Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

[Alberto G. Corona]

Space and time may be a perception of the mind in the Kantian sense. I don´t find that space must be independent of the mind.  space and time may be the way  we perceive a space-time manifold which is pure mathematical and nothing else. Maybe we can see space out there and we can think on geometrical figures in space (not algebraically)  because we have space-mode rasoning on the mind, not because space is pre-existent to the mind, neither because space is something in mathematics, because space is described in math without gemetry.

And may be that the autopoietic computation, in the forms of natural selection, life and mind are trajectories in the space-time manifold, which, when looked closely form outside space-time,  they are nothing but fortunate collisions of particle trajectories and molecules so that entropy stay controlled along these lines, with no reason but fortunate manifold structure and fortunate initial conditions.  But looked from inside it appears to have phenomena like matter space, causality, termodinamic irreversibility, time, minds etc.

--
Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:48, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Space and time may be a perception of the mind in the Kantian sense. I don´t find that space must be independent of the mind.  space and time may be the way  we perceive a space-time manifold which is pure mathematical and nothing else. Maybe we can see space out there and we can think on geometrical figures in space (not algebraically)  because we have space-mode rasoning on the mind, not because space is pre-existent to the mind, neither because space is something in mathematics, because space is described in math without gemetry.

And may be that the autopoietic computation, in the forms of natural selection, life and mind are trajectories in the space-time manifold, which, when looked closely form outside space-time,  they are nothing but fortunate collisions of particle trajectories and molecules so that entropy stay controlled along these lines, with no reason but fortunate manifold structure and fortunate initial conditions.  But looked from inside it appears to have phenomena like matter space, causality, termodinamic irreversibility, time, minds etc.

OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.

We have the logical entaiment:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.

It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).

This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Alberto G. Corona]

I Bruno.

I wanted to put geometry in the chain because materialists seems to base their firm belief in the fact that space is both in mathematics, in the reality and in the mind, so space it is the firm thing where "real" things are located. I try to show that  space is just our mental representation of a mathematical reality in R3 where information with survival value is  presented and "colored" . This information is the matter. and therefore space and matter is only on the mind.

Both chains can be alternative descriptions of the same cosmology (basically). since Arithmetic + computation unfold the set of all structures, including the ones with good properties of simplicity etc. for biology.   But there is an introduction of consciousness  in your chain that is lacking in the one I propose.  

I'm conscious that  mine is incomplete since the mind (or consciousness in your case) appears as a derivative and this is not so, since existence properly seen, is not possible without consciousness and therefore it must be more at the beginning of the chain by definition. 

A better chain would be, with (<->) in the two first steps since the mind or in your case consciousness is the selector of existence. n your case, I think that consciousness would "cause-back" Arithmetic and computation:

Math<-> Computation<-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

2013/1/13 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Alberto G. Corona

According to Kant, space and time are intuitions, not perceptions.


[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/13/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-12, 07:48:13
Subject: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter


Space and time may be a perception of the mind in the Kantian sense. I don? find that space must be independent of the mind. ?pace and time may be the way ?e perceive a space-time manifold which is pure mathematical and nothing else. Maybe we can see space out there and we can think on geometrical figures in space (not algebraically) ?ecause we have space-mode rasoning on the mind, not because space is?re-existent?o the mind, neither because space is something in mathematics, because space is described in math without gemetry.


And may be that the autopoietic computation, in the forms of natural selection, life and mind are trajectories in the space-time manifold, which, when looked closely form outside space-time, ?hey are nothing but fortunate collisions of particle trajectories and molecules so that entropy stay controlled along these lines, with no reason but fortunate manifold structure and fortunate initial conditions. ?ut looked from inside it appears to have phenomena like matter space, causality, termodinamic irreversibility, time, minds etc.


--
Alberto.

[Richard Ruquist]

On Sun, Jan 13, 2013 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> We have the logical entaiment:
>
> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical
> reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.
>
> It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical
> truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a
> self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).
>
> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.
>
> Bruno

Where dies the substitution level lie in this entainment?

[meekerdb]

On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and
> constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.
>
> We have the logical entaiment:
>
> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical
> reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.
>
> It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and in
> which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the global
> first person indeterminacy).
>
> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

But you stop one step too soon.

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter

-> human biology -> human consciousness -> arithmetic.

That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.

Brent

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

    This logical entailment seems to render consciousness to be an epiphenomena with no causal efficacy. How can the physical reality/matter level put any selective pressure on the sharing of dreams? You seem to be replicating Nietzsche's problem of recurrence.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

Hi,

I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that
there is something fundamental that has particular properties is
unscientific dogma'.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Craig Weinberg]

 <- Physics <- Chemistry <- Biology <- Efferent Motive <- Sense -^ Afferent Feeling ^ Awareness ^ Consciousness ^ Cognition ^ Theology ^ Philosophy ^ Logic ^ Math <-

On Saturday, January 12, 2013 7:48:13 AM UTC-5, Alberto G.Corona wrote:

Space and time may be a perception of the mind in the Kantian sense. I don´t find that space must be independent of the mind.  space and time may be the way  we perceive a space-time manifold which is pure mathematical and nothing else.

If something was purely mathematical, how could anything perceive it?
 

Maybe we can see space out there

We can't see space out there. We see colors and shapes which invite a spatial interpretation based on our experience of navigating our own body through a world of tangible bodies.
 

and we can think on geometrical figures in space (not algebraically)  because we have space-mode rasoning on the mind, not because space is pre-existent to the mind, neither because space is something in mathematics, because space is described in math without gemetry.

Is space inevitable in math without geometry, or is it just adapted to math from a geometric analysis of our bodily experience?


Craig
 

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Jan 2013, at 10:46, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

I Bruno.

I wanted to put geometry in the chain because materialists seems to base their firm belief in the fact that space is both in mathematics, in the reality and in the mind, so space it is the firm thing where "real" things are located. I try to show that  space is just our mental representation of a mathematical reality in R3 where information with survival value is  presented and "colored" . This information is the matter. and therefore space and matter is only on the mind.

That can be locally correct, but is part of what I want an explanation. Geometry, topology, analysis *and* physics should emerge from the arithmetical (notably from the "view from inside.

geometry is tricky because we have a qualia for the space of dimension 3 (and lower), but none for higher dimension, and I still don't know if this is a necessity or if it is contingent.

Can we hardwired a machine so that he could imagine, and have qualia, for higher than 3 dimensional space?

Both chains can be alternative descriptions of the same cosmology (basically). since Arithmetic + computation unfold the set of all structures,

Only the subjective structure. The "objective structure of those subjective structure" is beyond arithmetic. There is sort of "Skolem paradox". With comp, arithmetic got "inside views", and the content of those views are bigger than arithmetic. 

including the ones with good properties of simplicity etc. for biology.   But there is an introduction of consciousness  in your chain that is lacking in the one I propose.  

Consciousness is mind in the first person perspective.

I'm conscious that  mine is incomplete since the mind (or consciousness in your case) appears as a derivative and this is not so, since existence properly seen, is not possible without consciousness and therefore it must be more at the beginning of the chain by definition. 

Here I disagree,if only methodologically. Consciousness is too much interesting to be taken as an assumption. Computer science suggest an explantion of consciousness in term of the truth that machine cannot avoid, despite they remain unjustifiable. It is really the coupling consciousness/material-realities which emerges from the addition and multiplication of natural numbers.

A better chain would be, with (<->) in the two first steps since the mind or in your case consciousness is the selector of existence.

Like in the UD Argument. There is no "magic" involved. I assume comp, and derive from it. 

in your case, I think that consciousness would "cause-back" Arithmetic and computation:

Exactly: cause back, but not at the same logical state.

Math<-> Computation<-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

We have only dreams, strictly speaking, and we must justifies in detail why we can share some of them.

Bruno

2013/1/13 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:48, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Space and time may be a perception of the mind in the Kantian sense. I don´t find that space must be independent of the mind.  space and time may be the way  we perceive a space-time manifold which is pure mathematical and nothing else. Maybe we can see space out there and we can think on geometrical figures in space (not algebraically)  because we have space-mode rasoning on the mind, not because space is pre-existent to the mind, neither because space is something in mathematics, because space is described in math without gemetry.

And may be that the autopoietic computation, in the forms of natural selection, life and mind are trajectories in the space-time manifold, which, when looked closely form outside space-time,  they are nothing but fortunate collisions of particle trajectories and molecules so that entropy stay controlled along these lines, with no reason but fortunate manifold structure and fortunate initial conditions.  But looked from inside it appears to have phenomena like matter space, causality, termodinamic irreversibility, time, minds etc.

OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.

We have the logical entaiment:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.

It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).

This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Do you agree with the first seven step of UDA?

If you get them, you can understand that for each computations going
through your state, there is an infinity of "finer grained" (notably)
computations going through you state below your substitution level.
That is why if you look below, you get indirect information on the
"comp parallel computations", which all exists in arithmetic. We might
call them the 3-dreams. You next events are given by a probability
bearing on that continuum.

So the substitution level lies in the "computation-> consciousness",
and in "sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter".

OK?

Bruno

PS I will have to go soon ... Sorry for the comments delays.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Richard Ruquist]

Two substitution levels??? Are different things being substitutes at each level?

>
> Bruno
>
> PS I will have to go soon ... Sorry for the comments delays.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

[Bruno Marchal]

I guess you mean:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness ->

human arithmetic.

>
> That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.

It should not. It is the main assumption of the rationalist. A dogma
becomes a dogma when you are not *allow* to doubt it, only.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Not at all. Why? I don't see this at all. I have explained that consciousness has an important role of self-speeding ourself relatively to local universal numbers. It is a must for most self-moving entities.

How can the physical reality/matter level put any selective pressure on the sharing of dreams?

The physical is the making of the sharability. 

You seem to be replicating Nietzsche's problem of recurrence.

?

I give the theory, and how to derive both quanta and qualia from it. I am not sure I see the problem.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.

Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In
my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any
properties?

You have not been able to explain this, up to now.

Bruno



>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

>
>
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[Alberto G. Corona]

 'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

Then everything is unscientific. because no human knowledge can be expressed without unproven premises at the bottom.

Dogmas are not axioms neither premises, neither assumption, but the latter tend to become dogmas. This has been a constant in history no matter where it is applied.  

2013/1/15 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

--
Alberto.

[Bruno Marchal]

It is the same. But in computation->consciousness we just bet on its
existence, and in "dreams-matter" we look below the subst level. The "-
>" are not "physical causation", but are more like logical
entailment. The same subst. level can play different roles.

Bruno

>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> PS I will have to go soon ... Sorry for the comments delays.
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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>> li...@googlegroups.com.

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[meekerdb]

On 1/15/2013 5:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:02, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and
>>> constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.
>>>
>>> We have the logical entaiment:
>>>
>>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical
>>> reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.
>>>
>>> It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and
>>> in which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the
>>> global first person indeterminacy).
>>>
>>> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.
>>
>> But you stop one step too soon.
>>
>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical
>> reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> arithmetic.
>
> I guess you mean:
>
> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical
> reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> human arithmetic.

No, I meant "arithmetic" - although somewhat tongue-in-cheek. I think people invented
arithmetic and so it makes a nice loop, I might even say a virtuous circle. Something
like being in that circle is what it means to exist and what excludes the 'white rabbits'
and 'Boltzmann brains' which "exist" in the mathematical sense of satisfying some
propositional function.

Brent

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

I am amazed at your inability to understand this very simple idea.
It is just the generalization of what we see in the additive identity in
arithmetic, X - X = 0. Have you not understood the idea that Russell
Standish discusses in his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in
his book is a great example of the concept that I am using. When one
imagines a substance that has *all possible properties*, there would
always be properties within such that are equal and opposite to others
such that they cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition.
This idea also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the
positive numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero.
I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology, but
the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes have
anti-processes that would cancel them.

>
> You have not been able to explain this, up to now.

I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
considered to have specific and definite properties if there does not
exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be coherent in
out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our primitives have
specific properties innately. All properties are the result of the act
of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily the most primitive.
This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the result
of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness and thus
imagine that numbers have specific properties innately. One might try to
justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of well foundedness and
regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and others have pointed out,
consciousness requires non-well foundedness - self-reference - and so
the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an intentional blindness.



--
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

On 1/15/2013 9:13 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

Then everything is unscientific. because no human knowledge can be expressed without unproven premises at the bottom.

Dogmas are not axioms neither premises, neither assumption, but the latter tend to become dogmas. This has been a constant in history no matter where it is applied.  

Dear Alberto,

    I argue that we can test the results of these dogmas, axioms and other assumed-to-be-true concepts by their logical consequences in models of the theories that can be formed from them. We just have to give up the idea that we can have absolute and infallible knowledge and accept partial and approximate notions of truth. We can see in the history of mathematics and science how is is the weakening of absolutist assumptions that has lead us to better knowledge of the world, so why do we keep kicking against the pricks?

   

2013/1/15 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Alberto G. Corona]

Yep.

May be because as I say from time to time, we can not live without dogmas or else there would be no human collaboration, so no human society could exist whatsoever. The mind was made for that purpose,. Then innately, its notion of truth is not neutral, it is linked to values. We can not avoid that.  That´s why assumptions or premises, slowly become dogmas. 

There are funny examples. Democracy for example, can not be just a convenient (or the most convenient) way of organizing a society. Once formulated, and specially among the people that do not accept other dogmas, Inmediately the democatic principle becomes a dogma an a source of wishdom. so the democratic decissions can not go wrong. Many people says: The people can not go wrong!!

economy and simplicity homogeneity principle

2013/1/16 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>

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Alberto.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Alberto G. Corona

These days, anything that smacks of authority is trashed.


[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/16/2013

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-16, 03:51:58
Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter


Yep.
May be because as I say from time to time, we can not live without dogmas or else there would be no human collaboration, so no human society could exist whatsoever. The mind was made for that purpose,. Then innately, its notion of truth is not neutral, it is linked to values. We can not avoid that. ?hat? why assumptions or premises, slowly become dogmas.?

There are funny examples. Democracy for example, can not be just a convenient (or the most convenient) way of organizing a society. Once formulated, and specially among the people that do not accept other dogmas, Inmediately the democatic principle becomes a dogma an a source of wishdom. so the democratic decissions can not go wrong. Many people says: The people can not go wrong!!












economy and simplicity homogeneity principle



2013/1/16 Stephen P. King

On 1/15/2013 9:13 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

?'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.


Then everything is unscientific. because no human knowledge can be expressed without?nproven?remises at the bottom.


Dogmas are not axioms neither premises, neither assumption, but the latter tend to become dogmas. This has been a constant in history no matter where it is applied. ?




Dear Alberto,

?? I argue that we can test the results of these dogmas, axioms and other assumed-to-be-true concepts by their logical consequences in models of the theories that can be formed from them. We just have to give up the idea that we can have absolute and infallible knowledge and accept partial and approximate notions of truth. We can see in the history of mathematics and science how is is the weakening of absolutist assumptions that has lead us to better knowledge of the world, so why do we keep kicking against the pricks?

??


2013/1/15 Bruno Marchal

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.

I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia,
which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1.
A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before,
and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers
are distinguished by context.

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/16/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-15, 08:51:12

Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi Alberto G. Corona

These days, anything that smacks of authority is trashed.

Possibly because of information spreading on the Internet. (Most) authority thrives on the ignorance of its victims. It's becoming common place for dictatorships to restrict Internet access when they feel threatened.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Telmo Menezes

I think that according to the definition below, authority implies
a power greater than you are. Pride tells you that you are the greater power.
Thus ignorant and uncaring pride seems to be the source of all injustice.

authority
n pl -ties
1. the power or right to control, judge, or prohibit the actions of others
2. (often plural) a person or group of people having this power, such as a government, police force, etc.
3. a position that commands such a power or right (often in the phrase in authority)
4. such a power or right delegated, esp from one person to another; authorization she has his authority
5. the ability to influence or control others a man of authority
6. an expert or an authoritative written work in a particular field he is an authority on Ming china
7. evidence or testimony we have it on his authority that she is dead
8. confidence resulting from great expertise the violinist lacked authority in his cadenza
9. (Government, Politics & Diplomacy) (capital when part of a name) a public board or corporation exercising governmental
authority in administering some enterprise Independent Broadcasting Authority
10. (Law) Law
a. a judicial decision, statute, or rule of law that establishes a principle; precedent
b. legal permission granted to a person to perform a specified act
[from French autority, from Latin auctoritas, from auctor author]

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/16/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-16, 07:18:28
Subject: Re: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Alberto G. Corona

These days, anything that smacks of authority is trashed.



Possibly because of information spreading on the Internet. (Most) authority thrives on the ignorance of its victims. It's becoming common place for dictatorships to restrict Internet access when they feel threatened.

?

[Bruno Marchal]

Nice circle, but it is as vicious as virtuous, assuming comp. The idea
that people invented arithmetic does not make sense to me. The reason
why white rabbits are not appearant is that QM emerges from the
"inside" of any Turing complete theory.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.
>>
>> It should not. It is the main assumption of the rationalist. A
>> dogma becomes a dogma when you are not *allow* to doubt it, only.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>

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[Bruno Marchal]

You need to assume properties to get X - X = 0. Or you need to assume
that X - X = 0, which will be an elementary property.

> Have you not understood the idea that Russell Standish discusses in
> his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in his book is a great
> example of the concept that I am using. When one imagines a
> substance that has *all possible properties*, there would always be
> properties within such that are equal and opposite to others such
> that they cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition.
> This idea also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the
> positive numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero.
> I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology,
> but the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes
> have anti-processes that would cancel them.
>
>
>>
>> You have not been able to explain this, up to now.
>
> I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
> kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
> something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
> considered to have specific and definite properties if there does
> not exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be
> coherent in out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our
> primitives have specific properties innately. All properties are the
> result of the act of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily
> the most primitive.

That is solipsism.

> This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
> distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the
> result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness
> and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.

I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming
elementary properties. If you assume consciousness at the start (which
might make sense in some non-comp theory) you have to assume for
consciousness that it has the elementary property to make distinction
(and this is already more than arithmetic).

> One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of
> well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and
> others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well foundedness
> - self-reference - and so the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an
> intentional blindness.

Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the recursion
theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory, you are
definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed for comp,
and you are definitely assuming elementary properties contradicting
your claim.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.
>
> I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia,
> which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1.
> A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before,
> and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers
> are distinguished by context.

I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen.
Note that we are distinguished by context too.

Bruno

>> To post to this group, send email to everything-
>> li...@googlegroups.com.

[Richard Ruquist]

On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
>> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
>> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.

Indeed. I conjecture that every single monad is distinct
given the vast string landscape of monad possibilities.
Distinctness appears to be more primative than the monad.
Richard

>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
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>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
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>>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>

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[Stephen P. King]

On 1/16/2013 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
>> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
>> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.
>>
>> I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia,
>> which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1.
>> A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before,
>> and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers
>> are distinguished by context.
>
> I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen.
> Note that we are distinguished by context too.
>
> Bruno

Hi,

There is no context or figure-ground relation at the primitive
level as such would be a distinction that makes no difference. To who or
what would such matter? Even consciousness cannot be primitive, as it is
distinct from non-consciousness.. Property neutrality is a necessary
condition for ontological primitivity.

The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (of Leibniz) is exactly
what I base my claim upon. In the absence of an agent to affect
distinctions or to have a bias of a point of view, all properties
vanish. Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my
proposal that existence is necessary possiblity. When we consider the
nature of ontological primitives and understand that we are considering
what must occur in the situation where there is no special or
preternatural agent to distinguish a 1 from a 2, for example, then it
follows that even the property of being a number becomes degenerate.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

Yes, at our level we must assume an a priori background of
differentiated property bundles (objects), this is just so that we can
communicate with each other.

>
>> Have you not understood the idea that Russell Standish discusses in
>> his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in his book is a great
>> example of the concept that I am using. When one imagines a substance
>> that has *all possible properties*, there would always be properties
>> within such that are equal and opposite to others such that they
>> cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition. This idea
>> also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the positive
>> numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero.
>> I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology,
>> but the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes
>> have anti-processes that would cancel them.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> You have not been able to explain this, up to now.
>>
>> I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
>> kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
>> something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
>> considered to have specific and definite properties if there does not
>> exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be coherent in
>> out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our primitives have
>> specific properties innately. All properties are the result of the
>> act of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily the most primitive.
>
> That is solipsism.

Certainly! That is not a disqualification. Any entity that has no
ability to know anything other than itself, is by definition
solipsistic. The question that is relevant here is whether or not such
an entity can come to be able to bet that its existence is not alone. I
cannot know what it is like to be Bruno nor you can know what it is like
to be Stephen, but there is sufficient overlap between our "dreams" to
construct a measure of similarity and difference between us. This is a
local condition, not a global imposition.

>
>> This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
>> distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the
>> result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness
>> and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.
>
> I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming
> elementary properties.

This is ontology, not symbolic logic. I am arguing in a different
category.

> If you assume consciousness at the start (which might make sense in
> some non-comp theory) you have to assume for consciousness that it has
> the elementary property to make distinction (and this is already more
> than arithmetic).

This is inconsistent in a ontological theory as I have pointed out
before.

>
>> One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of
>> well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and
>> others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well foundedness
>> - self-reference - and so the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an
>> intentional blindness.
>
> Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the recursion
> theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory, you are
> definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed for comp,
> and you are definitely assuming elementary properties contradicting
> your claim.

Representationally, numbers do the job well, but I am trying to get
'under' the numbers. I see numbers as a derivative of actions, not as
ontological primitives, but they can be used, retroactively, to
represent knowledge and relations. This is simply because as
representations, numbers can represent themselves; unlike matter...

>


--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

That is solipsism, and you have to assume a basic consciousness, which
is what I search an explanation for. Also, it contradicts comp. Also,
without assumeing something Turing universal, you will not been able
to have computers in your reality, so a theory which assumes not
elementary properties to its basic object will be mud unable to
explain where the consciousness of the distinction come from.

> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
> that existence is necessary possiblity.

Existence of what.
"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which
modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal
logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one
standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.

> When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and understand
> that we are considering what must occur in the situation where there
> is no special or preternatural agent to distinguish a 1 from a 2,
> for example, then it follows that even the property of being a
> number becomes degenerate.

Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe, but
you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Glad to hear so.

OK. But above leads to doctrinal solipsism.

>
>>
>>> This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
>>> distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the
>>> result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness
>>> and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.
>>
>> I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming
>> elementary properties.
>
> This is ontology, not symbolic logic. I am arguing in a different
> category.

You are mystifying "ontology". That's bad philosophy.

>
>> If you assume consciousness at the start (which might make sense in
>> some non-comp theory) you have to assume for consciousness that it
>> has the elementary property to make distinction (and this is
>> already more than arithmetic).
>
> This is inconsistent in a ontological theory as I have pointed
> out before.
>
>>
>>> One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of
>>> well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and
>>> others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well
>>> foundedness - self-reference - and so the appeal to well
>>> foundedness is maybe an intentional blindness.
>>
>> Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the
>> recursion theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory,
>> you are definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed
>> for comp, and you are definitely assuming elementary properties
>> contradicting your claim.
>
> Representationally, numbers do the job well, but I am trying to
> get 'under' the numbers. I see numbers as a derivative of actions,
> not as ontological primitives, but they can be used, retroactively,
> to represent knowledge and relations. This is simply because as
> representations, numbers can represent themselves; unlike matter...

?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Perhaps a simpler version of the argument against duplicates
is that a substance is defined as a subject, possibly with a predicate or predicates.
If two or more of these entities are the same, they are the same substance,
which converts a duplicate into a single entity. Hence one , no longer two.
Thus duplicates cannot be sustained.

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/17/2013

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2013-01-17, 07:16:49

Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Stephen P. King

A monad is blind, and so does not know the location in space of
his physical body, so he must trust the PEH, which is his eyes and
his guiding spirit, to lead him on safe paths. Psalm 23.
In this Best of All Possible Worlds, there's no guarantees, but
being blind, what else can he do but trust in his PEH guide ?

All he knows is what his guiding spirit tells him, which can
be the whole universe, but L says somewhere that the monad
has limited and distorted vision (he's perhaps only technically blind)
and can only see what's "nearby". So the monad does not where he is,
but he does know similar monads, wherever they be. And by "know"
he can sense their feelings and even read their minds to some extent.
So a given monad will find himself mentally and emotionally among the
strangers that fate (the PEH) has decided to link him to.

The problem of being a monad is that monads are always competing
with one another, such that a more dominant one will beat down a
weaker one. On the other hand, perhaps his guiding spirit will
limit such actions. Etc.

This is a my personal rendering of L's Theodicy, at least in part.

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]
1/17/2013

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-16, 17:45:42

Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter

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[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or
'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away by
the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask you:
Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell
Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same basic idea, IMHO.

>
>
>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
>> that existence is necessary possiblity.
>
> Existence of what.

Anything.

> "Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which
> modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal
> logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one
> standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.

Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?

>
>
>
>> When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and understand
>> that we are considering what must occur in the situation where there
>> is no special or preternatural agent to distinguish a 1 from a 2, for
>> example, then it follows that even the property of being a number
>> becomes degenerate.
>
> Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe, but
> you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent.

Wrong level.



--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
things to make sense.

You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but
you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.

>
>>
>>
>>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
>>> that existence is necessary possiblity.
>>
>> Existence of what.
>
> Anything.

That's the object of inquiry.

>
>> "Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which
>> modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the
>> modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the
>> only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.
>
> Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?

With Kripke:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in
at least one world accessible from alpha.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in all the worlds accessible from alpha.

The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and
"metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds
accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the
accessibility relation:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in
at least one world.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in all the worlds.

In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth value of
p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:

[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p

(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and reciprocally
S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation rule (p/ []p), and
classical propositional calculus) is complete for all formula true
(whatever values taken by the propositional variable) in all worlds.

To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to
accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly abstract
metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics, worlds (states,
whatever) get special relations with other worlds (accessibility,
proximity, etc.).

Bruno

>
>>
>>
>>
>>> When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and
>>> understand that we are considering what must occur in the
>>> situation where there is no special or preternatural agent to
>>> distinguish a 1 from a 2, for example, then it follows that even
>>> the property of being a number becomes degenerate.
>>
>> Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe,
>> but you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent.
>
> Wrong level.
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>

[Stephen P. King]

On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>> I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or
>> 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away by
>> the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask you:
>> Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell
>> Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same basic idea,
>> IMHO.
>
> An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
> things to make sense.

Dear Bruno,

Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that this
word points to a concept?

>
> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but
> you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.

You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for me.
I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the thesis of
Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he describes?

>
>>
>>>
>>>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
>>>> that existence is necessary possiblity.
>>>
>>> Existence of what.
>>
>> Anything.
>
> That's the object of inquiry.

OK, so go to the next step. Is the existence of a mind precede the
existence of what it might have as thoughts?

Good, we agree on those concepts, but we need to get back to the
impasse we have over the concept of Nothing (which I am equating to the
neutral ontological primitive) and my argument against your claim that
numbers can be ontological primitives.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>
>>> I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing
>>> or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted
>>> away by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me
>>> just ask you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of
>>> Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for
>>> the same basic idea, IMHO.
>>
>> An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
>> things to make sense.
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
> Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
> book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that this
> word points to a concept?

Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It
makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.

>
>
>>
>> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times,
>> but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't
>> help.
>
> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
> me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
> thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
> describes?

Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
but that can evolve.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my
>>>>> proposal that existence is necessary possiblity.
>>>>
>>>> Existence of what.
>>>
>>> Anything.
>>
>> That's the object of inquiry.
>
> OK, so go to the next step. Is the existence of a mind precede
> the existence of what it might have as thoughts?

Yes.

Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
physical realities).

I will let Russell agree or not with this. I have just no clue what
you mean by the "neutral ontological primitive", as you oppose it to
numbers, it cannot even make sense once we accept that our brain works
like a machine.

Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you
put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for
your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe
and Bergson, somehow.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>> On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>>
>>>> I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or
>>>> 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away
>>>> by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask
>>>> you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by
>>>> Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same
>>>> basic idea, IMHO.
>>>
>>> An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
>>> things to make sense.
>>
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>> Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
>> book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that this
>> word points to a concept?
>
> Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It
> makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.

Dear Bruno,

There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book that

is denoted by the word Nothing:

"There is a mathematical equivalence between the
Everything, as represented by this collection of all
possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
no information."

This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the
ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at all.
Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is the
neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of a well
founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as a special
case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless ontology
whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of Heraclitus, Bergson
and A.N. whitehead.

>
>>
>>>
>>> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but
>>> you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.
>>
>> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for me.
>> I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the thesis
>> of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he describes?
>
> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
> but that can evolve.

I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a
single level is causes only confusions.

>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my
>>>>>> proposal that existence is necessary possiblity.
>>>>>
>>>>> Existence of what.
>>>>
>>>> Anything.
>>>
>>> That's the object of inquiry.
>>
>> OK, so go to the next step. Is the existence of a mind precede the
>> existence of what it might have as thoughts?
>
> Yes.
>
> Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
> physical realities).

Dear Bruno,


I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well
except of special cases such as what you consider.

Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
| ^
| \
| \
| \
V \
Number ---> Universal Machine

All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
ontologically primitive than the rest.

Numbers have particular properties even as a category, they are
different from colors, for example. Thus this disqualifies them to be
ontologically fundamental.

>
> Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you
> put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for
> your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe
> and Bergson, somehow.

OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!




--
Onward!

Stephen

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Jan 20, 2013 at 01:53:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> > You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
> >me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
> >thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
> >describes?
>
> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
> but that can evolve.
>

In some sense, my work is not ontology, as I do not ask the question
"what is fundamental" like you two are doing. Indeed, I believe the
question to be largely meaningless (I had a long debate with Colin
Hales on this topic).

More on this later today, if I get time. I had some thoughts during
the night crystallising my understanding of the UDA.

I do acknowledge Bruno's point that set theory is already too
rich. Yet none of my work is based on controversial aspects of set
theory, such as the axiom of choice, so I don't see a big problem
here.

As for compatibility with COMP, UD* is already the Nothing I refer
to. I do use the uniform measure over the reals as a means for motivating
the use of Solomonoff-Levin's universal prior measure, and Bruno has
criticised this, however the S-L measure over the semantic space is
rather insensitive to the assumed measure over the underlying syntactic
space. It is, of course, an open problem whether the measure induced
by the universal dovetailer over UD* makes any difference, as that
measure has not been calculated. My gut feeling is that it wouldn't
make any difference, however.


--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Jan 2013, at 18:34, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>> On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>>>
>>>>> I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing
>>>>> or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted
>>>>> away by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me
>>>>> just ask you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of
>>>>> Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing
>>>>> for the same basic idea, IMHO.
>>>>
>>>> An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already
>>>> many things to make sense.
>>>
>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>
>>> Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
>>> book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that
>>> this word points to a concept?
>>
>> Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It
>> makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
> There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book that
> is denoted by the word Nothing:

But it is a meta notion. It is equivalent with "everything". It is the
main thema of this list. Assuming everything is conceptually clearer
than assuming any particular things.
Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach, like
Everett-QM on physical reality.

>
> "There is a mathematical equivalence between the
> Everything, as represented by this collection of all
> possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
> no information."

You see.
But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you assume
(sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties without
which you can do nothing.

>
> This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the
> ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at
> all.

I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.

> Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is
> the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of
> a well founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as
> a special case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless
> ontology whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of
> Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.

Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to
assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.

>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times,
>>>> but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think,
>>>> doesn't help.
>>>
>>> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
>>> me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
>>> thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
>>> describes?
>>
>> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
>> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its
>> reversal, but that can evolve.
>
> I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a
> single level is causes only confusions.

This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA before)
explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.

>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my
>>>>>>> proposal that existence is necessary possiblity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Existence of what.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anything.
>>>>
>>>> That's the object of inquiry.
>>>
>>> OK, so go to the next step. Is the existence of a mind precede
>>> the existence of what it might have as thoughts?
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>> Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
>> physical realities).
> Dear Bruno,
>
>
> I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
> generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well
> except of special cases such as what you consider.
>
> Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
> | ^
> | \
> | \
> | \
> V \
> Number ---> Universal Machine
>
> All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
> ontologically primitive than the rest.

OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural numbers.
But they emerge trhough definition that the numbers cannot avoid when
looking at themselves, so it is misleading to make them assumed. Only
the definition is proposed.
I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.

There is no theory at all with a neutral ontology in your sense. Not
one.

>
>
>>
>> Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you
>> put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for
>> your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe
>> and Bergson, somehow.
>
> OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!

?
I don't do literary philosophy. Everything I say can be verified (and
has been verified by numerous people, some taking a long time to do
so, which is normal as the second part is technically demanding).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Jan 2013, at 23:57, Russell Standish wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 20, 2013 at 01:53:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
>>> me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
>>> thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
>>> describes?
>>
>> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
>> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
>> but that can evolve.
>>
>
> In some sense, my work is not ontology, as I do not ask the question
> "what is fundamental" like you two are doing. Indeed, I believe the
> question to be largely meaningless (I had a long debate with Colin
> Hales on this topic).

My point is that IF we are machine, then physics is 100% retrievable
by the math of the comp first person indeterminacy, making comp
testable (and partially tested).

>
> More on this later today, if I get time. I had some thoughts during
> the night crystallising my understanding of the UDA.
>
> I do acknowledge Bruno's point that set theory is already too
> rich. Yet none of my work is based on controversial aspects of set
> theory, such as the axiom of choice, so I don't see a big problem
> here.

No problem there, except that your assumption are not entirely clear,
but I have no doubt they can be made clearer. In part you build on an
intuition which I show to be necessary once we assume comp, so indeed
there is no problem.
To really compare you would need to formalised, but this would be a
long work in logic.

>
> As for compatibility with COMP, UD* is already the Nothing I refer
> to.

This is not alway clear. Of course UD*, or the equivalent sigma_1
truth (the tiny part of elementary arithmetic) is a nothing in the
sense of "no physical reality", but this is not nothingness with
respect to the mathematical assumption. I insist on this for Stephen.
Assuming UD* is equivalent with assuming elementary arithmetic, or the
axioms:

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x

> I do use the uniform measure over the reals

What is the *uniform* measure on the reals? I am not sure this makes
sense.

> as a means for motivating
> the use of Solomonoff-Levin's universal prior measure, and Bruno has
> criticised this, however the S-L measure over the semantic space is
> rather insensitive to the assumed measure over the underlying
> syntactic
> space.

What do you mean by "semantic space". The book did not help me too
much on this.
The physics is very sensitive to the measure of the comp histories in
the UD*, but only thanks to its super-redundancy. Indeed: physics *is*
the measure.

Solomonof approach (certainly good for doing inductive inference, and
he does not pretend to do anything else) is of no use to extract
physics, as his measure compress the redundancy into the non-computable.

Chaitin's number can be seen as the compression (the suppression of
all redundancy) of Post number (where the ith digit tells if the ith
machine stops or not).

> It is, of course, an open problem whether the measure induced
> by the universal dovetailer over UD* makes any difference, as that
> measure has not been calculated.

We don't need to calculate it to understand that such a measure is
equivalent with the physical laws. Comp makes physics a measure
theory, and this is arguably the case for quantum mechanics. That is
not an open problem.
I am not sure we talk about the same measure. I show that physics is
equal to the computationalist first person indeterminacy measure on
UD*. different measure will give different physics, that is different
probabilities for the result of the experiments we can do.

Solomonof approach can make sense for the study of biological
evolution, as it is non computable, but still limit computable. the
first person indeterminacy is a priori much less computable (not even
limit-computable), but it is the one we are living, and the overall
logic bearing on the indeterminacy domain can be found without any
algorithm to compute it; and it has been found: it is the Z1* and X1*
logic, probably S4Grz1, which all gives an arithmetical quantization.
It is just an open problem if this gives rise to quantum computation
in our most probable neighborhoods.

Bruno

> My gut feeling is that it wouldn't
> make any difference, however.
>
>
> --
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Bruno,

Of course it is a meta-notion! I am wrestling with metaphysics
after all! I am interested in the philosophical notions that underpin
mathematics and physics.

> It is equivalent with "everything".

Sure. The point is that unless there is a selective bias on that
collection of Everything, we cannot claim that Everything has any
particular properties to the exclusion of other possible properties. We
are forced to say that Everything has *all possible* properties
simultaneously or, equivalently as Prof. Standish shows, that it has no
properties at all.

> It is the main thema of this list. Assuming everything is conceptually
> clearer than assuming any particular things.
> Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach, like
> Everett-QM on physical reality.

And that makes it just one of many possible ways to obtain
ontological theories that one can build coherent explanations upon. ;-)

>
>>
>> "There is a mathematical equivalence between the
>> Everything, as represented by this collection of all
>> possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
>> no information."
>
> You see.
> But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you assume
> (sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties without
> which you can do nothing.

Correct, and we cannot ignore the role of change in our "doings".

>>
>> This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the
>> ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at all.
>
> I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.

Try harder! Guess some meaning and see if it 'works'.

>
>> Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is
>> the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of a
>> well founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as a
>> special case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless
>> ontology whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of
>> Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.
>
> Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to
> assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.

Sure, but that works within the domain of human discourse. We
formulate explanations for each other and ourselves, this does not
require that our explanation be anything more than "just so' stories
that we comfort each other with.

>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times,
>>>>> but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think,
>>>>> doesn't help.
>>>>
>>>> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
>>>> me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
>>>> thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
>>>> describes?
>>>
>>> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
>>> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
>>> but that can evolve.
>>
>> I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a
>> single level is causes only confusions.
>
> This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA before)
> explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.

OK, well can the same self-referencial logic be used to eliminate the
idea that there is a irriducible ontological ground that has some
particular properties associated with it? We can expand and contract
non-well founded logical structures as needed. ;-) The infinite regress
that so vexes ordinary logics becomes the flexibility that allows
self-referential structures to not depend on any particular configuration.

>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
>>> physical realities).
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>>
>> I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
>> generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well
>> except of special cases such as what you consider.
>>
>> Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
>> | ^
>> | \
>> | \
>> | \
>> V \
>> Number ---> Universal Machine
>>
>> All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
>> ontologically primitive than the rest.
>
> OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural numbers.

> But they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when

> looking at themselves, so it is misleading to make them assumed. Only
> the definition is proposed.

But you ignore the very process that is implied by your words
"...they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when
looking at themselves..". Looking is an action equivalent, I claim, to
the computation of a simulation of the content of what it is like to
experience that "looking". Can a number alone be a computer? Not if it
can't be implemented physically! A number is merely a representaqtion,
such can do many things, but they cannot be something that persists yet
changes in time. Physical objects have 'persistence in time'. Numbers,
only exist, they have no time or change associated with them.

> I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.

You would be wrong. my theory predicts a few concrete things! No
ghosts, white rabbits or zombies, for one thing.

This extensive article
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ must be just a figment
of many people's imagination...

>
>>
>>>
>>> Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you
>>> put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for
>>> your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe
>>> and Bergson, somehow.
>>
>> OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!
>
> ?
> I don't do literary philosophy.

I do not do literary philosophy either.

> Everything I say can be verified (and has been verified by numerous
> people, some taking a long time to do so, which is normal as the
> second part is technically demanding).

Good! So I might wonder why the physical existence of those people
seems to be denied in your claims of immaterial Arithmeticism. They are
all just dreams that exist with no explanation at all!



--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

I don't separate a priori those things.

>
>
>> It is equivalent with "everything".
>
> Sure. The point is that unless there is a selective bias on that
> collection of Everything, we cannot claim that Everything has any
> particular properties to the exclusion of other possible properties.
> We are forced to say that Everything has *all possible* properties
> simultaneously or, equivalently as Prof. Standish shows, that it has
> no properties at all.

The selective bias is explained by the first person indeterminacy. It
is a relative notion.
"Everything" is usually to big to have properties. What you say does

not make sense to me.



>
>

>> It is the main thema of this list. Assuming everything is
>> conceptually clearer than assuming any particular things.
>> Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach,
>> like Everett-QM on physical reality.
>
> And that makes it just one of many possible ways to obtain
> ontological theories that one can build coherent explanations
> upon. ;-)

Yes. But comp is quite general, (only one scientist believe in non-
comp, and a few philosophers), and, besides, I use comp to make thing
easier, as the consequences follows from quite string weakening of comp.

>
>>
>>>
>>> "There is a mathematical equivalence between the
>>> Everything, as represented by this collection of all
>>> possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
>>> no information."
>>
>> You see.
>> But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you
>> assume (sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties
>> without which you can do nothing.
>
> Correct,

That contradicts what you said before.

> and we cannot ignore the role of change in our "doings".

Sure. but computer science, and thus arithmetic, explains "change" and
"doing" quite well.

>
>
>>>
>>> This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of
>>> the ontologically primitive: that which has no particular
>>> properties at all.
>>
>> I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.
>
> Try harder! Guess some meaning and see if it 'works'.

I do that all the time. If I didn't I would have stopped to converse
with you. I do that up to the point where I can show that what you say
contradicts comp. Unfortunately, at that stage you try to save your
idea (in the comp context) by fuzzification, and then you lost me.

>
>>
>>> Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it
>>> is the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the
>>> assumption of a well founded or reductive ontology which I argue
>>> against except as a special case. Additionally, you consider a
>>> static and changeless ontology whereas I consider a process
>>> ontology, like that of Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.
>>
>> Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to
>> assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.
>
> Sure, but that works within the domain of human discourse. We
> formulate explanations for each other and ourselves, this does not
> require that our explanation be anything more than "just so' stories
> that we comfort each other with.

If that is what you seek then I understand better why you avoid
studying theories.

>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the
>>>>>> times, but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I
>>>>>> think, doesn't help.
>>>>>
>>>>> You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
>>>>> me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
>>>>> thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing"
>>>>> he describes?
>>>>
>>>> Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
>>>> acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its
>>>> reversal, but that can evolve.
>>>
>>> I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into
>>> a single level is causes only confusions.
>>
>> This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA
>> before) explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.
>
> OK, well can the same self-referencial logic be used to eliminate
> the idea that there is a irriducible ontological ground that has
> some particular properties associated with it?

This is total nonsense for me. Sorry.

> We can expand and contract non-well founded logical structures as
> needed. ;-)

You will still need to define an ontological background for those sets
to make sense. They will have elementary properties.

> The infinite regress that so vexes ordinary logics becomes the
> flexibility that allows self-referential structures to not depend on
> any particular configuration.

That's already the case. I use numbers only because they are familiar.
Any Turing universal system will do.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
>>>> physical realities).
>>> Dear Bruno,
>>>
>>>
>>> I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
>>> generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as
>>> well except of special cases such as what you consider.
>>>
>>> Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
>>> | ^
>>> | \
>>> | \
>>> | \
>>> V \
>>> Number ---> Universal Machine
>>>
>>> All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
>>> ontologically primitive than the rest.
>>
>> OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural
>> numbers. But they emerge through definitions that the numbers
>> cannot avoid when looking at themselves, so it is misleading to
>> make them assumed. Only the definition is proposed.
>
> But you ignore the very process that is implied by your words
> "...they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid
> when looking at themselves..". Looking is an action equivalent, I
> claim, to the computation of a simulation of the content of what it
> is like to experience that "looking". Can a number alone be a
> computer?

Yes. Relatively to the initial theory (like + and *). I will show that
precisely on FOAR some day.

> Not if it can't be implemented physically!

This does not work with comp, because "physically" is defined from
numbers and addition and multiplication.

> A number is merely a representaqtion, such can do many things, but
> they cannot be something that persists yet changes in time. Physical
> objects have 'persistence in time'. Numbers, only exist, they have
> no time or change associated with them.

They have, by the many relations that they have (atemporally) with
universal numbers.

>
>
>> I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.
>
> You would be wrong. my theory predicts a few concrete things! No
> ghosts, white rabbits or zombies, for one thing.

I have not seen your theory. You are usually angry when I ask for that
theory.

Let me quote the first paragraph, which says exactly what I tell you
since the beginning: mainly that "neutral" means neither physical nor
mental. Arithmetic is neither mental nor physical.

<<
Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in
agreement with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral
monism from its better known monistic rivals is the claim that the
intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical.
This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being
intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality
is said to be neutral between the two.
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/)

>>






>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery,
>>>> you put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad
>>>> press for your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same
>>>> mistake as Goethe and Bergson, somehow.
>>>
>>> OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!
>>
>> ?
>> I don't do literary philosophy.
>
> I do not do literary philosophy either.

Then make you theory into a semi-axiomatic system. But when you say
that your theory assume "existence" I see only prose.

>
>
>> Everything I say can be verified (and has been verified by numerous
>> people, some taking a long time to do so, which is normal as the
>> second part is technically demanding).
>
> Good! So I might wonder why the physical existence of those
> people seems to be denied in your claims of immaterial Arithmeticism.

I have never denied any physical existence. Only primary physical
existence.

> They are all just dreams that exist with no explanation at all!

I explain it entirely in the theory with two non logical axioms:

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x

I have explained this at length and continue to do this on FOAR. I am
not sure you have understood that I am literal here, with comp as
metatheory, everything is explained (or transform into a math problem)
from just the two axioms above. UDA has already proved that it must be
like that, and AUDA explains constructively how to do the derivation.

Bruno