under various guides, from the Humean injunction against deriving an 'ought' from an 'is', through variations of ethical non-cognitivism, to different types of usage in 'use' theories of meaning. Opposition to the distinction (and defence of 'fact-value entanglement') is exemplified by pragmatists such as Peirce, James and Dewey, and in particular their rejection of the so-called 'representationalist' model of knowledge, according to which 'human understanding [is] a matter of faithful mirroring [of] a reality which is brute and deaf to our requests' (13). One difficulty I had with this survey is that it privileges history over taxonomy, hence the interconnections between the various ways of making the distinction are not clearly set out, nor is there a detailed introduction to the remaining papers.
"Part I ('A Counter-History of the Dichotomy') aims to provide a history of critique of the dichotomy, focusing on the work of classical pragmatists (papers by H. Putnam and Robert Schwartz) and critical theorists (papers by Maeve Cooke and John McGuire). Putnam's own contribution explores Dewey's opposition to the flag bearers of the fact/value dichotomy of his day -- logical positivists such as Carnap, Reichenbach and Ayer. Putnam sees Dewey as targeting a fact/value distinction according to which matters of fact are subject to rational argument and evaluation, but value judgements (expressing only pseudo-propositions) are not (28). Against this, Putnam notes that pragmatists have a positive view of the role of reason in ethical inquiry, although in typically fallibilistic mode this is not as an Archimedean point prior to and outside of all existing evaluation, but a self-reflective 'careful evaluation of experience and the invention of new descriptions of experience' (39). Hence
"The right approach to our ethical problems is neither to give up the very possibility of intelligent discussion nor to seek a metaphysical foundation outside of . . . all problematic situations, but to investigate and discuss and try things out cooperatively, democratically, and above all fallibilistically. The terrible thing about the fact/value dichotomy is that by denying that there is such a thing as a responsible and rational ethical discussion, it "blocks the path of inquiry" from the very start (39)."
Jaray...@aol.com
unread,
Jul 12, 2017, 3:33:11 AM7/12/17
Reply to author
Sign in to reply to author
Forward
Sign in to forward
Delete
You do not have permission to delete messages in this group
Copy link
Report message
Show original message
Either email addresses are anonymous for this group or you need the view member email addresses permission to view the original message
to loner...@googlegroups.com
Doug,
Beards' critique of Putnam etc is quite a "meaty" contribution (e.g. for
our purposes). More on this e..g. at
where Putnam also urges a return to common sense as does of course
BL.
Credibly founding ethics AND spirituality for our age is one of BL's
feats.
Most "do-gooders" of our day (I'm talking about credible, responsible ones)
who do not delve all too deeply into the philosophical underpinnings of
spirituality travel, it seems to me, a path not unlike what a Putnam,
Haldane, BL and other philosophers have done for ethics.
E.g, below is a link to Andrew Harvey and other popular presenters
of more "private" transformationalists in the social realm by way of
spiritual guidance. One can access it at
The
UK election result has been a game changer. The electorate has turned down the
Theresa May/Daily Mail offer of a hard Brexit and the threat of walking away
from the negotiations with the European Union. The result is a rebuff to May and
all her ministers claiming that ‘no deal is better than a bad deal.’
The
new parliamentary arithmetic means that the road is now clear for negotiating a
soft Brexit. That means accepting the result of the June 23 referendum but
recognising that for reasons of economics, geography, history and culture a
close working partnership between the UK and the Continent is in the interests
of both parties. Hence, the UK should seek a partnership and cooperation
arrangement with the EU across a whole range of areas – the economy, security,
culture, the environment, research – where it has vital shared interests with
our closest neighbours.
Furthermore,
events are pushing the EU as well as the UK in that direction. First, after the
latest terrorist horrors in Manchester and London, who is seriously going to
suggest that the UK should pull out of its intelligence sharing and security
cooperation with European police and counter-terrorism services? Second, the
disastrous performance of President Trump in Saudi Arabia, at NATO and the G7
has given renewed momentum to the desire amongst European leaders for greater
self-reliance. The swift declaration with the Chinese government upholding their
joint commitment to the Paris agreement on climate change after Trump’s
announcement of US withdrawal is an early example. Third, the election of
Emmanuel Macron as the new French President adds a new powerful, political
figure pushing for collective action at the European level.
The
main political obstacle remains migration. The May government has argued that
the UK must pull out of the Single Market and the Customs Union because
membership of either is incompatible with the UK controlling its own migration
policy. This view is regularly echoed by EU leaders and Commission President
Juncker. I have shown previously inSocial Europewhy this is not the case.
The
Treaty of Rome is not a neoliberal free for all. Importantly, this is also the
view of Jean Pisani Ferry, the author of Emmanuel Macron’s Presidential policy
programme and now his chief economic adviser. Nine months ago Ferry wrote a
pamphlet for the influential Bruegel think tank with four other senior EU policy
makers entitledEurope After Brexitthat argues that in an increasingly
volatile world, neither the EU nor the UK has an interest in a divorce that
diminishes their influence, especially as the balance of economic power shifts
away from the North Atlantic world. The authors propose a new form of
collaboration between the EU and the UK, a continental partnership which would
consist of participating in the movement of goods, services and capital and
allowing some additional labour mobility, as well as in a new system of
inter-governmental decision-making and enforcement of common rules to protect
the homogeneity of their deeply integrated economies.
On
migration, the Bruegel authors suggest managed labour mobility is required for
the interdependent parts of the European economies to function smoothly and to
enable firms to transfer staff to other countries easily, but there is no legal
necessity for unrestricted movement.
The
precise form that those arrangements on a managed migration policy within the
single market between the UK and the EU could take are a matter for negotiation
but the starting point should be that all options including membership of the
Single Market a la Norway or the Customs Union a la Turkey are on the table.
These are crucial because the central economic issue is not about trade but
about integrated production flows. Serious European politicians and
policy-makers know that economics has leapt the boundaries of their relatively
small nation states. The optimal economic area is now Continental in
scale
Jaray...@aol.com
unread,
Jul 12, 2017, 10:39:43 AM7/12/17
Reply to author
Sign in to reply to author
Forward
Sign in to forward
Delete
You do not have permission to delete messages in this group
Copy link
Report message
Show original message
Either email addresses are anonymous for this group or you need the view member email addresses permission to view the original message
to loner...@googlegroups.com
Hi all,
Below is a refrence to Andrew Harvey and here is a link to his
biography
"Andrew
Harvey is Founder Director of the Institute of Sacred
Activism,
an international organization focused on inviting concerned people to take up
the challenge of our contemporary global crises by becoming inspired, effective,
and practical agents of institutional and systemic change, in order to create
peace and sustainability. Sacred Activism is a transforming force of
compassion-in-action that is born of a fusion of deep spiritual knowledge,
courage, love, and passion, with wise radical action in the world. The
large-scale practice of Sacred Activism can become an essential force for
preserving and healing the planet and its inhabitants. ....."
One may ask how does this all "fit in with Lonergan"? If Lonergan were
writing MiT today he might at least footnote him. Let us remember that
MiT builds on Insight. and its "ethical-spiritual
metaphysics" (John)
--
Jaray...@aol.com
unread,
Jul 17, 2017, 2:32:14 AM7/17/17
Reply to author
Sign in to reply to author
Forward
Sign in to forward
Delete
You do not have permission to delete messages in this group
Copy link
Report message
Show original message
Either email addresses are anonymous for this group or you need the view member email addresses permission to view the original message
to loner...@googlegroups.com
Hi all,
"Metaphysics has survived numerous attempted assassinations...." we read
below in Doug's posting. We might say that with such "leaders" as Putin,
Erdogan, Trump it'll take some HUGE efforts to help democracy survive in
the ongoing attempted assassinations of "rule of the people" based on justice
and, from our point of view on this site, ALSO underpinned by a sound
metaphysics and a living faith. How about the complex following analysis?
John
In his eight years as president, Barack Obama oversaw
acivil rights
renaissance, laid the groundwork
forcombating climate
change, and shepherded the nation
through its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
But his failure to prosecute Wall Street executives for
causing the collapse of the housing market ushered in an era of populist rage
that cleared the path for a demagogic reality-TV star to take the Oval Office,
according to Jesse Eisinger’s new book,The Chickenshit Club,which hit shelves on Tuesday.
“If they had, the history of the country would be
different,” Eisinger, a veteran financial reporter at ProPublica whoseinvestigationon shady
crisis-era Wall Street practiceswon a Pulitzer Prizein 2011,
told HuffPost by phone. “We would think of the financial crisis differently,
think of the Obama administration differently; there would be a sense that the
government was legitimate. There would be a sense of accountability after the
crisis, the reforms would be tougher.”
He added: “I don’t think we would haveDonald
Trumpas
president.”
The book traces Department of Justice impotence on
corporate crime back two decades. In 2000, the dot-com bubble burst, and the
sudden deflation of highly valued early internet firms increased scrutiny over
companies’ books across industries. At Arthur Andersen, the Chicago-based
accounting giant that for nearly nine decades had been one of the nation’s top
auditing firms, troubles began to mount. In 2001, the firmsettledwith the Securities and Exchange Commission for making
false and misleading statements about Waste Management Inc. In 2002, the
companyfound itselfin the
middle of telecom giant WorldCom’s $3.8 billion fraud scandal.
That year, President George W. Bush, eager to steady a
quivering economy, signed anexecutive orderestablishing the Justice Department’s
Corporate Fraud Task Force. The team of prosecutors would ultimately bring down
Enron in what became the world’s most infamous accounting-fraud scandal. But
before toppling the energy-services company and sending its top executives to
prison, DOJ investigators would snag another big fish, catching Arthur Andersen
shredding its audits of Enron. In June 2002, the world’s fifth-biggest
accounting firm effectively shut down after a conviction for obstructing
justice.
The conviction rippled through the corporate world as
Arthur Andersen laid off thousands of employees. The shock wave inspired a
fierce backlash from corporate lobbyists and defense attorneys. They launched a
PR campaign that painted prosecutors as overly aggressive cowboys willing to put
people out of work and destabilize markets. Groups like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce funded appeals of the conviction all the way to the Supreme Court, and
in 2005, the high court unanimously ruled against the Justice
Department.
The court found that prosecutors failed to properly
convey to the jury the laws Arthur Andersen broke ― essentially letting the firm
off on a technicality, Eisinger argues. “Today, prosecutors remain reluctant to
indict large corporations for fear of driving them out of business,” Eisinger
concludes early in his book. “Andersen had to die so that all other big
corporations might live, free of prosecution.”
ALEX
WONG VIA GETTY IMAGES
President
Barack Obama signs the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act into law as
congressional leaders look on during a ceremony in the East Room of the
White House May 20, 2009.
Changes to the way the Justice Department treated white
collar crime came into sharp relief after the 2007 financial crisis. The
Corporate Fraud Task Force of 2002 boasted nearly 1,300 fraud convictions by the
time Obama replaced it in 2009 with the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
The new entity combined the efforts of the Justice Department, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Treasury Department, in what then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithnerpromisedwould
“act aggressively and proactively in a coordinated effort to combat financial
fraud.” But, lacking the focus or prosecutorial muscle of its predecessor, the
task force turned out to be whatcritics called“a
clearinghouse of information and resources to facilitate enforcement by other
government agencies.” One former Justice Department official derided itto Eisingeras “the
turtle.”
The book takes its name from an address then-U.S.
Attorney James Comey gave in 2002 to a fresh-faced crop of elite Justice
Department recruits. Before becoming the best-known FBI director since J. Edgar
Hoover, Comey oversaw the Southern District of New York, a federal jurisdiction
with domain over Wall Street. The district has long served as the premiere
assignment for prosecuting corporate wrongdoing, with a magnetic attraction to
some of the country’s most ambitious young legal minds. In the speech, Comey
warned against joining the “chickenshit club” ― his shorthand for prosecutors
who only pursue cases they’re almost certain to win. Justice, he argued, came of
taking on violators for whom the system seems rigged, not picking off easy
targets.
One of the book’s best examples of Comey’s unheeded
advice comes in the form of another figure famous today for his public disputes
with the new administration: Preet Bharara, who served as the U.S. attorney in
Manhattan from 2009 until Trump abruptly fired him in 2017. Bharara earned a
reputation as the “sheriff of Wall Street” for prosecuting crooked hedge fund
managers and insider trading cases. But as Eisinger describes it, the nickname
was overblown. Compared with financial giants’ reckless mortgage security
trading, insider trading amounted to a “two-bit, low-level crime that has
nothing to do with the systemic corruption on Wall Street,” he
said.
“In the wake of the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression, right in Preet’s backyard, when banks that he and his office
were supposed to police made egregious mistakes and acted recklessly and, I
think, committed crimes up and down, the fact that they didn’t prosecute is a
scandal,” Eisinger said. “The argument that they looked and didn’t find anything
isn’t persuasive. They either didn’t look very hard, or they didn’t dedicate
enough resources.”
It’s easy to feel cynical about the broader legal
system outlined inThe Chickenshit Club.And at a time when the Justice Department faces ashrinking budget, the idea of a well-funded task force sniffing around
potential dead ends for corporate crime is difficult to imagine. The first
stages of a corporate criminal probe are typically carried out by a law firm
hired by the company under investigation. For example, in 2008 ― two years after
its CEO became the first top executive on Wall Street to own a company stake
worth$1 billion― Bear
Stearns hired a law firm to probe the collapse of its mortgage-related hedge
funds. Later that year, company, on the brink of bankruptcy, was soldto
JPMorgan Chase at a fire-sale price.
The
Democrats have very few differences from the Republicans now.Jesse Eisinger
“The great secret to corporate criminal prosecution is
that we have privatized and outsourced it to the companies themselves,” Eisinger
said. “In doing so, they’re taking cues from the client of the company, and the
client of the company is going to be studiously incurious about following
investigative threads that might lead to the CEO or board rooms. Instead, they
point the finger at a middle manager or someone expendable, and that’s the
person who gets indicted by the general government.”
It’s a revolving-door system. Those same law firms
poach Justice Department prosecutors, with offers of far higher salaries than
the government can afford. That makes the Justice Department just a middling
step in the pipeline between elite law schools and big firms, which is true
regardless of politics these days. Firms like WilmerHale and Covington &
Burling lean Democratic, while Jones Day leans Republican.
“The Democrats have very few differences from the
Republicans now,” Eisinger said. “They’re both drawing from the same elite legal
culture, they’re all essentially clerking from the same judges or the same
courts. … They’re all drawing from the same well with just little gradations in
difference on ideology, mainly around social issues.”
There
are steps that would help. Salaries for Justice Department prosecutors top out
around $150,000. That makes offers nearing seven figures from private firms hard
to resist for someone in a costly city like New York or Washington. Eisinger
recommended raising salaries for such public servants to $400,000.
“The
reality is you have a couple kids in New York City, and you do have great needs
if you want to live an affluent life,” he said. “We should not say that you
should live a life lacking in status or material wealth if you want to serve the
government. That’s not the way to get the best service.”
To its credit,The Chickenshit Clubpresents
a stable of heroes, too. There’s Kathy Ruemmler, the former deputy director of
the Enron Task Force who delivered the government’s closing arguments in the
trial that convicted former Enron executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling
and later went on to become Obama’s White House counsel. And there’s U.S.
District Judge Jed Rakoff, whoargues to this daythat
government enforcers lack a backbone when it comes to indicting corporations.
And Benjamin Lawsky, New York state’s former head of the Department of Financial
Services, who, absent indictments,fined big bankshundreds
of millions of dollars and forced dozens of employees to
resign.
For all the failures of the Obama administration, the
Trump White House threatens to be “an order of magnitude worse,” Eisinger said.
Already, Attorney GeneralJeff
Sessionshas made street crime
and drug enforcement higher priorities than corporate misdeeds. White House
officials indicated that antitrust approval of AT&T’s merger with CNN-owner
Time Warner may hinge on personnel changes at the network, whose aggressive
reporting has drawn Trump’s ire. Plus, Trump refused to sell his personal
business, raising concerns that the Justice Department could become a tool to
reward or punish the president’s partners and rivals.
“We’re going to have a kleptocratic administration that
looks the other way at corporate crime and hands the federal government over to
corporates for all sorts of malfeasance,” Eisinger said. “I anticipate the
worst Department of Justice in our lifetimes.”
In a message dated 7/11/2017 5:55:51 PM Mitteleuropäische Sommerzeit,
doug....@gmail.com writes:
I collect the text from these ND Philosophical Reviews when there
is a key word of interest in a context that I might want to later
recover. The recent one with a quote from Putnam looked useful, but it
led me to Andrew Beards' Method in Metaphysics where he critiques Putnam and
Kripke in a context that matters, so I'll just go there if needs arise.
(Beards begins with this quote:)
"Metaphysics has survived numerous attempted assassinations. Hume's call
for the burning of books has not yet been heeded except by his distant
descendants the logical positivist's, whose theatrical derision of metaphysics
raised a few cheap laughs. Now the show is over and serious metaphysics
flourishes once more. But it has not survived unscathed. There are urgent,
unanswered questions about its methods of inquiry."
Alex Oliver, 1996
The ND example:
"One difficulty in answering this question
[about facts and values] is that it depends on how precisely the distinction
is understood. Pulling apart the various threads is one aim of the editors'
introduction. They provide a litany of notions associated with each side of
the divide (1-3):
"There follows a history of this
distinction under various guides, from the Humean injunction against deriving
an 'ought' from an 'is', through variations of ethical non-cognitivism, to
different types of usage in 'use' theories of meaning. Opposition to the
distinction (and defence of 'fact-value entanglement') is exemplified by
pragmatists such as Peirce, James and Dewey, and in particular their rejection
of the so-called 'representationalist' model of knowledge, according to which
'human understanding [is] a matter of faithful mirroring [of] a reality which
is brute and deaf to our requests' (13). One difficulty I had with this survey
is that it privileges history over taxonomy, hence the interconnections
between the various ways of making the distinction are not clearly set out,
nor is there a detailed introduction to the remaining papers.
"Part I ('A Counter-History of
the Dichotomy') aims to provide a history of critique of the dichotomy,
focusing on the work of classical pragmatists (papers by H. Putnam and Robert
Schwartz) and critical theorists (papers by Maeve Cooke and John McGuire).
Putnam's own contribution explores Dewey's opposition to the flag bearers of
the fact/value dichotomy of his day -- logical positivists such as Carnap,
Reichenbach and Ayer. Putnam sees Dewey as targeting a fact/value distinction
according to which matters of fact are subject to rational argument and
evaluation, but value judgements (expressing only pseudo-propositions) are not
(28). Against this, Putnam notes that pragmatists have a positive view of the
role of reason in ethical inquiry, although in typically fallibilistic mode
this is not as an Archimedean point prior to and outside of all existing
evaluation, but a self-reflective 'careful evaluation of experience and the
invention of new descriptions of experience' (39). Hence
"The right approach to our
ethical problems is neither to give up the very possibility of intelligent
discussion nor to seek a metaphysical foundation outside of . . . all
problematic situations, but to investigate and discuss and try things out
cooperatively, democratically, and above all fallibilistically. The terrible
thing about the fact/value dichotomy is that by denying that there is such a
thing as a responsible and rational ethical discussion, it "blocks the path of
inquiry" from the very start (39)."