All,I'm starting a new topic on wavefunctions in this reply to Jason because he brings up a very important issue.The usual interpretation of wavefunctions are that particles are 'spread out' in the fixed common pre-existing space that quantum theory mistakenly assumes, that they are superpostions of states in this space.However in my book on Reality in Part III, Elementals I propose another interpretation, namely that particles are discrete information entities in logical computational space, and that what wavefunctions actually are is descriptions of how space can become dimensionalized by decoherence events (since decoherence events produce exact conserved relationships between the dimensional variables of interacting particles).
The mathematical results are exactly the same, its just a different interpretation.
enables us to conceptually unify GR and QM and also resolves all so called quantum 'paradox' as quantum processes are paradoxical ONLY with respect to the fixed pre-existing space mistakenly assumed.
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
3. Of course quantum computers are possible. Simple examples already exist, but fundamentally all computations take place in logical information space, as I've described before in a number of posts.
However I don't think the answers to these questions will help you understand the theory. Refer to my other topic on this group titled "Yes, my book does cover quantum reality", or refer to the book itself, or I can explain further....
On Friday, December 27, 2013 9:17:52 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:19 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
All,I'm starting a new topic on wavefunctions in this reply to Jason because he brings up a very important issue.The usual interpretation of wavefunctions are that particles are 'spread out' in the fixed common pre-existing space that quantum theory mistakenly assumes, that they are superpostions of states in this space.However in my book on Reality in Part III, Elementals I propose another interpretation, namely that particles are discrete information entities in logical computational space, and that what wavefunctions actually are is descriptions of how space can become dimensionalized by decoherence events (since decoherence events produce exact conserved relationships between the dimensional variables of interacting particles).I am not sure that I follow, but it sounds like an interesting idea. It reminds me of Ron Garret's talk, where he says metaphorically "we live in a simulation running on a quantum computer": http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfcThe mathematical results are exactly the same, its just a different interpretation.I am not sure if it is possible in any theory consistent with QM to deny completely the notion of superposition. How can the single-electron double-slit experiment be explained without the electron being in more than one place at the same time?I think it would help me understand your interpretation if you answered the following questions. According to your interpretation:1. Are faster-than-light influences involved?2. When it is determined whether or not Schrodinger's cat is alive or dead?3. Are quantum computers possible, and if so, where are all the intermediate computations performed?JasonHowever this approach that space is something that emerges from quantum events rather than being a fixed pre-existing background to events enables us to conceptually unify GR and QM and also resolves all so called quantum 'paradox' as quantum processes are paradoxical ONLY with respect to the fixed pre-existing space mistakenly assumed.
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On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.
Jason,PS to answer your other question. In the double slit experiment there is no pre-existing dimensional space for the electron to be in more than one place in.
Everything is being computed exactly in the fundamental non-physical dimensionless information space. What we call space is actually networks of dimensional relationships between quantum events that emerge from those quantum events. Empty space is unobservable and therefore not a part of reality.
All that is observable is events, in this case specifically the dimensional relationships between the participants in quantum events imposed by the conservation laws. But his occurs in logical (non-dimensional) computational space, not a physical dimensional space.
So in the double slit experiment the actual events are the decoherences of the electrons with the screen which produce exact dimensional relationships. The apparent wave behavior of the electrons passing through the slits is a non-observable backward inference based on the wavefunction equations which are not electrons spread out in multiple locations in a pre-existing space but the mathematical equivalent probabilities of how space could dimensionalize when those electrons decohere.
This is a subtle theory, and hopefully I can explain further if necessary, or you can read Part III of my book.....
Edgar
On Friday, December 27, 2013 9:17:52 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:19 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
All,I'm starting a new topic on wavefunctions in this reply to Jason because he brings up a very important issue.The usual interpretation of wavefunctions are that particles are 'spread out' in the fixed common pre-existing space that quantum theory mistakenly assumes, that they are superpostions of states in this space.However in my book on Reality in Part III, Elementals I propose another interpretation, namely that particles are discrete information entities in logical computational space, and that what wavefunctions actually are is descriptions of how space can become dimensionalized by decoherence events (since decoherence events produce exact conserved relationships between the dimensional variables of interacting particles).I am not sure that I follow, but it sounds like an interesting idea. It reminds me of Ron Garret's talk, where he says metaphorically "we live in a simulation running on a quantum computer": http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfcThe mathematical results are exactly the same, its just a different interpretation.I am not sure if it is possible in any theory consistent with QM to deny completely the notion of superposition. How can the single-electron double-slit experiment be explained without the electron being in more than one place at the same time?I think it would help me understand your interpretation if you answered the following questions. According to your interpretation:1. Are faster-than-light influences involved?2. When it is determined whether or not Schrodinger's cat is alive or dead?3. Are quantum computers possible, and if so, where are all the intermediate computations performed?JasonHowever this approach that space is something that emerges from quantum events rather than being a fixed pre-existing background to events enables us to conceptually unify GR and QM and also resolves all so called quantum 'paradox' as quantum processes are paradoxical ONLY with respect to the fixed pre-existing space mistakenly assumed.
--
On 28 December 2013 16:26, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.Huw Price's time symmetry also solves the paradox.
Bell agreed with him on this, so I think it's probably a valid result even if not widely known. I'm not sure that Price's ontology is intended as a "rival" to Everett, however, although it may introduce modifications.
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,
Answers to your 3 questions.
1. No.
If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
3. Of course quantum computers are possible. Simple examples already exist, but fundamentally all computations take place in logical information space, as I've described before in a number of posts.
If a quantum computer can factor a randomly generated semi-prime of 1,000,000 digits, where is the computation for this being performed? This is a computation that is so complex that no conventional computer (even the size of the universe) could solve this problem if given a trillion years, yet a device that could fit on your desk could solve it in less than a second. If the exponentially exploding states in the superposition are not really there, there is apparently no explanation at all for where the result of the computation comes from.
Jason,
All your questions assume a pre-existing space that doesn't actually exist. When it is recognized that space emerges from events rather than being a fixed background to them these questions disappear.
E.g. in the EPR 'paradox' the opposite spin relationship of the two particles is fixed when they are created by the particle property conservation law, but the absolutely crucial point is that that when it is created that relationship is only in the mutual frame of the two particles which is not yet connected to the frame of the observer. It is only when the frame of the particles and the observer are aligned by a common dimensional event (the measurement of the spin of one particle by the observer) that both frames become aligned and thus the spin of the second particle becomes apparent in the observer's frame.
The exact spin relationship between the particles existed since their creation. It had to since their creation determined it. However that frame was independent of that of the observer until a single common event connected the two frames at which time every dimensional relationship of both frames became aligned. It is basically how two independent spaces must be completely ignorant of each other until connected by a common dimensional event at which point all dimensionality of both become automatically aligned in a single dimensionality.
Thus there is NO need for faster than light transmission, and your "As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds." is certainly not true (more accurately does not apply) in this model.
Jason,
All your questions assume a pre-existing space that doesn't actually exist. When it is recognized that space emerges from events rather than being a fixed background to them these questions disappear.
E.g. in the EPR 'paradox' the opposite spin relationship of the two particles is fixed when they are created by the particle property conservation law, but the absolutely crucial point is that that when it is created that relationship is only in the mutual frame of the two particles which is not yet connected to the frame of the observer. It is only when the frame of the particles and the observer are aligned by a common dimensional event (the measurement of the spin of one particle by the observer) that both frames become aligned and thus the spin of the second particle becomes apparent in the observer's frame.
The exact spin relationship between the particles existed since their creation.
It had to since their creation determined it. However that frame was independent of that of the observer until a single common event connected the two frames at which time every dimensional relationship of both frames became aligned. It is basically how two independent spaces must be completely ignorant of each other until connected by a common dimensional event at which point all dimensionality of both become automatically aligned in a single dimensionality.
Thus there is NO need for faster than light transmission, and your "As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds." is certainly not true (more accurately does not apply) in this model.
Second, the cat is always either alive or dead in its own frame. But that frame is unknowable by some external observer until it becomes observable via a common event between that frame and that observer's frame (the measurement of whether it is alive or dead).
We can't assume some single universal dimensional frame. All dimensional frames arise independently of each other and unaligned with each other (because there is no common fixed pre-existing standard frame of reference, there are only individual independent frames emerging from connected networks of dimensional events) until they are connected and then dimensionally aligned by some shared event.
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:28 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 28 December 2013 16:26, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.Huw Price's time symmetry also solves the paradox.Is this the same as, or related to Cramer's transactional interpretation?
Bell agreed with him on this, so I think it's probably a valid result even if not widely known. I'm not sure that Price's ontology is intended as a "rival" to Everett, however, although it may introduce modifications.Interesting, do you have any sources you can point me to on this?
That's not really true. If you look at the wikipedia table that you cited, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics you see that Popper'sOn 12/27/2013 7:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,
Answers to your 3 questions.
1. No.
If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.
, time symmetric,
many-minds,
consistent histories,
and the relational interpretation
are all local, i.e. no FTL.
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
However, keep in mind that all this computation takes place in this world, otherwise the processes could not interfere and converge to a (probable) answer.
3. Of course quantum computers are possible. Simple examples already exist, but fundamentally all computations take place in logical information space, as I've described before in a number of posts.
If a quantum computer can factor a randomly generated semi-prime of 1,000,000 digits, where is the computation for this being performed? This is a computation that is so complex that no conventional computer (even the size of the universe) could solve this problem if given a trillion years, yet a device that could fit on your desk could solve it in less than a second. If the exponentially exploding states in the superposition are not really there, there is apparently no explanation at all for where the result of the computation comes from.
On 28 December 2013 18:39, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:28 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 28 December 2013 16:26, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.Huw Price's time symmetry also solves the paradox.Is this the same as, or related to Cramer's transactional interpretation?No, it's a lot simpler. It doesn't add any new physics, and removes one assumption.
Bell agreed with him on this, so I think it's probably a valid result even if not widely known. I'm not sure that Price's ontology is intended as a "rival" to Everett, however, although it may introduce modifications.Interesting, do you have any sources you can point me to on this?I'd start with "Time's arrow and Archimedes' point" by Huw Price.
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 1:26 AM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 28 December 2013 18:39, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:28 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 28 December 2013 16:26, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote:
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.If there are no faster-than-light (FTL) influences, then how does your interpretation address the EPR paradox ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox )? As a previously mentioned, according to Bell's theorem, there is only one known solution to the paradox that does not involve FTL influences, and that is Everett's theory of many-worlds.Huw Price's time symmetry also solves the paradox.Is this the same as, or related to Cramer's transactional interpretation?No, it's a lot simpler. It doesn't add any new physics, and removes one assumption.What is that assumption that is removed?
Jason,Answers to your 3 questions.1. No.2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
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Jason,
Clock time is emergent from comp but comp takes place sequentially in P-time, which is effectively the processor cycles of comp. This is another way the clock time P-time distinction works to produce reality as it exists....
No, the particles MUST have their properties determined at the time of creation to obey the law of conservation of particle properties.
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r />
Jason,
Clock time is emergent from comp but comp takes place sequentially in P-time, which is effectively the processor cycles of comp.
One interpretation by some physicists with Cramer's transactional model, implies that information is coming from the future, and handshaking with the paste to create the present. Price's old book seems to imply this as well.
One interpretation by some physicists with Cramer's transactional model, implies that information is coming from the future, and handshaking with the paste to create the present. Price's old book seems to imply this as well.
Cramer's transactional interpretation is non-local.
--
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
The collapse for Wigner's friend can be interpreted either epistemically or by MWI.
Brent
Anny: What happened to that poor cat? It looks half dead.
Erwin: I don't know. Ask Wigner.
Eugene: I just looked in and it collapsed!
--
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
What makes it incoherent though?
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
Jason
>> Are faster-than-light influences involved?
> No.
>> 2. When it is determined whether or not Schrodinger's cat is alive or dead?
>> The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
>> Cramer's transactional interpretation is non-local.
> Not really. It's slower-than-light, but retro.
> violations of Bell's inequality can also be explained by time symmetry (Huw Price and John Bell, private communications).
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 6:15 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> Cramer's transactional interpretation is non-local.
> Not really. It's slower-than-light, but retro.
If you can reach the finish line of a race before you even hear the starting gun I'd say you're pretty damn fast.
From Wikipedia:
"The transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics is explicitly non-local [...] As such it incorporates the non-locality demonstrated by the Bell test experiments and eliminates the observer dependent reality that plagues the Copenhagen Interpretation"
John K Clark
If an influence can go backward in time as well as forward then it can effectively have FTL influence, as in the EPR diagram in the Elitzur/Dolev paper:On 12/29/2013 12:28 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 6:15 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> Cramer's transactional interpretation is non-local.
> Not really. It's slower-than-light, but retro.
If you can reach the finish line of a race before you even hear the starting gun I'd say you're pretty damn fast.
Brent
5. It is not clear how the transactional interpretation handles the quantum mechanics of more than one particle.
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote>> Are faster-than-light influences involved?
> No.That means you think things are local.>> 2. When it is determined whether or not Schrodinger's cat is alive or dead?>> The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.
And yes I know that's crazy, but complain to the universe not to me. Your ideas are not crazy, and that is exactly why they're wrong. If I were making a universe I'd make it your way too, but unfortunately Yehowah got the job not me.
John K Clark
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
What makes it incoherent though?
But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...). In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian. Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture. That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 1:47 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
What makes it incoherent though?
But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...). In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
So if someone keeps alternating between measuring the spin on the y axis, and then the spin on the x axis, are they not multiplying themselves continuously into diverging states (under MWI)? Even though these states only weakly interfere, are they not still superposed (that is, the particles involved in a simultaneous combination of possessing many different states for their properties)?
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian. Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture. That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
Are there pure states in Everett's interpretation? Doesn't one have to consider the wave function of the universe and consider it all the way into the past?
In any case, returning to the original point that began this tangent, do agree that QM interpretations which are anti-realist (or deny the reality of the superposition) are unable to describe where the intermediate computations that produce the answer to a quantum computation, take place?
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
It's a physical process whose outcome is predicted by QM.
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 5:29 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 2:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 1:47 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs.
�
"No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
�
�
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.�Superposition is just a question of basis.� An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? �If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? �Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?�
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.�
What makes it incoherent though?�
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.
Right, according to Everett, the world state becomes a superposition of states of the form |x0,x1,...> where each xi is either +x, -x, +y, or -y.� And per the Bucky Ball, Young's slit experiment, the spins don't have to observed by anyone.� If the silver atom just goes thru the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and hits the laboratory wall, the superposition is still created.� If it just goes out the window and into space...it's not so clear.But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...).� In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
So if someone keeps alternating between measuring the spin on the y axis, and then the spin on the x axis, are they not multiplying themselves continuously into diverging states (under MWI)? �Even though these states only weakly interfere, are they not still superposed (that is, the particles involved in a simultaneous combination of possessing many different states for their properties)?
�
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian.� Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture.� That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
Are there pure states in Everett's interpretation? Doesn't one have to consider the wave function of the universe and consider it all the way into the past?
I suppose the universe could have started in a mixed state, but most cosmologists would invoke Ockham and assume it started in a pure state - which, assuming only unitary evolution, means it's still in a pure state.� Of course since inflation there can be entanglements across event horizons, so FAPP that creates mixed states.
They take place in a quantum computer.
In any case, returning to the original point that began this tangent, do agree that QM interpretations which are anti-realist (or deny the reality of the superposition) are unable to describe where the intermediate computations that produce the answer to a quantum computation, take place?
And the quantum computer is a coherent, long-lived superposition with a number of real states exponential with the number of its qubits.�
If superpositions are real and long-lived, and involve an arbitrary number of particles, it seems there is no reason that people could not also be in superpositions.
�
It's a physical process whose outcome is predicted by QM.
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
We limit the power and effectiveness our own theories and stifle progress, when we don't put forward theories that make bold statements about reality.�
Bohr's (and seemingly Fuch's) positions are so conservative as to never be falsified,
but they also inhibit progress and new understandings. For example, general purpose quantum computers may not have been invented had Deutsch not been operating under Everett's paradigm.
"You are the only contemporary physicist, besides�Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality�reality as something independent of what is experimentally established." --- Einstein in a letter to Schrodinger
On 12/29/2013 3:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 5:29 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 2:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 1:47 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs.
"No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.
What makes it incoherent though?
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.
Right, according to Everett, the world state becomes a superposition of states of the form |x0,x1,...> where each xi is either +x, -x, +y, or -y. And per the Bucky Ball, Young's slit experiment, the spins don't have to observed by anyone. If the silver atom just goes thru the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and hits the laboratory wall, the superposition is still created. If it just goes out the window and into space...it's not so clear.But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...). In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
So if someone keeps alternating between measuring the spin on the y axis, and then the spin on the x axis, are they not multiplying themselves continuously into diverging states (under MWI)? Even though these states only weakly interfere, are they not still superposed (that is, the particles involved in a simultaneous combination of possessing many different states for their properties)?
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian. Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture. That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
Are there pure states in Everett's interpretation? Doesn't one have to consider the wave function of the universe and consider it all the way into the past?
I suppose the universe could have started in a mixed state, but most cosmologists would invoke Ockham and assume it started in a pure state - which, assuming only unitary evolution, means it's still in a pure state. Of course since inflation there can be entanglements across event horizons, so FAPP that creates mixed states.
They take place in a quantum computer.
In any case, returning to the original point that began this tangent, do agree that QM interpretations which are anti-realist (or deny the reality of the superposition) are unable to describe where the intermediate computations that produce the answer to a quantum computation, take place?
And the quantum computer is a coherent, long-lived superposition with a number of real states exponential with the number of its qubits.
I'm not sure what you mean by "a number of real states"? It has only one state (which is in a complex Hilbert space), which can be written as a superposition of some set of basis states - but that's true of my refrigerator too.
If superpositions are real and long-lived, and involve an arbitrary number of particles, it seems there is no reason that people could not also be in superpositions.
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
It's a physical process whose outcome is predicted by QM.
We limit the power and effectiveness our own theories and stifle progress, when we don't put forward theories that make bold statements about reality.
And we divert progress when we adopt intuitively appealing theories with no operational content and try to reify them.
Nevertheless they both published more papers than Everett (whose interpretation doesn't seem testable either - if it were, it would be a theory instead of an intepretation).
Bohr's (and seemingly Fuch's) positions are so conservative as to never be falsified,
Feynman wrote about quantum computation well before Deutsch.
but they also inhibit progress and new understandings. For example, general purpose quantum computers may not have been invented had Deutsch not been operating under Everett's paradigm.
"You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as something independent of what is experimentally established." --- Einstein in a letter to Schrodinger
Everybody believes in reality. Nobody agrees on what it is. :-)
That is the only way to make progress. �Propose theories, and falsify them. �Ockham says between theories that make equal predictions, simpler ones are better, and it for theories of equal simplicity, ones that can explain more are also better. �Anti-realist interpretations of QM have no adequate explanation for quantum computers.�
They say "don't ask" on fundamental questions, which is never a good attitude to have in science.
On 12/29/2013 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
There's nothing "anti-realist" about relational or Bayesian subjective interpretations, they just don't reify the wave function as you would like them to. Bohm used to make the same complaint that other theories weren't "realistic". Fuchs et al have as good an explanation of quantum computers as any dynamic quantum system, there's nothing special about computers - it's just not one that appeals to you.That is the only way to make progress. Propose theories, and falsify them. Ockham says between theories that make equal predictions, simpler ones are better, and it for theories of equal simplicity, ones that can explain more are also better. Anti-realist interpretations of QM have no adequate explanation for quantum computers.
They say "don't ask" on fundamental questions, which is never a good attitude to have in science.
That's your straw man attribution. You've apparently stopped asking and decided you have the answer.
Brent
The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work.
--—John von Neumann
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 11:43 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
There's nothing "anti-realist" about relational or Bayesian subjective interpretations, they just don't reify the wave function as you would like them to.� Bohm used to make the same complaint that other theories weren't "realistic".� Fuchs et al have as good an explanation of quantum computers as any dynamic quantum system, there's nothing special about computers - it's just not one that appeals to you.That is the only way to make progress. �Propose theories, and falsify them. �Ockham says between theories that make equal predictions, simpler ones are better, and it for theories of equal simplicity, ones that can explain more are also better. �Anti-realist interpretations of QM have no adequate explanation for quantum computers.�
Computers in particular, while not special, are good examples because they illustrate that nothing known in our universe (aside from the superposition) has the necessarily complexity to produce answers to certain complex problems.
�
They say "don't ask" on fundamental questions, which is never a good attitude to have in science.
That's your straw man attribution.� You've apparently stopped asking and decided you have the answer.
I would rather choose a speculative interpretation that turns out to be wrong then say QM needs no interpretation, nor should we look for one, as the paper you recently cited suggested.
�
Brent
The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to� interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a� mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal� interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of� such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is� expected to work.
��� --�John von Neumann
If Fuchs et al operated according to this quote, they would see that a model is not the same thing as the description/predictions of observed phenomena that it makes.
If we identify reality only with observed phenomena, what is to prevent us from falling into solipsism or idealism?
On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 10:08 PM, Edgar L. Owen <edga...@att.net> wrote>> Are faster-than-light influences involved?
> No.That means you think things are local.>> 2. When it is determined whether or not Schrodinger's cat is alive or dead?
>> The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.
And yes I know that's crazy, but complain to the universe not to me.
Your ideas are not crazy, and that is exactly why they're wrong. If I were making a universe I'd make it your way too, but unfortunately Yehowah got the job not me.
John K Clark
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Not quite, violations of Bell's inequality can also be explained by time symmetry (Huw Price and John Bell, private communications).
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On 12/29/2013 2:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 1:47 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs."No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
What makes it incoherent though?
But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...). In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
So if someone keeps alternating between measuring the spin on the y axis, and then the spin on the x axis, are they not multiplying themselves continuously into diverging states (under MWI)? Even though these states only weakly interfere, are they not still superposed (that is, the particles involved in a simultaneous combination of possessing many different states for their properties)?
Right, according to Everett, the world state becomes a superposition of states of the form |x0,x1,...> where each xi is either +x, -x, +y, or -y. And per the Bucky Ball, Young's slit experiment, the spins don't have to observed by anyone. If the silver atom just goes thru the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and hits the laboratory wall, the superposition is still created. If it just goes out the window and into space...it's not so clear.
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian. Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture. That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
Are there pure states in Everett's interpretation? Doesn't one have to consider the wave function of the universe and consider it all the way into the past?
I suppose the universe could have started in a mixed state, but most cosmologists would invoke Ockham and assume it started in a pure state - which, assuming only unitary evolution, means it's still in a pure state. Of course since inflation there can be entanglements across event horizons, so FAPP that creates mixed states.
In any case, returning to the original point that began this tangent, do agree that QM interpretations which are anti-realist (or deny the reality of the superposition) are unable to describe where the intermediate computations that produce the answer to a quantum computation, take place?
They take place in a quantum computer.
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
It's a physical process whose outcome is predicted by QM.
On 12/29/2013 3:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 5:29 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 2:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 1:47 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 8:32 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/28/2013 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Dec 28, 2013 at 7:12 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/27/2013 10:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
To that I would add the purely epistemic "non-intepretation" of Peres and Fuchs.
"No interpretation needed" -- I can interpret this in two ways, one way is to just take the math and equations literally (this leads to Everett), the other is "shut up and calculate", which leads no where really.
Superposition is just a question of basis. An eigenstate in one basis is a superposition in another.
2. Determined by which observer? The cat is always either dead or alive. It's just a matter of someone making a measurement to find out.
So are you saying that before the measurement the cat is neither alive nor dead, both alive and dead, or definitely alive or definitely dead? If you, (and I think you are), saying that the cat is always definitely alive or definitely dead, then about about the radioactive atom? Is it ever in a state of being decayed and not decayed? If you say no, it sounds like you are denying the reality of the superposition, which some interpretations do, but then this leads to difficulties explaining how quantum computers work (which require the superposition to exist).
Can you provide a concrete example where some system can simultaneously be considered to be both in a superposition and not? Is this like the superposition having collapsed for Wigner's friend while remaining for Wigner before he enters the room?
?? Every pure state can be written as a superposition of a complete set of basis states - that's just Hilbert space math.
So then when is the system not in a superposition?
When it's an incoherent mixture of pure states.
What makes it incoherent though?
If the density matrix is not a projection operator, i.e. rho^2 =/= rho, it's incoherent.
Right, according to Everett, the world state becomes a superposition of states of the form |x0,x1,...> where each xi is either +x, -x, +y, or -y. And per the Bucky Ball, Young's slit experiment, the spins don't have to observed by anyone. If the silver atom just goes thru the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and hits the laboratory wall, the superposition is still created. If it just goes out the window and into space...it's not so clear.But really I just meant that in theory there is a basis in which any given pure state is just (1,0,0,...). In theory there is a 'dead&alive' basis in which Schrodinger's cat can be represented just like a spin-up state is a superposition is a spin-left basis.
So if someone keeps alternating between measuring the spin on the y axis, and then the spin on the x axis, are they not multiplying themselves continuously into diverging states (under MWI)? Even though these states only weakly interfere, are they not still superposed (that is, the particles involved in a simultaneous combination of possessing many different states for their properties)?
An electron in a superposition, when measured, is still in a superposition according to MWI. It is just that the person doing the measurement is now also caught up in that superposition.
The only thing that can destroy this superposition is to move everything back into the same state it was originally for all the possible diverged states, which should practically never happen for a superposition that has leaked into the environment.
In Everett's interpretation a pure state can never evolve into a mixture because the evolution is via a Hermitian operator, the Hamiltonian. Decoherence makes the submatrix corresponding to the system+instrument to approximate a mixture. That's why it can be interpreted as giving classical probabilities.
Are there pure states in Everett's interpretation? Doesn't one have to consider the wave function of the universe and consider it all the way into the past?
I suppose the universe could have started in a mixed state, but most cosmologists would invoke Ockham and assume it started in a pure state - which, assuming only unitary evolution, means it's still in a pure state. Of course since inflation there can be entanglements across event horizons, so FAPP that creates mixed states.
They take place in a quantum computer.
In any case, returning to the original point that began this tangent, do agree that QM interpretations which are anti-realist (or deny the reality of the superposition) are unable to describe where the intermediate computations that produce the answer to a quantum computation, take place?
And the quantum computer is a coherent, long-lived superposition with a number of real states exponential with the number of its qubits.
I'm not sure what you mean by "a number of real states"? It has only one state (which is in a complex Hilbert space), which can be written as a superposition of some set of basis states - but that's true of my refrigerator too.
If superpositions are real and long-lived, and involve an arbitrary number of particles, it seems there is no reason that people could not also be in superpositions.
What would Fuchs say about quantum computation?
It's a physical process whose outcome is predicted by QM.
We limit the power and effectiveness our own theories and stifle progress, when we don't put forward theories that make bold statements about reality.
And we divert progress when we adopt intuitively appealing theories with no operational content and try to reify them.
Bohr's (and seemingly Fuch's) positions are so conservative as to never be falsified,
Nevertheless they both published more papers than Everett (whose interpretation doesn't seem testable either - if it were, it would be a theory instead of an intepretation).
but they also inhibit progress and new understandings. For example, general purpose quantum computers may not have been invented had Deutsch not been operating under Everett's paradigm.
Feynman wrote about quantum computation well before Deutsch.
"You are the only contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as something independent of what is experimentally established." --- Einstein in a letter to Schrodinger
Everybody believes in reality. Nobody agrees on what it is. :-)
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 6:52 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 3:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Everett's idea is more properly a theory. It explains the phenomenon of collapse without supposing it is the other ideas of QM that try to interpret what is seen (without offering any explanation for them).As Deutsch says, we wouldn't call dinosaurs an interpretation of fossils when they are the very thing that explains the appearance of the fossils. So it is with Everett and collapse.
On 12/29/2013 9:05 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 11:43 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/29/2013 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
There's nothing "anti-realist" about relational or Bayesian subjective interpretations, they just don't reify the wave function as you would like them to. Bohm used to make the same complaint that other theories weren't "realistic". Fuchs et al have as good an explanation of quantum computers as any dynamic quantum system, there's nothing special about computers - it's just not one that appeals to you.That is the only way to make progress. Propose theories, and falsify them. Ockham says between theories that make equal predictions, simpler ones are better, and it for theories of equal simplicity, ones that can explain more are also better. Anti-realist interpretations of QM have no adequate explanation for quantum computers.
Computers in particular, while not special, are good examples because they illustrate that nothing known in our universe (aside from the superposition) has the necessarily complexity to produce answers to certain complex problems.
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
They say "don't ask" on fundamental questions, which is never a good attitude to have in science.
That's your straw man attribution. You've apparently stopped asking and decided you have the answer.
I would rather choose a speculative interpretation that turns out to be wrong then say QM needs no interpretation, nor should we look for one, as the paper you recently cited suggested.
Brent
The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work.
--—John von Neumann
If Fuchs et al operated according to this quote, they would see that a model is not the same thing as the description/predictions of observed phenomena that it makes.
But it could be. You only know the observations - you don't know the reality in itself.
If we identify reality only with observed phenomena, what is to prevent us from falling into solipsism or idealism?
Solipism doesn't seem to work well. When I kick people they kick back. :-)
Brent
"I'm a Solipist, and I must say I'm surprised there aren't more of us."
-- letter to Bertrand Russell
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But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum.� But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem).� So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. �You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
It is conceptually no different than doing a calculation in ordinary probability theory: I start with some initial conditions and I introduce a probability distribution and compute a probability for some event. In that intermediate step I introduced a continuous probability distribution which implies an *infinite* number of bits. Nobody thinks this requires an infinite number of worlds.
Brent
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
> If an influence can go backward in time as well as forward then it can effectively have FTL influence,
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,
>> That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.> Or measurements are multi-valued. MWI has both locality and realism.
That's your story and you're sticking to it.
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.> Or measurements are multi-valued. MWI has both locality and realism.If the many World's Theory was local AND realistic we'd know with certainty that it's wrong because any theory that is consistent with experimental results can NOT be both.
But MWI could be true because although it is realistic it is not local.
A entire parallel universe as big as our own that you can never go to or even see is about as far from being local as you can get.
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
That's your story and you're sticking to it.
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,
Do you disagree?
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
So it depends on whether the computations are sufficient to instantiate such a world.It is certainly relevant that we can only access N-bits of an N-qubit computer. But what it shows is not certain.
That's your story and you're sticking to it.
That we can only access N-bits of a mind from any one world is irrelevant, as all the conscious states exist in the intermediate states,
Do you disagree?
Brent
--
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
"ability"whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical computations,
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then N qubits could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't.On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
"ability"whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical computations,
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce an answer.
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:00 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.> Or measurements are multi-valued. MWI has both locality and realism.If the many World's Theory was local AND realistic we'd know with certainty that it's wrong because any theory that is consistent with experimental results can NOT be both.There are at least two possible answers to the bell inequalities:1. Nonlocal influences2. Mutliple outcomes for each measurement
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs. It is conceptually no different than doing a calculation in ordinary probability theory: I start with some initial conditions and I introduce a probability distribution and compute a probability for some event. In that intermediate step I introduced a continuous probability distribution which implies an *infinite* number of bits. Nobody thinks this requires an infinite number of worlds.
Brent
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On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 4:09 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:> If an influence can go backward in time as well as forward then it can effectively have FTL influence,We already know for a fact that faster than light influences exist, and this has nothing to do with any theory, it was found experimentally.
Of course this does not mean you can sent a message faster than light, matter and energy and information are still limited by the speed of light, but influences can certainly go astronomically faster, probably infinitely faster.
On Sun, Dec 29, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:>> That means you think things are realistic, and that means I know for a fact your thinking is wrong, not crazy but wrong. We know from experiment that Bell's inequality is violated, and that means that locality or realism or both MUST be wrong.> Or measurements are multi-valued. MWI has both locality and realism.If the many World's Theory was local AND realistic we'd know with certainty that it's wrong because any theory that is consistent with experimental results can NOT be both.
But MWI could be true because although it is realistic it is not local.
A entire parallel universe as big as our own that you can never go to or even see is about as far from being local as you can get.
On 12/30/2013 2:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:45 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
I'm not sure what you mean by "power";On 12/30/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course that is assuming the very proposition you're arguing.On 12/30/2013 12:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:41 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Why is that "the real question"? Saying yes to the doctor implies that a classical computer can support consciousness.On 12/30/2013 11:17 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 2:00 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs.On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
Can such "calculation fictions" support conciousness? That's the real question. If they can, then you can't avoid many-worlds (or at least many minds).
Because with computationalism, if a quantum computer runs the computations that support a mind, there would be many resulting conscious states, and first person views.
No, I am trying to show that given computationalism, there is nothing "fictional" about these computations. They would have very bit the same power to yield consciousness as the computations of a classical computer. Do you disagree with this?
"ability"whether it means effectively or potentially? I don't think consciousness (at least like ours) can occur except in the context of a quasi-classical world.
Each of the myriad of computations executed in the quantum computer can be seen as separate classical computations. I agree classical computation is what is behind consciousness, so if quantum computation is the superposition of many classical computations,
But that's a very questionable assumption. If it were literally true then N qubits could do as much a 2^N classical computers, but they can't.
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce an answer.
> There are at least two possible answers to the bell inequalities:1. Nonlocal influences
>2. Mutliple outcomes for each measurement
> If you choose 2, then you don't need 1.
>> But MWI could be true because although it is realistic it is not local.
> It is local,
> You can have multiple outcomes for a measurement and realism.
> Locality has a specific definition in physics,
> that things are only affected by other things (fields or particles) in direct proximity to each other.
> It says nothing about the existence of places we can or can't go to.
> There is no faster than light influences in QM. You need to have an explicit physical collapse to have that. In the MW, the non locality is only apparent.
> Alice eventually just tells Bob in which partition of the multiverse they have situated themselves in.
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:34 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
> There are at least two possible answers to the bell inequalities:1. Nonlocal influences
There are not "at least two" there are exactly two, but yes, things might not be local.>2. Mutliple outcomes for each measurementYes, things might not be realistic. We know that at best one of those 2 commonplace assumptions is wrong, at worse both are.
> If you choose 2, then you don't need 1.Yes, but locality OR realism OR both must be wrong.>> But MWI could be true because although it is realistic it is not local.> It is local,I sorta like the MWI but apparently you are not a fan because if what you say is true then the MWI is dead wrong.
We already know MWI is realistic and ANY theory that is both realistic AND local can NOT be consistent with experiment. And if experiment says that's not the way things are then that's just not the way things are.
> You can have multiple outcomes for a measurement and realism.No you can not because that's not what physicists mean when they use the word "realistic", they mean that a wave or a particle possesses one specific attribute even if it has not been measured.
For example, if a photon already has one specific polarization even before its quantum entangled twin has been measured then it is realistic.
> Locality has a specific definition in physics,Yes.
> that things are only affected by other things (fields or particles) in direct proximity to each other.Once a universe has split off it can have no effect on us whatsoever nor us to it. And someplace that the laws of physics forbid us from going to or seeing is not in our "direct proximity".
It most certainly does! If a event is not even in our past or future spacetime lightcone then it is not local, and no event in another universe is within our lightcone.> It says nothing about the existence of places we can or can't go to.
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 4:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:> There is no faster than light influences in QM. You need to have an explicit physical collapse to have that. In the MW, the non locality is only apparent.So it's all only apparent. I hate it when people say X is a illusion without even hinting at how that illusion works.
> Alice eventually just tells Bob in which partition of the multiverse they have situated themselves in.Alice tells Bob? The problem is that the laws of physics provide no way for Alice to say one word to Bob nor Bob to Alice.
John K Clark--
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On 30 Dec 2013, at 20:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs. It is conceptually no different than doing a calculation in ordinary probability theory: I start with some initial conditions and I introduce a probability distribution and compute a probability for some event. In that intermediate step I introduced a continuous probability distribution which implies an *infinite* number of bits. Nobody thinks this requires an infinite number of worlds.
Then you need to add some selection principle to QM. If QC works through QM, the "parallel" computation are done in our quasi-classical world as in any other branch, and this is tested by doing a Fourier Transform which required the computation do be done in some non fictitious way (or you are adding some non linear magic in QM at some place).
A entire parallel universe as big as our own that you can never go to or even see is about as far from being local as you can get.
Differentiation/splitting of "universes" is a local phenomenon. It is not instantaneous at all.
Without adding a selection principle, like a collapse, I don't see why self-aware creature in those branches would lost their consciousness.
The "quantum computations" are not just classical computations being done in parallel because they have to interfere to produce an answer.
So you agree that they are computations in parallel.
Then we cannot exploit the results obtained in the parallel world directly, as we would lost the information in the other branch, but by changing the base of the outcome-analyser, we can still exploit some amount of information from the results obtained in *all* other branches (like seeing if they are all equal, or not).
>> I sorta like the MWI but apparently you are not a fan because if what you say is true then the MWI is dead wrong.> Explain why the following table shows that MWI is local, and realistic on the wave function and universal wave function:
>>that's not what physicists mean when they use the word "realistic", they mean that a wave or a particle possesses one specific attribute even if it has not been measured.> That is hidden variable.
> There cannot be a single hidden value but there can be multiple real values.
>>For example, if a photon already has one specific polarization even before its quantum entangled twin has been measured then it is realistic.
> It has many specific polarizations before it is measured.
> See the answer to Question 12: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html
>> It most certainly does! If a event is not even in our past or future spacetime lightcone then it is not local, and no event in another universe is within our lightcone.>>> It says nothing about the existence of places we can or can't go to.
> By this definition, the existence of light cones or things outside would make special relativity non-local,
> A theory is only non-local if something outside your past light cone could affect you, or if you could affect things outside your future light cone.
> This is not the case in special relativity,
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 12:54 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I sorta like the MWI but apparently you are not a fan because if what you say is true then the MWI is dead wrong.> Explain why the following table shows that MWI is local, and realistic on the wave function and universal wave function:I have no idea where Wikipedia got that table but it is self contradictory. It says the observer plays no part in many worlds
but it also says "no" to counterfactual definiteness meaning you can't speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been observed.
Both those things can't be right.
And in many world there is no unique future but it says there is no unique past, and that's not what the theory says.
>>that's not what physicists mean when they use the word "realistic", they mean that a wave or a particle possesses one specific attribute even if it has not been measured.> That is hidden variable.That is realism. Hidden variables are about how something is going to change, realism is about how something is right now.
> There cannot be a single hidden value but there can be multiple real values.I don't know what you mean by that. The best way to think of hidden variables is as a lookup table that photons and electrons can see but for some reason we can not. The table can contain as many real values as you like, it can even contain an infinite number of values; but no lookup table, no set of hidden variables, can explain the results we see from experiment.
>>For example, if a photon already has one specific polarization even before its quantum entangled twin has been measured then it is realistic.
> It has many specific polarizations before it is measured.Then it is observer dependent, and the crown jewel of the MWI is that it's observer independent and solves the measurement problem.
The MWI may have other difficulties but at least it solves the measurement problem, without that WMI has no advantage and you might as well stick with the Copenhagen muddle.
> See the answer to Question 12: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html
It says "the splitting is a local process, transmitted causally at light or sub-light speeds", so the question is, transmitted THROUGH WHAT at light or sub-light speeds? I don't know but it certainly isn't through local space.
>> It most certainly does! If a event is not even in our past or future spacetime lightcone then it is not local, and no event in another universe is within our lightcone.>>> It says nothing about the existence of places we can or can't go to.
> By this definition, the existence of light cones or things outside would make special relativity non-local,
No it does not because non-local events, that is to say things outside our past or future lightcone may exist but they have no effect on what we see here and now nor can anything that happens here effect anything there.
> A theory is only non-local if something outside your past light cone could affect you, or if you could affect things outside your future light cone.Exactly.
> This is not the case in special relativity,Exactly. So how is it non-local?John K Clark
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 12:12 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 4:34 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
> There are at least two possible answers to the bell inequalities:1. Nonlocal influences
There are not "at least two" there are exactly two, but yes, things might not be local.
>2. Mutliple outcomes for each measurement
Yes, things might not be realistic. We know that at best one of those 2 commonplace assumptions is wrong, at worse both are.
> If you choose 2, then you don't need 1.
Yes, but locality OR realism OR both must be wrong.
>> But MWI could be true because although it is realistic it is not local.
> It is local,
I sorta like the MWI but apparently you are not a fan because if what you say is true then the MWI is dead wrong.
Explain why the following table shows that MWI is local, and realistic on the wave function and universal wave function:
Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the properties of these systems and observers, induced by measurement interactions, "label" each copy and provide the mechanism which, e.g., ensures that each copy of one of the observers in an EPRB or GHZM experiment will only interact with the "correct" copy of the other observer(s). The conceptual problem of nonlocality is thus replaced with a conceptual problem of proliferating labels, as correlated systems and observers undergo measurement-type interactions with newly-encountered objects and instruments; it is suggested that this problem may be resolved by considering quantum field theory rather than the quantum mechanics of particles.
Comments: | 18 pages, no figures. Minor changes |
Subjects: | Quantum Physics (quant-ph) |
Journal reference: | Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (2001) 301-322 |
Report number: | WW-10184 |
Cite as: | arXiv:quant-ph/0103079 |
JasonWe already know MWI is realistic and ANY theory that is both realistic AND local can NOT be consistent with experiment. And if experiment says that's not the way things are then that's just not the way things are.
> You can have multiple outcomes for a measurement and realism.
No you can not because that's not what physicists mean when they use the word "realistic", they mean that a wave or a particle possesses one specific attribute even if it has not been measured.
That is hidden variable. There cannot be a single hidden value but there can be multiple real values. Hidden variables are something different from realism, which is a reality independent of measurement or observation.
Perhaps that is the only thing we are arguing over. Definitions. What you say seems correct to me if what you call reality is things possess "single-valued hidden variables".For example, if a photon already has one specific polarization even before its quantum entangled twin has been measured then it is realistic.
It has many specific polarizations before it is measured.> Locality has a specific definition in physics,
Yes.
> that things are only affected by other things (fields or particles) in direct proximity to each other.
Once a universe has split off it can have no effect on us whatsoever nor us to it. And someplace that the laws of physics forbid us from going to or seeing is not in our "direct proximity".
The whole universe doesn't split off, rather superpositions spread from particle to particle at sub-light speeds.
See the answer to Question 12: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html
(Submitted on 14 Mar 2001 (v1), last revised 10 May 2001 (this version, v2))Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the properties of these systems and observers, induced by measurement interactions, "label" each copy and provide the mechanism which, e.g., ensures that each copy of one of the observers in an EPRB or GHZM experiment will only interact with the "correct" copy of the other observer(s). The conceptual problem of nonlocality is thus replaced with a conceptual problem of proliferating labels, as correlated systems and observers undergo measurement-type interactions with newly-encountered objects and instruments; it is suggested that this problem may be resolved by considering quantum field theory rather than the quantum mechanics of particles.
Comments: 18 pages, no figures. Minor changes Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Journal reference: Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (2001) 301-322 Report number: WW-10184 Cite as: arXiv:quant-ph/0103079
just moves the problem from FTL signaling to FTL labeling.
On 1 January 2014 12:05, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
(Submitted on 14 Mar 2001 (v1), last revised 10 May 2001 (this version, v2))Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the properties of these systems and observers, induced by measurement interactions, "label" each copy and provide the mechanism which, e.g., ensures that each copy of one of the observers in an EPRB or GHZM experiment will only interact with the "correct" copy of the other observer(s). The conceptual problem of nonlocality is thus replaced with a conceptual problem of proliferating labels, as correlated systems and observers undergo measurement-type interactions with newly-encountered objects and instruments; it is suggested that this problem may be resolved by considering quantum field theory rather than the quantum mechanics of particles.
Comments: 18 pages, no figures. Minor changes Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Journal reference: Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (2001) 301-322 Report number: WW-10184 Cite as: arXiv:quant-ph/0103079
just moves the problem from FTL signaling to FTL labeling.
Where is the FTL? I don't recall any suggestion that the "contagion" of entangled systems spreading themeselves in the MWI involves anything FTL.
In fact, it's generally assumed to be very, very STL (unless light itself is involved). At great distances from the laboratory, one imagines that the superposition caused by whatever we might do to cats in boxes would decay to the level of noise, and fail to spread any further.
So a gaxlaxy (say) might be in a MWI bubble of superpositions that fails to split neighbouring galaxies for billions of years, because the difference between them is undetectable. Or maybe even planets.... What difference would it make to anyone in M31 if the Nazis had won WW2? (after the light travel time had elapsed, I mean. Maybe a few different radio signals could be picked up, if anyone pointed an antenna in the right direction...)
Of course in Hilbert space there's no FTL because the system is just one point and when a measurement is performed it projects the system ray onto a mixture of subspaces; spacetime coordinates are just some labels.On 12/31/2013 3:24 PM, LizR wrote:
On 1 January 2014 12:05, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
(Submitted on 14 Mar 2001 (v1), last revised 10 May 2001 (this version, v2))Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the properties of these systems and observers, induced by measurement interactions, "label" each copy and provide the mechanism which, e.g., ensures that each copy of one of the observers in an EPRB or GHZM experiment will only interact with the "correct" copy of the other observer(s). The conceptual problem of nonlocality is thus replaced with a conceptual problem of proliferating labels, as correlated systems and observers undergo measurement-type interactions with newly-encountered objects and instruments; it is suggested that this problem may be resolved by considering quantum field theory rather than the quantum mechanics of particles.
Comments: 18 pages, no figures. Minor changes Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Journal reference: Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (2001) 301-322 Report number: WW-10184 Cite as: arXiv:quant-ph/0103079
just moves the problem from FTL signaling to FTL labeling.
Where is the FTL? I don't recall any suggestion that the "contagion" of entangled systems spreading themeselves in the MWI involves anything FTL.
That's an interesting viewpoint - but it's taking spacetime instead of Hilbert space to be the arena. If we take the cat, either alive or dead, and shoot it off into space then, as a signal, it won't fall off as 1/r^2.In fact, it's generally assumed to be very, very STL (unless light itself is involved). At great distances from the laboratory, one imagines that the superposition caused by whatever we might do to cats in boxes would decay to the level of noise, and fail to spread any further.
On 1 January 2014 13:54, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course in Hilbert space there's no FTL because the system is just one point and when a measurement is performed it projects the system ray onto a mixture of subspaces; spacetime coordinates are just some labels.On 12/31/2013 3:24 PM, LizR wrote:
On 1 January 2014 12:05, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
(Submitted on 14 Mar 2001 (v1), last revised 10 May 2001 (this version, v2))Bell's theorem depends crucially on counterfactual reasoning, and is mistakenly interpreted as ruling out a local explanation for the correlations which can be observed between the results of measurements performed on spatially-separated quantum systems. But in fact the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the Heisenberg picture, provides an alternative local explanation for such correlations. Measurement-type interactions lead, not to many worlds but, rather, to many local copies of experimental systems and the observers who measure their properties. Transformations of the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the properties of these systems and observers, induced by measurement interactions, "label" each copy and provide the mechanism which, e.g., ensures that each copy of one of the observers in an EPRB or GHZM experiment will only interact with the "correct" copy of the other observer(s). The conceptual problem of nonlocality is thus replaced with a conceptual problem of proliferating labels, as correlated systems and observers undergo measurement-type interactions with newly-encountered objects and instruments; it is suggested that this problem may be resolved by considering quantum field theory rather than the quantum mechanics of particles.
Comments: 18 pages, no figures. Minor changes Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph) Journal reference: Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (2001) 301-322 Report number: WW-10184 Cite as: arXiv:quant-ph/0103079
just moves the problem from FTL signaling to FTL labeling.
Where is the FTL? I don't recall any suggestion that the "contagion" of entangled systems spreading themeselves in the MWI involves anything FTL.
I thought there was no FTL in ordinary space, either? (I mean, none required for the MWI?)
That's an interesting viewpoint - but it's taking spacetime instead of Hilbert space to be the arena. If we take the cat, either alive or dead, and shoot it off into space then, as a signal, it won't fall off as 1/r^2.In fact, it's generally assumed to be very, very STL (unless light itself is involved). At great distances from the laboratory, one imagines that the superposition caused by whatever we might do to cats in boxes would decay to the level of noise, and fail to spread any further.
No, but it will travel STL!
Right, but the state in Hilbert space is something like |x1 y1 z1 s1 x2 y2 z2 s2> and when Alice measures s1 at (x1 y1 z1) then s2 is correlated at (x2 y2 z2). As I understand it the MWI advocates say this isn't FTL because this is just selecting out one of infinitely many results |s1 s2>. But the 'selection' has to pair up the spins in a way that violates Bell's inequality.On 12/31/2013 7:22 PM, LizR wrote:
On 1 January 2014 13:54, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
Of course in Hilbert space there's no FTL because the system is just one point and when a measurement is performed it projects the system ray onto a mixture of subspaces; spacetime coordinates are just some labels.
I thought there was no FTL in ordinary space, either? (I mean, none required for the MWI?)
Sure. I was just commenting on the idea that the entanglement has a kind of limited range because of 'background noise'. An interesting idea, similar to one I've had that there is a smallest non-zero probability.
That's an interesting viewpoint - but it's taking spacetime instead of Hilbert space to be the arena. If we take the cat, either alive or dead, and shoot it off into space then, as a signal, it won't fall off as 1/r^2.In fact, it's generally assumed to be very, very STL (unless light itself is involved). At great distances from the laboratory, one imagines that the superposition caused by whatever we might do to cats in boxes would decay to the level of noise, and fail to spread any further.
No, but it will travel STL!
But if you want to get FTL, that's possible if Alice and Bob are near opposite sides of our Hubble sphere when they do their measurements. They are then already moving apart faster than c and will never be able to communicate - with each other, but we, in the middle will eventually receive reports from them so that we can confirm the violation of Bell's inequality.
On 12/31/2013 1:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Dec 2013, at 20:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/30/2013 3:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's essentially everything, since everything is (presumably) quantum. But notice the limitation of quantum computers, if it has N qubits it takes 2^N complex numbers to specify its state, BUT you can only retrieve N bits of information from it (c.f. Holevo's theorem). So it doesn't really act like 2^N parallel computers.
OK, but nobody pretended the contrary. You can still extract N bits depending on the 2^N results, by doing some Fourier transfrom on all results obtained in "parallel universes". This means that the 2^N computations have to occur in *some* sense.
But they pretend that the number 2^N is so large that it cannot exist in whole universe, much less in that little quantum computer and therefore there must be other worlds which contain these enormous number of bits. What Holevo's theorem shows is the one can regard all those interference terms as mere calculation fictions in going from N bit inputs to N bit outputs. It is conceptually no different than doing a calculation in ordinary probability theory: I start with some initial conditions and I introduce a probability distribution and compute a probability for some event. In that intermediate step I introduced a continuous probability distribution which implies an *infinite* number of bits. Nobody thinks this requires an infinite number of worlds.
Then you need to add some selection principle to QM. If QC works through QM, the "parallel" computation are done in our quasi-classical world as in any other branch, and this is tested by doing a Fourier Transform which required the computation do be done in some non fictitious way (or you are adding some non linear magic in QM at some place).
I don't understand your comment. It is my point that the computations are done in our world via the interference of wave functions - which have to be in the same world in order to interfere.
I take "worlds" to mean quasi-classical worlds and a quasi-classical world may be supported by many different quantum "worlds". But in Deutsch's famous proposed experiment, a quantum AI computer after factoring some prime by Shor's algorithm may not be able to tell us anything more than the factors - because those factors comes out the same in almost all branches and hence correspond to the same quasi-classical world.
On 12/31/2013 1:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A entire parallel universe as big as our own that you can never go to or even see is about as far from being local as you can get.
Differentiation/splitting of "universes" is a local phenomenon. It is not instantaneous at all.
In an EPR experiment if you imagine a forward light cone of entanglement issuing from Alice and another from Bob those are STL effects (aka local), but where the light cones start to overlap it is observed that there is more correlation than can be accounted for by a local variables at the EPR source.
That's sort of the definition of "influence".
So the split into different quasi-classical worlds didn't just start from Alice or from Bob, they had to split in a a correlated way.