Emulation and Stuff

[David Nyman]

Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
the list. So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
stimulating some feedback on this issue . Anyway, here's what I think
I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
inaccuracies):

1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer, based on a tape
(memory device) of potentially infinite length, that has been shown to
be capable of emulating any type of digital computer, and hence any
other TM. The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
sufficient time. In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.

2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
transformation algorithm. Since we're dealing with QM this must
entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
here please. But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.

3) Now we get into more controversial territory. Bruno has shown (at
least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
computation, essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
perspective of numbers and their relations. This is not universally
accepted, but more on this in the next section. Suffice it to say
that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*. But this of course
also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
numbers all the way down.

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter, but at the
cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know; but even
those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
this. The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically, and
'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
model of stuff and its relations. But it does entail that no digital
emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
down.

5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
(contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
ontologies. And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
that you didn't have before. A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
structure it happens to be computing.

Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral. This
is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices. I know that Colin isn't
precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
concept of 'emulation' in each case?

David

[Brent Meeker]

A good summary, David. However, there are some other possibilities.
Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
only be approximated digitally. QM supposes true randomness, which
Turing machines can't produce. Again it may just be a matter of
"sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
"everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

> 5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
> (contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
> ontologies. And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
> getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
> digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
> that you didn't have before. A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
> whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
> TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
> structure it happens to be computing.
>

I can look at it either way. A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models. But also
a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
as the consciousness it models.

Brent

[David Nyman]

2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:

> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.  Again it may just be a matter of
> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models

And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
bricks. By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
(i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
case). Yes?

> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
> as the consciousness it models.

If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree. But as
before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency. If we accept
for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
great for stuffy brain building. But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?
And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
not absurd. In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
computational ontology, so we can get building.

Reconsidering my recent statements in the light of this, I suspect I'm
trying to eat my cake and have it (an old tendency) - but this might
be OK. It still seems to me that the a priori ontological assumption
of choice is some fundamental conjunction of self-access +
self-relativisation: i.e.the One, I guess. Stuff and consciousness -
which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
reality to be settled empirically.

David

[Brent Meeker]

David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:
>
>> A good summary, David. However, there are some other possibilities.
>> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
>> only be approximated digitally. QM supposes true randomness, which
>> Turing machines can't produce. Again it may just be a matter of
>> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
>> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.
>
> But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
> possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
> alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

Yes, but some of the arguments like the MGA wouldn't work and the UD wouldn't work.

>
>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>
> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> bricks.

No, I really mean "as good as". In other words if we can model every detail of stuffy
existence numerically, then we can suppose that we *are* the numerical model. We're not
the numerical model that we run, but we're the numerical model in God's computer.

>By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
> complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
> (i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
> case). Yes?
>
>> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as good
>> as the consciousness it models.
>
> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree. But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency. If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building. But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?
> And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
> likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
> The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
> straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
> But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
> stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

Except the lazy Olympia and MGA arguments don't go thru for continua. Of course one could
still approximate a brain by artificial digital neurons, but the continuous nature of
their causal connections may be important.

>
> Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
> computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
> not absurd. In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
> computational ontology, so we can get building.

Aren't you're just assuming consciousness cannot be what brains do. It seems that we
assume stuff(i.e. physics) computes it's own evolution. But if stuff=>computation and
computation=>consciousness it seems stuff=>consciousness.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi David,

This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart. 

Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?

On 13 Aug 2009, at 23:01, David Nyman wrote:

Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
the list.  So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
stimulating some feedback on this issue .  Anyway, here's what I think
I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
inaccuracies):

1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,

No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with a pencil and paper.

He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is, with Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical notion of computation, and this before the appearance of concrete computers. Computers have appeared after. Turing has played a role in that later appearance.  A platonist could say those concrete beings are just pale approximation of the real thing. Later this statement will be made precise, but with the step 8, we just cannot invoke any physical things or physical reality.

To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math, before "in nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that, especially for the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that is the reason why I explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical discovery. Computation has nothing to do with physics at the start.

Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer by Babbage.

based on a tape
(memory device) of potentially infinite length,

The human computer can use as many papers, or even the wall of its cavern, or of its living room, ... He is a finite being embedded in a non finite available memory-time space.

that has been shown to
be capable of emulating any type of digital computer,

This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis. 

and hence any
other TM.  

What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine, capable of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal machine can be shown to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church Thesis: all universal (and particular) machines.

The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
sufficient time.  

OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced from Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute the same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same algorithm). 

In effect, digitally 'emulating' a computation is
conceptually indistinguishable from the computation itself; or to put
it another way, computation is deemed to be invariant under emulation.

... at some level. OK.

2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.

Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is done at that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea to do the step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way, computational supervenience is defined after step 8.

Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter should be Turing emulable. The mathematics of physics will have to escape the turing emulable. The apparent turing emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am machine").

Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non Turing emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA deduces the non Turing-emulability of matter from the non Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is constructive. It redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.

3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.

Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather subtle, no doubt. 

But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that. 

 Bruno has shown (at
least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
computation,

The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
perspective of numbers and their relations.  

True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.

This is not universally
accepted, but more on this in the next section.  

This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

Suffice it to say
that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
numbers all the way down.

No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that it's got to be number all the way up. It makes the comp immaterial appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the step-7.

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,

We can't by step 8; but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make sense at all. The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations. The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the indexical computationalist. 

but at the
cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.

Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save computation for both mind and body. Colin is correct for saying bodies cannot be computable, but this follows from the mind being "computable", in the "yes doctor" sense, not from the scientist mind being non computable.

Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;

Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

but even
those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
this.  

That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal. 

The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,

Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic. 

and
'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
model of stuff and its relations.  

UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any way the observation of stuff.

But it does entail that no digital
emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
down.

Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the epistemological level.

5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
(contingent) model of reality -

Hmm... The "numerical model", but non-computational model,  is necessary by reasoning. The contingent realities are well explained, and the stuffy model is not contingent but impossible.

but of course I don't insist on this.
Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
ontologies.  

But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any meaning.

And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
that you didn't have before.  A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount of
whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
structure it happens to be computing.

Now of course this stricture wouldn't necessarily apply to model 3).
But the 'comp' that Colin claims to refute is, I suspect, not this but
stuffy-comp - i.e. the comp based on stuff rather than numbers, that
Olympia, in her lazy but decisive way, dismisses as ephemeral.  This
is also the comp that I have argued against, but I don't intend this
merely to be a re-statement of my prejudices.  I know that Colin isn't
precisely a proponent of model 3) nor model 4), arguing strenuously
for a distinctive alternative; so it would be interesting (certainly
for me) if he'd care to characterise precisely how it diverges from or
extends the foregoing stuffy-numerical dichotomy.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
concept of 'emulation' in each case?

You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes the stuffy things not just useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical objects too.  

There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in nature. We will come back on this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

The appearance of the continuum is a consequence of comp. If digital
or constructive physics is possible, then by UDA comp if false. Of
course digital physics entails trivially comp. So digital physics is
inconsistent (with or without comp).

> It can
> only be approximated digitally.

Yes. Comp explains this, I mean the "can only", in the best case.
Today there are still too much non computable white rabbits. So,
strictly speaking, it is an open problem.

> QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.

Well, here too comp explains the randomnes, by the (hopefully plural)
first person indeterminacy. QM randomness is just the randomness due
to our self-multiplication (or differentiation) in the many-dreams.

> Again it may just be a matter of
> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.

Comp forces this to be true.

>
>> 5) We might call 3 the numerical (necessary) model, and 4 the stuffy
>> (contingent) model of reality - but of course I don't insist on this.
>> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
>> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
>> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
>> ontologies. And I think this has something to do with what Colin is
>> getting at: if your model is stuffy, then no amount of
>> digital-numerical emulation is ever going to get you anything stuffy
>> that you didn't have before. A physical-stuffy TM doing any amount
>> of
>> whatever kind of computation-emulation remains just a physical-stuffy
>> TM, and a fortiori *not* transmogrified into the stuff whose causal
>> structure it happens to be computing.
>>
>
> I can look at it either way. A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models. But
> also
> a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy model is as
> good
> as the consciousness it models.

The stuffy model works for consciousness only if consciousness is a
actually infinite stuffy thing itself, making indexical comp false.

But you told us that you still don't follow step-8, so I am not
astonished by this reply. More explanations will be given.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:

>
> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:
>
>> A good summary, David. However, there are some other possibilities.
>> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
>> only be approximated digitally. QM supposes true randomness, which
>> Turing machines can't produce. Again it may just be a matter of
>> "sufficient approximation", but the idea of a multiverse and
>> "everything-happens" assumes real numbers.
>
> But the possibility of 'mathematical ontology' would remain a
> possibility for physics, even if it turned out that we needed an
> alternative to the digital TM as the 'computational substrate'?

Not at all. With comp, the basic "level" has to be any universal
system. (N,+,*) of combinators or JAVA, whatever. Quantum like stuffy
bricks have to emerge from the inside first person indeterminacy. The
proble of comp is that such a stuff is a priori not digitally
emulable. The quantum computer is a threat to comp! That is why I have
developed AUDA, it shows that universal machine have a highly non
trivial epistemology and physics, so that hope remains to save comp by
providing the comp explanation of the origin of the apparent quantum
waves.

>
>
>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>
> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> bricks.

You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
from number and logic alone.

> By contrast, in terms of numerical ontology, a sufficiently
> complete 'model' would actually *constitute* the stuff it emulated
> (i.e. indicating the quite different force of 'emulation' in this
> case). Yes?

Only for the mind. Matter escapes computation, once we assume that
"we" are machine.

I think that you fail to take into account simultaneously UDA1-6,
UDA-7, and UDA-8. I know it is not easy.

>
>
>> But also a sufficiently accurate, detailed and predictive stuffy
>> model is as good
>> as the consciousness it models.
>
> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree. But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency. If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building. But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?

You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can run
a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that computation,
it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and relative
computations as well, and from the perspective of that consciousness,
it entails that if the person (with consciousness) decide to look at
his stuffy neighborhood, below its comp-substitution, he will discover
the trace of that, a priori non turing emulable, infinities of
computations.

>
> And if that is so, then a stuffy brain running a computation is
> likewise just a stuffy brain running a computation: equally WYSIWYG.
> The only way you invoke consciousness in either case is by the
> straight a priori assumption: stuffy computation => consciousness.
> But according to lazy Olympia, going about computation in such a
> stuffy way reduces this assumption to an absurdity.

OK. And then UDA1-7 shows that any possible observable "stuffy" thing
is given by a probability/credibility measure on an infinity of
computations.

>
>
> Of course, in terms of numerical ontology, the assumption that
> computation => consciousness is equally a priori, but at least it's
> not absurd. In this case, brains, TMs - and bricks - share a
> computational ontology, so we can get building.

Hmm... Not really. The bricks become a priori beyond the computable.
Immaterial, like number relation, but non computable, like a
probability on a infinite, even continuous, realities made of infinite
computations.

>
>
> Reconsidering my recent statements in the light of this, I suspect I'm
> trying to eat my cake and have it (an old tendency) - but this might
> be OK. It still seems to me that the a priori ontological assumption
> of choice is some fundamental conjunction of self-access +
> self-relativisation: i.e.the One, I guess.

Here we are back on our little theological divergence. I may insist
you take a look on the Plotinus paper. The ONE is really arithmetical
truth before any notion of self is yet defined. Once a notion of self
appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true
provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine
intellect), which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the
God of the eastern). And this one, due to tension with the intellect,
will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy
matter. Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this
temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the
coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the
falling souls, and the souls see their rise to the ONE. Same
arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.

> Stuff and consciousness -
> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
> reality to be settled empirically.

With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a
computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes
to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:

>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>
>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>> bricks.
>
> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
> from number and logic alone.
>

Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

>
>> Stuff and consciousness -
>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>> reality to be settled empirically.
>
> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a
> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes
> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.

I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
our consciousness is too.

Regards,
Quentin


> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>



--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

[Bruno Marchal]

Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer
it cautiously.

Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I
have to do some works.

On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:
>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>>
>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -
>>> but
>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>> bricks.
>>
>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>> from number and logic alone.
>>
>
> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
(*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
hypostases).

>
>
>
>>
>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into
>>> this.
>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions
>>> till
>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will
>>> play
>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>>
>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we
>> discover a
>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say
>> yes
>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
>
> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
> our consciousness is too.

You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
Turing emulable (obvious).
But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)

From this it follows that: Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
is NOT turing emulable.

This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.

The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not
yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still
be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature
would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington
instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

>
> Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer
> it cautiously.
>
> Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I
> have to do some works.
>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:
>>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>>>
>>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -
>>>> but
>>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>>> bricks.
>>>
>>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>>> from number and logic alone.
>>>
>>
>> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
>> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
>> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
>> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

>http://cpc.cx/lP

>
> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
> hypostases).
>

I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.

Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
fact there is a computable theory of reality). So your objections is
correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
contradiction.

So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
(not COMP), or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
already disproven to disprove the theory.

> This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.
>
> The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not
> yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still
> be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature
> would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington
> instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>

Regards,
Quentin

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 02:18, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>:

> If we take 'sufficiently' to the limit I suppose I must agree. But as
> before, in terms of stuffy ontology, any digital emulation - if that's
> what we're still discussing - is a model, not the stuff modelled, and
> hence wouldn't meet any such criterion of sufficiency. If we accept
> for the sake of argument a stuffy TM as equivalent to a stuffy brain,
> then what we're asked to accept here is that - although emulated
> bricks are no good for stuffy house building - stuffy neurons are just
> great for stuffy brain building. But why isn't a stuffy TM running a
> computation just a stuffy TM running a computation: WYSIWYG isn't it?

The standard response is that cogitation is one of a special subset
of tasks where the gap between simualtion and realisation vanishes.
Simulated flying isn't flying, but simuilated chess *is* chess.

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 04:34, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> David Nyman wrote:

> > And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
> > you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
> > bricks.
>
> No, I really mean "as good as". In other words if we can model every detail of stuffy
> existence numerically, then we can suppose that we *are* the numerical model.

To suppose that we are in a model running on a stuffy computer
violates
occam's razor. To suppose that we are in a model made out of free-
standing maths
requires an assumption of Platonism

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can run
> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that computation,
> it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and relative
> computations as well,

There's your Platonism. If nothing immaterial exists (NB "nothing",
I don't make exceptions for just a few pixies or juse a few numbers)
there is nothiign for a cosnc. to attach itself to except a propbably
small, probabuily singular set of stuiffy brains and computers.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:

> A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities.
> Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can
> only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which
> Turing machines can't produce.

As Bruno said, a branching algorithm can produce true randomness from
the perspective of the embedded observer.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

[David Nyman]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

> Hi David,
> This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart.
> Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have
> no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?

Don't worry Bruno, nothing pleases me more than discovering precisely
in what ways I am wrong! Having said this, I think you sometimes get
into a bit of trouble following me because of the way I structure my
arguments (my fault I'm sure). When I say something like "if we
assume x, then y follows" it doesn't mean that I'm saying that I
*believe* x or y; I'm just attempting to establish a position in order
to compare it with what I'm going to say next. Sorry if this is
already obvious to you, but I'll try to point to examples where
relevant.

> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,
>
> No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with a
> pencil and paper.
> He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is, with
> Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical notion of
> computation, and this before the appearance of concrete computers. Computers
> have appeared after. Turing has played a role in that later appearance.  A
> platonist could say those concrete beings are just pale approximation of the
> real thing. Later this statement will be made precise, but with the step 8,
> we just cannot invoke any physical things or physical reality.
> To be sure, the fact that computer have been discovered in math, before "in
> nature" is not an argument, yet it helps a lot to see that, especially for
> the grasp of the comp supervenience thesis. And that is the reason why I
> explain that absolutely fundamental mathematical discovery. Computation has
> nothing to do with physics at the start.
> Note that I abstract myself from the pioneer building of a computer by
> Babbage.

Thanks for this amplification.

> This has not been shown. But this follows from Church Thesis.

Thanks, I wasn't sure about this.

> and hence any
> other TM.
>
> What Turing has shown, is that there is a universal Turing machine, capable
> of simulating all Turing machines. Then that Universal machine can be shown
> to emulate all existing universal machine, and by Church Thesis: all
> universal (and particular) machines.

OK

> The meaning of 'emulation' here entails transforming
> precisely the same inputs into the precisely same outputs, given
> sufficient time.
>
> OK. But there is an intensional Church thesis, which can be deduced from
> Church thesis, saying that not only two universal systems can compute the
> same functions, but they can compute them in the same way (same algorithm).

OK

> 2) Insofar as the causal processes of physics are specifiable in the
> form of decidable (i.e. definitely stopping) functions, they are
> capable of finite computation on a TM - i.e. they are TM emulable.
> What this amounts to is that we can in principle use a TM to compute
> the evolution of any physical process given the appropriate
> transformation algorithm.  Since we're dealing with QM this must
> entail various probabilistic aspects and I don't know what else: help
> here please.  But the general sense is that the mathematics of physics
> could in principle be fully Turing-emulable.
>
> Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical. The reversal is done at
> that step. I guess you are right that it could be a better idea to do the
> step 8 before, but it is more difficult for most. Any way, computational
> supervenience is defined after step 8.

Now when you say "Step 8 forbids us to introduce anything physical" we
might have an example of 'taking things out of sequence'. In this
section I hadn't yet made the assumption of UDA-8. I was just setting
out what I understand with respect to the ordinary sense of the
physical as being mathematically describable in some way.

> Then we will discover that "Colin is right" no piece of matter should be Turing emulable > The mathematics of physics will have to escape the turing emulable. The apparent turing > emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical comp (the idea that "I am > machine"). Of course I disagree with Colin's reasoning where he deduce the non Turing > emulability of nature from the non emulability of mind. UDA deduces the non Turing- > emulability of matter from the non Turing-emulability of the mind. And the proof is > constructive. It redefines precisely what "matter" consists in.

Ah! So by 'the non Turing-emulability of matter' I take you to refer
to the example of Olympia: i.e. the argument that shows that
computation can't depend on the physicality of a TM. So it follows
that neither mind nor matter are 'emulable' by - in the strong sense
of being constituted by - a *physical* TM. Rather, the reverse is
true - both (including the now 'apparently physical TM') are
constituted by infinities of computations in a highly-specific
relation: i.e. the UD.

On the basis of the above, I can perhaps see why you say "The apparent

turing emulability of the world around us, is a threat to indexical

comp (the idea that "I am machine")", if one were to take
'emulability' in the strong sense above, since we would now seem to
have a contradiction of some sort. But - and I stress I mean outside
of the UDA framework - I have been accustomed to understand
'emulation' in the sense of a mathematical model of the evolution of
physical systems, not an ontological reversal with what-is-emulated -
hence this post. Why would the 'Turing emulability' of nature in this
weaker sense constitute a threat to comp?

> 3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.
>
> Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather
> subtle, no doubt.
> But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that.

I think the ordinary English usage of 'controversial' is that there is
considerable disagreement - of which this list demonstrates ample
proof! It doesn't imply that it is wrong. But I didn't mean to
offend.

> Bruno has shown (at
> least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a
> computation,
>
> The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of
> mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations
> going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point
> of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

Yes, I'll avoid saying "a computation".

> essentially everything else must also be regarded in the
> same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the
> perspective of numbers and their relations.
>
> True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as
> computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily
> computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.
>
> This is not universally
> accepted, but more on this in the next section.
>
> This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood
> quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

When I make a gesture to one side of the argument (i.e. the simple
fact that they don't - in fact - accept it) the other side objects!
But I understand your frustration.

> Suffice it to say
> that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the
> appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere
> 'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course
> also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be
> numbers all the way down.
>
> No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that
> it's got to be number all the way up.

Yes, I nearly said 'all the way up'.

> It makes the comp immaterial
> appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a
> priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the
> step-7.

Ah, this is a key point, I suspect. Now, in my pre-UDA ("beam me up
Scotty") way of thinking about it, I saw that teleportation could be
coherent only if consciousness was seen in terms of a movable
viewpoint within some larger context, not as consisting in a
'thing-in-itself' - hence the a priori 1-person indeterminacy.
Consequently this also implied that the brain - matter itself - must
be seen somehow in this way too, but I was unable to say how. Anyway,
now I see the Star Trek part as UDA1-6. UDA-7 introduces the UD
itself, and from this, that "comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a

infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
rabbits-computations".

UDA-8 crucially shows - finally - that the computations cannot
themselves supervene on stuffy matter - i.e. the 'stuffy TM' one
previously assumed they were running on. So the overall picture
derived from this is that both the first person and the appearance of
matter are complex - and, in any specific instance, a priori
indeterminate - emergents from this infinite blizzard of computation;
hence 'individual instances' of minds and bodies can't be regarded as
'isolated computations'. Is this is what you mean when you say that
matter is "non turing emulable, a priori"?

> 4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,
>
> We can't by step 8;

Surely we can if we're willing to drop the computational theory of
mind? Note that I say this later on (another sequencing problem).

> but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make
> sense at all.

Yes, but my point was that one isn't forced to accept the UDA, as long
as one is equally willing to give up the computational theory of mind.
Faced with the UDA, I suspect many non-specialists might well see
that as preferable to relinquishing their grasp on stuffy matter. I'm
not making claims about the correctness of positions here, I'm just
contrasting them.

The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of
> infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations.
> The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the
> indexical computationalist.
>
> but at the
> cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.
>
> Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save
> computation for both mind and body.

Yes, but I agree with you that this doesn't work.

> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;
>
> Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of
> understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

Whoa! It's a fact that not everyone agrees. This is obviously true,
because when I don't say this, the ones that don't, start disagreeing!
Your point is that disagreement isn't refutation (or even
understanding).

> but even
> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
> this.
>
> That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal.

The reversal is necessary only to save the computational theory of mind, surely?

> The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of
> physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,
>
> Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic.

Yes, but I was referring here to matter in the stuffy sense, precisely
to *contrast* it with the comp sense. IOW mathematics is still
"unreasonably effective" even if it turns out that comp doesn't go
through as a TOE.

> and
> 'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a
> model of stuff and its relations.
>
> UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any
> way the observation of stuff.

Yes, of course, I know this! This is what makes me think you have a
problem with the way I present the argument in stages. I was trying
to characterise the stuffy model in its own terms (with the caveat
that IMO this entails abandoning the comp theory of mind), as well as
comp (however inadequately) also in its own terms. I just get
confused when you interpolate comp objections when I'm not saying
anything about comp.

> But it does entail that no digital
> emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -
> be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way
> down.
>
> Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the
> epistemological level.

Yes, but there's no reason to claim that comp is necessarily the
*only* theory of mind. Physicalism itself isn't necessarily
inconsistent at the epistemological level, but it does need a
different theory of mind - IMO.

> Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the
> emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of
> whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy
> ontologies.
>
> But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any
> meaning.

Again, surely only on the basis that a stuffy theory still hangs on to
comp as a theory of mind? Can't we escape the UDA in this way, even
in principle?

> Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the
> distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with
> *specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the
> concept of 'emulation' in each case?
>
> You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes
> the stuffy things not just
> useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is
> the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical
> objects too.

Well, I'm always willing to stand corrected, but I had hoped in my
post on Olympia to show you finally that I had indeed grasped
*exactly* this point. My questions in this post about emulation were
really directed to clarifying the stuffy-ontology position, as a
result of the debate with Colin: i.e. what does emulation mean in a
stuffy context? The common sense view is that - if stuff is primitive
- emulation can only be a 3-description. However, if numbers are
primitive, then in principle mathematical structures - in very special
relation, as you argue - actually *constitute* reality, not just
describe it.

I think what muddies the waters all the time is the physicalist
assumption that 'immaterial computation' can still be claimed account
for the mind on the basis of a stuffy ontology. Without this, we
would have more or less the simple dichotomy I propose: i.e.
stuffy-ontology => stuffy stuff + stuffy mind; or comp-ontology =>
comp stuff + comp mind. Each side could then argue against the
other's position, but at least without laying claim to each other's
'stuff'!

> There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no
> change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in
> nature

On the basis of the comp theory of mind-body: yes, definitely, no question.

David

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart.
> Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you
> have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?
>
>
> On 13 Aug 2009, at 23:01, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet
>> again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some
>> of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on
>> the list. So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in
>> stimulating some feedback on this issue . Anyway, here's what I think
>> I know already (and I beg you patience in advance for the
>> inaccuracies):
>>
>> 1) A Turing machine is an idealised digital computer,
>
> No, Turing tried to capture the notion of a human computer, working with
> a pencil and paper.
> He tried to define mathematically what is human computable, and he is,
> with Post, and some other are the discoverer of a purely mathematical
> notion of computation, and this before the appearance of concrete
> computers. Computers have appeared after. Turing has played a role in
> that later appearance.

You are of course right about Turing. He was thinking of human computation. But he was
preceded by some real computers, notably those of Charles Babbage.

As an aside, when I was in college I worked during summers for a geophysical research
company in Texas. I calculated subsurface distances from sonic echo records. My
official job title was "Computer".

But don't you start with the hypothesis that saying yes to the doctor continues your mind?
Are you contemplating that the brain may do something that is not computable or only
that the world is not computable?

I don't care where stuffy matter comes from, but whatever the TOE is, I want it to recover
stuffy matter because that allows it to connect to all the science we have based on stuffy
matter.

Brent

>Colin is correct for saying bodies
> cannot be computable, but this follows from the mind being "computable",
> in the "yes doctor" sense, not from the scientist mind being non computable.
>
>
>
>>
>> Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;
>
> Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of
> understanding or not (or to find a mistake).
>
>
>> but even
>> those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens
>> finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal
>> basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model
>> this.
>

> That is comp, /before/ UDA, before the necessary reversal.

> makes, it is the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant*
> for physical objects too*.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 18:05, David Nyman wrote:

 I have been accustomed to understand
'emulation' in the sense of a mathematical model of the evolution of
physical systems, not an ontological reversal with what-is-emulated -
hence this post.  Why would the 'Turing emulability' of nature in this
weaker sense constitute a threat to comp?

In that case I think the word simulation is more appropriate. Emulation strictly works for digital phenomena.

Emulation can be exact, simulation a priori never is.

3)  Now we get into more controversial territory.

Really? I don't think so. Difficult, not yet very well known, and rather

subtle, no doubt.

But I don't think there is anything controversial. Nobody told me that.

I think the ordinary English usage of 'controversial' is that there is
considerable disagreement - of which this list demonstrates ample
proof!  It doesn't imply that it is wrong.  But I didn't mean to
offend.

You think about Peter Jones? I don't think we can call that a disagreement.

I think many understand UDA1-7, and many probably are interrogative on UDA-8, and the notion of comp supervenience. Some can be skeptical, but that is a sane attitude in front of a "reversal" proposition. I would not call that disagreement. May be we are trapped by different connotation due to english/french slight nuance.

 Bruno has shown (at

least I agree with him on this) that for the mind to be regarded as a

computation,

The wording is a bit dangerous. All I know after UDA is that my state of

mind at time and place (x,t) has to be linked to an infinity of computations

going through that state, and that my next state, from my first person point

of view is indeterminate on the set of all those computations.

Yes, I'll avoid saying "a computation".

essentially everything else must also be regarded in the

same light: IOW our ontology is to be understood entirely from the

perspective of numbers and their relations.

True, but this excludes quickly that it can be conceived a priori as

computations. Immaterial relation between numbers, sure, but not necessarily

computable relation. Cf the first person indeterminacy.

This is not universally

accepted, but more on this in the next section.

This is not universally understood, nor really studied. But it is understood

quickly or slowly when studied. To my knowledge.

When I make a gesture to one side of the argument (i.e. the simple
fact that they don't - in fact - accept it) the other side objects!
But I understand your frustration.

But who does not accept what? You worry me. Scientists don't play the game of accepting or not accepting proposition. They understand, they refute, or they criticize, the axioms, or the validity of a reasoning.

Suffice it to say

that on this basis we would appear to have a situation where the

appropriate set of computations could be regarded not as mere

'emulation', but in fact *as real as it gets*.  But this of course

also renders 'stuffy matter' irrelevant to the case: it's got to be

numbers all the way down.

No. With the first person indeterminacy it would be more correct to say that

it's got to be number all the way up.

Yes, I nearly said 'all the way up'.

It makes the comp immaterial

appearance of "stuffy matter" infinitely complex and non turing emulable, a

priori. I suspect you have not yet really see the role of UDA1-6 in the

step-7.

Ah, this is a key point, I suspect.  Now, in my pre-UDA ("beam me up
Scotty") way of thinking about it, I saw that teleportation could be
coherent only if consciousness was seen in terms of a movable
viewpoint within some larger context, not as consisting in a
'thing-in-itself' - hence the a priori 1-person indeterminacy.
Consequently this also implied that the brain - matter itself - must
be seen somehow in this way too, but I was unable to say how.  Anyway,
now I see the Star Trek part as UDA1-6.  UDA-7 introduces the UD
itself, and from this, that "comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a
infinite sum of infinite computations including infinities of white
rabbits-computations".

It is more the comp stuffy matter appearances which has to be made by ...

OK.

UDA-8 crucially shows - finally - that the computations cannot
themselves supervene on stuffy matter - i.e. the 'stuffy TM' one
previously assumed they were running on.

I am not sure I understand. What UDA-8 shows is that consciousness is not related to the physical activity of some machine. Consciousness is related to the truth of some arithmetical relations which defines the computations going through the relevant states at the right level and below.

Computation can supervene on the comp-stuffy matter. Without this no first plural person, nor personal computer.

Hmm.. My be I see what you say, cautious with the wording, or I miss something ...

 So the overall picture
derived from this is that both the first person and the appearance of
matter are complex - and, in any specific instance, a priori
indeterminate - emergents from this infinite blizzard of computation;

Well, it is the problem of matter to which comp force to reduce the mind-body problem. But that blizzard is a well structured part of the arithmetical reality, so it is a mathematical problem. AUDA provides already information on the solution.

hence 'individual instances' of minds and bodies can't be regarded as
'isolated computations'.  Is this is what you mean when you say that
matter is "non turing emulable, a priori"?

A priori, to predict with 100% accuracy the result that "I" will observe when doing an experience in physics, I will have to run the entire UD*, which is an infinite task. Empirically we can bet on very long computations with many high level stable emerging pattern which makes most of them easily simulable, but those are the hard to justify with comp, they have to be relatively multiplied to "save the internal appearance".

4) If we don't accept 3) then we can keep stuffy matter,

We can't by step 8;

Surely we can if we're willing to drop the computational theory of
mind?  Note that I say this later on (another sequencing problem).

OK, sorry.

but by the whole UDA 'stuffy matter" does no more make

sense at all.

Yes, but my point was that one isn't forced to accept the UDA, as long
as one is equally willing to give up the computational theory of mind.
Faced with the UDA, I suspect many non-specialists might well see
that as preferable to relinquishing their grasp on stuffy matter.  I'm
not making claims about the correctness of positions here, I'm just
contrasting them.

No problem, you are right. To abandon 1500 years of Aristotelian theology will take time, especially for the atheist which have to understand they were doing theology without saying. 

But you can' disagree with such type of work, because it is mainly question made precise. A statement of a problem. Now this problem was under the rug, since long, and many materialist thought that mechanism, per se, solve the problem.  But comp, per computer science, can only make the problem precise, mathematical.

The comp "stuffy" matter has to be made by a infinite sum of

infinite computations including infinities of white rabbits-computations.

The apparent computability of the physical laws *is* a problem for the

indexical computationalist.

but at the

cost of losing the digital computational model of both mind and body.

Most want introduce a stuffy matter because they believe they can save

computation for both mind and body.

Yes, but I agree with you that this doesn't work.

Not everyone agrees with that radical assessment, I know;

Who disagree? It is not a question to agree or not. It is a question of

understanding or not (or to find a mistake).

Whoa!  It's a fact that not everyone agrees.  This is obviously true,
because when I don't say this, the ones that don't, start disagreeing!
Your point is that disagreement isn't refutation (or even
understanding).

In science, we can always succeed in agreeing  on what we disagree, and then it means we propose different theories. Before that it is the hard work to understand the theory.

but even

those who don't concur presumably do hold that everything that happens

finally supervenes on something stuffy as its ontological and causal

basis, and that numbers and their relations serve merely to model

this.

That is comp, before UDA, before the necessary reversal.

The reversal is necessary only to save the computational theory of mind, surely?

Yes. But it is also welcome to give a rationale spectrum of where the laws of physics come from.

The stuffiness doesn't of course mean that the evolution of

physical systems can't in principle be specified algorithmically,

Comp-stuffiness *is* a priori not algorithmic.

Yes, but I was referring here to matter in the stuffy sense, precisely
to *contrast* it with the comp sense.  IOW mathematics is still
"unreasonably effective" even if it turns out that comp doesn't go
through as a TOE.

Hmm... If comp is true, then elementary arithmetic goes through as a TOE. 

Comp is an axiom of a sort of "theology", a belief in a form or relative incarnation (yes doctor). Then that theology entails that we don't need more than elementary arithmetic, for the ontology, and arithmetic+induction, for an epistemology, at least for having the big shape. Comp entails that the question of the ontic existence of anything more than what we can defined in arithmetic is absolutely undecidable. We cannot know the cardinal of the universe, in a sense. But from inside, there is not one drop of Cantor paradise, which can't help us. There is a sort of Skolem phenomenon.

and

'emulated' on a TM if that is possible; we still have mathematics as a

model of stuff and its relations.

UDA entails there is no stuff at all. No stuff capable of justifying in any

way the observation of stuff.

Yes, of course, I know this!  This is what makes me think you have a
problem with the way I present the argument in stages.  I was trying
to characterise the stuffy model in its own terms (with the caveat
that IMO this entails abandoning the comp theory of mind),

OK, my fault. I read too quickly. 

as well as
comp (however inadequately) also in its own terms.  I just get
confused when you interpolate comp objections when I'm not saying
anything about comp.

But it does entail that no digital

emulation of a physical system can - as a mere structure of numbers -

be considered the 'real thing': it's got to be stuffy all the way

down.

Well, with comp+physicalism. But this is inconsistent, at the

epistemological level.

Yes, but there's no reason to claim that comp is necessarily the
*only* theory of mind.

Of course. But apart from its many weakenings (for which AUDA continue to work) I don't have heard about other "rationalist" approach. 

I tried to build one, a very long time ago, when I was still believing in the quantum wave collapse. 

Physicalism itself isn't necessarily
inconsistent at the epistemological level, but it does need a
different theory of mind - IMO.

I am not even sure of that, but I have no proof, yet. :-)

Rather, it seems to me that in our various discussions on the

emulability or otherwise of physics, we may sometimes lose sight of

whether we are interpreting in terms of numerical or stuffy

ontologies.

But "stuffy" or just primitively physical, after UDA has no more any

meaning.

Again, surely only on the basis that a stuffy theory still hangs on to
comp as a theory of mind?  Can't we escape the UDA in this way, even
in principle?

To escape UDA, you have to invent a substantial matter, a substantial mind, and glue them in a way that makes them unduplicable. Using infinities does not help, you have to use genuine complex infinities which prevents your mind to slip in the mathematical world, where infinities can self-multiply. To identify yourself to your quantum state, could seem a good idea, because by the non cloning theorem, your necessarily unknown state (by comp) cannot be cloned, but this does not work because you remain "preparable" in many similar states, and the UD will do this all the times. 

To escape UDA, I am afraid that you will have to diagonalize it, but it is closed for the diagnalization, so perhaps with strong oracles, I don't know. 

Only the ONE could perhaps escape UDA, that is comp's consequences. AUDA points toward the idea that comp makes just the argument against physicalism simpler, but that physicalism could be inconsistent by itself. But I really don't know anything for sure. It is very complex.

Be that as it may, the punchline is: do we find this analysis of the

distinction between numerical 3) and stuffy 4) to be cogent with

*specific* respect to the significance and possible application of the

concept of 'emulation' in each case?

You don't yet have grasped the UDA yet. It makes

the stuffy things not just

useless for having computations and relative emulation, but it makes, it is

the big hard point, any notion of stuffiness, irrelevant for physical

objects too.

Well, I'm always willing to stand corrected, but I had hoped in my
post on Olympia to show you finally that I had indeed grasped
*exactly* this point. My questions in this post about emulation were
really directed to clarifying the stuffy-ontology position, as a
result of the debate with Colin: i.e. what does emulation mean in a
stuffy context?  

OK sorry. 

The common sense view is that - if stuff is primitive
- emulation can only be a 3-description.  However, if numbers are
primitive, then in principle mathematical structures - in very special
relation, as you argue - actually *constitute* reality, not just
describe it.

Yes. But in the sense that you are relatively immaterial, when your wife offers you two new bodies for your birthday. Despite this is present in the material frame, "you" somehow is already immaterial. You own your bodies. This immaterial being is a reality.

I expect many realties of that kind, be it person, people, game, galaxies, photons, etc. 

The common sense believes in particles, and everything is made of those particles, and their laws are the fundamental laws. Comp is threatening only the last point, the fundamental aspect of such laws, they have to justified once comp is assumed.

I think what muddies the waters all the time is the physicalist
assumption that 'immaterial computation' can still be claimed account
for the mind on the basis of a stuffy ontology.  Without this, we
would have more or less the simple dichotomy I propose: i.e.
stuffy-ontology => stuffy stuff + stuffy mind;

That's OK. If "stuffy" in "stuffy-mind" is enough sophisticated in its non-comp aspect, then you can save physicalism. This is somehow what Penrose tried.

or comp-ontology =>
comp stuff + comp mind.  

More or less OK. stuff, mind, etc. become arithmetical reality as seen from inside from some angle.

Each side could then argue against the
other's position, but at least without laying claim to each other's
'stuff'!

There is just no stuff available. Even if we introduce it, it makes no

change in consciousness, and can't have any relation with what we observe in

nature

On the basis of the comp theory of mind-body: yes, definitely, no question.

OK. thanks for that precision. I remain open to the idea that someone find that there is something wrong in the reasoning given the difficulty of the subject.

We will come back on this.

OK,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

I love Babbage.

>
> As an aside, when I was in college I worked during summers for a
> geophysical research
> company in Texas. I calculated subsurface distances from sonic
> echo records. My
> official job title was "Computer".

It is still an open problem for me if, for the english speaker,
computer really means automatically universal computer, or does it
means also some non universal device. In french we have the term
"ordinateur", but it has the connotation of big monumental machine.
People said "PC" today. The universal thing can take many shapes and
have many names.

Yes.

> Are you contemplating that the brain may do something that is not
> computable or only
> that the world is not computable?

Both. Below my substitution level. My histories does not care.

I am sure it will, or comp will appear to be false, and then UDA gives
a tool to measure the degree of non-computationalism. Don't worry, we
have to be very near the big one to escape the stuffy world.

Look at this in this way: may be it is because I like the stuffy stuff
so much that I want to assoir it on something more solid than
observations and guesses.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[russell standish]

On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 10:03:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Look at this in this way: may be it is because I like the stuffy stuff
> so much that I want to assoir it on something more solid than

^^ seat? - "base" perhaps.

> observations and guesses.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
>

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the

physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite

computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which

is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem

(*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-

hypostases).

I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.

A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis, because it cannot compute more than a classical machine.

But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of classical computations.

The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp computation", seems to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum computers.

According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th hypostases, (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or the same, histories with the right relative proportions.

You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is

Turing emulable   (obvious).

But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical

reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)

 From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality

is NOT turing emulable.

Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
fact there is a computable theory of reality).

I am not sure I understand.

UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable  (roughly speaking).

UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.

So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to abandon comp.

(if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).

But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not computable, if only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which indeed vastly extends the realm of the computable.

So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality, which is a sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine, looks so much computational.

Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief for the one who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a doctor).

So your objections is
correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
contradiction.

comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)

thus

Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)

But 

Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if necessary)

So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.

So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.

So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
(not COMP),

UDA is not a proposition. It is the UD Argument. It is a reasoning. It cannot be true or false. It has to be valid or non valid.

If it non valid, then the first line of the reasoning is already unjustified, and the conclusion does not follow.

or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
already disproven to disprove the theory.

If the UDA reasoning is valid, then with or without comp, there can be no computable theory of 'reality', in general. And about 'physical reality' it is an open problem. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:

>
>
>
> On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
>> run
>> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
>> computation,
>> it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and
>> relative
>> computations as well,
>
> There's your Platonism.

Not mine. The one which follows from the comp assumption, if UDA is
valid.

> If nothing immaterial exists (NB "nothing",
> I don't make exceptions for just a few pixies or juse a few numbers)
> there is nothiign for a cosnc. to attach itself to except a propbably
> small, probabuily singular set of stuiffy brains and computers.

I can understand how easy for a materialist it is, to conceive at
first sight, that numbers and mathematical objects are convenient
fiction realized as space-time material configuration, perhaps of
brains.
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or
explain. This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
consciousness problem.
This shows that a purely physicalist explanation of numbers could lead
to difficulties. But the same for a description of any piece of
material things, by just that token.
So, I am not sure that physicist can be said to have solved the
"matter" problem either, and some physicists are already open,
independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative
mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".
Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.
But then with comp, you are yourself an immaterial object, of the kind
person, like the lobian machine. You own a body, or you borrow it to
your neighborhood, and "you" as an immaterial pattern can become
stable only by being multiplied in infinities of coherent similar
histories, which eventually the physicists begin to talk about
(multiverse).

I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real
(I think) like the natural numbers.
Some may be seen as absolutely real, or just as useful fiction: it
changes nothing. This is the case for the negative number, the
rational, a large part of the algebraic and topological, and analytical.
Some are both absolutely real, and physically real, they live in
"platonia", and then can come back on earth: they have a relatively
concrete existence. For example, the games of chess, the computers,
the animals, and the persons. But the concreteness is relative, the
'I' coupled with the chessboard is an abstract couple following
normality conditions (that QM provides, but comp not yet).
Some could have an even more trivial sense of absolute existence, and
a case could be made they don't exist, even in Platonia, like the
unicorns, perhaps, and the squared circles (hopefully).

Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp, we
have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
its enough to justified the existence of the universal numbers, and
either they dreams (if "yes doctor") or at least their discourse on
their dreams (if you say no the doctor and decide to qualify those
machines are "inexistent zombies").

There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it
happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that, and
for them, in-existence does not make sense.

And for a mathematicans, they exists in a very strong sense, which is
that, by accepting Church Thesis, they can prove the existence of
universal digital (mathematical) machine from 0, succession, addition
and multiplication.
Both amoebas colony (human cells), and engineers are implementing some
of them everyday in our neighborhood, as we can guess.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
> > >
> > > Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
> > >
> > > physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
> > >
> > > computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
> > >
> > > is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
> > >
> > > (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
> > >
> > > hypostases).
>
>
> > I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
> > what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
> > classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.
>
> A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis, because it
> cannot compute more than a classical machine.
> But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of classical
> computations.

Ok but as this could be done on classical machine an order of
magnitude slower I don't see how it is relevant.

> The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp computation", seems
> to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum computers.

I don't understand what you mean here ?

> According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th hypostases,
> (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the
> comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or the same,
> histories with the right relative proportions.

I'm sorry but here too.

> > >
> > > You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
> > >
> > > Turing emulable   (obvious).
> > >
> > > But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
> > >
> > > reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
> > >
> > >  From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
> > >
> > > is NOT turing emulable.
> > >
> > Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
> > invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
> > fact there is a computable theory of reality).
>
> I am not sure I understand.
> UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable  (roughly
> speaking).
> UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.

If UDA is not valid, you don't get the contradiction (I'm not saying
the argument (UDA) is invalid, I'm saying that you could not deduce
the contradiction if UDA is invalid because the contradiction only
arises if UDA is valid). If you come up with a computable theory of
reality, either UDA is invalid or the computable theory of reality is
invalid. But you can't use UDA to say the computable theory of reality
is invalid if UDA is invalid.

> So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to abandon
> comp.
> (if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).
> But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not computable, if
> only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which indeed
> vastly extends the realm of the computable.

I'm ok with that... but obvious I couldn't say it is, there could be
rules which restrict to something vastly smaller than arithmetical
truth... not that I believe it.

> So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality, which is a
> sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine, looks so
> much computational.
> Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief for the one
> who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a doctor).
>
> > So your objections is
> > correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
> > with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
> > contradiction.
>
> comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)
> thus
> Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)
> But
> Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if
> necessary)
> So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.
> So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.

No, not in all circumstance, only if UDA is valid.

Regards,
Quentin

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
> (not COMP),
>
> UDA is not a proposition. It is the UD Argument. It is a reasoning. It
> cannot be true or false. It has to be valid or non valid.
> If it non valid, then the first line of the reasoning is already
> unjustified, and the conclusion does not follow.
>
>
>
>
> or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
> reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
> already disproven to disprove the theory.
>
> If the UDA reasoning is valid, then with or without comp, there can be no
> computable theory of 'reality', in general. And about 'physical reality' it
> is an open problem. OK?
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> >
>

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Aug 2009, at 21:39, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
> 2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>>>
>>>> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
>>>>
>>>> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
>>>>
>>>> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy
>>>> which
>>>>
>>>> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open
>>>> problem
>>>>
>>>> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
>>>>
>>>> hypostases).
>>
>>
>>> I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
>>> what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
>>> classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.
>>
>> A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis,
>> because it
>> cannot compute more than a classical machine.
>> But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of
>> classical
>> computations.
>
> Ok but as this could be done on classical machine an order of
> magnitude slower I don't see how it is relevant.

It is an evidence wich confirms the sort of reality we can expect with
comp. below our substitution level we should have evidence of more
than one computation acting in parallel.

>
>> The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp
>> computation", seems
>> to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum
>> computers.
>
> I don't understand what you mean here ?

Comp predicts that any miece of observable matter "does not exist
primitively" but emerge from a first person view on an infinity of
identical (with respect to the level of description) but dissimilar
(below that level) computations. They relative proportion dtemined the
way we have to quantify the 1-indterminacy. Just remember how the step
seven works. You are in front of a UD which never stop. To predict
your next experience accirately, a priori you have to run the whole
UD, so as to measure the right relative frequencies. In reality, no
such runhas to be done, because the first person is not aware on any
of the UD delays, and that is why "nature" does automatically, in
appearance, what would take an infinite time, if we would search for
such an accuracy. But then why is the physical world so much
computable in appearance. Matter has become the phenomenon that we
have to explain without any recourse of theories based on observable
matter.
It is really the step seven, and we are doing again in detail, so
don't worry if it is still unclear.

>
>> According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th
>> hypostases,
>> (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the
>> comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or
>> the same,
>> histories with the right relative proportions.
>
> I'm sorry but here too.

The UD* run all quantum computation going through my state, and a
priori much more other computations.

>
>>>>
>>>> You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness
>>>> is
>>>>
>>>> Turing emulable (obvious).
>>>>
>>>> But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
>>>>
>>>> reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
>>>>
>>>> From this it follows that: Reality is turing emulable ====>
>>>> Reality
>>>>
>>>> is NOT turing emulable.
>>>>
>>> Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
>>> invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
>>> fact there is a computable theory of reality).
>>
>> I am not sure I understand.
>> UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable
>> (roughly
>> speaking).
>> UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.
>
> If UDA is not valid, you don't get the contradiction (I'm not saying
> the argument (UDA) is invalid, I'm saying that you could not deduce
> the contradiction if UDA is invalid because the contradiction only
> arises if UDA is valid). If you come up with a computable theory of
> reality, either UDA is invalid or the computable theory of reality is
> invalid. But you can't use UDA to say the computable theory of reality
> is invalid if UDA is invalid.

Of course. Unless someone find another proof which is valid.
In case someone would find a flaw in the UDA.
But this you can say for all theorems.

>
>> So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to
>> abandon
>> comp.
>> (if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).
>> But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not
>> computable, if
>> only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which
>> indeed
>> vastly extends the realm of the computable.
>
> I'm ok with that... but obvious I couldn't say it is, there could be
> rules which restrict to something vastly smaller than arithmetical
> truth... not that I believe it.

I doubt it too. I mean how to make such restriction, without making
more or less than a universal machine. We will come back on this.

>
>> So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality,
>> which is a
>> sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine,
>> looks so
>> much computational.
>> Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief
>> for the one
>> who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a
>> doctor).
>>
>>> So your objections is
>>> correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
>>> with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
>>> contradiction.
>>
>> comp => Reality is not computable (UDA)
>> thus
>> Reality is Computable = > ~comp (contraposition)
>> But
>> Reality is Computable = > Comp (to emulate me, emulate Reality if
>> necessary)
>> So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp) a contradiction.
>> So reality is not computable. In all circumstance.
>
> No, not in all circumstance, only if UDA is valid.

I was supposing UDA is valid. But when you present an argument,
usually you don't have to assume the reasoning valid to pursue. If the
reasoning is non valid, people (intersted) have to point on where the
argument if not valid.
In AUDA, do you think we have to assuming Turing, Gödel, Church,
Kleene to be valid?
If UDA is not valid, all what I say should be abandoned. Well actually
you can recover a part of the theory by postulating Pytahgoreanism at
the start (What Peter seems to believe): the assumption that there is
nothing but numbers (with +, and *). But no need to do that, unless
you feel an error remains in UDA. Of course *you* can think like that
only when you are personally convinced by UDA, or by some other
argument.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

> Here we are back on our little theological divergence.

I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very
generally. No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will try to
clarify later. BTW, at the risk of being 'undiplomatic', could I ask
you to read to the end of my remarks and consider them in a general
'theological' context before commenting them 'per comp'?

> The ONE is really arithmetical
> truth before any notion of self is yet defined

This corresponds I think to my intuition of 'that-which-is
self-accessing + self-relativising'. I would say that per comp this
self-relativisation corresponds to the number relations in which
arithmetical truth is realised. But it is also central for me that
all such relations are understood as mutually-accessing. In reply to
Rex you commented that to have a notion of content you needed
something non-conscious, and I commented on this in situ. My thought
is that relational access must be comprehensible as not-yet-conscious
(because prior to the emergence of the self that will contextualise
it) but nonetheless possessing the sine-qua-non of such consciousness.
BTW, first-person indeterminacy is already implicit - though not
emergent - at this point, because the identity "I", though it will be
pluralised by relativisation, nonetheless inheres in the whole, not
the part (which represents a relative point-of-view, not a permanently
individuated soul).

> Once a notion of self
> appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true
> provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine
> intellect),

In that case, provable provability - the terrestrial intellect -
corresponds to what can be communicated (or what I called in another
remark, what can be abstracted or taken out-of-context); and true
provability - the divine intellect - corresponds to what is
knowable-in-context. The context of what-is-knowable corresponds to
the feelable (a perfectly good term IMO). I think too that this is
where what is often (wrongly IMO) referred to as the explanatory gap
opens up. The gap is not explanatory, because it eludes the scope of
what explanation can be. IOW, the feelable nature of the quale can be
known-in-context, but never communicated out-of-context.

> which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the
> God of the eastern).

And through relativisation to the 'many points-of-view'

> And this one, due to tension with the intellect,
> will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy
> matter.

On this I am less clear, but in general this corresponds to the
emergent 'content' in terms of which the many points of view integrate
- at the level of mutually consistent 3-descriptions; and segregate -
in terms of the many histories. Per comp, this derives from - I would
say (very loosely) - statistical consequences of the universal
dovetailing.

> Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this
> temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the
> coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the
> falling souls,

i.e. Its pluralities of viewpoints and narratives.

> and the souls see their rise to the ONE.

i.e. The many souls lay claim to a common "I"; their feelings inhabit
a common context; their differentiation is relative, not absolute.

> Same
> arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.

Precisely.

David

[Bruno Marchal]

Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much
precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal
Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some vocabulary
adjustments.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Aug 2009, at 04:08, russell standish wrote:

>
> On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 10:03:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Look at this in this way: may be it is because I like the stuffy
>> stuff
>> so much that I want to assoir it on something more solid than
>
> ^^ seat? - "base" perhaps.

Thanks Russell. Now, I was thinking some french words here and there
can be tolerated, and that it would only make my prose looking
snobbish. But then I guess I was wrong, right? Or does it look too
much snobbish?

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[1Z]

On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> >> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can  
> >> run
> >> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that  
> >> computation,
> >> it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and  
> >> relative
> >> computations as well,
>
> > There's your Platonism.
>
> Not mine. The one which follows from the comp assumption, if UDA is  
> valid.

Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
round.

> > If nothing immaterial exists (NB "nothing",
> > I don't make exceptions for just a few pixies or juse a few numbers)
> > there is nothiign for a cosnc. to attach itself to except a propbably
> > small, probabuily singular set of stuiffy brains and computers.
>
> I can understand how easy for a materialist it is, to conceive at  
> first sight, that numbers and mathematical objects are convenient  
> fiction realized as space-time material configuration, perhaps of  
> brains.

It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
assuming immaterialism

> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> explain.

Irrelevant. "Described by" does not mean "is"

>This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the  
> consciousness problem.

Such as?

> This shows that a purely physicalist explanation of numbers could lead  
> to difficulties. But the same for a description of any piece of  
> material things, by just that token.
> So, I am not sure that physicist can be said to have solved the  
> "matter" problem either,

You arguments here are based on the idea
that primary matter needs to be given a
purely mathematical expression. That in turn
is based on an assumption of Platonism. If
Platonism is false and materialism true,
one would *expect* mathematical explanation
to run out at some point. Your "difficulty" is a
*prediction* of materialism , and therefore a
successfor materailism

> and some physicists are already open,  
> independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative  
> mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".  
> Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.

They have a consisent set of assumptions. So do
their materialist oponents. You can't get an "is true"
out of a "might be true"

> But then with comp, you are yourself an immaterial object,

False. computaitonlism does not prove the immaterial existence
of anything whatsoever. Most computationalists are materialists.

>of the kind  
> person, like the lobian machine. You own a body, or you borrow it to  
> your neighborhood, and "you" as an immaterial pattern can become  
> stable only by being multiplied in infinities of coherent similar  
> histories, which eventually the physicists begin to talk about  
> (multiverse).
>
> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real  
> (I think) like the natural numbers.

There's your Platonism again. Believe what you like, but don'
call it proof.

> Some may be seen as absolutely real, or just as useful fiction: it  
> changes nothing.

It changes everything. If the UD is a useful ficiton, I cannot be a
programme running on it, any more than I can book a flight to Narnia.

>This is the case for the negative number, the  
> rational, a large part of the algebraic and topological, and analytical.

Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument
about which pixies exist.

> Some are both absolutely real, and physically real, they live in  
> "platonia", and then can come back on earth: they have a relatively  
> concrete existence. For example, the games of chess, the computers,  
> the animals, and the persons. But the concreteness is relative, the  
> 'I' coupled with the chessboard is an abstract couple following  
> normality conditions (that QM provides, but comp not yet).
> Some could have an even more trivial sense of absolute existence, and  
> a case could be made they don't exist, even in Platonia, like the  
> unicorns, perhaps, and the squared circles (hopefully).
>
> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp, we  
> have a lot  choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take  
> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and  
> its enough to justified the existence of the universal numbers, and  
> either they dreams (if "yes doctor") or at least their discourse on  
> their dreams (if you say no the doctor and decide to qualify those  
> machines are "inexistent zombies").
>
> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it  
> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that, and  
> for them, in-existence does not make sense.

If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
rigourous mathematical argument you think
you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:

> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> round.

Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
exist? Prime number does not exist? That mathematical existence is a
meaningless notion?

Mathematics would be a physical illusion?

But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
circular?

> It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
> disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
> assuming immaterialism

Well, I do believe in the natural numbers, and I do believe in their
immateriality (the number seven is not made of quantum field, or
waves, or particle).

So either you tell me that you don't believe in the number seven, or
that you have a theory in which the number seven is explained in
materialist term, without assuming numbers in that theory.

>> This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
>> consciousness problem.
>
> Such as?

Explaining number with physical notions,
and explaining, even partially, physical notions with the use numbers.

> You arguments here are based on the idea
> that primary matter needs to be given a
> purely mathematical expression. That in turn
> is based on an assumption of Platonism. If
> Platonism is false and materialism true,
> one would *expect* mathematical explanation
> to run out at some point. Your "difficulty" is a
> *prediction* of materialism , and therefore a
> successfor materailism

Not at all. Cf the "even partially" in my sentence just above.

>> and some physicists are already open,
>> independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative
>> mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".
>> Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.
>
> They have a consisent set of assumptions. So do
> their materialist oponents. You can't get an "is true"
> out of a "might be true"

Well the movie graph conclusion is that materialism is not consistent,
unless it opt for eliminativism of persons and/or non computationalism.

>> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real
>> (I think) like the natural numbers.
>
> There's your Platonism again. Believe what you like, but don'
> call it proof.

Given that the theorem is "comp => platonism", and given that I am
open to the idea that comp could be correct, I am of course open to
the idea that Platonism may be correct.

But again, I don't need platonism (non-physicalism) to be an
arithmetical realist, like all classical mathematicians. This is
explicit in the assumption. The non physicalism and general
immaterialism is a consequence of the movie graph argument. What is
wrong with it?

> It changes everything. If the UD is a useful ficiton, I cannot be a
> programme running on it, any more than I can book a flight to Narnia.

Would you say that the 1000^1000th base ten decimal of PI is a fiction?

>> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it
>> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that,
>> and
>> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>
> If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
> rigourous mathematical argument you think
> you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.

I do like Chuang-tzu, and I can see the relation between comp and
Chuang-tzu, although it is more clear with Lao-Tzu, as you may see in
"Conscience et Mécanisme", where an explicit correspondence is
suggested.

So, what you tell me is that you don't believe in *any* form of
mathematical existence.

So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis, which
is part of comp.

Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
more sure of your position.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

2009/8/17 1Z <peter...@yahoo.com>:

> Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument
> about which pixies exist.

Forgive me for butting in, but I wonder whether there is a level at
which your metaphysical disagreement is perhaps somewhat more
resolvable? It might be supposed that materialism begins and ends
with predicting and manipulating the observable and 'real', and
consequently can dismiss further metaphysical speculation with Dr
Johnson's robust kick. But we know this does not prevent physicists -
even when not explicitly seeking a 'platonic' mathematical basis for
physics - from speculating about theoretical entities - superstrings,
loops, etc - far beyond the observable; IOW seeking to situate the
observable within a more comprehensive interpretative background so
that appearance can be explicated more coherently and with less
arbitrariness.

If this is true, it seems to me that the essential focus of comp is no
different - to explain the appearance of the observable - though it
places the observer (correctly IMO) in a more central role than
current physical theory. Like physical theory, comp predictions are
in principle falsifiable in terms of the observable. Like physical
theory, comp privileges certain entities and relations as
'fundamental' with respect to others that supervene on, or are
derivable from them. In fact, the most fundamental theoretical
divergence would seem precisely to lie in the direction each
postulates for the inference: mathematics <=> matter <=> mind; and how
this plays out must, as you both have said, be central to our
understanding of the scope and limits of the mathematical, the
physical, and the mental.

I think the core of the problem is a tendency to mentally conjure
platonia as a pure figment; this will not do; nor is it presumably
what Plato had in mind. Rather, platonia might be reconceived in
terms of the preconditions of the observable and real; its theoretical
entities must - ultimately - be cashable for what is RITSIAR, both
'materially' and 'mentally'. On this basis, some such intuition of an
'immaterial' (pre-material?) - but inescapably real - precursory
state could be seen as theoretically inevitable, whether one
subsequently adopts a materialist or a comp interpretative stance.

David

[David Nyman]

On 17 Aug, 08:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much  
> precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal  
> Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some vocabulary  
> adjustments.

Thanks Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview?

David

>
> Bruno
>
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
>
>

> > 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

[Jesse Mazer]

1Z wrote:

> > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> > explain.
>
> Irrelevant. "Described by" does not mean "is"
>
> >This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the  
> > consciousness problem.
>
> Such as?
>
> > This shows that a purely physicalist explanation of numbers could lead  
> > to difficulties. But the same for a description of any piece of  
> > material things, by just that token.
> > So, I am not sure that physicist can be said to have solved the  
> > "matter" problem either,
>
> You arguments here are based on the idea
> that primary matter needs to be given a
> purely mathematical expression. That in turn
> is based on an assumption of Platonism. If
> Platonism is false and materialism true,
> one would *expect* mathematical explanation
> to run out at some point. Your "difficulty" is a
> *prediction* of materialism , and therefore a
> successfor materailism

But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior). In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".

And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2009, at 12:39, David Nyman wrote:

>
> On 17 Aug, 08:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much
>> precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal
>> Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some
>> vocabulary
>> adjustments.
>
> Thanks Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview?

I am not sure what do you mean exactly.
Today, the concrete universal machines are still very primitive, if
not already too much enslaved (full of non universal programs).

So the existing "interview" is still part of mathematical logic
exclusively. It is known today as the logic of provability, or the
logic of consistency, or the logic of self-reference.
The notion of self-reference is the natural third person notion of
self-reference as defined by Gödel in his 1931 paper. It applies to
very general notions of self-referential entity, not just machine. But
I I limit myself on correct machines.
May be you could study the second part of the sane04 paper, and help
yourself with an introductory book on the subject like the book by
Raymond Smullyan "Forever Undecided", but you may need some taste in
logic.

Textbooks exist like Boolos 1979 (which has been reedited), Boolos
1993, and Smorynski 1985. You will find the reference in my Lille PhD
thesis. Those books assumed some knowledge of mathematical logic. Good
books are Elliot Mendelson (many editions), or the book by Boolos,
Burgess and Jeffrey.

Have you follow the seventh step series, or the older but recent UDA
and MGA threads? I am actually explaining the math from scratch needed
to understand the seventh step, which is the step where the Universal
Dovetailer appears.
The understanding of the notion of Universal Dovetailer requires the
notion Universal machine, which requires the notion of computable
functions, which requires the notion of functions and related
elementary set theory.

UDA shows this: "if I am a machine" then "correct physical prediction
= a sum on self-consistent extensions".

This transforms a part of the mind body problem into a tremendously
hard mathematical body problem.

That was the goal: to show that the comp hyp reduces, if only
partially, the mind body problem into a computer science/mathematical
logico problem.

Now at first sight you get an infinite sum of infinite things, so it
could seem UDA is just a refutation of comp.

Now UDA shows *and illustrate* that machines which introspect
themselves can see that physics is the head, so to speak. So instead
of using computer science to look at the sum on self-consistent
extension, it is simpler, conceptually to directly study what a
correct universal machine can see by introspecting herself. We know
she must see the "physics" in her "head", OK? And that is what Gödel
did for correct machines known by logicians as (sufficiently rich)
axiomatic theories. This has given the logic of self-reference.

I give an exemple: Gödel shows that (arithmetical or above) axiomatic
theories can talk (prove) propositions about themselves. The
"themselves" is a third person self-reference, so that the machine is
talking in the manner of a scientific about her body, in a third
person way.

Examples
- An incompleteness theorem: it asserts that the correct machine
machine cannot prove its own consistency (own based on that third
person self-reference). This can be written ~B(~Bf) (it is not
provable that the false is not provable).
- *the* incompleteness theorem: if "I" am consistent then "I" cannot
prove "my" own consistency ("I", and "me" = 3-self).
This can be written ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf ). First person reference are more
tricky to define, and requires Theaetetus.

Now, some machine believes this, they believes in the natural numbers.
For example, they believe in Ex (x = 0), (it exists a number x equal
to the 0). and also, they believe in Ex (x = s(0)), i.e. it exists a
number x equal to the 0), and so one with s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), etc.
But they believe also in all the induction formula:

[p(0) and Ax(p(x) -> p(s(x))] -> Ax p(x)

I translate (read the colonne vertically):

p(0) the property p is true for zero
and and
Ax for all number x we have that
(p(x) -> p(s(x)) the truth of p for x entails the truth of p for the
successor of x

-> all what precedes entails the truth of what follows

The induction formula gives an enormous power of probability. To
believe in addition and multiplication makes you already universal. To
believe in addition, multiplication and in the induction formula makes
you Löbian, and this makes you know, in a sense, that you are
universal. At the propositional level the logic has been axiomatized
soundly and completely by Solovay, and with the mathematical decor
(the so called normal modal logic) they are entirely characterized by
the formula B(Bp->p)->Bp. A formula related to a theorem by Löb.

Oops I must go. We were beginning the AUDA. It could be premature,
given that we are just at the seventh step of UDA in another thread.
Let me be short and hopefully not too much discouraging. If you want
to take part in the interview, you have to learn theoretical computer
science, math and logic. You may have an opportunity, given that I
like to teach those matter especially when people are motivated by
deep questions.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> > Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> > physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> > round.
>
> Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
> exist?

Yes, the square root of two has no ontological existence.

> Prime number does not exist?

Yes, prime numbers have no ontological existence

>That mathematical existence is a
> meaningless notion?

Sense but no refence. Mathematical statements have
truth values but do not refere to anything outside the
formal system.

> Mathematics would be a physical illusion?

A referentless formal game, distinguished from fiction
only by its rigour and generality

> But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
> circular?

No, because it uses mathematics empirically. The same
language that can be used to write fiction can be used to
write history. The difference is in how it used. not in the langauge
itself

> > It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
> > disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
> > assuming immaterialism
>
> Well, I do believe in the natural numbers, and I do believe in their
> immateriality (the number seven is not made of quantum field, or
> waves, or particle).

Then you are a Platonist, and you argument is based
on Platonism.

> So either you tell me that you don't believe in the number seven, or
> that you have a theory in which the number seven is explained in
> materialist term, without assuming numbers in that theory.

The latter.

> >> This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
> >> consciousness problem.
>
> > Such as?
>
> Explaining number with physical notions,
> and explaining, even partially, physical notions with the use numbers.

That is just a repetition of the claim that there
are problems. You have not in the least explained what
the problems are.

> > You arguments here are based on the idea
> > that primary matter needs to be given a
> > purely mathematical expression. That in turn
> > is based on an assumption of Platonism. If
> > Platonism is false and materialism true,
> > one would *expect* mathematical explanation
> > to run out at some point. Your "difficulty" is a
> > *prediction* of materialism , and therefore a
> > successfor materailism
>
> Not at all. Cf the "even partially" in my sentence just above.

That sentence does not demonstate anything
about anything.

> >> and some physicists are already open,
> >> independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative
> >> mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".
> >> Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.
>
> > They have a consisent set of assumptions. So do
> > their materialist oponents. You can't get an "is true"
> > out of a "might be true"
>
> Well the movie graph conclusion is that materialism is not consistent,
> unless it opt for eliminativism of persons and/or non computationalism.

Materialism=true and computationalism=false is a consistent
set of assumptions. Moreover, the movie graph doesn;t prove
what you say it does since it involves an illegitimate move from
"minimal physical basis" to "no physical basis".

> >> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real
> >> (I think) like the natural numbers.
>
> > There's your Platonism again. Believe what you like, but don'
> > call it proof.
>
> Given that the theorem is "comp => platonism", and given that I am
> open to the idea that comp could be correct, I am of course open to
> the idea that Platonism may be correct.

The theorem is platonism=>UD, UD=comp=>immaterialism

> But again, I don't need platonism (non-physicalism) to be an
> arithmetical realist, like all classical mathematicians.

Yes you do. The UD doesn't exist physically. If it doesn't
exist non-physically either, it doesn't exist, and I am not
a programme running on it.

>This is
> explicit in the assumption. The non physicalism and general
> immaterialism is a consequence of the movie graph argument. What is
> wrong with it?

The movie graph doesn;t prove
what you say it does since it involves an illegitimate move from
"minimal physical basis" to "no physical basis".

> > It changes everything. If the UD is a useful ficiton, I cannot be a
> > programme running on it, any more than I can book a flight to Narnia.
>
> Would you say that the 1000^1000th base ten decimal of PI is a fiction?

Yes. I don't beleive in *any* pixies, not a single one.

> >> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it
> >> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that,
> >> and
> >> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>
> > If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
> > rigourous mathematical argument you think
> > you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.
>
> I do like Chuang-tzu, and I can see the relation between comp and
> Chuang-tzu, although it is more clear with Lao-Tzu, as you may see in
> "Conscience et Mécanisme", where an explicit correspondence is
> suggested.

> So, what you tell me is that you don't believe in *any* form of
> mathematical existence.

Not in any, and not in any pixies either.

> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.

The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.

You may of course mean something else by "comp".....

> Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis, which
> is part of comp.

if AR is as claim abotu the immateial existence of numbers it does
not.
Not even remotely.

> Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
> more sure of your position.

I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
truth=existence is extraordinary and metaphysical...

> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
>> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
>> round.
>
>
> Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
> exist? Prime number does not exist? That mathematical existence is a
> meaningless notion?
>
> Mathematics would be a physical illusion?
>
> But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
> circular?

I think of numbers as part of our descriptive models. We (along with our evolution)
invented them). Mathematical existence is only meaningful in the sense that some
mathematical object follows from axioms. Descriptions are not illusory if they model
something in reality. The number 2 models pairs of things in the world, but a model is
not the thing. Pairing things by similarity or function or color is done by abstracting
away the particularities.

Brent

[Flammarion]

On 17 Aug, 11:23, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/17 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>
> > Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument
> > about which pixies exist.
>
> Forgive me for butting in, but I wonder whether there is a level at
> which your metaphysical disagreement is perhaps somewhat more
> resolvable? It might be supposed that materialism begins and ends
> with predicting and manipulating the observable and 'real', and
> consequently can dismiss further metaphysical speculation with Dr
> Johnson's robust kick. But we know this does not prevent physicists -
> even when not explicitly seeking a 'platonic' mathematical basis for
> physics - from speculating about theoretical entities - superstrings,
> loops, etc - far beyond the observable; IOW seeking to situate the
> observable within a more comprehensive interpretative background so
> that appearance can be explicated more coherently and with less
> arbitrariness.

I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
justifiiable in the way you suggest, but it does need
to be made explicit.

> If this is true, it seems to me that the essential focus of comp is no
> different - to explain the appearance of the observable -

That has nothing to do with Computaitonalism -- the Computational
Theory of Mind. If what you mean by comp is Brono's theory, then
it migh help to call it Bruno's theory.

>though it
> places the observer (correctly IMO) in a more central role than
> current physical theory. Like physical theory, comp predictions are
> in principle falsifiable in terms of the observable. Like physical
> theory, comp privileges certain entities and relations as
> 'fundamental' with respect to others that supervene on, or are
> derivable from them. In fact, the most fundamental theoretical
> divergence would seem precisely to lie in the direction each
> postulates for the inference: mathematics <=> matter <=> mind; and how
> this plays out must, as you both have said, be central to our
> understanding of the scope and limits of the mathematical, the
> physical, and the mental.

Bruno's theory may well be falsifiable. But then it is hardly
a disproof of materialism as it stands.

> I think the core of the problem is a tendency to mentally conjure
> platonia as a pure figment;

I am not sure what you mean by that. Anti-Platonic philsoophies
of maths, such as formalism, are considered positons supported by
arguments, not vague intuitions.

> this will not do; nor is it presumably
> what Plato had in mind. Rather, platonia might be reconceived in
> terms of the preconditions of the observable and real; its theoretical
> entities must - ultimately - be cashable for what is RITSIAR, both
> 'materially' and 'mentally'. On this basis, some such intuition of an
> 'immaterial' (pre-material?) - but inescapably real - precursory
> state could be seen as theoretically inevitable, whether one
> subsequently adopts a materialist or a comp interpretative stance.

I don;t see why it is necessay at all, let alone why
it was inevitable. You were earlier comparing it
to a hypothetical background ontology. How did
it jump form (falsifiable) hypotheiss to necessary
and inevitable truth?

[Brent Meeker]

I agree in a sense. There is the allowance of a primariness, i.e. some things exist and
some don't, that is irreducible and perhaps mysterious. It is not asserted, but it is
accepted that however good one's models are at making accurate predictions one can never
know if they are really real or just good models.

Does Bruno assume arithmetic is really real or just a really good model, and can the
difference be known? And what if his theory is empirically falsified, as he says it could
be? Will that suddenly change arithmetic to fiction?

If you can't settle for less than certain knowledge - then you will end up like Rex, with
none at all.

>
> And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between
> this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I
> don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with
> primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or
> qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then
> why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)

I don't have any model in which there would be qualia but no matter. Most models of the
world suppose there were no qualia prior to a billion years ago. For me it's not a
question of logical possibility, but nomological possibility.

Brent

[Jesse Mazer]

Peter Jones wrote:

>
>
> On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> > > physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> > > round.
> >
> > Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
> > exist?
>
> Yes, the square root of two has no ontological existence.
>
> > Prime number does not exist?
>
> Yes, prime numbers have no ontological existence

What do you mean by "ontological existence"? The modern perspective among analytic philosophers is to tie ontology to the notion of objective truth--if we imagine a book containing an exhaustive set of *all* objective truths about reality, then the minimal set of entities that we would need to refer to in such a book, in such a way that we could not remove all reference to them by coming up with a "paraphrase" of all statements involving them, would be the ones that must be part of our ontology. This idea goes back to Quine, it's discussed at http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/ontology.html and there's also a discussion in the introduction to the book "The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics", which says:

"Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is understood to be something like this: If one affirms a statement using a name or other singular term, or an initial phrase of 'existential quantification', like 'There are some so-and-sos', then one must either (1) admit that one is committed to the existence of things answering to the singular term or satisfying the description, or (2) provide a 'paraphrase' of the statement that eschews singular terms and quantifications over so-and-sos. So interpreted, Quine's criterion can be seen as a logical development of the methods of Russell and Moore, who assumed that one must accept the existence of entities corresponding to the singular terms used in statements one accepts, unless and until one finds systematic methods of paraphrase that eliminate these terms. .... Most philosophers today who identify themselves as metaphysicians are in basic agreement with the Quinean approach to systematic metaphysics"

The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.

As the quote says, most philosophers (analytic philosophers anyway) adopt this point of view when dealing with metaphysical questions. For instance, if you believe there are objective truths about mathematics which cannot be reduced to statements about the physical world using an appropriate "paraphrase", then in Quine's scheme you'd have committed yourself to some form of mathematical platonism. Likewise, if you believe there is an objective truth about what it is like for a human to experience the color blue which could not be deduced from an exhaustive set of facts about their physical brain, as suggested by the "Mary's room" thought-experiment (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary's_room ), then you've committed yourself to an ontology where qualia have some sort of nonmaterial existence (even if they are entirely determined by the physical arrangements of matter and the physical world is 'causally closed', as proposed by David Chalmers).

[Flammarion]

On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> > > explain.

> But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).

Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
instantiates
that particualar amtehamtical structure.

> In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".

You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
arbitrary.

> And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)

The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White Rabbits.
The first is no different from the Bruno-Tegmark theory. They cannot
predict qualia from Platonism.

[Flammarion]

On 17 Aug, 18:51, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> Jesse Mazer wrote:

> Does Bruno assume arithmetic is really real or just a really good model, and can the
> difference be known?

I don't think Bruno believes there is anything else
for arithemeic *to* model.

[Flammarion]

On 17 Aug, 20:49, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Peter Jones wrote:
>
> > On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > > On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> > > > physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> > > > round.
>
> > > Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
> > > exist?
>
> > Yes, the square root of two has no ontological existence.
>
> > > Prime number does not exist?
>
> > Yes, prime numbers have no ontological existence
>
> What do you mean by "ontological existence"?

Real in the Sense that I am Real.

>The modern perspective among analytic philosophers is to tie ontology to the notion of objective truth--if we imagine a book containing an exhaustive set of *all* objective truths about reality, then the minimal set of entities that we would need to refer to in such a book, in such a way that we could not remove all reference to them by coming up with a "paraphrase" of all statements involving them, would be the ones that must be part of our ontology.

That acount ties ontology to objective truth AND reality. We anti-
Platonists think
the truths of mathematics are objective but without any necessary
connection to reality.

>This idea goes back to Quine, it's discussed athttp://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/ontology.htmland there's also a discussion in the introduction to the book "The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics", which says:
> "Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is understood to be something like this: If one affirms a statement using a name or other singular term, or an initial phrase of 'existential quantification', like 'There are some so-and-sos', then one must either (1) admit that one is committed to the existence of things answering to the singular term or satisfying the description, or (2) provide a 'paraphrase' of the statement that eschews singular terms and quantifications over so-and-sos.

We anti-Platonists do the latter.

>So interpreted, Quine's criterion can be seen as a logical development of the methods of Russell and Moore, who assumed that one must accept the existence of entities corresponding to the singular terms used in statements one accepts, unless and until one finds systematic methods of paraphrase that eliminate these terms. .... Most philosophers today who identify themselves as metaphysicians are in basic agreement with the Quinean approach to systematic metaphysics"
> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.

> As the quote says, most philosophers (analytic philosophers anyway) adopt this point of view when dealing with metaphysical questions. For instance, if you believe there are objective truths about mathematics which cannot be reduced to statements about the physical world using an appropriate "paraphrase", then in Quine's scheme you'd have committed yourself to some form of mathematical platonism. Likewise, if you believe there is an objective truth about what it is like for a human to experience the color blue which could not be deduced from an exhaustive set of facts about their physical brain, as suggested by the "Mary's room" thought-experiment (seehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary's_room), then you've committed yourself to an ontology where qualia have some sort of nonmaterial existence (even if they are entirely determined by the physical arrangements of matter and the physical world is 'causally closed', as proposed by David Chalmers).

Yep. I have no problem with any of that

[David Nyman]

2009/8/17 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:

> Yep. I have no problem with any of that

Really? Let's see then.....

>> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.

I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the
above passage? If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that
gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements
about physical processes in human brains". So what may we now suppose
gives such processes this particular power? Presumably not their
'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point
I originally made). It seems to me that what one can recover from
this is simply the hypothesis that certain brain processes give rise
to consciousness in virtue of their being precisely the processes that
they are - no more, no less.

Am I still missing something?

David

[David Nyman]

2009/8/17 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:

> I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
> assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An  assumption
> of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
> justifiiable in the way you suggest, but it does need
> to be made explicit.

Yes, this is why I felt it might help the discussion to make the
possibility of such an assumption explicit in this way.

> Bruno's theory may well be falsifiable. But then it is hardly
> a disproof of materialism as it stands.

Agreed - not as a knockdown blow - although as you know his argument
is that materialism is incompatible with the computational theory of
mind; and of course I've also been arguing for this, although my
alternative (i.e. a theory, rather than an intuition) wouldn't
necessarily be the same as his.

>> I think the core of the problem is a tendency to mentally conjure
>> platonia as a pure figment;
>
>
> I am not sure what you mean by that. Anti-Platonic philsoophies
> of maths, such as formalism, are considered positons supported by
> arguments, not vague intuitions.

Yes, I don't dispute that. But aside from this, perhaps one could say
that we tend to assume that ideas about 'platonias' have sense but no
reference. However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
One should perhaps recall that the appeal to number as a causal
principle (to use the logic of 'paraphrase') can't be met by any
merely human concept of number. IOW for reality to emerge from
number, whatever the putative referents of human number terminology
may be, they must at some level be uniquely cashable in terms of
RITSIAR.

>> this will not do; nor is it presumably
>> what Plato had in mind.  Rather, platonia might be reconceived in
>> terms of the preconditions of the observable and real; its theoretical
>> entities must - ultimately - be cashable for what is RITSIAR, both
>> 'materially' and 'mentally'.  On this basis, some such intuition of an
>> 'immaterial'  (pre-material?) - but inescapably real - precursory
>> state could be seen as theoretically inevitable, whether one
>> subsequently adopts a materialist or a comp interpretative stance.
>
> I don;t see why it is necessay at all, let alone why
> it was inevitable. You were earlier comparing it
> to a hypothetical background ontology. How did
> it jump form (falsifiable) hypotheiss to necessary
> and inevitable truth?

It didn't. I was just suggesting that embracing some more 'agnostic'
background schema of this kind might actually be helpful in
appreciating the scope and limits of explanation. For example, just
how far down the explanatory hierarchy do we have to go before it
starts making less and less sense to insist on characterising the
explanatory entities as 'material'? Are superstrings material? Is
quantum foam material? Are
whatever-are-conceived-as-the-pre-conditions for their appearance in
the scheme of things material? What is surely at issue is not their
'essential' materiality but their properties as appealed to by theory
(i.e. the ones to which we would resort by paraphrase). Perhaps our
ultimate explanatory entities need be conceived as no more 'material'
than necessary for us to depend on them as plausible pre-cursors of
the more obviously material; but of course, no less so either.

While I've got you here, as it were - I don't see why this wouldn't
apply equally to the mental: IOW our explanatory entities need be
conceived as no more 'mental' than necessary for us to depend on them
as plausible precursors of the more obviously mental; but no less so
either.

David

> >
>

[Jesse Mazer]

Peter Jones wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> > > > explain.
>
> > But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).
>
> Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
> problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> instantiates
> that particualar amtehamtical structure.

But then it seems like you're really just talking about consciousness and qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes containing possible self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are these possible observers actually real in the sense of having qualia (and there qualia being influenced by other, possibly nonconsious elements of the mathematical universe they are a part of). There's no need to have a middleman called "primary matter", such that only some (or one) mathematical possible universes are actually instantianted in primary matter, and only those instantiated in primary matter give rise to qualia. If you *are* going to add unobservable middlemen like this, there's no real logical justification for having only one--you could say "only some mathematically possible universes are instantiated in primary asfgh, and only some of those give rise to qwertyuiop, and only the ones with quertyuiop can give rise to zxcvbn, and only ones with zxcvbn can give rise to qualia and consciousness".

 > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".
>
> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
> arbitrary.

My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).

>
> > And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)
>
> The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White Rabbits.

I don't agree, there's no reason you couldn't postulate a measure on the set of mathematical possibilities which determined the likelihood they would actually be experienced by conscious observers--this measure might be such that white-rabbit worlds would be very improbable, it might even pick out a unique mathematically possible universe where the possible observers are actually conscious, while assigning zero measure to all other possibilities. 

[David Nyman]

2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:

>>
>> Peter Jones wrote:
>>
>> Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
>> physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
>> it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
>> problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
>> universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
>> instantiates
>> that particualar amtehamtical structure.
>
> But then it seems like you're really just talking about consciousness and
> qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes containing possible
> self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are these possible observers
> actually real in the sense of having qualia (and there qualia being
> influenced by other, possibly nonconsious elements of the mathematical
> universe they are a part of). There's no need to have a middleman called
> "primary matter", such that only some (or one) mathematical possible
> universes are actually instantianted in primary matter, and only those
> instantiated in primary matter give rise to qualia. If you *are* going to
> add unobservable middlemen like this, there's no real logical justification
> for having only one--you could say "only some mathematically possible
> universes are instantiated in primary asfgh, and only some of those give
> rise to qwertyuiop, and only the ones with quertyuiop can give rise to
> zxcvbn, and only ones with zxcvbn can give rise to qualia and
> consciousness".

AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
parameters capable of predicting what is observed; since white rabbits
are not in fact observed, it follows that no successful mathematics of
primary matter has any business predicting them.

This is not to say that such circularity is necessarily vicious; its
proponents no doubt see it as virtuously parsimonious. Nonetheless,
one of the chief arguments for the pluralistic alternatives is that -
by not applying a priori mathematical or parametric restrictions -
they may thereby be less arbitrary. This of course leaves them with
the problem of the white rabbits to solve by other means.

David

[Brent Meeker]

David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:
>
>> Yep. I have no problem with any of that
>
> Really? Let's see then.....
>
>>> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement
>>> like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being
>>> forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in
>>> terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word
>>> "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting
>>> mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem
>>> plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human
>>> concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may
>>> lack the understanding to do that now.
>
> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the above passage?
> If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that gives rise to consciousness
> could be "paraphrased using statements about physical processes in human brains". So
> what may we now suppose gives such processes this particular power? Presumably not
> their 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point I originally
> made). It seems to me that what one can recover from this is simply the hypothesis
> that certain brain processes give rise to consciousness in virtue of their being
> precisely the processes that they are - no more, no less.

No less, but some more. Compare the concept that chemistry gives rise to life. As we
have come to understand life we see that it has lots of sub-processes and there are
different kinds suited to different environments. We can manipulate some aspects of life,
e.g. genetic engineering. So we did get more than just certain chemical processes give
rise to life in virtue of being the processes they are. The very concept of life is now
seen to be a fuzzy abstraction with no definite meaning.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>>
>>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
>>> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
>>> round.
>>
>> Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
>> exist?
>
> Yes, the square root of two has no ontological existence.

All what matters with comp is that things like the square root of 2
has a notion of existence independent of "me".

>
>> Prime number does not exist?
>
> Yes, prime numbers have no ontological existence

I guess you make a "material" ontological commitment. One of my goal
is to explain, notably with the comp hyp, that a term like matter has
no referent. This would explain why physicist never use such
ontological commitment explicitly.
To say that matter exists simply is a non rational act of the type
"don't ask". UDA makes just this precise by reudcing the mind body
problem to a body problem.

>
>> That mathematical existence is a
>> meaningless notion?
>
> Sense but no refence. Mathematical statements have
> truth values but do not refere to anything outside the
> formal system.

Then they have no truth value. What you say is formalism, and this has
been explicitly refuted by mathematical logicians.
We know, mainly by the work of Gödel that the truth about numbers
extends what can be justified in ANY effective formal systems (and non
effective one are not really "formal").
But I know that there are still some formalists in the neighborhood,
and that is why I make explicit the assumption of arithmetical
realism. It is the assumption that the structure (N, +, x) is well
defined, despite we can't define it effectively.

>
>> Mathematics would be a physical illusion?
>
> A referentless formal game, distinguished from fiction
> only by its rigour and generality

You evacuate the whole approach of semantics by Tarski and Quine. I
will not insist on this because I will explain with some detail why
Church thesis necessitate arithmetical realism, and why this leads
directly to the incompleteness and the discovery that arithmetical
truth cannot be captured by any effective formal system. The formalist
position in math is no more tenable.

>
>> But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
>> circular?
>
> No, because it uses mathematics empirically. The same
> language that can be used to write fiction can be used to
> write history. The difference is in how it used. not in the langauge
> itself

I don't see any difference in the use of analytical tools in physics
and in number theory. The distribution of the prime numbers is
objective, and this is the only type of independent objectivity needed
in the reasoning. Nothing more.

>
>>> It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
>>> disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
>>> assuming immaterialism
>>
>> Well, I do believe in the natural numbers, and I do believe in their
>> immateriality (the number seven is not made of quantum field, or
>> waves, or particle).
>
> Then you are a Platonist, and you argument is based
> on Platonism.

I believe that the truth of arithmetical statement having the shape
"ExP(x)" is independent of me, and you and the physical universe (if
that exists).
You can call that Platonism, if you want, but this is not obviously
"anti-physicalist". Non-physicalism is the conclusion of a reasoning
(UDA).
Given that Plato's conception of reality is closer to the conclusion,
I prefer to use the expression "Arithmetical realism" for this (banal)
assumption, and Platonism or non-physicalism for the conclusion. But
that is only a vocabulary problem.

>
>> So either you tell me that you don't believe in the number seven, or
>> that you have a theory in which the number seven is explained in
>> materialist term, without assuming numbers in that theory.
>
> The latter.

Show it. I know an attempt toward "science without number" by Hartree
Field (wrong spelling?), but I found it poorly convincing. Most
physicists accept the objectivity of numbers. Even more so with the
attempt to marry GR and QM.

>
>>>> This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
>>>> consciousness problem.
>>
>>> Such as?
>>
>> Explaining number with physical notions,
>> and explaining, even partially, physical notions with the use
>> numbers.
>
> That is just a repetition of the claim that there
> are problems. You have not in the least explained what
> the problems are.

UDA is such an explanation. AUDA gives a constructive path toward a
solution.

I am not even sure of that, but given the fuzziness of the notion of
"primitive matter", why not. May be God created it in 6 days, or the
big bang in zero seconds.
I always felt that taking notion of matter, or consciousness, for
granted, is a creationist-like move on the type "don't ask". UDA shows
that we have to ask more precisely when we assume that personal
consciousness can be invariant for the change of implementations done
below the substitution level.

> Moreover, the movie graph doesn;t prove
> what you say it does since it involves an illegitimate move from
> "minimal physical basis" to "no physical basis".

It goes explicitly to "no physical activity" in the MGA3 thread. But
MGA2 is enough, due to the "qua computatio" condition in the "yes
doctor" hypothesis. I guessed that your problem is in the
understanding of UDA step-8.

>
>>>> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely
>>>> real
>>>> (I think) like the natural numbers.
>>
>>> There's your Platonism again. Believe what you like, but don'
>>> call it proof.
>>
>> Given that the theorem is "comp => platonism", and given that I am
>> open to the idea that comp could be correct, I am of course open to
>> the idea that Platonism may be correct.
>
> The theorem is platonism=>UD, UD=comp=>immaterialism

I am glad you see this. All what I have to do is convince you that
formalism does not work for arithmetic and mathematical computer
science.

>
>> But again, I don't need platonism (non-physicalism) to be an
>> arithmetical realist, like all classical mathematicians.
>
> Yes you do. The UD doesn't exist physically. If it doesn't
> exist non-physically either, it doesn't exist, and I am not
> a programme running on it.

Because you don't believe in anything non physical. But this comes
from your "formalist" position which does no more make sense after
Gödel. Each formal system, and machine, miss almost all arithmetical
truth.

>
>> This is
>> explicit in the assumption. The non physicalism and general
>> immaterialism is a consequence of the movie graph argument. What is
>> wrong with it?
>
>
> The movie graph doesn;t prove
> what you say it does since it involves an illegitimate move from
> "minimal physical basis" to "no physical basis".

See MGA3. Actually the contradiction appears, in the movie graph, even
when the whole physical activity is still there, but is no more
corresponding to any computation. This is a subtle point, no doubt,
and it asks for an understanding of the computational supervenience
thesis, which I am explaining in the "seven step series" thread.

>
>>> It changes everything. If the UD is a useful ficiton, I cannot be a
>>> programme running on it, any more than I can book a flight to
>>> Narnia.
>>
>> Would you say that the 1000^1000th base ten decimal of PI is a
>> fiction?
>
> Yes. I don't beleive in *any* pixies, not a single one.

All what I need is that the statement "the 1000^1000th base ten
decimal of PI is even" is true or false independently of the
existence of me, the planet earth or the physical universe (if that
exists).

>
>>>> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist,
>>>> but it
>>>> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that,
>>>> and
>>>> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>>
>>> If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
>>> rigourous mathematical argument you think
>>> you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.
>>
>> I do like Chuang-tzu, and I can see the relation between comp and
>> Chuang-tzu, although it is more clear with Lao-Tzu, as you may see in
>> "Conscience et Mécanisme", where an explicit correspondence is
>> suggested.
>
>> So, what you tell me is that you don't believe in *any* form of
>> mathematical existence.
>
> Not in any, and not in any pixies either.
>
>> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.

Comp is based on the notion of digitalness, which needs Church thesis.
I will explain in detail why Church thesis needs arithmetical realism.
I think that you are confusing everyone by switching "arithmetical
realism" with "Platonism". If you call "Platonism" what I call
"Arithmetical realism", I will put the result in the following way:
comp => non physicalism. It leads to a reduction of the mind-body
problem to the search of an explanation of stable beliefs in matter,
without matter. AUDA provides the explanation, yet not the physical
theory (but still the logic of physical propositions). It explains the
appearance of "many worlds" below the substitution level.

>
> You may of course mean something else by "comp".....
>
>> Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis,
>> which
>> is part of comp.
>
> if AR is as claim abotu the immateial existence of numbers it does
> not.
> Not even remotely.

AR is a claim that number exists independently of my body and soul.
Number are immaterial, by definition. You don't need a theory of
matter to explain what numbers are. On the contrary, all book which
talk on matter assumes them more or less explicitly.

>
>> Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
>> more sure of your position.
>
> I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
> but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
> truth=existence is extraordinary and metaphysical...

Mathematical existence = truth of existential mathematical statement.

The number seven exists independently of me, is equivalent with the
statement that the truth of the mathematical statement Ex(x =
s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))))) is true independently of me.

If you really believe that the number 7 has no existence at all, then
the UDA reasoning does not go through, but then you are abandoning
comp because you can no more give sense to digitalness. You can still
say "yes" to a doctor, but you have to refer to some analog material
object, and not accept that you survive "qua computatio". This plays a
role in step-8.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 02:47, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:

> 2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:

> AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
> problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
> exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
> parameters capable of predicting what is observed; since white rabbits
> are not in fact observed, it follows that no successful mathematics of
> primary matter has any business predicting them.
>
> This is not to say that such circularity is necessarily vicious; its
> proponents no doubt see it as virtuously parsimonious.  Nonetheless,
> one of the chief arguments for the pluralistic alternatives is that -
> by not applying a priori mathematical or parametric restrictions -
> they may thereby be less arbitrary.  This of course leaves them with
> the problem of the white rabbits to solve by other means.
>
> David
>

Yes. It pretty well comes to a trade-off between cotingency and saving
appearances.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Peter Jones wrote:
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> > > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> > > > > explain.
>
> > > But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).
>
> > Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> > physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> > it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
> > problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> > universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> > instantiates
> > that particualar amtehamtical structure.
>
> But then it seems like you're really just talking about consciousness and qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes containing possible self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are these possible observers actually real in the sense of having qualia (and there qualia being influenced by other, possibly nonconsious elements of the mathematical universe they are a part of).

No.. I don't need the hypothesis that WR universes are there but
unobserved.

> There's no need to have a middleman called "primary matter", such that only some (or one) mathematical possible universes are actually instantianted in primary matter, and only those instantiated in primary matter give rise to qualia.

There is no absolute need, but there are advantages. For instance, the
many-wolder might have to admit
the existence of zombie universes -- universes that containt
*apparent* intelligent lige that is nonetheless unconscious--
in order to account for the non-obseration of WR universes.

> If you *are* going to add unobservable middlemen like this,

I don't concede that PM is unobservable. What exists is material, what
is immaterial does not
exist. There is therefore a large set of facts about matter. Moreover,
the many-worlders extra
universes *have* to be unobservable one way or the other, since they
are not observed!

>there's no real logical justification for having only one--you could say "only some mathematically possible universes are instantiated in primary asfgh, and only some of those give rise to qwertyuiop, and only the ones with quertyuiop can give rise to zxcvbn, and only ones with zxcvbn can give rise to qualia and consciousness".

Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
not about
explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
contingency as the price
paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
explanatory
desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
Everythingism wins.

>  > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".
>
> > You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
> > arbitrary.
>
> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).

I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
properties could be accounted for
as non-mathematical attributes of PM)

> > > And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)
>
> > The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White Rabbits.
>
> I don't agree, there's no reason you couldn't postulate a measure

Yes there is: you have to justify from first principles and not just
postulate it.
The problem is that if all possible maths exists, all possible
measures exist...
you can't pick out one as being, for some contingent reason "the"
measure....

>on the set of mathematical possibilities which determined the likelihood they would actually be experienced by conscious observers--this measure might be such that white-rabbit worlds would be very improbable, it might even pick out a unique mathematically possible universe where the possible observers are actually conscious, while assigning zero measure to all other possibilities.

So you are appealing to the unknown relationship between maths and
qualia, rather than the unknown properties
of matter?

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 00:41, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>
> > Yep. I have no problem with any of that
>
> Really?  Let's see then.....
>
> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.
>
> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the
> above passage?  If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that
> gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements
> about physical processes in human brains".  So what may we now suppose
> gives such processes this particular power?  Presumably not their
> 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point
> I originally made).  

That's completely back to front. Standard computaitonalism
regards computation as a physical process taking place
in brains and computer hardware. It doesn't exist
at the fundamental level like quarks, and it isn't non-existent
like unicorns. It is a higher-level existent, like horses.

Standard computationalism is *not* Bruno's claims about
immaterial self-standing computations dreaming they are butterflies
or
whatever. That magnificent edifice is very much of his own
making. He may call it "comp" but don't be fooled.

>It seems to me that what one can recover from
> this is simply the hypothesis that certain brain processes give rise
> to consciousness in virtue of their being precisely the processes that
> they are - no more, no less.
>
> Am I still missing something?

It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true
and computationalism false. That is to say that
the class of consciousness-causing processes might
not coincide with any proper subset of the class
of computaitonal processes.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>>> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
>>>> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
>>>> described or
>>>> explain.
>
>> But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from
>> all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical
>> models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate
>> predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes
>> something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical
>> experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding
>> 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it
>> *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical
>> models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).
>
> Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
> problem.

QM mechanics solves mathematically the white rabbit problem. I do
agree with this, but to say it does this by invoking primitive matter
does not follow. On the contrary QM amplitude makes primitive matter
still more hard to figure out. Primitive matter is, up to now, a
metaphysical notion. Darwinian evolution can justify why we take
seriously the consistency of our neighborhood, and why we extrapolate
that consistency, but physicists does not, in their theories, ever
postulate *primitive* matter.

> We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> instantiates
> that particualar amtehamtical structure.

Are you defending Bohm's Quantum Mechanics? The wave without particles
still act physically, indeed they have to do that for the quantum
disappearance of the white rabbits.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Artithmetical theories model (in the physicists sense) the standard
model (in the logician sense) of arithmetic.

But you are right. Arithmetical truth is what our theories try to
model, always imperfectly, and necessarily so, as we know since Gödel.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 01:43, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>
> > I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
> > assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An  assumption
> > of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
> > justifiiable in the way you suggest, but it does need
> > to be made explicit.
>
> Yes, this is why I felt it might help the discussion to make the
> possibility of such an assumption explicit in this way.
>
> > Bruno's theory may well be falsifiable. But then it is hardly
> > a disproof of materialism as it stands.
>
> Agreed - not as a knockdown blow - although as you know his argument
> is that materialism is incompatible with the computational theory of
> mind; and of course I've also been arguing for this, although my
> alternative (i.e. a theory, rather than an intuition) wouldn't
> necessarily be the same as his.
>
> >> I think the core of the problem is a tendency to mentally conjure
> >> platonia as a pure figment;
>
> > I am not sure what you mean by that. Anti-Platonic philsoophies
> > of maths, such as formalism, are considered positons supported by
> > arguments, not vague intuitions.
>
> Yes, I don't dispute that.  But aside from this, perhaps one could say
> that we tend to assume that ideas about 'platonias' have sense but no
> reference.  

I don't see why

>However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.

Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
whole point

> One should perhaps recall that the appeal to number as a causal
> principle (to use the logic of 'paraphrase') can't be met by any
> merely human concept of number.  IOW for reality to emerge from
> number, whatever the putative referents of human number terminology
> may be, they must at some level be uniquely cashable in terms of
> RITSIAR.

I would have hoped that was obvious.

> >> this will not do; nor is it presumably
> >> what Plato had in mind.  Rather, platonia might be reconceived in
> >> terms of the preconditions of the observable and real; its theoretical
> >> entities must - ultimately - be cashable for what is RITSIAR, both
> >> 'materially' and 'mentally'.  On this basis, some such intuition of an
> >> 'immaterial'  (pre-material?) - but inescapably real - precursory
> >> state could be seen as theoretically inevitable, whether one
> >> subsequently adopts a materialist or a comp interpretative stance.
>
> > I don;t see why it is necessay at all, let alone why
> > it was inevitable. You were earlier comparing it
> > to a hypothetical background ontology. How did
> > it jump form (falsifiable) hypotheiss to necessary
> > and inevitable truth?
>
> It didn't.  I was just suggesting that embracing some more 'agnostic'

?!?!?!

> background schema of this kind might actually be helpful in
> appreciating the scope and limits of explanation.  For example, just
> how far down the explanatory hierarchy do we have to go before it
> starts making less and less sense to insist on characterising the
> explanatory entities as 'material'?  

It hasn't happened yet.

>Are superstrings material?  Is
> quantum foam material?  Are
> whatever-are-conceived-as-the-pre-conditions for their appearance in
> the scheme of things material?  What is surely at issue is not their
> 'essential' materiality but their properties as appealed to by theory
> (i.e. the ones to which we would resort by paraphrase).

Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:

>>
>> What do you mean by "ontological existence"?
>
> Real in the Sense that I am Real.

What does that mean?

Do you mean "real in the sense that 1-I is real"? or
do you mean "real in the sense that 3-I is real"?

The 1-I reality (my consciousness) is undoubtable, and incommunicable
in any 3-ways.

The 3-I reality (my body, identity card, ...) is doubtable (I could be
dreaming) and communicable in 3-ways, yet always with interrogation
mark.

This makes a big difference.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> >>> physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> >>> round.
>
> >> Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 does not
> >> exist?
>
> > Yes, the square root of two has no ontological existence.
>
> All what matters with comp is that things like the square root of 2  
> has a notion of existence independent of "me".

that's what I meant.

> >> Prime number does not exist?
>
> > Yes, prime numbers have no ontological existence
>
> I guess you make a "material" ontological commitment. One of my goal  
> is to explain, notably with the comp hyp, that a term like matter has  
> no referent.

One of my goals is to explain that you cannot convince
me tha matter doesn't exist without first convincing
me that numbers do. You may be able to eliminate
matter in favour of numbers, but that doesn;'t stop
me douing the converse.

>This would explain why physicist never use such  
> ontological commitment explicitly.

Physicists write reams about matter.

> To say that matter exists simply is a non rational act of the type  
> "don't ask". UDA makes just this precise by reudcing the mind body  
> problem to a body problem.

The UDA doesn't even start without Platonism

>
> >> That mathematical existence is a
> >> meaningless notion?
>
> > Sense but no refence. Mathematical statements have
> > truth values but do not refere to anything outside the
> > formal system.
>
> Then they have no truth value.

That statement requires some justification

> What you say is formalism, and this has  
> been explicitly refuted by mathematical logicians.

False. From previous conversations, you conflate fomalism
with Hilbert's programme. I am not referring to the claim
that there is a mechanical proof-porcedure for any
theorem, I am referring to the claim that mathematics
is a non-referential formal game. Note that Platonism
vs. Formalism is an open quesiton in philosophy.

> We know, mainly by the work of Gödel that the truth about numbers  
> extends what can be justified in ANY effective formal systems (and non  
> effective one are not really "formal").

Irrelevant. Platonism
vs. Formalism is a debate about *existence* not about truth.

> But I know that there are still some formalists in the neighborhood,  
> and that is why I make explicit the assumption of arithmetical  
> realism. It is the assumption that the structure (N, +, x) is well  
> defined, despite we can't define it effectively.
>
>
>
> >> Mathematics would be a physical illusion?
>
> > A referentless formal game, distinguished from fiction
> > only by its rigour and generality
>
> You evacuate the whole approach of semantics by Tarski and Quine.

Maybe. Evidently I prefer Frege

> I  
> will not insist on this because I will explain with some detail why  
> Church thesis necessitate arithmetical realism, and why this leads  
> directly to the incompleteness and the discovery that arithmetical  
> truth cannot be captured by any effective formal system. The formalist  
> position in math is no more tenable.
>
>
>
> >> But physics use mathematics, would that not make physics illusory or
> >> circular?
>
> > No, because it uses mathematics empirically. The same
> > language that can be used to write fiction can be used to
> > write history. The difference is in how it used. not in the langauge
> > itself
>
> I don't see any difference in the use of analytical tools in physics  
> and in number theory.

I've done both and I do.

>The distribution of the prime numbers is  
> objective, and this is the only type of independent objectivity needed  
> in the reasoning. Nothing more.

Truths about prime numbers are objective truths,. That
says nothing about existence.

> >>> It's a perfectly consistent assumption. THere is no
> >>> disproof of materialism that doesn't beg the quesiton by
> >>> assuming immaterialism
>
> >> Well, I do believe in the natural numbers, and I do believe in their
> >> immateriality (the number seven is not made of quantum field, or
> >> waves, or particle).
>
> > Then you are a Platonist, and you argument is based
> > on Platonism.
>
> I believe that the truth of arithmetical statement having the shape  
> "ExP(x)" is independent of me, and you and the physical universe (if  
> that exists).

To get a claim of existence out of that claim of truth, you have
to take the "exists" to have a single uniform meaning in all
contexts,. This, we formalists dispute.

> You can call that Platonism, if you want, but this is not obviously  
> "anti-physicalist".

Show me where these numbers are phsycially, then

>Non-physicalism is the conclusion of a reasoning  
> (UDA).

Unfortunately, it is also the assumption

> Given that Plato's conception of reality is closer to the conclusion,  
> I prefer to use the expression "Arithmetical realism" for this (banal)  
> assumption, and Platonism or non-physicalism for the conclusion. But  
> that is only a vocabulary problem.

I think AR conflates the objective truth claim with the ontological
existence claim.

> >> So either you tell me that you don't believe in the number seven, or
> >> that you have a theory in which the number seven is explained in
> >> materialist term, without assuming numbers in that theory.
>
> > The latter.
>
> Show it. I know an attempt toward "science without number" by Hartree  
> Field (wrong spelling?), but I found it poorly convincing. Most  
> physicists accept the objectivity of numbers. Even more so with the  
> attempt to marry GR and QM.

1. Numbers are (referentless) concepts
2. Concepts are mental
3. The mind is the activity of the brain
4. The brain is physical


Both Platonism and Empriricism share the assumption that mathematical
symbols refer to objects. An alternative to both is the theory that
they do not refer at all: this theory is called formalism. For the
formalist, mathematical truths are fixed by the rules of mathematics,
not by external objects. But what fixes the rules of mathematics ?
Formalism suggests that mathematics is a meaningless game, and the
rules can be defined any way we like. Yet mathematicians in practice
are careful about the selection of axioms, not arbitrary. So do the
rules and axioms of mathematics mean anything or not ?

The reader may or have noticed that I have been talking about
mathematical symbols "referring" to things rather than "meaning"
things. This eliptically refers to a distinction between two different
kinds or shades of meaning made by Frege. "Reference" is the external-
world object a symbol is "about". "Sense" is the kind of meaning a
symbol has even if does not have a reference.

Meaning is *not* the same thing as reference (Bedeutung). That is the
box the anti-Platonist has climbed out of. Some terms have referents
(non-linguistic items they denote), others have only "sense" (Sinn).
Sense and reference are two dimensions aspects of meaning, but not
every term has both. Sense is internal to langauge, it a relationship
between a word/concept and others. It is like a dictionary definition,
whereas reference is like defining a word by pointing and saying "it
is one of those". But no-one has ever defined a unicorn that way,
since there is no unicorn to be pointed to. Mathematical concepts are
defined in terms of other mathematical concepts. Mathematical
reference is impossible and unnecessary.

In this way, statements about unicorns or the bald King of France have
Sense but not Reference. Therfore, it is possible for mathematical
statments to have a sense, and therefore a meaning, beyond the formal
rules and defintions, but stopping short of external objects
(referents), whether physical or Platonic. This position retains the
negative claim of Formalism, that mathematical symbols don't refer to
objects, and thus avoids the pitfalls of both Platonism and
Empiricism. Howeverm it allows that mathematical symbols can have
meanings of an in-the-head kind and thus explains the non-arbitrary
nature of the choice of axioms; they are not arbitrary because they
must correspond to the mathematician's intuition -- her "sense" -- of
what a real number or a set is.

So far we have been assuming that the same answer must apply uniformly
to all mathematical statmentents and symbols: they all refer or none
do. There is a fourth option: divide and conquer -- some refer and
others don't.

> >>>> This leads to major difficulties, even before approaching the
> >>>> consciousness problem.
>
> >>> Such as?
>
> >> Explaining number with physical notions,
> >> and explaining, even partially, physical notions with the use  
> >> numbers.
>
> > That is just a repetition of the claim that there
> > are problems. You have not in the least explained  what
> > the problems are.
>
> UDA is such an explanation. AUDA gives a constructive path toward a  
> solution.

The UDA goes nowhere without Platonism

Taking the immaterial existene of numbers for granted differs how?

No, because truth is no existence. There may be true facts
about the UD, but if it doesn;t exist, it is not generating me.

> >>>> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist,  
> >>>> but it
> >>>> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that,
> >>>> and
> >>>> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>
> >>> If they don't exist, they don't exist. You don't have the
> >>> rigourous mathematical argument you think
> >>> you have, you have some baroque Chuang-Tzu metaphysics.
>
> >> I do like Chuang-tzu, and I can see the relation between comp and
> >> Chuang-tzu, although it is more clear with Lao-Tzu, as you may see in
> >> "Conscience et Mécanisme", where an explicit correspondence is
> >> suggested.
>
> >> So, what you tell me is that you don't believe in *any* form of
> >> mathematical existence.
>
> > Not in any, and not in any pixies either.

> >> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> > The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.
>

> Comp is based on ...
>
> read more »

[Jesse Mazer]

> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peter...@yahoo.com
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Peter Jones wrote:
> >
> > > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by  
> > > > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or  
> > > > > > explain.
> >
> > > > But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).
> >
> > > Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> > > physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> > > it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
> > > problem. We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> > > universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> > > instantiates
> > > that particualar amtehamtical structure.
> >
> > But then it seems like you're really just talking about consciousness and qualia--of all the mathematically possible universes containing possible self-aware observers, only in some (or one) are these possible observers actually real in the sense of having qualia (and there qualia being influenced by other, possibly nonconsious elements of the mathematical universe they are a part of).
>
> No.. I don't need the hypothesis that WR universes are there but
> unobserved.

What does "are there" mean? It seems to be a synonym for physical existence, but my whole point here is that the notion of physical existence doesn't even seem well-defined, if this discussion is going to get anywhere you need to actually address this argument head on rather than just continue to talk as though terms like "exists" and "are there" have a transparent meaning. The only kinds of existence that seem meaningful to me are the type of Quinean existence I discussed earlier, and existence in the sense of conscious experience which is something we all know firsthand. Can you explain what "physical existence" is supposed to denote if it is not either of these?

> > There's no need to have a middleman called "primary matter", such that only some (or one) mathematical possible universes are actually instantianted in primary matter, and only those instantiated in primary matter give rise to qualia.

>
> There is no absolute need, but there are advantages. For instance, the
> many-wolder might have to admit
> the existence of zombie universes -- universes that containt
> *apparent* intelligent lige that is nonetheless unconscious--
> in order to account for the non-obseration of WR universes.
>
> > If you *are* going to add unobservable middlemen like this,
>
> I don't concede that PM is unobservable. What exists is material, what
> is immaterial does not
> exist. There is therefore a large set of facts about matter. Moreover,
> the many-worlders extra
> universes *have* to be unobservable one way or the other, since they
> are not observed!

Who said anything about many worlds? Again, we are free to believe in a type of single-universe scenario, let's call it "scenario A", where only a single one of the mathematical universes which "exist" in the Quinean sense (and it seems you cannot deny that all mathematical structures do 'exist' in this sense, since you agree there are objective mathematical truths) also "exist" in the giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense. You want to add a third notion of "physical existence", so your single-universe scenario, which we can call "scenario B", says that only one of the mathematical universes which exist in the Quinean sense also exists in the physical sense (i.e. there is actual 'prime matter' whose behavior maps perfectly to that unique mathematical description), and presumably you believe that only a universe which exists in the physical sense can exist in the giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense. But all observations that conscious observers would make about the world in scenario B would also be observed in scenario A (assuming that the same mathematical universe that is granted physical existence in scenario B is the one that's granted conscious existence in scenario A). In both scenarios "physical objects" would be identified based on the qualia associated with them (color, visual shape, tactile hardness, etc.), and based on the fact that they behaved in certain predictable lawlike ways which could be boiled down to mathematical rules. If the experiences of observers in scenario A are identical in every way to those of observers in scenario B, despite the fact that there is no "physical existence" in scenario A, then the extra ingredient of "physical existence" makes no observable difference, and thus must be something utterly mysterious, we might as well call it "clapsahadrical existence".

>
> >there's no real logical justification for having only one--you could say "only some mathematically possible universes are instantiated in primary asfgh, and only some of those give rise to qwertyuiop, and only the ones with quertyuiop can give rise to zxcvbn, and only ones with zxcvbn can give rise to qualia and consciousness".
>
> Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> not about
> explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> contingency as the price
> paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
> explanatory
> desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
> Everythingism wins.

Again, I said nothing about "Everythingism", my comments about "physical existence" being a meaningless middleman would apply just as well if we believed there was only one universe that "existed" in the sense of giving rise to first-person experiences and qualia.

>
> >  > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".
> >
> > > You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
> > > arbitrary.
> >
> > My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).
>
> I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
> properties could be accounted for
> as non-mathematical attributes of PM)

Well, see my point above about the complete indistinguishability of scenario A from scenario B from the perspective of conscious observers.

>
> > > > And are you making any explicit assumption about the relation between this "primary matter" and qualia/first-person experience? If not, then I don't see why it wouldn't be logically possible to have a universe with primary matter but no qualia (all living beings would be zombies), or qualia but no primary matter (and if you admit this possibility, then why shouldn't we believe this is exactly the type of universe we live in?)
> >
> > > The second possibility is ruled out because it predicts White Rabbits.
> >
> > I don't agree, there's no reason you couldn't postulate a measure
>
> Yes there is: you have to justify from first principles and not just
> postulate it.

Huh? Who made up that rule? If you can postulate that only one mathematically possible universe exists in the physical sense without justifying it from first principles, I can postulate that only one mathematically possible universe exists in the giving-rise-to-conscious-experience sense.

> The problem is that if all possible maths exists, all possible
> measures exist...
> you can't pick out one as being, for some contingent reason "the"
> measure....
>
> >on the set of mathematical possibilities which determined the likelihood they would actually be experienced by conscious observers--this measure might be such that white-rabbit worlds would be very improbable, it might even pick out a unique mathematically possible universe where the possible observers are actually conscious, while assigning zero measure to all other possibilities.
>
> So you are appealing to the unknown relationship between maths and
> qualia, rather than the unknown properties
> of matter?

If you want to put it that way, sure. This isn't necessarily what I believe personally, I'm just pointing out that *if* you want to believe in a single universe that "exists" in some sense distinct from the Quinean sense, then it's much simpler to just talk about existence in the sense of giving rise to conscious experience rather than first talking about something mysterious called "physical existence" and then as an afterthought adding the additional claim that physical existence is required for conscious experience.

[Jesse Mazer]

> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700

> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peter...@yahoo.com
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>

>

> >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> whole point

What does "real" mean? Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence. On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 09:52, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> >>>> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> >>>> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
> >>>> described or
> >>>> explain.
>
> >> But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from
> >> all the evidence from physics that various abstract mathematical
> >> models of particles and fields can be used to make accurate
> >> predictions about observed experimental results, then it becomes
> >> something utterly mysterious and divorced from any of our empirical
> >> experiences whatsoever (since all of our intuitions regarding
> >> 'matter' are based solely on our empirical experiences with how it
> >> *behaves* in the sensory realm, and the abstract mathematical
> >> models give perfectly accurate predictions about this behavior).
>
> > Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
> > physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
> > it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
> > problem.
>
> QM mechanics solves mathematically the white rabbit problem.

That is still a subset of all possible maths, just like a single-world
universe. Is it a contingent fact that only that subset exists?

>I do
> agree with this, but to say it does this by invoking primitive matter
> does not follow. On the contrary QM amplitude makes primitive matter
> still more hard to figure out. Primitive matter is, up to now, a
> metaphysical notion. Darwinian evolution can justify why we take
> seriously the consistency of our neighborhood, and why we extrapolate
> that consistency, but physicists does not, in their theories, ever
> postulate *primitive* matter.

PM in the sense I define it is quite compatible
with a QM MV (= Tegmark's level III)

> > We don't see logically consistent but otherwise bizarre
> > universes because they are immaterial and non-existent--not matter
> > instantiates
> > that particualar amtehamtical structure.
>
> Are you defending Bohm's Quantum Mechanics?

No. I am defending the idea that PM just *is* contingent
existence. What is immaterial just ain't there.

[Flammarion]

It's an epistemological difference.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com

> > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > whole point
>
> What does "real" mean?

ITSIAR

>Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.

There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.

>On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)

It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
b) not physcially accountable then they
are c) immaterically existent.

[Flammarion]

On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> >> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
> >> run
> >> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
> >> computation,
> >> it is automatically attached to an infinity of immaterial and
> >> relative
> >> computations as well,
>
> > There's your Platonism.
>
> Not mine. The one which follows from the comp assumption, if UDA is
> valid.
>
> > If nothing immaterial exists (NB "nothing",
> > I don't make exceptions for just a few pixies or juse a few numbers)
> > there is nothiign for a cosnc. to attach itself to except a propbably
> > small, probabuily singular set of stuiffy brains and computers.
>
> I can understand how easy for a materialist it is, to conceive at
> first sight, that numbers and mathematical objects are convenient
> fiction realized as space-time material configuration, perhaps of
> brains.

> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or

> explain. This leads to major difficulties,

i dont; see why. THe neural underpinnings of the concept "horse"
are probably more complex than the concept "horse". If you folow that
reasonng through consistently, Plato's heaven is going to be densely
populated
and the brain will have no woro to do at all....

> even before approaching the
> consciousness problem.

mathematical stucture+matter gives you more to
tackle the consciousness problem with than mathematical structure
alone

> This shows that a purely physicalist explanation of numbers could lead
> to difficulties. But the same for a description of any piece of
> material things, by just that token.

By what token? You think there is some complex undepiining to
quarks?

> So, I am not sure that physicist can be said to have solved the

> "matter" problem either, and some physicists are already open,

> independently of comp, to the idea that physical objects are relative
> mathematical (immaterial) objects. Which of course are "no material".
> Wheeler, Tegmark, for example.

> But then with comp, you are yourself an immaterial object, of the kind
> person, like the lobian machine. You own a body, or you borrow it to
> your neighborhood, and "you" as an immaterial pattern can become
> stable only by being multiplied in infinities of coherent similar
> histories, which eventually the physicists begin to talk about
> (multiverse).

>
> I tend to believe in many immaterial things. Some are absolutely real
> (I think) like the natural numbers.

> Some may be seen as absolutely real, or just as useful fiction: it
> changes nothing.

I can't take a ride on pagasus. and I can;t be computed
by a convenient fiction

> This is the case for the negative number, the
> rational, a large part of the algebraic and topological, and analytical.
> Some are both absolutely real, and physically real, they live in
> "platonia", and then can come back on earth: they have a relatively
> concrete existence. For example, the games of chess, the computers,
> the animals, and the persons. But the concreteness is relative, the
> 'I' coupled with the chessboard is an abstract couple following
> normality conditions (that QM provides, but comp not yet).
> Some could have an even more trivial sense of absolute existence, and
> a case could be made they don't exist, even in Platonia, like the
> unicorns, perhaps, and the squared circles (hopefully).
>
> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp, we
> have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
> its enough to justified the existence of the universal numbers, and
> either they dreams (if "yes doctor") or at least their discourse on
> their dreams (if you say no the doctor and decide to qualify those
> machines are "inexistent zombies").

Platonism is not taught in schools. You are conflatin
existence with truth

> There is a sense to say those universal machines do not exist, but it
> happens that they don't have the cognitive abilities to know that, and
> for them, in-existence does not make sense.
>

> And for a mathematicans, they exists in a very strong sense, which is
> that, by accepting Church Thesis, they can prove the existence of
> universal digital (mathematical) machine from 0, succession, addition
> and multiplication.
> Both amoebas colony (human cells), and engineers are implementing some
> of them everyday in our neighborhood, as we can guess.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:

Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.

That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.

And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor numbers).

 I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.

Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the existence of primitive matter.

All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a contradiction.

So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.

Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to give referents to such "Peter Jones". Fregean sense is enough to see that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they are not.

Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable. 

If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:

> >> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> > The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.
>
> Comp is based on the notion of digitalness, which needs Church thesis.
> I will explain in detail why Church thesis needs arithmetical realism.
> I think that you are confusing everyone by switching "arithmetical
> realism" with "Platonism". If you call "Platonism" what I call
> "Arithmetical realism", I will put the result in the following way:
> comp => non physicalism. It leads to a reduction of the mind-body
> problem to the search of an explanation of stable beliefs in matter,
> without matter. AUDA provides the explanation, yet not the physical
> theory (but still the logic of physical propositions). It explains the
> appearance of "many worlds" below the substitution level.

The computaitonal Theory of Mind still has no implications about
Platonism.
As for "comp", that is another question...

> > You may of course mean something else by "comp".....
>
> >> Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis,
> >> which
> >> is part of comp.
>
> > if AR is as claim abotu the immateial existence of numbers it does
> > not.
> > Not even remotely.
>
> AR is a claim that number exists independently of my body and soul.
> Number are immaterial, by definition.

So are ghosts and angels

> You don't need a theory of
> matter to explain what numbers are. On the contrary, all book which
> talk on matter assumes them more or less explicitly.

It doesn't take them as actually existent. Maths is used as
a language. English is used a langauge. English words
do not have immaterial existence in some heaven.

> >> Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
> >> more sure of your position.
>
> > I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
> > but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
> > truth=existence is extraordinary and metaphysical...
>
> Mathematical existence = truth of existential mathematical statement.

existential mathematical statement="existence" used in fictive sense,
like "Hobbits exist
in Middle Earth"

> The number seven exists independently of me, is equivalent with the
> statement that the truth of the mathematical statement Ex(x =
> s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))))) is true independently of me.

No. it is equivalent to the conjunction of that stament with
"and the mathematicians Ex is a claim of ontological existence".

> If you really believe that the number 7 has no existence at all, then
> the UDA reasoning does not go through,

at last!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

>but then you are abandoning
> comp because you can no more give sense to digitalness.

I am not abandoning the Computational Theory of Mind
because I can give a Quinean physical paraphrase of
computation. As for "comp", that is another question....

>You can still
> say "yes" to a doctor, but you have to refer to some analog material
> object, and not accept that you survive "qua computatio". This plays a
> role in step-8.

Exactly. The materialist computationalist says yes to being
reincarnated
on a physical computer, and no to magic beans.

[Jesse Mazer]

> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700

> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

> From: peter...@yahoo.com
> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
> >
> > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
> >
> > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > whole point
> >
> > What does "real" mean?
>
> ITSIAR

Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?

 
> >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.
>
> There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.

Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending on how seriously he intended it. Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you are responding to here.

>
> >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
>
> It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> b) not physcially accountable then they
> are c) immaterically existent.

What do you mean by "physically accountable"? Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not as part of the physical world.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com

> > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> > > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > > whole point
>
> > > What does "real" mean?
>
> > ITSIAR
>
> Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?

In The Sense I Am Real

> > >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.
>
> > There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
>
> Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending on how seriously he intended it.

It was not very apriori or theoretical. But then it is perverse to
ignore the fact that we do in fact exist. Why struggle
for defintions when the brute fact stare yo in the face?

>Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you are responding to here.

The he would exist in an idealist universe. He would still exist.

> > >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
>
> > It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> > b) not physcially accountable then they
> > are c) immaterically existent.
>
> What do you mean by "physically accountable"?

What you mean: that there are truths about them that can be

paraphrased into truths about the physical world

> Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not as part of the physical world.

Mathematical truths are relationships between concepts, and concepts
are neural acitivity. So the paraphrase
can be made.

[Jesse Mazer]

> Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700

> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

> From: peter...@yahoo.com

> To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
> >
> > > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
> >
> > > > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
> >
> > > > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > > > whole point
> >
> > > > What does "real" mean?
> >
> > > ITSIAR
> >
> > Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?
>
> In The Sense I Am Real

And what sense is that? You are obviously real in the Quinean sense, and Platonists would say numbers are real in this sense too, but you are also real in the sense of having conscious experiences, and perhaps in the sense of being "physically real" (although as always I have doubts about whether this is meaningful as distinct from the other two senses), I think most mathematical Platonists would *not* say numbers are real in these senses.

 
> > > >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.
> >
> > > There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
> >
> > Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending on how seriously he intended it.
>
> It was not very apriori or theoretical. But then it is perverse to
> ignore the fact that we do in fact exist. Why struggle
> for defintions when the brute fact stare yo in the face?
>
> >Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you are responding to here.
>
> The he would exist in an idealist universe. He would still exist.

Sure, but Johnson's kicking the rock was specifically meant to refute idealism, so I thought that's what you were referring to. My whole argument with you has been that it's sufficient to posit the Quinean existence of mathematical universes + the existence of conscious experience in at least one of these mathematical universes, that there is no need to posit any additional notion called "physical existence" that's distinct from both mathematical existence in the Quinean sense and existence in the sense of having real conscious experiences. It would help if you'd address my comments about "scenario A" vs. "scenario B" in that earlier post.

>
> > > >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
> >
> > > It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> > > b) not physcially accountable then they
> > > are c) immaterically existent.
> >
> > What do you mean by "physically accountable"?
>
> What you mean: that there are truths about them that can be
> paraphrased into truths about the physical world
>
> > Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not as part of the physical world.
>
> Mathematical truths are relationships between concepts, and concepts
> are neural acitivity. So the paraphrase
> can be made.

Wait, so do you believe there is no objective truth about mathematical statements that humans haven't specifically figured out in their brains? For example, do you think there's an objective truth about the googolplexth digit of pi?

[Bruno Marchal]

This does not answer the question:

Do you mean "real in the sense that 1-I is real"? or
do you mean "real in the sense that 3-I is real"?

Bruno



> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:

>>
>> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
>> we
>> have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
>> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
>> its enough to justified the existence of the universal numbers, and
>> either they dreams (if "yes doctor") or at least their discourse on
>> their dreams (if you say no the doctor and decide to qualify those
>> machines are "inexistent zombies").
>
> Platonism is not taught in schools. You are conflatin
> existence with truth

Platonism is not taught in schools, I agree. But I have never said that.
I am not conflating existence with truth, I am conflating mathematical
existence with truth of existential arithmetical statements.

> mathematical stucture+matter gives you more to
> tackle the consciousness problem with than mathematical structure
> alone

The mind-body problem comes from the fact that we have not yet find
how to attach consciousness to matter. At least with comp, after UDA,
we know why.

> No. it is equivalent to the conjunction of that stament with
> "and the mathematicians Ex is a claim of ontological existence".

You are the one making that addition. So, again, show where in the
reasoning I would use that addition.

>
>> If you really believe that the number 7 has no existence at all, then
>> the UDA reasoning does not go through,
>
> at last!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Read or reread the SANE paper, I explicitly assume Arithmetical
Realism. This is hardly new. I really don't follow you.
UDA is an argument showing that comp (yes doctor + CT) => non
physicalism. (CT = Church thesis)
A weaker version of CT is provably equivalent with Ex(x = universal
number). It makes no sense without AR.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

The above of course is a set of tokens symbolizing a set of cardinality eight. The fact
that it symbolizes something depends on humans interpreting it. This seems similar to the
MGA and the idea that a rock computes every function. They depend on being interpreted in
some context or environment. I'm happy to abstract them from their environment to get a
manageable model. I'm not so comfortable to say that that abstraction doesn't need the
environment and is what is really real.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable. Almost any physics explanation of how the
universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes. If it's based on
QM is will be probabilistic. So then there is a tension with parsimony between an
unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens", and keeping the
theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they all happen."

>
>> > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".
>>
>>> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
>>> arbitrary.
>> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).
>
> I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
> properties could be accounted for
> as non-mathematical attributes of PM)

I think this is a category mistake. Mathematical attributes belong to *the descriptions*
or PM, not to PM. And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise
and consistent.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

Not explicitly, but physicists generally accept that some things happen and others don't;
not only in QM but in symmetry breaking.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

I would say that giving-rise-to-conscious-perception = physical-existence. Roughly
speaking perceiving is being kicked back when you kick. It allows ostensive definition.
But I'm not sure this is the same as giving-rise-to-conscious-experience. Would it be
possible to have a stream of conscious experience with no perception, i.e. like a dream
about mathematics, but with no perceptions of the tokens we use to represent mathematical
concepts, i.e. a dream about the number two without any representation like "2" or "two"
or "{{}{{}}}"? I doubt it.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2009, at 19:17, Brent Meeker wrote:

>>
>>
>>>> Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
>>>> more sure of your position.
>>> I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
>>> but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
>>> truth=existence is extraordinary and metaphysical...
>>
>> Mathematical existence = truth of existential mathematical statement.
>>
>> The number seven exists independently of me, is equivalent with the
>> statement that the truth of the mathematical statement Ex(x =
>> s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))))) is true independently of me.
>
> The above of course is a set of tokens symbolizing a set of
> cardinality eight.

Er, actually it symbolizes the number seven (it is a detail, but set
theory will never been formalized in my posts, except much later, for
giving another example of Lobian machine).

> The fact
> that it symbolizes something depends on humans interpreting it.

I would have used the usual humans notation "7".
So I was referring to any "interpretative machine" (computer,
universal number) which agrees on the usual first order axiom of
arithmetic, talking in first order language, together with the
supplementary symbols "s", 0, "x" and "+".
We fix the notation, and, in the case of such machine we fix the
semantic by the usual mathematical structure (N,+,x).

> This seems similar to the
> MGA and the idea that a rock computes every function.

I have already criticized this. Once sup-comp is accepted, the
computation exists in arithmetic and are given by well defined
relations among numbers, entirely defined with the language above, and
they have the usual interpretation in (N,+,x). But those relation will
define complex UD-like relationships describing relative observers in
relative environment/universal machine, like "Brent deciding to send a
mail", for example. Those internal interpretation will exist in a
sense which is not dependent of the choice of any interpretation or
even representation, once you assume the usual truth of the
arithmetical relations.
In comp, like in QM, a rock compute only in the sense that "it is made
of infinities of computations". Without comp, I have no clue of what a
rock is, except that QM seems to agree on the fact that it is made of
infinities of computations.

> They depend on being interpreted in
> some context or environment.

Right. The interpreter are given by the universal numbers, or
universal machine. This is a bit tricky to define shortly, and I
postpone it in the seven step series (but I am a bit buzy), so that
more can uderstand.

In the third person way: a computation is always defined relatively to
another universal number, or directly in term of number addition and
multiplication.
From the first person perspective we can only bet on the most
probable universal number, among an infinity of them.

> I'm happy to abstract them from their environment to get a
> manageable model.

But once the "model" is a number that the doctor will send on Mars,
where a reconstitution device has been build, you have to abstract
yourself from the environment, for awhile. Saying "yes doctor" *is* a
big theological step. Nobody should ever force you. The ethic of comp
is the right to say "no" to the doctor.

> I'm not so comfortable to say that that abstraction doesn't need the
> environment and is what is really real.

Yeah ... I am sorry. But let us not be driven by wishful thinking, and
if comp survives UDA, there is a sense in which matter becomes much
more solid and stable. Observable environment emerge statistically
from infinities of non temporal and non spatial computations/number
relations.

Including (universal) environment does not help, because the UD
generates them all (with their many variants), except some infinite
diagonal "garden of Eden" which are evacuated through the comp hyp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2009, at 19:36, Brent Meeker wrote:

QM mechanics solves mathematically the white rabbit problem. I do  

agree with this, but to say it does this by invoking primitive matter  

does not follow. On the contrary QM amplitude makes primitive matter  

still more hard to figure out. Primitive matter is, up to now, a  

metaphysical notion. Darwinian evolution can justify why we take  

seriously the consistency of our neighborhood, and why we extrapolate  

that consistency, but physicists does not, in their theories, ever  

postulate *primitive* matter.

Not explicitly, but physicists generally accept that some things happen and others don't;
not only in QM but in symmetry breaking.

Number theorist too. And computer scientist too.

Some people tend to confuse Babel library and the UD. Not all histories are generated by the UD. There are things which happen and things which never happen. UD* is a highly structured, and even more so when "seen from inside".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> > some
> > possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> > is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> > defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
>
> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor  
> numbers).

If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
no UD.

>   I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent  
> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.

I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
existence. It is not a structure of anything.

> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the  
> existence of primitive matter.

Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
other.

> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or  
> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does  
> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and  
> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones  
> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a  
> contradiction.

It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.

> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness  
> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.

No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. You keep confusing the
idea
that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
with the
actual existence of those entities and beliefs.

> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that  
> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to  
> give referents to such "Peter Jones".

False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR.
I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
no-one can see it, so it ain't there.

>Fregean sense is enough to see  
> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that  
> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they  
> are not.

So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
doesn't make us wrong
about anything.

> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable.

No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
*would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.

> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.

Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
materially?
Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 12:52, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > > > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > > > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
>
> > > > > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
>
> > > > > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > > > > whole point
>
> > > > > What does "real" mean?
>
> > > > ITSIAR
>
> > > Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?
>
> > In The Sense I Am Real
>
> And what sense is that?

I can assert that X >= Y without knowing what X and Y are. The point
is that numbers of immaterial computers have
to be at least as real as I am if they are somehow generating me.
RITSIAR is a relative level of existence, not a kind of existence.

>You are obviously real in the Quinean sense, and Platonists would say numbers are real in this sense too, but you are also real in the sense of having conscious experiences, and perhaps in the sense of being "physically real" (although as always I have doubts about whether this is meaningful as distinct from the other two senses), I think most mathematical Platonists would *not* say numbers are real in these senses.

I don't think those are different sense of being real, I think they
are different properties things can have. A red bus does not exist
redly, it is just a red thing that exists in the ordinary sense.

> > > > >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical existence.
>
> > > > There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
>
> > > Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending on how seriously he intended it.
>
> > It was not very apriori or theoretical. But then it is perverse to
> > ignore the fact that we do in fact exist. Why struggle
> > for defintions when the brute fact stare yo in the face?
>
> > >Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you are responding to here.
>
> > The he would exist in an idealist universe. He would still exist.
>
> Sure, but Johnson's kicking the rock was specifically meant to refute idealism, so I thought that's what you were referring to.

I was referring to the lack of necessity of putting up a theoretical,
apriori
argument for my own existence.

>My whole argument with you has been that it's sufficient to posit the Quinean existence of mathematical universes + the existence of conscious experience in at least one of these mathematical universes, that there is no need to posit any additional notion called "physical existence" that's distinct from both mathematical existence in the Quinean sense and existence in the sense of having real conscious experiences. It would help if you'd address my comments about "scenario A" vs. "scenario B" in that earlier post.

Physical existence may be unnecessary if Platonic existence is
assumed. *My* whole argument is that Platonic
existence is unnecessary if physical existence is assumed.

>
>
> > > > >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
>
> > > > It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> > > > b) not physcially accountable then they
> > > > are c) immaterically existent.
>
> > > What do you mean by "physically accountable"?
>
> > What you mean:  that there are truths about them that can be
> > paraphrased into truths about the physical world
>
> > > Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not as part of the physical world.
>
> > Mathematical truths are relationships between concepts, and concepts
> > are neural acitivity. So the paraphrase
> > can be made.
>
> Wait, so do you believe there is no objective truth about mathematical statements that humans haven't specifically figured out in their brains? For example, do you think there's an objective truth about the googolplexth digit of pi?

I don't think there is a *subjective* truth about it. I think the
principle of bivalence is true about it -- it either is true or it
isn't. I think its
truth value is fixed for all practical purposes. But then these are
all hypothetical ways of talking, because the statement hasn't even
been specified.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 15:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,  
> >> we
> >> have a lot  choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
> >> arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
> >> its enough to justified the existence of the universal numbers, and
> >> either they dreams (if "yes doctor") or at least their discourse on
> >> their dreams (if you say no the doctor and decide to qualify those
> >> machines are "inexistent zombies").
>
> > Platonism is not taught in schools. You are conflatin
> > existence with truth
>
> Platonism is not taught in schools, I agree. But I have never said that.
> I am not conflating existence with truth, I am conflating mathematical  
> existence with truth of existential arithmetical statements.

You have to be doing more than that, because
you cannot agree with me that mathematical "existence"
is no existence at all.

> > mathematical stucture+matter gives you more to
> > tackle the consciousness problem with than mathematical structure
> > alone
>
> The mind-body problem comes from the fact that we have not yet find  
> how to attach consciousness to matter.

No, it comes from no being able to attach *phenomenal*
consciousness to mathematical structures. There is no problem
attaching *cognition* to matter at all. If the matter of your brain
is disrupted, so are your though processes.

>At least with comp, after UDA,  
> we know why.



> > No. it is equivalent to the conjunction of that stament with
> > "and the mathematicians Ex is a claim of ontological existence".
>
> You are the one making that addition. So, again, show where in the  
> reasoning I would use that addition.

Where you want me to be running on a UD. I cannot be running on a
merely conceptual UD any more than I can be a character in fiction.

> >> If you really believe that the number 7 has no existence at all, then
> >> the UDA reasoning does not go through,
>
> > at last!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
>
> Read or reread the SANE paper, I explicitly assume Arithmetical  
> Realism.

Then you are explicitly *not* assuming standard computaitonalism

>This is hardly new. I really don't follow you.
> UDA is an argument showing that comp (yes doctor + CT) => non  
> physicalism.  (CT = Church thesis)

The sane paper says

"Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism,
or just comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-
hypotheses: "

You mentioned two. The third is AR/Platonism

> A weaker version of CT is provably equivalent with Ex(x = universal  
> number). It makes no sense without AR.

All mathematics makes sense without Platonism. You are
conflating truth and existence again. Ex(x = universal number)
can be true without x being RITSIAR

> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

2009/8/18 Brent Meeker <meek...@dslextreme.com>:

>> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the above passage?
>> If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that gives rise to consciousness
>> could be "paraphrased using statements about physical processes in human brains".
>> So what may we now suppose gives such processes this particular power?
>> Presumably not
>> their 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
>> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point I originally
>> made).  It seems to me that what one can recover from this is simply the hypothesis
>> that certain brain processes give rise to consciousness in virtue of their being
>> precisely the processes that they are - no more, no less.
>
> No less, but some more.  Compare the concept that chemistry gives rise to life.  As we
> have come to understand life we see that it has lots of sub-processes and there are
> different kinds suited to different environments.  We can manipulate some aspects of life,
> e.g. genetic engineering.  So we did get more than just certain chemical processes give
> rise to life in virtue of being the processes they are.  The very concept of life is now
> seen to be a fuzzy abstraction with no definite meaning.

Yes, I agree completely, in terms of insight and explanation. But
notwithstanding this - in terms of a primary matter ontology - it does
nothing to weaken the 'paraphrase' physical reduction argument with
respect to either 'life' or 'computation' - does it?

David

>
> Brent
>
>
>>
>> Am I still missing something?
>>
>> David
>
> >
>

[David Nyman]

2009/8/18 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:

>> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.

>>
>> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the
>> above passage?  If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that
>> gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements
>> about physical processes in human brains".  So what may we now suppose
>> gives such processes this particular power?  Presumably not their
>> 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
>> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point
>> I originally made).
>

> That's completely back to front. Standard computaitonalism
> regards computation as a physical process taking place
> in brains and computer hardware. It doesn't exist
> at the fundamental level like quarks, and it isn't non-existent
> like unicorns. It is a higher-level existent, like horses.

I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable* (my original point) after such
reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation'
escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is
conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased
reduction to physical process?

BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false
(although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one
of its consequences.

> It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true
> and computationalism false. That is to say that
> the class of consciousness-causing processes might
> not coincide with any proper subset of the class
> of computaitonal processes.

Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory
of mind urgently required. QED

David



>
>

[David Nyman]

On 18 Aug, 09:55, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> some
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.

That's a good start - contingent vs. necessary is a key distinction in
theoretical approaches, as I've said. Given that, under PM, just how
'material' do explanatory entities have to be? Perhaps the clue is in
the pun: IOW they must obviously be material to the explanation - i.e.
their referents must be plausibly RITSIAR. Is this just to say
material => whatever-is-RITSIAR? And what about the mental? Is
mental => material under a different - but paraphrasable -
description?

David
>
> > Perhaps our
> > ultimate explanatory entities need be conceived as no more 'material'
> > than necessary for us to depend on them as plausible pre-cursors of
> > the more obviously material; but of course, no less so either.
>
> > While I've got you here, as it were - I don't see why this wouldn't
> > apply equally to the mental: IOW our explanatory entities need be
> > conceived as no more 'mental' than necessary for us to depend on them
> > as plausible precursors of the more obviously mental; but no less so
> > either.
>
> > David

[John Ross]

Some of you may be interested in my model of our Universe in which I propose
that the fundamental building blocks of our Universe are tronnies each of
which is one-half of nothing, with no mass and no volume and a charge of +e
or -e. I have attached a copy of the first portion of my latest patent
application disclosing my model which was filed a few months ago. The
portion attached includes the lead-in portion, the Background and the
Summary. If anyone is interested in the rest of the patent application, he
or she should let me know. It will soon be published by the patent office
at uspto.gov. Several earlier applications are listed in the first
paragraph of the attached. These can now be down-loaded from the patent
office website. Search for "tronnies".

John R. Ross
V.P. Intellectual Property
Trex Enterprises Corp.
Office No. (858) 646-5488
Fax No. (858) 646-5500

-----Original Message-----
From: everyth...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everyth...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Flammarion
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2009 1:43 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
>>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
>>> some
>>> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
>>> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
>>> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
>>
>> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
>> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
>> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor
>> numbers).
>
> If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
> no UD.

I think you have a magical conception of reality.
I don't need to reify number to believe in them.
I just need to play with them.

>
>> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent
>> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
>
> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
> existence. It is not a structure of anything.

Plotinus says that too! Me too.
With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not-
computable or not-provable, or some relativizations.

>
>> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
>> existence of primitive matter.
>
> Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
> other.

In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below.

>
>> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or
>> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter
>> does
>> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and
>> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter
>> Jones
>> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a
>> contradiction.
>
> It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
> PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.

Once you say yes to the doctor, there are immaterial Peter Jones. All
your doppelganger emulating you, and being emulated at your level of
substitution and below relatively occuring in the proof of the Sigma_1
sentences of Robinson Arithmetic. (The arithmetical version of the UD).

>
>> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
>> "consciousness
>> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>
> No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.

You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).

> You keep confusing the
> idea
> that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
> with the
> actual existence of those entities and beliefs.

You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It
contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,
with correct approximation of its neighborhood. It is hard to
recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge
numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there
exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.
In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one,
it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and
behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses.

>
>> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
>> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease
>> to
>> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
>
> False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR.
> I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
> no-one can see it, so it ain't there.

Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take
the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer
science.
See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running
mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented
"materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.

>
>> Fregean sense is enough to see
>> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove
>> that
>> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
>> are not.
>
> So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
> the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
> doesn't make us wrong
> about anything.

This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct
argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is
material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical
reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But
then your reasoning has to be false too.
The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not
Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
not. At this stage.
Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.

>
>> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing
>> emulable.
>
> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.

But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
correct to. It is the same reasoning.
Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
sense.

>
>> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.
>
> Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
> materially?

He will try.

> Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.

Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which
capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,
and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
contingent obeys laws.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no  
> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,  
> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of  
> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which  
> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,  
> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
> contingent obeys laws.

AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in:

1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then
matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances
of any kind, mental or physical.

2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of
appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate
to appeal to CTM.

Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are
compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form -
seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this
argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic
currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or
disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what
basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds
for this?

David

>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Brent Meeker]

Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated? It seems that your argument uses MGA to
conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument
showing they are material. But this is already well known from "brain in a vat" thought
experiments.

>or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
> not. At this stage.
> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.
>
>
>
>
>
>>> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing
>>> emulable.
>> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
>> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
>
> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
> correct to. It is the same reasoning.
> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
> sense.

Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so long as the doctor
maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically instantiates your
emulation.

Brent

[Brent Meeker]

I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether to regard it
as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a reductio against
the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very straightforward when you
just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with functionally
similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever. But then I reflect that I, with my
new head full of straw, must still interact with the world. So I have not been reduced to
computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by computational
elements (I think this problem is swept under the rug with the phrase "at the appropriate
level of substitution"). So suppose the doctor also emulates all the world that I will
ever interact with. Now it is not so clear that such an emulation is computable, but
suppose it is. Now my consciousness is entirely emulation - but it is also entirely in
another, emulated, world. In that world it is physically instantiated. So it has not
been shown that the emulation can be uninstantiated mathematics.

Brent

[David Nyman]

On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> It seems that your argument uses MGA to
> conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated.  It
> seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument
> showing they are material.  But this is already well known from "brain in a vat" thought
> experiments.

I thought that MGA was an argument contra the compatibility of the
computational theory of mind and a primitive matter ontology (i.e. CTM
+ PM = false), explicitly on the *starting* assumption of CTM. That
is, starting from CTM, MGA says you can't *have* a correct argument
showing you are material. Alternatively, if you don't begin with CTM,
you're not forced to resort to arithmetical or any other type of
mathematical realism. Isn't that about the size of it?

David

[David Nyman]

On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux.  But I don't know whether to regard it
> as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a reductio against
> the "yes doctor" hypothesis.  Saying yes to the doctor seems very straightforward when you
> just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with functionally
> similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever.  But then I reflect that I, with my
> new head full of straw, must still interact with the world.  So I have not been reduced to
> computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by computational
> elements (I think this problem is swept under the rug with the phrase "at the appropriate
> level of substitution").  So suppose the doctor also emulates all the world that I will
> ever interact with.  Now it is not so clear that such an emulation is computable, but
> suppose it is.  Now my consciousness is entirely emulation - but it is also entirely in
> another, emulated, world.  In that world it is physically instantiated.  So it has not
> been shown that the emulation can be uninstantiated mathematics.

Our last two posts crossed in the ether! Yes, I've wondered about the
possible reductio element in yes doctor - like it's sometimes
forgotten that Schrödinger's poor old tabby was originally proposed as
a reductio against the Copenhagenists. But I'm not sure I agree that
"computation need not be physically instantiated" is strong enough -
MGA is more dismissive of PM than that (Bruno sometimes says that
appeals to PM are 'spurious' with respect to CTM). I think that the
strong entailment of MGA is CTM + PM = false, and that yes doctor is a
promissory note against some future theory of substitution (with the
caveat that it won't be complete).

David

>
> Brent

[Colin Hales]

Hi,
Can you please send a .PDF or a .DOC
I can't read .DOCX and I can't upgrade my PC to read it....uni rules... :-(
regards
Colin Hales

[Brent Meeker]

Download OpenOffice. It's free. It'll read .doc and .docx files and it will save in .doc
and .pdf (but it won't import .pdf).

Brent
"The first time Microsoft makes a product that doesn't suck will be when they make vacuum
cleaners."

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct  

argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us  

is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct  

argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is  

material. The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical  

reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But  

then your reasoning has to be false too.

The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not  

Turing-emulable,

Why can't I just say I'm not Turing emulated?  It seems that your argument uses MGA to
conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated.  It
seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument
showing they are material.  But this is already well known from "brain in a vat" thought
experiments.

OK. But this seems to me enough to render invalid any reasoning leading to our primitive materiality.

If a reasoning is valid, it has to be valid independently of being published or not, written with ink or carbon, being in or outside the UD*. I did not use MGA here.

But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be  

correct to. It is the same reasoning.

Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"  

one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your  

doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you  

better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that  

sense.

Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so long as the doctor
maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically instantiates your
emulation.

This means, by definition of the "generalized brain", that you have not choose the right substitution level/context.

You can say yes because the doctor substitute correctly a *part* of your brain, but you have to introduce a non computational element in the environment to prevent its appearance in the mathematical UD*.

You do *seem* to have a sort of point here, though. You provide a situation where comp is false, yet we can say"yes" to the doctor. But in this case your survival is no more "qua computatio". Your survival comes from the fact that your consciousness supervene on some magical (non turing emulable) property of the material moon (say), and that your doctor did not give you an artificial brain, just an artificial part of your brain. This is no more comp or CTM. It is not different than saying yes to the doctor because you believe there is a God who will save your soul and put it back in the reconstitution. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> Flammarion wrote:

> > Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> > not about
> > explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> > contingency as the price
> > paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
> > explanatory
> > desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
> > Everythingism wins.
>
> But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable.

Everythingists tend to think that, and their opponents tend
not to.

> Almost any physics explanation of how the
> universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes. If it's based on
> QM is will be probabilistic. So then there is a tension with parsimony between an
> unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens", and keeping the
> theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they all happen."

Physical many-world theories are still constrained down to a subset of
the
the total of maths. Everythingist theories are not.

> >> > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or "primary asdfgh".
>
> >>> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
> >>> arbitrary.
> >> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter" which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal properties (including quantitative ones).
>
> > I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
> > properties could be accounted for
> > as non-mathematical attributes of PM)
>
> I think this is a category mistake. Mathematical attributes belong to *the descriptions*
> or PM, not to PM. And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise
> and consistent.

I think that is a bizzare statement. You mean I can;t say that a
cubic object is cubic,
because a "cube" is part of geometry, which is part of maths? If the
attributes belong to the
descriptions only, the descriptions are never going to be accurate at
all, since the descriptions
are attributing the attributes to the objects.

> And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise
> and consistent.

a) if they are not precise descriptions *of* something -- of
properties that things have -- what's the point?
All you are going to achieve is a kind of fictive self-consistency,
like a set of cooked books.

b) there is no apriori necessity why the world should be susceptible
to mathematical description
at all iTFP

[Flammarion]

On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

If you were a programme interacting with the world before,
you still will be after a function-preserving replacement is made.

[Flammarion]

That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
with the full force of necessity -- although your own argument does
not have that force. In fact, PM only has to be shown to be more
plausible than the alternatives. It is not necessarily true because of
sceptical hypotheses like the BIV and the UD, but since neither of
them has much prima-facie plausibility, the plausibility og PM
is not impacted much

[Flammarion]

On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia).   I've also
> argued this, in a somewhat different form.  Peter's position I think
> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are
> compatible).  Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form -
> seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this
> argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic
> currently generating so much heat.  UDA-8 sets out to be provable or
> disprovable on purely logical grounds.  


>I for one am unclear on what
> basis it could be attacked as invalid.  Can anyone show strong grounds
> for this?

Of course, no argument can validly come to a metaphysical conclusion--
in this
case, that matter does not exist --without making a single
metaphysical assumption.
The argument is therefore invalid, or not purely logical

[Flammarion]

On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> >>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> >>> some
> >>> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> >>> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> >>> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
>
> >> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
> >> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
> >> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor
> >> numbers).
>
> > If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
> > no UD.
>
> I think you have a magical conception of reality.
> I don't need to reify number to believe in them.
> I just need to play with them.

I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that
if you write down hypothetical truths about what
an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude
that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine.

It's like saying you can go from making a theoretical study of the
aerodynamics of Pegasus to taking a ride on Pegasus's back.

> >>   I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent
> >> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
>
> > I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
> > existence. It is not a structure of anything.
>
> Plotinus says that too! Me too.
> With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not-
> computable or not-provable, or some relativizations.

You're still not getting it. PM isn't a non-computable number.
It isn't mathematical at all. You really do think in a box..

> >> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
> >> existence of primitive matter.
>
> > Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
> > other.
>
> In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below.

!!!!

In arithemetic. people write down problems on blackboards and solve
them.

> >> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or
> >> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter  
> >> does
> >> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and
> >> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter  
> >> Jones
> >> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a
> >> contradiction.
>
> > It's not  a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
> > PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.
>
> Once you say yes to the doctor, there are immaterial Peter Jones. All  
> your doppelganger emulating you, and being emulated at your level of  
> substitution and below relatively occuring in the proof of the Sigma_1  
> sentences of Robinson Arithmetic. (The arithmetical version of the UD).

There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.

> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your  
> >> "consciousness
> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>
> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.
>
> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used  
> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,  
> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).

No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that
mathematical
existence is ontological existence. As I have been

> > You keep confusing the
> > idea
> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
> > with the
> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
>
> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It  
> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,  
> with correct approximation of its neighborhood.

Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything.

>It is hard to  
> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge  
> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there  
> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.  

Same mistake
All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would
contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist.

> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one,  
> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and  
> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses.
>
>
>
> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease  
> >> to
> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
>
> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or  AR.
> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there.
>
> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take  
> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer  
> science.

That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
ontological RITISAR existence.

> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running  
> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented  
> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.

So? It hasn't been.

> >> Fregean sense is enough to see
> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove  
> >> that
> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
> >> are not.
>
> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
> > doesn't make us wrong
> > about anything.
>
> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct  
> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us  
> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct  
> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is  
> material.

So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a
computer
when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that
argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical
hypothesis, and there are many.

> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical  
> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But  
> then your reasoning has to be false too.
> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not  
> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or  
> not.

The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses
are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence
for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no
certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest
plausibility.

>At this stage.
> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,  
> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,  
> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.

I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any
more than I can be "in" Nanrnia

> >> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing  
> >> emulable.
>
> > No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
> > *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
>
> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be  
> correct to.

False. You are treating all reasoning as being assumptionless and
apriori. Both me's could have arguments of equal validity, but one of
the argumetns could have true assumptions and the other false
assumptionsm
because the truth of the assumptions (and hence the soundness of the
argument)
depends on external factors which vary.

>It is the same reasoning.
> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"  
> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your  
> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you  
> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that  
> sense.

I don't need to strenuously argue against that there is something
special about me that makes me un-emulable , or un-BIV-able.
I just have to note that there is no evidence for either hypothesis.
The burden is on the sceptic.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>
>
>
> >> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, although we may lack the understanding to do that now.
>
> >> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the
> >> above passage?  If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that
> >> gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements
> >> about physical processes in human brains".  So what may we now suppose
> >> gives such processes this particular power?  Presumably not their
> >> 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette
> >> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point
> >> I originally made).
>
> > That's completely back to front. Standard computaitonalism
> > regards computation as a physical process taking place
> > in brains and computer hardware. It doesn't exist
> > at the fundamental level like quarks, and it isn't non-existent
> > like unicorns. It is a higher-level existent, like horses.
>
> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware".  The
> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
> *any* human concept is *eliminable*

No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction.

> (my original point) after such
> reduction to primary physical processes.  So why should 'computation'
> escape this fate?  How would you respond if I said the brain is
> conscious because it is 'alive'?  Would 'life' elude the paraphrased
> reduction to physical process?

I don't see your point. Either claim may or may not be true
and may or may not be paraphraseable.

> BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false
> (although IMO it is at least incomplete).  I'm merely pointing out one
> of its consequences.

Which is what?

> > It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true
> > and computationalism false. That is to say that
> > the class of consciousness-causing processes might
> > not coincide with any proper subset of the class
> > of computaitonal processes.
>
> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake.  Here's
> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
> subset of the class of computational processes".  Physicalist theory
> of mind urgently required.  QED

I am arguing with Bruno about whether the eliminaiton of matter
makes things easier for the MBP. I think it just give you less to work
with.

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/8/19 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:

> There is no immaterial existence at all, and  my agreeign to have
> my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.

And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.

>
>> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
>> >> "consciousness
>> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>>
>> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.
>>
>> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
>> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
>> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).
>
> No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that
> mathematical
> existence is ontological existence. As I have been

Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language
existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why
bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it.

>
>> > You keep confusing the
>> > idea
>> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
>> > with the
>> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
>>
>> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It
>> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,
>> with correct approximation of its neighborhood.
>
> Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything.

You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer.

>>It is hard to
>> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge
>> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there
>> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.
>
> Same mistake
> All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would
> contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist.
>
>> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one,
>> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and
>> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses.
>>
>>
>>
>> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
>> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease
>> >> to
>> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
>>
>> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or  AR.
>> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
>> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there.
>>
>> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take
>> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer
>> science.
>
> That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
> You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
> ontological RITISAR existence.

So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My
question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program
written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly
equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the
machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the
bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical
machine ?

What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ?

If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ?
If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? If I never restart it do you
still exists ? If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do
you still exists ?

So you can't be a program...


Regards,
Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

[Flammarion]

On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
> subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory
> of mind urgently required. QED

Why does it have to be spelt out? No-one in this discussion has
spelt out a CMT, it is taken off the shelf.

[Flammarion]

On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>
> > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
> > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
>
> And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
>
>
>
> >> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
> >> >> "consciousness
> >> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>
> >> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.
>
> >> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
> >> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
> >> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).
>
> > No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that
> > mathematical
> > existence is ontological existence. As I have been
>
> Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language
> existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why
> bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it.

People do. People agree that Sherlock Holmes lived
at 221b Baker Street even though he lived at all.
If you want to start a project to eliminate metaphorical
and other non-literla uses from langauge, you have
a long way to go.

> >> > You keep confusing the
> >> > idea
> >> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
> >> > with the
> >> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
>
> >> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It
> >> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,
> >> with correct approximation of its neighborhood.
>
> > Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything.
>
> You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer.

*If* it does not exist, it does not contain anything.

Now show that it exists.

Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in
fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not
going to make me immaterial.

> If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ?

no

> If I restart it ? Do you still exists ?

yes

> If I never restart it do you
> still exists ?

no

>If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do
> you still exists ?

no

So I *can* be a runnign programme. I *can't* be abstract software.

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/8/19 Flammarion <peter...@yahoo.com>:

>> > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
>> > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
>> > ontological RITISAR existence.
>>
>> So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
>> running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My
>> question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program
>> written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly
>> equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the
>> machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the
>> bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical
>> machine ?
>>
>> What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ?
>
> Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in
> fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not
> going to make me immaterial.

If I'm reading the program and executing it in my head with a pencil
and writing down the result on a sheet of paper... would you exists ?
in my head ? on the paper ? on the pencil ? Would you cease to exists
at the very moment I stop doing it ?