For John Clark

[Jason Resch]

(And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.)

I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter:

"I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers."

He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. 

Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College:

Everett:

Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist.  In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it.

Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much.

Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing?

Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati.

Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet.

Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it.

Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the correlation structure of this state.

Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds.

Everett: Yes.

[LizR]

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. 

Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)

[Jason Resch]

On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. 

Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences.

That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution.  That is completely predictible.

Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down you can't predict in advance.  That is because you experience both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down.

It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)

Apparently not.  John refuses to accept that a fully deterministic process can lead to the subjective appearance of randomness when duplication is involved. (the third step of the UDA)

Jason

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[LizR]

On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR <liz...@gmail.com> wrote:

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

"Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle."

So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view.  Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. 

Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences.

That's the third person view. The view of the wavefunction's evolution.  That is completely predictible.

Whether or not you will measure the electron to be spin up or spin down you can't predict in advance.  That is because you experience both but neither experiences it as being both spin up and spin down.

I don't see how that's different from what I said - "afterwards, they will feel that they've experienced a probablistic event."

[Jason Resch]

I agree with the text above. The part I was contesting was where you said that one can predict their next subjective experience.

When you say that one could answer they will experience all perspectives, then you are no longer speaking of a subjective experience. 

[Bruno Marchal]

It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer).

She will not "feel the split", nor even notice any split.

Bruno

(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[chris peck]

>> But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'.

The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience.

A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise.

---

From: mar...@ulb.ac.be
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: For John Clark
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/16 chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com>

>> But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'.

The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience.

A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes.

And he would be wrong, because that assume that every subjective future has exactly the same measure... as comp should be at least compatible with MWI (which is compatible with QM and should respect actual measured probability), it's not the case... So I feel such a person is not a "genuine" comp practitioner.

Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

[Jason Resch]

On Oct 16, 2013, at 2:38 AM, chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>> But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'.

The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience.

A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise.

I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective.  I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome.  The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds. 

In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which  is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

Jason  

[John Clark]

When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those "who ignore the importance of first person views" and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it.

 John K Clark

--

[Jason Resch]

It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?

Jason

[John Clark]

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page?

> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?

In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what?

  John K Clark

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/16 John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page?

> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic... POV plays a role. So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both, or look like a fool.

Quentin

--

[meekerdb]

On 10/16/2013 10:48 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page?

> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?

In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what?

So then the uncertainty of John Clark in Bruno's teleportation is the same as in Everett's MWI, which I think is all Bruno wants to show because he has a theory in which everybody is 'duplicated' countless times as in MWI in which interaction with the environment induces MW splits even in the absence of specific measurements.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page?

I will have to check later.  But I found the page in Google books (but it shows now page number unfortunately):

http://books.google.com/books?id=dqgqPjqIyJoC&pg=PT204&dq=All+of+the+consistency+of+ordinary+physics+is+preserved+by+the+correlation+structure+of+this+state.&hl=en&sa=X&ei=uuJeUqGFL-iMyAGn84HYDQ&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=All%20of%20the%20consistency%20of%20ordinary%20physics%20is%20preserved%20by%20the%20correlation%20structure%20of%20this%20state.&f=false

 

> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

The difference is that first person uncertainty remains even in cases when the entire system and its evolution is known. For example, a deterministic program running on a computer whose evolution can be entirely predicted.  If it forks into two paths and those paths diverge, an AI or any other conscious entity within that program cannot from their point of view predict their experience after the fork, despite that the entire process is deterministic and in principle could be entirely derived beforehand.

 

> Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?

In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what?

if you agree with that, move on to the next steps and see how the computational theory of mind, together with arithmetical realism, necessarily lead to the appearance of a physical world. That is the "so what", a falsifiable theory of everything that arises from among the barest set of starting assumptions, and explains many aspects of quantum mechanics.

Jason

[LizR]

On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way.

* "Take the dice or die!" as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was just being pedantic but it got my attention.

[chris peck]

Hi jason

>>I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. 

In what way?

Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but.

>>I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead physicist?

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

>> There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome.  The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds.

ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both duplicates.

So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am bound to.

>> In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which  is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a little bit silly.

Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on board.

regards.

---

Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300

Subject: Re: For John Clark

From: liz...@gmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/17 chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com>

Hi jason

>>I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. 

In what way?

Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but.

>>I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead physicist?

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

>> There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome.  The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds.

ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both duplicates.

So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am bound to.

>> In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which  is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a little bit silly.

So, if you have to predict if you'll get spin up or down, you'll predict 100% seeing sping up and 100% seeing spin down ? And so, that proves your theory is wrong (MWI true or not)... no need to go further.

Quentin

 

Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on board.

regards.

---

Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300

Subject: Re: For John Clark

From: liz...@gmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote:

 

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way.

* "Take the dice or die!" as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was just being pedantic but it got my attention.

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[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 1:04 AM, chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com> wrote:

Hi jason

>>I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. 

In what way?

You said: "She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise."

Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person.  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer.  Perhaps the only thing we are disagreeing on is language usage..

 

Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 1-p experiences and can't be anything but.

I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I". The person before the duplication, and as it evolves into the experience of one of he continuations following the duplication.

 

>>I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead physicist?

I pointed to him in particular because John Clark respects the MWI and the uncertainty that arises in it due to the superpositions of states in the wavefunction. The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied.

 

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

I have no issue with Alice expecting and believing that other branched copies of her experience all the other possibilities, but I think it is incorrect for her to say she her next experience will be of all possibilities.  All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one).  She could repeat it many times, e.g. sending various photons through a polarizer film.  Over time and after  taking many measurements she comes to conclude the chance of her experiencing the photon making it through is 50%, not 100%.

 

>> There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label "chris peck". This allows you to say: "chris peck experiences all outcomes" but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome.  The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds.

ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both duplicates.

This same assumption exists (implicitly) in the MWI. In the UDA it is stated explicitly as an assumption (the computational theory of mind).

So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I am obliged to accept?

Because you are asked to picture how the experiment unfolds from your personal view as the one stepping into the duplication chamber, not the bird's eye view who seeing the duplication occur. Consider this: you have no way of distinguishing whether the transporter is sending you to either Washington or Moscow with 50% probability or if it is sending you to both cities every time you step into it. It therefore makes sense to maintain that there is a subjective probability of 50% that one will find oneself in a particular city (e.g. Washington) after stepping into the transporter and pushing the button.  After many repeated trials, you could not conclude that you have a 100% chance of feeling as though you teleport to Washington every time, because from the memory of those who have undergone these trials, they remember often ending up in Moscow.

 

Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am bound to.

You can say "Chris peck" will experience both outcomes, but you cannot say "I" will experience both outcomes, as I is indexical to one of the experiencers, and all of the experiencers experience only one outcome.

>> In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which  is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a little bit silly.

So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? (assuming of course that you never run into one of your alternate copies). If subjectively these cases are indistinguishable, (even after many repeated trials), then this is enough to explain the appearance of uncertainty/unpredictability/randomness from the viewpoint of the subject.

 

Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on board.

Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be?

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-)

Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page?

> So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations.

And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA?

In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what?

It is not because some indeterminacy can be phenomenological than they can't have different reason/origin.

But if you agree that the FPI is phenomenologically equivalent with a coin throwing, then you can proceed to step 4.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[John Clark]

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic.

As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing. Even if we restrict ourselves to just Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be 100% unpredictable even in theory.  Even with all the information in the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation about what it will do it will have already done it.

> POV plays a role.

It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a role.

> So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both

I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign identity, because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with a feeling of self.

> or look like a fool.

In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or that. When John Clark asks "who is you?" Bruno responds that he could no more answer that question than he could square a circle.  But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's the real fool around here?

  John K Clark

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/17 John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic.

As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing.

There is not *uncertainty* from the 3rd POV... nothing, zip, nada (both event happen) and it is fully deterministic.

There is uncertainty from the 1st POV, and it is random.

 

Even if we restrict ourselves to just Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be 100% unpredictable even in theory.  Even with all the information in the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation about what it will do it will have already done it.

> POV plays a role.

It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a role.

> So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both

I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign identity, because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with a feeling of self.

> or look like a fool.

In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or that. When John Clark asks "who is you?" Bruno responds that he could no more answer that question than he could square a circle.  But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's the real fool around here?

In MWI thought experiment, *you* (John Clark) measure the spin, and before doing so, *you* ask *yourself* what is the probability that *you* will see spin up... and John Clark says 50%... somehow John Clark will not ask who is *you* and proceed unlike with Bruno's thought experiment beside being the same thing, John Clark is thus not consistent.

Quentin

  John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Oct 2013, at 08:04, chris peck wrote:

Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective?

The uncertainty is objective (indeed provable) but it bears on set of alternative *subjective* experiences. It is an objective probability on subjective experiences, not to be confused with the (mathematical) notion of subjective probability (which is Bayesian probability). They are related, but are different notions.

To insist, I use "first person indeterminacy" instead of subjective indeterminacy, because there is a notion of subjective probability (Bayesian probability) which is not related with the objective indeterminacy *on* the subjective experiences possible in the self-duplication (comp) or self-superposition (Everett QM)

As many pointed out, self-duplication and self-superposition leads, in theoretical protocols, to equivalent phenomenological experiences. 

Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated into 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24.

I multiply you 24 times per second (24) during 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one of the 2^(16180 * 10000) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 10000 pixels, which can be black or white each.

Put in another way, I make you (from the 3p view) seen simultaneously all  black and white "movies".

The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that you will certainly have (as we assume comp).

***

You can also answer the corresponding following feasible (in near futures) experiences (assuming QM). I use a screen where the 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24 pixels are quantum devices measuring, in the {0>, 1>} base, the state of a photon prepared in the  0> + 1> state, and such that if the device measure 1> it makes the pixel white, and if it measures 0>, it makes the pixel black.

What do you expect to see if you were looking at such a screen? 

 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Oct 2013, at 16:53, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. 

> The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic.

As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing. Even if we restrict ourselves to just Newtonian physics something can be 100% deterministic and still be 100% unpredictable even in theory.  Even with all the information in the world sometimes the only way to know what something will do is watch it an see because by the time you've finished the calculation about what it will do it will have already done it.

True, but non relevant.

> POV plays a role.

It's not exactly a grand new discovery that point of view can play a role.

Then why don't you take into account. If it is so easy, please proceed to step 4.

> So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both

I have absolutely no objection to assigning probability when it is appropriate to do so, but I do object to using probability to assign identity,

No identity is ever assigned. I showed this more than one. You come back circularly on points without having answer or comment the relevant posts with the previews explanation. 

because predictions, both good ones and bad, have nothing to do with a feeling of self.

This is not entirely true either. Even if you just throw a dice, you have to stay yourself in the process to win or lose a game of chance. usually this is an implicit default assumption, but to do the math, we have to take this into account (and later will explain the role of the "& Dt" arithmetical nuance) (I say this for those interested in the math).

> or look like a fool.

In Bruno's thought experiment [YOU] walk into a duplicating chamber and Bruno asks after the duplication, that is to say after you has been duplicated, what is the probability that [YOU] will see this or that.

For the billion times, this is wrong, and even nonsensical, and will never see any post or papers or book by me saying such a stupidity. 

You did this already. Please stop.

The evaluation of the probability is asked to the H-man. He has to write it in his diary in Helsinki. Only the validation/non-validation of the prediction is done after, by each copies. 

When John Clark asks "who is you?" Bruno responds that he could no more answer that question than he could square a circle. 

The quote, please.

But even though Bruno admits that he doesn't know what he means when he says [YOU] he still demands to know what [YOU] will see. So who's the real fool around here?

YOU

(You criticize things I never say. Please provide the quotes).

You agreed on the FPI, as you admit it is like throwing a coin, which was exactly my point, so proceed to step 4, where you will see an invariance for that FPI, which is not definable in term of coin throwing. This might help you to get the idea and where we are are going to.

Ask specific questions. 

Bruno

  John K Clark

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[Bruno Marchal]

I meant of course (16180 * 10000) devices! That's the quantum pixels.

(not  2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24, which is the number of movies).

Hope you rectify such kind of mistakes ... Sorry. (wrong cut, wrong paste, that happens when flies enter the teleportation machine ... :)

Bruno

What do you expect to see if you were looking at such a screen? 

 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[meekerdb]

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we�ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders� question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.�� Why is the experience classical?� Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?� Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?

Brent

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in. 

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time.

 

  Why is the experience classical?  Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others.

 

Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?

Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents in other times.

Jason

 

Brent

[LizR]

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now?" - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it!

[chris peck]

Hi Jason

>> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person.

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me.

>>  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ).

Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty.

>> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer.

 You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.

 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.

 >> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I".

 Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me.

  >> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied.

  yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects.

  >>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). 

I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet.

>> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations?

I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations.

>> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be?

Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it.

regards.

---

Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300

Subject: Re: For John Clark
From: liz...@gmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com

[LizR]

On 18 October 2013 15:04, chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com> wrote:

Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future.

I keep saying this, too. The only reason it feels like uncertainty is because we automatically assume we're "one continuous person" - even if we know intellectually that there is going to be a duplication, we don't experience it, in the MWI or the teleporter. From that point of view the 1-p uncertainty makes sense. Since that's the POV we're used to, it's legitimate for us to at least feel as though we've experienced 1-p uncertainty, since that's the state both of us end up in.

"Doubt from the future" is a very good description.

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

Hi Bruno

>>The uncertainty is objective

How can uncertainty be objective Bruno?

Uncertainty is a predicate applicable to experiences only.

>> To insist, I use "first person indeterminacy" instead of subjective indeterminacy

In step 3 you ask the reader to assess what he would 'feel' about the chances of turning up in either location. When I use the term 'subjective certainty' by 'subjective' I mean to refer the to feelings I would have, and by 'certainty' I mean that I would bet 100% on both outcomes.



>> Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated into 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24...The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that you will certainly have (as we assume comp).


My answer is that it would violate axioms you stipulate in COMP to suggest that we should expect anything other than to see each film. Following Greaves I would add that my decision whether to let you do this to me should be governed by my concern for all future mes. And since a vast amount of them are going to sit infront of 90 minutes of static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the ending just static, I wouldn't let you do it to me.

I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I would experience that exact fate.

Regards.

---

From: chris_...@hotmail.com
To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: For John Clark
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:04:27 +0000

[meekerdb]

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

Brent

Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now?" - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it!

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[meekerdb]

On 10/17/2013 7:04 PM, chris peck wrote:

 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.

I think more indicative is that apparently he took no care for his health. He evidently didn't think about ALL outcomes obtaining; since most of those might be experiencing nothing at all.

Brent
"I do not fear death, in view of the fact that I had been dead for billions and billions of years before I was born, and had not suffered the slightest inconvenience from it."'
    --- Mark Twain

[meekerdb]

On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we�ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders� question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.�

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time.

That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the brain have access to this and not that?� Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being "this world".� But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

�

� Why is the experience classical?� Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?�

There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others.

�

Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?

Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents in other times.

But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM is time symmetric.� The question is why does "experience" adhere only with these certain states which we call 'classical'.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

Right, same with why am I this particular person, (look at which brain is asking the question, why is the present this moment (look at what time the brain is thinking that question), why am I in this branch experiencing having measured the spin to be up (wonders the brain who is entangled with the spin-up electron). They are all the same question, and all have the same tautological answer.

Jason 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 04:48, chris peck wrote:

>>The uncertainty is objective

How can uncertainty be objective Bruno?

By being (provably) the same for all possible experimenters.

Examples: comp, QM.

Uncertainty is a predicate applicable to experiences only.

Yes, but it can be said objective if it is sharable by all observers. This is what happens with the comp first person plural indeterminacy.

>> To insist, I use "first person indeterminacy" instead of subjective indeterminacy

In step 3 you ask the reader to assess what he would 'feel' about the chances of turning up in either location. When I use the term 'subjective certainty' by 'subjective' I mean to refer the to feelings I would have, and by 'certainty' I mean that I would bet 100% on both outcomes. 

In this case, the objective answer, sharable by all reasoners, is 50%. 

The experience is subjective, but the indeterminacy bearing on the experience is objective, 3p-provable, sharable, either by reasoning, or by belonging to the multiplied population.

>> Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated into 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24...The question is what do you expect to live as an experience, that you will certainly have (as we assume comp).


My answer is that it would violate axioms you stipulate in COMP to suggest that we should expect anything other than to see each film.

Like we can say living each life. But that's a 3-view on the 1-views, and so evade the question of the relative prediction of the next (after duplication) experiences.

In that case, an interview of some sample of observer will confirm that they have seen only one precise movie, and most will assess it was white noise/random.

Following Greaves I would add that my decision whether to let you do this to me should be governed by my concern for all future mes. And since a vast amount of them are going to sit infront of 90 minutes of static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the ending just static, I wouldn't let you do it to me.

I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I would experience that exact fate. 

That is why it is a thought experience. Your taste is simply not relevant to figure what are the logical consequence of the axioms chosen.

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 04:04, chris peck wrote:

Hi Jason

>> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. 

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me.

'me' is also an indexical. Both the 3-me, and, more indirectly though, the 1-me.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 9:04 PM, chris peck <chris_...@hotmail.com> wrote:

Hi Jason

>> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person.

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me.

Right but when you refer to "the experience" or "chris peck's experiences", that is speaking in the third person.

 

>>  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ).

Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty'

According to your usage, how is the meaning of "subjective certainty" different from just "certainty"?

 

does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty.

Sure.

 

>> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer.

 You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.

After the duplication there are two experiencers. Each is confronted with the impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would next have following the duplication.  The knowledge that all experiences will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty.

 

 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.

 >> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I".

 Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me.

According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing himself becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not subjective in the sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should literally imagine what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber and be duplicated.

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I", but this does not remove the appearance of randomness as seen from the first person views, which is the main point of step 3: objectively deterministic processes which duplicate persons whose states diverge leads to the subjective feeling of unpredictability. This is no different than how Everett's many worlds explain the appearance of the unpredictable collapse. When I ask you what is the probability that your next experience will contain a block of U-238 in which all its atoms spontaneously decay in the next second, do you answer 100%? (because this does happen in some branches).

 

  >> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied.

  yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects.

Okay nice.

 

  >>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). 

I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet.

I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem?  I wonder what answer you would agree with:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem

 

>> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations?

I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations.

Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), distinguish these two cases?

 

>> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be?

Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it.

Okay, that is fair.

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

If I can be sure today that tomorrow I will be uncertain about some experiment output, then I am in doubt about it today.

So, before a duplication, if the protocol is well defined and will be applied, I am uncertain of its outcome.

Bruno

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[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you.  Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

 

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:27 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in. 

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I believe it is a matter of what information the brain has access to within the context of the conscious moments it supports. The "now" brain doesn't have access to the information in future brain states, and only limited access to information from past brain states, so any particular conscious experience appears to be an isolated moment in time.

That is really just restating the problem in other words: Why does the brain have access to this and not that?

I am not really following what question you are asking.  Are you asking why the brain state is isolated, or why we (who are here) are not experiencing the them (over there)?

 

  Of course the materialist answer is that there are two brains and they are not in a superposition in the basis we can agree on as being "this world".

The brain is a classical computer operating on classical information. It does not operate upon or process qubits so I don't see any reason it should be conscious of its multiplicity. The information patters in differently conscious brains are not accessible.

 

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

 

 

  Why is the experience classical?  Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

There various elements of the wavefunction corresponding to different experiences for Alice are macroscopically distinct and thus they have decohered and will never interact again. Without a classical information exchange between the various Alices there is can be no awareness of the experiences of the others.

 

Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?

Nothing more than what makes your state of 5 minutes ago "inexperiential". It is only "inexperiential" from the viewpoint of Brents in other times.

But there is a basis in which Brent is a superposition...maybe even a state that is a superposition of Brent-now and Brent-5min-ago given that QM is time symmetric.  The question is why does "experience" adhere only with these certain states which we call 'classical'.

I think Ron Garrett gives a good explanation for this.  In short, measurement and entanglement are the same phenomenon.  See this part where he describes quantum information theory: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc&t=46m25s

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?

yes, the fact that our brain might be classical computer. But if the brain was a quantum computer, we could experience some aspect of the superposition. 

Note that this would not change any of the consequence of comp, only make the level very low, and of course the physics extracted from comp would reflect such low-levelness.

But today's evidence are more that the brain, and biology, exploits classical, or quasi-classical, physical features.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

Brent

[meekerdb]

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical.  But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical.  So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases.  So how does it feel?

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

� But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand? �I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.� Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.� Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.� So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.� Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.� For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.� But those answers assume the physics.� If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we�ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders� question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.�� Why is the experience classical?�

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?�

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.� In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.


Brent

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.  In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition of something... But as we don't know currently how consciousness arises from computation (nor if it can arises from it), it's premature to ask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is not that consciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable) then physics as to be derived from computation alone... and no Bruno doesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that up to now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity (huge) of "dreams" is compatible with MWI... but he does not know how consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this mass and no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalism is true, then physics has to emerge from computation alone, the work left here (huge) is to show how. If one day you should be "uploaded" as a computer program, and you still feel as alive as today and as yourself, it should be a kind of confirmation that it is indeed the case, even if we have not workout the details how physics emerge from computation and just worked on how to transfer our consciousness... Well it would be for me...

Quentin

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.  In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

I assume classical, boolean, platonist (= assuming p v ~p), from the start, at the meta-level, and for the machines I interview and studied. You need only to agree that the arithmetical propositions obeys classical logic. All scientists do that, as it is the simpler way to proceed. There are no quantum theorem, and quantum proof in physical books. 

Quantum logic is an empirical discovery, and I interpret it literally (logic of alternative stories). With comp, that empirical reality must be justified by boolean realities concerning the mind of classical, or  not, machines.

The thought experiences are simpler with a high level description, which is boolean, but at step seven that restriction is relinquished, as quantum computer can be emulated by classical machine, and we must explain why they seem to win the measure game.

I was not relying on physics, but not in way which would imply physicalism.

Bruno

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 10:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we�ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders� question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.�� Why is the experience classical?�

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?�

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.� In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition of something... But as we don't know currently how consciousness arises from computation (nor if it can arises from it), it's premature to ask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is not that consciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable) then physics as to be derived from computation alone...

I don't buy that argument yet either.� It's not clear to me that counterfactuals can be handled as Bruno and Maudlin propose.

and no Bruno doesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that up to now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity (huge) of "dreams" is compatible with MWI...

"There must be" IF is his theory is right.� But then you can't cite MWI or classicality as support for his theory - it's circular support.

but he does not know how consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this mass and no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalism is true, then physics has to emerge from computation alone,

He's made an argument.� I don't think he's shown it.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we�ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders� question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.�� Why is the experience classical?�

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition?�

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.� In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

I assume classical, boolean, platonist (= assuming p v ~p), from the start, at the meta-level, and for the machines I interview and studied. You need only to agree that the arithmetical propositions obeys classical logic. All scientists do that, as it is the simpler way to proceed. There are no quantum theorem, and quantum proof in physical books.�

Quantum logic is an empirical discovery, and I interpret it literally (logic of alternative stories).

Some would say that MWI is far from 'literal', but I'll let that pass.

With comp, that empirical reality must be justified by boolean realities concerning the mind of classical, or �not, machines.

It's that last sentence that bothers me.� What does "must" mean in that context?� I think it means "If my assumptions about a TOE are right then everything *must* be explained by my assumptions."� But then it seems that you and others make a further leap and say that comp does explain everything - which is quite different than it "must explain them".�

The thought experiences are simpler with a high level description, which is boolean, but at step seven that restriction is relinquished, as quantum computer can be emulated by classical machine, and we must explain why they seem to win the measure game.

Again, "We *must* IF my assumptions are right."

I was not relying on physics, but not in way which would imply physicalism.

?? You mean "I was relying on physics, but..."

Brent

Bruno

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>

On 10/18/2013 10:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.  In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition of something... But as we don't know currently how consciousness arises from computation (nor if it can arises from it), it's premature to ask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is not that consciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable) then physics as to be derived from computation alone...

I don't buy that argument yet either.  It's not clear to me that counterfactuals can be handled as Bruno and Maudlin propose.

and no Bruno doesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that up to now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity (huge) of "dreams" is compatible with MWI...

"There must be" IF is his theory is right.  But then you can't cite MWI or classicality as support for his theory - it's circular support.

I don't use it in support of his theory or does he... only that if it was not compatible with MWI, it would have been shown false, so being compatible with MWI does not refute it.... it certainly does not support it of course.

 

but he does not know how consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this mass and no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalism is true, then physics has to emerge from computation alone,

He's made an argument.  I don't think he's shown it.

Well if the argument is without error, and I think it is, computationalism qua computation (where your consciousness is turing emulable by virtue of the execution of a computation *alone* without any support for a special kind of physical hardware ==> can run on any machine with the correct program set up) then I think is conclusion goes through... that doesn't say anything about computationalism being true, it may well be false, but if it is, then his conclusion is ok unless you can show a mistake in the argument.

Quentin

 

Brent

the work left here (huge) is to show how. If one day you should be "uploaded" as a computer program, and you still feel as alive as today and as yourself, it should be a kind of confirmation that it is indeed the case, even if we have not workout the details how physics emerge from computation and just worked on how to transfer our consciousness... Well it would be for me...

Quentin

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 19:48, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/10/18 meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net>

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a
good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So
she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.
What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I
invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.  In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

Well a computation is "classical"... it's not a superposition of something... But as we don't know currently how consciousness arises from computation (nor if it can arises from it), it's premature to ask for an answer like you'd like. The point of Bruno, is not that consciousness is a computation only that if it is (turing emulable) then physics as to be derived from computation alone... and no Bruno doesn't have the complete description how it is done... only that up to now, the fact that it shows that there must be a multiplicity (huge) of "dreams" is compatible with MWI... but he does not know how consciousness arises, how physics, why an electron has this mass and no other and so on. He has just shown that if computationalism is true, then physics has to emerge from computation alone,

That's UDA. It provides also the shape of physics, like MW, statistics on computation, taking track of the difference between 1p and 3p (which generalize relativity, and Everett), etc.

the work left here (huge) is to show how.

Indeed.

Yet, AUDA (Arithmetical UDA, what I call "interview" in sane04) shows constructively how, and the propositional logic of observable is given by a precise theory (X1*). 

Of course this is a long way from explaining the whole logic, and thus the bosons and fermions. But that's not the goal here. The key result is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical antic dream argument) given a classical theory of knowledge (S4Grz) which X1* is an important "physical" variant.

Those logic have the two sides: provable and true-but-not provable, which is promising to interpret the qualia.

If one day you should be "uploaded" as a computer program, and you still feel as alive as today and as yourself, it should be a kind of confirmation that it is indeed the case, even if we have not workout the details how physics emerge from computation and just worked on how to transfer our consciousness... Well it would be for me...

Computationalism will be practiced long before we get the whole of physics from it. But not so long, as physicists also close the bridge (with the vertex algebra and number theory per se). They just miss the non provable intensional nuances, allowed and unavoidable for the "mystic machine" (looking inward).

I know this asks for some work, but after (or even before, for some) UDA, there is AUDA. It is only a beginning, of course. And the remaining task is huge.

The basic idea is very simple though:  we can already listen to what the machines already tell us.

Roughly speaking:

UDA: reality is in our head.

AUDA: reality is in the head of any universal machine. Just ask her today you need Gödel's tools, but the interview, at the propositional level, is entirely axiomatized by the Solovay logics (G and G*).

Bruno

Quentin

Brent

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[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The key result is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical antic dream argument) given a classical theory of knowledge (S4Grz) which X1* is an important "physical" variant.

I'm not sure how to parse that sentence, but the definition of knowledge that you give seems to me just a rough approximation (like the physicists spherical cow) to knowledge people actually have.� For example, I 'know' the four color theorem is true, but I can't prove it without a computer.� And there must be infinitely many other theorems of arithmetic who's proof is would take longer than the age of the universe.� So, except as rough approximation why should we identify Bp&p with Knows(p).

Brent

[Jason Resch]

But the chain is immortal and cyclic, convoluted with periods of amnesia, branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you.  Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

 

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical. 

Okay.

 

But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical.  So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable process.  Turing machines are classical.

 

Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases.  So how does it feel?

Let me make sure I understand the question.  Let us say we are in a metal box (like Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a super position of having measured both states.  You are asking what it feels like to the person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside the box?

If so, I think the answer is rather clear.  It doesn't matter what the person outside the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition, and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be performing the measurement and has split.  Had they known the entire state of the wave function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

From the paper:

"What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a

good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So

she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There
is nothing left for her to be uncertain about.

What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I

invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see
spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that
she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"

But this is where the basis problem comes in.   Why is the experience classical? 

Probably because our substitution level is above (or equal) to the "QM-level" (defined by the Heisenberg uncertainty)

Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? 

She could in case she has a quantum brain (quantum computer brain for example) so that she can exploit some Fourier transforms of the thought process in the all the terms of the superposition. But you have defended often Tegmark's argument that the brain is classical, and so she can experience only each branch, for the same reason that the WM-duplicated candidate can experience only Washington xor Moscow.

Yes, but now you're relying on physics to explain why experiences are classical - but people keep proposing that experiences or computation are fundamental and that physics is to be explained in terms them.  In that case you can't appeal to the physics to say why the experiences are classical.

I assume classical, boolean, platonist (= assuming p v ~p), from the start, at the meta-level, and for the machines I interview and studied. You need only to agree that the arithmetical propositions obeys classical logic. All scientists do that, as it is the simpler way to proceed. There are no quantum theorem, and quantum proof in physical books. 

Quantum logic is an empirical discovery, and I interpret it literally (logic of alternative stories).

Some would say that MWI is far from 'literal', but I'll let that pass.

With comp, that empirical reality must be justified by boolean realities concerning the mind of classical, or  not, machines.

It's that last sentence that bothers me.  What does "must" mean in that context? 

It means that if I can survive with a digital brain (quantum or classical) the physics has to arise from that "dream-interference" (to be short) as explained by the UDA.

I think it means "If my assumptions about a TOE are right then everything *must* be explained by my assumptions." 

No. It is means that if mechanism is right, then materialism is at best without any purpose (and occam-eliminable), or contradictory.

But then it seems that you and others make a further leap and say that comp does explain everything - which is quite different than it "must explain them". 

Comp *has to* explain both matter and consciousness. 

Consciousness is explained by self-reference + Theaetetus, and matter is explained by Theaetetus + consistency (changing provability to probability in the way imposed by the UDA). We can come back on this.

The thought experiences are simpler with a high level description, which is boolean, but at step seven that restriction is relinquished, as quantum computer can be emulated by classical machine, and we must explain why they seem to win the measure game.

Again, "We *must* IF my assumptions are right."

Yes. But that was not trivial to show, and is against the current trend to believe in both materialism and mechanism.

I was not relying on physics, but not in way which would imply physicalism.

?? You mean "I was relying on physics, but..."

I was relying on physics to illustrate a point, but the reasoning does not rely on that physics being fundamental, or matter being primary.

Bruno

Brent

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Oct 2013, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The key result is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical antic dream argument) given a classical theory of knowledge (S4Grz) which X1* is an important "physical" variant.

I'm not sure how to parse that sentence, but the definition of knowledge that you give seems to me just a rough approximation (like the physicists spherical cow) to knowledge people actually have. 

Sure. 

For example, I 'know' the four color theorem is true, but I can't prove it without a computer.  And there must be infinitely many other theorems of arithmetic who's proof is would take longer than the age of the universe.  So, except as rough approximation why should we identify Bp&p with Knows(p).

Because it provides the only way to associate knowledge (S4) to provability (rational belief).

That it works is already a miracle made possible thanks to incompleteness and self-reference, and that it is the only way is a result by Artemov.

And the ideally self-referentially correct machine reasoning about herself cannot avoid it.

We always simplified when we do science, and when it shows that the simplification leads already to a rich theory putting some light, usually we don't complain. If you know better, please improve the situation ...

But you have to understand that the UDA reduces the mind body problem into a self-referential arithmetical problem.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just being dispersed into the enivronment.  If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis.  But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question.  Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process.  The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

I don't think there's anything either classical or quantum about Turing machines.  They are just mathematical abstractions.  And assuming they read and write qubits instead of bits doesn't change the range of things they can compute.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes. the goal is to explained the feelings, and the quantum, from the classical theory of thought (George Boole) and self-reference (Gödel, Löb, ... well sum up in George Boolos's books).

Quantum physics also assumes classical arithmetic.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Why? It entails that there is only one person, and that is deducible from the statement that the two Washington and Moscow copies are and stay the same Helsinki-person.

It is also coherent with what results from identifying oneself with the universal machine that we are, or the Löbian one. We might be that machine, in different context. We know she has an already very sophisticated (Plotinian) theology.

(Then salvia seems to be able to make us conceive that she is conscious, and that her consciousness is out of time, space, etc. That is admittedly very weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you.  Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

 

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical. 

Okay.

 

But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical.  So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable process.  Turing machines are classical.

 

Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases.  So how does it feel?

Let me make sure I understand the question.  Let us say we are in a metal box (like Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a super position of having measured both states.  You are asking what it feels like to the person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside the box?

If so, I think the answer is rather clear.  It doesn't matter what the person outside the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition, and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be performing the measurement and has split.  Had they known the entire state of the wave function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.

That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just being dispersed into the enivronment. 

Why? On the contrary; the superposition is not destroyed. The first observer memeory is just entangled with the state of the particle.

If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis.  But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question.  Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

But the natural evolution, and the building of a brain does select a base, if you accept that our memory state is classical, which is the case in comp. The fact that we don't "feel superposition" is only an empirical confirmation that we have a classical brain, approximated by a quantum, but macroscopic, brain. The human original universal machine, our ancestor the amoeba, has chosen the base. It is a geographical-historical happening.

Bruno

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 01:09, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process.  The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

The whole picture does not depend on the basis. Everett made this very clear, in my opinion.

The choice of the base happened in the earlier apparition of life. As I said, the first amoeba did it. 

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

I don't think there's anything either classical or quantum about Turing machines.  They are just mathematical abstractions. 

Those mathematical abstraction relies on the fact that such machine can distinguish some classical, well defined, states. The tape contains bits, not qubits, for all practical evolutionnary purpose. Of course, in their physical implementation, those are qubit, and that is why the state of the machines differentiate into quasi-classical world. Why nature did not evolve quantum brain might be explained by the fact that evolution has favorised classical macroscopic mind, for reason comparable of why nature did not evolve any wheels.

If you want, the base has been selected by the first macroscopic organism, or the first Turing universal system. The theory of decoherence explains well why macroscopic objects leads to classical states. It is probably as difficult for nature than for humans to isolate a quantum macroscopic universal system. We are classical because our bodies contains many atoms entangling quickly their states with their neighborhood. It is a good thing as this explains how the quantum reality defined a first person *plural*, duplicating us together.

Bruno 

And assuming they read and write qubits instead of bits doesn't change the range of things they can compute.

Brent

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[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Brent

and that is deducible from the statement that the two Washington and Moscow copies are and stay the same Helsinki-person.

It is also coherent with what results from identifying oneself with the universal machine that we are, or the Löbian one. We might be that machine, in different context. We know she has an already very sophisticated (Plotinian) theology.

(Then salvia seems to be able to make us conceive that she is conscious, and that her consciousness is out of time, space, etc. That is admittedly very weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you.  Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

 

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical. 

Okay.

 

But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical.  So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable process.  Turing machines are classical.

 

Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases.  So how does it feel?

Let me make sure I understand the question.  Let us say we are in a metal box (like Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a super position of having measured both states.  You are asking what it feels like to the person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside the box?

If so, I think the answer is rather clear.  It doesn't matter what the person outside the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition, and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be performing the measurement and has split.  Had they known the entire state of the wave function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.

That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just being dispersed into the enivronment. 

Why? On the contrary; the superposition is not destroyed. The first observer memeory is just entangled with the state of the particle.

If they were in a superposition then so would their memory of what they had written be in a superposition.  Implicit in the description is that the superposition has turned into a mixture and the cross-terms (interference) is no longer present IN the particular basis that measured the spin.

If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis.  But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question.  Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

But the natural evolution, and the building of a brain does select a base, if you accept that our memory state is classical, which is the case in comp.

I don't see that it is the case in comp.  That seems to me an additional axiom which has to be added to solve the basis problem by fiat.  I don't see that comp can entail QM and then just assume that experience will be classical.

The fact that we don't "feel superposition" is only an empirical confirmation that we have a classical brain,

I understand that.  But it is not predicted by comp and so cannot be taken as evidence supporting comp.

Brent

approximated by a quantum, but macroscopic, brain. The human original universal machine, our ancestor the amoeba, has chosen the base. It is a geographical-historical happening.

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience. In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique, and the infinity will play a role only in the statistics on the relative futures. 

We belong all the "time" to finite computations, cyclic computations, and infinite non cyclic computations. 

At first sight, only those last one can change the relative measure on the consistent extensions, so we can say that finite and cyclic computations have a measure zero for the 1_p. 

Of course this needs some "AUDA-confirmation", but the fact that the S4Grz logic is a temporal logic is promising for this. I think.

Bruno

Brent

and that is deducible from the statement that the two Washington and Moscow copies are and stay the same Helsinki-person.

It is also coherent with what results from identifying oneself with the universal machine that we are, or the Löbian one. We might be that machine, in different context. We know she has an already very sophisticated (Plotinian) theology.

(Then salvia seems to be able to make us conceive that she is conscious, and that her consciousness is out of time, space, etc. That is admittedly very weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6756 - Release Date: 10/16/13

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[meekerdb]

On 10/18/2013 11:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience.

But "I" is indicial too, so it makes no sense to say it is the same person.

In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique,

And it makes the 1p unique.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

But they are still present. They just get close to zero, describing quasi-classical worlds. We just trace thel out, because the superposition has leaked in the environment.

If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis.  But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question.  Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

But the natural evolution, and the building of a brain does select a base, if you accept that our memory state is classical, which is the case in comp.

I don't see that it is the case in comp.  That seems to me an additional axiom which has to be added to solve the basis problem by fiat.  I don't see that comp can entail QM and then just assume that experience will be classical.

?

Just look at any definition of any universal machine. 

The fact that we don't "feel superposition" is only an empirical confirmation that we have a classical brain,

I understand that.  But it is not predicted by comp and so cannot be taken as evidence supporting comp.

The point is that it must be predicted by comp. If we get something different, then comp is refuted. Possible, but not yet done. We have to extract QM first, and then the usual decoherence theory will be retrieved automatically.

Platonism implies the arithmetical truth is boolean. Intuitionism and quantum logics emerges from internal epistemological machine's points of view (through the intensional nuances on self-reference).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:34 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic? 

For the same reason Poincare believed in recurrence.

 

Where was it before life evolved?

Before and after are only directions relative to some point of view.

 

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote:

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?

I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows.

But I don't find myself in all the nows.  Why not?

I've highlighted the answer for you.  Why should anyone (including you) take the word of one particular Brent from one particular time, that other Brents do not find themselves in other times?

 

  Note that in some basis I *am* in a superposition.

How does the theory of mind you are operating under predict what being in a superposition should feel like?

First, my theory of mind makes mind dependent on classical processes in a physical brain - so it explains why experiences are of the classical. 

Okay.

 

But Bruno's theory takes experience as logically prior to the physical.  So he can't appeal to the physical aspects of the brain to make experience classical.

He assumes this when he says our consciousness is supported by a Turing emulable process.  Turing machines are classical.

 

Second, you and I are in superpositions relative to some bases.  So how does it feel?

Let me make sure I understand the question.  Let us say we are in a metal box (like Schrodinger's cat), and we measure the spin state of some electron's y-axis. Outside of this box, there is an observer, and from his perspective, we within the box remain in a super position of having measured both states.  You are asking what it feels like to the person inside the box in the superposition, from the perspective of the person outside the box?

If so, I think the answer is rather clear.  It doesn't matter what the person outside the box thinks, within the box the electron's spin is no longer in the superposition, and neither is the person who measured it. Their experiences have diverged. From the perspective of the person outside the box, they know that the person inside will be performing the measurement and has split.  Had they known the entire state of the wave function within the box, they could predict it is now in a superposition where one observer has measured and written down "spin is up", and the other where the observer has written "spin is down", but even from the perspective of this external observer, he does not find any state in the evolved wavefunction of the box where the two observers have some kind of shared memory of seeing both states.

That's a Copenhagen description in which superpositions are destroyed instead of just being dispersed into the enivronment. 

Is that still the case is the box is completely isolated from the outside environment, such that the superposition can remain within the box from the perspective of those outside?

 

If you take MWI seriously the whole system (including the observers) are in superpositions and to say that the observers see either "spin-up" or "spin-down" is assuming that there is some projection operator that neatly separates the superpositions in that basis. 

Can't the whole superposition of the entire universe simply exist?  Why do we need to indicate some particular basis?  What purpose does the "projection operator" serve?

 

But to say that is the preferred basis is to beg the question.  Not begging the question is "the basis problem".

What is the basis problem?

Thanks,

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 6:09 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process. 

Is this a process to recover the probabilities of some observation from some point of view?  I so will different probabilities be calculated if one takes a different basis?

 

The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

Can you provide an example of how using a different basis leads to different conclusions?  I very much appreciate your helping me to understand this problem.

 

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

I don't think there's anything either classical or quantum about Turing machines.  They are just mathematical abstractions.  And assuming they read and write qubits instead of bits doesn't change the range of things they can compute.

But qubits don't exist in normal definitions of information or Turing machines.  Sure, they can be modeled, but only by splitting the entire tape and Turing machine and having one of them read a 1 and the other read a 0. When you do this, you are talking about two different computational states, (you might as well model them as separate Turing machines/programs at this point) and hence you are talking about two different minds, not one mind that is conscious of a superpositional state.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 12:52 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Yes.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience. In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique, and the infinity will play a role only in the statistics on the relative futures. 

We belong all the "time" to finite computations, cyclic computations, and infinite non cyclic computations. 

At first sight, only those last one can change the relative measure on the consistent extensions, so we can say that finite and cyclic computations have a measure zero for the 1_p. 

Why should cyclic computations not have as much weight towards some particular state as an infinite computation that is not cyclic?  Is it because there are an infinite number of these non-cyclic computations all proceeding through that state an an infinite number of times (and hence a larger infinity)?

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 08:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 11:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience.

But "I" is indicial too, so it makes no sense to say it is the same person.

Unless you agree with "Clark's definition of personal identity". (Where the W-man, and the M-man have the right to consider being the H-man, as both copies have the H-man memories, and this corresponds to the first person identity used in the UDA, that is the personal memories contained in the diary which undergo the duplications).

But the personal identity has not a big role. Even if you are totally amnesic, comp will predict the movie "white noise" for the iterated duplication.

Like the quantum MW predicts that a photon beam in the relevant states will split in half when going thorugh the relevant polarization analyser.

In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique,

And it makes the 1p unique.

From the 1p view. Indeed.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 09:30, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:34 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

 

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

I agree, but I agree also that this can be debated. Needless to say that for doing predictions, and confirming or refuting them (like when doing physics, or testing the FPI, which should be the same with comp), memories are needed.

Bruno

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Jason

 

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 10:00, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience. In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique, and the infinity will play a role only in the statistics on the relative futures. 

We belong all the "time" to finite computations, cyclic computations, and infinite non cyclic computations. 

At first sight, only those last one can change the relative measure on the consistent extensions, so we can say that finite and cyclic computations have a measure zero for the 1_p. 

Why should cyclic computations not have as much weight towards some particular state as an infinite computation that is not cyclic?  Is it because there are an infinite number of these non-cyclic computations all proceeding through that state an an infinite number of times (and hence a larger infinity)?

Because non cyclic computations can dovetail on the reals (or infinite duplications), making the computations non enumerable, and giving them in this way a measure different from zero. 

This is intuitive, but partially conformed by the semantics possible for the " # & p" povs (hypostases).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 09:42, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 6:09 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process. 

Is this a process to recover the probabilities of some observation from some point of view?  I so will different probabilities be calculated if one takes a different basis?

 

The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

Can you provide an example of how using a different basis leads to different conclusions?  I very much appreciate your helping me to understand this problem.

Let me try a short attempt. 

May be you are more familiar with vectors than with "density matrices" used by Brent.

Definite states (like definite position) define a base in a vector space. QM associates such a base to anything you can observe, and reciprocally, having a base, you can find the corresponding measuring apparatus. (forgetting annoying selection rules for some observable, like charge).

The most typical example is position. A system having a definite position will be the same as a system having all possible impulsion in the parallel "universes", and reciprocally. So a superposition correspond to well defined state for a different measuring apparatus. Likewise a state like 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) is a well defined state in the base {1/sqrt(2)(up + down) , 1/sqrt(2)(up - down) }. 

When you measure 1/sqrt(2)(up + down)  in the base {1/sqrt(2)(up + down) , 1/sqrt(2)(up - down) }, you get 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) with probability one. 

But in the base {up, down}, you will get up or down with probability 1/2, and the local system state will seemingly undergo a projection on up or down state. 

(That projection is the vector equivalent of the wave packet reduction, and in the MW, there is no reduction, as you have seen. It is only a subjective selection).

But now, it looks like the choice of the measuring apparatus determine the possible type of parallel universes you can access, so that the notion of parallel universe seems to be non intrinsic, but depending on the choice of the base, or equivalently, the choice of the observable measured (or the corresponding apparatus).

Everett was well aware of that problem, and when you do the math, the entire picture does not depend on the choice of the base, despite locally, the choice of the base will determine the type of parallel universe you can access.

There is a problem only if we believe in some naive boolean type of universe. It is just that in some terms of the universal Everett superposition, machines can develop, and then they will indeed continue to work in the same bases (if they are classical machines). But the whole quantum state will not depend on that base at all.

I thought that this was the reason to use the label "relative states" instead of parallel universes, but apparently Everett has been asked to avoid the label "parallel universe" as it looks too much like sc. fic. IMO: relative states is better, by preventing the belief that some base plays a crucial role right at the start, which is not the case, as the role will be indexical and relative.

The base problem disappears when you take 1) the universal wave, and 2) accept the idea that all states of the subsystem are relative indexical defined by the base in which some self-aware subparts (local universal machine) can develop and remember personal memories. 

Hope this can help a little bit. Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.

Bruno

 

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

I don't think there's anything either classical or quantum about Turing machines.  They are just mathematical abstractions.  And assuming they read and write qubits instead of bits doesn't change the range of things they can compute.

But qubits don't exist in normal definitions of information or Turing machines.  Sure, they can be modeled, but only by splitting the entire tape and Turing machine and having one of them read a 1 and the other read a 0. When you do this, you are talking about two different computational states, (you might as well model them as separate Turing machines/programs at this point) and hence you are talking about two different minds, not one mind that is conscious of a superpositional state.

Jason

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't think you would be the same person.  Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going there.

Brent

[John Clark]

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 11:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing.

There is not *uncertainty* from the 3rd POV... nothing, zip, nada (both event happen) and it is fully deterministic.

Bullshit. A Turing Machine is fully deterministic and there is nothing going on in it that Newton would not have understood, but will it ever stop? ALL observers are *uncertain* about that, all they can do is watch it and see if it stops.  And ALL OBSERVERS are also *uncertain* about how long they will need to watch it to know, it might be forever or it might not, they are *uncertain* about that too.

  John K Clark

[Quentin Anciaux]

2013/10/19 John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com>

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 11:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> As I've said many times, being deterministic and being predictable is NOT the same thing.

There is not *uncertainty* from the 3rd POV... nothing, zip, nada (both event happen) and it is fully deterministic.

Bullshit. A Turing Machine is fully deterministic and there is nothing going on in it that Newton would not have understood, but will it ever stop?

I don't care, that's not what we are talking about... we're talking about the duplication though experiment *or* the measuring of the spin of an electron if MWI is true. You're the bullshitter by changing continuously the discussion and evading **simple** question. Be consistent, reject MWI and stop bullshitting and changing the discussion.

Quentin

 

LL observers are *uncertain* about that, all they can do is watch it and see if it stops.  And ALL OBSERVERS are also *uncertain* about how long they will need to watch it to know, it might be forever or it might not, they are *uncertain* about that too.

  John K Clark

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[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't think you would be the same person. 

You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null conscious state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent Meeker. Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal definitions of personhood, but they may become any person (who emerges in a similar way as a human does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo).

 

Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.

Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you will find only confusion.

 

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going there.

But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored (comp/mwi), then in all your travels through the many-worlds/many-dreams, some fraction of the time, you will get to Antarctica from California.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 09:42, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 6:09 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process. 

Is this a process to recover the probabilities of some observation from some point of view?  I so will different probabilities be calculated if one takes a different basis?

 

The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

Can you provide an example of how using a different basis leads to different conclusions?  I very much appreciate your helping me to understand this problem.

Let me try a short attempt. 

May be you are more familiar with vectors than with "density matrices" used by Brent.

Definite states (like definite position) define a base in a vector space. QM associates such a base to anything you can observe, and reciprocally, having a base, you can find the corresponding measuring apparatus. (forgetting annoying selection rules for some observable, like charge).

The most typical example is position. A system having a definite position will be the same as a system having all possible impulsion in the parallel "universes", and reciprocally. So a superposition correspond to well defined state for a different measuring apparatus. Likewise a state like 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) is a well defined state in the base {1/sqrt(2)(up + down) , 1/sqrt(2)(up - down) }. 

When you measure 1/sqrt(2)(up + down)  in the base {1/sqrt(2)(up + down) , 1/sqrt(2)(up - down) }, you get 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) with probability one. 

But in the base {up, down}, you will get up or down with probability 1/2, and the local system state will seemingly undergo a projection on up or down state. 

(That projection is the vector equivalent of the wave packet reduction, and in the MW, there is no reduction, as you have seen. It is only a subjective selection).

But now, it looks like the choice of the measuring apparatus determine the possible type of parallel universes you can access, so that the notion of parallel universe seems to be non intrinsic, but depending on the choice of the base, or equivalently, the choice of the observable measured (or the corresponding apparatus).

It seems this was a core piece of Everett's theory. If we measure something, we are entangled with it and it becomes part of our memory. It is then considered a problem (by some) that this memory persists and we are confined to the branches where we remember it being one particular value?

 

Everett was well aware of that problem, and when you do the math, the entire picture does not depend on the choice of the base, despite locally, the choice of the base will determine the type of parallel universe you can access.

There is a problem only if we believe in some naive boolean type of universe. It is just that in some terms of the universal Everett superposition, machines can develop, and then they will indeed continue to work in the same bases (if they are classical machines). But the whole quantum state will not depend on that base at all.

I thought that this was the reason to use the label "relative states" instead of parallel universes, but apparently Everett has been asked to avoid the label "parallel universe" as it looks too much like sc. fic. IMO: relative states is better, by preventing the belief that some base plays a crucial role right at the start, which is not the case, as the role will be indexical and relative.

The base problem disappears when you take 1) the universal wave, and 2) accept the idea that all states of the subsystem are relative indexical defined by the base in which some self-aware subparts (local universal machine) can develop and remember personal memories. 

Hope this can help a little bit.

Thanks Bruno, it is helpful.

So in summary is the selection of base dependent on one's own conscious state and therefore the set of histories compatible with its formation? E.g., like when Einstein spoke of the consciousness of the mouse determining the history of the universe, (taken literally but with the realization that there are other creatures in entirely different universes found elsewhere in the universal wave).

 

Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.

Are you referring to "Quantum Mechanics and Experience" (1992)?  I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).

Jason

 

[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 6:09 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

  But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem.

Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand?  I've found all kinds of things said on it, and they all seem to be asking different things.

For physicists, it's part of the problem of explaining the emergence of the classical world from the quantum world.  Decoherence can diagonalize (approximately) a reduced density matrix IN SOME BASIS.

Is this the same basis as in "momentum basis" and "position basis", or is it some other usage of the term?

Forgive my ignorance, but what does it mean to "diagonalize a reduced density matrix"?

It means to take an average over all the other variables except those of interest (i.e. the ones you measure). If you do this in a particular basis we think it makes the submatrix corresponding to those variables diagonal.  Then it can be interpreted as the probabilities of the different values.  Note that it is a mathematical operation that depends on choosing a basis, not a physical process. 

Is this a process to recover the probabilities of some observation from some point of view?  I so will different probabilities be calculated if one takes a different basis?

There's only one basis in which the reduced matrix is diagonal - i.e. the 'classical basis'.  But saying which basis this is from a fundamentally quantum standpoint (not relying on a classical world like Bohr) is part of "the basis problem". 

 

The MWI view is that this is  a physical process - which it could be IF the basis was not an arbitrary choice but was somehow dictated by the physics.  But so far there are only hand waving arguments that "it must be that way".

Can you provide an example of how using a different basis leads to different conclusions?  I very much appreciate your helping me to understand this problem.

If you choose a basis in which the density matrix is not diagonal, then there's no clear interpretation of it as probabilities.  There are complex cross-terms that have not probabilistic interpretation.

 

 

  Being diagonal in one basis means it's superposition in some other basis.  So for physicists the problem is saying what privileges or picks out the particular bases we see in experiments.  Why do our instruments have needles that are in eigen states of position, while some other things (e.g. atoms) are in eigen states of energy or eigen states of momentum.  For physicists there are some suggestive, but not fully worked out answers to these questions, e.g. you get position eigenstates because the interaction term of the Hamiltonian is a function of position.  But those answers assume the physics.  If you want to reconstruct physics from experiences, you can't borrow the physical explanation to say why your experiences are classical.

I think the assumption that experiences are classical comes from the classicality of Turing machines (which are the supposed mechanism by which experiences are manifest).

I don't think there's anything either classical or quantum about Turing machines.  They are just mathematical abstractions.  And assuming they read and write qubits instead of bits doesn't change the range of things they can compute.

But qubits don't exist in normal definitions of information or Turing machines.  Sure, they can be modeled, but only by splitting the entire tape and Turing machine and having one of them read a 1 and the other read a 0. When you do this, you are talking about two different computational states, (you might as well model them as separate Turing machines/programs at this point) and hence you are talking about two different minds, not one mind that is conscious of a superpositional state.

I don't think that's right. A universal Turing machine can emulate a quantum Turing machine, it's just less efficient.  But that's part of the point of Seth Lloyd's paper and of Scott Aaronson, that maybe efficiency is important.  It's not in Bruno's theory, because if your computing the Everything, then time is part of the computation and not some outside measure against which to judge efficiency.

Brent

Jason

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[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 1:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person.  It seems more accurate to say there is no "I".

But the chain is immortal and cyclic,

Why do you assume it's cyclic?  Where was it before life evolved?

convoluted with periods of amnesia,

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

Why? It entails that there is only one person,

Not only that, it entails that the one person lives each life over and over.

Like in Gödel rotative universe. 

But time is an indexical, it makes no sense to ascribe an absolute time to the living of an experience. In the UD all experiences are "lived" an infinity of times, but the 1p makes it unique, and the infinity will play a role only in the statistics on the relative futures. 

We belong all the "time" to finite computations, cyclic computations, and infinite non cyclic computations. 

At first sight, only those last one can change the relative measure on the consistent extensions, so we can say that finite and cyclic computations have a measure zero for the 1_p. 

Why should cyclic computations not have as much weight towards some particular state as an infinite computation that is not cyclic?  Is it because there are an infinite number of these non-cyclic computations all proceeding through that state an an infinite number of times (and hence a larger infinity)?

For one thing, in what sense can a computation be said to repeat?  There may be a cyclic computation, but there's no external measure of time or progression corresponding to "going around the cycle".  It's static mathematical object.

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 7:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The base problem disappears when you take 1) the universal wave, and 2) accept the idea that all states of the subsystem are relative indexical defined by the base in which some self-aware subparts (local universal machine) can develop and remember personal memories. 

But why are self-aware subparts necessarily classical?  That's was my question that started this thread.  Why can't there be a self-aware subpart that is aware of the wave-functions projection onto other bases in which it is not even approximately diagonal?

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 10:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't think you would be the same person. 

You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null conscious state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent Meeker. Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal definitions of personhood,

And why should be adopt non-normal definitions of personhood?  and what would those be?

but they may become any person (who emerges in a similar way as a human does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo).

 

Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.

Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you will find only confusion.

And the border between Mexico and Texas is indefinite at the atomic level.  That doesn't mean there's no Mexico and no Texas.

 

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going there.

But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored

All things follow from a false premise.

Brent

(comp/mwi), then in all your travels through the many-worlds/many-dreams, some fraction of the time, you will get to Antarctica from California.

Jason

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[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 01:53:14PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> But why are self-aware subparts necessarily classical? That's was
> my question that started this thread. Why can't there be a
> self-aware subpart that is aware of the wave-functions projection
> onto other bases in which it is not even approximately diagonal?
>
> Brent
>

This is an important question, but will probably require a better
understanding of consciousness before we have a satisfactory answer.

It is essentially equivalent to asking why I make the "PROJECTION"
postulate in my book.

It is plausible that this is inherent in COMP.

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Principal, High Performance Coders
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University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 4:30 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 10:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't think you would be the same person. 

You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null conscious state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent Meeker. Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal definitions of personhood,

And why should be adopt non-normal definitions of personhood? 

Because the conventional views are probably logically inconsistent. Most attach significance to either physiological or psychological continuity, but you can construct convincing arguments of continuity in situations where one is held constant and the other is entirely replaced. Neither one of these conventional views appears to be correct.

 

and what would those be?

Ones that address and answer problems in the area of personal identity.  Candidates I am aware of that seem consistent and able to answer questions include no-self theory, and universalism.

 

but they may become any person (who emerges in a similar way as a human does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo).

 

Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.

Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you will find only confusion.

And the border between Mexico and Texas is indefinite at the atomic level.  That doesn't mean there's no Mexico and no Texas.

Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and everything in between.  Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.

Jason

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 4:30 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 10:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going there.

But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored

All things follow from a false premise.

 

That may be true, but it is no argument against the veracity of the premise.

Jason

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 06:02:14PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of
> persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and everything
> in between. Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent
> ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.
>
> Jason

This is what Parfitt argues in his Napoleon thought experiment. I
don't agree that this is at all obvious. It seems likely to me
that there are vast gulfs of non-conscious configurations in between
say you and me, without there being a continuous path linking us in
the Multiverse. In such a case, universalism makes no sense.

Cheera

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 7:24 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 06:02:14PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of
> persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and everything
> in between.  Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent
> ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.
>
> Jason

This is what Parfitt argues in his Napoleon thought experiment. I
don't agree that this is at all obvious. It seems likely to me
that there are vast gulfs of non-conscious configurations in between
say you and me, without there being a continuous path linking us in
the Multiverse.

If there is anything in reality that knows what it is like to be you, and knows what it is like to be me, then we are both it.

 

In such a case, universalism makes no sense.

I think the evolution of a person which eventually leads to all possible states is only one of the arguments in support universalism.  Other arguments exist, which are well articulated in Arnold Zuboff's "One self: The logic of experience".

Jason

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 07:33:42PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 7:24 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>wrote:
>
> > On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 06:02:14PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of
> > > persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and
> > everything
> > > in between. Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent
> > > ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.
> > >
> > > Jason
> >
> > This is what Parfitt argues in his Napoleon thought experiment. I
> > don't agree that this is at all obvious. It seems likely to me
> > that there are vast gulfs of non-conscious configurations in between
> > say you and me, without there being a continuous path linking us in
> > the Multiverse.
>
>
> If there is anything in reality that knows what it is like to be you, and
> knows what it is like to be me, then we are both it.
>

That seems a big "if".

>
>
> > In such a case, universalism makes no sense.
> >
> >
>
> I think the evolution of a person which eventually leads to all possible
> states is only one of the arguments in support universalism.

What is this evolution you speak of?

> Other
> arguments exist, which are well articulated in Arnold Zuboff's "One self:
> The logic of experience".
>
> Jason
>

OK - I've downloaded this paper and added it to my backlog. Will
peruse sometime in the next 5 years :).

[Bruno Marchal]

I think so.

If we measure something, we are entangled with it and it becomes part of our memory. It is then considered a problem (by some) that this memory persists and we are confined to the branches where we remember it being one particular value?

It looks like a particular base is chosen, and that the "parallel universes" are determined by it. But it is only the accessible universe, from the point of view of the observer. The choice of the base is done by the specific physical history of the brain/body of the observers. States are relative with respect of the (classical) observable exploited by the brain. In our case position is exploited, and this can be explained by the theory of decoherence (Zurek).

 

Everett was well aware of that problem, and when you do the math, the entire picture does not depend on the choice of the base, despite locally, the choice of the base will determine the type of parallel universe you can access.

There is a problem only if we believe in some naive boolean type of universe. It is just that in some terms of the universal Everett superposition, machines can develop, and then they will indeed continue to work in the same bases (if they are classical machines). But the whole quantum state will not depend on that base at all.

I thought that this was the reason to use the label "relative states" instead of parallel universes, but apparently Everett has been asked to avoid the label "parallel universe" as it looks too much like sc. fic. IMO: relative states is better, by preventing the belief that some base plays a crucial role right at the start, which is not the case, as the role will be indexical and relative.

The base problem disappears when you take 1) the universal wave, and 2) accept the idea that all states of the subsystem are relative indexical defined by the base in which some self-aware subparts (local universal machine) can develop and remember personal memories. 

Hope this can help a little bit.

Thanks Bruno, it is helpful.

So in summary is the selection of base dependent on one's own conscious state and therefore the set of histories compatible with its formation? E.g., like when Einstein spoke of the consciousness of the mouse determining the history of the universe, (taken literally but with the realization that there are other creatures in entirely different universes found elsewhere in the universal wave).

It is more the brain description than the conscious state, which "chose the base". And the mouse state does not influence the entire universe at all. The mouse only discover and determine his own branch, which get separated and single out in a purely local way. 

It is the main interest of Everett: physics remains reversible, local and deterministic. Einstein would have chosen it, as he was quite opposed to non-locality, or non determinism in nature.

Comp has a similar base problem. It might look like the many-dreams are determined by the choice of the initial, basic, universal systems phi_i, and this is literally true. But the inside views (which determine the whole theology including physics) does not depend on it. That initial choice is conventional, but it changes nothing in the realities that we can, or not dream or access.

 

Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.

Are you referring to "Quantum Mechanics and Experience" (1992)?  I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).

It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 22:53, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/19/2013 7:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The base problem disappears when you take 1) the universal wave, and 2) accept the idea that all states of the subsystem are relative indexical defined by the base in which some self-aware subparts (local universal machine) can develop and remember personal memories. 

But why are self-aware subparts necessarily classical? 

They are not. But once we choose a simple universal base like arithmetic of combinators, we have to recover the quantum from an epistemology of classical machines. 

We start from classical because we want to explain the quantum.

Starting from the quantum would beg the explanation of matter. 

That's was my question that started this thread.  Why can't there be a self-aware subpart that is aware of the wave-functions projection onto other bases in which it is not even approximately diagonal?

That can exist. It is called a quantum computer or brain, but we don't want assue them, because we want to explain why they exist, from simple (boolean) assumptions. It is a methodological decision.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Oct 2013, at 23:30, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/19/2013 10:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 11:11 AM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 10/19/2013 12:30 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Amnesia = gap in the chain.

Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and survival. You survive despite forgetting things, or being in a meditative state not drawing on any past memories.

You're talking about long term memories.  If you lost ALL memories I don't think you would be the same person. 

You woke up this morning as Brent Meeker, emerging from the null conscious state to a barely awake one, and eventually a fully awake Brent Meeker. Someone with no memories may not be the same person by our normal definitions of personhood,

And why should be adopt non-normal definitions of personhood?  and what would those be?

but they may become any person (who emerges in a similar way as a human does awaking from sleep, or developing in an embryo).

 

Having experiences is not necessarily the same as being Jason Resch.

Jason Resch is a label that can be applied to some experiences, but when you try to find the borderline where you can no longer apply this label you will find only confusion.

And the border between Mexico and Texas is indefinite at the atomic level.  That doesn't mean there's no Mexico and no Texas.

 

 

branching, etc. Any state eventually leads to every other state.

Sounds like wishful thinking.

I will accept that when you can point to a computational state not reachable from some other arbitrary computational state.

Anartica is reachable from California, but that doesn't mean I'm going there.

But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored

All things follow from a false premise.

Only when actually proved to be false will everything actually follows. You can't speculate on the falsity of e proposition to say that everything follows, or you beg the question.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/19/2013 11:30 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But such a path that exists, and in the case that all paths are explored

All things follow from a false premise.

Only when actually proved to be false will everything actually follows. You can't speculate on the falsity of e proposition to say that everything follows, or you beg the question.

But no more than asserting the point that was in question.

Brent

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 8:03 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 07:33:42PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 7:24 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>wrote:
>
> > On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 06:02:14PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of
> > > persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and
> > everything
> > > in between.  Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where Brent
> > > ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.
> > >
> > > Jason
> >
> > This is what Parfitt argues in his Napoleon thought experiment. I
> > don't agree that this is at all obvious. It seems likely to me
> > that there are vast gulfs of non-conscious configurations in between
> > say you and me, without there being a continuous path linking us in
> > the Multiverse.
>
>
> If there is anything in reality that knows what it is like to be you, and
> knows what it is like to be me, then we are both it.
>

That seems a big "if".

Well, as one who's theory of everything derives from the theory of nothing, is the existence of such a being not guaranteed by that theory?

 

>
>
> > In such a case, universalism makes no sense.
> >
> >
>
> I think the evolution of a person which eventually leads to all possible
> states is only one of the arguments in support universalism.

What is this evolution you speak of?

The immortality of computationalism/many worlds, coupled with the infinite variation in reality.

 

> Other
> arguments exist, which are well articulated in Arnold Zuboff's "One self:
> The logic of experience".
>
> Jason
>

OK - I've downloaded this paper and added it to my backlog. Will
peruse sometime in the next 5 years :).

Universalism is not only the theory of Arnold Zuboff, but also the theory of Erwin Schrodinger, Fred Hoyle, Freeman Dyson, Kurt Godel, Bruno Marchal (I believe) and Aldous Huxley. Zuboff is also the inventor of the sleeping beauty problem (if that gives you any additional incentive to read his paper).

Jason

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Oct 2013, at 02:24, Russell Standish wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 06:02:14PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Across the many worlds you will find a nearly continuous spectrum of
>> persons from those just like you to those like someone else, and
>> everything
>> in between. Any suggestion of a discrete border that defines where
>> Brent
>> ends and someone else begins would be completely arbitrary.
>>
>> Jason
>
> This is what Parfitt argues in his Napoleon thought experiment. I
> don't agree that this is at all obvious. It seems likely to me
> that there are vast gulfs of non-conscious configurations in between
> say you and me, without there being a continuous path linking us in
> the Multiverse. In such a case, universalism makes no sense.

There are vast gulf of non-conscious configurations, But I think that
with comp, despite this, there are still a conscious continuous path.

In fact I think (but not use!) that you have a conscious path between
any brain, and the empty brain (no brain!).

It is an "agnosologic" (I forget the correct term right now. Hope that
Stathis will correct the term) path. Some people can become blind, and
not see the difference, as they become amnesic on everything
concerning vision. Comp generalizes this, I think, for all sensation/
perception, and it means that there is a special path, for destroying
a brain, so that the subject, at each step would say (until he can't
talk!) that he don't feel anything changed in his consciousness. When
he can't talk anymore, he will still not see the difference, as he
forget what talking is all about!

Then you can added again pieces of a brain, of some different person,
in the inverse "agnosological" path, and you get a continuous (first
person) path between two different persons.

Note that salvia can do something very similar. You get totally
amnesic, but, in some circumstance, cannot acknowledge the fact. You
can even feel like "oh, this time nothing happened". It is only when
you come back that you realize the hugeness of the experience.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/