A direct rep party wouldn't really be a "party" in the sense that it
wouldn't have a coherent ideology; every jurisdiction would have its
own outcomes. So it's no more binary than any other form of liquid
democracy; it's just that you control one legislator's actions (some
of which are ternary, like votes, and some of which are not, like
proposals and budget allocation negotiations and the like), rather
than the final outcome.
(FWIW, I see this as an intermediate step of a full liquid democracy
anyway, at least in places like the US where votes are allocated based
on things other than pure population, like the Senate which skews
towards state equality rather than population equality. It's one of
the reasons why we still have an electoral college, despite the purely
technological part of it being totally moot.)
Therefore, I'd reframe your question thus: how can one have a
collaborative, liquid-democratically-weighted legislation authorship
system that allows for differing outcomes for different cliques within
the system (e.g. voters in different states) while still nudging
people towards collaboration / consensus rather than mere majority
(using process, forced exposure to minority opinions, etc) and taking
empirical information into account (… especially when it disagrees
with your prior opinion)?
I think it's a very interesting question — as I said during one of the
WFD plenaries, I think it's *far* more interesting to ask how one can
make a liquid democracy deliberative than to ask whether deliberation
is in conflict with direct/liquid democracy — and it's one I've given
some significant thought to.
They're not written up in one place however, and I'd prefer to hear
what others think before giving my ideas on it.
- Sai