From Feudalism to Consent: Rethinking Birthright Citizenship
by John C. Eastman, Ph.D
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm18.cfm
It is today routinely believed that under the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, mere birth on U.S. soil is sufficient to obtain
U.S. citizenship. However strong this commonly believed interpretation
might appear, it is incompatible not only with the text of the
Citizenship Clause (particularly as informed by the debate surrounding
its adoption), but also with the political theory of the American Founding.
It is time for Congress to reassert its plenary authority and make
clear, by resolution, its view that the “subject to the jurisdiction”
phrase of the Citizenship Clause has meaning of fundamental importance
to the naturalization policy of the nation.
The Original Understanding of the Citizenship Clause
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”[1] As manifest by the conjunctive “and,” the
clause mandates citizenship to those who meet both of the constitutional
prerequisites: (1) birth (or naturalization) in the United States and
(2) being subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The widely held, though erroneous, view today is that any person
entering the territory of the United States—even for a short visit; even
illegally—is considered to have subjected himself to the jurisdiction
of the United States, which is to say, subjected himself to the laws of
the United States. Surely one who is actually born in the United States
is therefore “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and
entitled to full citizenship as a result, or so the common reasoning goes.
Textually, such an interpretation is manifestly erroneous, for it
renders the entire “subject to the jurisdiction” clause redundant.
Anyone who is “born” in the United States is, under this
interpretation, necessarily “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States. Yet it is a well-established doctrine of legal interpretation
that legal texts, including the Constitution, are not to be interpreted
to create redundancy unless any other interpretation would lead to
absurd results.[2]
The “subject to the jurisdiction” provision must therefore require
something in addition to mere birth on U.S. soil. The language of the
1866 Civil Rights Act, from which the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was derived, provides the key to its meaning. The
1866 Act provides: “All persons born in the United States, and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States.”[3] As this formulation
makes clear, any child born on U.S. soil to parents who were temporary
visitors to this country and who, as a result of the foreign citizenship
of the child’s parents, remained a citizen or subject of the parents’
home country was not entitled to claim the birthright citizenship
provided by the 1866 Act.
The jurisdiction clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat
different from the jurisdiction clause of the 1866 Act, of course. The
positively phrased “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States
might easily have been intended to describe a broader grant of
citizenship than the negatively phrased language from the 1866 Act, one
more in line with the modern understanding. But the relatively sparse
debate we have regarding this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not support such a reading.
When pressed about whether Indians living on reservations would be
covered by the clause since they were “most clearly subject to our
jurisdiction, both civil and military,” for example, Senator Lyman
Trumbull, a key figure in the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, responded that “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States meant subject to its “complete” jurisdiction, “[n]ot owing
allegiance to anybody else.”[4] And Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced
the language of the jurisdiction clause on the floor of the Senate,
contended that it should be construed to mean “a full and complete
jurisdiction,” “the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies
to every citizen of the United States now”[5] (i.e., under the 1866
Act). That meant that the children of Indians who still “belong[ed] to a
tribal relation” and hence owed allegiance to another sovereign (however
dependent the sovereign was) would not qualify for citizenship under the
clause. Because of this interpretative gloss, provided by the authors of
the provision, an amendment offered by Senator James Doolittle of
Wisconsin explicitly to exclude “Indians not taxed,” as the 1866 Act had
done, was rejected as redundant.[6]
The interpretative gloss offered by Senators Trumbull and Howard was
also accepted by the Supreme Court—by both the majority and the
dissenting justices—in The Slaughter-House Cases.[7] The majority in
that case correctly noted that the “main purpose” of the clause “was to
establish the citizenship of the negro” and that “[t]he phrase, ‘subject
to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children
of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born
within the United States.”[8] Justice Steven Field, joined by Chief
Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley in dissent from the
principal holding of the case, likewise acknowledged that the clause was
designed to remove any doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866
Civil Rights Act, which provided that all persons born in the United
States were as a result citizens both of the United States and of the
state in which they resided, provided they were not at the time subjects
of any foreign power.[9]
Although the statement by the majority in Slaughter-House was dicta, the
position regarding the “subject to the jurisdiction” language advanced
there was subsequently adopted as holding by the Supreme Court in Elk v.
Wilkins.[10] John Elk was born on an Indian reservation and subsequently
moved to non-reservation U.S. territory, renounced his former tribal
allegiance, and claimed U.S. citizenship by virtue of the Citizenship
Clause. This Court held that the claimant was not “subject to the
jurisdiction” of the United States at birth, which required that he be
“not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the
United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction,
and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.”[11] Elk did not meet
the jurisdictional test because, as a member of an Indian tribe at his
birth, he “owed immediate allegiance to” his tribe and not to the
United States. Although “Indian tribes, being within the territorial
limits of the United States, were not, strictly speaking, foreign
states,” “they were alien nations, distinct political communities,”
according to the Court.[12]
Drawing explicitly on the language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the
Court continued:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members
of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes (an
alien though dependent power), although in a geographical sense born in
the United States, are no more “born in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof,” within the meaning of the first section of
the fourteenth amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign
government born within the domain of that government, or the children
born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers
of foreign nations.[13]
Indeed, if anything, American Indians, as members of tribes that were
themselves dependent upon the United States (and hence themselves
subject to its jurisdiction), had a stronger claim to citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment merely by virtue of their birth within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States than did children of
foreign nationals. But the Court in Elk rejected even that claim and in
the process necessarily rejected the claim that the phrase, “subject to
the jurisdiction” of the United States, meant merely territorial
jurisdiction as opposed to complete, political jurisdiction.
Such was the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause initially given by
the Supreme Court, and it was the correct interpretation. As Thomas
Cooley noted in his treatise, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the
United States “meant full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens
are generally subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction,
such as may consist with allegiance to some other government.”[14]
The Supreme Court’s Wrong Turn in Wong Kim Ark
Despite the clear holding of Elk and the persuasive dicta from
Slaughter-House that mere birth on U.S. soil is not sufficient to meet
the constitutional prerequisites for birthright citizenship, the Supreme
Court held otherwise in United States v. Wong Kim Ark,[15] with
expansive language even more broad than the holding of the case itself.
It is that erroneous interpretation of the Citizenship Clause, adopted
30 years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that has
colored basic questions of citizenship ever since.
In Wong Kim Ark, Justice Horace Gray, writing for the Court, held that
“a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who
at the time of his birth were subjects of the emperor of China, but have
a permanent domicile and residence in the United States,” was, merely
by virtue of his birth in the United States, a citizen of the United
States as a result of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.[16] Justice Gray correctly noted that the language to the
contrary in The Slaughter-House Cases was merely dicta and therefore not
binding precedent.[17] He found the Slaughter-House dicta unpersuasive
because of a subsequent decision, in which the author of the majority
opinion in Slaughter-House had concurred, holding that foreign consuls
(unlike ambassadors) were “subject to the jurisdiction, civil and
criminal, of the courts of the country in which they reside.”[18]
Justice Gray appears not to have appreciated the distinction between
partial, territorial jurisdiction, which subjects all who are present
within the territory of a sovereign to the jurisdiction of that
sovereign’s laws, and complete political jurisdiction, which requires
allegiance to the sovereign as well.
More troubling than his rejection of the persuasive dicta from
Slaughter-House, though, was the fact that Justice Gray also repudiated
the actual holding in Elk, which he himself had authored. After quoting
extensively from the opinion in Elk, including the portion, reprinted
above, noting that the children of Indians owing allegiance to an Indian
tribe were no more “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment than were the children
of ambassadors and other public ministers of foreign nations born in the
United States, Justice Gray simply held, without any analysis, that Elk
“concerned only members of the Indian tribes within the United States,
and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children born in the United
States of foreign parents of Caucasian, African, or Mongolian descent,
not in the diplomatic service of a foreign country.”[19]
By limiting the “subject to the jurisdiction” clause to the children of
diplomats, who neither owed allegiance to the United States nor were
(at least at the ambassadorial level) subject to its laws merely by
virtue of their residence in the United States as the result of the
long-established international law fiction of extraterritoriality by
which the sovereignty of a diplomat is said to follow him wherever he
goes, Justice Gray simply failed to appreciate what he seemed to have
understood in Elk, namely, that there is a difference between
territorial jurisdiction, on the one hand, and the more complete,
allegiance-obliging jurisdiction that the Fourteenth Amendment
codified, on the other.
Justice Gray’s failure even to address, much less appreciate, the
distinction was taken to task by Justice Fuller, joined by Justice
Harlan, in dissent. Drawing on an impressive array of legal scholars,
from Vattel to Blackstone, Justice Fuller correctly noted that there was
a distinction between the two sorts of allegiance—“the one, natural and
perpetual; the other, local and temporary.”[20] The Citizenship Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment referred only to the former, he contended.
He noted that the absolute birthright citizenship urged by Justice Gray
was really a lingering vestige of a feudalism that the Americans had
rejected, implicitly at the time of the Revolution and explicitly with
the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.[21]
Quite apart from the fact that Justice Fuller’s dissent was logically
compelled by the text and history of the Citizenship Clause, Justice
Gray’s broad interpretation led him to make some astoundingly incorrect
assertions. He claimed, for example, that “a stranger born, for so long
as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes
obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for
treason.”[22] And he was compelled to recognize dual citizenship as a
necessary implication of his position,[23] despite the fact that ever
since the Naturalization Act of 1795, “applicants for naturalization
were required to take, not simply an oath to support the constitution
of the United States, but of absolute renunciation and abjuration of
all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince or state, and
particularly to the prince or state of which they were before the
citizens or subjects.”[24]
Finally, Justice Gray’s position is incompatible with the notion of
consent that underlay the sovereign’s power over naturalization. What
it meant, fundamentally, was that foreign nationals could secure
American citizenship for their children merely by giving birth on
American soil, whether or not their arrival on America’s shores was
legal or illegal, temporary or permanent.
Justice Gray stated that the children of only two classes of foreigner
nationals were not entitled to the birthright citizenship he thought
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, as noted above, were the children of ambassadors and other
foreign diplomats who, as the result of the fiction of
extraterritoriality, were not even considered subject to the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.
Second were the children of members of invading armies who were born on
U.S. soil while it was occupied by the foreign army. But apart from
these two narrow exceptions, all children of foreign nationals who
managed to be born on U.S. soil were, in Justice Gray’s formulation,
citizens of the United States. Children born of parents who had been
offered permanent residence but were not yet citizens, and who as a
result had not yet renounced their allegiance to their prior sovereign,
would become citizens by birth on U.S. soil. This was true even if, as
was the case in Wong Kim Ark itself, the parents were, by treaty, unable
ever to become citizens.
Children of parents residing only temporarily in the United States on a
student or work visa would also become U.S. citizens. Children of
parents who had overstayed their temporary visas would likewise become
U.S. citizens, even though born of parents who were now in the United
States illegally. And, perhaps most troubling from the “consent”
rationale, even children of parents who never were in the United States
legally would become citizens as the direct result of the illegal action
by their parents. This would be true even if the parents were nationals
of a regime at war with the United States and even if the parents were
here to commit acts of sabotage against the United States, at least as
long as the sabotage did not actually involve occupying a portion of the
territory of the United States. The notion that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when seeking to guarantee the right of
citizenship to former slaves, also sought to guarantee citizenship to
the children of enemies of the United States who were in its territory
illegally is simply too absurd to be a credible interpretation of the
Citizenship Clause.
Although hard to sustain under the broad language used by Justice Gray,
the actual holding of Wong Kim Ark is actually much more narrow, and the
case need not be read so expansively as to produce such absurd results.
Because of the Chinese Exclusion Acts,[25] Wong Kim Ark’s parents were
ineligible for citizenship even if they had renounced their Chinese
citizenship and subjected themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States. As such, Wong Kim Ark arguably would have been
entitled to citizenship because, like his parents, he would in fact have
been “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the
complete, allegiance-obliging sense intended by the phrase.[26]
This is not to say that Congress could not, pursuant to its
naturalization power, choose to grant citizenship to the children of
foreign nationals.[27] But thus far it has not done so. Instead, the
language of the current naturalization statute simply tracks the
minimum constitutional guarantee— anyone “born in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” is a citizen.[28] Indeed, Congress
has by its own actions with respect to Native Americans—both before and
after this Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark—rejected the claim that the
Citizenship Clause itself confers citizenship merely by accident of
birth.[29] None of these citizenship acts would have been
necessary—indeed, all would have been redundant— under the expansive
view of the Citizenship Clause propounded by Justice Gray.
A Citizenship of Consent, not Feudal Allegiance
Once one considers the full import of Justice Gray’s language in Wong
Kim Ark, it becomes clear that his proposition is simply incompatible
not only with the text of the Citizenship Clause, but with the political
theory of the American Founding as well.
At its core, as articulated by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence, that political theory posits the following: Governments
are instituted among particular peoples, comprised of naturally equal
human beings, to secure for themselves certain unalienable rights. Such
governments, in order to be legitimate, must be grounded in the consent
of the governed—a necessary corollary to the self-evident proposition
of equality.[30] This consent must be present, either explicitly or
tacitly, not just in the formation of the government, but also in the
ongoing decision whether to embrace others within the social compact of
the particular people. As formulated in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights
of 1780:
The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of
government, is to secure the existence of the body-politic, to protect
it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of
enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural rights…. The
body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is
a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen
and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good.[31]
Thus, as Professor Edward Erler has noted:
[T]he social contract requires reciprocal consent. Not only must the
individual consent to be governed, but he must also be accepted by the
community as a whole. If all persons born within the geographical limits
of the United States are to be counted citizens—even those whose parents
are in the United States illegally— then this would be tantamount to the
conferral of citizenship without the consent of “the whole people.”[32]
In other words, birthright citizenship is contrary to the principle of
consent that is one of the bedrock principles of the American regime.
Such a claim of birthright citizenship traces its roots not to the
republicanism of the American Founding, grounded as it was in the
consent of the governed, but to the feudalism of medieval England,
grounded in the notion that a subject owed perpetual allegiance and
fealty to his sovereign.[33] A necessary corollary of the feudal notion
of citizenship was the ban on expatriation, embraced by England and
described by Blackstone as follows:
Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king’s
dominions immediately upon their birth. For, immediately upon their
birth, they are under the king’s protection…. Natural allegiance is
therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, canceled, or
altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance…. For it is a
principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince
cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another,
put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this
natural allegiance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the
other, and cannot be divested without the concurrence act of that prince
to whom it was first due.[34]
Thus, when Congress passed as a companion to the Fourteenth Amendment
the Expatriation Act of 1868, which provided simply that “the right of
expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people,
indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness,” it necessarily rejected the feudal birthright
citizenship doctrine of medieval England as fundamentally incompatible
with the principles of the Declaration of Independence. As
Representative Woodward of Pennsylvania noted on the floor of the House
of Representatives: “It is high time that feudalism were driven from our
shores and eliminated from our law, and now is the time to declare it.”[35]
Such remnants of feudalism were rejected by our nation’s Founders when
they declared to a candid world that they no longer owed allegiance to
the king of their birth. They were rejected again by the Congress in
1866 and by the nation when it ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reviving Congress’s Constitutional Power Over Naturalization
It is time for the courts, and for the political branches as well, to
revisit Justice Gray’s erroneous interpretation of the Citizenship
Clause, restoring to the constitutional mandate what its drafters
actually intended: that only a complete jurisdiction, of the kind that
brings with it a total and exclusive allegiance, is sufficient to
qualify for the grant of citizenship to which the people of the United
States actually consented.
Of course, Congress has in analogous contexts been hesitant to exercise
its own constitutional authority to interpret the Constitution in ways
contrary to the pronouncements of the courts. Even if that course is
warranted in most situations so as to avoid a constitutional conflict
with a co-equal branch of the government, it is not warranted here for
at least two reasons.
First, as the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly acknowledged,
Congress’s power over naturalization is “plenary,” while “judicial
power over immigration and naturalization is extremely limited.”[36]
While that recognition of plenary power does not permit Congress to dip
below the constitutional floor, it does counsel against any judicial
interpretation that provides a broader grant of citizenship than is
actually supported by the Constitution’s text.
Second, the gloss that has been placed on the Wong Kim Ark decision is
actually much broader than the actual holding of the case. Congress
should therefore adopt a narrow reading of the decision that does not
intrude on the plenary power of Congress in this area any more than the
actual holding of the case requires. Wong Kim Ark’s parents were
actually in this country both legally and permanently, yet were barred
from even pursuing citizenship (and renouncing their former allegiance)
by a treaty that closed that door to all Chinese immigrants. They were
therefore as fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as
they were legally permitted to be, and under those circumstances, it is
not a surprise that the Court would extend the Constitution’s grant of
birthright citizenship to their children. But the effort to read Wong
Kim Ark more broadly than that, as interpreting the Citizenship Clause
to confer birthright citizenship on the children of those not subject
to the full and sovereign (as opposed to territorial) jurisdiction of
the United States, not only ignores the text, history, and theory of the
Citizenship Clause, but also permits the Court to intrude upon a plenary
power assigned to Congress itself.