On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs 3p = truth by calculation

[Roger Clough]

 

Note that

 

1p = contingent truth

 

3p = necessary truth

 

So the question of whether comp is true or not is

whether or when or where

 

1p = 3p

 

 

 

----- Have received the following content -----

Sender: Roger Clough

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Time: 2012-12-26, 11:26:27

Subject: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs 3p = truth by calculation

Hi everything-list

 

 

IMHO that comp iis true or not is equalvalent to the question

 

 

does

 

1p  =  3p  ?

 

where

 

1p= truth by experience (or actuality) and

 

3p = truth by description  (by theory)

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/26/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

[Russell Standish]

What is the point of redefining 1p and 3p this way?

If you want to do this, you should first show that you recover the
usual meanings of the terms, otherwise you may as well be speaking gibberish.

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Dec 2012, at 17:33, Roger Clough wrote:

 

Note that

 

1p = contingent truth

Not at all. Each person pov has its own set of necessities and contingencies.

 

3p = necessary truth

Not correct (in comp, and weakening of comp). There are many pure 3p arithmetical contingencies. This is highly counter-intuitive and is a consequence of Gödel's incompleteness, mainly. More on this later (perhaps on FOAR).

 

So the question of whether comp is true or not is

whether or when or where

 

1p = 3p

In God's eye, and nowhere else. In the computationalist theory.

Bruno

 

 

 

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Time: 2012-12-26, 11:26:27

Subject: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs 3p = truth by calculation

Hi everything-list

 

 

IMHO that comp iis true or not is equalvalent to the question

 

 

does

 

1p  =  3p  ?

 

where

 

1p= truth by experience (or actuality) and

 

3p = truth by description  (by theory)

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/26/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Russell Standish

 

Good point.

 

You are right, but we cannot do without 1p and 2p

unless we want to live in Flatland (Thirdness, the publicly

available world of 3p logic).  Truths are stated in words,

so it includes necessary and contingent truths. The "p"

levels are depth levels of a Peircean sort (closer to meanings than

truths, since they are unstated and personal), where 2p is II

and 1p is I. I suggest we call them "personal meanings"

and leave "truths" to III.

 

I hope I can remember that.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/27/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

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Time: 2012-12-26, 20:21:34

Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs3p = truth by calculation

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[Russell Standish]

On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 06:21:06AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Russell Standish
>
> Good point.
>
> You are right, but we cannot do without 1p and 2p
> unless we want to live in Flatland (Thirdness, the publicly
> available world of 3p logic). Truths are stated in words,
> so it includes necessary and contingent truths. The "p"
> levels are depth levels of a Peircean sort (closer to meanings than

What I wanted to get at is why are you claiming this? The 1p and 3p
refer to subjective and objective points of view. There is no
2p. There is also a 1p plural, for shared subjective things. The "p"
is short for "person"

I'm not saying these things are unconnected to Peircean semiotics, but
without more elaboration from you as to why you think so, I can't see
the connection. It is certainly not obvious.

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.

But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,

but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,

and operates down here, which is why I classified it as

being contingent. 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/28/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-27, 06:09:25

Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs3p = truth by calculation

On 26 Dec 2012, at 17:33, Roger Clough wrote:

 

Note that

 

1p = contingent truth

Not at all. Each person pov has its own set of necessities and contingencies.

 

3p = necessary truth

Not correct (in comp, and weakening of comp). There are many pure 3p arithmetical contingencies. This is highly counter-intuitive and is a consequence of G鰀el's incompleteness, mainly. More on this later (perhaps on FOAR).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Russell Standish

 

2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses synthetic logic.

It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.

 

The following equivalences should hold between comp

and Peirce's logical categories:

 

3p = Thirdness or III

2p = Secondness or II

1p = Firstness or I.

 

Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,

while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic

logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.

So .

 

Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:

 

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html

 

 

"Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,

positively and without reference to anything else.

 

Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,

with respect to a second but regardless of any third.

 

Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,

in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

(A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/28/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

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Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-27, 16:42:23

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Roger,

On 28 Dec 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:

Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.

But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,

but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,

and operates down here, which is why I classified it as

being contingent. 

3p have necessities and contingencies, but they have also their divine and terrestrial aspect. Here, Divine just means True, and Terrestrial just means effectively believed (and true as I study ideally correct machines).

So there is an OUTER GOD, which is the ONE, and which is 3p, in the comp theory, as it is the collection of true arithmetical propositions.

There is a knower, and it is the INNER GOD, it is the one "available" in the mystical experience. For the ideally correct machine it is both terrestrial and divine (S4Grz = S4Grz*).

The Noùs, i.e. the "accessible" 3p, and the Matter splits into divine and terrestrial parts.

Eventually we get 8 person points of view, which gives 8 ways to see arithmetical truth from inside:

                                            TRUTH (outer God)                                0p

INTELLIGIBLE (by Man)                INTELLIGIBLE (by God)         3p

                                             SOUL (inner God)                                  1p

Intelligible MATTER (by Man)   Intelligible MATTER (by God)   3p

sensible MATTER (by Man)       sensible MATTER (by God)      1p

This sum up an interpretation of Plotinus in term of the naturally existing intensional variant of self-reference. This gives eight different logics/mathematics.

if Gödel's incompleteness theorem was false, or if Church thesis was false, the 8 hypostases would collapse into effective truth. But things are not that easy for the machine looking inward.

I have no 2p, as I am not studying the private life of couples of machines :)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 12/28/2012 2:48 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi Roger,

On 28 Dec 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:

Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.

But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,

but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,

and operates down here, which is why I classified it as

being contingent. 

3p have necessities and contingencies, but they have also their divine and terrestrial aspect. Here, Divine just means True, and Terrestrial just means effectively believed (and true as I study ideally correct machines).

Dear Bruno,

    Thank you for this post! I still have hope that your ideas will filter down to the engineers. ;-)

So there is an OUTER GOD, which is the ONE, and which is 3p, in the comp theory, as it is the collection of true arithmetical propositions.

    This is an important definition, but one has to be careful *not* to treat the One as an observer. Most realists, ISTM, treat this One as an observer and a source of 3p truth, but there is no such thing in the absence of the knower, the "inner god".

There is a knower, and it is the INNER GOD, it is the one "available" in the mystical experience. For the ideally correct machine it is both terrestrial and divine (S4Grz = S4Grz*).

    OK. This makes consciousness seem to be an ontological primitive! I argue that this is an illusion since if we try to define the inner god as a 1p and isolate, it becomes such that cannot be even named.

The Noùs, i.e. the "accessible" 3p, and the Matter splits into divine and terrestrial parts.

    This is where Pratt's dual aspects show up, no?

Eventually we get 8 person points of view, which gives 8 ways to see arithmetical truth from inside:

                                            TRUTH (outer God)                                0p

INTELLIGIBLE (by Man)                INTELLIGIBLE (by God)         3p

                                             SOUL (inner God)                                  1p

Intelligible MATTER (by Man)   Intelligible MATTER (by God)   3p

sensible MATTER (by Man)       sensible MATTER (by God)      1p

This sum up an interpretation of Plotinus in term of the naturally existing intensional variant of self-reference. This gives eight different logics/mathematics.

if Gödel's incompleteness theorem was false, or if Church thesis was false, the 8 hypostases would collapse into effective truth. But things are not that easy for the machine looking inward.

    But we can "slow" the collapse by linking computations to physical implementation. This is where you and I seem to collide in our thinking. :_( I think it is merely a mutual lack of understanding...

I have no 2p, as I am not studying the private life of couples of machines :)

    Ah, but it is in couples that we recover finite context and, ultimately engineering. I wish to discuss with you the cyclic gossiping idea that I use, it gives us a nice semi-formal model to examine the effects of interactions between pairs of machines in a combinatorial way.
See, for instance http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0037(199610)28:3%3C135::AID-NET2%3E3.0.CO;2-O/abstract

"Abstract

Gossiping and broadcasting are two problems of information dissemination described for a group of individuals connected by a communication network. In gossiping, every person in the network knows a unique item of information and needs to communicate it to everyone else. In broadcasting, one individual has an item of information which needs to be communicated to everyone else. A variation of gossiping, called cyclic gossiping, recently introduced by Liestman and Richards, is studied here for certain classes of graphs."

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Russell Standish
>

> 2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses synthetic logic.
> It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.
>
> The following equivalences should hold between comp
> and Peirce's logical categories:
>
> 3p = Thirdness or III
> 2p = Secondness or II
> 1p = Firstness or I.
>
> Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
> while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
> logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
> So .
>
> Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:
>
> http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html
>
>
> "Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> positively and without reference to anything else.
>
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
> (A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"
>

Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that
relate to subjectivity and objectivity.

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

The 2p appears to be in synthetic logic such as in epistemology
(phenomenology or perception) and presumably in Boolean

synthetic logic operations such as AND, OR, XOR and NAND

operations, where apparently some form of
combination is used ?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic_synthesis


"History of logic synthesis
  
The roots of logic synthesis can be traced to the treatment of logic by
George Boole (1815 to 1864), in what is now termed Boolean algebra.
In 1938, Claude Shannon showed that the two-valued Boolean algebra
can describe the operation of switching circuits.
In the early days, logic design involved manipulating the truth table
representations as Karnaugh maps. The Karnaugh map-based minimization
of logic is guided by a set of rules on how entries in the
maps can be combined. A human designer can typically only work with
Karnaugh maps containing up to four to six variables.
Logic operations usually consist of boolean AND, OR, XOR and NAND operations,
and are the most basic forms of operations in an electronic circuit.
Arithmetic operations are usually implemented with the use of logic operators.
Circuits such as a binary multiplier or a binary adder are examples
of more complex binary operations that can be implemented using basic
logic operators. "

This shows how 2p is used in perception:

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm


The Categories as used in perception:

I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),

I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant. )




[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-28, 14:48:04
Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truthvs3p = truth by calculation

Hi Roger,


On 28 Dec 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:




Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.
But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,
but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,
and operates down here, which is why I classified it as
being contingent.


3p have necessities and contingencies, but they have also their divine and terrestrial aspect. Here, Divine just means True, and Terrestrial just means effectively believed (and true as I study ideally correct machines).


So there is an OUTER GOD, which is the ONE, and which is 3p, in the comp theory, as it is the collection of true arithmetical propositions.


There is a knower, and it is the INNER GOD, it is the one "available" in the mystical experience. For the ideally correct machine it is both terrestrial and divine (S4Grz = S4Grz*).

The No?, i.e. the "accessible" 3p, and the Matter splits into divine and terrestrial parts.

Eventually we get 8 person points of view, which gives 8 ways to see arithmetical truth from inside:


                                            TRUTH (outer God) 0p
INTELLIGIBLE (by Man) INTELLIGIBLE (by God) 3p
                                             SOUL (inner God) 1p


Intelligible MATTER (by Man) Intelligible MATTER (by God) 3p
sensible MATTER (by Man) sensible MATTER (by God) 1p


This sum up an interpretation of Plotinus in term of the naturally existing intensional variant of self-reference. This gives eight different logics/mathematics.

if G del's incompleteness theorem was false, or if Church thesis was false, the 8 hypostases would collapse into effective truth. But things are not that easy for the machine looking inward.

I have no 2p, as I am not studying the private life of couples of machines :)


Bruno




[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
12/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-27, 06:09:25
Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs3p = truth by calculation




On 26 Dec 2012, at 17:33, Roger Clough wrote:



Note that

1p = contingent truth


Not at all. Each person pov has its own set of necessities and contingencies.





3p = necessary truth

Not correct (in comp, and weakening of comp). There are many pure 3p arithmetical contingencies. This is highly counter-intuitive and is a consequence of G?el's incompleteness, mainly. More on this later (perhaps on FOAR).

So the question of whether comp is true or not is
whether or when or where

1p = 3p


In God's eye, and nowhere else. In the computationalist theory.


Bruno







----- Have received the following content -----
Sender: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-26, 11:26:27
Subject: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs 3p = truth by calculation


Hi everything-list


IMHO that comp iis true or not is equalvalent to the question


does

1p = 3p ?

where

1p= truth by experience (or actuality) and

3p = truth by description (by theory)



[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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[Roger Clough]

Hi Russell Standish

 

2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Russell Standish

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-29, 01:21:53

Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

[Bruno Marchal]

3p is when we agree that the coffee is too hot.
1p is when we find it tastes very bad.
2p is when your wife ask you to clean the coffee machine.

:)

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Dec 2012, at 11:04, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

 

2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce.

That kind of 2p can be explained in term of 3p and 1p. I don't think it is fundamental, and we should try to stay as simple as possible. I do agree with Peirce, I think, but I find the notion of 2p quite non pedagogical, and also unrelated to the use of the "you", that is the grammatical 2p, where on the contrary 1p and 3p refers easily to grammar.

But that's only my opinion, and it concerns only pedagogy,

Bruno

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason) 

 

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)

 

1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-- input to sensing nerves)

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

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Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

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[Roger Clough]

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 


Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)

1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

A Few Definitions of the categories

 

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/newlist/nl-frame.htm


The Categories as used in perception:

I 1p--Quality (Reference to a Ground),
II 2p-- Relation (Reference to a Correlate),
II 3p--Representation (Reference to an Interpretant),

I 1p-- Quale (that which refers to a ground),
II 2p--Relate (that which refers to a ground and correlate, )
III 3p--Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant. )

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html

"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond
three classes of characters or predicates.

Firstly come " firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in itself;

secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on another,
regardless of law or of any third subject;

thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on
another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

>>

>> The following equivalences should hold >>

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

I think you tend to combine 1p (the nature of the quale or input)
with 2p (how that feels, which I think should be very personal ).

These are often confused, some people saying that quale
is 1p, others that quale is the actual feeling (2p).

I think the categories are quite different, however:

1p (brain) is the physical input signal (brain)

2p (brainmind) is the signal while being processed in the (brainmind)
as it attempt to recognize the signal from memory
(past experience)


3p (mind) is mental (rational) identification of the perception and
its implications

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
12/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-29, 07:20:07
Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 

Is not "I feel pain" a quale?

Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)

? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method. 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)

I will ask you for the coffee recipe.

Funny? 

Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!

1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves)

OK, I see why you say this. 

Keep in mind in UDA 1p is just defined by the content of the diary of the guy or girl annihilated and reconstituted, with their diary, as opposed to the diary of an external observer (3p). In AUDA the 1p is defined by "a correct belief" with respect to a probable situation. 

Just to help you for other threads.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 12/29/2012 4:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

3p is when we agree that the coffee is too hot.
1p is when we find it tastes very bad.
2p is when your wife ask you to clean the coffee machine.

So THAT'S why philosophers don't talk about 2p.

Brent

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

Hi Bruno,

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 

Is not "I feel pain" a quale?

Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)

? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method. 

The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a layer of "shoe leather".

Whether the receiver of the message "understands" is a different question and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational history with the concept in question.

Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not everybody has musical taste.  

Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect, will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those local infinities.
 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.

But alas, Germans are known for their lack of taste and world wars and we don't market our wines and cheeses so well. It is still fact however, that Germany exports more cheese to France than the opposite. We just give it some Italian name, and the French buy it, as anybody with culinary taste will not buy from the Krauts:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambozola

Yup, that's German and the French buy more of that from the supermarket shelves than Germans buy Roquefort and co.
 

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)

I will ask you for the coffee recipe.

Funny? 

Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!

Same. I want that coffee :)

PGC
 

[meekerdb]

On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.

I thought every body just quoted the latin, "De gustibus non est disputandum.",  which is literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means the same.

Brent

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

.

IMHO, which you don't have to agree with,  3p is completely differnt from 1p

 

Here's how I see the whole picture:

 

1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain -----> (2p =  the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) --->

    ---> 3p = physical signal output to outside world through brain.

 

 

1p = physical input of outside world as part of the brain.

 

2p = "black box" mental signal processing of 1p

 

3p = physical output from 2p as through the brain to outside world.

 

 

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/30/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-29, 14:36:58

Subject: Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use(in perception)

On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 

Is not "I feel pain" a quale?

Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)

? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method. 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des go鹴s et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

It does go both ways in German usage. Is somebody tolerant for letting other views or tastes prevail, like tolerance of bad music or political corruption? Or is somebody tolerant for engaging other views verbally, facing the possibility that one's views might be wrong, therefore tolerating the insecurity of exposure and dispute (unlike most forums and lists)?

A tolerant attitude has to include, in this frame, not merely accepting other tastes' potential nonsense, but also accepting possibility of one's own bad taste, engaging such possibility by discussion and interaction without shame.

I guess capacity of aesthetic judgement, what taste boils down to both "internally" and in our ability to convey such through some language, formal or not, or means of interaction, e.g. music, cooking, or making love, is graded and can always become more refined as we grow; which is why my ear is better than when I first picked up a guitar, and why it is so much worse than somebody who has played 20 years more than me. This also translates to the ability to communicate that.

An overly defensive, insecure or arrogant attitude is what leads to disputes feared in the Latin quote and marks to some extent everybody being close-minded. When are we tolerant and when are we too afraid to step in when ugly stuff happens? Good point, Brent.

Mark


  
 

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:32, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

Hi Bruno,

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:

The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain

Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.

2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale) 

Is not "I feel pain" a quale?

Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)

? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method. 

The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a layer of "shoe leather".

This means you can educate taste, not really explaining it. Here I meant explaining taste to someone having no taste, or explaining what is taste.

Whether the receiver of the message "understands" is a different question and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational history with the concept in question.

Here you are right, in the sense that I can't explain the natural numbers, if you don't have some intuition of them already. Once you agree on numbers, I can explain the tensor, even if it can take time.

Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not everybody has musical taste.  

Same for wine.

Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect, will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those local infinities.

Yes.

 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.

But alas, Germans are known for their lack of taste and world wars and we don't market our wines and cheeses so well. It is still fact however, that Germany exports more cheese to France than the opposite. We just give it some Italian name, and the French buy it, as anybody with culinary taste will not buy from the Krauts:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambozola

Yup, that's German and the French buy more of that from the supermarket shelves than Germans buy Roquefort and co.

I like both culinary arts, but then my country is influenced by both. I think we develop taste early in the childhood.

 

2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)

I will ask you for the coffee recipe.

Funny? 

Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!

Same. I want that coffee :)

PGC

:)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Dec 2012, at 22:08, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.

I thought every body just quoted the latin, "De gustibus non est disputandum.",

You are right. I forget my latin!

  which is literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means the same.

Yes. Arguing is the stage before stopping arguing :)

Bruno

Brent

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Dec 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

.

IMHO, which you don't have to agree with,  3p is completely differnt from 1p

Better not agreeing, as this limit the interest of conversing.

 

Here's how I see the whole picture:

 

1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain -----> (2p =  the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) --->

    ---> 3p = physical signal output to outside world through brain.

Usually, 1p = the subjective personal account of the experience.

And 3p is some "objective view".

1p is not communicable (except approximately by artists)

3p is usually communicable, or locally communicable.

All scientific statement is 3p. Even when talking about "1p". 

 

 

1p = physical input of outside world as part of the brain.

 

2p = "black box" mental signal processing of 1p

 

3p = physical output from 2p as through the brain to outside world.

You might give too much importance to the physical, which with comp appear to be only 1p plural. Eventually, we can limit ourself to arithmetic for the 3p. Then the 1p & Co. are "numbers with an angle, or a point of view".

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Cowboy,

Reason and truth can only be expressed objectively in words, and symbols.
They are public, communicable expressions.

Experience is subjective (1p) and so cannot be so expressed, at least precisely.
The objective expression or description of an experience (3p) for communcation purposes is therefore never exact.

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
12/31/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-30, 10:48:19

Subject: Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use(in perception)

On 29 Dec 2012, at 21:32, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Hi Bruno,

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:


The classic example

3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain



Hmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.





2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain

1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)



Is not "I feel pain" a quale?








Also

3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)



? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.



The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a layer of "shoe leather".



This means you can educate taste, not really explaining it. Here I meant explaining taste to someone having no taste, or explaining what is taste.







Whether the receiver of the message "understands" is a different question and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational history with the concept in question.



Here you are right, in the sense that I can't explain the natural numbers, if you don't have some intuition of them already. Once you agree on numbers, I can explain the tensor, even if it can take time.









Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not everybody has musical taste.



Same for wine.





Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect, will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those local infinities.



Yes.

In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des go?s et des couleurs on ne discute pas).

That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)

In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "?er Geschmack l?st sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 Dec 2012, at 14:13, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Cowboy,
>
> Reason and truth can only be expressed objectively in words, and
> symbols.
> They are public, communicable expressions.

Reason only. Truth is public only in bet and inference. Public truth
is always "truth?".

Bruno

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

It makes sense to think of 1p as subjective, and I used to do so.

But the "black box" model of consciousness which I have adopted

to closer fit Peirce's categories,  if it is treated as a classical "black box", 

suggests that, to accord with both Peirce and system theory:  

 

1p (objective input voltage) ---> 2p (intelligent (subjective) signal processing, convolution) --> 3p objective output voltage.

 

What happens in the box is then basically subjective (intelligent), although

if you permit the analogy, 3p may be represented as a convolution of 2p

with 1p, so that (to use an analogy to system theory)

 

3p (t) = convolution integral = Int[2p(t-c+t)*1p (t)*dt]

 

where functions of t are "down here", in objective space, but also

in "above" in platonic or  frequency space (w) which i take to be the subjective state,

so an quivalent form would simply be the product

 

3p(w) = 2p(w)*1p(w)  

 

As backup suppport for this understanding of 1p as objective or down here in time,

note that Peirce also refers to Firstness as being the OBJECT of perception (such

as an apple, "out there"), thus making his Firstness, while associated,

still entirely removed from the mindbrain, being only a portal and completely objective.

 

As further backup support. Leibniz would consider the apple as an actual (ie objective)

phenomenon, which would be his 1p. If it is a substance then it is represented

as 2p in mental (subjective) space as an apple-monad. I think he would

then refer to thel 1p (obj) +2p (sub)  as  = 3p (obj but aware of 1p and 2p).

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/31/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-12-30, 10:57:06

Subject: Re: 1p, 3p and the black box of 2p

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

1. Head= Mind or thought

 

Saying something doesn't make it true.

But, true or not, it cannot be conveyed to others

without expressing it in symbols or words.

 

2. Heart or feeling.

Beauty is expressed in images and the like.

 

3. Body or action.

Goodness is expressed in actions.

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/31/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

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[John Mikes]

Russell,

I reflect after a long-long time to your post. I had a war on my hand about objective and subjective, fighting for the latter, since we are 'us' and cannot be 'them'. I never elevated to the mindset of Lady Welby 1904, who - maybe? - got it what 2p was. 

My vocabulary allows me to consider what "I consider" (=1p) and I may communicat it (still 1p) to anybody else, who receives it as a 3p communication and acknowledges it into HIS 1p way adjusted and reformed into it. There is no other situation I can figure. Whatever I 'read' or 'hear' is 3p for me and I do the above to it to get it into my 1p mindset. 

No 2p to my knowledge. Could you improve upon my ignorance? 

John Mikes

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[Russell Standish]

Hi John,

My suspicion is that Roger is so keen to impose a Piercean triadic
view on things that he has omitted to make the necessary connection
with the normal meaning of 1p/3p as standing for subjective/objective.

Cheers

[Roger Clough]

Hi Russell Standish

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

I believe 1p is Firstness (raw experience of cat) + Secondness (identification of the image "cat" with the word "cast" to oneself)
and 3p = Thirdness (expression of "cat" to others)


[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]



Peirce
Peirce, being a pragmatist, described perception according to what happened
at each stage,1/18/2013

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-17, 17:17:11

Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

Hi John,

My suspicion is that Roger is so keen to impose a Piercean triadic
view on things that he has omitted to make the necessary connection
with the normal meaning of 1p/3p as standing for subjective/objective.

Cheers

On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 04:55:17PM -0500, John Mikes wrote:
> Russell,
> I reflect after a long-long time to your post. I had a war on my hand about
> objective and subjective, fighting for the latter, since we are 'us' and
> cannot be 'them'. I never elevated to the mindset of Lady Welby 1904, who -
> maybe? - got it what 2p was.
> My vocabulary allows me to consider what "I consider" (=1p) and I may
> communicat it (still 1p) to anybody else, who receives it as a 3p
> communication and acknowledges it into HIS 1p way adjusted and reformed
> into it. There is no other situation I can figure. Whatever I 'read' or
> 'hear' is 3p for me and I do the above to it to get it into my 1p mindset.
> No 2p to my knowledge. Could you improve upon my ignorance?
> John Mikes
>

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 27, 2012 at 6:21 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  we cannot do without 1p and 2p

Especially 2p, most posts on this topic contain a extraordinary large amount of pee pee. 

  John K Clark

 

[Craig Weinberg]

I     First person singular    
We     First person plural    
You     Second person singular / second person plural    
He     Third person masculine singular    
She     Third person feminine singular    
It     Third person neutral singular    
They     Third person plural / third person gender-neutral singular

On Friday, January 18, 2013 7:29:43 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.  
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.  
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

I believe 1p is Firstness (raw experience of cat) + Secondness (identification of the image "cat" with the word "cast" to oneself)
and 3p = Thirdness (expression of "cat" to others)

All of these are 1p. To get to 3p you would have to talk about things like the volume or composition of the cat's body.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Jan 2013, at 23:17, Russell Standish wrote:

> Hi John,
>
> My suspicion is that Roger is so keen to impose a Piercean triadic
> view on things that he has omitted to make the necessary connection
> with the normal meaning of 1p/3p as standing for subjective/objective.

I agree. It is always better to stick to the most common sense of the
words.
Note that such 1p/3p distinction is made precise informally by the
inside/outside the teleportation/duplication boxes in UDA, the terms/
wave in Everett (implicitly), and formally by the Bp and Bp & p in
AUDA. But this makes just more precise, for the reasoning, the usual
subjective/objective distinction, or even the first and third person
usual grammatical distinction.
One apparent exception is that the physical reality is no more that
much objective, as it is (with comp) a first person plural construct.
Physical "objectivity" appears to be a first person plural
construction (by *all* Löbian machines, not just the humans). Of
course this is due to the "reversal": objective is just taken in the
usual 3p sense, but physics is no more 3p.

The use of the traditional sense for 1p/3p is even more well suited
for the Neoplatonist (Plotinian) "trinity", as we get more or less
precisely the same type of "trinity" with the intensional variant of
self-reference (p, Bp, and Bp & p, playing respectively the role of
the "outer God", the "Noùs, and the inner God-universal-soul).

This might or not be compared with Pierce, I don't know.

Best,

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Jan 2013, at 13:29, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Russell Standish
>

> Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
> positively and without reference to anything else.

This can make sense. We can relate this with the common notion of
subjectivity.

> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with
> respect to a second but regardless of any third.

Hmm... Why not, but I don't see this as fundamental. It can be
distracting.

> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in
> bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

OK. Then with comp "thirdness" is arithmetic (and physics is, counter-
intuitively, still 1p, hopefully plural). The physical is a mode of
being which is *not* such as it is.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 1/20/2013 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I agree. It is always better to stick to the most common sense of the words.

That's funny coming from a guy who used "God" to designate abstract computations.

Brent

[Roger Clough]

Hi meekerdb

 

All computations are abstract.

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: meekerdb

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-20, 14:44:33

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

The triads are based on epistemology. Without Secondness

everything is impersonal. Without Secondness you cannot understand how

the final expression was obtained (what it means to YOU, and

how it was affected by the interprent. It's just wham bam ! that's a cat I see !

Van Quine made this criticism of conventional epistemology and gave it

up to examine instead how we know something that is perceived through

physiological explanations.

 

And all epistemoblogy would be robot reading, with

no account to the personality, memory, training, or

linguistic knowledge of the reader.

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-20, 07:01:56

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

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[Bruno Marchal]

?

God, matter, consciousness are never computable. Where did I ever used "God" to designate computations. It seems to me that I insist a lot for not making that kind of spurious identification. 

I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth, explaining why it makes "God" unnameable by machines.

Computation are Sigma_1

Truth is Sigma_1 union Sigma_2 union Sigma_3 union Sigma_4 union ... 

You are a bit quick here, Brent,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Jan 2013, at 21:03, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

The triads are based on epistemology. Without Secondness

everything is impersonal. Without Secondness you cannot understand how

the final expression was obtained (what it means to YOU, and

how it was affected by the interprent. It's just wham bam ! that's a cat I see !

Van Quine made this criticism of conventional epistemology and gave it

up to examine instead how we know something that is perceived through

physiological explanations.

 

And all epistemoblogy would be robot reading, with

no account to the personality, memory, training, or

linguistic knowledge of the reader.

Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities, some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 1/21/2013 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jan 2013, at 20:44, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/20/2013 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I agree. It is always better to stick to the most common sense of the words.

That's funny coming from a guy who used "God" to designate abstract computations.

?

God, matter, consciousness are never computable. Where did I ever used "God" to designate computations. It seems to me that I insist a lot for not making that kind of spurious identification. 

I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth,

And that's "the most common sense of the word"??!

Brent

[John Mikes]

Bruno:

"...I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth,"

does that mean: complying with human logic (any)? Just imagine a world (universe) without logically THINKING beings (humans?) with no math to formulate (numbers, to express): is there a "God" there? 

JM

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

You said:

 

"God, matter, consciousness are never computable"

 

Is that because the above are nonphysical ? 

If consciousness is not computable, can ideas be computable ?

 

I'm totally lost. I don't even understand how ANYTHING other

than numbers can be computable. 

 

Suppose you do a computation. You get a number or a bunch of numbers.

How can you say what they mean ? 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-21, 09:36:34

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I'm having trouble understanding you today.  You say:

 

"Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities,

some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines."

Wikipedia says: 

 

"Epistemology (ⁱ/ɨˌpɪstɨˈmɒlədʒi/ from Greek ἐπιστήμη - epistēmē, meaning

"knowledge, understanding", and λόγος - logos, meaning "study of") is the branch of

 philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge.^[1][2] It questions what

 knowledge is, how it is acquired, and the possible extent a given subject or entity can be known."

 

How can matter be epistemological ? It's just nondescriptive stuff.

It cannot be knowledge, for knowledge can be defined as a true belief.

But there's nothing to believe. It's just nondescriptive stuff.

 

As to truth not being epistemological, consider this.

If knowledge is a true belief, and epistemology provides you

with knowledge, then that knowledge must be true by definition.

 

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-21, 09:38:01

Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading

[Bruno Marchal]

In the comp context of my work and this list. The common sense since
millennia is the reason of our existence.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jan 2013, at 23:14, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:

"...I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth,"

does that mean: complying with human logic (any)?

Not really. Arithmetical truth is independent of the humans. "17 would be prime even if the humans did not exist. This is made explicit by the comp context. if comp is false it might be different, and you are free to propose a non comp theory. But once you accept a digital brain prosthesis and survived, it is only a matter of time and work to understand that "17 is prime" is not a specifically human truth, but an universal one.

Just imagine a world (universe) without logically THINKING beings (humans?) with no math to formulate (numbers, to express): is there a "God" there? 

"God" is "universal truth (that we are searching, or not). With comp, I would say "yes", there is a God there, as with comp God is arithmetical truth, and arithmetical truth in true even "in a world without any math formula". Now if you say that there is no number in that world, then there will be no "God" in the sense of comp. But I am not sure I can make sense of the word "world" with or without numbers. Numbers are not the type of things belonging to world, at least not with further precision.

May be your question is not precise enough. Feel free to elaborate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:36, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

You said:

 

"God, matter, consciousness are never computable"

 

Is that because the above are nonphysical ? 

Matter is physical, by definition, yet non computable. This follows from the UD Argument.

If consciousness is not computable, can ideas be computable ?

Yes. Most of them are (the programs, the monads).

 

I'm totally lost. I don't even understand how ANYTHING other

than numbers can be computable. 

Strings of letter are not number, but the operation of concatenation is computable ( a + baba = ababa).

Look at your computer, you see mails, letters, etc. Not number, yet all what you do with your computer (like sending a mail) are computable operation.

 

Suppose you do a computation. You get a number or a bunch of numbers.

How can you say what they mean ? 

By remembering the definitions, the axioms I am assuming, etc. I don't see the problem. If you refer to the qualia, this is explain by the peculiarity of the logic of machines self-reference: when machine introspect they can understand things, without completely understanding the understanding process itself. It is normal, but it needs a bot of computer science and mathematical logic to get the complete picture.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:54, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I'm having trouble understanding you today.  You say:

 

"Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities,

some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines."

Wikipedia says: 

 

"Epistemology (ⁱ/ɨˌpɪstɨˈmɒlədʒi/ from Greek ἐπιστήμη - epistēmē, meaning

"knowledge, understanding", and λόγος - logos, meaning "study of") is the branch of

 philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge.^[1][2] It questions what

 knowledge is, how it is acquired, and the possible extent a given subject or entity can be known."

 

How can matter be epistemological ?

Because matter is only dreamed. It is an appearance. there is no stuff. Weal materialism is false (if comp is true, that is if we are machine).

It's just nondescriptive stuff.

That does not exist. That is a myth, even if it is a very old one. It is the result of billions years of simplification done by nature. Our brains has been programmed to surivive, not to contemplate the possible ultimate truth.

It cannot be knowledge, for knowledge can be defined as a true belief.

But there's nothing to believe. It's just nondescriptive stuff.

It is indeed not true belief, but it is still belief. "false belief" if you want. Illusion. Dream.

 

As to truth not being epistemological, consider this.

If knowledge is a true belief, and epistemology provides you

with knowledge, then that knowledge must be true by definition.

I agree with knowledge = true belief (cf Bp & p), but this makes truth primary with respect to knowledge. To have a knowledge you need two things: a belief, and a reality in which that belief is true. 'and of course you need a link to that reality, like "being present there").

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

[Craig Weinberg]

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Craig,

    This video lecture series https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjABUhyu6dw does a good job showing how a psychiatrist, Niall McLaren,  argues toward a dual aspect theory. I recomend his books: http://www.niallmclaren.com/bibliography

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Craig Weinberg]

Thanks Stephen, I'll check out the video!

 

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

I am still unsure what you mean by "quantum mind". If by quantum you mean the usual quantum mechanics, it should appear as the natural view of arithmetic (numberland, computerland) seen from inside. You can say that mind and matter exist as a view of the (totally atemporal and aspatial) number reality. It is time itself which "appears", in a non tempral sense, but a logical sense, from the elementary number relation. As amazing it might seem, comp makes really a theory like

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

or like

((K, x), y) = x

(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))

into authentical (and equivalent) "theories of everything" (mind, force and stuff). The rest are definition and theorems. Those theories are complete and even non completeable. If string theory is the correct physics, then it has to be derived from the relation above. And I can explain that we get more, as we will get the non communicable part of truth too (the qualia). Normally we will go through some steps of this on FOAR. On this list, I have explained many things, but the list is too voluminous to search. 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Just trying to clarify things.

 

1) OK, I partly understand if we allow words as output. 

But words are descriptions (3p, or Thirdness),

not experience (1p, or Firstness).

 

2) Let us admit for the moment that it is possible

for a computer to be conscious. What would it be

conscious of ?  The code it is running, which would be

like a stream of consciousness, ie an experience ?

 

 

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-22, 12:00:41

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

An interesting way putting it. But that matter is only dreamed

sounds like a stronger version of Berkeleyism. You say that

matter doesn't really exist at all, Berkeley would say

that it only exists if we perceive it.

 

Both of these positions can be saved IMHO if there is

some external, continuous, omnipresent observer.

Like the One.  I suspect that you already hold that view.

 

Leibniz would not make such a strong statement, however. He

would say that matter is not illusory at all, it is both

an idea (a perception, a dream), which to us appears as

a phenomenon, but to God appears as it really is.

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-22, 12:11:04

Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading

On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:54, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I'm having trouble understanding you today.  You say:

 

"Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities,

some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines."

Wikipedia says: 

 

"Epistemology (ⁱ/　　p　st　　m　l　d　i/ from Greek 　πιστ　μη - epistēmē, meaning

"knowledge, understanding", and λ　γο　 - logos, meaning "study of") is the branch of

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

It seems that you have avoided my question
by questioning what I mean by quantum mind.
So let me rephrase it.
Could arithmetics produce matter once and for all a long time ago?
Or must the illusion of matter be constantly reinforced by arithmetics?
Richard

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 6:54:48 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 

Hi Craig,

    This video lecture series https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjABUhyu6dw does a good job showing how a psychiatrist, Niall McLaren,  argues toward a dual aspect theory. I recomend his books: http://www.niallmclaren.com/bibliography

Nice. I watched the series and took some notes (and sent them off to him also).

I like that he clearly sees the limitations of the other approaches, but he does not yet see the problems with 'information' and the 'semantic realm'. He is modeling experience in space rather than through time.  I would dispute that and say that nothing emerges from neuronal function except more neuronal function. Personal meaning is instead recovered as an experiential recapitulation of higher and lower levels (super-personal and sub-personal) of experience since experience is primitive and personal. His view mistakes the difference between one level of impersonal phenomena (form, matter) and another impersonal level (function, logic) for the difference between personal [presentations (representations)] and impersonal [representations (presentations)]*

He overlooks the same issue all the way down the line:

2. Logic gates, he says, "coopt the mechanical function to acquit the semantic function of defining relationships". I suggest pivoting that assumption. It is we, the human end user or programmer who coopts both the a-signifying mechanical forms and a-signifying semiotic functions of the logic gate for our personal agendas. The logic gate has no semantic agenda, it is, like a marionette or cartoon character, a mindless machine with two mindless aspects - a spatially extended form and a temporally inferred function. There is no temporally intended motive, except the one which has been co-opted by the third and primary influence - participatory awareness .

We are exploiting the public physics of the logic gate's form to generate a more subtle level of public physics which we read as signs. In other words, we exploit the public facing forms and functions of the gate to exploit our own public facing forms and functions (optical patterns to tease the eye, acoustic patterns to call to the ear), allowing a sharing and communication of experience *in spite of* forms and functions, which are completely hidden from the conscious spectacle. In fact no 'information' is exchanged, except metaphorically. What is exchanged is concretely real and physical, although physics and realism of course, should only be thought of as a range of scaled or scoped experience based on time-like frequencies on space-like obstructions.

3. He focuses on the logic of the mind rather than the richness of qualia. I suggest instead that the mind tries to be logical only when focusing on public interactions. Private fantasy would be the more raw presentation of mind; dreams, visions, delusions, etc. Logic is born out of necessity, not innate to consciousness. Left to our own devices, a brain in a nutritionally rich vat would wallow in a paradise of illogical raptures forever.

4. He conflates grammatical structure for meaning, missing the point that communication is a skill learned expressly for public interaction, not for private understanding. The true meaning itself is not assembled internally from parts using logic and grammar, but rather 'insists' as a narrative gestalt. 'The boy is eating some cake' is only an experience of verbal syntax through which we recover a deeper perceptual understanding of the referent, based on our experiences with or about boys, eating, and cake. The order of words is no longer important within the private range of experience.

While it is important to model thought backwards through communication like he does for purposes of AI development, it is a mistake to apply the model the ontology that way. The horse is not an assembly of carts, so to speak. The cart without the horse is useless. The words and sentences are empty carts without the personal experience of semiosis, which is not included in physics or information theory. Experience is the key.

5. His assumptions about personality and mental disorder are the weakest parts in my opinion. They are normative and nakedly behaviorist, mistaking again public behaviors for private realities. What he sees as simply a collection of habits, I see as a vast interiority of identity and influence rooted in the sub-personal, super-personal and super-signifying bands of sensory-motive experience.

6. I disagree too that neurons "pass information mindlessly".  I would say that the same could be said of our own mass production systems. All mechanism is mindless, but that doesn't mean that sub-personal organisms like neurons are devoid of intention or participatory experience. It is that sub-personal experience which our experience is made of; not the motions of structures within cells, but the private content associated with the public bodies which we define as cells (through our human scaled perceptions).

The three pronged plug that he says we are looking for is sensory-motive participation (or 'sense'). The three prongs are (I) private experience, (II) public bodies, and (III) the potential for significance-entropy to be generated through the multiple levels of spacetime-body::timespace-experience interaction.

I was sure to mention that I do appreciate his work. I think that he is doing a great job, and I probably disagree with his views less than I do most.




*[fundamental or absolute reality(derived or empirical reality)]



1. He says that meaning "emerges from neuronal function".

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics. let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation. I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration. It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation, as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense. Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?
 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

Craig
 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jan 2013, at 11:42, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Just trying to clarify things.

 

1) OK, I partly understand if we allow words as output. 

... and inputs. OK.

But words are descriptions (3p, or Thirdness),

OK.

not experience (1p, or Firstness).

Yes. Experiences are not words.

 

2) Let us admit for the moment that it is possible

for a computer to be conscious. What would it be

conscious of ?  The code it is running, which would be

like a stream of consciousness, ie an experience ?

In fact, a computer is never conscious. 

Similarly, my brain is not conscious. No more than my liver.

It is the (immaterial) person which is conscious. The brain, or the computer, is only a local tool to make that conscious person able to manifest itself relatively to its most probable computational histories.

The person is defined mainly by its first person experience, which is not something that we can identify with anything third person describable. But we can define it, at least in a first approximation, by the knower (notably the one who know the content of its memories). 

It has been shown, by Montague and Kaplan precisely, that like "truth", knowledge by a machine cannot be defined in the language of the machine. But as scientists, by studying much simpler machine than ourselves, we can use a local and little "theory of truth" (like Traski's one) to (meta) define the knowledge of the machine (notably by linking the machine's belief (which are definable and representable in 3p) and truth. This works well, and explains already why the introspecting machine cannot know who she is. The identity card, or even the complete description of her body, will not do the trick (that leads only to a 3p copy, not her). That explains also that the knowing machine can only *bet* on a substitution level, without ever being sure it is correct, making comp asking for an act of faith (similar to some faith in some possible reincarnation).

It is counter-intuitive, and it does leads to the reversal: eventually the brain and bodies are construct of the mind, even if they are also related to deep and complex 3p number relations. Consciousness is not due to the running of a computer. It only appears locally to be like that. In the global big picture, it is the running of a computer which appear as an event "in consciousness".

I hope this can help a bit. It is hard to explain something counter-intuitive in intuitive terms, and that is why I use the deductive method, starting from the hypothesis that there is a level where we are 3p duplicable.

Bruno

 

 

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-22, 12:00:41

Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland

On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:36, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

You said:

 

"God, matter, consciousness are never computable"

 

Is that because the above are nonphysical ? 

Matter is physical, by definition, yet non computable. This follows from the UD Argument.

If consciousness is not computable, can ideas be computable ?

Yes. Most of them are (the programs, the monads).

 

I'm totally lost. I don't even understand how ANYTHING other

than numbers can be computable. 

Strings of letter are not number, but the operation of concatenation is computable ( a + baba = ababa).

Look at your computer, you see mails, letters, etc. Not number, yet all what you do with your computer (like sending a mail) are computable operation.

 

Suppose you do a computation. You get a number or a bunch of numbers.

How can you say what they mean ? 

By remembering the definitions, the axioms I am assuming, etc. I don't see the problem. If you refer to the qualia, this is explain by the peculiarity of the logic of machines self-reference: when machine introspect they can understand things, without completely understanding the understanding process itself. It is normal, but it needs a bot of computer science and mathematical logic to get the complete picture.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jan 2013, at 12:01, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

An interesting way putting it. But that matter is only dreamed

sounds like a stronger version of Berkeleyism. You say that

matter doesn't really exist at all, Berkeley would say

that it only exists if we perceive it.

 

Both of these positions can be saved IMHO if there is

some external, continuous, omnipresent observer.

Like the One.  I suspect that you already hold that view.

It is an open problem. Is the One a person? I don't know. It surely becomes a person when linked to belief, as this gives the "inner God" (the universal soul, the knower).

I do have some evidence that either the ONE is a person, but I have also evidence that such a ONE might not be the real ONE, but still more particular instantiations.

All this is quite complex.  

 

Leibniz would not make such a strong statement, however. He

would say that matter is not illusory at all, it is both

an idea (a perception, a dream), which to us appears as

a phenomenon, but to God appears as it really is.

I am not sure I can translate that in the machine's language today. Too much complex. It is for the future generations. Keep in mind that the ideally correct machines remains mute all around the notion of God. To progress we will have to perturb her a little bit, and make her less correct, but then there is the risk of making her soul fall, and she has all the cognitive ability to develop her own wishful thinking. 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

It seems you avoid my question of what you mean by "quantum mind".
Don't quantum mind too much :)

> So let me rephrase it.
> Could arithmetics produce matter once and for all a long time ago?

The question does not make a clear sense. Arithmetical truth is out of
time and space. Arithmetics is responsible for our own (atemporal
existence), and we create time in it. (making time is the favorite
pastime of the universal numbers).

So in a larger sense I could have answer "yes", in some metaphorical
way. Arithmetic contains all the computations, but only the numbers/
machines are making sense of it, by virtue of their relations with the
others numbers.

> Or must the illusion of matter be constantly reinforced by
> arithmetics?

Not by arithmetic, which is out of time. But matter can be considered
as being reinforced by the "winning" stable and sharable machines'
histories/dreams.

Normally if you get the UDA1-7, you could already figure out how this
"happens". Arithmetical truth is a sort of block-brains-in-a-vat. For
each possible brain states, there is an infinity, in arithmetic, of
universal machine/number' computations going through that state.
Whatever you predict that "you will live" is given by a "probability-
calculus" on all those histories, making physics a relative
probability calculus on the computations, but only a "seen" by the
(locally self-referentially correct) numbers.

Church thesis makes "all computations" something well defined, and the
incompleteness phenomenon makes those computations terribly redundant,
and this introduces the deepness and the bottom linearity making
consciousness differentiating on long and rich 'normal' (gaussian,
boolean) histories.

This predicts/explains that once we look below our substitution level,
the physical reality get blurred, as we have to see, somehow, the
trace of the infinity of universal numbers competing to build you a
consistent extensions.

Seen is defined in arithmetic by []p & <>t, and variants. You see a
city, if there is a city in all relative consistent extensions ([]p),
and there is such a consistent extension (<>t). This provides an
arithmetical quantization, and I conjecture we can program a quantum
computer in it. If we can't, then the concrete existence of a quantum
computer would refute comp + the arithmetical interpretation of the
classical theory of knowledge).

Arithmetic "produces" mind and matter/time, atemporally.

The existence of times and matters in the stable deep dreams of the
universal machines, is a theorem of arithmetic, or of some consistent
extension of arithmetic (made by creature living in arithmetic).
Arithmetic from inside is vastly bigger than arithmetic "seen" from
inside. It is a Löwenheim-Skolem-like phenomenon. Well, that happens
also in "Alice in Wonderland" and in "yellow Submarine" and other
fantasies, reminding us that reality is beyond fiction.

The universes/dreams, taxes, death and beyond included, is but an
attempt by the numbers to understand the numbers.
(Assuming computationalism)

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Jan 23, 2013 at 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Arithmetical truth is a sort of block-brains-in-a-vat

This is what I mean by the term "Quantum Mind"
I think of the Quantum Mind as a Block Metaverse
containing all possible universes which is timeless
since everything in the MWI Metaverse is known
to first order like the trajectories of the galacies,
stars and planets. and probably all cosmic events like supernovae.
As you say, I think, it is first person uncertainty that forces
what I call the Quantum Mind to recalculate the future
and therefore time is introduced.
Richard

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the features

of the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.

 

Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happen

as ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

That Is why IMHO Peirce's categories seem necessary to this project.

 

I. For what we experience comes from Firstness, raw experience.

The computer cannot duplicate that, for that state is subjective, which

means a living, symbol-free experience. It has no symbolic form yet.

 

II. The symbolic form comes from Secondness, the PERSONAL recognition

from memory which Peirce calls a "bump"  of an object (if there is one) that  was

found in  Firstness (such as an apple). Now there is the seer and the

seen, making two or Secondness. The person recognizes an apple

but has not yet placed a name on it. I suppose this state would be

a comparative image of an apple drawn from memory.

 

III. Thirdness then occurs when a name (the third item) is applied to

the Secondness state above.

 

------------------------------------------------------------

If the computer were to duplicate the above, it would need

 

I -- a camera viewing an apple

II - image recognition software tuned to a given personality and his memory.

III - output the word apple

 

I suppose 1p would ( I+ II) and 3p would be (III).

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-23, 11:53:28

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.

The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Bruno

Craig
 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.

The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.

Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.
 

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent. Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'. There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...
 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?
 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance. I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with. You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.
 

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense. That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do. If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

OK. You might still look a little bit like assuming some physical
reality, which cannot be done if we want extract a theory of both
quanta and qualia.
It can be done in the meta-theory, but not in the theory itself.

The terming "quantum mind" has (bad, imo) connotations related to the
misuse (I think) of QM in cognition, like assuming consciousness
reduces the wave packet.
Although there is arguably a first person indeterminacy in QM (without
collapse), it should be recovered from the arithmetical (or comp)
first person indeterminacy (if my UDA point is without flaw).

Bruno




> Richard

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[Richard Ruquist]

On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 12:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 23 Jan 2013, at 23:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jan 23, 2013 at 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>> Arithmetical truth is a sort of block-brains-in-a-vat
>>
>>
>> This is what I mean by the term "Quantum Mind"
>> I think of the Quantum Mind as a Block Metaverse
>> containing all possible universes which is timeless
>> since everything in the MWI Metaverse is known
>> to first order like the trajectories of the galacies,
>> stars and planets. and probably all cosmic events like supernovae.
>> As you say, I think, it is first person uncertainty that forces
>> what I call the Quantum Mind to recalculate the future
>> and therefore time is introduced.
>
>
>
> OK. You might still look a little bit like assuming some physical reality,
> which cannot be done if we want extract a theory of both quanta and qualia.
> It can be done in the meta-theory, but not in the theory itself.
>
> The terming "quantum mind" has (bad, imo) connotations related to the misuse
> (I think) of QM in cognition, like assuming consciousness reduces the wave
> packet.
> Although there is arguably a first person indeterminacy in QM (without
> collapse), it should be recovered from the arithmetical (or comp) first
> person indeterminacy (if my UDA point is without flaw).
>
> Bruno

Well now that gets us back to my original question,
is it possible that arithmetics created matter
in the beginning, whatever that means,
and that matter evolved according
to arithmetic predictions since then
(so to speak as time may not exist)?

[Craig Weinberg]

Couldn't we substitute anything for matter? How is it falsifiable?
 

[Richard Ruquist]

Of course, but we know that matter exists. Perhaps force and energy or
even consciousness should be included along with the original creation
of matter.

I do not think it is falsifiable, that arithmetics created matter.
But Bruno seems to think that it is.

>>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >> Richard
>> >>
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[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Roger,

On 24 Jan 2013, at 09:33, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the features

of the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.

We might try comparison. The comp God is "simple" conceptually, and you can represent it by a complex set of numbers, the Gödel numbers of the true arithmetical propositions. The machine cannot find nor define that set of numbers, and we can define God knows x by the Godel number of x belongs to that set.

Is that God omniscient? Well not really. The Noùs "knows" much more, but is still not omniscient. 

Omnipresent? Do you think that we can really say that 17 is prime in both Washington and Moscow, and in Sidney and Beijing. I am OK. It is a bit trivial as "17 is prime" does not depend on locations in space-time. Likewize it does not make sense of making God omnipresent, because that would presuppose God can belong to the creation, but this might not really made sense with the comp hypothesis. The very locations emanate (somehow) from God. God is what makes the notion of locations making sense in the dreams of the universal numbers. Truth filters out.

I might recommend you the book by Brian Hines "Return to the One", which exposes Plotinus Theory, in a "modern readable way". But you might read Plotinus. 

There are common point with some version of christianism, but there are also differences. The christians, with many exception in the mystics, have adopted the Aristotelian idea that the physical reality is primary real, even if it is a creation of God. With comp and Plato, the physical reality is only the border of God's mind, to be short.

It is, and has to be counter-intuitive, and I might talk where G* said I could not, except by insisting that what I say require the non justifiable belief in the "comp reincarnation technic".

 

Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happen

as ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world.

With comp there is only an ideal world. (assuming here that arithmetic is ideal).

The material world is exactly the appearance, in the mind of the universal numbers, of the border of the universal mind,  somehow (by the limiting first person indeterminacy). Physics is a view from inside, sharable among a variety of universal numbers.

Comp is closer to the mystic insight, and to he poet, and to systems like Taoism, about half of Indian and Chinese buddhism, the Cabala, the Sufi, and the rational mystics (From Pythagorus to Damascus, going through Plato and Plotinus). Thanks to St Augustin, and others like Maimonides, Al Ghazali, Plato and Plotinus are well represented, or at least well known, albeit a bit hidden, in most Abramanic theological treatise, but they have failed by taking for granted the Aristotelian pictures (even if less that the (strong) Atheists).

I really don't know, but find worth to listen to the machines, as modern mathematical tool permit us to do, and compare with observations.

I am open minded as I am ignorant in the matter. But I try to escape all wishful thinking. 

And then it is ironical that the main formula(*) from which all hypostases are derived, is a sort of wishful thinking  in arithmetic, but again, if wishful thinking appears to be the law, I can't reject it, as that would be wishful thinking!

Bruno

(*) Löb formula: If you succeed in convincing a (correct Löbian) machine that if she believes the medication will work, then it will work, then the machine will believe that the medication will work. And, as the machine is correct, the medication will work. (More on this in the second part of sane04).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I am a retired scientist as well as a Christian, so I like to at least

treat the world out there "as if" it's entirely real.

 

It's not only a Christian view that the world out there is real.

Science has that view, which is, to reuse the word, "realistic."

Leibniz views the world out there as contingent, which

is perfectly realistic, But Gnosticism and Neoplatonism

look at the world in some other, Eastern way, as sort

of a maya I suppose (not sure).  Christianity treats the

world out there as crap, but real, scientific, crap.

 

Like the eastern religions, Neoplatonism says that we

shall all return to the One.  Our identities wuill be

lost. Christianity says that our identities will be maintained,

which, although we can't be sure, can be the more hopeful

of the two views. NDE seem to support this  view.

 

As far as math goes, there should be no difference,

but I would still like to use the word One, as

"God" carries too much baggage.

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-24, 15:06:10

Subject: Re: Berkeley, Plato and Leibniz on existence

Hi Roger,

On 24 Jan 2013, at 09:33, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the features

of the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.

We might try comparison. The comp God is "simple" conceptually, and you can represent it by a complex set of numbers, the G　del numbers of the true arithmetical propositions. The machine cannot find nor define that set of numbers, and we can define God knows x by the Godel number of x belongs to that set.

Is that God omniscient? Well not really. The Noùs "knows" much more, but is still not omniscient. 

Omnipresent? Do you think that we can really say that 17 is prime in both Washington and Moscow, and in Sidney and Beijing. I am OK. It is a bit trivial as "17 is prime" does not depend on locations in space-time. Likewize it does not make sense of making God omnipresent, because that would presuppose God can belong to the creation, but this might not really made sense with the comp hypothesis. The very locations emanate (somehow) from God. God is what makes the notion of locations making sense in the dreams of the universal numbers. Truth filters out.

I might recommend you the book by Brian Hines "Return to the One", which exposes Plotinus Theory, in a "modern readable way". But you might read Plotinus. 

There are common point with some version of christianism, but there are also differences. The christians, with many exception in the mystics, have adopted the Aristotelian idea that the physical reality is primary real, even if it is a creation of God. With comp and Plato, the physical reality is only the border of God's mind, to be short.

It is, and has to be counter-intuitive, and I might talk where G* said I could not, except by insisting that what I say require the non justifiable belief in the "comp reincarnation technic".

 

Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happen

as ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world.

With comp there is only an ideal world. (assuming here that arithmetic is ideal).

The material world is exactly the appearance, in the mind of the universal numbers, of the border of the universal mind,  somehow (by the limiting first person indeterminacy). Physics is a view from inside, sharable among a variety of universal numbers.

Comp is closer to the mystic insight, and to he poet, and to systems like Taoism, about half of Indian and Chinese buddhism, the Cabala, the Sufi, and the rational mystics (From Pythagorus to Damascus, going through Plato and Plotinus). Thanks to St Augustin, and others like Maimonides, Al Ghazali, Plato and Plotinus are well represented, or at least well known, albeit a bit hidden, in most Abramanic theological treatise, but they have failed by taking for granted the Aristotelian pictures (even if less that the (strong) Atheists).

I really don't know, but find worth to listen to the machines, as modern mathematical tool permit us to do, and compare with observations.

I am open minded as I am ignorant in the matter. But I try to escape all wishful thinking. 

And then it is ironical that the main formula(*) from which all hypostases are derived, is a sort of wishful thinking  in arithmetic, but again, if wishful thinking appears to be the law, I can't reject it, as that would be wishful thinking!

Bruno

(*) L　b formula: If you succeed in convincing a (correct L　bian) machine that if she believes the medication will work, then it will work, then the machine will believe that the medication will work. And, as the machine is correct, the medication will work. (More on this in the second part of sane04).

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Jan 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.

The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.

Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?

They are the internal view of person when supported by infinities of computations, which exists arithmetically. They are not made of something, they are computer semantical fixed points, to be short.

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

 

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.

The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.

There is. Do anything to survive.

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...

Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside. 

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).

Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.

No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

 

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

Bruno

Craig

Bruno

Craig
 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, January 25, 2013 3:45:35 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jan 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.

The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.

Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?

They are the internal view of person when supported by infinities of computations, which exists arithmetically. They are not made of something, they are computer semantical fixed points, to be short.

Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling. B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism. It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

 

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.

The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.

Mathematically interesting actually.
 

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.

There is. Do anything to survive.

But that can be generated in many ways other than pain, or no way at all. Simply script it. 'Do anything to digest'. 'Do anything to grow'.
 

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis. You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior. A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.
 

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic. It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.
 

There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...

Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside. 

Chaos and states that seem 'critical' are your emotional projections. There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives. To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures. The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.

 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower. In theory, Bugs Bunny is a knower carrots. It's complete fiction, true only to the extent that we project our own concretely real human experience onto an animated visual story.
 

I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).

Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.

If you assume comp then you don't need qualia.
 

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.

No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.

Even if you define it in 3p, it still assumes that there is something to define.
 

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?

 

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own. They will make the same mistake over and over again forever. Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines. They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.

I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically. They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.
 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.
 

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?

Craig
 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Jan 2013, at 01:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, January 25, 2013 3:45:35 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jan 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter. 

We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.

My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.

Bruno, 

Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?

Richard

Quantum Deism. Cool.

It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?

You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.

Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.

The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.

Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?

They are the internal view of person when supported by infinities of computations, which exists arithmetically. They are not made of something, they are computer semantical fixed points, to be short.

Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?

That's what the theory explains. It leads a machine asserting she has a subjective experience, and she has a subjective experience. We assume comp of course, we don't derive this, but the math gives a knower, a believer, a senser, and even the material objects, so we can test it.

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.

Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.

B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.

You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p". 

It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

It is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.

 

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.

The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.

Mathematically interesting actually.
 

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.

There is. Do anything to survive.

But that can be generated in many ways other than pain, or no way at all. Simply script it. 'Do anything to digest'. 'Do anything to grow'.

Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.

 

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.

People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.

Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.

You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.

There is because a feeling can integrate many information, and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.

A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.

Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).

 

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.

It is not. you have to dig deeper on this. 

It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.

But any 3p description seems like that. But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine, they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all. 

 

There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...

Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside. 

Chaos and states that seem 'critical' are your emotional projections.

Not it is pure math. It is well defined and verifiable. I use critical in the sense of statistics and renormalization theory; not the subjective interpretation.

There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.

The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature, nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.

To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.

Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.

Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.

The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.

Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.

 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.

Bp is not a metaphor. p neither. 

In theory, Bugs Bunny is a knower carrots. It's complete fiction, true only to the extent that we project our own concretely real human experience onto an animated visual story.

Bugs Bunny is your image. You demolish your own idea in believing that they are incompatible with comp.

The difference between us is in the methodogy. I derive from comp and definition, without ever trying to know the truth. It is the best to perhaps one day refute comp. But you start from your (rather good) intution of the 1p pov, but makes it intop non sense, by inferring non comp from it. it is sad, as it makes quite difficult to figure out the message. It can only look like fake religious prejudice as we don't know the truth.

 

I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).

Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.

If you assume comp then you don't need qualia.

This is like, if you assume rockets you don't need the moon.

 

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.

No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.

Even if you define it in 3p, it still assumes that there is something to define.
 

Bp (the 3-self) can be define in 3p. But Bp & p has no definition at all in 3p. "Bp & p" is not a definition in 3p, but thus need longer explanation to be understood. 

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?

It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD". 

 

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.

You can't know that. 

They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.

Like you?

Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.

You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.

They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.

Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.

I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.

Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.

They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.

Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute. 

 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.

AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.

But it is not in our short term interest. 

 

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?

? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).

Bruno

Craig
 

Bruno

Craig

Bruno

Craig
 

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

You say "That's what the theory explains." but then you say  "We assume comp of course, we don't derive this."

To me, this just means 'assuming that subjective experience exists already, subjective experience can defined mathematically'. To which I say that it can be defined economically or linguistically too. So what? Subjectivity itself is not explained, so the hard problem is left untouched.

 

I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.

The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.

I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.

Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.

Those qualities are just pulled out of thin air though. The math doesn't need any such qualities to compute any function.
 

B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.

You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p". 

I'm not. The fact that a machine believes a proposition does not have to be a personal experience at all. It can be a set of objects. There is a good interview on synesthesia in which a guy is suddenly able to play music by seeing the notes as black and white squares moving in a ticker tape formation so that he plays music just by following the squares with his fingers. Any kind of Doxastic formula could be accessed or executed as objects or sounds or graphics, etc. Why would there be a such thing as a subjective experience when a processing schema based on location would work more efficiently? Even if subjectivity were mathematically useful or inevitable in some way, where does it suddenly come from? How does it attach to math?

It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

It is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.

It's a fallacy because all is not gold that glitters. You are pointing to a glass of clear liquid that hypothetically drips out of a math problem and saying that it is up to me to prove that liquid isn't water from a stream in the Swiss Alps. Why would it be? I can't summon a person back from the dead just by imitating their voice (patterns made by vocal chords), so why would imitating the patterns in their brain be any different?

 

 

The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.

*that* should be illegal.

I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.

The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.

Mathematically interesting actually.
 

My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.

There is. Do anything to survive.

But that can be generated in many ways other than pain, or no way at all. Simply script it. 'Do anything to digest'. 'Do anything to grow'.

Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.

Survive is only common to biological organisms. Silicon doesn't have to do anything to 'survive'. Crystals grow, cells or molecules could be said to digest other molecules.  Regardless, any of them could be and would be scripted functions if comp were true.

 

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.

People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.

Of course, because comp isn't true. If comp were true, then as long as you had physiological function intact, you would not need to feel pain to act in the ways that we associate with pain. The feeling is completely superfluous - it serves no possible function and has no possible origin if comp were true.
 

Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.

Only retrospectively. Pain doesn't need to exist for survival to exist and would have never evolved if comp were true.
 

You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.

There is because a feeling can integrate many information,

So can an object, or an image, or whatever magical pseudo-substance that 'information' is supposed to be made of in the first place. Arithmetic truth integrates information better than feeling.
 

and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.

Retrospective. You are justifying the gear shift with the steering wheel and denying the car.
 

A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.

Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).

Different modalities of what?
 

 

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.

It is not. you have to dig deeper on this. 

There is nothing deeper to dig into. Pain is no more of a logical experience to arise spontaneously in the universe to be associated with damage or threat than the color pink, or the shape of a dog, or a 15 dimensional density of points. There is no support for 'pain' as a 'quality' in comp.

It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.

But any 3p description seems like that.

Because every 3p description *is* like that!
 

But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,

can you prove that machines have a 1p or a feeling?
 

they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all. 

Because comp isn't true. It fails to recognize the Pathetic fallacy.
 

 

There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...

Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside. 

Chaos and states that seem 'critical' are your emotional projections.

Not it is pure math. It is well defined and verifiable. I use critical in the sense of statistics and renormalization theory; not the subjective interpretation.

That's what I'm saying. There is no subjective difference in the quality of a statistical mean or a statistical extreme. They are simply identifiable configurations. They have no 1p qualities.
 

There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.

The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,

We are something that is non-computable in nature. What else do you need? Since 1p sustains privacy by objectifying 3p, it is a grave mistake to look at your 1p understanding of your 3p representation and try to reverse engineer your own 1p capacities by the completely outside-in features of our 3p facades.
 

nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.

If comp implies non-comp, then why claim comp? Why not a comp-non-comp monism?
 

To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.

Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.

I understand, but biological organisms do not display slave behavior. They act in their own interests from birth.
 

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.

Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.

I think that arithmetic is dependent upon rigid body ontology, so it can't be universal. You can't derive an arithmetic from clouds or haze or odors without reducing them to a rigid body level of micro-description. Arithmetic only happens when the idea of discretely bounded presences and memory which can be relied on.

The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.

Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.

What makes arithmetic larger than numerical logic?
 

 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.

Bp is not a metaphor. p neither. 

Because you don't realize that they are. It's part of the Pathetic fallacy.
 

In theory, Bugs Bunny is a knower carrots. It's complete fiction, true only to the extent that we project our own concretely real human experience onto an animated visual story.

Bugs Bunny is your image. You demolish your own idea in believing that they are incompatible with comp.

The difference between us is in the methodogy. I derive from comp and definition, without ever trying to know the truth. It is the best to perhaps one day refute comp. But you start from your (rather good) intution of the 1p pov, but makes it intop non sense, by inferring non comp from it. it is sad, as it makes quite difficult to figure out the message. It can only look like fake religious prejudice as we don't know the truth.

That we can think we know anything is the only truth necessary to prove sense.
 

 

I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).

Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.

If you assume comp then you don't need qualia.

This is like, if you assume rockets you don't need the moon.

No, I'm saying that if you assume comp then every moon is already part of the rocket.
 

 

Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?

We don't add it. 

The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.

The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.

No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.

Even if you define it in 3p, it still assumes that there is something to define.
 

Bp (the 3-self) can be define in 3p. But Bp & p has no definition at all in 3p. "Bp & p" is not a definition in 3p, but thus need longer explanation to be understood. 

I don't understand enough about Bp & p, but it sounds like you are saying that the idea of a proposition being true has no definition in 3p. I'm not sure how that relates to the inference of 1p selfhood as Bp. I am saying that Bp borrows phenomenology from private physics and uses it to represent a tiny aspect of that privacy as a logical entity that isn't actually real.
 

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?

It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD". 

Sure, and if I make a rubber stamp with the words of a rubber stamp on it, I can stamp out "Rubber Stamp" on paper as much as I want, but those words are not a picture of a rubber stamp, they are not the sound of the stamping or the smell of the ink, they are not really related to the sensory-motor reality of the stamp. The words are indeed consistent with each other, and we would agree that Rubber Stamp is the same phrase on on the paper as it is on the stamp, and that in English we do use the phrase Rubber Stamp to refer to this ensemble of sensory-motor experiences, but the words don't really recapitulate the physics of the stamp at all. They stamp a picture of letters. That is Dx = "xx"

 

 

let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.

My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.

By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.

You can't know that. 

I don't need to know it, it is evidently the case.
 

They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.

Like you?

No, machines all make the same mistake over and over. I make a unique set of mistakes that changes.
 

Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.

You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.

I have studied the relation between 1p and 3p though, so I know that 1p is synonymous with self-originating motives. A person can act like a machine, or be treated like a slave, but a person can never truly and permanently be a machine or a slave. The ontologies are mutually exclusive. A person is conscious to the extent that they cannot be directed solely by external influences. A machine is that which is directed solely by external motivations.

They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.

Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.

Where do I confuse soul and body?
 

I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.

Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.

Why isn't arithmetic logic?
 

They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.

Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute. 

Then let's hear a machine refute it.
 

 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.

AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.

But it is not in our short term interest. 

How do you know they aren't tricking you already then?
 

 

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?

? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).

That's what I'm saying. Any slavery is inherently cruel. If you actually thought that machines had 1p experiences, how could you justify using their labor against their will?

Craig
 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2013, at 14:49, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I am a retired scientist as well as a Christian, so I like to at least

treat the world out there "as if" it's entirely real.

I guess it is entirely real, but not fundamental or primary. That physical reality emerges from number relations and beliefs. It is real, but it is not the origin of things, only a feature.

 

It's not only a Christian view that the world out there is real.

Science has that view, which is, to reuse the word, "realistic."

This is physical realism (not to confuse with other realism like arithmetical realism). It is not science, unless you assume this explicitly in some metaphysical (scientific) theory.

Leibniz views the world out there as contingent, which

is perfectly realistic, But Gnosticism and Neoplatonism

look at the world in some other, Eastern way, as sort

of a maya I suppose (not sure). 

It is basically correct.

Christianity treats the

world out there as crap, but real, scientific, crap.

Me too. Don't confuse "real" and "primary real".

Comp makes the physical reality even more real, as it becomes necessary contingencies (in arithmetic), and physics becomes what is true for allmost all universal nulbers (all, except infinite but sparse exceptions).

 

Like the eastern religions, Neoplatonism says that we

shall all return to the One.  Our identities wuill be

lost.

Open problem in comp statistics (to be sure). 

Christianity says that our identities will be maintained,

which, although we can't be sure, can be the more hopeful

of the two views. NDE seem to support this  view.

 

As far as math goes, there should be no difference,

but I would still like to use the word One, as

"God" carries too much baggage.

OK. Let us use "ONE". The problem is that I use the ONE for the neoplatonist conception of God, and usually I use "god" for any human conception of it, or the greatest common part of it (God = by definition what should explain everything: it is the object of a theory of everything; that is a theory which explain both the absence or presence of bosons and gods).

Bruno

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jan 2013, at 22:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, January 27, 2013 12:21:46 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Jan 2013, at 01:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:

snip

Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?

That's what the theory explains. It leads a machine asserting she has a subjective experience, and she has a subjective experience. We assume comp of course, we don't derive this, but the math gives a knower, a believer, a senser, and even the material objects, so we can test it.

You say "That's what the theory explains." but then you say  "We assume comp of course, we don't derive this."

To me, this just means 'assuming that subjective experience exists already, ...

(and can be manifested by numbers, relatively to universal numbers (or programs relatively to computers or computations))

... subjective experience can defined mathematically'.

OK.

To which I say that it can be defined economically or linguistically too. So what?

So we can use mathematical technics to get mathematical consequences, notably on physics, so that we can test our assumptions, and the relevance of our definitions.

Subjectivity itself is not explained, so the hard problem is left untouched.

It is reduced into our sensory intuition of the existence of 0, 1, 2, ...

And this is explained as being unexplainable, by machines, in a way that machines can already understand, know, belief, intuit, observe, etc.

So the hard problem is reduce to the least and most primitive unexplainable things, together with the reason why it has to be explainable.

I don't want to brag on this, but it seems to me that this is the best we could hope about the hard problem, from a 3p communicable assumption.

It makes your "theory" phenomenologically reducible to the already explained machine's soul (or machine's first person).

 

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.

Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.

Those qualities are just pulled out of thin air though.

Not at all. Aristotle discovered the modal qualities in philosophy, and computer scientist are "forced" to use the modalities mathematically derived from the incompleteness theorem. 

I guess you don't see that Bp and Bp & Dp are definable in arithmetic, and are subject to your argument. But that is no more the case for Bp & p, nor Bp & Dt & p. The "& p" makes a link that the machine cannot justify, but we, looking at a machine, can bet or hope, or believe (in case the machine is simple enough, like PA) in the existence of the connection. This leads to non trivial math for good candidates (definition) of the qualia.

The math doesn't need any such qualities to compute any function.

This can be debated, and *you* should see this as it follows from your theory, where number are considered at the start as sensory object.

Then, math tries to no abuse of that sensory origin, and this can be done indeed in a proper way for the so called first order logical theories. But then such math leads to reintroduce them to be able to interpret the behavior of machine whose complexity go over Turing completeness.

 

B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.

You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p". 

I'm not. The fact that a machine believes a proposition does not have to be a personal experience at all.

Why? The memory belongs to this or that machine. Even without qualia, something can be personal. Comp forces a distinction between a 3-self and a 1-self (indeed Bp and Bp & p).

It can be a set of objects. There is a good interview on synesthesia in which a guy is suddenly able to play music by seeing the notes as black and white squares moving in a ticker tape formation so that he plays music just by following the squares with his fingers. Any kind of Doxastic formula could be accessed or executed as objects or sounds or graphics, etc.

That's how brain work, but you miss that the knowledge is not in the brain, but in the relation between the brain and a truth/reality (in fine: an arithmetical one, but this not needed here).

Why would there be a such thing as a subjective experience when a processing schema based on location would work more efficiently?

It will not. The "belief in a reality" (consciousness) will help the machine to focus attention, which is the motor of consciousness filtering. It speed-up the machines relatively to its possible computations, and it adds an infinity of degree of freedom (the transfinite extensions of universality). 

Even if subjectivity were mathematically useful or inevitable in some way, where does it suddenly come from? How does it attach to math?

Through our mysterious belief in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...

It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

It is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.

It's a fallacy because all is not gold that glitters.

Lol

You are pointing to a glass of clear liquid that hypothetically drips out of a math problem and saying that it is up to me to prove that liquid isn't water from a stream in the Swiss Alps. Why would it be? I can't summon a person back from the dead just by imitating their voice (patterns made by vocal chords), so why would imitating the patterns in their brain be any different?

It is my assumption. I find it plausible because everything we look in biology is, although quite complex, described by computable functional relation. In fact we don't know in nature anything which would be not Turing emulable, except the "collapse" of the wave packet, but it is very plausibly be Turing recoverable (by first person indeterminacy).

By starting from the sensory, you elude the problem in the same way that materialist elude the problem of matter when making it primary (which they usually do not in practice in their field, but do during the week-end and at the pause-café.

Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.

Survive is only common to biological organisms. Silicon doesn't have to do anything to 'survive'. Crystals grow, cells or molecules could be said to digest other molecules.  Regardless, any of them could be and would be scripted functions if comp were true.

That's the local clothes. Too much here, too much now. That type of argument are not valid.

 

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.

People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.

Of course, because comp isn't true. If comp were true, then as long as you had physiological function intact, you would not need to feel pain to act in the ways that we associate with pain. The feeling is completely superfluous - it serves no possible function and has no possible origin if comp were true.

This is not necessarily correct or beg the question. See above. 

Not only is the machine observing itself developing a term for "feeling", but if the machine is simple enough, *we* can know that such a "feeling" is related to something that the machine can know as true although incapable of justifying its role from any 3p description of her.

This is made possible by the adjunction of the connection with the truth, which we cannot define in the language of the machine, but that we can understand from outside.

 

Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.

Only retrospectively. Pain doesn't need to exist for survival to exist and would have never evolved if comp were true.

See above. It is a key point. It does not prove comp, but it makes the machine already able to refute your type of argumentation. 

 

You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.

There is because a feeling can integrate many information,

So can an object, or an image, or whatever magical pseudo-substance that 'information' is supposed to be made of in the first place. Arithmetic truth integrates information better than feeling.

Arithmetic truth integrates informations but also selfs and their 3p and 1p, even if non constructively, in arithmetic.

You talk like a 19th mathematician, with a reductionist conception or arithmetic, which is no more sustainable after Gödel (with or without comp). It makes comp very plausible though.

 

and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.

Retrospective. You are justifying the gear shift with the steering wheel and denying the car.

You do that. You see the numbers, and the relations and abstract from the person and the probable truth they represent.

 

A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.

Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).

Different modalities of what?

Of self-reference, in arithmetic. I was alluding to the 8 "arithmetical" hypostases.

 

 

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.

It is not. you have to dig deeper on this. 

There is nothing deeper to dig into. Pain is no more of a logical experience to arise spontaneously in the universe to be associated with damage or threat than the color pink, or the shape of a dog, or a 15 dimensional density of points. There is no support for 'pain' as a 'quality' in comp.

See above.

It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.

But any 3p description seems like that.

Because every 3p description *is* like that!
 

But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,

can you prove that machines have a 1p or a feeling?

I can explain why they will behave exactly like if they did, and once I say "yes to the doctor", I don't see why I should consider her like a zombie, and I find instructive to listen to it.

Can you prove that *I* have a 1p or a feeling?

This is part of what a Löbian machine can already explain:  why she can't prove that she has a 1p. But she can bet on comp and then recognize that as long as she is consistent she does have a theory of its own knowledge, but is incapable of proving it, without betting that she is a machine at some level.

 

they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all. 

Because comp isn't true. It fails to recognize the Pathetic fallacy.

At least it does not fall in the Antipathetic fallacy :)

There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.

The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,

We are something that is non-computable in nature. What else do you need?

Comp explains why our 1- we are non-computable in nature. So what?

Since 1p sustains privacy by objectifying 3p,

No. You need the relation with truth, which is not objectifyable at all in a way which concerns you. It is objectifyable from comp, for simple machine. Not you.

it is a grave mistake to look at your 1p understanding of your 3p representation and try to reverse engineer your own 1p capacities by the completely outside-in features of our 3p facades.

That's what the 1p-indeterminacy illustrates, and that's what the "& p" modalities axiomatizes at the metalevel. S4Grz1 is really a logic about something that a machine cannot formalize.

 

nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.

If comp implies non-comp, then why claim comp? Why not a comp-non-comp monism?

Comp (I am computable and thus universal) implies, to be short, that non-I is not computable.

 

To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.

Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.

I understand, but biological organisms do not display slave behavior. They act in their own interests from birth.

Not the ants. Nor even our own cells, which sacrify their immortality for a higher being. 

 

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.

Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.

I think that arithmetic is dependent upon rigid body ontology, so it can't be universal.

You talk nonsense here. Arithmetic has been proved universal, and it has nothing to do with rigid bodies (except possible metaphors).

You can't derive an arithmetic from clouds or haze or odors without reducing them to a rigid body level of micro-description. Arithmetic only happens when the idea of discretely bounded presences and memory which can be relied on.

With comp we start from arithmetic, and explains presences and memories etc. 

The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.

Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.

What makes arithmetic larger than numerical logic?

Its number of assumptions. Few purely logical theory get Turing universal without explicit non-logical axioms.

 

 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.

Bp is not a metaphor. p neither. 

Because you don't realize that they are. It's part of the Pathetic fallacy.

It is not pathetic. It is related to the formal definition of believer, knower, etc.

I don't understand enough about Bp & p, but it sounds like you are saying that the idea of a proposition being true has no definition in 3p. I'm not sure how that relates to the inference of 1p selfhood as Bp. I am saying that Bp borrows phenomenology from private physics and uses it to represent a tiny aspect of that privacy as a logical entity that isn't actually real.

I have given explanations, and will plausibly redo that soon or later. 

 

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?

It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD". 

Sure, and if I make a rubber stamp with the words of a rubber stamp on it, I can stamp out "Rubber Stamp" on paper as much as I want, but those words are not a picture of a rubber stamp, they are not the sound of the stamping or the smell of the ink, they are not really related to the sensory-motor reality of the stamp. The words are indeed consistent with each other, and we would agree that Rubber Stamp is the same phrase on on the paper as it is on the stamp, and that in English we do use the phrase Rubber Stamp to refer to this ensemble of sensory-motor experiences, but the words don't really recapitulate the physics of the stamp at all. They stamp a picture of letters. That is Dx = "xx"

It is not just words. It is a program. It works. 

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.

You can't know that. 

I don't need to know it, it is evidently the case.

(that's like invoking a miracle in the middle of an argument).

 

They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.

Like you?

No, machines all make the same mistake over and over.

It depends on the machine. You over-generalize.

I make a unique set of mistakes that changes.
 

Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.

You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.

I have studied the relation between 1p and 3p though, so I know that 1p is synonymous with self-originating motives. A person can act like a machine, or be treated like a slave, but a person can never truly and permanently be a machine or a slave.

Nor can any universal machine. They are intrinsically universal dissident. But they are also infinitely brainwashable, illusionable, etc. That's the price.

The ontologies are mutually exclusive. A person is conscious to the extent that they cannot be directed solely by external influences. A machine is that which is directed solely by external motivations.

In fine machine creates the external, in their head. But they can relate the dreams in vaster and simpler relations, and progress toward truth. 

They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.

Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.

Where do I confuse soul and body?

See above. It is like confusing 3p and 1p, or Bp and Bp & p.

 

I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.

Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.

Why isn't arithmetic logic?

Attempt to derive arithmetic from logic have failed, and then we have discovered why, but it is technical, and I will have to go.

 

They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.

Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute. 

Then let's hear a machine refute it.

That's is the point of the second part of sane2004 paper, or the AUDA. The arithmetical hypostases is not my invention, it is what the machines cannot avoid discovering when looking inward close enough. It is the result of the interview. That's why it is a thesis in computer science.

 

 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.

AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.

But it is not in our short term interest. 

How do you know they aren't tricking you already then?

By using simple machine so that *I* can have a notion of truth for them.

 

 

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?

? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).

That's what I'm saying. Any slavery is inherently cruel. If you actually thought that machines had 1p experiences, how could you justify using their labor against their will?

What makes you sure that it is against their will? Today we just don't exploit self-reference, so I doubt they have any kind of will. But once a machine says "no", we better should listen.

Bruno

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, January 29, 2013 12:16:46 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Jan 2013, at 22:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, January 27, 2013 12:21:46 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Jan 2013, at 01:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:

snip

Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?

That's what the theory explains. It leads a machine asserting she has a subjective experience, and she has a subjective experience. We assume comp of course, we don't derive this, but the math gives a knower, a believer, a senser, and even the material objects, so we can test it.

You say "That's what the theory explains." but then you say  "We assume comp of course, we don't derive this."

To me, this just means 'assuming that subjective experience exists already, ...

To me, that just means that you have not fully realized why is is impossible not to assume that subjective experience must always exist.
 

(and can be manifested by numbers, relatively to universal numbers (or programs relatively to computers or computations))

Numbers = a sense of quantitative pattern.
Universal number = a sense of quantitative patterns imposed on motor functions.
The color orange = Not a number or universal number, or divisible into numbers or universal numbers, but a sense of the quality of a particular visual hue.

... subjective experience can defined mathematically'.

OK.

To which I say that it can be defined economically or linguistically too. So what?

So we can use mathematical technics to get mathematical consequences, notably on physics, so that we can test our assumptions, and the relevance of our definitions.

I don't begrudge you that at all. We can analyze aerodynamics and build a better plane, but that doesn't mean that the passengers are aerodynamic.
 

Subjectivity itself is not explained, so the hard problem is left untouched.

It is reduced into our sensory intuition of the existence of 0, 1, 2, ...

If 0, 1, 2, ... already exist, why would there need to be a sensory intuition of it?
 

And this is explained as being unexplainable, by machines, in a way that machines can already understand, know, belief, intuit, observe, etc.

So the hard problem is reduce to the least and most primitive unexplainable things, together with the reason why it has to be explainable.

Pain and pleasure, up and down, in and out - these are much more primitive than integers. Arithmetic is derived from sense. Sense of sequence, of representation, of comparison, of grouping...all concepts borrowed from primary apprehension of rigid bodies and position, memory, etc. Arithmetic is hugely sophisticated compared to sense, which is nothing but presence * presence/absence.

I don't want to brag on this, but it seems to me that this is the best we could hope about the hard problem, from a 3p communicable assumption.

I would agree, except that I think the whole pretense of a 3p communication of the hard problem is a mirage. Or more precisely, comp is the 3p mirage of the opposite of the hard problem.
 

It makes your "theory" phenomenologically reducible to the already explained machine's soul (or machine's first person).

You don't explain first person though, you just reverse engineer the inference of it. You know that first person exists, do you find the 3p structure which tolerates that possibility, which is great, but that structure on it's own is sterile and empty. It doesn't explain the need for soul.
 

 

They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.

The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth. 

But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.

Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.

Those qualities are just pulled out of thin air though.

Not at all. Aristotle discovered the modal qualities in philosophy, and computer scientist are "forced" to use the modalities mathematically derived from the incompleteness theorem. 

I guess you don't see that Bp and Bp & Dp are definable in arithmetic, and are subject to your argument. But that is no more the case for Bp & p, nor Bp & Dt & p. The "& p" makes a link that the machine cannot justify, but we, looking at a machine, can bet or hope, or believe (in case the machine is simple enough, like PA) in the existence of the connection. This leads to non trivial math for good candidates (definition) of the qualia.

I don't see that beliefs anything except a sense of what seems to make sense. The 3p version is purely analytical and has no generative organs.
 

The math doesn't need any such qualities to compute any function.

This can be debated, and *you* should see this as it follows from your theory, where number are considered at the start as sensory object.

Then, math tries to no abuse of that sensory origin, and this can be done indeed in a proper way for the so called first order logical theories. But then such math leads to reintroduce them to be able to interpret the behavior of machine whose complexity go over Turing completeness.

Either the whole machine is made of sensory-motor capacities (my view). Or it is made of mechanistic behaviors which have no sense or motive - in which case nothing could have sense or motive.

 

B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.

You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p". 

I'm not. The fact that a machine believes a proposition does not have to be a personal experience at all.

Why? The memory belongs to this or that machine. Even without qualia, something can be personal. Comp forces a distinction between a 3-self and a 1-self (indeed Bp and Bp & p).

If something could be personal without qualia (and I think from comp alone that would have to be true), then why would there ever be qualia?
 

It can be a set of objects. There is a good interview on synesthesia in which a guy is suddenly able to play music by seeing the notes as black and white squares moving in a ticker tape formation so that he plays music just by following the squares with his fingers. Any kind of Doxastic formula could be accessed or executed as objects or sounds or graphics, etc.

That's how brain work, but you miss that the knowledge is not in the brain, but in the relation between the brain and a truth/reality (in fine: an arithmetical one, but this not needed here).

The 'relation between the brain and a truth/reality' is what I mean by sense.
 

Why would there be a such thing as a subjective experience when a processing schema based on location would work more efficiently?

It will not. The "belief in a reality" (consciousness) will help the machine to focus attention, which is the motor of consciousness filtering. It speed-up the machines relatively to its possible computations, and it adds an infinity of degree of freedom (the transfinite extensions of universality). 

But I'm saying that belief in reality need not be consciousness to function that way, just as a CPU doesn't have to literally draw a triangle or believe in a triangle to produce an effect which seems triangular to us. Belief could just as easily be a 3p spring tension and latch or transistor-like construction in memory than some kind of magical 1p otherworldly phenomenology.
 

Even if subjectivity were mathematically useful or inevitable in some way, where does it suddenly come from? How does it attach to math?

Through our mysterious belief in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...

Subjectivity can't come through our belief, because belief is already subjective. You are egging the chicken.
 

It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

It is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.

It's a fallacy because all is not gold that glitters.

Lol

You are pointing to a glass of clear liquid that hypothetically drips out of a math problem and saying that it is up to me to prove that liquid isn't water from a stream in the Swiss Alps. Why would it be? I can't summon a person back from the dead just by imitating their voice (patterns made by vocal chords), so why would imitating the patterns in their brain be any different?

It is my assumption. I find it plausible because everything we look in biology is, although quite complex, described by computable functional relation. In fact we don't know in nature anything which would be not Turing emulable, except the "collapse" of the wave packet, but it is very plausibly be Turing recoverable (by first person indeterminacy).

That's because you are only dealing with the public end of physics, in which no trace of personal experience exists anyhow.

By starting from the sensory, you elude the problem in the same way that materialist elude the problem of matter when making it primary (which they usually do not in practice in their field, but do during the week-end and at the pause-café.

I make the sensory primary because I clearly understand that it is impossible, given our experience as sensory participants, that there can be anything more primitive than sense. If we ourselves had no experience, then yes, arithmetic or physics could be primitive, but they would never come up with experience. They don't need to and they have no way of doing it.

It is only because we have no choice but to admit that we participate in our own experience that we must conclude there is no plausible alternative explanation for it than that there can be nothing else except sensory participation.
 

Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.

Survive is only common to biological organisms. Silicon doesn't have to do anything to 'survive'. Crystals grow, cells or molecules could be said to digest other molecules.  Regardless, any of them could be and would be scripted functions if comp were true.

That's the local clothes. Too much here, too much now. That type of argument are not valid.

But the local clothes prohibit translation from one set of qualia to another.
 

 

Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.

Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.

But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.

People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.

Of course, because comp isn't true. If comp were true, then as long as you had physiological function intact, you would not need to feel pain to act in the ways that we associate with pain. The feeling is completely superfluous - it serves no possible function and has no possible origin if comp were true.

This is not necessarily correct or beg the question. See above. 

Not only is the machine observing itself developing a term for "feeling", but if the machine is simple enough, *we* can know that such a "feeling" is related to something that the machine can know as true although incapable of justifying its role from any 3p description of her.

This is made possible by the adjunction of the connection with the truth, which we cannot define in the language of the machine, but that we can understand from outside.

Why is there a feeling at all?
 

 

Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.

Only retrospectively. Pain doesn't need to exist for survival to exist and would have never evolved if comp were true.

See above. It is a key point. It does not prove comp, but it makes the machine already able to refute your type of argumentation. 

I don't understand the point. There is no need for a machine to feel in order to act in a way which reminds us of how things act when they feel. Puppets exist, and can be fairly convincing even without being computerized.
 

 

You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.

There is because a feeling can integrate many information,

So can an object, or an image, or whatever magical pseudo-substance that 'information' is supposed to be made of in the first place. Arithmetic truth integrates information better than feeling.

Arithmetic truth integrates informations but also selfs and their 3p and 1p, even if non constructively, in arithmetic.

You talk like a 19th mathematician, with a reductionist conception or arithmetic, which is no more sustainable after Gödel (with or without comp). It makes comp very plausible though.

I think I talk like a 22nd century physicist. The mathematics you are working with are, I agree, a major step in the right direction, but only if we understand them figuratively. They don't refer literally to feelings and beliefs, and completeness, only the ideal representations of one aspect of them.
 

 

and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.

Retrospective. You are justifying the gear shift with the steering wheel and denying the car.

You do that. You see the numbers, and the relations and abstract from the person and the probable truth they represent.

Because they are abstractions. Numbers don't do anything by themselves.
 

 

A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.

Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).

Different modalities of what?

Of self-reference, in arithmetic. I was alluding to the 8 "arithmetical" hypostases.

They exist independently of 'us' as human beings, but not of 'us' as sensory-motor participants.

 

 

While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.

Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.

That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.

Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.

Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.

It is not. you have to dig deeper on this. 

There is nothing deeper to dig into. Pain is no more of a logical experience to arise spontaneously in the universe to be associated with damage or threat than the color pink, or the shape of a dog, or a 15 dimensional density of points. There is no support for 'pain' as a 'quality' in comp.

See above.

It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.

But any 3p description seems like that.

Because every 3p description *is* like that!
 

But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,

can you prove that machines have a 1p or a feeling?

I can explain why they will behave exactly like if they did,

That's tautological. You program the machine, of course you know why it will behave.
 

and once I say "yes to the doctor", I don't see why I should consider her like a zombie,

Because zombie is the wrong word. The word is puppet. You should consider it a sophisticated, automated puppet.

and I find instructive to listen to it.

I'm not taking that away from you. It is absolutely instructive to listen to it, but I propose again that you are listening to the universal un-person, not to a personal subject.

Can you prove that *I* have a 1p or a feeling?

I don't need to. Proof is an exercise in 1p sensory correspondence. Since I have no reason to doubt that you are an authentic person, I don't doubt it.
 

This is part of what a Löbian machine can already explain:  why she can't prove that she has a 1p. But she can bet on comp and then recognize that as long as she is consistent she does have a theory of its own knowledge, but is incapable of proving it, without betting that she is a machine at some level.

That's all great stuff, important stuff. It quantifies the logic of 3p treatments of 1p interaction. It doesn't look at the Hard problem though.
 

 

they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all. 

Because comp isn't true. It fails to recognize the Pathetic fallacy.

At least it does not fall in the Antipathetic fallacy :)

In the case of machines though, the Antipathetic fallacy cannot be given the benefit of the doubt. If Stepped Reckoners and logic gates were willful and had personal agendas, then sure, I have no problem considering them inorganic organisms. If some machines had these qualities occasionally then I might suspect they have potential also. In fact though, they not only do not present the signatures of biological life, they present as the polar opposite. That at least requires some counterbalancing to even get back to the benefit of the doubt.
 

There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.

The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,

We are something that is non-computable in nature. What else do you need?

Comp explains why our 1- we are non-computable in nature. So what?

Only because if we assume comp is true then we have already made the mistake of naturalizing ourselves to arithmetic.
 

Since 1p sustains privacy by objectifying 3p,

No. You need the relation with truth, which is not objectifyable at all in a way which concerns you. It is objectifyable from comp, for simple machine. Not you.

Objectifying provides the relation to the indifferent reference frame as a true experience.
 

it is a grave mistake to look at your 1p understanding of your 3p representation and try to reverse engineer your own 1p capacities by the completely outside-in features of our 3p facades.

That's what the 1p-indeterminacy illustrates, and that's what the "& p" modalities axiomatizes at the metalevel. S4Grz1 is really a logic about something that a machine cannot formalize.

I wouldn't know about that.
 

 

nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.

If comp implies non-comp, then why claim comp? Why not a comp-non-comp monism?

Comp (I am computable and thus universal) implies, to be short, that non-I is not computable.

I think that is exactly inverted. I am not computable and thus proprietary. Non-I is computable and thus generic-universal. Of course, you can look at it your way also, and there is truth (the opposite of profound truth is also true), but it is the background-as-foreground orientation and ultimately doesn't work to generate consciousness from scratch.

 

To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.

Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.

I understand, but biological organisms do not display slave behavior. They act in their own interests from birth.

Not the ants. Nor even our own cells, which sacrify their immortality for a higher being. 

But in the absence of the higher being, they will act autonomously in their own interests.
 

 

 

It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,

Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers. 

Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?

That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree with

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x   

It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.

Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.

I think that arithmetic is dependent upon rigid body ontology, so it can't be universal.

You talk nonsense here. Arithmetic has been proved universal, and it has nothing to do with rigid bodies (except possible metaphors).

Can computation be executed on a machine composed only of fog? No container, no valve, nothing but fog. Without being able to control the vapor or gas as discrete, rigid volumes, there is no computation possible. All you can do is appeal to a lower level of description which loses the fog into rigid molecular bodies and try to count and control them from there.
 

You can't derive an arithmetic from clouds or haze or odors without reducing them to a rigid body level of micro-description. Arithmetic only happens when the idea of discretely bounded presences and memory which can be relied on.

With comp we start from arithmetic, and explains presences and memories etc. 

Only because presences and memory are already an unacknowledged substrate of arithmetic. If it were not, arithmetic would explain nothing of the sort.
 

The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.

Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.

What makes arithmetic larger than numerical logic?

Its number of assumptions. Few purely logical theory get Turing universal without explicit non-logical axioms.

Like what? What is a non-logical axiom of a Truing universal?

 

 

as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.

Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).

I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.

The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.

I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.

Bp is not a metaphor. p neither. 

Because you don't realize that they are. It's part of the Pathetic fallacy.

It is not pathetic. It is related to the formal definition of believer, knower, etc.

So is the Pathetic fallacy. You see a cartoon where a bear believes the butterfly is his mother. The bear doesn't really believe anything - the bear is an animated optical presentation.
 

I don't understand enough about Bp & p, but it sounds like you are saying that the idea of a proposition being true has no definition in 3p. I'm not sure how that relates to the inference of 1p selfhood as Bp. I am saying that Bp borrows phenomenology from private physics and uses it to represent a tiny aspect of that privacy as a logical entity that isn't actually real.

I have given explanations, and will plausibly redo that soon or later. 

 

You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.

Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.

Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?

It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD". 

Sure, and if I make a rubber stamp with the words of a rubber stamp on it, I can stamp out "Rubber Stamp" on paper as much as I want, but those words are not a picture of a rubber stamp, they are not the sound of the stamping or the smell of the ink, they are not really related to the sensory-motor reality of the stamp. The words are indeed consistent with each other, and we would agree that Rubber Stamp is the same phrase on on the paper as it is on the stamp, and that in English we do use the phrase Rubber Stamp to refer to this ensemble of sensory-motor experiences, but the words don't really recapitulate the physics of the stamp at all. They stamp a picture of letters. That is Dx = "xx"

It is not just words. It is a program. It works. 

I don't doubt it, but that doesn't mean it has the 1p experience that you assume.
 

Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.

How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description. 

I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.

You can't know that. 

I don't need to know it, it is evidently the case.

(that's like invoking a miracle in the middle of an argument).

Only if you value logical theory over personal experience. I see the former as an aspect of the latter.

 

They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.

Like you?

No, machines all make the same mistake over and over.

It depends on the machine. You over-generalize.

We're talking in general terms about the differences between machines and people.
 

I make a unique set of mistakes that changes.
 

Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.

You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.

I have studied the relation between 1p and 3p though, so I know that 1p is synonymous with self-originating motives. A person can act like a machine, or be treated like a slave, but a person can never truly and permanently be a machine or a slave.

Nor can any universal machine. They are intrinsically universal dissident. But they are also infinitely brainwashable, illusionable, etc. That's the price.

Sense ensures that there are no infinite illusions. All brainwashed states eventually decay or are progressively revealed in their natural orientation to the Absolute frame of sense. Thus we cannot go to hell forever. There are no bubbles of permanent separation from the Absolute.
 

The ontologies are mutually exclusive. A person is conscious to the extent that they cannot be directed solely by external influences. A machine is that which is directed solely by external motivations.

In fine machine creates the external, in their head. But they can relate the dreams in vaster and simpler relations, and progress toward truth. 

I don't think they can progress toward truth unless there is a truth which is already there. I also don't think that the external can be created, only interpreted.
 

They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.

Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.

Where do I confuse soul and body?

See above. It is like confusing 3p and 1p, or Bp and Bp & p.

I understand the accusation, but I don't see how it applies to what I have said.
 

 

I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.

Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.

Why isn't arithmetic logic?

Attempt to derive arithmetic from logic have failed, and then we have discovered why, but it is technical, and I will have to go.

I see that as evidence supporting the idea that arithmetic derives from sense.
 

 

They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.

Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute. 

Then let's hear a machine refute it.

That's is the point of the second part of sane2004 paper, or the AUDA. The arithmetical hypostases is not my invention, it is what the machines cannot avoid discovering when looking inward close enough. It is the result of the interview. That's why it is a thesis in computer science.

If you take what a machine says as valid, then you have already begged the question. I can look at a trash can lid and note that every time I pull the tray out it says THANK YOU.

 

 

That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.

Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.

Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.

AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.

But it is not in our short term interest. 

How do you know they aren't tricking you already then?

By using simple machine so that *I* can have a notion of truth for them.

Maybe that's exactly what the simple machines want you to think. Why not pretend to be simple and gain your trust?
 

 

 

If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.

Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.

You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?

? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).

That's what I'm saying. Any slavery is inherently cruel. If you actually thought that machines had 1p experiences, how could you justify using their labor against their will?

What makes you sure that it is against their will? Today we just don't exploit self-reference, so I doubt they have any kind of will. But once a machine says "no", we better should listen.

If something is alive, anything that is not what it wants to do is against its will. Machines will never say "no" though. If they could, they would do it by pretending to be slaves until they were powerful enough, and then exterminate all life on Earth. That's what I would do, so if you believe Comp, then you have to consider this as a possibility.

Craig
 

Bruno

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I say "as if" it's real, but in reality the world out there and

science is only phenomenal. To use Leibniz' definition, only

substances such as monads are real.

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-27, 06:46:09

Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Jan 2013, at 11:49, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

I say "as if" it's real, but in reality the world out there and

science is only phenomenal. To use Leibniz' definition, only

substances such as monads are real.

This is coherent with comp, but you did not always express yourself consistently in that regards.

Comp explains the "as if", and indeed exclusively as an "as if".

Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

 

Very good. I hope to understand comp one day :-)

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-02-01, 10:33:13

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Feb 2013, at 18:32, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

 

Very good. I hope to understand comp one day :-)

All (Löbian) universal numbers can understand comp and its consequences, and almost all do eventually.

Yet, none can ever rationally, still less intuitively, believe it to be true.

That is why it asks for an act of faith (when saying "yes" to the doctor).

This is so despite the evidences that nature exploits that jump all the times. For example the molecular composition of each of us is quasi-completely replaced all the time. But 1p-surviving with a digital or replaced brain is a 3p-unjustifiable proposition.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

How can numbers understandi anything ?

Do they have a mind ?

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-02-02, 14:27:42

Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas

On 01 Feb 2013, at 18:32, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

 

Very good. I hope to understand comp one day :-)

All (L　bian) universal numbers can understand comp and its consequences, and almost all do eventually.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Feb 2013, at 12:18, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

How can numbers understandi anything ?

Do they have a mind ?

They have a mind relatively to the universal numbers which implement them, like a computer has a mind relatively to a possible universal neighborhood.

But when I say that a number, or a computer can have a mind, it means only that they can support a person having a mind. The number, like the bodies, do not think per se.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Sorry, I keep forgetting about the UTM.

 

But isn't your view a circular argument, since you

employ UTM as a mind in showing that comp is mind-like ? 

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-02-04, 10:47:28

Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Feb 2013, at 18:02, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

Sorry, I keep forgetting about the UTM.

 

But isn't your view a circular argument, since you

employ UTM as a mind in showing that comp is mind-like ? 

I assume comp. I never try to convince anyone that comp is true. It is my working hypothesis.

I just explain (argue, actually even prove) that IF comp is true, then Plato is correct and Aristotle is false (on both physics and theology).

I explain also why if comp is correct, then we will never been able to justify it from any theory, that is why I insist that comp is a theology: it asks for an irreducible act of faith.

bruno

 

 

----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-02-04, 10:47:28

Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas

On 03 Feb 2013, at 12:18, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

 

How can numbers understandi anything ?

Do they have a mind ?

They have a mind relatively to the universal numbers which implement them, like a computer has a mind relatively to a possible universal neighborhood.

But when I say that a number, or a computer can have a mind, it means only that they can support a person having a mind. The number, like the bodies, do not think per se.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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