The table quoted below doesn't say who won in IRV. The Occupy Movement's report says that Obama won in Plurality, Approval, Score, and also in IRV.
In other words, the method didn't make any difference. I assume that, unlike the earlier Occup poll on political parties, this more recent candidate poll was conducted among actua members of the geneal public.
The results show that more people prefer Obama to Stein than vice-versa--probably because they've never heard of Stein, and have no idea what the GPUS platform offers. People have been conditioned to vote for the Democrat.
Of course the hope, if Approval is enacted (somhow) under the existing government, is that that enactment would bring publicity to the variety of parties and alternative platforms, with their very significantly different policy proposals. Then, with Approval, I'd expect different results.
As for third parties preferring IRV to Approval and Score, of course they do, and I agree that IRV wouldn't be any good under existing conditions. If we somehow enacted a new voting system under the current Republocrat government, with Approval people could and would be assured that they could always approve their favorite, and evesryone they like better than whatever compromise they think they need. With IRV, which fails FBV, they of course couldn't be assured of that. In fact, the media would do is very best, and would successfully convince progressives that only the Democrat or Republican can win, and that they need to rank the Democrat (alone) in 1st place. So I agree that, for existing conditions, IRV wouldn't be any good. (But I still hope that Maine's IRV bill passes, because anything is worth a try).
Five U.S. political parties offer IRV as the voting system in the new government that their platforms propose:
Green Party of the U.S. (GPUS)
Vermont Progressive Party
California Peace & Freedom Party
Greens/ Green Party of the USA (G/GPUSA)
Socialist Party of the USA (SPUSA)
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They're all progressive parties. No alternative voting systen other than IRV is offered in a political party platform.
Though I agree that IRV would probably not be any good for current conditions, due to its FBC failure, that doens't mean that IRV wouldn't be good under different conditions. I've defined the Green scneario in lots of posts here, so I won't define it here. In the Green scenario, IRV is a fine method. ...as are the other I&c methods. "I&c" stands for IRV&c, or IRV etc. It refers to IRV and various hybrids of IRV, which include:
1. Approval IRV (AIRV):
IRV, but voters can rank as many candidates to a rank position as they want to. Candidates top-ranked on your each get a whole vote from you. When all of your rank N candidates are eliminated, then each of your rank N+1 candidates gets a whole vote from you.''
2. Benham:
Do IRV until there's an uneliminated candidate who isn't pairwise-beaten by any uneliminated candidate. Elect hir.
3. Woodall:
Do IRV until only one member of the initial Smith set remains uneliminated. Elect hir.
4. MM//Benham:
Choose from the innermost mutual majority (MM) preferred set. Choose by Benham, counting only the ballots of that innermost MM.
5. MM//Woodall:
Choose from the innermost mutual majority (MM) preferred set. Choose by Woodall, counting only the ballots of that innermost MM.
6. Unbeaten//IRV:
If there's a candidate with no pairwise defeats, elect hir. If there are several, choose among them by IRV. If there are none, just do IRV.
These are the methods that I call IRV etc., IRV&c, or I&c.
For the Green scenario, I prefer I&c.
But the A&c methods would be fine too, just not quite as deluxe (for MM members). By A&c, I mean Approval&c, or Approval etc.
A&c methods include:
1. Approval
2. Score
3. Symmetrical ICT
4. ICT (but to a lesser extent--
....plain ICT doesn't pass a LNHe version.
Those methods are strategically similar to eachother. Symmetrical ICT is strategically Approval with CD (no chicken dilemma)
Anyway, those 5 abovementioned political parties offer IRV. If one of them (say GPUS) wins office and starts its new government, that party might be dis-satisified with IRV, if it eliminates their CW. If that happens, they might side with the non-MM voters, in a majority vote to replace IRV with a method that better elects CWs. That could be Approval, but it's more likely to be Unbeaten//IRV or Benham. Maybe Woodall. Maybe AIRV.
No doubt, in a Green government (where IRV is the default voting system), there'd soon be an initiative or referendum on voting systems. Of course it would be an IRV vote.
For that vote, for the voting system for use under Green scenario conditions, I'd rank these voting systems, in this order:
1. MM//Benham
2. MM//Woodall
3. AIRV
4. IRV
5. Benham
6. Woodall
7. Unbeaten//IRV
8. Symmetrical ICT
9. ICT
10. Score
11. Approval
As I said, Green dis-satisfaction with the elimimination of their CWs would lead to the replacement of IRV with a method that better elects CWs. But maybe the MM would feel that it isn't necessary to let non-MM voters participate in the choice of which MM preferred candidate should win. In that case, IRV, MM//Benham or MM//Woodall would be preferred. That choice to keep IRV, MM//Benham or MM//Woodall wouldn't be made unless, before it's known which party will have the CW, the MM dedided that it didn't want non-MM voters to partiipate in the choice among the MM-preferred candidates--and then later even the CW-preferrers stayed with and stood by that decisioin. ...Or else the CW-preferrers actually decided that they only liked their candidate for strategic reasons, and that they therefore didn't care if s/he were the MM-preferred candidate who wins.
Michael Ossipoff