Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

[Pzomby]

Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.

1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter
and energy?

2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding*
of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

Thanks

[Craig Weinberg]

On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby <htra...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
> consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
> emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
> observations of the physical universe and its processes.

We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe
reads them that way.

>
> This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
> exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
> computations.
>
> 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter
> and energy?

If so that would mean that mathematics is either:

a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is
that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and
unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does
math need to be encoded as it?

b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the
appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable.

>
> 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
> replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding*
> of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to
recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby
superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of
it's reality.

My view in a nutshell:

Sense is not an emergent property of information.

Significance is a recovered property* of sense.

Matter is a form of significance. A sensible persistence through time
which we perceive as volume-densities divided from us and each other
by space.

To be informed is to recover significance through sense.

Sense is primordial, concrete, essential, and viscerally real.

Information is a derivative, redundant term which models sense from a
hypothetical third person view (a view which, taken literally, could
only be that of a formless, non-sense, omniscient voyeur), rendering
consciousness a generic, sterile, and meaningless wireframe of
experience.

Extrapolating a worldview based on this inversion of sense-making and
inert data is useful for modeling computation but is catastrophic if
applied literally to consciousness, as it makes life, order, emotion,
and intelligence itself into a meaningless function for the sake of
function. It makes sense into a kind of non-sense.

Craig

*By recovered property I mean that significance cannot emerge from
nothing, it can only be recovered or discovered from everything.

Consciousness is a splinter or temporal diffraction of the cosmos as a
whole, which, when experienced outside of ‘our world’ (umwelt,
perceptual inertial frame, or cumulative history of perception), would
be an undiffracted totality or eternal instant…devoid of everything
except absence of any absence and filled with nothing except the
presence of presence

…and I mean that in the most non-mystical and unambiguous sense (/
Cheshire grin)

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

> Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
> consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
> emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
> observations of the physical universe and its processes.
>
> This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
> exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
> computations.

Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? For example
the impedance model of a Li-ion battery

http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery

is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery

http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg

is not the Li-ion battery.

By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the
territory of semiotics (the world of signs)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

"What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three
interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant."

From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing.

Evgenii

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:
>> Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
>> consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
>> emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
>> observations of the physical universe and its processes.
>>
>> This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
>> exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
>> computations.
>
> Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?

That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the
case. In particular digital "processes", or relations, can be emulated
exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are
possible "exact model", like a digital brain and its corresponding
relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be
distinguished in any immediate way.

If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never
become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that
computer "you + the typhoon" at the right comp level (assuming it
exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the
simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet
the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).

Bruno

> For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery
>
> http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery
>
> is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery
>
> http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg
>
> is not the Li-ion battery.
>
> By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the
> territory of semiotics (the world of signs)
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>
> "What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of
> three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant."
>
> From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing.
>
> Evgenii
>
>>
>> 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in
>> matter and energy?
>>
>> 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
>> replications, representations, a mathematical computational
>> *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>

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[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>
>> On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:
>>> Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
>>> consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
>>> emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
>>> observations of the physical universe and its processes.
>>>
>>> This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
>>> exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
>>> computations.
>>
>> Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?
>
> That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always
> the case. In particular digital "processes", or relations, can be
> emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer,
> there are possible "exact model", like a digital brain and its
> corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those
> cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.
>
> If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never
> become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that
> computer "you + the typhoon" at the right comp level (assuming it
> exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the
> simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet
> the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).

But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a
computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume
comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that

arithmetics -> mind -> physics

Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster
at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this
does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your
theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of
me makes me wet.

Evgenii

[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru>

Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said "Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp)."

Quentin
 

Evgenii

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[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same
level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in
simulation, my simulated computer in front of simulated myself will not
make simulated myself wet.

Evgenii

[Quentin Anciaux]

??
No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you).

Quentin
 

in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet.

Evgenii

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[Pzomby]

Thanks for your input.  Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside.

  

To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding.  Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain.

 

DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body & brain (if there is such a thing). 

 

If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain.

 

This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe.

 

 

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

> 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
>
>> On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:
>>
>> 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi<use...@rudnyi.ru>
>>>
>>> On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

...

>>>> Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a
>>>> computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather
>>>> access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even
>>>> after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the
>>>> typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet.
>>>>
>>>> Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect
>>> that... Bruno said "Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make
>>> wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp)."
>>>
>>
>> Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the
>> same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being
>> in simulation, my simulated computer
>
> ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer
> wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer
> simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the
> 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the
> simulated simulated you).
>

This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in
simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then
what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that
is simulated? Where the difference comes from?

Evgenii

[Quentin Anciaux]

You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that simulated computer).

So you have:

"real" computer running a simulation.

In that simulation a universal computer is "built" and on it (the simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer.

Quentin

Evgenii

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[Quentin Anciaux]

2012/6/9 Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com>

Of course if you take our current hardware and your simulation cannot pause or cope with a shorting of memory space of the hardware, eventually a simulation deep down will be able to crash everything (up to your level, if itself cannot cope with that), but that's an implementation problem not an in principle problem.

Quentin

Evgenii

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[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 20:00 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

No, I have meant

a) simulated computer

b) simulated myself (but not in a)

Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed
by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would
you define the difference then in this case?

Evgenii

[Quentin Anciaux]

If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation, meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer.

[David Nyman]

On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:

> No, I have meant
>
> a) simulated computer
>
> b) simulated myself (but not in a)
>
> Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by
> some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you
> define the difference then in this case?

I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in
terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality. In
that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary
auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour.
But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which
the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends?

David

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 20:27 Quentin Anciaux said the following:
> Le 9 juin 2012 20:22, "Evgenii Rudnyi"<use...@rudnyi.ru> a �crit :
>>

...

>>
>>
>> No, I have meant
>>
>> a) simulated computer
>>
>> b) simulated myself (but not in a)
>>
>> Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions
>> executed by
> some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would
> you define the difference then in this case?
>>
>
> If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation,
> meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and
> the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer.

And computer in a way cannot affect me. This what I actually wanted to
say in the beginning. Even if we assume simulation hypothesis, nothing
changes and the business continues as usual. On Monday for example it is
necessary to go to work.

On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and b)
imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b) leads to

arithmetic -> mind -> physics

That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in
simulation is possible.

Evgenii

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 09.06.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:

I am not sure if I want to justify something. I am rather in a mood for
anarchy.

Evgenii

[Craig Weinberg]

On Jun 9, 12:08 pm, Pzomby <htra...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > Thanks for your input.  Some of what you state I follow, but some I do
> > not, but I set that aside.
>
> > To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the
> > role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino
> > acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results
> > of the coding.

> Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to
> > theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc
> > of a physical body containing a physical brain.

Not necessarily. All we really know is that genes code for protein.
Protein synthesis, epigenetics, a whole universe of environmental
interaction and top-down influence contribute to the overall
development of a physical body. It's like saying that tcp/ip packets
give rise to YouTube content.

>
> > DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be
> > *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body & brain (if
> > there is such a thing).
>
> > If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain
> > an encoded version of that same brain.

Our fingers are natural computers if we use them that way. Computation
isn't necessarily a causally efficacious principle in the universe. I
think that it's a sensory theme which is instrumental in maintaining
solid objects through time, but that's about it. It has no feeling,
meaning, power, or desire. The lowest, most common end of what we are
looks like a brain, and computation is what goes on when we look at
matter with matter.

>
> > This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more
> > importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of
> > what the 6 senses observe.

The brain computes, but it is also a collection of living organism. An
electronic computer computes but it is not a living organism, and it
is an inorganic assembly. The commonality is paper thin, and the
difference extends back billions of years.

Craig

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> On 09.06.2012 20:27 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

>> Le 9 juin 2012 20:22, "Evgenii Rudnyi"<use...@rudnyi.ru> a écrit :
>>>
>
> ...
>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, I have meant
>>>
>>> a) simulated computer
>>>
>>> b) simulated myself (but not in a)
>>>
>>> Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions
>>> executed by
>> some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would
>> you define the difference then in this case?
>>>
>>
>> If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation,
>> meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and
>> the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer.
>
> And computer in a way cannot affect me. This what I actually wanted
> to say in the beginning. Even if we assume simulation hypothesis,
> nothing changes and the business continues as usual. On Monday for
> example it is necessary to go to work.
>
> On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and
> b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)
> leads to
>
> arithmetic -> mind -> physics
>
> That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in
> simulation is possible.

Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.

Let me explain why.

Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of
life, arithmetic, S & K, etc.

Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called
phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable
functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra. We
can associate a number to each partial computable functions.

A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =
phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In
that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first
approximation of a definition to be sure).

Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function,
so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With
this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by
yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the
universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of
simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical
relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We
cannot avoid them in the measure problem.

The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities
computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above the
substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never know
our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a matter
of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion, something
like that.

In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic, there are a lot of even
infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with
variants etc.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

On 10 June 2012 17:49, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Yes it is possible. And "worth", it is necessary the case.

worse?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.06.2012 18:49 Bruno Marchal said the following:

>
> On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
>

...

Bruno,

I do not completely understand consequences from your theorem, sorry.

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and
physics?

arithmetic -> mind -> physics -> mind -> physics -> ...

For example, does it imply that my 1st person view can make a
supercomputer and then instantiate itself in that supercomputer? Then
there should be two my 1st person views and we seem to come to what you
have referred to as first person indeterminacy.

Could you please relate simulation in simulation with what you are
saying about first person indeterminacy?

Evgenii

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes
easily phonetical when I type too fast.

Sorry again,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[David Nyman]

On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes easily
> phonetical when I type too fast.

It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)

David

[Bruno Marchal]

You can say that.

Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first
person experience for the delays, you have to take into account all
computations accessing to your 3-actual computational states (in comp).

This will include some computation made by some universal number
(computer) u, but also the computation made by the universal number j
when simulating u, and then those made by the universal number k
simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an
infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics.
Physics does not really relies on any particular computations a
priori, but on *all* computations, as defined by the UD processing (or
equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by their proofs).

>
> arithmetic -> mind -> physics -> mind -> physics -> ...

It is more like:

arithmetic -> mind -> mind -> mind -> mind -> ... -> (at the limit
viewed from inside) physics.

(of course it is not that linear, given that it bifurcates and fuses,
and the topology of the local first person neighborhood are
constrained by relatively correct self-reference).

>
> For example, does it imply that my 1st person view can make a
> supercomputer and then instantiate itself in that supercomputer?

Only bodies, even if dreamed or relatively virtual, can make other
bodies, like the body of a supercomputer. But that is something that
you can do, by definition of comp. But you cannot do it in a provable
way, so you have to bet on the level, and take your risk and
responsibility. If the doctor says something like "science has proved
that you will survive", without mentioning the theory/hypotheses, it
is better to run away.

> Then there should be two my 1st person views and we seem to come to
> what you have referred to as first person indeterminacy.

OK. And that happens "naturally" in the realm of the arithmetical
relations. If you accept that truth like "24 is composite" does not
depend on your consciousness, then the whole arithmetical pattern on
which consciousness can differentiated is well defined (through comp).

>
> Could you please relate simulation in simulation with what you are
> saying about first person indeterminacy?

It is not really related. I will try. I start from arithmetic, which
contains all computations.

A computation is what universal machine does. Universal machines
emulates other machines. OK?

In particular, a universal machine can emulate another universal
machine. Actually, a universal machine can emulate herself, and even
plays with the levels. This belongs to its 'natural imagination'
capacity.

Consider U1 emulating M. At base level, like the physical laws if you
want made it "concrete", or in arithmetic (to take a simple base).
This give a sort of level zero of a computation. Now here the
computation is made by U1, emulated by the physical laws (or
arithmetic). But that computations, like any computation, can be done
by any universal numbers/machines. So a second universal machine U2
can emulate U1 emulating M. This will be a more complex computations,
and will appear later in the work of the UD.

Now, the first person indeterminacy, when in "front of a UD, or
arithmetic" bear on all computations leading to your state "as lived
from your first person point of view". So the indeterminacy domain is
somehow trans-level of simulation, making matter emerging from many
computations including infinite sequence of emulation, etc.

The first person indterminacy is illustrate each time bearing on the
same level, or on one level of emulation, in the first six UDA steps.
But on the UD*, or on arithmetic, the first person is dispersed on all
levels.

If we look at ourselves below our first person plural substitution
level, we must see the trace of those "competing computations". I
think QM-without-collapse (= Everett) confirms this.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and physics?

You can say that.

Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience for the delays, you have to take into account all computations accessing to your 3-actual computational states (in comp).

This will include some computation made by some universal number (computer) u, but also the computation made by the universal number j when simulating u, and then those made by the universal number k simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics. Physics does not really relies on any particular computations a priori, but on *all* computations, as defined by the UD processing (or equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by their proofs).

But that seems to invoke realizes, not just potential, infinities.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

Which illustrates that my pronunciation, which you cannot know (lucky
you), is worse than my spelling!

Bruno

PS Heavy day. I will comment other posts asap.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Only at the epistemological level to describe the domain of indeterminacy of the first person. It is the same as in analysis, except that here it concerns an internal epistemology of numbers, by numbers betting on comp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/