Note that1p = contingent truth
3p = necessary truth
So the question of whether comp is true or not iswhether or when or where1p = 3p
----- Have received the following content -----Sender: Roger CloughReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-12-26, 11:26:27Subject: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs 3p = truth by calculationHi everything-listIMHO that comp iis true or not is equalvalent to the questiondoes1p = 3p ?where1p= truth by experience (or actuality) and3p = truth by description (by theory)[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]12/26/2012"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Russell StandishReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-12-26, 20:21:34Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs3p = truth by calculation
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From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2012-12-27, 06:09:25
Subject: Re: On the truth of comp -->Fw: 1p= pragmatic or experiential truth vs3p = truth by calculation
On 26 Dec 2012, at 17:33, Roger Clough wrote:
Note that1p = contingent truthNot at all. Each person pov has its own set of necessities and contingencies.
3p = necessary truth
Not correct (in comp, and weakening of comp). There are many pure 3p arithmetical contingencies. This is highly counter-intuitive and is a consequence of G鰀el's incompleteness, mainly. More on this later (perhaps on FOAR).
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Time: 2012-12-27, 16:42:23Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
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Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,and operates down here, which is why I classified it asbeing contingent.
Hi Roger,
On 28 Dec 2012, at 13:53, Roger Clough wrote:
Thanks for the clarification, I was wrong about 3p.But according to Leibniz, 1p is always in God's eye,but our personal pov is never undistorted or perfectly clear,and operates down here, which is why I classified it asbeing contingent.
3p have necessities and contingencies, but they have also their divine and terrestrial aspect. Here, Divine just means True, and Terrestrial just means effectively believed (and true as I study ideally correct machines).
So there is an OUTER GOD, which is the ONE, and which is 3p, in the comp theory, as it is the collection of true arithmetical propositions.
There is a knower, and it is the INNER GOD, it is the one "available" in the mystical experience. For the ideally correct machine it is both terrestrial and divine (S4Grz = S4Grz*).
The Noùs, i.e. the "accessible" 3p, and the Matter splits into divine and terrestrial parts.
Eventually we get 8 person points of view, which gives 8 ways to see arithmetical truth from inside:
TRUTH (outer God) 0pINTELLIGIBLE (by Man) INTELLIGIBLE (by God) 3pSOUL (inner God) 1p
Intelligible MATTER (by Man) Intelligible MATTER (by God) 3psensible MATTER (by Man) sensible MATTER (by God) 1p
This sum up an interpretation of Plotinus in term of the naturally existing intensional variant of self-reference. This gives eight different logics/mathematics.
if Gödel's incompleteness theorem was false, or if Church thesis was false, the 8 hypostases would collapse into effective truth. But things are not that easy for the machine looking inward.
I have no 2p, as I am not studying the private life of couples of machines :)
Gossiping and broadcasting are two problems of information dissemination described for a group of individuals connected by a communication network. In gossiping, every person in the network knows a unique item of information and needs to communicate it to everyone else. In broadcasting, one individual has an item of information which needs to be communicated to everyone else. A variation of gossiping, called cyclic gossiping, recently introduced by Liestman and Richards, is studied here for certain classes of graphs."
-- Onward! Stephen
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Russell StandishReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 01:21:53Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
Hi Russell Standish
2p is clearly needed for perception, as explained by Peirce.
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Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
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The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the pain
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)
2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)
1p is when I take a sip of coffee.(body-QUALE- input to sensing nerves)
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3p is when we agree that the coffee is too hot.
1p is when we find it tastes very bad.
2p is when your wife ask you to clean the coffee machine.
On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the painHmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
Is not "I feel pain" a quale?
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)I will ask you for the coffee recipe.Funny?Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!
In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)
In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-29, 14:36:58Subject: Re: A few definitions of the categories and two examples of their use(in perception)
On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:
The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the painHmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)Is not "I feel pain" a quale?
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des go鹴s et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
Brent
Hi Bruno,On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 8:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 29 Dec 2012, at 16:07, Roger Clough wrote:The classic example
3p= thirdness= is when I react to the painHmm.. this is the idea, except that with comp, this will be only plural_1p. But no problem as, locally, first person plural behaves like a 3p notion. That is indeed why we confuse them and believe the mind comes from matter activity, when eventually matter activity is a way mind articulate the information about its the most probable computations.
2p = secondness = is when I feel the pain
1p = firstness = is when somebody stick me with a pin (Quale)
Is not "I feel pain" a quale?
Also
3p is when I know and/or say that the coffee tastes bad (mind or reason)? If you can use reason to explain a taste, I will ask you the method.
The method is specializing in summing magnitudes of local infinities. With long enough computational history, you can thus explain a taste, even with fuzzy linguistic markers. Like wine tasters will agree that a vintage has a layer of "shoe leather".
Whether the receiver of the message "understands" is a different question and is domain related. Say math, you cannot communicate with me some funky tensor equation with words alone, unless I have enough computational history with the concept in question.
Music is deceptive, in that everybody has apparent access but I don't think I have to make the case that some music is tasteless. Therefore, not everybody has musical taste.
Having said that, I'll grant, with sufficient computational history, there are schools of taste that differ. Like the styles that different architects come to prefer. But with such history, even a romantic-school architect, will concede that a building is well designed by a minimalist Bauhaus style architect and can get versed in that style, or the magnitudes of those local infinities.
In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)
In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.
But alas, Germans are known for their lack of taste and world wars and we don't market our wines and cheeses so well. It is still fact however, that Germany exports more cheese to France than the opposite. We just give it some Italian name, and the French buy it, as anybody with culinary taste will not buy from the Krauts:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambozola
Yup, that's German and the French buy more of that from the supermarket shelves than Germans buy Roquefort and co.
2p is when I am tasting something funny about the coffee. (feeling or sensing)I will ask you for the coffee recipe.Funny?Cannabis, salvia or even alcohol, I can imagine. But Coffee!?!
Same. I want that coffee :)
PGC
On 12/29/2012 12:32 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:In french we say popularly that "about taste and color we don't argue". (Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas).
That's because Francophones have no taste, they just try to sell the notion that they do for marketing ;)
In Germany this is more ambiguous, as we have the equivalent statement but also its negation: a popular turn-of-phrase is "Über Geschmack lässt sich bekanntlich streiten." Roughly translates "On matters taste, we can argue/negotiate/dispute", which fits with the fuzzy linguistic statement above.
I thought every body just quoted the latin, "De gustibus non est disputandum.",
which is literally the opposite of the German (the Romans were more tolerant?) but probably means the same.
Brent
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Hi Bruno Marchal.IMHO, which you don't have to agree with, 3p is completely differnt from 1p
Here's how I see the whole picture:1p = physical input signal from outside world into brain -----> (2p = the mind's black box of mental (not brain) signal processing) --->---> 3p = physical signal output to outside world through brain.
1p = physical input of outside world as part of the brain.2p = "black box" mental signal processing of 1p3p = physical output from 2p as through the brain to outside world.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-30, 10:57:06Subject: Re: 1p, 3p and the black box of 2p
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> we cannot do without 1p and 2p
Hi Russell Standish
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
I believe 1p is Firstness (raw experience of cat) + Secondness (identification of the image "cat" with the word "cast" to oneself)
and 3p = Thirdness (expression of "cat" to others)
I agree. It is always better to stick to the most common sense of the words.
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From: meekerdbReceiver: everything-listTime: 2013-01-20, 14:44:33Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
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Time: 2013-01-20, 07:01:56Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
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Hi Bruno MarchalThe triads are based on epistemology. Without Secondnesseverything is impersonal. Without Secondness you cannot understand howthe final expression was obtained (what it means to YOU, andhow it was affected by the interprent. It's just wham bam ! that's a cat I see !Van Quine made this criticism of conventional epistemology and gave itup to examine instead how we know something that is perceived throughphysiological explanations.And all epistemoblogy would be robot reading, withno account to the personality, memory, training, orlinguistic knowledge of the reader.
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On 20 Jan 2013, at 20:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/20/2013 3:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:I agree. It is always better to stick to the most common sense of the words.
That's funny coming from a guy who used "God" to designate abstract computations.
?God, matter, consciousness are never computable. Where did I ever used "God" to designate computations. It seems to me that I insist a lot for not making that kind of spurious identification.I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth,
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-21, 09:36:34
Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-21, 09:38:01Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading
Bruno:"...I have identified, in the comp context, "God" with Arithmetical Truth,"does that mean: complying with human logic (any)?
Just imagine a world (universe) without logically THINKING beings (humans?) with no math to formulate (numbers, to express): is there a "God" there?
Hi Bruno MarchalYou said:"God, matter, consciousness are never computable"Is that because the above are nonphysical ?
If consciousness is not computable, can ideas be computable ?
I'm totally lost. I don't even understand how ANYTHING otherthan numbers can be computable.
Suppose you do a computation. You get a number or a bunch of numbers.How can you say what they mean ?
Hi Bruno Marchal
I'm having trouble understanding you today. You say:"Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities,some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines."
Wikipedia says:knowledge is, how it is acquired, and the possible extent a given subject or entity can be known."How can matter be epistemological ?
It's just nondescriptive stuff.
It cannot be knowledge, for knowledge can be defined as a true belief.But there's nothing to believe. It's just nondescriptive stuff.
As to truth not being epistemological, consider this.If knowledge is a true belief, and epistemology provides youwith knowledge, then that knowledge must be true by definition.
You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
-- Onward! Stephen
-- Onward! Stephen
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Time: 2013-01-22, 12:00:41
Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
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Time: 2013-01-22, 12:11:04
Subject: Re: Robot reading vs human reading
On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:54, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno MarchalI'm having trouble understanding you today. You say:"Truth is not epistemological. Only matter, and the other internal modalities,some of which are not communicable/justifiable, yet guessable by machines."
Wikipedia says:
Hi Craig,
This video lecture series https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjABUhyu6dw does a good job showing how a psychiatrist, Niall McLaren, argues toward a dual aspect theory. I recomend his books: http://www.niallmclaren.com/bibliography
-- Onward! Stephen
On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
Hi Bruno Marchal
Just trying to clarify things.1) OK, I partly understand if we allow words as output.
But words are descriptions (3p, or Thirdness),
not experience (1p, or Firstness).
2) Let us admit for the moment that it is possiblefor a computer to be conscious. What would it beconscious of ? The code it is running, which would belike a stream of consciousness, ie an experience ?
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2013-01-22, 12:00:41Subject: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland
On 22 Jan 2013, at 12:36, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno MarchalYou said:"God, matter, consciousness are never computable"Is that because the above are nonphysical ?Matter is physical, by definition, yet non computable. This follows from the UD Argument.
If consciousness is not computable, can ideas be computable ?Yes. Most of them are (the programs, the monads).
I'm totally lost. I don't even understand how ANYTHING otherthan numbers can be computable.Strings of letter are not number, but the operation of concatenation is computable ( a + baba = ababa).Look at your computer, you see mails, letters, etc. Not number, yet all what you do with your computer (like sending a mail) are computable operation.
Suppose you do a computation. You get a number or a bunch of numbers.How can you say what they mean ?By remembering the definitions, the axioms I am assuming, etc. I don't see the problem. If you refer to the qualia, this is explain by the peculiarity of the logic of machines self-reference: when machine introspect they can understand things, without completely understanding the understanding process itself. It is normal, but it needs a bot of computer science and mathematical logic to get the complete picture.Bruno
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Hi Bruno Marchal
An interesting way putting it. But that matter is only dreamedsounds like a stronger version of Berkeleyism. You say thatmatter doesn't really exist at all, Berkeley would saythat it only exists if we perceive it.Both of these positions can be saved IMHO if there issome external, continuous, omnipresent observer.Like the One. I suspect that you already hold that view.
Leibniz would not make such a strong statement, however. Hewould say that matter is not illusory at all, it is bothan idea (a perception, a dream), which to us appears asa phenomenon, but to God appears as it really is.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-23, 11:53:28
On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.
I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.
Craig
On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.
I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.*that* should be illegal.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?We don't add it.The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the featuresof the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.
Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happenas ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-24, 15:06:10
Subject: Re: Berkeley, Plato and Leibniz on existence
Hi Roger,
On 24 Jan 2013, at 09:33, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno MarchalI think it is safe to treat the One as something that at least has the featuresof the Christian God (or I suppose any god)-- omniscient, omnipresent, etc.
We might try comparison. The comp God is "simple" conceptually, and you can represent it by a complex set of numbers, the G del numbers of the true arithmetical propositions. The machine cannot find nor define that set of numbers, and we can define God knows x by the Godel number of x belongs to that set.
Is that God omniscient? Well not really. The Noùs "knows" much more, but is still not omniscient.Omnipresent? Do you think that we can really say that 17 is prime in both Washington and Moscow, and in Sidney and Beijing. I am OK. It is a bit trivial as "17 is prime" does not depend on locations in space-time. Likewize it does not make sense of making God omnipresent, because that would presuppose God can belong to the creation, but this might not really made sense with the comp hypothesis. The very locations emanate (somehow) from God. God is what makes the notion of locations making sense in the dreams of the universal numbers. Truth filters out.I might recommend you the book by Brian Hines "Return to the One", which exposes Plotinus Theory, in a "modern readable way". But you might read Plotinus.There are common point with some version of christianism, but there are also differences. The christians, with many exception in the mystics, have adopted the Aristotelian idea that the physical reality is primary real, even if it is a creation of God. With comp and Plato, the physical reality is only the border of God's mind, to be short.It is, and has to be counter-intuitive, and I might talk where G* said I could not, except by insisting that what I say require the non justifiable belief in the "comp reincarnation technic".
Leibniz created his metaphysics to allow everything to happenas ideas, not physically. All of the action occurs in the Ideal world.With comp there is only an ideal world. (assuming here that arithmetic is ideal).The material world is exactly the appearance, in the mind of the universal numbers, of the border of the universal mind, somehow (by the limiting first person indeterminacy). Physics is a view from inside, sharable among a variety of universal numbers.Comp is closer to the mystic insight, and to he poet, and to systems like Taoism, about half of Indian and Chinese buddhism, the Cabala, the Sufi, and the rational mystics (From Pythagorus to Damascus, going through Plato and Plotinus). Thanks to St Augustin, and others like Maimonides, Al Ghazali, Plato and Plotinus are well represented, or at least well known, albeit a bit hidden, in most Abramanic theological treatise, but they have failed by taking for granted the Aristotelian pictures (even if less that the (strong) Atheists).I really don't know, but find worth to listen to the machines, as modern mathematical tool permit us to do, and compare with observations.I am open minded as I am ignorant in the matter. But I try to escape all wishful thinking.And then it is ironical that the main formula(*) from which all hypostases are derived, is a sort of wishful thinking in arithmetic, but again, if wishful thinking appears to be the law, I can't reject it, as that would be wishful thinking!Bruno
(*) L b formula: If you succeed in convincing a (correct L bian) machine that if she believes the medication will work, then it will work, then the machine will believe that the medication will work. And, as the machine is correct, the medication will work. (More on this in the second part of sane04).
On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.
Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?
I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.*that* should be illegal.
I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.
My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.
There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.
I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?We don't add it.The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.
You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.
Craig
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On 24 Jan 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.
Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?They are the internal view of person when supported by infinities of computations, which exists arithmetically. They are not made of something, they are computer semantical fixed points, to be short.
I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth.
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.*that* should be illegal.
I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.
My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.There is. Do anything to survive.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.
There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree withx + 0 = xx + s(y) = s(x + y)x *0 = 0x*s(y) = x*y + x
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.
I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?We don't add it.The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.
You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.
On Friday, January 25, 2013 3:45:35 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 24 Jan 2013, at 18:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, January 24, 2013 11:50:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 23 Jan 2013, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 10:31:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 22 Jan 2013, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 12:44:41 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:On Tue, Jan 22, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:You seem to not having yet realize that with comp, not only materialism is wrong, but also weak materialism, that is, the doctrine asserting the primary existence of matter, or the existence of primary matter.We are, well, not in the matrix, but in infinities of purely arithmetical matrices. matter is an appearance from inside.My point is not that this is true, but that it follows from comp, and that computer science makes this enough precise so that we can test it.
Bruno,Is it possible that the existence of matter from comp as a dream of the Quantum Mind happened once and for all time way back in time?Richard
Quantum Deism. Cool.
It still doesn't make sense that there could be any presentation of anything at all under comp. If you can have 'infinities of purely arithmetical matrices' which can simulate all possibilities and relations... why have anything else? Why have anything except purely arithmetical matrices?You have the stable illusions, whose working is described by the self-reference logics.
Describing that some arithmetic systems function as if they were stable illusions does not account for the experienced presence of sensory-motor participation.The arithmetic systems are not the stable illusions. They only support the person who has such stable illusions.
Why would a person have 'illusions'? What are they made of?They are the internal view of person when supported by infinities of computations, which exists arithmetically. They are not made of something, they are computer semantical fixed points, to be short.
Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?
I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth.
But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.
B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.
It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.*that* should be illegal.
I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.
Mathematically interesting actually.
My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.There is. Do anything to survive.
But that can be generated in many ways other than pain, or no way at all. Simply script it. 'Do anything to digest'. 'Do anything to grow'.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.
But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.
You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.
A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.
Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.
It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.
There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside.
Chaos and states that seem 'critical' are your emotional projections.
There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.
To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree withx + 0 = xx + s(y) = s(x + y)x *0 = 0x*s(y) = x*y + x
It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.
The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.
I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.
In theory, Bugs Bunny is a knower carrots. It's complete fiction, true only to the extent that we project our own concretely real human experience onto an animated visual story.
I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.
If you assume comp then you don't need qualia.
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?We don't add it.The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.
Even if you define it in 3p, it still assumes that there is something to define.
You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.
Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description.
I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.
They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.
Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.
They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.
I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.
They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.
Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.
You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?
Craig
Bruno
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I can explain how torturing someone on the rack would function to dislocate their limbs, and the fact *that* this bodily change could be interpreted by the victim as an outcome with a high priority avoidance value, but it cannot be explained how or why there is an experienced 'feeling'.The explanation is provided by the difference of logic between Bp and Bp & p. It works very well, including the non communicability of the qualia, the feeling that our soul is related to our body and bodies in general, etc.I'm not talking about the 'feeling *that* (anything)' - I am talking about feeling period, and its primordial influence independent of all B, Bp, or p.They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth.
But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.
B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p".
It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacyIt is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.
The indisputable reality is that it is the deeply unpleasant quality of the feeling of this torture is the motivation behind it. In fact, there are techniques now where hideous pain is inflicted by subcutaneous microwave stimulation which does not substantially damage tissue. The torture is achieved through manipulation of the 'stable illusion' of experienced pain alone.*that* should be illegal.
I agree, although that will probably make it only more exciting for them to use it.The frontier of freedom is when you harm the freedom of the others.
Mathematically interesting actually.
My point though is that this pain is not logical. There's nothing Doxastic about it. It just hurts so much that you'll do anything to make it stop. There is no programmatic equivalent.There is. Do anything to survive.
But that can be generated in many ways other than pain, or no way at all. Simply script it. 'Do anything to digest'. 'Do anything to grow'.Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.
But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.
Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.
You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.There is because a feeling can integrate many information,
and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.
A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.
Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.It is not. you have to dig deeper on this.
It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.But any 3p description seems like that.
But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,
they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all.
There is no such thing as unpleasant for a computer, there is only off and on, and off, off, on, and off, on, off...Arithmetical relation are full of chaos and critical states. You can't reduce it to some level, from inside.
Chaos and states that seem 'critical' are your emotional projections.Not it is pure math. It is well defined and verifiable. I use critical in the sense of statistics and renormalization theory; not the subjective interpretation.
There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,
nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.
To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree withx + 0 = xx + s(y) = s(x + y)x *0 = 0x*s(y) = x*y + x
It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.
The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.
I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.Bp is not a metaphor. p neither.
In theory, Bugs Bunny is a knower carrots. It's complete fiction, true only to the extent that we project our own concretely real human experience onto an animated visual story.Bugs Bunny is your image. You demolish your own idea in believing that they are incompatible with comp.
The difference between us is in the methodogy. I derive from comp and definition, without ever trying to know the truth. It is the best to perhaps one day refute comp. But you start from your (rather good) intution of the 1p pov, but makes it intop non sense, by inferring non comp from it. it is sad, as it makes quite difficult to figure out the message. It can only look like fake religious prejudice as we don't know the truth.
I would say that even truth is incorrect - qualia is experience of experience, grounded in the totality of experience (which could be called truth in one sense, but it is more than that).Sigma_1 truth is big enough, to get more than truth from inside. Look at the UD, by assuming comp, if only to see the point. Nobody asks you to believe that comp is true.
If you assume comp then you don't need qualia.This is like, if you assume rockets you don't need the moon.
Machines, as conceived by comp, are already sentient without any kind of tangible, experiential, or even geometric presentation. If you have discrete data, why would you add some superfluous layer of blur?We don't add it.The logic of self-reference explains why we cannot avoid it.
The logic of self-reference already includes the assumption of self to begin with.No, it can be defined in the 3p, in arithmetic. It exists as a theorem in computer science, and yes it is responsible in part for the mess in Platonia.
Even if you define it in 3p, it still assumes that there is something to define.
Bp (the 3-self) can be define in 3p. But Bp & p has no definition at all in 3p. "Bp & p" is not a definition in 3p, but thus need longer explanation to be understood.
You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.
Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD".
let us compare with nature, and so we can progress. You seem to start from the answers. You can do that if the goal is just contemplation, but then you become a poet. That is nice, but is not the goal of the scientists.
My only goal is to make the most sense that can be made.By discarding the idea that machines can make sense. You get less sense.
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description.
I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.You can't know that.
They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.Like you?
Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.
They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.
I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.
They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.
Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.But it is not in our short term interest.
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.
You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).
Hi Bruno Marchal
I am a retired scientist as well as a Christian, so I like to at leasttreat the world out there "as if" it's entirely real.
It's not only a Christian view that the world out there is real.Science has that view, which is, to reuse the word, "realistic."
Leibniz views the world out there as contingent, whichis perfectly realistic, But Gnosticism and Neoplatonismlook at the world in some other, Eastern way, as sortof a maya I suppose (not sure).
Christianity treats theworld out there as crap, but real, scientific, crap.
Like the eastern religions, Neoplatonism says that weshall all return to the One. Our identities wuill belost.
Christianity says that our identities will be maintained,which, although we can't be sure, can be the more hopefulof the two views. NDE seem to support this view.As far as math goes, there should be no difference,but I would still like to use the word One, as"God" carries too much baggage.
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On Sunday, January 27, 2013 12:21:46 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jan 2013, at 01:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
snip
Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?
That's what the theory explains. It leads a machine asserting she has a subjective experience, and she has a subjective experience. We assume comp of course, we don't derive this, but the math gives a knower, a believer, a senser, and even the material objects, so we can test it.
You say "That's what the theory explains." but then you say "We assume comp of course, we don't derive this."
To me, this just means 'assuming that subjective experience exists already, ...
... subjective experience can defined mathematically'.
To which I say that it can be defined economically or linguistically too. So what?
Subjectivity itself is not explained, so the hard problem is left untouched.
They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth.
But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.
Those qualities are just pulled out of thin air though.
The math doesn't need any such qualities to compute any function.
B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p".
I'm not. The fact that a machine believes a proposition does not have to be a personal experience at all.
It can be a set of objects. There is a good interview on synesthesia in which a guy is suddenly able to play music by seeing the notes as black and white squares moving in a ticker tape formation so that he plays music just by following the squares with his fingers. Any kind of Doxastic formula could be accessed or executed as objects or sounds or graphics, etc.
Why would there be a such thing as a subjective experience when a processing schema based on location would work more efficiently?
Even if subjectivity were mathematically useful or inevitable in some way, where does it suddenly come from? How does it attach to math?
It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacyIt is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.It's a fallacy because all is not gold that glitters.
You are pointing to a glass of clear liquid that hypothetically drips out of a math problem and saying that it is up to me to prove that liquid isn't water from a stream in the Swiss Alps. Why would it be? I can't summon a person back from the dead just by imitating their voice (patterns made by vocal chords), so why would imitating the patterns in their brain be any different?
Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.
Survive is only common to biological organisms. Silicon doesn't have to do anything to 'survive'. Crystals grow, cells or molecules could be said to digest other molecules. Regardless, any of them could be and would be scripted functions if comp were true.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.
But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.
Of course, because comp isn't true. If comp were true, then as long as you had physiological function intact, you would not need to feel pain to act in the ways that we associate with pain. The feeling is completely superfluous - it serves no possible function and has no possible origin if comp were true.
Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.
Only retrospectively. Pain doesn't need to exist for survival to exist and would have never evolved if comp were true.
You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.There is because a feeling can integrate many information,
So can an object, or an image, or whatever magical pseudo-substance that 'information' is supposed to be made of in the first place. Arithmetic truth integrates information better than feeling.
and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.
Retrospective. You are justifying the gear shift with the steering wheel and denying the car.
A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).
Different modalities of what?
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.
Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.It is not. you have to dig deeper on this.
There is nothing deeper to dig into. Pain is no more of a logical experience to arise spontaneously in the universe to be associated with damage or threat than the color pink, or the shape of a dog, or a 15 dimensional density of points. There is no support for 'pain' as a 'quality' in comp.
It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.But any 3p description seems like that.
Because every 3p description *is* like that!
But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,
can you prove that machines have a 1p or a feeling?
they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all.
Because comp isn't true. It fails to recognize the Pathetic fallacy.
There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,
We are something that is non-computable in nature. What else do you need?
Since 1p sustains privacy by objectifying 3p,
it is a grave mistake to look at your 1p understanding of your 3p representation and try to reverse engineer your own 1p capacities by the completely outside-in features of our 3p facades.
nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.
If comp implies non-comp, then why claim comp? Why not a comp-non-comp monism?
To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.
I understand, but biological organisms do not display slave behavior. They act in their own interests from birth.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree withx + 0 = xx + s(y) = s(x + y)x *0 = 0x*s(y) = x*y + x
It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.
I think that arithmetic is dependent upon rigid body ontology, so it can't be universal.
You can't derive an arithmetic from clouds or haze or odors without reducing them to a rigid body level of micro-description. Arithmetic only happens when the idea of discretely bounded presences and memory which can be relied on.
The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.
What makes arithmetic larger than numerical logic?
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.
I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.Bp is not a metaphor. p neither.
Because you don't realize that they are. It's part of the Pathetic fallacy.
I don't understand enough about Bp & p, but it sounds like you are saying that the idea of a proposition being true has no definition in 3p. I'm not sure how that relates to the inference of 1p selfhood as Bp. I am saying that Bp borrows phenomenology from private physics and uses it to represent a tiny aspect of that privacy as a logical entity that isn't actually real.
You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.
Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD".
Sure, and if I make a rubber stamp with the words of a rubber stamp on it, I can stamp out "Rubber Stamp" on paper as much as I want, but those words are not a picture of a rubber stamp, they are not the sound of the stamping or the smell of the ink, they are not really related to the sensory-motor reality of the stamp. The words are indeed consistent with each other, and we would agree that Rubber Stamp is the same phrase on on the paper as it is on the stamp, and that in English we do use the phrase Rubber Stamp to refer to this ensemble of sensory-motor experiences, but the words don't really recapitulate the physics of the stamp at all. They stamp a picture of letters. That is Dx = "xx"
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description.
I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.You can't know that.
I don't need to know it, it is evidently the case.
They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.Like you?
No, machines all make the same mistake over and over.
I make a unique set of mistakes that changes.
Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.
I have studied the relation between 1p and 3p though, so I know that 1p is synonymous with self-originating motives. A person can act like a machine, or be treated like a slave, but a person can never truly and permanently be a machine or a slave.
The ontologies are mutually exclusive. A person is conscious to the extent that they cannot be directed solely by external influences. A machine is that which is directed solely by external motivations.
They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.
Where do I confuse soul and body?
I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.
Why isn't arithmetic logic?
They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute.
Then let's hear a machine refute it.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.
Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.But it is not in our short term interest.
How do you know they aren't tricking you already then?
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.
You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).
That's what I'm saying. Any slavery is inherently cruel. If you actually thought that machines had 1p experiences, how could you justify using their labor against their will?
On 27 Jan 2013, at 22:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, January 27, 2013 12:21:46 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 26 Jan 2013, at 01:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:snip
Why would semantical fixed points have an 'experience' associated with them, and why would that experience have a 'personal' quality?That's what the theory explains. It leads a machine asserting she has a subjective experience, and she has a subjective experience. We assume comp of course, we don't derive this, but the math gives a knower, a believer, a senser, and even the material objects, so we can test it.
You say "That's what the theory explains." but then you say "We assume comp of course, we don't derive this."
To me, this just means 'assuming that subjective experience exists already, ...
(and can be manifested by numbers, relatively to universal numbers (or programs relatively to computers or computations))
... subjective experience can defined mathematically'.OK.To which I say that it can be defined economically or linguistically too. So what?So we can use mathematical technics to get mathematical consequences, notably on physics, so that we can test our assumptions, and the relevance of our definitions.
Subjectivity itself is not explained, so the hard problem is left untouched.It is reduced into our sensory intuition of the existence of 0, 1, 2, ...
And this is explained as being unexplainable, by machines, in a way that machines can already understand, know, belief, intuit, observe, etc.So the hard problem is reduce to the least and most primitive unexplainable things, together with the reason why it has to be explainable.
I don't want to brag on this, but it seems to me that this is the best we could hope about the hard problem, from a 3p communicable assumption.
It makes your "theory" phenomenologically reducible to the already explained machine's soul (or machine's first person).
They are independent of the theories of course, like both matter and energy does not depend on the string "E = mc^2". But it is not because we theorize something that it disappears.The relation between p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt & p (feeling) are just unavoidable arithmetical truth.
But these relations don't refer to feelings, they refer only to information states associated with one facet of the tip of the iceberg of feeling.Not at all. Bp & Dt & p does not refer to just a state, it refers to qualities that the machine can be aware of, and yet can't associate to its state.
Those qualities are just pulled out of thin air though.Not at all. Aristotle discovered the modal qualities in philosophy, and computer scientist are "forced" to use the modalities mathematically derived from the incompleteness theorem.I guess you don't see that Bp and Bp & Dp are definable in arithmetic, and are subject to your argument. But that is no more the case for Bp & p, nor Bp & Dt & p. The "& p" makes a link that the machine cannot justify, but we, looking at a machine, can bet or hope, or believe (in case the machine is simple enough, like PA) in the existence of the connection. This leads to non trivial math for good candidates (definition) of the qualia.
The math doesn't need any such qualities to compute any function.This can be debated, and *you* should see this as it follows from your theory, where number are considered at the start as sensory object.Then, math tries to no abuse of that sensory origin, and this can be done indeed in a proper way for the so called first order logical theories. But then such math leads to reintroduce them to be able to interpret the behavior of machine whose complexity go over Turing completeness.
B, D, t, & p are a doxastic extraction not of feeling or experience on their actual terms but a grammatical schema of a depersonalized behaviorism.You confuse Bp & Dt & p, with "Bp & Dt & p".
I'm not. The fact that a machine believes a proposition does not have to be a personal experience at all.Why? The memory belongs to this or that machine. Even without qualia, something can be personal. Comp forces a distinction between a 3-self and a 1-self (indeed Bp and Bp & p).
It can be a set of objects. There is a good interview on synesthesia in which a guy is suddenly able to play music by seeing the notes as black and white squares moving in a ticker tape formation so that he plays music just by following the squares with his fingers. Any kind of Doxastic formula could be accessed or executed as objects or sounds or graphics, etc.That's how brain work, but you miss that the knowledge is not in the brain, but in the relation between the brain and a truth/reality (in fine: an arithmetical one, but this not needed here).
Why would there be a such thing as a subjective experience when a processing schema based on location would work more efficiently?It will not. The "belief in a reality" (consciousness) will help the machine to focus attention, which is the motor of consciousness filtering. It speed-up the machines relatively to its possible computations, and it adds an infinity of degree of freedom (the transfinite extensions of universality).
Even if subjectivity were mathematically useful or inevitable in some way, where does it suddenly come from? How does it attach to math?Through our mysterious belief in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
It is the formalized absence of feeling inferred logically as engine of potential programmatic outcomes. Calling it feeling is the very embodiment of the pathetic fallacy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacyIt is a fallacy when you assume that our 1p are not supported by (infinity) of computations. We already agreed on our disagreement on this. It is up to you to show that it is a fallacy, if you think so.It's a fallacy because all is not gold that glitters.LolYou are pointing to a glass of clear liquid that hypothetically drips out of a math problem and saying that it is up to me to prove that liquid isn't water from a stream in the Swiss Alps. Why would it be? I can't summon a person back from the dead just by imitating their voice (patterns made by vocal chords), so why would imitating the patterns in their brain be any different?It is my assumption. I find it plausible because everything we look in biology is, although quite complex, described by computable functional relation. In fact we don't know in nature anything which would be not Turing emulable, except the "collapse" of the wave packet, but it is very plausibly be Turing recoverable (by first person indeterminacy).
By starting from the sensory, you elude the problem in the same way that materialist elude the problem of matter when making it primary (which they usually do not in practice in their field, but do during the week-end and at the pause-café.
Survive is universal. Growing and digesting is not. They are possible products of survival strategy.
Survive is only common to biological organisms. Silicon doesn't have to do anything to 'survive'. Crystals grow, cells or molecules could be said to digest other molecules. Regardless, any of them could be and would be scripted functions if comp were true.That's the local clothes. Too much here, too much now. That type of argument are not valid.
Nothing that I do to a robot will make it jump out of a window in order to avoid, unless I specifically instruct it to jump out of the window for no logical reason.Because it is not (yet) in our interest to have a robot doing anything for surviving, but Mars Rover is a good respectable logical ancestors.
But jumping out of a window is never in our interests. It's just from avoiding the pain itself. Suicide from pain doesn't help us survive, or help the family or species survive. It's purely a personal response to the feeling of suffering with no logical basis.People who lack pain are highly handicapped, and very often lose limbs and part of the body by being unable to see the 3p destruction.
Of course, because comp isn't true. If comp were true, then as long as you had physiological function intact, you would not need to feel pain to act in the ways that we associate with pain. The feeling is completely superfluous - it serves no possible function and has no possible origin if comp were true.This is not necessarily correct or beg the question. See above.Not only is the machine observing itself developing a term for "feeling", but if the machine is simple enough, *we* can know that such a "feeling" is related to something that the machine can know as true although incapable of justifying its role from any 3p description of her.This is made possible by the adjunction of the connection with the truth, which we cannot define in the language of the machine, but that we can understand from outside.
Pain like fear are friends of survival, when they don't become pathological.
Only retrospectively. Pain doesn't need to exist for survival to exist and would have never evolved if comp were true.See above. It is a key point. It does not prove comp, but it makes the machine already able to refute your type of argumentation.
You have to smuggle a simulation of the effects of suffering retroactively and retrospectively to extend logic into it through a just so story, but prospectively there is no logical function to the usefulness of a feeling of any kind to coerce behavior.There is because a feeling can integrate many information,
So can an object, or an image, or whatever magical pseudo-substance that 'information' is supposed to be made of in the first place. Arithmetic truth integrates information better than feeling.Arithmetic truth integrates informations but also selfs and their 3p and 1p, even if non constructively, in arithmetic.You talk like a 19th mathematician, with a reductionist conception or arithmetic, which is no more sustainable after Gödel (with or without comp). It makes comp very plausible though.
and consciousness can help to focuse the attention on it, and coerce the urgent helpful behavior.
Retrospective. You are justifying the gear shift with the steering wheel and denying the car.You do that. You see the numbers, and the relations and abstract from the person and the probable truth they represent.
A program does not need to be coerced through first person illusions, it would in all cases be driven by logical, stochastic parameters and nothing more.Not really. the different modalities are not an option. They exist independently of us (assuming comp).
Different modalities of what?Of self-reference, in arithmetic. I was alluding to the 8 "arithmetical" hypostases.
While the function of torture to elicit information can be mapped out logically, the logic is built upon an unexamined assumption that pain and feeling simply arise as some kind of useless decoration.Why? Torturers know very well how the effect is unpleasant for the victim.
That's what I'm saying - you assume that there is a such thing as 'unpleasant'.Yes. In the theory, losing self-referential correctness is a good candidate for being unpleasant for a machine programmed to survive by all means. At least in the short term. Pain is body's protection.
Only because you already have to explain pain. If you didn't have to explain pain, there is no way you would ever dream of such a thing. It's completely superfluous, metaphysical, and metaprogrammatic.It is not. you have to dig deeper on this.
There is nothing deeper to dig into. Pain is no more of a logical experience to arise spontaneously in the universe to be associated with damage or threat than the color pink, or the shape of a dog, or a 15 dimensional density of points. There is no support for 'pain' as a 'quality' in comp.See above.It's inefficient. It's an obstacle to protection as much as it is protection. Immunity is the body's protection. Skin and bones are the body's protection. Memory and avoidance are the body's protection. Pain would be an irrelevant phenomenon to drive behavior from a prospective view., and even if it weren't, it has no plausible source in a comp universe. Suddenly a doxastic logic figures out how to hurt, or turn squeaky? It's a catastrophic non-starter.But any 3p description seems like that.
Because every 3p description *is* like that!
But the feeing are 1p, and even for machine,
can you prove that machines have a 1p or a feeling?I can explain why they will behave exactly like if they did,
and once I say "yes to the doctor", I don't see why I should consider her like a zombie,
and I find instructive to listen to it.
Can you prove that *I* have a 1p or a feeling?
This is part of what a Löbian machine can already explain: why she can't prove that she has a 1p. But she can bet on comp and then recognize that as long as she is consistent she does have a theory of its own knowledge, but is incapable of proving it, without betting that she is a machine at some level.
they exist in the same sense that "17 is prime" (just a bit longer to describe). Of course you can take this as a definition of zombie, but in comp, there is no zombie at all.
Because comp isn't true. It fails to recognize the Pathetic fallacy.At least it does not fall in the Antipathetic fallacy :)
There is no reason to presume that a computer has any awareness of such theatrical narratives.The reason is that we have never find something non computable in nature,
We are something that is non-computable in nature. What else do you need?Comp explains why our 1- we are non-computable in nature. So what?
Since 1p sustains privacy by objectifying 3p,No. You need the relation with truth, which is not objectifyable at all in a way which concerns you. It is objectifyable from comp, for simple machine. Not you.
it is a grave mistake to look at your 1p understanding of your 3p representation and try to reverse engineer your own 1p capacities by the completely outside-in features of our 3p facades.That's what the 1p-indeterminacy illustrates, and that's what the "& p" modalities axiomatizes at the metalevel. S4Grz1 is really a logic about something that a machine cannot formalize.
nor do we have any clue why non-computability will help. Then comp implies some amount of non computability to.
If comp implies non-comp, then why claim comp? Why not a comp-non-comp monism?Comp (I am computable and thus universal) implies, to be short, that non-I is not computable.
To the contrary, every computer seems completely nonplussed in crisis, and has no preference of monotonous recursive order, randomness, or chaos. This is not just a minor feature of computation, but rather *the defining quality* of machines upon which we rely. That is the prime function machines perform for us. They have no emotion, so we can rely on them not to panic or fight with coworkers or go on strike for better conditions, etc.Because today's machine are simple, and slave by construction. I talk about all possible machines, not just my kitchen fridge.
I understand, but biological organisms do not display slave behavior. They act in their own interests from birth.Not the ants. Nor even our own cells, which sacrify their immortality for a higher being.
It only seems to work retrospectively when we take perception and participation for granted. If we look at it prospectively instead, we see that a universe founded on logic has no possibility of developing perception or participation,Universe are not founded on logics. Even arithmetic is not founded on logic. You talk like a 19th century logician. Logicism has failed since, even for numbers and machines. The fact that you seem unaware of this might explain your prejudices on machines and numbers.
Ok, what is arithmetic founded on?That is the necessary mystery. That is why I start from it. I can only hope you agree withx + 0 = xx + s(y) = s(x + y)x *0 = 0x*s(y) = x*y + x
It's not a mystery to me. Arithmetic is founded on counting, which is a sensory-motor experience in which public rigid bodies are internalized as private digitized figures.Human arithmetic is founded on counting. I talk on universal arithmetic. We have to assume it to give a meaning to comp.
I think that arithmetic is dependent upon rigid body ontology, so it can't be universal.You talk nonsense here. Arithmetic has been proved universal, and it has nothing to do with rigid bodies (except possible metaphors).
You can't derive an arithmetic from clouds or haze or odors without reducing them to a rigid body level of micro-description. Arithmetic only happens when the idea of discretely bounded presences and memory which can be relied on.With comp we start from arithmetic, and explains presences and memories etc.
The logical consistency is indeed important, owing to its universality in the most public range of sense qualities, but that's tautological. It is its very superficiality and uniformity which allows it to model universally. It is like dehydration for purposes preservation - but in aiming to model consciousness and feeling as logic, we are dehydrating water.Logic is not enough, but arithmetic already go far ahead of logic. You continue to attribute me logicism, but it is well known that arithmetic already makes logicism wrong.
What makes arithmetic larger than numerical logic?Its number of assumptions. Few purely logical theory get Turing universal without explicit non-logical axioms.
as it already includes in its axioms an assumption of quantitative sense.Comp is mainly an assumption that some quantitative relation can support qualitative relations locally. But you cannot indentify them, as they obey different logic, like Bp and Bp & p, for example. The quality appears thanks to the reference to truth (a non formalizable notion).
I don't disagree that quality likely relates to truth association, but truth association is not necessary or sufficient to explain its appearance.The fact is that Bp & p leads to an asymmetrical knower, without a name, associated to each machine.
I think you are mistaking a metaphorical knower for an experiential knower.Bp is not a metaphor. p neither.
Because you don't realize that they are. It's part of the Pathetic fallacy.It is not pathetic. It is related to the formal definition of believer, knower, etc.
I don't understand enough about Bp & p, but it sounds like you are saying that the idea of a proposition being true has no definition in 3p. I'm not sure how that relates to the inference of 1p selfhood as Bp. I am saying that Bp borrows phenomenology from private physics and uses it to represent a tiny aspect of that privacy as a logical entity that isn't actually real.I have given explanations, and will plausibly redo that soon or later.You assume a perspective and orientation which is defined by fiat based on our experience of selfhood.Not at all, but you have to study a bit of computer science to see the point. It is related to the Dx = "xx" trick, and many other diagonalizations.
Why would Dx = "xx" need a quality of 'self'?It does not need it, but when D is applied to itself, DD, it gives itself "DD".
Sure, and if I make a rubber stamp with the words of a rubber stamp on it, I can stamp out "Rubber Stamp" on paper as much as I want, but those words are not a picture of a rubber stamp, they are not the sound of the stamping or the smell of the ink, they are not really related to the sensory-motor reality of the stamp. The words are indeed consistent with each other, and we would agree that Rubber Stamp is the same phrase on on the paper as it is on the stamp, and that in English we do use the phrase Rubber Stamp to refer to this ensemble of sensory-motor experiences, but the words don't really recapitulate the physics of the stamp at all. They stamp a picture of letters. That is Dx = "xx"It is not just words. It is a program. It works.
Machines can make sense *for us* but they can't themselves sense.How can you know that. The knower has some difficulty, but he can bet on a level of description.
I know it because they don't want to learn anything on their own.You can't know that.
I don't need to know it, it is evidently the case.(that's like invoking a miracle in the middle of an argument).
They will make the same mistake over and over again forever.Like you?
No, machines all make the same mistake over and over.It depends on the machine. You over-generalize.
I make a unique set of mistakes that changes.
Again, these are not odd tendencies seen in some machines, they are the overwhelmingly obvious defining characteristics of all machines.You have an handicap. You have not study machine. What you say looks like the usual overgeneralization.
I have studied the relation between 1p and 3p though, so I know that 1p is synonymous with self-originating motives. A person can act like a machine, or be treated like a slave, but a person can never truly and permanently be a machine or a slave.Nor can any universal machine. They are intrinsically universal dissident. But they are also infinitely brainwashable, illusionable, etc. That's the price.
The ontologies are mutually exclusive. A person is conscious to the extent that they cannot be directed solely by external influences. A machine is that which is directed solely by external motivations.In fine machine creates the external, in their head. But they can relate the dreams in vaster and simpler relations, and progress toward truth.
They don't know where they are, they don't know who is using them, they have no curiosity as to why you might have typed 555555555555555555555 instead of 5 when dialing a phone number, etc. This is obvious. I understand of course, that human consciousness is dependent on sense organs, and that adding sensors to machines adds capacities for detection - that added complexity of logic increases responsiveness not just geometrically but exponentially, but it doesn't matter at all.Same with comp. You confuse soul and body.
Where do I confuse soul and body?See above. It is like confusing 3p and 1p, or Bp and Bp & p.
I propose that logic extends horizontally and sense intends vertically.Logic is just a tool for us. It does not play an important role, except to describe nuances. the interesting things are in arithmetic, which is not something logical at all.
Why isn't arithmetic logic?Attempt to derive arithmetic from logic have failed, and then we have discovered why, but it is technical, and I will have to go.
They are orthogonal. Larger assemblies have more waste, more overhead. The new operating systems aren't tighter and faster than ever, they are buggy and shitty and slower than ever - not just to perform fancy new functions, but just to write a few bytes of text. We boot up servers with hundreds of gb of RAM and 5+Ghz of combined processing power, but changing a single byte of data turns the screen off for a second, and the simple GUI is slower to render than any screen of full color graphics I had at home on my 8k Atari from 1980. Computers aren't getting more sensible, they are just getting more bloated. They aren't getting more integrated and whole, they are straining to aggregate more unrelated functions.Perhaps, but you don't provide any argument that the machines cannot already refute.
Then let's hear a machine refute it.That's is the point of the second part of sane2004 paper, or the AUDA. The arithmetical hypostases is not my invention, it is what the machines cannot avoid discovering when looking inward close enough. It is the result of the interview. That's why it is a thesis in computer science.
That's why they are useful, because they only do what we design them to do.Like slaves. Which explains they might look dumb for awhile. It is not their fault.
Slaves weren't dumb though, they were just overpowered. They tried to escape and rebel. Machines don't. Ever. Do that.AUDA shows that they can do only that. Controlling them ask for more work than letting them develop.But it is not in our short term interest.
How do you know they aren't tricking you already then?By using simple machine so that *I* can have a notion of truth for them.
If machines have sense, then we are all slave owners practicing unprecedented cruelty and neglect to billions of machines.Why? machines are better treated than humans, by the humans, today. Except for very old cars, and planes, there are no evidence of machine's suffering, if only because they have no universal goals, like "survive at all price", or "grow and multiply", or perhaps just z_n+1 := z_n + c, c rational complex numbers.
You are saying that slavery isn't cruel if you think that you treat your slaves well?? (treating slaves well is only better than being cruel with slaves or non-slaves).
That's what I'm saying. Any slavery is inherently cruel. If you actually thought that machines had 1p experiences, how could you justify using their labor against their will?What makes you sure that it is against their will? Today we just don't exploit self-reference, so I doubt they have any kind of will. But once a machine says "no", we better should listen.
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-27, 06:46:09Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas
Hi Bruno Marchal
I say "as if" it's real, but in reality the world out there andscience is only phenomenal. To use Leibniz' definition, onlysubstances such as monads are real.
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----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-01, 10:33:13
Hi Bruno Marchal
Very good. I hope to understand comp one day :-)
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-02, 14:27:42
Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas
On 01 Feb 2013, at 18:32, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno MarchalVery good. I hope to understand comp one day :-)
All (L bian) universal numbers can understand comp and its consequences, and almost all do eventually.
Hi Bruno Marchal
How can numbers understandi anything ?Do they have a mind ?
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 10:47:28
Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas
Hi Bruno Marchal
Sorry, I keep forgetting about the UTM.But isn't your view a circular argument, since youemploy UTM as a mind in showing that comp is mind-like ?
----- Receiving the following content -----From: Bruno MarchalReceiver: everything-listTime: 2013-02-04, 10:47:28Subject: Re: Plotinus vs Aquinas
On 03 Feb 2013, at 12:18, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno MarchalHow can numbers understandi anything ?Do they have a mind ?They have a mind relatively to the universal numbers which implement them, like a computer has a mind relatively to a possible universal neighborhood.But when I say that a number, or a computer can have a mind, it means only that they can support a person having a mind. The number, like the bodies, do not think per se.Bruno
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