WIG and WOG (brain representations continued)
JPL Verhey
Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact that
"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
WOG, another human being and wife of Glen, exists independantly of
whatever happens in Glen's brain, WIG included and serves as the "input"
for Glen's sense organs and brain, in which Glens' beloved
WIG-experience ultimately occurs after a lot of complex brain processes.
(input-process-output of course cycles around continuously)
Many don't mind (neither do I) calling WIG an 'internal representation'
(occuring in Glen's brain) of WOG. Glen though abhors the very word
representation. He fears an infinite regression of homunculi looking at
indefinate sequences of representations. That fear is unfounded IMO. WIG
can be said to represent WOG, simply becasue we all healthely assume 1)
there he is married to a real other human being and that WIG is not just
a daydream, and 2) that WIG is a pretty good representation of WOG, ie
for instance that WOG is in reality not a man with beard that is
secretly transformed by Glen's brain into a woman with breasts. But even
if WIG were a false representation of WOG, it would still be a
representation of WOG.
AFAICT, Glen's critique is legitimate in one sense, ie when "what is
represented" is put inside Glen's brain. Then, indeed, one would be
almost forced the create an infinte regression of homunculi in the brain
that look at infinite amounts of representations. But we don't put "what
is represented" inside his brain - it is put outside of it, such as WOG.
T
There is no "see-er" in Glen's brain "looking at WIG" - "Glen seeing his
wife" IS WIG, ie "his" brainactivity. In the context of Glen's brain
where "he sees his wife", Glen (see-er) and his wife (the seen) are
literally, organically One and the Same! Not a surprise, since it is
all occuring in one brain: Glen's.
So we have Glen's brain where "Glen-sees-his-wife" called WIG, and WOG..
the woman he really married and that lives on also in case Glen drops
dead on the spot.
Glen M. Sizemore
"JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:422832c5$0$44090$5fc...@dreader2.news.tiscali.nl...
As I have said, this is just standard representationalism with added
nonsense, the goal of which is to avoid the absurdities of saying we see a
representation. I see nothing here that would make me change that
evaluation. But I will state my position once again:
Seeing is behavior, just like walking, eating, and driving. It frequently
requires environmental support, not only in the form of some physical
operandum (it is hard to drive w/o a car, etc.), but in the form of
antecedent controlling stimuli. Usually when I "see my wife," it is because
my wife is present. In that circumstance, what I see is my publicly
observable wife. I can also "see that I am seeing my wife," and that is a
response to the behavior that I have called "seeing my wife." Now, "seeing
my wife" can occur in the absence of my wife, and when I report that, I am
observing, not a copy or representation of my wife, but my own behavior
(i.e., that of "seeing my wife").
>
>
Neil W Rickert
>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact that
>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife. But
we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
Sure, there is brain activity involved in Glen's seeing his wife.
But seeing his wife is not the same thing, nor part of, that brain
activity.
If you wanted to reword your statement to "brain activity is
part of seeing his wife", you would be a lot closer.
>Many don't mind (neither do I) calling WIG an 'internal representation'
>(occuring in Glen's brain) of WOG.
You are correct that part of the dispute on representation has to do
with different people meaning different things when they use that
word.
JPL Verhey
"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:d09vv7$qnh$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>
>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact
>>that
>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
>
> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
My goodness Neil, not you too! All I say is really 101 basics.. nothing
new, nothing spectacular or crazy. And plz don't put words in my mouth.
All I say is that whatever Glen is seeing, imagining in the presence or
abscence of his wife or ex-wives.. is brainactivity (see-er and seen
included).
> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife.
> But
> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
When we report seeing our wife, then the wife we SEEEEEE occurs in the
brain. He doesn't see his real/original wife at all.. first light waves
need to be deflected direction his retina, optical nerve pulses..initial
brainactivities.. etc. Then at one point, some milliseconds later, the
visual imagery of his wife - ie the one he in fact SEEEEES - occurs in
his brain.
>
> Sure, there is brain activity involved in Glen's seeing his wife.
> But seeing his wife is not the same thing, nor part of, that brain
> activity.
That sounds dark, or I misunderstand. The truth is still, that whatever
Glen sees or imagines in the presence of his wife, wives or the pope..
is all brainactivity in Glen's own skull. He is NOT seeing his
original/real wife that exists out there even when he drops dead on the
spot. "Glen seeing his wife" is the internal representation occuring in
his own skull, which is all brainactivity/neurophysiology.
>
> If you wanted to reword your statement to "brain activity is
> part of seeing his wife", you would be a lot closer.
That is not correct IMO. One could correctly say that "among other
things, Glen's brain activity is involved in seeing his wife". But
ultimately, once "Glen is seeing his wife", it is proven that the brain
is the locus of that experience - off all conscious experiences.
I'm ok being misunderstood, but I know exactly what I try to say - and
it all is simple 101 modern knowledge, which seems to cause some trouble
to Glen.
>
>>Many don't mind (neither do I) calling WIG an 'internal
>>representation'
>>(occuring in Glen's brain) of WOG.
>
> You are correct that part of the dispute on representation has to do
> with different people meaning different things when they use that
> word.
Indeed.
JPL Verhey
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist.html
JPL Verhey
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:20050304072314.190$k...@news.newsreader.com...
I didn't know there exists a "representationalism" as there is the
church of behaviorism. To me using representation in the context of
these discussions is just fine, but with a few needed connotations.
> with added
> nonsense, the goal of which is to avoid the absurdities of saying we
> see a
> representation.
Like a clergy man you seem deeply hypnotised and obsessed with words.
No major enlightening insights need to be expected.
> I see nothing here that would make me change that
> evaluation. But I will state my position once again:
>
>
>
> Seeing is behavior,
I don't mind calling anything behavior.
> just like walking, eating, and driving. It frequently
> requires environmental support, not only in the form of some physical
> operandum (it is hard to drive w/o a car, etc.), but in the form of
> antecedent controlling stimuli.
Nothing new - there are causal interconnections everywhere.
> Usually when I "see my wife," it is because
> my wife is present.
Ok
>In that circumstance, what I see is my publicly
> observable wife.
Wrong. The wife you see, ie you-seeing-your-wife in one package is your
brainactivity. Sure your real/original public wife can cause similar
experiences in other peoples brains and from there we can all conclude
that your wife is real and not a figment in the minds of a whole
community.
> I can also "see that I am seeing my wife," and that is a
> response to the behavior that I have called "seeing my wife."
Ok, seeing or knowing that I see my wife.
> Now, "seeing
> my wife" can occur in the absence of my wife, and when I report that,
> I am
> observing, not a copy or representation of my wife, but my own
> behavior
> (i.e., that of "seeing my wife").
Which keeps begging the question and me bringing back the homunculus
that AFAICT is an unescapable necessity with your train of thought:
who/what is observing his/her own behavior? Your train crashes before it
arrives.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d09vv7$qnh$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact
>>>that
>>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
>> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
>My goodness Neil, not you too! All I say is really 101 basics.. nothing
>new, nothing spectacular or crazy. And plz don't put words in my mouth.
Should I just killfile you?
I cannot read what you write, and attempt to make sense of it,
without putting words in your mouth. You are sounding like Longley,
with his foolish insistence on using only direct quotes. But
effective communication requires paraphrasing. In particular, it
depends on the give and take of agreeing or disagreeing with the
paraphrasing given by the other party.
>All I say is that whatever Glen is seeing, imagining in the presence or
>abscence of his wife or ex-wives.. is brainactivity (see-er and seen
>included).
>> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
>> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife.
>> But
>> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
>When we report seeing our wife, then the wife we SEEEEEE occurs in the
>brain. He doesn't see his real/original wife at all.. first light waves
>need to be deflected direction his retina, optical nerve pulses..initial
>brainactivities.. etc. Then at one point, some milliseconds later, the
>visual imagery of his wife - ie the one he in fact SEEEEES - occurs in
>his brain.
Here is my paraphrasing, attempting to make sense of what you are
saying.
You seem to be making two points:
(A) Seeing one's wife can be partitioned into two stages.
stage 1: Some brain changes occur, that you call WIG
stage 2: An experience results from those brain changes.
(B) The verb "to see" properly applies to what happens in
stage 2.
The disagreement I expressed was with (B). Clearly that is not what
we mean by "see". Rather, the verb "to see" applies to the whole
combined activity, not just to the second stage.
However, I should also point out that (A) is controversial, and
certainly is not proven. The activity may be indivisible, in the
sense that there may be no principled way of partitioning it into two
separate phases.
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>news:d09vv7$qnh$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>>> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>
>>>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact
>>>>that
>>>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called
>>>>WIG.
>
>>> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
>
>>My goodness Neil, not you too! All I say is really 101 basics..
>>nothing
>>new, nothing spectacular or crazy. And plz don't put words in my
>>mouth.
>
> Should I just killfile you?
>
> I cannot read what you write, and attempt to make sense of it,
> without putting words in your mouth. You are sounding like Longley,
> with his foolish insistence on using only direct quotes. But
> effective communication requires paraphrasing. In particular, it
> depends on the give and take of agreeing or disagreeing with the
> paraphrasing given by the other party.
Sure.
>
>>All I say is that whatever Glen is seeing, imagining in the presence
>>or
>>abscence of his wife or ex-wives.. is brainactivity (see-er and seen
>>included).
>
>>> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife
>>> is
>>> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife.
>>> But
>>> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
>
>>When we report seeing our wife, then the wife we SEEEEEE occurs in the
>>brain. He doesn't see his real/original wife at all.. first light
>>waves
>>need to be deflected direction his retina, optical nerve
>>pulses..initial
>>brainactivities.. etc. Then at one point, some milliseconds later, the
>>visual imagery of his wife - ie the one he in fact SEEEEES - occurs
>>in
>>his brain.
>
> Here is my paraphrasing, attempting to make sense of what you are
> saying.
>
> You seem to be making two points:
>
> (A) Seeing one's wife can be partitioned into two stages.
>
> stage 1: Some brain changes occur, that you call WIG
>
> stage 2: An experience results from those brain changes.
The experience(s) is what I call WIG, not the brain changes preceding
them.
Maybe my mistake is that I try to say/explain 101 things to extensively,
so that the reader may think it must be something novel or crazy. So
I'll try to say it as simple as I can: all your experiences occur in
your brain. That includes also you seeing your wife.
>
> (B) The verb "to see" properly applies to what happens in
> stage 2.
>
> The disagreement I expressed was with (B). Clearly that is not what
> we mean by "see". Rather, the verb "to see" applies to the whole
> combined activity, not just to the second stage.
I beg to differ. When we say we see something/somebody, we surely use
that in the sense of stage 2: the experience. We *know* more is
involved..but in daily life I'd say we mean 2)
>
> However, I should also point out that (A) is controversial, and
> certainly is not proven. The activity may be indivisible, in the
> sense that there may be no principled way of partitioning it into two
> separate phases.
But what is not controversial, is that we are not aware of the actual
lightwaves traveling from an object to our eyes. Nor is it controversial
that the pulses traveling in the optical nerve to the brain that were
triggered at the retina are not the main machinery at work at stage 2.
(although usually needed and involved) The core machinary of vision is
in the visual brain areas and their connections with the frontal lobes
where we tell ourselves "we see this or that". And the non-visual
associations like emotion that imagry can trigger in the process.
I imagine there are brain events that can be called "pre-conscious"
(stage 1) because they can be established to be causally related nearly
1:1 to the experiential stage 2. Other brain events follow a more
"autonomous" pathway and possibly only indirectly give certain "colors"
to the spectrum of our experiences.
A good analogy is IMO our experiential reality as the cybernetic cockpit
of an air plane. Only data relevant to global controls of the organism
are experiential data. There is always the "passive" reception of data
as fed by the many sensors positioned all over the airplane with a lot
of automated (unconscious) feed back controls.. but also an amount of
"active" ie conscious processing and feed-back when it concernes the
global / motor behavior of the airplane where what was already learned
is not enough to anticipate the (always new though similar) situation.
The phases are not clear cut and overlap here and there, but in the
"cock pit", the non- or pre conscious processes/phases are naturally and
by definition subtracted from the equations, which leaves us/ the cock
pit's experiences virtually float like an experiential bubble in space.
The so called "binding problem" is related to this I think. Our
experiences occur as "whole" and as if cut-off from any other pre- or
unconscious brain events/phases. My view on that can be found here:
http://home.tiscali.nl/boynalechmipo/bindingproblem.htm
AlphaOmega
"JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:422832c5$0$44090$5fc...@dreader2.news.tiscali.nl...
THis one and the sameness you mention is the core of the Society Of Mind
(Minsky) wherein the topmost agent (a WIG for example) *is* consciousness at
the moment. No need for a see-er as you state.
Interesting.
But I still fail to see any necessary regression (let alone an infinite one)
from the POV that another process - called consciouness - sees the WIG.
Perhaps logically it is *possible* that an infinite (or nearly so)
regression can come to be, but other than self looking at aspects of self,
and perhaps one or two more layers beyond that - there is little need for
regression_du_homunculi.
AlphaOmega
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsiz...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:20050304072314.190$k...@news.newsreader.com...
>
As I mentioned in my ealier reply - nothing absurd about that. No need for
regression either. It is a logical possibility, but not a causal
probability.
AlphaOmega
>
> "Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
> news:d09vv7$qnh$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>
>>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact that
>>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
>>
>> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
>
> My goodness Neil, not you too! All I say is really 101 basics.. nothing
> new, nothing spectacular or crazy. And plz don't put words in my mouth.
> All I say is that whatever Glen is seeing, imagining in the presence or
> abscence of his wife or ex-wives.. is brainactivity (see-er and seen
> included).
>
>> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
>> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife. But
>> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
>
> When we report seeing our wife, then the wife we SEEEEEE occurs in the
> brain. He doesn't see his real/original wife at all.. first light waves
> need to be deflected direction his retina, optical nerve pulses..initial
> brainactivities.. etc. Then at one point, some milliseconds later, the
> visual imagery of his wife - ie the one he in fact SEEEEES - occurs in
> his brain.
You are correct hee JPL. Right outta Hawkins analysis as well.
All we SEEEEEE are patterns represented by the sense organs to the rest of
our cortex.
AlphaOmega
>
>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact that
>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
>
> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
>
> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife. But
> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
>
> Sure, there is brain activity involved in Glen's seeing his wife.
> But seeing his wife is not the same thing, nor part of, that brain
> activity.
>
> If you wanted to reword your statement to "brain activity is
> part of seeing his wife", you would be a lot closer.
This is nitpicking JPL's position here Neil (IMHO).
The seeing of WIG in JPL's version of the world is *just* that part of the
world that *is* the brain activity that can be said to be the seeing
activity.
We realize there are more things going on. Especially if theer is a real
WOG in front of Glen as he is seeing her. The light waves bouncing off of
WOG for example.
>
>>Many don't mind (neither do I) calling WIG an 'internal representation'
>>(occuring in Glen's brain) of WOG.
>
> You are correct that part of the dispute on representation has to do
> with different people meaning different things when they use that
> word.
That is not all that it is about though. Even with an agreed upon meaning,
I suspect the rad. Behaviorists would rather call it a "response to
environmental contingencies" or "physiological mediation" or some such with
*no* internal represenation of any type.
>
AlphaOmega
Well, when one hallucinates, the WOG is gone and therfore so is part A. Yet
we "see" WIG anyway.
>
JPL Verhey
"AlphaOmega" <OmegaZ...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1109967879.c9977a5ba78ba8d918f4c58e99618357@teranews...
In some eastern philosophy they have this phrase: "you are the world",
or "the observer is the observed". It sounds grotesque, but if meant in
the above sense it is "scaringly" true and totally scientific, and
surprisingly simple!
A bit a side track.. but it also prompted some thoughts how to
understand their concept of unification of subject and object. To our
western ears it sounds like a regression to early childhood, where the
kid does not distinguish itself yet as different from the environment.
But it can also be understood, and more correctly I think, as meaning
that the verbal commentator/subtitler that says "I see..etc" is simply
quiet. Thought is only active when there is a demand - it acts and is
quiet again.
I always like documentaries that just show things without a commentator
telling me what I see or how to understand what I see. That world shown
in such documentaries truly can come alive..and speak its own words.
Similarly, when our sense-organs do their "job" freely without our
internal commentator / conceptual thought popping its head even when not
necessary.. the world looks much more colorful and alive and we act more
immediate, anticipating the novelty of every moment. To have thinking
quieted dow into a more natural rythm..thinking is of course a bit
useless. Like fighting fire with fire.
>
> But I still fail to see any necessary regression (let alone an
> infinite one) from the POV that another process - called
> consciouness - sees the WIG.
Yes I understand your point. But for convenience I choose to restrict
the use of the words seeing and representation only to the top-level and
to us available domain. Same with information. Just useful verbal
vehicles to help clarify things that are not too far away from things
known and understood. But if promoted all the way down, sideways or
upward.. those words fast lose their power IMO. Though I like sometimes
too to go far away and wonder..
>
> Perhaps logically it is *possible* that an infinite (or nearly so)
> regression can come to be, but other than self looking at aspects of
> self, and perhaps one or two more layers beyond that - there is little
> need for regression_du_homunculi.
Also an intersting take on the homunculus is here, maybe you looked at
it already once, starting here:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist42.html
min...@media.mit.edu
snip
> THis one and the sameness you mention is the core of the Society Of
Mind
> (Minsky) wherein the topmost agent (a WIG for example) *is*
consciousness at
> the moment. No need for a see-er as you state.
Actually, I didn't say that. I did say that consciousness was a
collection of processes, but not that these had to be on top.
However, what I did say about consciouness in that book was pretty
muddled, in any case. Later, I got what I think were much better
ideas, and you can see some of them at
http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/E4/eb4.html
In any case, I certainly agree with AlphaOmega's point--that even if
there were a 'top-level manager,' it would not necessarily be very
powerful:
> Perhaps logically it is *possible* that an infinite (or nearly so)
regression can come to be, but other than self looking at aspects of
self,
and perhaps one or two more layers beyond that - there is little need
for
regression_du_homunculi.
Exactly. It might make some sort of self-model, and then a model of
that, but pretty soon it would get down to one that is small, and the
next steo would jut be a single point---or just a pointer back to an
earlier one. So (in bad cases) it could lead to an endless regression,
but only in time, and just a finite one in the spece in the brain
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>> You seem to be making two points:
>> (A) Seeing one's wife can be partitioned into two stages.
>> stage 1: Some brain changes occur, that you call WIG
>> stage 2: An experience results from those brain changes.
>The experience(s) is what I call WIG, not the brain changes preceding
>them.
Maybe you are trying to say something that is difficult to express.
If the experience is the WIG, then what is seeing?
>Maybe my mistake is that I try to say/explain 101 things to extensively,
>so that the reader may think it must be something novel or crazy. So
>I'll try to say it as simple as I can: all your experiences occur in
>your brain. That includes also you seeing your wife.
>> (B) The verb "to see" properly applies to what happens in
>> stage 2.
>> The disagreement I expressed was with (B). Clearly that is not what
>> we mean by "see". Rather, the verb "to see" applies to the whole
>> combined activity, not just to the second stage.
>I beg to differ. When we say we see something/somebody, we surely use
>that in the sense of stage 2: the experience. We *know* more is
>involved..but in daily life I'd say we mean 2)
The verb "to see" expresses a relation. What is being related?
You seem to now be saying that the WIG is the act of seeing. But in
other paragraphs, you seem to be saying that the WIG is the object of
seeing.
>> However, I should also point out that (A) is controversial, and
>> certainly is not proven. The activity may be indivisible, in the
>> sense that there may be no principled way of partitioning it into two
>> separate phases.
>But what is not controversial, is that we are not aware of the actual
>lightwaves traveling from an object to our eyes. Nor is it controversial
>that the pulses traveling in the optical nerve to the brain that were
>triggered at the retina are not the main machinery at work at stage 2.
I had assumed you were putting those in stage 1. This gets more and
more confusing.
>(although usually needed and involved) The core machinary of vision is
>in the visual brain areas and their connections with the frontal lobes
>where we tell ourselves "we see this or that". And the non-visual
>associations like emotion that imagry can trigger in the process.
But when we say "we see this and that", we don't point to frontal
lobes. We point to the external this and that, and these external
things are the object of the seeing. That's the way the language
works.
>I imagine there are brain events that can be called "pre-conscious"
>(stage 1) because they can be established to be causally related nearly
>1:1 to the experiential stage 2. Other brain events follow a more
>"autonomous" pathway and possibly only indirectly give certain "colors"
>to the spectrum of our experiences.
>A good analogy is IMO our experiential reality as the cybernetic cockpit
>of an air plane. Only data relevant to global controls of the organism
>are experiential data. There is always the "passive" reception of data
>as fed by the many sensors positioned all over the airplane with a lot
>of automated (unconscious) feed back controls.. but also an amount of
>"active" ie conscious processing and feed-back when it concernes the
>global / motor behavior of the airplane where what was already learned
>is not enough to anticipate the (always new though similar) situation.
Okay. But vision isn't passive. There is a lot of feedback to
controls that move the eye, for example. It is this feedback which
may make it hard to partition the activity involved in vision.
We do things in a particular way in our robotic "computer vision"
systems. But there is no guarantee that biology follows the same
design principles.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d09vv7$qnh$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>>I used elsewhere "WIG" for Wife In Glen's brain, and "WOG" for Wife
>>>Outside Glen's brain. When Glen sees his wife, it is a proven fact that
>>>"seeing his wife" is (part of) his own brainactivity, here called WIG.
>> No, that is not a proven fact. It is false.
>> If all of the "right" brain activity is occurring, but Glen's wife is
>> not present, then we might say that Glen is halucinating his wife. But
>> we would not say that Glen is seeing his wife.
>> Sure, there is brain activity involved in Glen's seeing his wife.
>> But seeing his wife is not the same thing, nor part of, that brain
>> activity.
>> If you wanted to reword your statement to "brain activity is
>> part of seeing his wife", you would be a lot closer.
>This is nitpicking JPL's position here Neil (IMHO).
Perhaps. But whatever JPLV is trying to say, he is expressing it in
a way that invites the criticism that it leads to infinite
regression. It would be better if he could find less controversial
ways to express his point.
Neil W Rickert
>> The disagreement I expressed was with (B). Clearly that is not what
>> we mean by "see". Rather, the verb "to see" applies to the whole
>> combined activity, not just to the second stage.
>> However, I should also point out that (A) is controversial, and
>> certainly is not proven. The activity may be indivisible, in the
>> sense that there may be no principled way of partitioning it into two
>> separate phases.
>Well, when one hallucinates, the WOG is gone and therfore so is part A. Yet
>we "see" WIG anyway.
Sure, but only because you put "see" in scare quote, indicationg that you
recognize the use is metaphorical.
Glen M. Sizemore
The person is observing his or her own behavior. I don't see what is
troublesome about this. No more troublesome than observing anything that is
not behavior.
>Your train crashes before it
> arrives.
Needless to say, I disagree.
>
>
AlphaOmega
<min...@media.mit.edu> wrote in message
news:1109971719.0...@l41g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
> AlphaOmega wrote:
> snip
>
>> THis one and the sameness you mention is the core of the Society Of
> Mind
>> (Minsky) wherein the topmost agent (a WIG for example) *is*
> consciousness at
>> the moment. No need for a see-er as you state.
>
> Actually, I didn't say that. I did say that consciousness was a
> collection of processes, but not that these had to be on top.
I know - but I thought you said in your book that the topmost agent is / was
identical with the conscious (aware) moment. My bad if you did not.!!!
>
> However, what I did say about consciouness in that book was pretty
> muddled, in any case. Later, I got what I think were much better
> ideas, and you can see some of them at
>
> http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/E4/eb4.html
>
> In any case, I certainly agree with AlphaOmega's point--that even if
> there were a 'top-level manager,' it would not necessarily be very
> powerful:
>
>> Perhaps logically it is *possible* that an infinite (or nearly so)
> regression can come to be, but other than self looking at aspects of
> self,
> and perhaps one or two more layers beyond that - there is little need
> for
> regression_du_homunculi.
>
> Exactly. It might make some sort of self-model, and then a model of
> that, but pretty soon it would get down to one that is small, and the
> next steo would jut be a single point---or just a pointer back to an
> earlier one. So (in bad cases) it could lead to an endless regression,
> but only in time, and just a finite one in the spece in the brain
Yes; those that have meditated long enough seem to equate a universal
consciousness with the ultimate Subject, which could be the last humonculi
on the regrssion ladder.
>
AlphaOmega
<min...@media.mit.edu> wrote in message
news:1109971719.0...@l41g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
AlphaOmega
>
> The person is observing his or her own behavior. I don't see what is
> troublesome about this. No more troublesome than observing anything that
> is
> not behavior.
>
So, Glen, correct me if I am wrong here but you seem to be saying both that
1) You have a problem with homunculi
and 2) that you have at least a colloquial usage of the word "person"
above - which usage I would claim denotes exactly what 1 points to - an
homunculi. Psychologically-speaking at least - right?.
How do 1 and 2 comport with each other?
Glen M. Sizemore
I cannot see how saying that a person observes their own behavior raises the
issue of an inner man. Hold your hand up in front of your eyes and move it.
Do you see it? Now look at the TV across the room. Do you see it? Who is
doing the seeing? Why would observing your hand moving raise the specter of
an inner man any more than seeing the TV? Of course, for you, seeing both is
a matter of the homunculus seeing a representation.
>
>
>
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>news:d0a935$un0$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>
>>> You seem to be making two points:
>
>>> (A) Seeing one's wife can be partitioned into two stages.
>
>>> stage 1: Some brain changes occur, that you call WIG
>
>>> stage 2: An experience results from those brain changes.
>
>>The experience(s) is what I call WIG, not the brain changes preceding
>>them.
>
> Maybe you are trying to say something that is difficult to express.
>
> If the experience is the WIG, then what is seeing?
> The verb "to see" expresses a relation. What is being related?
>
> You seem to now be saying that the WIG is the act of seeing. But in
> other paragraphs, you seem to be saying that the WIG is the object of
> seeing.
Maybe this graphic will help clear it up:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist53A.html
Lets say this is Glen that sees his wife for the first time. WOG is the
woman on the left painted with grey pencil. WIG is the woman painted
with colored pencil inside Glen's skull. If we just leave the question
of "who sees what" for the moment.. do you think the graphic in the URL
correctly displays the basics of what happens when person A sees person
B?
[snip rest for later discussion]
JPL Verhey
> snip
>
>> THis one and the sameness you mention is the core of the Society Of
> Mind
>> (Minsky) wherein the topmost agent (a WIG for example) *is*
> consciousness at
>> the moment. No need for a see-er as you state.
>
> Actually, I didn't say that. I did say that consciousness was a
> collection of processes, but not that these had to be on top.
>
> However, what I did say about consciouness in that book was pretty
> muddled, in any case. Later, I got what I think were much better
> ideas, and you can see some of them at
>
> http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/E4/eb4.html
>
> In any case, I certainly agree with AlphaOmega's point--that even if
> there were a 'top-level manager,' it would not necessarily be very
> powerful:
But if we consider consciousness a function of an organ (ie of mainly of
the brain), then this function can be said to be the "top-level manager"
of some specific (more "global") behaviors that truly depend on that
function. Like the function of the hart to pump around blood can be said
to be a "top-level manager" (or executer) of the blood stream. Or the
ear's function to feed the auditory brain functions: very top-level and
powerful for a musician like Mozart. Without the function of
consciousness working properly, I'm sure many very important, crucial
behaviors are simply not possible.
There has always been a lot of discussion about what the hell the
brains' function of human consciousness does for the organism and human
society. To some, consciousness only epiphenominally hovers around as an
emergent awareness that does not do anything else but "watch", a waste
product like the steam leaving a steam engine.
Although there are interesting cases where sleep walkers go out, get in
the car, drive to parents in law and kill them, go home and back to
sleep again.. or "blind sighted" persons that do see things but are not
aware of seeing them..it is questionable if they were ever able to
perform if they had not been functioning as human beings doing things
consciously first.
If the brain's function of conscious experience were disabled ie turning
us into zombies.. I dare to predict that most of our behaviors would
cease to be possible, society would collapse and we would get extinct in
no time.
JPL Verhey
Point taken. I tend to compress maybe too much trying to put everything
in only e few sentences making it undigestible. But remember: all those
issues ARE controversial - if your read anything of Chalmer's site.. boy
do need people a lot of words. Did they find common grounds yet? Hardly.
JPL Verhey
....
>> Which keeps begging the question and me bringing back the homunculus
>> that AFAICT is an unescapable necessity with your train of thought:
>> who/what is observing his/her own behavior?
>
> The person is observing his or her own behavior. I don't see what is
> troublesome about this. No more troublesome than observing anything
> that is
> not behavior.
I see my hands behaving when this message it typed. Fine. You dismiss
the scientific fact that the *seeing my hands behave* occurs in my
brain?? Whether we call these occurences in the brain a representation,
translation or don't call it any names.. is only secundary and food for
clerics.
Neil W Rickert
>Maybe this graphic will help clear it up:
>http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist53A.html
>Lets say this is Glen that sees his wife for the first time. WOG is the
>woman on the left painted with grey pencil. WIG is the woman painted
>with colored pencil inside Glen's skull. If we just leave the question
>of "who sees what" for the moment.. do you think the graphic in the URL
>correctly displays the basics of what happens when person A sees person
>B?
No, I don't agree.
If you were designing a robot, perhaps your design would be as
depicted there. But biology was not obliged to follow your design
preferences, and I doubt that it did.
According to the graphic,
an internal image is formed. Presumably this is what you want
to call a representation.
there is an analysis of that internal image, to extract needed
information. Presumably that results in seeing.
But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary. The analysis
can occur directly with the external object (WOG). And I believe that
the biological systems are doing that external analysis.
Incidently, it is the result of the analysis that I want to consider
a representation.
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>
>>Maybe this graphic will help clear it up:
>
>>http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist53A.html
>
>>Lets say this is Glen that sees his wife for the first time. WOG is
>>the
>>woman on the left painted with grey pencil. WIG is the woman painted
>>with colored pencil inside Glen's skull. If we just leave the question
>>of "who sees what" for the moment.. do you think the graphic in the
>>URL
>>correctly displays the basics of what happens when person A sees
>>person
>>B?
>
> No, I don't agree.
>
> If you were designing a robot, perhaps your design would be as
> depicted there. But biology was not obliged to follow your design
> preferences, and I doubt that it did.
>
> According to the graphic,
>
> an internal image is formed. Presumably this is what you want
> to call a representation.
The graphic just displays what basically happens. I don't want to
discuss any more whether in reality our (visual) experiences can be
called an internal representation or not. I find it a useful word to
describe and help understand what is happening, that all there's in it
for me. (and you too, I think?)
>
> there is an analysis of that internal image, to extract needed
> information. Presumably that results in seeing.
When we use those words: seeing and representation, I'd say that seeing
and internal image (representation) must be considered identical.
Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
>
> But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary.
Yet we have visual (and other) experiences. Why is that?
> The analysis
> can occur directly with the external object (WOG). And I believe that
> the biological systems are doing that external analysis.
Probably most other mammals dont tell them selves "I see something" like
we do so easily, but that doesn't mean they don't need visual experience
(and other) to be able to complete the external analysis.
>
> Incidently, it is the result of the analysis that I want to consider
> a representation.
Ok.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d0cdtf$pf6$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> If you were designing a robot, perhaps your design would be as
>> depicted there. But biology was not obliged to follow your design
>> preferences, and I doubt that it did.
>> According to the graphic,
>> an internal image is formed. Presumably this is what you want
>> to call a representation.
>The graphic just displays what basically happens. I don't want to
>discuss any more whether in reality our (visual) experiences can be
>called an internal representation or not. I find it a useful word to
>describe and help understand what is happening, that all there's in it
>for me. (and you too, I think?)
>> there is an analysis of that internal image, to extract needed
>> information. Presumably that results in seeing.
>When we use those words: seeing and representation, I'd say that seeing
>and internal image (representation) must be considered identical.
>Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
That's not obvious. The use of an internal image, if there were one,
could be a mere implementation detail with no implications about
infinite regression.
>> But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary.
>Yet we have visual (and other) experiences. Why is that?
My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the visual
experience.
>> The analysis
>> can occur directly with the external object (WOG). And I believe that
>> the biological systems are doing that external analysis.
>Probably most other mammals dont tell them selves "I see something" like
>we do so easily, but that doesn't mean they don't need visual experience
>(and other) to be able to complete the external analysis.
Probably most other mammals have not been indoctrinated into bad
philosophy. I don't doubt that other mammals have visual
experience. But since we don't share a common language, they cannot
tell us about it.
You appear to be implying that mammals need the visual experience,
and somehow analyze that visual experience. However, most of the
time, we are not analyzing our visual experience (except when we are
suffering from too much philosophy). I am not analyzing my visual
experience and deducing that there is a cup of coffee on my desk. I
am seeing a cup of coffee. The cup of coffee is already part of my
visual experience, so no further analysis of that experience is
required. The visual experience is a result of the analysis, not a
precursor to analysis.
AlphaOmega
What about "seeing" the blue cube in your mind's eye?
What is doing the seeing and what is being seen? Let's make this
interesting by claining that the blue cube is nothing the suubject has seen
before (or substitute any fantastic thing/object that is not seen prior to
being seen by the inner eye.
That "what" that is doing the seeing - the person - is that not the
homunculus you abhore? Isn't there a representation of the seer in brain -
the "I" that I identify with. I (and others I am sure) do sense ther own
monolithic (or not depending on psychoses - haha) self as something inside
of them.
>Of course, for you, seeing both is
> a matter of the homunculus seeing a representation.
A process interacting with another process on many levels of description
perhaps (QM, electrical, neurochemical, cellular, neuronal groups etc.) - as
M. Minsky agreed with.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
AlphaOmega
>
> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the visual
> experience.
The qualia problem; why do we experience the image at all. Simply ("simply"
because the details have not been worked out yet - thence the problem)
because a process or processes that we identify with as the self (that
wandering, seemingly wholistic thing, that *has* a stream of consciousness
which is actually a stream of contents/representations, with (or not) an
experiencer) has a relationship with the thing seen (the representation of
the pattern presented as a percept to one or more of the sense organs). It
is that relationship (dynamic) that is experienced *as* qualia. Without it,
we could have the separate patterns of self and content with no relationship
between them and would be called a zombie by most modern philosophers.
JPL Verhey
...
>>When we use those words: seeing and representation, I'd say that
>>seeing
>>and internal image (representation) must be considered identical.
>>Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
>
> That's not obvious. The use of an internal image, if there were one,
> could be a mere implementation detail with no implications about
> infinite regression.
What was meant was that if we use words "seeing an image" (both "seeing"
and "image" occuring in the brain) to describe visual experience, it
makes more sense to not make that distinction/relationship and consider
seeing-and-image (observer and observed) identical. Again: here we
discuss what happens within the brain.
I maintain that within the context of the brain, which is where the
visual experience occurs, the "observer" and "the observed" are
identical.
>>> But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary.
>
>>Yet we have visual (and other) experiences. Why is that?
>
> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the visual
> experience.
Fortunately we are talking about human brain and human experience, not
computers.
>
>>> The analysis
>>> can occur directly with the external object (WOG). And I believe
>>> that
>>> the biological systems are doing that external analysis.
>
>>Probably most other mammals dont tell them selves "I see something"
>>like
>>we do so easily, but that doesn't mean they don't need visual
>>experience
>>(and other) to be able to complete the external analysis.
>
> Probably most other mammals have not been indoctrinated into bad
> philosophy. I don't doubt that other mammals have visual
> experience. But since we don't share a common language, they cannot
> tell us about it.
>
> You appear to be implying that mammals need the visual experience,
> and somehow analyze that visual experience.
Not at all. Visual experience IS an analysis / analytical activity.
> However, most of the
> time, we are not analyzing our visual experience (except when we are
> suffering from too much philosophy). I am not analyzing my visual
> experience and deducing that there is a cup of coffee on my desk. I
> am seeing a cup of coffee. The cup of coffee is already part of my
> visual experience, so no further analysis of that experience is
> required. The visual experience is a result of the analysis, not a
> precursor to analysis.
Visual experience, in as far as analysis has anything to do with it (you
bring it in), is just another form or stage of analysis, analytical
activity. Or call it computation, or call it brain physiology, or brain
process - for all I care!
JPL Verhey
So lets try to make some more sense of the sense of self. (not in the
preceding sense of "why am I here at all" which is another nice brain
cracker :o)
You have a point that, if I understand you correctly, there is
undenyably a sense of self. A self that that senses to be the axis of
all experiences. Like a "point" around which all experiences evolve. One
aspect is the sense of identity, the knowledge of who I am, my history.
Another, especial in visual experience, is that we have a view point. We
look out into the world and are the center of our own universe. More
than anything else, this experience is therefor a geometry - ie a point
of view within a geometry. It appears that the self is the point where
all vectors of the geomtery come together. Yet when try to figure out
what is at/in this point, we don't find anything.
What remains is the geometric POV that appears to come together in a
virtual point, that we may call "I". But in no way we can figure out if
we are the point with a view, or rather the view with a point. To say
"we are both things" makes no sense, so it makes logically more sense
(to me err) to say that "I am the View" and "The View is I". Which is
the poetic way if saying that observer and observed are identical - two
words for the same thing: observation.
JPL Verhey
of self, the geometry that converges in the virtual point "I", is an
emulation of the position of our body in space. Within the brain, our
experiences emulate what is relevant for the organism to function and
survive in its environment. The organism informs via the senses the
brain its location and all other relevant data.. so that the brain can
emulate the experiential context in which "we" live. Since the brain
cannot of course be inhibited by the organism as a whole..the organism
as a whole can only be represented as the "empty" self, the zero axis in
the experiential geometry.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d0cjht$rlc$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
>> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
>> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the visual
>> experience.
> The qualia problem; why do we experience the image at all.
I'll grant that many would like a good explanation here. But having
an internal image in the brain does not explain qualia.
> Simply ("simply"
>because the details have not been worked out yet - thence the problem)
>because a process or processes that we identify with as the self (that
>wandering, seemingly wholistic thing, that *has* a stream of consciousness
>which is actually a stream of contents/representations, with (or not) an
>experiencer) has a relationship with the thing seen (the representation of
>the pattern presented as a percept to one or more of the sense organs).
That's a long sentence.
I agree that qualia involve representation in some sense of the
term. But I don't see any basis for assuming that representation has
to be in the form of a images in the brain.
> It
>is that relationship (dynamic) that is experienced *as* qualia.
Maybe that's your theory of qualia.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>news:d0cjht$rlc$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>...
>>>Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
>> That's not obvious. The use of an internal image, if there were one,
>> could be a mere implementation detail with no implications about
>> infinite regression.
>What was meant was that if we use words "seeing an image" (both "seeing"
>and "image" occuring in the brain) to describe visual experience, it
>makes more sense to not make that distinction/relationship and consider
>seeing-and-image (observer and observed) identical. Again: here we
>discuss what happens within the brain.
Our seeing may happen because of things that go on in the brain. But
I think we cannot thereby conclude that they happen in the brain.
>I maintain that within the context of the brain, which is where the
>visual experience occurs, the "observer" and "the observed" are
>identical.
That does not seem correct.
>>>> But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary.
>>>Yet we have visual (and other) experiences. Why is that?
>> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
>> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
>> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the visual
>> experience.
>Fortunately we are talking about human brain and human experience, not
>computers.
However, that "explanation" is not persuasive with some account as to
what is importantly different between computer and brain.
>...
>> You appear to be implying that mammals need the visual experience,
>> and somehow analyze that visual experience.
>Not at all. Visual experience IS an analysis / analytical activity.
That I can accept as reasonable.
JPL Verhey
> "JPL Verhey" <matterD...@hotmail.com> writes:
>>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>news:d0cjht$rlc$1...@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
>
>>...
>>>>Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
>
>>> That's not obvious. The use of an internal image, if there were
>>> one,
>>> could be a mere implementation detail with no implications about
>>> infinite regression.
Rethinking this might be true. It actually can be read like this: if we
call our (visual) experience an internal image, it turns out that me
"the seer" and "what I see" are always both resident, ie comprising the
image / visual experience. Like siamese twins that always come and go
together. The twins is the internal image. They are always implemented
"together", as far as we know. We never experience "nothing": in visual
experience a seer without something seen simply never occurs.
This does still, IMHO, question the legitimacy to organically and
functionally separate the twins where one, the seer looks at the other,
the seen. And it immediately disables the possibility for an infinite
regression of homunculi. However if we nevertheless opt for the
possibility that the twins do have separate functions (and locations in
the brain) although they always work together in visual experience.. we
still only have the two twins implemented where neither logically needs
to regress infinitely at all. There just is this "one pair of twins",
the seer and the seen comprising the visual experience.
But maybe you had something else in mind?
>
>>What was meant was that if we use words "seeing an image" (both
>>"seeing"
>>and "image" occuring in the brain) to describe visual experience, it
>>makes more sense to not make that distinction/relationship and
>>consider
>>seeing-and-image (observer and observed) identical. Again: here we
>>discuss what happens within the brain.
>
> Our seeing may happen because of things that go on in the brain. But
> I think we cannot thereby conclude that they happen in the brain.
Explain?
>
>>I maintain that within the context of the brain, which is where the
>>visual experience occurs, the "observer" and "the observed" are
>>identical.
>
> That does not seem correct.
>
>>>>> But the forming of an internal image seems unnecessary.
>
>>>>Yet we have visual (and other) experiences. Why is that?
>
>>> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
>>> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
>>> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the
>>> visual
>>> experience.
>
>>Fortunately we are talking about human brain and human experience, not
>>computers.
>
> However, that "explanation" is not persuasive with some account as to
> what is importantly different between computer and brain.
So far we were just trying to correctly describe what happens in eg
human visual experience. To explain things is another matter, next step.
Neil W Rickert
>"Neil W Rickert" <ricke...@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
>>>...
>>>>>Otherwise we have the infinite regression of homunculi.
>>>> That's not obvious. The use of an internal image, if there were
>>>> one,
>>>> could be a mere implementation detail with no implications about
>>>> infinite regression.
>Rethinking this might be true. It actually can be read like this: if we
>call our (visual) experience an internal image, it turns out that me
>"the seer" and "what I see" are always both resident, ie comprising the
>image / visual experience.
There is part of where we are miscommunicating. I would not call our
visual experience an image. But even if you insist on calling
it an image, then you should not consider it to be an image in the
brain. If you want to think of it as an image, then think of brain
processes as creating a virtual reality, and your visual experience
is of that virtual reality. In that case the image isn't in the
brain at all; it is in the created virtual reality.
Personally, I prefer not to introduce the assumption of a virtual
reality. I think that idea is more confusing than useful. It is,
roughly, the "Cartesian theater" idea that Dennett argued against.
> Like siamese twins that always come and go
>together. The twins is the internal image. They are always implemented
>"together", as far as we know. We never experience "nothing": in visual
>experience a seer without something seen simply never occurs.
The idea that we might experience nothing is one that Chalmers pushes
in his talk about zombies. But I think the zombie idea is confused.
>This does still, IMHO, question the legitimacy to organically and
>functionally separate the twins where one, the seer looks at the other,
>the seen. And it immediately disables the possibility for an infinite
>regression of homunculi. However if we nevertheless opt for the
>possibility that the twins do have separate functions (and locations in
>the brain) although they always work together in visual experience.. we
>still only have the two twins implemented where neither logically needs
>to regress infinitely at all. There just is this "one pair of twins",
>the seer and the seen comprising the visual experience.
Isn't that the kind of confusion that arises from thinking of experience
as an image, and from assuming that it would be possible to be zombie?
>>>What was meant was that if we use words "seeing an image" (both
>>>"seeing"
>>>and "image" occuring in the brain) to describe visual experience, it
>>>makes more sense to not make that distinction/relationship and
>>>consider
>>>seeing-and-image (observer and observed) identical. Again: here we
>>>discuss what happens within the brain.
>> Our seeing may happen because of things that go on in the brain. But
>> I think we cannot thereby conclude that they happen in the brain.
>Explain?
The music I am listening to happens because of what goes on in my
radio. But the music itself is not in the radio. My camera works
because of the lens, but you won't find the picture in the lens. If
you look in the radio, you will find electrical signals, but no
music. If you look in the brain, you will find lots of
electro-chemical signals, but you won't find any qualia or sounds or
sights.
You can say that visual experience occurs in you as a person. But it
seems wrong to say that it occurs in your brain. Your brain is
locked up inside a light-proof box, so how could visual experience
occur there? Visual experience is for the whole person, not for the
neurons or other brain components.
>...
>>>> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its frame
>>>> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
>>>> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the
>>>> visual
>>>> experience.
>>>Fortunately we are talking about human brain and human experience, not
>>>computers.
>> However, that "explanation" is not persuasive with some account as to
>> what is importantly different between computer and brain.
>So far we were just trying to correctly describe what happens in eg
>human visual experience. To explain things is another matter, next step.
Giving an "explanation" and basing research on that, may lead you
astray. You need to understand the operating principles first, before
you commit to a particular form of explanation.
JPL Verhey
I find "virual reality" to be a particularly false idea because 1) it
suggests wrongly that we know what an objective "real reality" is
unmediated by the interface of our subjective experiences, and 2) it
devaluates our experiential reality by branding it only "virtual",
whilst to each of us it is the only real reality known and lived.
>> Like siamese twins that always come and go
>>together. The twins is the internal image. They are always implemented
>>"together", as far as we know. We never experience "nothing": in
>>visual
>>experience a seer without something seen simply never occurs.
>
> The idea that we might experience nothing is one that Chalmers pushes
> in his talk about zombies. But I think the zombie idea is confused.
There is too much talk about zombies.. on the other hand it is a
legitimate question: why are we not zombies? (organisms without
qualia/experiences, conscious awareness)
>
>>This does still, IMHO, question the legitimacy to organically and
>>functionally separate the twins where one, the seer looks at the
>>other,
>>the seen. And it immediately disables the possibility for an infinite
>>regression of homunculi. However if we nevertheless opt for the
>>possibility that the twins do have separate functions (and locations
>>in
>>the brain) although they always work together in visual experience..
>>we
>>still only have the two twins implemented where neither logically
>>needs
>>to regress infinitely at all. There just is this "one pair of twins",
>>the seer and the seen comprising the visual experience.
>
> Isn't that the kind of confusion that arises from thinking of
> experience
> as an image, and from assuming that it would be possible to be zombie?
I don't see the connection with zombies. And there is no confusion here
on my side. Notebly Glen has severe problems with certain common words
used by most people to describe what happens when we see things, have
visual (any) experiences. I just try to be helpful because I think this
whole issue is mute. Apparently it is possible to let definitionional
quarrels blur the simple reality: our experiential, subjective reality
is generated in/by our (body-)brain. ie we don't see/experience things
out there in the world directly or "as-is". This forces us to at least
*distinguish* between the elements that "reside" in our experiential
subjective reality.. and the inferred objectively existing "things" that
can be assumed to exist out there in the world, serving as the "input"
for the many human body-brains in which each our unique (but similar)
individual experiential realities are subsequently generated.
>>>>What was meant was that if we use words "seeing an image" (both
>>>>"seeing"
>>>>and "image" occuring in the brain) to describe visual experience, it
>>>>makes more sense to not make that distinction/relationship and
>>>>consider
>>>>seeing-and-image (observer and observed) identical. Again: here we
>>>>discuss what happens within the brain.
>
>>> Our seeing may happen because of things that go on in the brain.
>>> But
>>> I think we cannot thereby conclude that they happen in the brain.
>
>>Explain?
>
> The music I am listening to happens because of what goes on in my
> radio. But the music itself is not in the radio. My camera works
> because of the lens, but you won't find the picture in the lens. If
> you look in the radio, you will find electrical signals, but no
> music. If you look in the brain, you will find lots of
> electro-chemical signals, but you won't find any qualia or sounds or
> sights.
There is a simple and obvious organic explanation for why you won't find
sounds or any qualia/experiences when you look in the brain.
>
> You can say that visual experience occurs in you as a person. But it
> seems wrong to say that it occurs in your brain. Your brain is
> locked up inside a light-proof box, so how could visual experience
> occur there? Visual experience is for the whole person, not for the
> neurons or other brain components.
The objective environment is needed and involved in seeing, so are the
lenzes of the eye, the retina, optical nerve, V1 and other brain tissue
is involved, as well as other physiology in the body. There is no
mystery here. But is is a proven fact that the function of experience is
a primal function of brain tissue when the human organism is awake and
behaving (inter-)activily within the environment. The organ that is the
brain has many functions of course most of which are not even
"conscious", but the activity called experience is a major and
indispensible one. The locus and action of that particular function is
in the brain.
>
>>...
>
>>>>> My computer has an internal image of the screen display on its
>>>>> frame
>>>>> buffer. Yet nobody proposed that the computer is having visual
>>>>> experience. An internal image does not in any way explain the
>>>>> visual
>>>>> experience.
>
>>>>Fortunately we are talking about human brain and human experience,
>>>>not
>>>>computers.
>
>>> However, that "explanation" is not persuasive with some account as
>>> to
>>> what is importantly different between computer and brain.
>
>>So far we were just trying to correctly describe what happens in eg
>>human visual experience. To explain things is another matter, next
>>step.
>
> Giving an "explanation" and basing research on that, may lead you
> astray. You need to understand the operating principles first, before
> you commit to a particular form of explanation.
With this I agree whole heartedly. Lets look at the operating principles
and facts first and worry about definitions or "best verbal practise"
later.