Outline for a Semiotic Computationalism

[Roger Clough]

Outline for a Semiotic Computationalism

 

Semiotics is the science of symbols developed by CS Peirce.

Everything in the mind used to think is a symbol.

 

Computationalism or comp is the philosophical view that

the mind can be emulated by calculations, such as by a

computer, often using the natural numbers.  

 

To the semiotician, the world consists of extended things and

their inextended representations called signs. The physical and

the nonphysical. So not dissimilar to the world of Leibniz.

There are two related branches of the study of signs. One,

called semiotics, is more properly the study of the logic of signs,

is what I shall be addressing, and was developed by CS Peirce.

The other branch, called semiosis, was developed by Saussure.

It is the study of the application of signs (frequently words

or language) socially, in the world outside. A basic branch

of this study involves linguistics and the study of structures

in language.

 

So Peirce's semiotics is based on logical mental phenomena,

while Saussure's semioses deals with the use and

meanings of words and phrases socially in the world at large.

Semiotics, being logical, appears to me to be the proper branch to

study together with comp.

 

How could computationalism emulate the brain ?

 

Peirce is known to have borrowed some ideas from Locke,

the most likely one being Locke's philosophy of mind,

namely that the mind is a blank slate and that all knowledge

is obtained through the senses.

Comp could in fact provide such sensory signals if the

numbers of comp are converted to analog form signals

and interfaced to the brain. Presumably this is how

digital implants work.

So in principle comp could work.

A possibly workable scheme would begin with

comp forming signs or representations in the brain

with electrical signals. Then what ?

Then the life in the brain-- its intelligence-- takes over.

The resultant thinking would be semiotic:

the interpretation of such signs and manipulation of them

by this intelligence according to Peirce's logic system.

 

eg

 

(the Venn overlap of) S1 + S2 = S3

 

Thus a semiotic computationalism appears at least feasible.

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/1/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

[Craig Weinberg]

I'm a fan of semiotics as well. Not to be the nit-picking guy but, since we are talking about symbols and clear communication, it's not technically true to say that Peirce developed semiotics or that Saussure's work is called semiosis. I think of semoisis as referring to the actual process by which meaning is encoded and decoded in symbolic forms, while semiotics refers to the study of that process and its larger issues of interpreters, referents, and descriptions.

According to the wiki, Peirce actually introduced the word semiosis himself, and Locke came brought the word semiotics into use before Peirce.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiosis
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/semiotics

I agree that semiotics provides a good framework - a better framework than math or physics in my opinion with which to approach consciousness. The problem is that it also fails to 'go all the way' and account for the fundamental capacities which signs supervene on - namely consciousness itself.

Peirce said "Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign". Properly understood, this sentence reveals why no symbol, including those generated by processes in the brain or logical functions in a program can possibly be seen as a root source of consciousness. The capacity to interpret signs must prefigure semiotics, as it must prefigure Turing machines, arithmetic operators and numbers, physical forces and fields, quantum states and dynamics, etc.

you said "Comp could in fact provide such sensory signals if the

numbers of comp are converted to analog form signals

and interfaced to the brain. Presumably this is how

digital implants work."

If this were true, then there would have to be miniature plum orchards and baseball stadiums inside of the brain. At some point there would have to be a final decoding which could only be into the form of qualia that we actually experience. Otherwise there is metaphysical never-never land where qualia comes from.

Since we don't see any constructed qualia in the tissue of the brain - and again it's more than digital patterns being converted to analog signals, because odors and flavors don't work that way. There is no algebraic transformation or topology which inherently has an odor or a feeling. We know this because we can't put an odor on a computer screen, no matter how precisely the information associated with that aromatic experience is modeled. There is an insurmountable gulf between all mathematical models and all direct experiences. As Peirce says, signs must be interpreted as such, which means intentionality and awareness - whether it is on the human individual level or the level of a cell, molecule, machine, etc. No matter what it is, it has to have the capacity to participate in the world.

Digital implants work like a cane works for a blind person. They are prosthetic extensions through which the nervous system can adapt and utilize the foreign device as an antenna. There is a limit though, just as eyeglasses won't help someone who is completely blind, the structures of the brain through which support the experience of the individual person as a whole can't be replaced without killing off the person. I'm open to other arguments, but none that I have heard so far impress me as being plausible.

Craig

[Roger Clough]

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Good points, and I very much welcome your sharing of information and

discussion on Peirce, particularly:

 

1) Peirce said "Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign".

Fuuny you mention that, because last night I realized the same thing.

This is a serious problem for comp, because IMHO without

a living mind to interpret its calculations, the calculations are

stillborn. More precisely, a computer can only know things by

description (3p), not by acquaintance (1p), a computer having no 1p.

Which means that a computer only has theoretical access to Platonia (3p),

not actual access (1p), so although it can calculate numbers,

it cannot do anything there with those numbers.

 

On the other hand, semiotics has at least a theoretical 1p

since it has an interprant.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net]

12/2/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

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Subject: Re: Outline for a Semiotic Computationalism

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[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, December 2, 2012 6:49:01 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

 

Good points, and I very much welcome your sharing of information and

discussion on Peirce, particularly:

 

1) Peirce said "Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign".

Fuuny you mention that, because last night I realized the same thing.

This is a serious problem for comp, because IMHO without

a living mind to interpret its calculations, the calculations are

stillborn. More precisely, a computer can only know things by

description (3p), not by acquaintance (1p), a computer having no 1p.

Which means that a computer only has theoretical access to Platonia (3p),

not actual access (1p), so although it can calculate numbers,

it cannot do anything there with those numbers.

Thanks, yes all of these things tie together:

The Explanatory Gap,
The Symbol Grounding Problem (Leibniz Mill argument, Searle's Chinese Room, China Brain),
Incompleteness and logical paradox,
semiotics,
the Hard Problem,
Map-territory relation,
Use-mention distinction.

I did a photoshop this morning: http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_mef1gugpuU1qeenqko1_1280.jpg

It's about recognizing that, as Krishnamurti said, 'The description is not the described', but if it isn't, then what is it? Most people think that descriptions are 'information', but the more that we look at what that means, the more it becomes clear that information is nothing but an experience of being informed - of some detection event which makes a difference to some interpreter. Outside of that capacity to discern signal from noise, there is no concrete reality to information. You can see that information doesn't even have the power to make itself understood to people of all ages and cultures, let alone other species or physical systems. Bytes can't do anything without something to receive, interpret, and act on their behalf.

 

On the other hand, semiotics has at least a theoretical 1p

since it has an interprant.

Sure. My view is basically a semiotic view of the universe, except that I take semiosis to inherently be a 1p capacity, and in fact, the fundamental capacity which frames all appearances of the cosmos.