Predictive physiological anticipation preceding seemingly unpredictable stimuli: a meta-analysis

[Stephen P. King]

http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract

Comments?

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

At the risk of beating a dead horse, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics TIQM, a 4th possible interpetation of QM, requires waves
coming back from the future.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation "More
recently he [Cramer] has also argued TIQM to be consistent with the
Afshar experiment, while claiming that the Copenhagen interpretation
and the many-worlds interpretation are not.[3]"
[3] ^ A Farewell to Copenhagen?, by John Cramer. Analog, December 2005.

Feynman used waves coming back from the future to solve his Quantum
Electrodynamics QED, the most experimentally accurate physics theory
extant, which in my mind lends TIQM credence. Such teteological
effects are expanded on for living systems in Terrence Deacon's book
"Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter".

Is evidence of anticipatory effects possibly evidence for TIQM?

I should add that my extension of ordinary superstring theory, and in
particular the properties of the compactified dimensions, provides a
mechanism for TIQM. The conjecture of my extension is that the compact
particles or monads react instantly to the entire universe because of
its exterior to interior mapping, as Brian Greene showed in a 2-D
approximation.
Richard

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Oct 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote:

> http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
> Comments?




If verified it might confirms Helmholtz intuition that "perception" is
"unconscious anticipation".

It would be the Dt of the Bp & Dt. It is natural with the finding that
when we "perceive objects" a big deal of information does not come
from the data but from the brains (memories, constructions, gap
fillings, ...)

Some comment in your links above seems to confirm this analysis, but I
have not really the time to dig deeper.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Alberto G. Corona]

2012/10/24 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

On 24 Oct 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote:

http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
   Comments?

If verified it might confirms Helmholtz intuition that "perception" is "unconscious anticipation".

It would be the Dt of the Bp & Dt. It is natural with the finding that when we "perceive objects" a big deal of information does not come from the data but from the brains (memories, constructions, gap fillings, ...)

I struggle with the psicho-slang to ascertain what they really said. 

From some comentaires:

 The title and intro leave out the fact that a likely cause -- cited by the highest-quality study -- is the experimental methods. I am curious if any of the experiments attempted to automate both stimulus presentation and data analysis to avoid experimenter effects.

 

It may be a variation of the case of subtle perception of the experimenter intentions by the subjects under test. 

I remember the case of a Horse that apparently know how to multiply numbers. The horse stopped khocking on the floor when the experimenter moved in a certain way when the number of knocks reached the correct result. The experimenter did not realized that he was sending the signal "enough" to the horse. 

This may be a more sophisticated case of the same phenomenon. In this case the signal could be "be prepared because we are going to do this or that". Neiter the experimeinte nor the subject of the experiment have to be conscious of that signal. There are a largue number of bad psychological experiments with these flaws. One of the last ones, the subject of these experiment was myself with my otolaryngologist who, to test my audition performance, advised me when I supposedly must hear a weak sound instead of shut up and wait.

 

Some comment in your links above seems to confirm this analysis, but I have not really the time to dig deeper.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Alberto.

[Alberto G. Corona]

I dont believe that such genuine anticipation is possible, for a simple reason: If for quantum or relativistic means the mind or the brain could genuinely anticipate anything, this would be such a huge advantage, that this hability would be inherited genetically by everyone of us, every human plant, animal with the most accurate precission. because it would be so critical.

The fact is the we have no such hability. the most we can do is to simulate it with the available data, gatering as much as possible information from the behaviour, faces etc of other human beings and we process it unconsciously. Most of the time even we are not conscious of how much information we gather.

2012/10/24 Alberto G. Corona <agoc...@gmail.com>

--
Alberto.

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/24/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> At the risk of beating a dead horse, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation of
> Quantum Mechanics TIQM, a 4th possible interpetation of QM, requires waves
> coming back from the future.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transactional_interpretation "More
> recently he [Cramer] has also argued TIQM to be consistent with the
> Afshar experiment, while claiming that the Copenhagen interpretation
> and the many-worlds interpretation are not.[3]"
> [3] ^ A Farewell to Copenhagen?, by John Cramer. Analog, December 2005.
>
> Feynman used waves coming back from the future to solve his Quantum
> Electrodynamics QED, the most experimentally accurate physics theory
> extant, which in my mind lends TIQM credence. Such teteological
> effects are expanded on for living systems in Terrence Deacon's book
> "Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter".
>
> Is evidence of anticipatory effects possibly evidence for TIQM?

Hi Richard,

The advanced wave aspect is bounded in the future, just as the
retarded waves are bounded in the past within a finite duration that is
related to the Hamiltonian of the system in question. The best picture
of this is to think of a standing wave bouncing between a pair of zero
phase nodes. This is how normal QM works, the bra and ket of Dirac's
formalism is just another version of this, but it does not take
relativity (relative motions of objects 'in' space-time) into account.
The anticipatory effect is a bit different as it involves a
component of information that seems to be outside the causal light cone.
This is an concept that requires new thinking about what "causality" is!

>
> I should add that my extension of ordinary superstring theory, and in
> particular the properties of the compactified dimensions, provides a
> mechanism for TIQM. The conjecture of my extension is that the compact
> particles or monads react instantly to the entire universe because of
> its exterior to interior mapping, as Brian Greene showed in a 2-D
> approximation.

Superstrings are not helpful here as they assume a flat space-time
background and are just fibrations of that space-time. I don't know of
any discussion of a variability of the compactified manifolds or
whatever that would give us an explanation. The internal dimensions of
the manifolds have no relation what so ever to the dimensions of
space-time. They are orthogonal and thus completely independent.

[meekerdb]

On 10/24/2012 5:31 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract

    Comments?

Woo-woo.  Small effect sizes which are *statistically* significant are indicative of bias errors.  I'd wager a proper Bayesian analysis of the original data will show they *support* the null hypothesis (c.f. "Testing Precise Hypotheses" Berger & Delampady, Stat Sci 1987 v2 no. 3 317-352 and "Odds Are It's Wrong" Tom Siegfried, Science News 27 Mar 2010).  Meta-analyses are notoriously unreliable and should only be considered suggestive at a best.

Brent

[Richard Ruquist]

I do not understand what you are saying here.
The compact manifolds are 10^90/cc, 1000 Planck-length, 6-d particles
in a 3-D space.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory
.
How can those 6d dimensions be orthogonal to 3D space?
I admit that it is a conjecture that each particle maps the universe instantly.
So if you have a means to falsify that conjecture I would like to hear about it.

Richard
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 24, 2012 at 8:31 AM, Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
>>>
>>> Comments?
>>>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/24/2012 2:35 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

I do not understand what you are saying here.
The compact manifolds are 10^90/cc, 1000 Planck-length, 6-d particles
in a 3-D space.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory
.
How can those 6d dimensions be orthogonal to 3D space?
I admit that it is a conjecture that each particle maps the universe instantly.
So if you have a means to falsify that conjecture I would like to hear about it.
 Richard

Hi Richard,

    The strings are not free moving particles! From the link:

"To make contact with our 4-dimensional world, it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X . The 6-dimensional space X would be tiny, which would explain why it has not been detected so far at the existing experimental energy levels. Each choice of the internal space X leads to a different effective theory on the 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 , which should be the theory describing our world."

    Note the words "... string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X" . This implies that the orthogonality.X .

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Nonsense Stephan,
I totally agree with everything you copied over
but totally disagree with your interpretation of it.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/24/2012 10:20 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Nonsense Stephan,
> I totally agree with everything you copied over
> but totally disagree with your interpretation of it.
> Richard

OK, please tell me how else the math is to be understood.

>> implies the orthogonality of X with respect to M4.
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen


--
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Stephan,

The compactified dimensions curl-up into particles
that resemble a crystalline structure
with some peculiar properties
compared to ordinary particles,
but nevertheless just particles.

What about that do you not understand?
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/24/2012 11:25 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

The compactified dimensions curl-up into particles
that resemble a crystalline structure
with some peculiar properties
compared to ordinary particles,
but nevertheless just particles.

What about that do you not understand?
Richard

Dear Richard,

    That picture is not consistent with the mathematics as I understand them, they do not "curl up into particles". The explanations for laymen books like to invoke such ideas, but the math tells a different tale. The compactified dimensions exhibit the properties of particles, yes, but they are not free floating. The string picture is very much like a cellular automata on a 3d lattice. This looks like a crystalline structure, yes.
    One of the problems of string theory is that there is no explanation as to what prevents the compactified manifolds from "uncurling" if we relax the strict orthogonality condition. The Kaluza-Klein theory that inspired string theory has the same problem. There does not seem to be a way to prevent the uncertainty principle from being universal such that the "size" of the compact manifold's radius is not subject to uncertainty. We can try to hand wave this away with the T-duality, but that just pushes the problem somewhere else.
     I have tried hard to make string theory "work" for me. I appreciate your enthusiasm for them, but the theory seems too dependent on the assumption of a fundamental substance (in this case an a priori existing lattice of manifolds) and on the vicissitudes of scalar fields. I hope you can appreciate that I simply see string theories as very elegant examples of "pure math".
   

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Please inform ST Yau of your views. He will be interested for sure.
I have informed him of my paper and he found it interesting.
Personally I think your perspective is intellectualism.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/25/2012 12:46 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Please inform ST Yau of your views. He will be interested for sure.
> I have informed him of my paper and he found it interesting.
> Personally I think your perspective is intellectualism.
> Richard

Dear Richard,

Your point is well made. It is quite possible that I am merely
intellectualizing the idea, but as a philosopher I have to press hard on
the idea that there is a possibility that we mistake our ideas of things
for the things. The problems that I have pointed out are unanswered in
the literature that I have found. I may have missed their solution. ;-)

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms, 2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.

Again from Vafa but a different reference, the hyper-EM flux that
winds through the 500 topo holes in the resulting compactified
particle (or crystalline element) is what constrains the particle from
re-inflating. The manner in which the flux winds through each Compact
Manifold (CM) particle apparently determines the laws and constants of
physics and is the basis of the so-called string theory landscape

As far as I know the hyper-EM constraining flux are not the strings
that are the basis of physical particles like photons or electrons.
But they may be related. I am admittedly just a (string-theory)
systems analyst and not a string theorist. I take the word of
theorists like Vafa and Yau at face value (whatever that means) for
the properties of the CM particles.
Other than reading the literature, my limited understanding comes from
auditing one of Vafa's courses on string theory at Harvard as an
alumnus.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Richard,

How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully
attacks. The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as
it does not allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally
effective. I do like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure
that they are anything more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf
transform groups on n-genus topological manifolds and so on....
Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to
exist if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/24 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>

On 24 Oct 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote:

http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
   Comments?

If verified it might confirms Helmholtz intuition that "perception" is "unconscious anticipation".

It would be the Dt of the Bp & Dt. It is natural with the finding that when we "perceive objects" a big deal of information does not come from the data but from the brains (memories, constructions, gap fillings, ...)

I struggle with the psicho-slang to ascertain what they really said. 

From some comentaires:

 The title and intro leave out the fact that a likely cause -- cited by the highest-quality study -- is the experimental methods. I am curious if any of the experiments attempted to automate both stimulus presentation and data analysis to avoid experimenter effects.

 

It may be a variation of the case of subtle perception of the experimenter intentions by the subjects under test. 

I remember the case of a Horse that apparently know how to multiply numbers. The horse stopped khocking on the floor when the experimenter moved in a certain way when the number of knocks reached the correct result. The experimenter did not realized that he was sending the signal "enough" to the horse. 

This may be a more sophisticated case of the same phenomenon. In this case the signal could be "be prepared because we are going to do this or that". Neiter the experimeinte nor the subject of the experiment have to be conscious of that signal. There are a largue number of bad psychological experiments with these flaws. One of the last ones, the subject of these experiment was myself with my otolaryngologist who, to test my audition performance, advised me when I supposedly must hear a weak sound instead of shut up and wait.

Just to be clear, neither Helmholtz, nor me, were saying that the brain anticipates by using some kind of magic, but just by using memories. There other experimental setup which confirms this view. Concerning the present experience, I am not convinced, as far as I understand it, that it shows any more than the usual confirmation that perception is, in great part, a form of anticipation. It is a very efficient strategy, as the sense got a lot of data, and it is normal to analyze them starting from the theories we already have (that is the neural circuits). That is why we can be hallucinated and deluded very easily, or why we can see picture and sense in random structure, etc. Otherwise I agree with your point.

Bruno

 

Some comment in your links above seems to confirm this analysis, but I have not really the time to dig deeper.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:31, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

I dont believe that such genuine anticipation is possible, for a simple reason: If for quantum or relativistic means the mind or the brain could genuinely anticipate anything, this would be such a huge advantage, that this hability would be inherited genetically by everyone of us, every human plant, animal with the most accurate precission. because it would be so critical.

The fact is the we have no such hability. the most we can do is to simulate it with the available data, gatering as much as possible information from the behaviour, faces etc of other human beings and we process it unconsciously. Most of the time even we are not conscious of how much information we gather.

I think we anticipate all the time. At every second. When we drive a car, we anticipate the movement and correct it accordingly. There are many picture of object lacking a crucial elements which when shown rapidly to subject makes the subject swearing having seen the lacking elements. When shown more slowly after, the subject is usually astonished to see they were lacking. A part of that anticipation is part of Hobson theory of dream, where the cerebral stem might sent to the cortex quasi random information, and the dreams is the result of the cortex anticipating sense from that crude information. A building of an hypothesis/theory and its momentary admission is also a form of anticipation. Everyone anticipate that tomorrow the sun will rise. 

If you decide to open your fridge you anticipate the vague shape of what you can see in your fridge. It is far more efficient than analyse the data like if they were new.

I don't think there is anything controversial here. Helmholtz theory is usually accepted as a base in pattern recognition, and basic perception. It is rather well tested.

More provocative perhaps: I personally would not been so much astonished that evolution itself does make variate sort of anticipation. I would not find this utterly shocking, as genetic algorithm can isolate anticipative programs, like brains are. It would just means that some brain-like mechanism has already appear at the level of the genome, but on a scale which makes it hard to be detected for us. I am not sure at all about this, but I see nothing really "magical" if such thing was detected.

Bruno

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[meekerdb]

On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
interested.

According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms,  2 dimensions
(actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
occur.

It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold that there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions.  Compactified dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have closed topology.  That property is completely independent of having orthogonal directions.

Brent

[Alberto G. Corona]

But I don not mean such kind of anticipation. such anticipation by
gathering information and computation is a fundamental activity of
living beings. I refer to adivination. I suppose that a definition of
adivination is the anticipation of something for which we have no
conscious or unconscious inference possible. To anticipate that a
policeman knoking on the door will tell us bad news is not
adivination, for example.

2012/10/25 Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>:

--
Alberto.

[Richard Ruquist]

Stephan,

But you said that you liked my paper
which was about how consciousness
might arise from the Compact Manifolds
if they are enumerable
as astronomical observations suggest.
Richard.

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/25/2012 11:55 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> But I don not mean such kind of anticipation. such anticipation by
> gathering information and computation is a fundamental activity of
> living beings. I refer to adivination. I suppose that a definition of
> adivination is the anticipation of something for which we have no
> conscious or unconscious inference possible. To anticipate that a
> policeman knoking on the door will tell us bad news is not
> adivination, for example.

Dear Alberto,

It seems that you are not considering the situation where all
entities have this ability, all living things can adivinate the behavior
of each other and so the ability is, in general a wash - it cancels out
because of the symmetry - except for the occasional statistical outlier
that locally breaks the symmetry. This might explain how co-evolution of
multiple co-habitating organism is so successful in spite of the fact
that most mutations are harmful or fatal. Nature might be exploiting the
global entanglement of physical systems to "load the dice" of chance
just a tiny bit.
The threshold of this effect is that multiple possible outcomes are
always involved - it never occurs in isolated and binary cases, it is as
if Nature requires a form of "plausible deniability" to maintain the
appearance of classical level causality.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Brent,

    Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But my point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not) are orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/25/2012 12:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

But you said that you liked my paper
which was about how consciousness
might arise from the Compact Manifolds
if they are enumerable
as astronomical observations suggest.
Richard.

Hi Richard,

    Yes, I did say that and I still do. In the model that I am advocating, there exists an infinite number of "monads" that have (in the math of the model) a duality between totally disconnected compact Hausdorff topological space (aka Stone space) and Boolean algebra aspects. It is a 'dual aspect" ontology.
    Minds, 1p, numbers, arithmetics and consciousness are elaborations on the Boolean algebras. Your compact manifolds are included in the class of topological spaces, thus they would be proto-conscious. The problem that I have is that the string theoretical version of compact manifolds demands the additional existence of a physical space-time manifold where as in my proposal there is no need to postulate a space-time at all.
    Space-time is a collective illusion emerging from the mutual consistency of 1p content of the "monads".

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Actually all string theories are based on an n dimensional manifold
where n may be anywhere from 9 to 26 or more dimensions
plus the assumption that all the dimensions but 3 compactify.
I even think of time as a compactified dimension.
Not sure if that's consistent with Relativity.

Theories that require collective illusion are not attractive to me.
Richard

[meekerdb]

If they weren't orthogonal then a vector on them could be represented by by a linear
combinations of vectors in 3-space - and then they wouldn't provide the additional degrees
of freedom to describe particles and fields. They'd just be part of 3-space.

Brent

[Richard Ruquist]

They are just part of 3 space once the extra dimensions are compactified.
I do not know about what happens to the extra degrees of freedom.
Richard


>
> Brent

[meekerdb]

No, that's incorrect. I don't know much about string theory, but I wrote my dissertation
on Kaluza-Klein and the additional dimensions are still additional dimensions. KK is
simple because there's only one extra dimension and so compactifying it just means it's a
circle, and then (classically) the location around the circle is the phase of the
electromagnetic potential; quantized it's photons. Being compact just means they're
finite, it doesn't imply they're part of the 3-space. If they were they couldn't function
to represent particles 'in' 3-space.

> I do not know about what happens to the extra degrees of freedom.

If you lost them then you'd just have 3-space, possibly with different topology, but you
couldn't represent all the particles which was the whole point of string theory.

Brent

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/25/2012 1:49 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
> that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
> Richard

Dear Richard,

That is what the 'x' in the string of symbols M_4 x X means. The
relation is orthogonality such that we end up with 3 dimensions of space
plus one of time plus 6 dimensions of the compact manifolds for a total
of ten. Dimensions are by definition orthogonal to each other.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/25/2012 2:21 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Actually all string theories are based on an n dimensional manifold
where n may be anywhere from 9 to 26 or more dimensions
plus the assumption that all the dimensions but 3 compactify.
I even think of time as a compactified dimension.
Not sure if that's consistent with Relativity.

    If the temporal dimension is compactified we get strange effect but no relativity.

Theories that require collective illusion are not attractive to me.

    I see it as a choice between collective illusion or blind faith in substances. Naive realism is nice but ultimately stultifying for any explanation of mind. Searle's lectures here are a valiant attempt to defend naive realism. Figure it out for yourself. ;-)

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Roger Clough]

Hi Richard,

Is there some way, such as reducing the dimensions of
strings to zero, that one can transverse from the world
of extension (the physical world) to that of inextended
experience or theory?


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-25, 14:23:04
Subject: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

[Roger Clough]

Hi Brent,

What happens -- or is it even possible -- to
collapse the dimensions down to one (which I
conjecture might be time), or zero (Platonia or mind).

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-25, 15:27:47

Subject: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

On 10/25/2012 11:47 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 2:23 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>> On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King

[Richard Ruquist]

No Roger,

In string theory dimensions are conserved but can undergo extreme
modification such as in compactification where formerly orthogonal
dimensions become embedded in 3D space in spite of what Brent thinks.
However, the string theory monads that result from compactification
have many of the properties that you ascribe to unextended realms.
Because of BEC and instant mapping effects, the entire collection of
monads in the universe may behave as though the existed at a single
point despite being extended.
Richard

[Roger Clough]

Hi Stephen P. King

Wow ! This connects up with what I have been speculating,
namely that comp or at least some sort of calculation,
can, if not recreate the brainmind, at least simulate what it does.

I need to study more about your theory.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-25, 14:09:23
Subject: Re: Strings are not in space-time, they are on space-time

On 10/25/2012 12:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Stephan,

But you said that you liked my paper
which was about how consciousness
might arise from the Compact Manifolds
if they are enumerable
as astronomical observations suggest.
Richard.

Hi Richard,

    Yes, I did say that and I still do. In the model that I am advocating, there exists an infinite number of "monads" that have (in the math of the model) a duality between totally disconnected compact Hausdorff topological space (aka Stone space) and Boolean algebra aspects. It is a 'dual aspect" ontology.
    Minds, 1p, numbers, arithmetics and consciousness are elaborations on the Boolean algebras. Your compact manifolds are included in the class of topological spaces, thus they would be proto-conscious. The problem that I have is that the string theoretical version of compact manifolds demands the additional existence of a physical space-time manifold where as in my proposal there is no need to postulate a space-time at all.
    Space-time is a collective illusion emerging from the mutual consistency of 1p content of the "monads".

[Roger Clough]

STEPHEN:  Hi Richard,

     How does Vafa explain the stability/instability of compactified
dimensions? My chief worry is that all of the stringy and loopy theories
assume a pre-existing continuum of space-time of some sort, the very
Aristotelian "substance" idea that Bruno's argument successfully
attacks. The assumption of primitive substances is very problematic as
it does not allow for any room for consciousness to occur or be causally
effective. I do like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure
that they are anything more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf
transform groups on n-genus topological manifolds and so on....
      Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to
exist if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in them...

--
Onward!

Stephen

ROGER: Unlike Aristotle, Leibniz's monads do not assume that there is

just one (primitive) substance, contrary to what I imagine Bruno attacked.

The monads as I now see them are subjective entities that

refer to physical brain domains of one function.  Being subjective,

they are beyond spacetime (are mental) but at the same time

they refer to functional domains of the brain (point to, are related to

the physical).So they seem to qualify as topics of functional brain

theory (functionalism).

 

As to causal effectiveness, the links between the monads and

the brain regions they refer to are not causal, as mind cannot

directly manipulate matter. Indirectly as monads they can,

however.  The links are thus called "bridges" and belong to

bridging theories of mind.

 

 

Every monad  is different functional, mental, substance, and they

are beginning to somewhat look like Whitehead's "occasions of experience",

although there are some important differences.

 

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[Roger Clough]

>
Dear Bruno and Alberto,

I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation
is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is
a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs
to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections
of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
mechanism.

--
Onward!

Stephen

ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
mirrors the rest of the universe.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Richard Ruquist

Thank you, but monads are not extended in space,
they are mental and so inextended.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-26, 08:08:44
Subject: Re: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

No Roger,

In string theory dimensions are conserved but can undergo extreme
modification such as in compactification where formerly orthogonal
dimensions become embedded in 3D space in spite of what Brent thinks.
However, the string theory monads that result from compactification
have many of the properties that you ascribe to unextended realms.
Because of BEC and instant mapping effects, the entire collection of
monads in the universe may behave as though the existed at a single
point despite being extended.
Richard

[Bruno Marchal]

Well, in defense of Craig, or of the devil, this has not been proved.
The problem occurs, or at least is "easy" to prove only when we make
the digital assumption. This entails a truncation of the subject,
local and relative (its mind code) which by the MGA is incapable to
distinguish the arithmetical from the real/analytical or substantial.
If you introduce special (very special) infinities in both mind and
matter, a non comp and materialist theory of mind an matter is not
(yet) excluded.
Also, the comp theory of consciousness makes it effective, even in the
materialist framework. The only thing not effective is the notion of
substance, and eventually (globally), of physics (that is highly
counter-intuitive, but can be understood in the big 'non physical'
picture, where we cannot 'add physics" and have to retrieve it from
arithmetic and/or computer science.

Bruno

> I do like the idea of hyper-EM fluxes, but am not so sure that they
> are anything more than fancy math, fiber bundles and sheaf transform
> groups on n-genus topological manifolds and so on....
> Where are all of the sparticles and bosinos that are supposed to
> exist if SUSY is correct? Occam's razor keeps me from believing in
> them...
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Oct 2012, at 17:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

> But I don not mean such kind of anticipation. such anticipation by
> gathering information and computation is a fundamental activity of
> living beings.

OK.

> I refer to adivination. I suppose that a definition of
> adivination is the anticipation of something for which we have no
> conscious or unconscious inference possible. To anticipate that a
> policeman knoking on the door will tell us bad news is not
> adivination, for example.

OK. I am not sure the paper under discussion spoke of adivination,
even if the title and some paragraph are not completely clear on this
(to attract reader perhaps).

Bruno

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[Richard Ruquist]

Roger,
Your Leibniz monads are not extended, but the monads of string theory
are extended yet have most of the important properties of inextension.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/26/2012 8:15 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Wow ! This connects up with what I have been speculating,
namely that comp or at least some sort of calculation,
can, if not recreate the brainmind, at least simulate what it does.

I need to study more about your theory.

Hi Roger,

    The theory is not mine, the idea that of Vaughan Pratt and his computer science group at Stanford: http://chu.stanford.edu/ and http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf The monad that I use to represent a generic observer is a combination of ideas from Leibniz, Louis H. Kaufmann, G. Zuckerman and the work of Hitoshi Kitada http://www.metasciences.ac/Articles/works.html (and others) and I am developing a unique model of interaction from these. I really don't have a "theory" per se, just a loose set of ideas...
    I am just exploring a combination of ideas for the sake of studying alternatives to the usual explanations of mind and body relations. I am just a student, not any kind of expert. ;-)

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

> Dear Bruno and Alberto,
>
> I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
> algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation
> is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is
> a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs
> to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections
> of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
> mechanism.
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
> mirrors the rest of the universe.
>
>

Dear Roger,

Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of
each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an exact
isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a difference between
monads or else there is only One.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[meekerdb]

On 10/26/2012 5:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Brent,

What happens -- or is it even possible -- to   
collapse the dimensions down to one (which I
conjecture might be time), or zero (Platonia or mind).

I'm not sure what you mean by 'collapse'.  Do you mean, "Is is possible to invent a theory which has only a one-dimensional Remannian manifold?"  Sure, but I don't think you can make it agree with physical observations. 

In my view, these are models we invent to try to understand the world; so we need our model to be understandable.  That's one of my objections to a lot of 'everything' theories like Tegmark's; they hypothesize a model that is incomprehensible in order to 'explain' something - it's like "God did it and God works in mysterious ways."

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/26/2012 5:08 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> No Roger,
>
> In string theory dimensions are conserved but can undergo extreme
> modification such as in compactification where formerly orthogonal
> dimensions become embedded in 3D space in spite of what Brent thinks.

Do you have a reference that describes this 'embedding'?

Brent

[meekerdb]

On 10/26/2012 6:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Well, in defense of Craig, or of the devil, this has not been proved. The problem
> occurs, or at least is "easy" to prove only when we make the digital assumption. This
> entails a truncation of the subject, local and relative (its mind code) which by the MGA
> is incapable to distinguish the arithmetical from the real/analytical or substantial. If
> you introduce special (very special) infinities in both mind and matter, a non comp and
> materialist theory of mind an matter is not (yet) excluded.

You've mentioned this several times. Can you explain these infinities and how they function?

> Also, the comp theory of consciousness makes it effective,

What does "it" refer to?..."comp theory" or "consciousness"?

Brent

[Richard Ruquist]

Yes
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/26/2012 4:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Yes
> http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory
Hi Richard,

Could you cut and paste the specific description that answers
Brent's question?

>
> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 3:01 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> On 10/26/2012 5:08 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>> No Roger,
>>>
>>> In string theory dimensions are conserved but can undergo extreme
>>> modification such as in compactification where formerly orthogonal
>>> dimensions become embedded in 3D space in spite of what Brent thinks.
>>
>> Do you have a reference that describes this 'embedding'?
>>
>> Brent
>>
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>>

--
Onward!

Stephen

[meekerdb]

On 10/26/2012 1:31 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Yes
> http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory

A search on "embed" turns up nothing about embedding in 3-space.

Brent

[Richard Ruquist]

The requested excerpt from
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory:

"Calabi-Yau manifolds in string theory
Superstring theory is a unified theory for all the forces of nature
including quantum gravity. In superstring theory, the fundamental
building block is an extended object, namely a string, whose
vibrations would give rise to the particles encountered in nature. The
constraints for the consistency of such a theory are extremely
stringent. They require in particular that the theory takes place in a
10-dimensional space-time. To make contact with our 4-dimensional
world, it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string
theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space
M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X . The 6-dimensional space X would be
tiny, which would explain why it has not been detected so far at the
existing experimental energy levels. Each choice of the internal space
X leads to a different effective theory on the 4-dimensional Minkowski
space M3,1 , which should be the theory describing our world."

The 6d space is tiny indeed, said by Yau in his book "The Shape of
Inner Space" to be 1000 Planck lengths in diameter. The rest of that
reference apparently describes a number of possible realizatons of the
6d space that is way beyond my comprehension. So now I am reading
http://universe-review.ca/R15-26-CalabiYau.htm, a math review of Yau's
book,
to get a more definitive answer to our questions.
Richard.

[Richard Ruquist]

From http://universe-review.ca/R15-26-CalabiYau.htm
"Compactification - Since all of us experience only 3 spatial and 1
temporal dimensions, the 10 and 26 extra-dimensions have to be hidden
under some schemes. One of the two alternatives is to roll them up
into very small size not observable even under a very powerful
microscope. The other one is to consider our existence on a 3 brane
floating in the bulk of ten spatial dimensions. The first alternative
is called compactification. It is more complicated than merely
shrinking the size (of the dimensions). Even in the very simple case
of a (4+1) toy model, compactification to a small circle of radius R
produces particle in the 3-D space with mass = n/R, where n is an
integer. It manifests itself as a scalar particle (spin 0) obeying the
Klein-Gordon equation. Compactification of the 16 extra-dimensions for
the bosonic string, produces the gluon and electroweak gauge fields.
Compactification of the remaining 6 extra-dimensions breaks the
Heterotic string symmetry down to the point where the hadrons and
leptons of more conventional theories are recovered. Viewed from a
distance, the symmetry-broken Heterotic strings look just like
familiar point particles - but without the infinities and anomalies of
the particle approach. In order to maintain conformal invariance
(i.e., the world sheet should remain unchanged by relabeling), these 6
extra-dimensions have to curl up in a particular way - a more
promising one is the Calabi-Yau manifold (see more in
"Compactification") as shown in Figure 12, where each point stands for
a 3-D space.
Figure 12 Calabi-Yau Space "

The keys words are " produces particle in the 3-D space with mass".
The picture of the compact manifolds, somewhat like a crystalline
structure, did not copy over.

More: "Calabi-Yau Manifold - As mentioned in the section of
"Calabi-Yau Manifold for Dummies", all the above-mentioned
requirements are satisfied by the Calabi-Yau manifold as if it is
"made to order" for the occasion. By the way, it also correctly
reproduce the three generations for the fermions, and is itself a
solution of the 6-D field equation in General Relativity (producing
the gravitino)."

The word embedding appears in this reference: "Another way to compute
g is through "embedding" the Calabi-Yau manifold in a higher
dimensional background space. But so far no one has been able to work
out the coupling constant g or mass for any fermion. Anyway, this is
one example of the attempts to derive fundamental constants in the 3+1
large dimensions from the 6 dimensional compactified space."

Bottomline, I am not satisfied with what I am able to extract from
these references anything to satisfy your criticisms, or even my
concerns. I am afraid that I have been influenced by the "picture" of
the Compact Manifolds as a periodic structure of 6d particles in 3D
space.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Richard,

    From the quote below: "it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X."

    This "local product" operation, represented by the 'x' is the act of adding two manifolds, one of 4 dimensions and one of 6 dimensions for a total of 10 dimensions, thus this yields a very different structure from, for example, a 10d Euclidean manifold.
    All of the local degrees of freedom are present at every point but the compacted ones are such that any motion (a translational transformation within M^3,1) shifts from one local 6d manifold to another 6d manifold. The 6d compactified manifolds are Planck sized 6d tori 'glued' (using the math of fiber bundles) to each and every point in the M^3,1 space. It is not correct to think of the compacted manifolds (actually they are tori) as "free floating" in a 3,1 dimensional (not 4d for technical reasons as the signature of time is not the same as the signature of the spatial dimensions) manifold. i.e. space-time.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Richard,

You wrote: "the "picture" of the Compact Manifolds as a periodic
structure of 6d particles in 3D space." I agree that a crude reading of
10d string theory is consistent with this picture. This picture is built
for use in quantum field theories where "particles" are excitations of
the "field" that are localized at a fixed point in space-time. To do
calculations involving GR this picture simply does not work.

Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

No one said they were free floating

[meekerdb]

On 10/26/2012 4:55 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Richard,

    From the quote below: "it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X."

    This "local product" operation, represented by the 'x' is the act of adding two manifolds, one of 4 dimensions and one of 6 dimensions for a total of 10 dimensions, thus this yields a very different structure from, for example, a 10d Euclidean manifold.
    All of the local degrees of freedom are present at every point but the compacted ones are such that any motion (a translational transformation within M^3,1) shifts from one local 6d manifold to another 6d manifold. The 6d compactified manifolds are Planck sized 6d tori 'glued' (using the math of fiber bundles) to each and every point in the M^3,1 space. It is not correct to think of the compacted manifolds (actually they are tori) as "free floating" in a 3,1 dimensional (not 4d for technical reasons as the signature of time is not the same as the signature of the spatial dimensions) manifold. i.e. space-time.

They are manifolds - just some more dimensions that happen to be compact.  It makes no more sense to talk about them as 'free-floating' than to talk about altitude free floating on lat-long; it's another 'direction', not an object.

Brent

--

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Richard,

OK, then where are we in disagreement?

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/26/2012 8:33 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/26/2012 4:55 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Richard,

    From the quote below: "it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X."

    This "local product" operation, represented by the 'x' is the act of adding two manifolds, one of 4 dimensions and one of 6 dimensions for a total of 10 dimensions, thus this yields a very different structure from, for example, a 10d Euclidean manifold.
    All of the local degrees of freedom are present at every point but the compacted ones are such that any motion (a translational transformation within M^3,1) shifts from one local 6d manifold to another 6d manifold. The 6d compactified manifolds are Planck sized 6d tori 'glued' (using the math of fiber bundles) to each and every point in the M^3,1 space. It is not correct to think of the compacted manifolds (actually they are tori) as "free floating" in a 3,1 dimensional (not 4d for technical reasons as the signature of time is not the same as the signature of the spatial dimensions) manifold. i.e. space-time.

They are manifolds - just some more dimensions that happen to be compact.  It makes no more sense to talk about them as 'free-floating' than to talk about altitude free floating on lat-long; it's another 'direction', not an object.

Brent

    I agree!

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Well, I admit that you said that. I said they had a rather crystalline
structure.
And you repeated my remark. If you think they are free floating,
then we are in disagreement.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/26/2012 9:27 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Well, I admit that you said that. I said they had a rather crystalline
> structure.
> And you repeated my remark. If you think they are free floating,
> then we are in disagreement.
> Richard
>
>

Hi Richard,

They cannot be free floating. On that we agree.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[meekerdb]

I don't know what it means to say some dimensions are "crystalline"?  Does this just mean periodic?

Brent

[Craig Weinberg]

All of it ultimately has to be grounded in ordinary conscious experience. Otherwise we have an infinite regress of invisible homunculi translating crystalline manifolds in compactified space into ordinary experiences. At what point does it become necessary for vibrating topological constructs to imagine that they are something other than what they are, and to feel and see rather than merely be informed of relevant data?

I am confident that ultimately there can be no reduction of awareness at all. Awareness can assume mathematical forms or physical substance, but neither of those can possibly generate even a single experience on their own.

Craig

[Stephen P. King]

Hi Craig,

All of this discussion is below the level of conscious
self-awareness. At most there is just raw perception, the basis
distinguishing of is from not is.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Richard Ruquist]

Stephan,

I agree that " All of this discussion is below the level of conscious
self-awareness", but prefer to think of raw perception as
distinguishing what can be from what cannot be, as for example in
constructor theory.

In my model conscious awareness is an arithmetic emergent due to the
incompleteness of discrete, ennumerable compact manifolds. What can or
cannot be is at a lower level, perhaps due to discrete arithmetic
computations that may be teleological, a nod to Deacon as well as
Deutsch.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

--

Hi Brent,

    Yes, it is periodic, but not "just"...

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[meekerdb]

By "just" I meant continuous symmetries as opposed to the discrete crystal groups.

Brent

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/27/2012 12:07 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> Stephen,

>
> I agree that " All of this discussion is below the level of conscious
> self-awareness", but prefer to think of raw perception as
> distinguishing what can be from what cannot be, as for example in
> constructor theory.
>
> In my model conscious awareness is an arithmetic emergent due to the
> incompleteness of discrete, ennumerable compact manifolds. What can or
> cannot be is at a lower level, perhaps due to discrete arithmetic
> computations that may be teleological, a nod to Deacon as well as
> Deutsch.

Hi Richard,

Umm, interesting. The incompleteness forces consciousness... Please
elaborate!

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 24.10.2012 20:31 meekerdb said the following:
> On 10/24/2012 5:31 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>> http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00390/abstract
>>
>>
>>
>> Comments?
>>
>
> Woo-woo. Small effect sizes which are *statistically* significant
> are indicative of bias errors. I'd wager a proper Bayesian analysis
> of the original data will show they *support* the null hypothesis
> (c.f. "Testing Precise Hypotheses" Berger & Delampady, Stat Sci 1987
> v2 no. 3 317-352 and "Odds Are It's Wrong" Tom Siegfried, Science
> News 27 Mar 2010). Meta-analyses are notoriously unreliable and
> should only be considered suggestive at a best.
>

It is a general situations with a statistical treatment. When people
like results based on mathematical statistics, as for example
correlations in a neurosience, they say that this is a good science. And
when people do not like statistical results, they can always say woo-woo.

Evgenii

[Richard Ruquist]

Stephan,
That is what my paper is all about: http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
It appears that your memory is no better than mine.
I went into physics because of my poor memory.
When I got kicked out, really black-balled due to the Star Wars protest
I managed to get into med school at age 55 but my memory failed me
and I had to settle for being a doctor of physics.
I am going to Hoboken to celebrate my 75th birthday with my son and grandson
over this weekend. So I will not be able to get on-line until Sunday night.
It's been fun.
Richard

[Roger Clough]

Hi Richard Ruquist

Yes, the strings themselves are extended, but
theoretical strings (string theory itself) are not.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/27/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-26, 09:48:32
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality


Roger,
Your Leibniz monads are not extended, but the monads of string theory
are extended yet have most of the important properties of inextension.
Richard

On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> Thank you, but monads are not extended in space,
> they are mental and so inextended.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
> 10/26/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Richard Ruquist
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-26, 08:08:44
> Subject: Re: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality

>
>
> No Roger,
>
> In string theory dimensions are conserved but can undergo extreme
> modification such as in compactification where formerly orthogonal
> dimensions become embedded in 3D space in spite of what Brent thinks.

> However, the string theory monads that result from compactification
> have many of the properties that you ascribe to unextended realms.
> Because of BEC and instant mapping effects, the entire collection of
> monads in the universe may behave as though the existed at a single
> point despite being extended.
> Richard
>
> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 7:56 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>> Hi Richard,
>>
>> Is there some way, such as reducing the dimensions of
>> strings to zero, that one can transverse from the world
>> of extension (the physical world) to that of inextended
>> experience or theory?
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
>> 10/26/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: meekerdb
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-10-25, 14:23:04
>> Subject: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality
>>
>>
>> On 10/25/2012 10:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>> On 10/25/2012 11:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 10/25/2012 4:58 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Stephan,
>>>>
>>>> Since yesterday it occurred to me that you may be thinking of the 10
>>>> or more dimensions of string theory as being orthogonal because they
>>>> were so before the big bang. But the dimensions that
>>>> curled-up/compactified went out of orthogonality during the big bang
>>>> according to Cumrun Vafa. I'll look up that reference if you are
>>>> interested.
>>>>
>>>> According to Vafa 2 dimensions compactified for every single space
>>>> dimension that inflated. In over simplified terms, 2 dimensions
>>>> (actually in strips of some 10,000 Planck lengths) to be compactified
>>>> lined up say in the east-west space dimension so that space in an
>>>> orthogonal direction could expand. So some semblance of orthogonality
>>>> exists in the compactification process, but it is clear that the
>>>> compactified dimensions become embedded in 3D space for inflation to
>>>> occur.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's implicit in the definition of dimensions of a Riemannian manifold that
>>>> there are as many orthogonal directions as dimensions. Compactified
>>>> dimensions are just small; they're small, not infinite, because they have
>>>> closed topology. That property is completely independent of having
>>>> orthogonal directions.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>> Dear Brent,
>>>>
>>>> Compactness and orthogonality are not the same quantities. Yes. But my
>>>> point is that the compact structures in string theories (super or not) are
>>>> orthogonal to the dimensions of space-time. Maybe we need all take a
>>>> remedial math class on linear algebra and geometry!
>>> I am still waiting for the explanation of how you know that to be true-
>>> that the compact manifolds are orthogonal to space dimensions.
>>> Richard
>>
>> If they weren't orthogonal then a vector on them could be represented by by a linear
>> combinations of vectors in 3-space - and then they wouldn't provide the additional degrees
>> of freedom to describe particles and fields. They'd just be part of 3-space.
>>
>> Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:00, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Brent,
>
> What happens -- or is it even possible -- to
> collapse the dimensions down to one (which I
> conjecture might be time), or zero (Platonia or mind).

Yes it is more zero, or zero^zero (one). In my favorite working theory.

Bruno

>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
> 10/26/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: meekerdb
> Receiver: everything-list

> Time: 2012-10-25, 15:27:47

> Subject: Re: Compact dimensions and orthogonality
>
>

> On 10/25/2012 11:47 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:

>> They are just part of 3 space once the extra dimensions are
>> compactified.
>
> No, that's incorrect. I don't know much about string theory, but I
> wrote my dissertation
> on Kaluza-Klein and the additional dimensions are still additional
> dimensions. KK is
> simple because there's only one extra dimension and so compactifying
> it just means it's a
> circle, and then (classically) the location around the circle is the
> phase of the
> electromagnetic potential; quantized it's photons. Being compact
> just means they're
> finite, it doesn't imply they're part of the 3-space. If they were
> they couldn't function
> to represent particles 'in' 3-space.
>> I do not know about what happens to the extra degrees of freedom.
>
> If you lost them then you'd just have 3-space, possibly with
> different topology, but you
> couldn't represent all the particles which was the whole point of
> string theory.

>
> Brent
>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote:

>>
> Dear Bruno and Alberto,
>
> I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
> algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
> anticipation
> is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It
> is
> a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
> belongs
> to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections
> of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
> mechanism.
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
> mirrors the rest of the universe.

In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal
numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is
already a dynamical Indra Net.

Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers.

Bruno

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Oct 2012, at 20:30, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Dear Bruno and Alberto,
>>
>> I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic
>> algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that
>> anticipation
>> is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia.
>> It is
>> a relation between any one and the class of computations that it
>> belongs
>> to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the
>> collections
>> of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression
>> mechanism.
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>> ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad
>> mirrors the rest of the universe.
>>
>>

> Dear Roger,
>
> Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of
> each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an exact
> isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a difference between
> monads or else there is only One.

Right, and in the arithmetical Indra Net, all universal numbers are
different.
And the, by the first person indeterminacy it is like there is a
competition between all of them to bring your most probable next
"instant of life". It looks that, at least on the sharable part, there
are big winners, like this or that quantum hamiltonian. But we have to
explain them through the arithmetical Net structure, if we want
separate properly the quanta from the qualia.

Bruno



>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

A slightly technical question. In the arithmetic IndraNet idea,
what plays the role of the "surface" that is reflective? How do we get
the numbers to appear separated from each other? This seems necessary
for the appearance of physical space.

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Craig Weinberg]

Hi Stephen,

I'm not seeing why the problem would be any different any particular level though? If you have experience, then sure, a manifold can possibly have an experience or be experienced by something that can, but if there is no theory for primordial perception in the first place, no amount of topological position indices will generate it. All that Calabi-Yau does is make an interesting shaped body, but the body still has nowhere to put a mind or a self, much less a reason for those things to ever exist.

Craig

 

--
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

AUDA is the "final" elaboration of that. At the propositional level. I
remind you. G and G* are the logic of incompleteness. Gödel's second
theorem is the arithmetical interpretation of Dt -> ~BDt, and by
Solovay's theorem we get them all. In fine consciousness is something
between Dt and Dt V t, Dt V t V Bf, the modal duals of the saured box
of the corresponding variants of G.
Incompleteness is just the startling fact of the logic of self-
reference, which can translated the classical theory of knowledge in
the arithmetical or machine languages.

Bruno

>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> --
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

reread carefully the UDA. You should understand by yourself that the
"surface" role is played by the first person experience. This is due
to the fact that the experience are UD-delay invariant, and is a
limiting sum on the infinite works of an infinite collection of
universal numbers.

> How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other?

This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why you
are using of the word "appear" instead of "are".

> This seems necessary for the appearance of physical space.

It is necessary to have anything.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

Dear Bruno,

My worry is that you seem to assume the equivalent of an absolute
observer that acts to distinguish the content of the first person
experience (1p) from each other, as simply an inherent difference
between "universal numbers". Given that one number can be used to code
for other numbers, ala Godel numbering schemes, how is it that universal
numbers can be said to have any thing unique that would identify them in
a non-trivial way?

>
>> How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other?
>
> This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why you
> are using of the word "appear" instead of "are".

"Are"? To who are they different? Your idea here seems to depend on
a pre-established harmony like situation.


--
Onward!

Stephen

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.

Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,
and numbers aren't like that. I find the following unsatisfactory,
but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
Not universakl enough.

My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly
somehow possesses the numbers.

Hurricane coming.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/28/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59
Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno

Still waiting for the storm to shut things down.

Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet,
in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that
they are simply numbers, with no ontological status.
Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere.

Numbers are definitely not monads, because no
corporeal body is attached. Although they can
whenever thought of appear in the minds of
particular men in the intellects of their monads.

Leibniz does refer to a proposed "universal"
language, which is simply everywhere
as well as possibly in each head. Numbers would
no doubt be the same, both everywhere and
in individual minds at times.

So numbers are universal and can be treated
mathematically as always.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-28, 18:31:25
Subject: Re: Re: A mirror of the universe.

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/29/2012 1:15 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno 

Still waiting for the storm to shut things down.  

Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet, 
in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that
they are simply numbers, with no ontological status.
Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere.

Numbers are definitely not monads, because no
corporeal  body is attached.  Although they can
whenever thought of appear in the minds of 
particular men in the intellects of their monads. 

Hi Roger,

    Physical bodies and, by extension, physical worlds follow from mutually consistent aspects of the individual 1p of monads; they are not "attached". Leibniz, IMHO, bungled this badly in his discussions of the Monadology. Given that "monads have no windows", it logically follows that they do not have any external aspect. Monads do not see the outsides of each other in any direct way. All that monads have as percepts of that which is other than themselves are those aspects of their own 1p that cannot be reconsidered as belonging to their identity in the moment of the observation/appearance.

Leibniz does refer to a proposed "universal"
language, which is simply everywhere
as well as possibly in each head.  Numbers would
no doubt be the same, both everywhere and
in individual minds at times.

    Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

So numbers are universal and can be treated 
mathematically as always.

 

    I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

Not at all. Where?
On the contrary, it is the difference of the inputs receive by
identical universal numbers which will trigger a branching experience.
It is exactly like the WM scenario, but with the UD protocol (step
seven).

> Given that one number can be used to code for other numbers, ala
> Godel numbering schemes, how is it that universal numbers can be
> said to have any thing unique that would identify them in a non-
> trivial way?

?
From the first person perspective no intensional number (the i in
phi_i) can be sure of its relative code, but this is normal in the
comp theory. No machine can know which machine she is, but this does
not prevent them of having experiences, and this with the right measure.

>
>
>>
>>> How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other?
>>
>> This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why
>> you are using of the word "appear" instead of "are".
>
> "Are"? To who are they different?

To God, if you insist. The difference between 17 and 2 is 15,
independently of any observer or universe.

> Your idea here seems to depend on a pre-established harmony like
> situation.

No, it depends on elementary arithmetic, like all theories which use
the number.

If you believe that "17 -2 = 15" is a function of observer, I will ask
you "in which theory (of number and observer"?". I will ask you for
describing the functional dependence.
You answer will make sense only in a theory which do no more depend on
the observer.

If you doubt that 17-2=15" is absolute, I am not sure any theory you
can give to me will make sense.

I'm afraid your remark might validly demolish the whole of the science
enterprise.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Oct 2012, at 23:31, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out.
> I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books.

That's OK, but eventually you have to look inward, and see what you
think. the solution is in your head, even if Leibniz can help you.

>
> Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies,

Intensional numbers needs some universal numbers around to make sense.
basically the extensional number is the corporeal bodies. They just
take the usual shape, when the u number emerges from all computations,
apparently.

> and numbers aren't like that.

They are. You can say that a game of life pattern does not look like a
number too, but this is just an appearance.

> I find the following unsatisfactory,
> but since numbers are like ideas, they can be
> in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads,
> but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me.
> Not universakl enough.

I don't get your point. I think you should study the theory of
universal machine. I explain a bit of this on the FOAR list.

>
> My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly
> somehow possesses the numbers.

The supreme monad might be played by the universal number, but is not
the one (God, arithmetical truth).
Universal numbers are more the Plotinus' man. They are sigma_1
complete. God, is sigma_i complete for all i.


>
> Hurricane coming.

Be careful,

Bruno

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[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2012, at 06:15, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno
>
> Still waiting for the storm to shut things down.

Take care.

>
> Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet,
> in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that
> they are simply numbers, with no ontological status.
> Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere.

I can be OK. I think that numbers are not even 'inextended' as
extension does not apply to them. Then, of course variant of
extension, like length in base 10, or number of Kb, can of course be
defined.

>
> Numbers are definitely not monads, because no
> corporeal body is attached.

For me, numbers, body, language, machine, etc. are basically
synonymous. There are nuances, be they are not useful before they play
a (usually relative) rôle.

> Although they can
> whenever thought of appear in the minds of
> particular men in the intellects of their monads.
>
> Leibniz does refer to a proposed "universal"
> language, which is simply everywhere
> as well as possibly in each head.

I think Leibniz got the intuition of universal number (machine,
language, program, etc.).

> Numbers would
> no doubt be the same, both everywhere and
> in individual minds at times.

OK.

>
> So numbers are universal and can be treated
> mathematically as always.

They are universal in that sense. But some numbers are universal in
the Turing sense, and, as language, might be closer to Leibniz
intuition. Such universal numbers can emulate the behavior of all
other number. typical incarnation: the brain, the computer, the three
bodies problem, the quantum zero body problem, game of life, fortran,
lisp, algol, c++, combinators, arithmetic, etc. They all faithfully
mirrors each other.

They are like the golem. You can instruct them by using words, or
numbers, so that they become slave, like your PC or MAC. Like the
golem, the math explain it is risky and that you can loose control.
With comp, you can make them becoming yourself, and an infinitely of
them already are.

Bruno

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[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
is the monad for the universe. Then the universe
would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/29/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-29, 11:54:20

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:
>> So numbers are universal and can be treated
>> mathematically as always.
>>
>>
>
> I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the
> existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is
> equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false
> even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is
that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining
some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and
the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands
(unless philosophers?).

Bruno

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never
succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am
afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental
and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability
issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the
arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics)
issue, etc.
When you say:

<<
> Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued
> before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that
> the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible
> world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God)
> prior to the availability of resources with which to actually
> perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content
> of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!
>>

I don't find any sense. I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't
say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and
formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in
the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the
link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>

> OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
> in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
> is the monad for the universe. Then the universe
> would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.

Hmm... I don't think this can work. The supreme monads can only dream,
the physical universe is when many universal numbers shared their
dreams, in some manner. There is no ultimate corporeal body, at least
not in the 'usual' sense, as some collection of dreams might point on
something very similar.
It is complex to explain the picture from scratch. It is simpler to
get it by oneself by doing the reasoning. We will see. The supreme
monad, as you define it, is just the 'man', or the Löbian universal
machine (man is used in a very large but precise sense, it includes
plausibly the jumping spiders). You have 8 hypostases:

God
Man Divine-Man
Soul

Intelligible matter Divine intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter Divine Sensible Matter

You supreme monad might be played by the Man or the Divine-Man, or
Divine-Intellect (it is Plato's Noùs).
Read some of my papers perhaps, but you might need to study a bit of
logic and computer science for this.

Bruno

[Roger Clough]

Hi Bruno Marchal

I think you're right. Anyway, I've since decided that the numbers
have to be simply a priori. Like the pre-established (a priori) Harmony.

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/29/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-29, 13:49:33

Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe.

On 29 Oct 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> OK, let's suppose that the numbers can be considered as ideas
> in the mind of the One or the Supreme monad, which
> is the monad for the universe. Then the universe
> would be the corporeal body. Or something like that.

Hmm... I don't think this can work. The supreme monads can only dream,
the physical universe is when many universal numbers shared their
dreams, in some manner. There is no ultimate corporeal body, at least
not in the 'usual' sense, as some collection of dreams might point on
something very similar.
It is complex to explain the picture from scratch. It is simpler to
get it by oneself by doing the reasoning. We will see. The supreme

monad, as you define it, is just the 'man', or the L?ian universal

machine (man is used in a very large but precise sense, it includes
plausibly the jumping spiders). You have 8 hypostases:

God
Man Divine-Man
Soul

Intelligible matter Divine intelligible Matter
Sensible Matter Divine Sensible Matter

You supreme monad might be played by the Man or the Divine-Man, or

Divine-Intellect (it is Plato's No?).

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always.

    I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

Dear Bruno

I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

    No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious beings. If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds. My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?).

    I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers. I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept!

Bruno

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc.

    It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read:

    "There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false."

    Solutions to equations or computations are not available until after they are actually solved. My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8. Let me try to be more explicit:

From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf :

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time  (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which  is  accepted  as  existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism). "

    I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existing independently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates the meaning and truth valuation of numbers with the existence of numbers as Platonic objects. It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of "17  is prime" depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of "17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd. If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd. The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all.
    Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing as valuations of numbers because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existing independently as some singular "perfect" version that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping.
    How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect" version of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that occur as physical instantiations of computations and thus they do not "exist" in Platonia. The Many exist in the physical worlds, no?
    I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-) (The idea of diffeomorphic equivalence is discussed in detail here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html )

When you say:

<<

    Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

>>

I don't find any sense.

    How is this so difficult for you to comprehend? The Platonic Realm is defined as timeless, everything in it just 'exists', no? Therefore any argument that shows that "if A does not exist then neither does B if B requires A to exist" is true in Platonia as well, (we stipulate the existence of Platonia as defined for the sake of this statement). If a solution to a computation cannot exist until the computation is run then if the resources required to run the computation do not exist then there does not exist a solution to the computation!
    I propose that we can easily resolve this conundrum by stating Computational universality as: "A computation is universal if and only if it is independent of any particular physical implementation." This allows for the existence of physical implementations, even those that are themselves defined by correlations between sheaves for computations. This sets up a relation between computations - as abstract or immaterial objects - and physical systems that seems consistent with "COMP minus Step 8". We can recover the picture of step 8,



in a way that is truly neutral ontologically, by changing its single directed arrow to a pair of oppositely directed arrows, but this one that occurs only in the ultimate sense of the elaboration of all possible physical worlds consistent with Pratt's idea.

    This idea, BTW, is consistent with the concept of Indra's Net, as an inversion of the idea that every Jewel reflects all others: Every jewel is a physical world that is defined by all computations of it. Note also that this naturally includes self-computation as jewels also reflect themselves. ;-)

I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.

    I am trying to be clear. I will correct and rephrase my verbiage until you understand it. I reject the idea of an entity, 'God', whose total purpose is to "observe" the Reality of the Universe! If we accept the idea that numbers exist in our complete absence, then it follows that an entity like us cannot exist just to observe the existence of numbers (or anything else). Why postulate the existence of a special entity that does what we collectively are already doing?
    It is our collective consciousness that Constitutes the Platonic Realm, IMHO. A theory that there is some independently existing realm is a gross violation of Occam.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Roger,

Hope everything is fine with Sandy.

On 29 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>

> I think you're right. Anyway, I've since decided that the numbers
> have to be simply a priori. Like the pre-established (a priori)
> Harmony.

I am OK with this. Note that it is mysterious, but that mystery can be
explained as being necessarily mysterious. We can't explain our
intuition of numbers without using our intuition of numbers. It is an
irreducible mystery, but then nobody doubt them, and they are a good
starting point. Comp explains conceptually, and even quantitatively
(but there are many open problems) how the coupling consciousness/
physical-reality appears from just the numbers (and the association of
consciousness to *some* computation, but this can be eliminated in
terms of statistics on first person relative memories).

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always.

    I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

Dear Bruno

I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

    No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious beings.

This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can do, even in absence of any conscious observer. 

If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds.

But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).

My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?).

    I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers.

That is idealism, if not solipsism. In comp plotinus term, you confuse the outer God (the objective ultimate truth) and the inner God, or the sould of the individual inquirer.

I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept!

Again, we need only the relation between the numbers, not the concept of numbers, which with comp will be explained by computation occurring in the brain of some machine/number.

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc.

    It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read:

    "There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false."

All this presuppose numbers at the outset. World in Kripke are only elements of any set having a binary relation. You must study the math, not use the naive interpretation based on the use of common terms.

    Solutions to equations or computations are not available until after they are actually solved.

That is constructive thinking, again incompatible with comp, although retrieved and explain for the subject. This is akin to your solipsism above.

Of course it is hard to guess what you think as long as you don't propose a theory.

My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8.

You can't make the conclusion of a reasoning false by stopping the reasoning. This will only make you ignorant of a conclusion. 

Let me try to be more explicit:

From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf :

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time  (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which  is  accepted  as  existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism). "

Yes. That is already true in a concrete robust physical universe (robust = own a non stopping  UD).

    I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existing independently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates the meaning and truth valuation of numbers with the existence of numbers as Platonic objects.

You seem to ignore that this conflation is not us, but the doing of the (universal) numbers themselves, and this independently of me, you, or universes.

It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of "17  is prime" depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of "17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd.

It is absurd with comp, as knowing, despite NON arithmetical in the logical sense, is still defined in purely arithmetical terms. If not, you will not surive with an artificial brain, even concrete.

If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd.

This is just realism. The semantical content of knowledge as to exist independently of you if you don't want to fall into solipsism. 

The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all.

With comp they "occur" as consequence of + and * laws.

    Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing as valuations of numbers

Then 17 is prime only since humans exist on the planet? or since insects use this to regulate mating?

This is solipsism/idealism.

because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existing independently as some singular "perfect" version that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping.

? (so you postulate conscious observer *and* physical universes?). Your theory looks more and more like Craig's non comp theory.

    How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect" version of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that occur as physical instantiations of computations

"physical instantiation of computations" is something in needed to be explaiend, not assumed, if we want to understand something (not just comp). Computation evaluation is a too fuzzy terming for me.

and thus they do not "exist" in Platonia.

Then Church thesis has no more meaning.

The Many exist in the physical worlds, no?

Primitive one?

    I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-)

That does not make sense to me. Sorry.

it might make sense in some non comp analogical theory of mind, with mind and matter explicitly defined in term of non computable diffeomorphism. But this looks to me like making the mind-body problem more complex just for fun.

(The idea of diffeomorphic equivalence is discussed in detail here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html )

When you say:

<<

    Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

>>

I don't find any sense.

    How is this so difficult for you to comprehend? The Platonic Realm is defined as timeless, everything in it just 'exists', no?

Only in the sense that if some proposition P(n) is true independently of me, then ExP(x) is true independently of me. 

Therefore any argument that shows that "if A does not exist then neither does B if B requires A to exist" is true in Platonia as well, (we stipulate the existence of Platonia as defined for the sake of this statement). If a solution to a computation cannot exist until the computation is run then if the resources required to run the computation do not exist then there does not exist a solution to the computation!

So you cannot compute 10^1000 + 10^1000, and your theory is ultrafinitist (and so non-comp).

    I propose that we can easily resolve this conundrum by stating Computational universality as: "A computation is universal if and only if it is independent of any particular physical implementation."

Universal applies to finite entity (numbers, humans, machines, language). Not to computations, although the running of a universal dovetailer can be said universal in some context, but only by abuse of language.

This allows for the existence of physical implementations,

Comp allows this too; without the need of assuming physical realities.

even those that are themselves defined by correlations between sheaves for computations. This sets up a relation between computations - as abstract or immaterial objects - and physical systems that seems consistent with "COMP minus Step 8". We can recover the picture of step 8,

<Sane 04 Bijection.gif>

Step 8 is a consequence of comp, like all steps in the UDA.   'Comp minus step 8' implies that  0 = 1.

in a way that is truly neutral ontologically, by changing its single directed arrow to a pair of oppositely directed arrows, but this one that occurs only in the ultimate sense of the elaboration of all possible physical worlds consistent with Pratt's idea.

1004.

    This idea, BTW, is consistent with the concept of Indra's Net, as an inversion of the idea that every Jewel reflects all others: Every jewel is a physical world that is defined by all computations of it. Note also that this naturally includes self-computation as jewels also reflect themselves. ;-)

I have no more any understanding by what you mean by "physical world". It seems like a God-of-the-Gap.

I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.

    I am trying to be clear. I will correct and rephrase my verbiage until you understand it.

It would help to tell us what you assume at the start. from what I understand it is just contradictory. Pratt assumes more than arithmetic. All paper you refer too assumes more than arithmetic. Your notion of consciousness and of physical universe seems to be very fuzzy and clearly not comp-compatible.

I reject the idea of an entity, 'God', whose total purpose is to "observe" the Reality of the Universe!

Comp too. Comp rejects also the primitive reality of a physical universe.

If we accept the idea that numbers exist in our complete absence, then it follows that an entity like us cannot exist just to observe the existence of numbers (or anything else).

? ? ?

Why postulate the existence of a special entity that does what we collectively are already doing?

Why postulate physical computations, and comp, when comp explains how physical computations emerges in our mind through the existence of the computations in arithmetic?

    It is our collective consciousness that Constitutes the Platonic Realm, IMHO. A theory that there is some independently existing realm is a gross violation of Occam.

But you do it for the physical computations, like in this post, despite you often pretend the contrary in other posts.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Roger Clough]

Computationalism and downward causation -- Leibniz's new paradigm for science

The new, strictly logical, Leibnizian view of the universe is
that the new paradigm- computationalism-- is thoroughly
logically based, while conventional science is based on appearances,
not that the appearances are wrong.

In a previous email I explained how all of today's science is based
on the logical error that mind and matter can directly
interact, which is false, because they are two different
substances, completely foreign to one another.

The more strictly logical view, as Leibniz showed, is that
the interaction only appears to happen.
But the strictly logical Leibnizian view is that upward
causation is only an appearance. All true causation is
actually downward (Platonic).

This new understanding not only allows today's scientific
results to be apparently true, but opens the door to
previously unexplainable phenomena such as gravity.

Another way to say this is that, although they may
appear to be a posteriori (in the world), all causes
are actually theoretical (a priori). Numbers being
a priori (given), this gives a completely new
solidity to computationalism.



Roger Clough

[Richard Ruquist]

Roger,

Mind and matter can interact if they both contain BECs.
Richard

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always.

    I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

Dear Bruno

I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

    No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious beings.

This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can do, even in absence of any conscious observer.

Dear Bruno,

    It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no ontological priority between them in my version.

If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds.

But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).

    Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not!

My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

    Your version, yes.

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?).

    I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers.

That is idealism, if not solipsism. In comp plotinus term, you confuse the outer God (the objective ultimate truth) and the inner God, or the sould of the individual inquirer.

    No, Idealism is that only the mind exists, i.e. idealism takes the mind as ontologically primitive. Solipsism is the condition of a mind such that it can only interact with some version of itself.

I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept!

Again, we need only the relation between the numbers, not the concept of numbers, which with comp will be explained by computation occurring in the brain of some machine/number.

    Let me ask you: Do numbers have "concepts" of each other" YES! Godel numbers are a way for one number to have a concept of another. No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream? This is just to show that your idea implicitly considers that concepts are 'mental' and that if numbers can be coherently said to have minds then their concepts supervene on their minds. But what are numbers as themselves - as objects?
    What can know the 'in-it-self-ness' of a number such that that 'in-it-self-ness' is not a concept?

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc.

    It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read:

    "There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false."

All this presuppose numbers at the outset. World in Kripke are only elements of any set having a binary relation. You must study the math, not use the naive interpretation based on the use of common terms.

    Please, you are not addressing my critique, but some straw man. You are smarter than to do that!

    Solutions to equations or computations are not available until after they are actually solved.

That is constructive thinking, again incompatible with comp, although retrieved and explain for the subject. This is akin to your solipsism above.

    Where am I claiming that only my thoughts exist? Could you define what solipsism is and how I am being such above?

Of course it is hard to guess what you think as long as you don't propose a theory.

    Oh, so its OK that you do not think that you propose a theory, but it is a crime is someone else does that. You are being a hypocrite with that claim! How childish! Stop trying to evade my critique.

My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8.

You can't make the conclusion of a reasoning false by stopping the reasoning. This will only make you ignorant of a conclusion.

    blah blah blah...

Let me try to be more explicit:

From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf :

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time  (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which  is  accepted  as  existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism). "

Yes. That is already true in a concrete robust physical universe (robust = own a non stopping  UD).

    OK, so how does it remain true when there is no physical universe? How can actions be defined on entities that are, by definition, static and eternally fixed? You result is self-stultifying here - not self-contradictory. If we take step 8 to be correct then there is no possibility of a means to communicate the meaningfulness of comp to anything other than the mind of Bruno Marchal, since his chalkboard can be, do be consistent not a "physical object" and thus is at best a "dream". Whose dream? Dreams of Numbers. What makes how are the dreams of numbers more "special' than the dreams of Pink Unicorns or Purple Ponys?
    We have discussed how concepts and objects are not the same thing, so what is the object aspect of a number? How does a number demonstrate its nature other than through concepts? It cannot!

    I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existing independently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates the meaning and truth valuation of numbers with the existence of numbers as Platonic objects.

You seem to ignore that this conflation is not us, but the doing of the (universal) numbers themselves, and this independently of me, you, or universes.

    OK, then this very independents prevents any meaning from being associated with its existence and thus the ability for "this sentence is true" to refer to itself vanishes (as it would for any Godel Numbering that does exactly the same thing or any derivative thing). Independence isolates and cuts off connections, so do not claim that the results of those connections remain once independence is claimed. There is no such thing as "running" or "implementing" or "meaning" or anything that is anything derivative of an action if step 8 is correct as you state it therefore AUDA is steaming rubbish if you insist on it. Why? Because AUDA (and all the argument about G and G* and Z and  Z*, etc) is "independent' of physical implementation and that independence goes both ways - it independence is applied coherently.

    If A and B are independent then they have nothing to do with each other at all, unless their is some C that is prior to A and B. If A and B are independent of the physical and timeless, there is nothing prior to them therefore no relation or prior to them can be used to infer any relation what so ever between them. Even the common naming conversion, A and B, is treachery as it tacitly assumes that there are two objects that can be simultaneously known and distinguished both between each other and some common background vanishes is they are independent and timeless. Your concept of Platonism is deeply flawed.

        You should spend some time studying philosophy if you are going to pretend to make philosophical arguments.

It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of "17  is prime" depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of "17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd.

It is absurd with comp, as knowing, despite NON arithmetical in the logical sense, is still defined in purely arithmetical terms. If not, you will not surive with an artificial brain, even concrete.

    No, it is not absurd, except for you that allows concepts of actions, such as "implements" and "runs", to exist when they cannot be coherently defined.

If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd.

This is just realism. The semantical content of knowledge as to exist independently of you if you don't want to fall into solipsism.

    How is it related to the word "real" at all? You are only showing us the mathematical theory of a consistent solipsist and, as a consistent solipsist you are unable to conceptualize that you are wrong, after all "it is absurd that anything contradict the solipsist as only it exists and its existence is only possible if it is consistent".

    Some thing is "real" only is that reality is common for many, thus solipsism and realism are mutually exclusive.

The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all.

With comp they "occur" as consequence of + and * laws.

    No. There is no "occurance" in your comp. Nothing can possibly "occur". In your result these is only "is". X is Y, not any X occurs iff Y. There are no coherent concept of actions in your comp.

    Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing as valuations of numbers

Then 17 is prime only since humans exist on the planet? or since insects use this to regulate mating?

This is solipsism/idealism.

    You fail to read temporarily or is it OK to attack straw men? Read further of my post.

because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existing independently as some singular "perfect" version that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping.

? (so you postulate conscious observer *and* physical universes?). Your theory looks more and more like Craig's non comp theory.

    They are very similar, I admit that. You have no idea what Craig's idea is as demonstrated by your inability to describe it accurately as anything other than rubbish or noise.

    How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect" version of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that occur as physical instantiations of computations

"physical instantiation of computations" is something in needed to be explaiend, not assumed, if we want to understand something (not just comp). Computation evaluation is a too fuzzy terming for me.

    A physical instance of a computation is the existence of a physical system that can "run" a universal turing machine. It can do so, among other things, because it uses resources of time and/or memory to transform through some set of states such that it reproduces the functions of the UTM. Straight forward idea that we see in texts on computers. Nothing new or magical...

and thus they do not "exist" in Platonia.

Then Church thesis has no more meaning.

    To you, perhaps. What a pity!

The Many exist in the physical worlds, no?

Primitive one?

    No. Not primitive, derivative. No different from how numbers are derivative in my thinking and that of most natural philosophers. Your mistake is in assuming strict ontological well foundedness; the idea that there has to be a irreducible ontological primitive that has innate properties. If you would read Bertrand Russell's discussions of neutral monism then you might see his explanation of what I am proposing and not have the straw man of my terrible writing to use as a shield of your unwillingness to try to understand what I am trying to communicate to you.
    Irreducible objects, in the ontological sense, cannot have a particular set of properties as such is to exclude all other possible properties without justification. To claim that numbers can be ontologically primitive and yet have valuations and abilities is to deny their irreducibility, as values and abilities are derivative, not fundamental or innate.

    I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-)

That does not make sense to me. Sorry.

    Read some more books on philosophy, such as The Problems of Philosophy

it might make sense in some non comp analogical theory of mind, with mind and matter explicitly defined in term of non computable diffeomorphism. But this looks to me like making the mind-body problem more complex just for fun.

    No, I am trying to show you how to solve the 'arithmetic body' problem.

(The idea of diffeomorphic equivalence is discussed in detail here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html )

When you say:

<<

    Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

>>

I don't find any sense.

    How is this so difficult for you to comprehend? The Platonic Realm is defined as timeless, everything in it just 'exists', no?

Only in the sense that if some proposition P(n) is true independently of me, then ExP(x) is true independently of me.

    But you are not the only entity involved in the truth of P(n)! You pretend that it is possible for something to be so absurd! P(n) is true only because it is possible to implement some version of P(n) and verify that indeed P(n) is true. The mere Platonic existence of P(n) is insufficient for truth as truth is a derivative evaluation. It cannot be ontologically irreducible.

Therefore any argument that shows that "if A does not exist then neither does B if B requires A to exist" is true in Platonia as well, (we stipulate the existence of Platonia as defined for the sake of this statement). If a solution to a computation cannot exist until the computation is run then if the resources required to run the computation do not exist then there does not exist a solution to the computation!

So you cannot compute 10^1000 + 10^1000, and your theory is ultrafinitist (and so non-comp).

    False. Straw man argument.

    I propose that we can easily resolve this conundrum by stating Computational universality as: "A computation is universal if and only if it is independent of any particular physical implementation."

Universal applies to finite entity (numbers, humans, machines, language). Not to computations, although the running of a universal dovetailer can be said universal in some context, but only by abuse of language.

    So? How does that contradict my definition of universality?

This allows for the existence of physical implementations,

Comp allows this too; without the need of assuming physical realities.

    Rubbish. You must assume the a priori possibility of physical reality to even have a coherent notion of comp or else it is, at least, not communicable.

even those that are themselves defined by correlations between sheaves for computations. This sets up a relation between computations - as abstract or immaterial objects - and physical systems that seems consistent with "COMP minus Step 8". We can recover the picture of step 8,

<Sane 04 Bijection.gif>

Step 8 is a consequence of comp, like all steps in the UDA.   'Comp minus step 8' implies that  0 = 1.

    LOL, no. It only means "'Comp minus step 8' implies that  0 = 1."  for a consistent solipsist.

in a way that is truly neutral ontologically, by changing its single directed arrow to a pair of oppositely directed arrows, but this one that occurs only in the ultimate sense of the elaboration of all possible physical worlds consistent with Pratt's idea.

1004.

    Straw Man.

    This idea, BTW, is consistent with the concept of Indra's Net, as an inversion of the idea that every Jewel reflects all others: Every jewel is a physical world that is defined by all computations of it. Note also that this naturally includes self-computation as jewels also reflect themselves. ;-)

I have no more any understanding by what you mean by "physical world". It seems like a God-of-the-Gap.

    I define a physical world as the set of mutually non-contradictory 1p for some set of non-solipsistic entities that have certain properties that at least allow for some coherent notion of communication between those entities.

I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.

    I am trying to be clear. I will correct and rephrase my verbiage until you understand it.

It would help to tell us what you assume at the start. from what I understand it is just contradictory. Pratt assumes more than arithmetic. All paper you refer too assumes more than arithmetic. Your notion of consciousness and of physical universe seems to be very fuzzy and clearly not comp-compatible.

    My point is that you are not "just assuming" arithmetic. You assume, additionally, at least that there is qualia.

I reject the idea of an entity, 'God', whose total purpose is to "observe" the Reality of the Universe!

Comp too. Comp rejects also the primitive reality of a physical universe.

    So do I. I reject as ontologically primitive anything that is not property neutral.

If we accept the idea that numbers exist in our complete absence, then it follows that an entity like us cannot exist just to observe the existence of numbers (or anything else).

? ? ?

Why postulate the existence of a special entity that does what we collectively are already doing?

Why postulate physical computations, and comp, when comp explains how physical computations emerges in our mind through the existence of the computations in arithmetic?

    No, it does not do so alone. Comp requires the implementation of a physical symbolic representation of the idea for it to be even evaluated and thus implicitly requires something physical even if that "physicality" is derivative and not ontologically primitive. Read Russell's book ad stop using straw amn arguments about my pitiful attempt to help you solve a problem that you ackowledge exists in comp.

    It is our collective consciousness that Constitutes the Platonic Realm, IMHO. A theory that there is some independently existing realm is a gross violation of Occam.

But you do it for the physical computations, like in this post, despite you often pretend the contrary in other posts.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

    Stop using logical fallacious statements.

-- 
Onward!

Stephen

[Bruno Marchal]

This would make Leibniz closer to Plato and Plotinus. I can only be happy with this. There is a lot in Leibiz which announces comp, from the binary (taken in the Yi-King) to the universal language, and also by its general philosophy. I agree, but I know that some fan of Leibniz are not so happy with this, but I guess they have a materialist conception of comp (which is inconsistent).

Bruno

Roger Clough

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[meekerdb]

On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

So your are agreeing?  "Two" has no truth value, but "Two equals one plus one." does.

Brent

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always.

    I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.

Dear Bruno

I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.

    No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious beings.

This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can do, even in absence of any conscious observer.

Dear Bruno,

    It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no ontological priority between them in my version.

Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be short. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively equivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *). If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It you reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal.

If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds.

But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).

    Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not!

I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing, except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must understand the technical result before philosophising on it. It is subtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch of science (indeed, arithmetic/computer science). 

My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves.

Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.

    Your version, yes.

Not my version. "My" version is just a technically more precise that the version used in some literature. Comp is the same for everybody. "My" Version implies all other one, as it is a very weaker version (because it does not depend on which level of substitution we use).

And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?).

    I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers.

That is idealism, if not solipsism. In comp plotinus term, you confuse the outer God (the objective ultimate truth) and the inner God, or the sould of the individual inquirer.

    No, Idealism is that only the mind exists, i.e. idealism takes the mind as ontologically primitive. Solipsism is the condition of a mind such that it can only interact with some version of itself.

Given that matter comes from the numbers, if the number comes from the human mind, everything comes from the human mind. This is a version of (collective) solipsism.

I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept!

Again, we need only the relation between the numbers, not the concept of numbers, which with comp will be explained by computation occurring in the brain of some machine/number.

    Let me ask you: Do numbers have "concepts" of each other" YES! Godel numbers are a way for one number to have a concept of another.

You can't be serious. A Godel number is a coding of something, which can indeed be a number. For a concept you need a thinking universal number; not just a faithful coding. Some numbers can be said having concept of other number, but just because some numbers implement sophisticated person relatively to their most probable computations.

No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream?

Yes, the universal numbers can have concept. 

This is just to show that your idea implicitly considers that concepts are 'mental' and that if numbers can be coherently said to have minds then their concepts supervene on their minds. But what are numbers as themselves - as objects?

We don't ever know that. But we don't need to know that, as we agree on the axioms, and reason from that. It is not philosophy. 

    What can know the 'in-it-self-ness' of a number such that that 'in-it-self-ness' is not a concept?

?

PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc.

    It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read:

    "There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false."

All this presuppose numbers at the outset. World in Kripke are only elements of any set having a binary relation. You must study the math, not use the naive interpretation based on the use of common terms.

    Please, you are not addressing my critique, but some straw man. You are smarter than to do that!

Rephrase your critics. You lost me, as I don't even see the critics.

    Solutions to equations or computations are not available until after they are actually solved.

That is constructive thinking, again incompatible with comp, although retrieved and explain for the subject. This is akin to your solipsism above.

    Where am I claiming that only my thoughts exist? Could you define what solipsism is and how I am being such above?

Because you seem to think that a solution of an equation exists only if we have found the solution. I think that arithmetic is boolean, and so a solution exist or does not exist independently of me and you.

Of course it is hard to guess what you think as long as you don't propose a theory.

    Oh, so its OK that you do not think that you propose a theory, but it is a crime is someone else does that. You are being a hypocrite with that claim! How childish! Stop trying to evade my critique.

I am trying hard to get it, and don't succeed, and point that this fact might come by my unability to see what are your assumption.

My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8.

You can't make the conclusion of a reasoning false by stopping the reasoning. This will only make you ignorant of a conclusion.

    blah blah blah...

?

Let me try to be more explicit:

From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf :

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time  (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which  is  accepted  as  existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism). "

Yes. That is already true in a concrete robust physical universe (robust = own a non stopping  UD).

    OK, so how does it remain true when there is no physical universe? How can actions be defined on entities that are, by definition, static and eternally fixed? You result is self-stultifying here - not self-contradictory. If we take step 8 to be correct then there is no possibility of a means to communicate the meaningfulness of comp to anything other than the mind of Bruno Marchal, since his chalkboard can be, do be consistent not a "physical object" and thus is at best a "dream".

? The chalk seems to be obviously a physical object. But comp explains where it comes from. 

Whose dream? Dreams of Numbers. What makes how are the dreams of numbers more "special' than the dreams of Pink Unicorns or Purple Ponys?

If you have a theory of Pink Unicorns precise enough to be proved Turing universal, it is OK. 

The laws of both mind and matter are totally independent of the initial objects you assume, be them numbers or combinators, or Pink Unicorn. Just give me the axioms you assume on Pink Unicorns.

    We have discussed how concepts and objects are not the same thing, so what is the object aspect of a number?

We don't need to know that. We need only to agree on the axioms:

x + 0 = x  

x + s(y) = s(x + y) 

 x *0 = 0

 x*s(y) = x*y + x  

together with some axioms on equality.

How does a number demonstrate its nature other than through concepts? It cannot!

It can. Read any textbook in mathematical logic, or theoretical computer science. Or Gödel original papers. It is coneptually not so difficult, just long and tedious, as it it an implementation of high level notion (concept of number) in low level notion numbers, addition and multiplication.

    I am pointing out that the idea of computations "existing independently of our selves" is wrong in that it conflates the meaning and truth valuation of numbers with the existence of numbers as Platonic objects.

You seem to ignore that this conflation is not us, but the doing of the (universal) numbers themselves, and this independently of me, you, or universes.

    OK, then this very independents prevents any meaning from being associated with its existence and thus the ability for "this sentence is true" to refer to itself vanishes (as it would for any Godel Numbering that does exactly the same thing or any derivative thing).

Why would meaning disappear? I guess you are again violating comp. The meaning and consciousness is preserved in the digital (arithmetical) emulation.

Independence isolates and cuts off connections, so do not claim that the results of those connections remain once independence is claimed.

Then you say no to the doctor.

There is no such thing as "running" or "implementing" or "meaning" or anything that is anything derivative of an action if step 8 is correct as you state it therefore AUDA is steaming rubbish if you insist on it. Why? Because AUDA (and all the argument about G and G* and Z and  Z*, etc) is "independent' of physical implementation and that independence goes both ways - it independence is applied coherently.

? All statements referred to in AUDA are theorems in PA. (the theory above + the induction axioms). And the theory above proves that already, as it emulates (but is different from) PA.

    If A and B are independent then they have nothing to do with each other at all, unless their is some C that is prior to A and B. If A and B are independent of the physical and timeless, there is nothing prior to them therefore no relation or prior to them can be used to infer any relation what so ever between them.

You might be correct here, and that is why it is a good thing that the *primitive* physical universe does not exist, as it would be indeed totally independent of any mind, and would be an epinomenon.

Even the common naming conversion, A and B, is treachery as it tacitly assumes that there are two objects that can be simultaneously known and distinguished both between each other and some common background vanishes is they are independent and timeless. Your concept of Platonism is deeply flawed.

But here you lost me again.

        You should spend some time studying philosophy if you are going to pretend to make philosophical arguments.

I do not. That's the point. 

It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of "17  is prime" depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of "17 is prime" is knowable by any person is not absurd.

It is absurd with comp, as knowing, despite NON arithmetical in the logical sense, is still defined in purely arithmetical terms. If not, you will not surive with an artificial brain, even concrete.

    No, it is not absurd, except for you that allows concepts of actions, such as "implements" and "runs", to exist when they cannot be coherently defined.

But they can. I already define them once (or twice). read any textbook in theoretical computer science. running, implementation, etc. are purely mathematical notion. It just happens that we can approximate them through a physical reality, and that is what make comp possible. But the the physical reality appears to be necessarily emerging from the numbers and their mind (or the mind associated to person associated to the arithmetical relations, to be more precise).

If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd.

This is just realism. The semantical content of knowledge as to exist independently of you if you don't want to fall into solipsism.

    How is it related to the word "real" at all? You are only showing us the mathematical theory of a consistent solipsist

Not at all. On the contrary I ascribe mind to numbers (in relation with opther numbers). It is the contrary of solipsism.

and, as a consistent solipsist you are unable to conceptualize that you are wrong, after all "it is absurd that anything contradict the solipsist as only it exists and its existence is only possible if it is consistent".

    Some thing is "real" only is that reality is common for many, thus solipsism and realism are mutually exclusive.

Of course.

The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all.

With comp they "occur" as consequence of + and * laws.

    No. There is no "occurance" in your comp.

The machine 678 on argument 456 stop after less than 456789 steps. That is a statement which if true can be proved in arithmetic, and you can defined many notion of occurrence from it.

Nothing can possibly "occur".

An infinity of emulation of the collision of the Milky way and Andromeda occurs in arithmetic. 

In your result these is only "is".

In GR too. In physics you can always replace a dynamical phenomenon by a higher dimensional statical structure. With comp we get the higher structure at the start. Dynamics arise in the internal inside views.

X is Y, not any X occurs iff Y. There are no coherent concept of actions in your comp.

There are many.

You really seems to lack even just the computer science intuition. Please study the book by Mendelson, or ask precise question, but most of it have already been explained.

    Absent the "concept" of numbers there is no such thing as valuations of numbers

Then 17 is prime only since humans exist on the planet? or since insects use this to regulate mating?

This is solipsism/idealism.

    You fail to read temporarily or is it OK to attack straw men? Read further of my post.

The fact is that your current posts makes me doubt about your position on "17 is prime independently of us".

because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existing independently as some singular "perfect" version that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping.

? (so you postulate conscious observer *and* physical universes?). Your theory looks more and more like Craig's non comp theory.

    They are very similar, I admit that. You have no idea what Craig's idea is as demonstrated by your inability to describe it accurately as anything other than rubbish or noise.

I have great respect for Craig's attempt to defend a non comp theory. But you seem to want both comp and a Craig-like theory, and then that is what I have shown inconsistent. Craig's theory is consistent, as it assumes non-comp. But your "theory", as far as I understand it, is not. Now Craig is not consistent in most of his argument against comp, as his conversation with Stathis illustrates, but that is another point.

    How exactly is a "type" or "sheaf" a singular and "perfect" version of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that occur as physical instantiations of computations

"physical instantiation of computations" is something in needed to be explaiend, not assumed, if we want to understand something (not just comp). Computation evaluation is a too fuzzy terming for me.

    A physical instance of a computation is the existence of a physical system that can "run" a universal turing machine.

Trivially true. The whole point is that such a physical existence will no more be primary. 

It can do so, among other things, because it uses resources of time and/or memory to transform through some set of states such that it reproduces the functions of the UTM.

Agains that is true for the physical universal machine. But not for all universal machine, and the physical emerges from the work of all universal machines.

Straight forward idea that we see in texts on computers. Nothing new or magical...

because computers are thought as physical, since we build them. but the mathematical notion preceded it, and does not rely on physical notion of resource, but on mathematical notion of "enough memory".

and thus they do not "exist" in Platonia.

Then Church thesis has no more meaning.

    To you, perhaps. What a pity!

To everyone. If arithmetical realism is excluded, you can no more explain the consistency of Church thesis by the diagonalization. You need to believe that for all i and j, either phi_i(j) stops or phi_i(j) does not stop, independently of you.

The Many exist in the physical worlds, no?

Primitive one?

    No. Not primitive, derivative. No different from how numbers are derivative in my thinking and that of most natural philosophers.

?

Your mistake is in assuming strict ontological well foundedness;

? Comp makes this possible.

the idea that there has to be a irreducible ontological primitive that has innate properties. If you would read Bertrand Russell's discussions of neutral monism then you might see his explanation of what I am proposing and not have the straw man of my terrible writing to use as a shield of your unwillingness to try to understand what I am trying to communicate to you.

You are quite unfair as I try hard.

    Irreducible objects, in the ontological sense, cannot have a particular set of properties as such is to exclude all other possible properties without justification. To claim that numbers can be ontologically primitive and yet have valuations and abilities is to deny their irreducibility, as values and abilities are derivative, not fundamental or innate.

Give me the entire quote of Russell. keep in mind that Russell philosophy has been refuted by Gödel, also. But the very existence of principia mathematica makes me doubt that Russell ever defended an ontology with object who irreducibility prevents them to have properties; such an ontology would be by construction not amenable to scientific analysis. 

    I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-)

That does not make sense to me. Sorry.

    Read some more books on philosophy, such as The Problems of Philosophy

I read it, and it does not say one word related to the paragraph above.

it might make sense in some non comp analogical theory of mind, with mind and matter explicitly defined in term of non computable diffeomorphism. But this looks to me like making the mind-body problem more complex just for fun.

    No, I am trying to show you how to solve the 'arithmetic body' problem.

You have just to see if the arithemtical quantization defines the measure, as it seems to promise up to now. If not, then comp + (theatetus definition) is refuted.

All what I have done is a translation of the arithmetic body problem in arithpmetic. The solution can only be technical, although some variability exists due to the use of the classical theory of knowledge. It is already a mircale that the Theaetus definition of knowledge gives rise to the classical theory of knowledge. Without Gödel and Löb, that would be impossible.

(The idea of diffeomorphic equivalence is discussed in detail here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/Leibniz_Equivalence.html )

When you say:

<<

    Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient!

>>

I don't find any sense.

    How is this so difficult for you to comprehend? The Platonic Realm is defined as timeless, everything in it just 'exists', no?

Only in the sense that if some proposition P(n) is true independently of me, then ExP(x) is true independently of me.

    But you are not the only entity involved in the truth of P(n)!

?

I am not involved at all.

You pretend that it is possible for something to be so absurd! P(n) is true only because it is possible to implement some version of P(n) and verify that indeed P(n) is true.

Then arithmetic is no more boolean, and both "yes doctor" and "church's thesis" have no more meaning. 

The mere Platonic existence of P(n)

P(n) does not exist.

n exist, and P is true or false about it.

is insufficient for truth as truth is a derivative evaluation.

Not at all. truth is a matter of fact.

It cannot be ontologically irreducible.

Truth is is the easiest notion to conceive as irreducible, for a platonist. 

Therefore any argument that shows that "if A does not exist then neither does B if B requires A to exist" is true in Platonia as well, (we stipulate the existence of Platonia as defined for the sake of this statement). If a solution to a computation cannot exist until the computation is run then if the resources required to run the computation do not exist then there does not exist a solution to the computation!

So you cannot compute 10^1000 + 10^1000, and your theory is ultrafinitist (and so non-comp).

    False. Straw man argument.

Then why do you say that a computation has to be run to assert the existence of its solution. And run by who, and where?

    I propose that we can easily resolve this conundrum by stating Computational universality as: "A computation is universal if and only if it is independent of any particular physical implementation."

Universal applies to finite entity (numbers, humans, machines, language). Not to computations, although the running of a universal dovetailer can be said universal in some context, but only by abuse of language.

    So? How does that contradict my definition of universality?

The computation of 2+2 will not depend on any particular implementation, yet it is not universal.

This allows for the existence of physical implementations,

Comp allows this too; without the need of assuming physical realities.

    Rubbish. You must assume the a priori possibility of physical reality to even have a coherent notion of comp or else it is, at least, not communicable.

I have already explain why this is a confusion of level.

even those that are themselves defined by correlations between sheaves for computations. This sets up a relation between computations - as abstract or immaterial objects - and physical systems that seems consistent with "COMP minus Step 8". We can recover the picture of step 8,

<Sane 04 Bijection.gif>

<mime-attachment.gif>

Step 8 is a consequence of comp, like all steps in the UDA.   'Comp minus step 8' implies that  0 = 1.

    LOL, no. It only means "'Comp minus step 8' implies that  0 = 1."  for a consistent solipsist.

Then you have to find a flaw.

in a way that is truly neutral ontologically, by changing its single directed arrow to a pair of oppositely directed arrows, but this one that occurs only in the ultimate sense of the elaboration of all possible physical worlds consistent with Pratt's idea.

1004.

    Straw Man.

Then you have to elaborate.

    This idea, BTW, is consistent with the concept of Indra's Net, as an inversion of the idea that every Jewel reflects all others: Every jewel is a physical world that is defined by all computations of it. Note also that this naturally includes self-computation as jewels also reflect themselves. ;-)

I have no more any understanding by what you mean by "physical world". It seems like a God-of-the-Gap.

    I define a physical world as the set of mutually non-contradictory 1p for some set of non-solipsistic entities that have certain properties that at least allow for some coherent notion of communication between those entities.

Then the physical reality emerges from the 1p. Like in comp. why do you take so much time to criticize comp for not assuming a physical reality. And how do you define 1p, without using physics or notions of resources.

I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others.

    I am trying to be clear. I will correct and rephrase my verbiage until you understand it.

It would help to tell us what you assume at the start. from what I understand it is just contradictory. Pratt assumes more than arithmetic. All paper you refer too assumes more than arithmetic. Your notion of consciousness and of physical universe seems to be very fuzzy and clearly not comp-compatible.

    My point is that you are not "just assuming" arithmetic. You assume, additionally, at least that there is qualia.

In UDA. No more in AUDA. They are defined and explain in arithmetic, as UDA eventually forces us to do.

I reject the idea of an entity, 'God', whose total purpose is to "observe" the Reality of the Universe!

Comp too. Comp rejects also the primitive reality of a physical universe.

    So do I. I reject as ontologically primitive anything that is not property neutral.

This makes no sense. It must be nuetral with respect to mind and body. Not neutral to any properties, as your theory will be unable to derive anything.

If we accept the idea that numbers exist in our complete absence, then it follows that an entity like us cannot exist just to observe the existence of numbers (or anything else).

? ? ?

Why postulate the existence of a special entity that does what we collectively are already doing?

Why postulate physical computations, and comp, when comp explains how physical computations emerges in our mind through the existence of the computations in arithmetic?

    No, it does not do so alone. Comp requires the implementation of a physical symbolic representation of the idea for it to be even evaluated and thus implicitly requires something physical even if that "physicality" is derivative and not ontologically primitive.

Then I don't see why you critics the consequence of comp, as it shows exactly this. 

Read Russell's book ad stop using straw amn arguments about my pitiful attempt to help you solve a problem that you ackowledge exists in comp.

The existence of that problem is the main result (UDA)

Then I transform it into a problem in arithmetic (AUDA).

    It is our collective consciousness that Constitutes the Platonic Realm, IMHO. A theory that there is some independently existing realm is a gross violation of Occam.

But you do it for the physical computations, like in this post, despite you often pretend the contrary in other posts.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

    Stop using logical fallacious statements.

Which one. How is it fallacious? I might have been wrong, but you have to elaborate on the clarity of your statements.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Bruno Marchal]

Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. 

But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say  "Two equals one plus one." depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

[Stephen P. King]

On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can
>> they dream?
>
> Yes, the universal numbers can have concept.

Dear Bruno,

Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universal number
and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p.

--
Onward!

Stephen