The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
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Roger Clough
Oct 18, 2012, 9:17:10 PM10/18/12
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Hi Craig
Thanks very much for your comments Craig. I still need to digest
them.
Meanwhile, a flood of new ideas came to me and I just want to set them
down.
There are no doubt mistakes, esp. with regard to subjective/objective.
The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.2
I Firstness
object
substance perception (quale)
aesthetics beauty
1st person
feeling subjective
II Secondness sign
monad
thought
logic
truth 2nd
person thinking
subj/obj
III Thirdness interprant supreme
monad
expression
morality
goodness 3rd
person
doing objective
It appears that Peirce's three categories match the Leibniz monadic structures
as follows:
I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale
II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance.
In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object .
In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective.
III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads.
In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are "predicates of predicates",
where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive.
then the overall object might be animal-->dog-->brown.
Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible
predicates.
I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective
and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective.
So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/18/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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Craig Weinberg
Oct 20, 2012, 3:33:54 PM10/20/12
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Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher-Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AAAAAAAAAZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg
That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way.
The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios:
I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, Time
to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:
IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance...fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities...information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation)
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539
Craig
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 9:18:50 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like Lower-Self/Higher-Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there. Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AAAAAAAAAZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg
That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way.
The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios:
I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, Time
to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:
IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance...fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities...information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation)
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539
Craig
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 9:18:50 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
Roger Clough
Oct 21, 2012, 7:18:00 AM10/21/12
to everything-list
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find
such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature.
This stuff is hard to get a hold of.
CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia.
This stuff is hard to get a hold of.
CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia.
Thinking is a meta-quale of
feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of
thinking (how it works).
In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!).
But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.
CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and
In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!).
But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.
CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and
substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body
distinction. What you have is like
Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects
kind of shoehorned in there.
Once you see matter as
a public extension and self as a private intention, then
Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
ROGER: Yes, distinction is another form of
basic thought. But that requires the ability to compare.
CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AAAAAAAAAZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg
That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way.
The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios:
I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, Time
ROGER: I could see it, but couldn't see how to interpret it, but's thats
OK.
The categories, like Hegel's dialectic, seem to be
a basic take on existence,
So no doubt there are many approaches to defining
them, yours included.
CRAIG: to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:
IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance...
fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment
capacities...
information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy
through sense participation)
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539
ROGER: I welcome your thoughts on this. But as for myself, I try to keep
things as simple as possible.
The truth is that actually I had a serior
moment when I wrote "morality".
I should have recalled a better term, Ethics. That
has to do with
law and doing, both typical of
III.
CRAIG: Craig
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 9:18:50 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig
Thanks very much for your comments Craig. I still need to digest them.
Meanwhile, a flood of new ideas came to me and I just want to set them down.
There are no doubt mistakes, esp. with regard to subjective/objective.
The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.2
I Firstness object substance perception (quale) aesthetics beauty 1st person feeling subjective
II Secondness sign monad thought logic truth 2nd person thinking subj/obj
III Thirdness interprant supreme monad expression morality goodness 3rd person doing objective
It appears that Peirce's three categories
match the Leibniz monadic structures
as follows:
I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale
II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance.
In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object .
In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective.
III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads.
In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are "predicates of predicates",
where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive.
then the overall object might be animal-->dog-->brown.
Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible
predicates.
I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective
and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective.
So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/18/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
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as follows:
I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale
II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance.
In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object .
In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective.
III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads.
In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are "predicates of predicates",
where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive.
then the overall object might be animal-->dog-->brown.
Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible
predicates.
I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective
and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective.
So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/18/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
--
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Craig Weinberg
Oct 21, 2012, 10:06:21 AM10/21/12
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On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature.
This stuff is hard to get a hold of.
It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc)
CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia.
Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works).
In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!).
But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.
A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday:
What exactly is a thought?
A thought is a private, personal, directly participatory narrative subjective experience which is typically expressed in a verbal-gestural sense modality (as words or feelings easily converted to words by an agency of proprietary interior voice). Thoughts can be discerned from images, awareness, and perception by their potential purposefulness; they serve as the seeds for public action. Generally public actions which are understood to be voluntary are assumed to be the consequence of private thoughts. Behaviors which are ‘thoughtless’ are deemed to be unconscious, subconscious, accidental, or socially impaired.
CRAIG: That puts the whole subjective enchilada as Firstness and leaves objects and
substance to Secondness. This is Self-Body distinction. What you have is like
Lower-Self/Higher- Self distinction but with objects kind of shoehorned in there.
Once you see matter as a public extension and self as a private intention, then
Thirdness arises as the spatiotemporal interaction of formation and information.
ROGER: Yes, distinction is another form of basic thought. But that requires the ability to compare.
First you have to be able to distinguish things before you can compare them, otherwise what would you be comparing?
CRAIG: That outlines one way of slicing the pizza. I don't know if you can see this but here:
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Xz8OmKGPEjE/UIL6EtVeBEI/AAAAAAAAAZ4/iBhuMxBj9oU/s1600/trio_sml_entropy.jpg
That gives a better idea of the syzygy effect of the big picture, how they overlap in different ways and set each other off in a multi-sense way.
The Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness relate respectively to the respective trios:
I. Sense, Motive
II. Matter, Energy,
III. Space, TimeROGER: I could see it, but couldn't see how to interpret it, but's thats OK.The categories, like Hegel's dialectic, seem to be a basic take on existence,So no doubt there are many approaches to defining them, yours included.CRAIG: to get to morality, you have to look at the black and white:
IV. Signal (escalating significance), Entropy aka Ent ntr rop opy (attenuating significance...fragmentation and redundancy obstructs discernment capacities...information entropy generates thermodynamic entropy through sense participation)
I did a post on this today, but it's pretty intense: http://s33light.org/post/33951454539ROGER: I welcome your thoughts on this. But as for myself, I try to keep things as simple as possible.The truth is that actually I had a serior moment when I wrote "morality".I should have recalled a better term, Ethics. That has to do withlaw and doing, both typical of III.
In my view morality and ethics are manifestation of IV. It is distinct from law because it is not a scripted assumption of compliance, it is an internalized sensitivity to social considerations which drives law from above, rather than a consequence of the existence of a-signifying behavioral constraints. This is actually pretty important as it reveals why COMP is wrong and AGI will fail without biology.
Craig
Roger Clough
Oct 22, 2012, 2:58:47 AM10/22/12
to everything-list
Hi Craig Weinberg
Good. But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.
Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but
I myself want to know how thinking is done.
What is thinking ?
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/22/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-21, 10:06:21
Subject: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature.
This stuff is hard to get a hold of.
It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc)
CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia.
Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works).
In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!).
But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.
A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday:
What exactly is a thought?
A thought is a private, personal, directly participatory narrative subjective experience which is typically expressed in a verbal-gestural sense modality (as words or feelings easily converted to words by an agency of proprietary interior voice). Thoughts can be discerned from images, awareness, and perception by their potential purposefulness; they serve as the seeds for public action. Generally public actions which are understood to be voluntary are assumed to be the consequence of private thoughts. Behaviors which are ?houghtless? are deemed to be unconscious, subconscious, accidental, or socially impaired.
Good. But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.
Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but
I myself want to know how thinking is done.
What is thinking ?
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/22/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-21, 10:06:21
Subject: Re: Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 7:19:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
CRAIG: Cool Roger,
It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale.
ROGER: It is not uncommon to find such objective/subjective dyslexia in the literature.
This stuff is hard to get a hold of.
It can be, yeah, although my model makes it really easy. Subject and object are poles on a continuum, with private, proprietary, solipsistic, trans-rational sense qualities on the East (Orienting) end and public, generic, nihilistic, logical realism quantities on the Western end. In the center region between the two poles, subjectivity and objectivity are clearly discernible as inner and outer body/world perception (I call this the mundane fold as it is like a crease which acts as a barrier). In the edge region, the East and West actually meet in the sort of transcendental oblivion of subjective union with the ultimate (nirvana, satori, enlightenment, etc)
CRAIG: To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia.
Thinking is a meta-quale of feeling (which is a meta-quale of awareness>perception>sensation>sense)
ROGER: Actually I have yet to find a clear or useful definition of thinking (how it works).
In fact Wittgenstein at one point said that he does not know what thinking is (!).
But I believe you have to think if you compare objects across an equals sign,
so comparison (a dyad) seems to me to be a basic type of thinking.
A think a comparison is a basic type of everything. As luck would have it, I just posted this definition for what a thought is yesterday:
What exactly is a thought?
--
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Craig Weinberg
Oct 22, 2012, 8:49:32 AM10/22/12
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On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:00:29 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
Good. But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.
Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but
I myself want to know how thinking is done.
What is thinking ?
Thinking, strictly speaking, doesn't have a what or a how. Thinking has a who and a why. How do you move your arm? How does something funny make you laugh? These are experienced events which can be caused by physiological events or the physiological events can be caused by experience. They are the same thing, only one view is public facing and reduced to objects in space and the other is private facing and lacking certain description. Thinking is a trick which allows us to personally experience what we could otherwise could not personally experience. It is virtual or meta-feeling; an algebraic substitution of feeling: It is the experience of "If there is an experience of X".
Craig
Roger Clough
Oct 22, 2012, 9:50:28 AM10/22/12
to everything-list
Hi Bruno,
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.
Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
These obviously aren't going to be the same.
So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/_uLW2CRInCMJ.
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.
Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
These obviously aren't going to be the same.
So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
Jason Resch
Oct 23, 2012, 10:30:37 AM10/23/12
to everyth...@googlegroups.com
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Bruno,
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.
Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
These obviously aren't going to be the same.
So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
You could use this same argument to "disprove" the consciousness of every other person on earth.
Jason
Roger Clough
Oct 24, 2012, 7:33:30 AM10/24/12
to everything-list
Hi Jason Resch
No, have proven solipsism.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-23, 10:30:37
Subject: Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno,
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.
Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
These obviously aren't ?oing to be the same.
No, have proven solipsism.
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Jason Resch
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-23, 10:30:37
Subject: Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno,
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
Or I am drunk and it is sober.
Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
You could use this same argument to "disprove" the consciousness of every other person on earth.
Jason
You could use this same argument to "disprove" the consciousness of every other person on earth.
Jason
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Jason Resch
Oct 24, 2012, 12:13:23 PM10/24/12
to everyth...@googlegroups.com
On Oct 24, 2012, at 6:33 AM, "Roger Clough"<rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Jason Resch
>
> No, have proven solipsism.
Bruno Marchal
Oct 23, 2012, 9:38:47 AM10/23/12
to everyth...@googlegroups.com
On 22 Oct 2012, at 15:50, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> My own subjectivity is 1p.
> I don't believe a computer can
> have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
> consciousness as well.
mean a piece of hardware, then, like a brain, or like a liver, he does
not think. It is the person processed by the computer which is the
thinker. This is not even just a higher level program, it is a program
embedded in a "true" complex arithmetical realization.
>
> Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
>
> But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
> -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
> Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
> Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
> Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
> Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
> Or I am drunk and it is sober.
>
> Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
> The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
>
> These obviously aren't going to be the same.
> So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
if the computer is an imitation at the correct substititution level of
your actual drunk brain of a Leinizian pagan having travel a lot, you
will be Roger Clough, having just a new digital artificial brain, and
you might not even be aware of teh change, as you have not yet see the
detail of the bill.
If 3p = 3p' at the substitution level (which comp assumes to exist)
then 1p = 1p'.
Note that the contrary is false. 1p = 1p' does not entail 3p = 3p'.
The 3ps can be different below the substitution level.
Bruno
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