Ceuster's 3 levels
Christian Bölling
63 of [1] which I also attach to this email. What are the abbreviations,
what are the coloured boxes, what is its relation to IAO constructs? Also,
any reference to a source where this figure is explained in more detail is
very much appreciated.
Thanks!
Christian
[1] http://icbo.buffalo.edu/Presentations/Ruttenberg.pdf
Dr. Christian Bölling
Computational Systems Biochemistry
Charité Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
Alan Ruttenberg
I would like to better understand the diagram "Ceuster's 3 levels" on slide
63 of [1] which I also attach to this email. What are the abbreviations,
what are the coloured boxes, what is its relation to IAO constructs?
Also,
any reference to a source where this figure is explained in more detail is
very much appreciated.
Thanks!
Christian
[1] http://icbo.buffalo.edu/Presentations/Ruttenberg.pdf
Dr. Christian Bölling
Computational Systems Biochemistry
Charité Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
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Alan Ruttenberg
“Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are representations of beliefs. “WC: L3 is not only about beliefs, can be about any level, and most are about L1-.
Barry Smith
“Level 1 is anything that exists.
Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... “
Robert Rovetto
If Level 1 (L1) is ANYTHING that exists, then that includes thoughts,
ideas, beliefs.
'exists' is ambiguous. What kind of existence?
If L2 is mind-internal entities (cognitive entities, cognitive
represenations, cognitive artifacts, etc.), and If L1 is that which
MIND-EXTERNALLY exists then thoughts would not be in L1, but in L2.
L1: Anything that mind-externally exists
L2: Cognitive representations, including thoughts.
L3: Artifactual representations / Representational Artifacts.
This needs to be cleared up.
Also, saying that thoughts, beliefs, ideas do not exist even as a
short-hand expression or even as jargon in a specialized ontology-
development group is packed with connotations and impressions, some of
which are potentially dangerous.
Professor Ceusters and I have had a couple of conversations and Q&A's
on this. Perhaps some of the points in that thread would be useful to
the discussion.
What exactly thoughts are is an unanswered question (WC, you accepted
this statement in our conversations) so to assume they are material
entities is a big step. At best, given the state of things, perhaps
what can be said is that they have a material grounding or basis, but
leaving it open as to whether thoughts, ideas, etc., are, themselves,
some entity composed of matter.
Are thoughts to be described or modeled as information artifacts, as
having a content that is concretised in some, perhaps, material basis?
On Feb 24, 4:28 pm, Barry Smith <phism...@buffalo.edu> wrote:
> I would say:
> “Level 1 is anything that exists.
> Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
> Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
> of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... “
>
> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE <ceust...@buffalo.edu>
Gwen Frishkoff
material entity," one that is verifiable and can be operationally
defined (in measurable, scientific terms).
This may not satisfy, but it corresponds to a distinction that is common
in psychological science -- a kind of methodological (as opposed to
philosophical) behaviorism. That is, we recognize that the mind is a
"black box" and that theoretical constructs like "thought," "memory,"
etc. are short-hand for physical-based processes that we don't fully
understand. In this sense, mental processes are not L1 entities, but
they may be isomorphic with L1 entities. At least we hope so, those of
us who believe that mental processes have a physical basis in the body
and brain. This does imply that L2 entities are reducible to L1 entities
in an absolute sense, but even if we knew enough to achieve this
mapping, there would still be value in maintaining the L1/L2
distinction for purposes of talking about things the human mind
perceives as meaningful or "real", just as it is useful to maintain the
distinction between bodies vs. bodily subsystems vs. cells vs. molecules
(etc.).
>> �Level 1 is anything that exists.
>> Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
>> Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
>> of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... �
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> <alanruttenb...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE<ceust...@buffalo.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>> �Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are
>>>> representations of beliefs. �
>>>> WC: L3 is not only about beliefs, can be about any level, and most are
>>>> about L1-.
>>> Whoops - thanks for the correction :)
>>> -Alan
>>>> From: Alan Ruttenberg
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2012 2:54 PM
>>>> To: Christian B�lling
>>>> Cc: informatio...@googlegroups.com ; Werner Ceusters
>>>> Subject: Re: [IAO] Ceuster's 3 levels
>>>> On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 11:16 AM, Christian B�lling
>>>>> Dr. Christian B�lling
>>>>> Computational Systems Biochemistry
>>>>> Charit� Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
>>>>> --
>>>>> informatio...@googlegroups.com
>>>>> To change settings, visit
>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/information-ontology
>>> --
>>> informatio...@googlegroups.com
>>> To change settings, visit
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/information-ontology
--
Gwen Frishkoff, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology
Associate Member, Neuroscience Institute
140 Decatur Street
Urban Life, Rm 712
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3083
Email: gfris...@gsu.edu
Phone: 404-413-6303
Fax: 404-413-6218
"The price of training is always a certain 'trained incapacity': the more we know how to do something, the harder it is to learn to do it differently."
-- A. Kaplan (The Scientific Method in Behavioral Science)
Alan Ruttenberg
Hi. I am not the expert here, but I've taken "exists" to mean "exists as material entity," one that is verifiable and can be operationally defined (in measurable, scientific terms).
This may not satisfy, but it corresponds to a distinction that is common in psychological science -- a kind of methodological (as opposed to philosophical) behaviorism. That is, we recognize that the mind is a "black box" and that theoretical constructs like "thought," "memory," etc. are short-hand for physical-based processes that we don't fully understand.
In this sense, mental processes are not L1 entities, but they may be isomorphic with L1 entities.
At least we hope so, those of us who believe that mental processes have a physical basis in the body and brain. This does imply that L2 entities are reducible to L1 entities in an absolute sense
, but even if we knew enough to achieve this mapping, there would still be value in maintaining the L1/L2 distinction for purposes of talking about things the human mind perceives as meaningful or "real", just as it is useful to maintain the distinction between bodies vs. bodily subsystems vs. cells vs. molecules (etc.).
I would say:
“Level 1 is anything that exists.
Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... “
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
<alanruttenb...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE<ceust...@buffalo.edu>
wrote:
“Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are
representations of beliefs. “
Dr. Christian Bölling
Computational Systems Biochemistry
Charité Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
--
information-ontology@googlegroups.com
To change settings, visit
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To change settings, visit
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--
Gwen Frishkoff, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology
Associate Member, Neuroscience Institute
140 Decatur Street
Urban Life, Rm 712
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3083
Email: gfris...@gsu.edu
Phone: 404-413-6303
Fax: 404-413-6218
"The price of training is always a certain 'trained incapacity': the more we know how to do something, the harder it is to learn to do it differently."
-- A. Kaplan (The Scientific Method in Behavioral Science)
Alan Ruttenberg
Thoughts, ideas, beliefs exist. We have them.
If Level 1 (L1) is ANYTHING that exists, then that includes thoughts,
ideas, beliefs.
'exists' is ambiguous. What kind of existence?
If L2 is mind-internal entities (cognitive entities, cognitive
represenations, cognitive artifacts, etc.), and If L1 is that which
MIND-EXTERNALLY exists then thoughts would not be in L1, but in L2.
L1: Anything that mind-externally exists
L2: Cognitive representations, including thoughts.
L3: Artifactual representations / Representational Artifacts.
This needs to be cleared up.
Also, saying that thoughts, beliefs, ideas do not exist even as a
short-hand expression or even as jargon in a specialized ontology-
development group is packed with connotations and impressions, some of
which are potentially dangerous.
Professor Ceusters and I have had a couple of conversations and Q&A's
on this. Perhaps some of the points in that thread would be useful to
the discussion.
What exactly thoughts are is an unanswered question (WC, you accepted
this statement in our conversations) so to assume they are material
entities is a big step. At best, given the state of things, perhaps
what can be said is that they have a material grounding or basis, but
leaving it open as to whether thoughts, ideas, etc., are, themselves,
some entity composed of matter.
Are thoughts to be described or modeled as information artifacts, as
having a content that is concretised in some, perhaps, material basis?
Gwen Frishkoff
On 2/27/12 12:34 PM, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
Lots said here, so I will react, in order to further the discussion:
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Gwen Frishkoff <gfris...@gsu.edu> wrote:
Hi. I am not the expert here, but I've taken "exists" to mean "exists as material entity," one that is verifiable and can be operationally defined (in measurable, scientific terms).
Exists as a material entity is not the same as verifiable and operationally defined. The former isn't sufficient - wouldn't you count as existing the saccade of an eye and the duration of that process? That satisfies verifiable (you can look at a movie of it) and it can be operationally defined (in terms of the velocity at which direction of the eye changes). But it is not a material entity - that is the eyeball. The eyeball is participant in the process which is saccadic movement.
This may not satisfy, but it corresponds to a distinction that is common in psychological science -- a kind of methodological (as opposed to philosophical) behaviorism. That is, we recognize that the mind is a "black box" and that theoretical constructs like "thought," "memory," etc. are short-hand for physical-based processes that we don't fully understand.
No one disagrees that there are processes and material entities involved in them. But are you saying thought, memory, etc don't exist? We know the details of how some kinds of memory are formed and recalled - in simpler organisms than human. Does that mean that we won't talk anymore of memory any more, but only those processes that are now understood? We also know that arrangement of matter is rather important. So consider the regular placement of molecules in a lattice that forms a crystal. Is that pattern of arrangement (we would call it a quality) real by your account?
I did not say that. I referred to "methodological" (not philosophical) materialism to make this point, but that phrase may not be familiar outside experimental psych, so I'll try to reformulate this a little more clearly. Yes: thought, memory, language etc. all "exist." But we cannot -- ever, even in principle -- measure or observe them. What we do observe are behavioral and brain (i.e, material) events. Strictly speaking, these are what we measure: mental phenomena are theoretical constructions -- not unlike gravity, genes, etc. -- that are inferred from these observations. There is nothing controversial in this position, at least not among experimental psychologists.�
In this sense, mental processes are not L1 entities, but they may be isomorphic with L1 entities.
So mental processes do not exist? Recall that L1 = everything, including L2 and L3.
No. see above.�
At least we hope so, those of us who believe that mental processes have a physical basis in the body and brain. This does imply that L2 entities are reducible to L1 entities in an absolute sense
L2 entities *are* L1 entities period. If you had to draw a hierarchy it would look like:
L1| \
| �\L2 L3�, but even if we knew enough to achieve this mapping, there would still be value �in maintaining the L1/L2 distinction for purposes of talking about things the human mind perceives as meaningful or "real", just as it is useful to maintain the distinction between bodies vs. bodily subsystems vs. cells vs. molecules (etc.).
Just to be clear, do you see the distinction between a cell and a bunch of molecules as merely a useful distinction? I would say, rather, that cells are, even considered as aggregates of molecules, rather special aggregates, having a number of properties that distinguish them, even according to the operation definition you give.
Yep.
Looking backwards, I think you want to hold onto the idea that real things have measurable consequences, but loosen up on the idea that only material entities can be real.
-Alan��
On Feb 24, 4:28 pm, Barry Smith<phism...@buffalo.edu> �wrote:
I would say:
�Level 1 is anything that exists.
Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... �
On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
<alanruttenb...@gmail.com> �wrote:
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE<ceust...@buffalo.edu>
wrote:
�Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are
representations of beliefs. �
Dr. Christian B�lling
Computational Systems Biochemistry
Charit� Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
--
information-ontology@ googlegroups.com
To change settings, visit
http://groups.google.com/ group/information-ontology
--
information-ontology@ googlegroups.com
To change settings, visit
http://groups.google.com/ group/information-ontology
--
Gwen Frishkoff, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology
Associate Member, Neuroscience Institute
140 Decatur Street
Urban Life, Rm 712
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia �30303-3083
Email: gfris...@gsu.edu
Phone: 404-413-6303
Fax: � 404-413-6218
"The price of training is always a certain 'trained incapacity': the more we know how to do something, the harder it is to learn to do it differently."
-- A. Kaplan (The Scientific Method in Behavioral Science)
To change settings, visit
http://groups.google.com/group/information-ontology
Pat Hayes
On Feb 27, 2012, at 3:10 PM, Gwen Frishkoff wrote:
>
>
> On 2/27/12 12:34 PM, Alan Ruttenberg wrote:
>> Lots said here, so I will react, in order to further the discussion:
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Gwen Frishkoff <gfris...@gsu.edu> wrote:
>> Hi. I am not the expert here, but I've taken "exists" to mean "exists as material entity," one that is verifiable and can be operationally defined (in measurable, scientific terms).
>>
>> Exists as a material entity is not the same as verifiable and operationally defined. The former isn't sufficient - wouldn't you count as existing the saccade of an eye and the duration of that process? That satisfies verifiable (you can look at a movie of it) and it can be operationally defined (in terms of the velocity at which direction of the eye changes). But it is not a material entity - that is the eyeball. The eyeball is participant in the process which is saccadic movement.
>>
> I was speaking loosely, but there is a close relationship between material and observable (verifiable). Your more detailed formulation seems consistent with the scientific approach, so I have no objections.
>> This may not satisfy, but it corresponds to a distinction that is common in psychological science -- a kind of methodological (as opposed to philosophical) behaviorism. That is, we recognize that the mind is a "black box" and that theoretical constructs like "thought," "memory," etc. are short-hand for physical-based processes that we don't fully understand.
>>
>> No one disagrees that there are processes and material entities involved in them. But are you saying thought, memory, etc don't exist? We know the details of how some kinds of memory are formed and recalled - in simpler organisms than human. Does that mean that we won't talk anymore of memory any more, but only those processes that are now understood? We also know that arrangement of matter is rather important. So consider the regular placement of molecules in a lattice that forms a crystal. Is that pattern of arrangement (we would call it a quality) real by your account?
>>
> I did not say that. I referred to "methodological" (not philosophical) materialism to make this point, but that phrase may not be familiar outside experimental psych, so I'll try to reformulate this a little more clearly. Yes: thought, memory, language etc. all "exist." But we cannot -- ever, even in principle -- measure or observe them. What we do observe are behavioral and brain (i.e, material) events. Strictly speaking, these are what we measure: mental phenomena are theoretical constructions -- not unlike gravity, genes, etc. -- that are inferred from these observations. There is nothing controversial in this position, at least not among experimental psychologists.
This sounds very much like behaviorism, and I'm afraid that there is a lot about it that is highly controversial, even among some experimental psychologists. Speaking for myself, I am quite sure that my own mental phenomena are not 'theoretical constructs'. You might want to check out what Dan Dennett refers to as "heterophenomenology".
BTW, language is probably more observed, measured, recorded, etc.., than any other single human activity.
In any case, we can make exactly similar points about the L1/2/3 distinctions using less controversial examples. Software exists, but is not physical in the way that, say, hardware is.
Pat Hayes
>> In this sense, mental processes are not L1 entities, but they may be isomorphic with L1 entities.
>>
>> So mental processes do not exist? Recall that L1 = everything, including L2 and L3.
>>
> No. see above.
>> At least we hope so, those of us who believe that mental processes have a physical basis in the body and brain. This does imply that L2 entities are reducible to L1 entities in an absolute sense
>>
>> L2 entities *are* L1 entities period. If you had to draw a hierarchy it would look like:
>>
>> L1
>> | \
>> | \
>> L2 L3
>>
>> , but even if we knew enough to achieve this mapping, there would still be value in maintaining the L1/L2 distinction for purposes of talking about things the human mind perceives as meaningful or "real", just as it is useful to maintain the distinction between bodies vs. bodily subsystems vs. cells vs. molecules (etc.).
>>
>> Just to be clear, do you see the distinction between a cell and a bunch of molecules as merely a useful distinction? I would say, rather, that cells are, even considered as aggregates of molecules, rather special aggregates, having a number of properties that distinguish them, even according to the operation definition you give.
>>
> Yep.
>> Looking backwards, I think you want to hold onto the idea that real things have measurable consequences, but loosen up on the idea that only material entities can be real.
>>
> I don't think I equated "material" with "real." If I did , it was sloppy. Point well taken. :)
>> -Alan
>>
>>
>>
>> On Feb 24, 4:28 pm, Barry Smith<phism...@buffalo.edu> wrote:
>> I would say:
>> “Level 1 is anything that exists.
>> Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
>> Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
>> of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... “
>>
>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> <alanruttenb...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE<ceust...@buffalo.edu>
>> wrote:
>> “Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are
>> representations of beliefs. “
>> WC: L3 is not only about beliefs, can be about any level, and most are
>> about L1-.
>> Whoops - thanks for the correction :)
>> -Alan
>> From: Alan Ruttenberg
>> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2012 2:54 PM
>> To: Christian Bölling
>> Cc: information-ontology@ googlegroups.com ; Werner Ceusters
>> Subject: Re: [IAO] Ceuster's 3 levels
>> Dr. Christian Bölling
>> Computational Systems Biochemistry
>> Charité Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry
>> --
>> information-ontology@ googlegroups.com
>> To change settings, visit
>> http://groups.google.com/ group/information-ontology
>> --
>> information-ontology@ googlegroups.com
>> To change settings, visit
>> http://groups.google.com/ group/information-ontology
>>
>> --
>> Gwen Frishkoff, Ph.D.
>> Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology
>> Associate Member, Neuroscience Institute
>> 140 Decatur Street
>> Urban Life, Rm 712
>> Georgia State University
> --
> informatio...@googlegroups.com
> To change settings, visit
> http://groups.google.com/group/information-ontology
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Gwen Frishkoff
I'll just offer, again, that my statements are based on methodological,
not philosophical behaviorism. I do not deny the reality of mental
processes, and I do not claim that the processes are themselves
theoretical constructs, but we do not observe these processes. What we
observe are behavioral and brain processes, and what we "know" about
psychological processes are based on inference. That's just the way it
is. I have not found Dennett's account very compelling, but one of these
days I'll re-read it and see if I missed something important.
Best,
Gwen
>>> �Level 1 is anything that exists.
>>> Level 2 is beliefs, ideas, thoughts, ... [in people's minds/heads, subjective]
>>> Level 3 are published (written down, printed, posted) representations
>>> of beliefs, ideas, thoughts .... �
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Alan Ruttenberg
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <alanruttenb...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:51 PM, Ceusters at CoE<ceust...@buffalo.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>> �Level 1 is anything that exists. Level 2 is beliefs, Level 3 are
>>> representations of beliefs. �
>>> WC: L3 is not only about beliefs, can be about any level, and most are
>>> about L1-.
>>> Whoops - thanks for the correction :)
>>> -Alan
>>> From: Alan Ruttenberg
>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 21, 2012 2:54 PM
>>> To: Christian B�lling
>>> Cc: information-ontology@ googlegroups.com ; Werner Ceusters
>>> Subject: Re: [IAO] Ceuster's 3 levels
>>> On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 11:16 AM, Christian B�lling
>>> Dr. Christian B�lling
>>> Computational Systems Biochemistry
>>> Charit� Medical School - Institute for Biochemistry