Re: Darwin's Nature Fairy
Howard Brazee
wrote:
>> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do know that
>> brains with different species think differently.
>
>Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
>can or cannot be purely physical.
It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
--
"In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found,
than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace
to the legislature, and not to the executive department."
- James Madison
Terry Cross
> On Mon, 14 Mar 2011 14:25:25 -0700 (PDT), Zev <zev_h...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
> >> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do know that
> >> brains with different species think differently.
>
> >Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
> >can or cannot be purely physical.
>
> It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
> no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
Since science cannot prove the negative, you insert your religion.
How rational.
TCross
Norm D. Plumber
>On Mon, 14 Mar 2011 14:25:25 -0700 (PDT), Zev <zev_...@yahoo.com>
>wrote:
>
>>> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do know that
>>> brains with different species think differently.
>>
>>Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
>>can or cannot be purely physical.
>
>
>It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
>no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
What is it that knows there's a physical element?
It's the same turtles-all-the-way-down problem, only instead of who
created the creator of the creator, it's who knows who's knowing the
knowing.
--
"If you don't want to risk the clap, keep your pants zipped." -anon
Michael Price
Of course science can prove a negative, to any useful defintion of
"prove". For instance they can prove that there are no massless black
holes.
David Johnston
> Howard Brazee <how...@brazee.net> wrote:
> >wrote:
>
> >>> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do know that
> >>> brains with different species think differently.
>
> >>Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
> >>can or cannot be purely physical.
>
> >It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
> >no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
>
> What is it that knows there's a physical element?
That would be our brains.
Norm D. Plumber
I understand what you're saying but I consider it erroneous.
If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
free-will.
If there is no such thing as free-will then there can be no individual
responsibility and the concepts of ethics and morality boil down to
the maximization of personal advantage for the physical unit.
If there is no individual responsibility, society's punishment of
wrongdoing is a matter of the societal mechanism attempting to remove
non-advantageous physical units from its structure to maximize the
advantage of the societal mechanism.
If society exists for no purpose other than its own advantage then all
non-advantageous components should be removed in order to optimize the
totality; the concept of individuals having "rights", or even value
beyond their contribution to the advantage of society as a whole
becomes risible, and genocide becomes a purely practical matter of
societal optimization.
In other words, if individual conscious is purely physical, it is
neither important, nor even essential, to the societal mechanism; and
if you remove all the unimportant and nonessential components from the
societal mechanism in order to optimize its functionality, it
disappears entirely.
I notice that at some point in this thread's history it has been
crossposted to alt.anarchism, and I would expect that the concept of
individual meaninglessness will draw some flames from that group, if
there is in fact anyone in that group who has not yet been assimilated
into the hive-mind that derives from your position that consciousness
is purely physical.
Howard Brazee
<nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>>That would be our brains.
>
>I understand what you're saying but I consider it erroneous.
>
>
>If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
>electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
>free-will.
...
You list a bunch of reasons you reject this on philosophical grounds.
Theologians have argued about free will for centuries and it ends up
not really mattering - we have to act as though we have free will.
But any rate, whether or not consciousness is purely physical is not
because we like or reject the implications. The answer isn't based
upon what we wish, it's based about what it actually is.
So any argument needs to be based upon observations, not comfortable
philosophies.
Wayne Throop
:: electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
:: free-will.
: Howard Brazee <how...@brazee.net>
: You list a bunch of reasons you reject this on philosophical grounds.
: Theologians have argued about free will for centuries and it ends up
: not really mattering - we have to act as though we have free will.
I'm really hard-put to understand why this "free will" stuff,
as the philosophers and such define it, is worth having.
I mean, what good is it? Why does it matter if the way the
mind functions is physical or not, or predictable or not?
It's a most bizarre psychosis, this desiring of "free will".
Wayne Throop thr...@sheol.org http://sheol.org/throopw
Christopher A. Lee
wrote:
It's only discussed because even though it is something normally
assumed, some silly theists have made it a doctrine that everything is
pre-ordained by their god as part of its supposed omniscience.
Paul Howard
Well, I've heard some *secularists* say that humans only assume that we
have free-will.
IE everything we do is so influenced by outside forces that we don't
really have choices but want to believe we have choices.
--
*
Paul Howard (Alias Drak Bibliophile)
*
Sometimes The Dragon Wins!
*
--------
*
Christopher A. Lee
<drakbib...@comcast.net> wrote:
>On 3/16/2011 12:48 PM, Christopher A. Lee wrote:
>> On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 17:40:53 GMT, thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop)
>> wrote:
>>
>>> :: If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
>>> :: electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
>>> :: free-will.
>>>
>>> : Howard Brazee<how...@brazee.net>
>>> : You list a bunch of reasons you reject this on philosophical grounds.
>>> : Theologians have argued about free will for centuries and it ends up
>>> : not really mattering - we have to act as though we have free will.
>>>
>>> I'm really hard-put to understand why this "free will" stuff,
>>> as the philosophers and such define it, is worth having.
>>> I mean, what good is it? Why does it matter if the way the
>>> mind functions is physical or not, or predictable or not?
>>> It's a most bizarre psychosis, this desiring of "free will".
>>
>> It's only discussed because even though it is something normally
>> assumed, some silly theists have made it a doctrine that everything is
>> pre-ordained by their god as part of its supposed omniscience.
>
>
>Well, I've heard some *secularists* say that humans only assume that we
>have free-will.
Cites, showing how they reach this conclusion?
>IE everything we do is so influenced by outside forces that we don't
>really have choices but want to believe we have choices.
Except that many of our choices are determined randomly. What we might
choose from a menu for example. At the most fundamental level this is
determined by quantum indeterminacy in the neurons of the brain.
Certainly many of our decisions are influenced by outside forces but
many aren't.
Davej
> David Johnston <davidjohnsto...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >On Mar 15, 4:26 am, "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
> >> Howard Brazee <how...@brazee.net> wrote:
> >> >On Mon, 14 Mar 2011 14:25:25 -0700 (PDT), Zev <zev_h...@yahoo.com>
> >> >wrote:
>
> >> >>> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do
> >> >>> know that brains with different species think differently.
>
> >> >>Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
> >> >>can or cannot be purely physical.
>
> >> >It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
> >> >no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
>
> >> What is it that knows there's a physical element?
>
> >That would be our brains.
>
> I understand what you're saying but I consider it erroneous.
>
> If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
> electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
> free-will.
So are you suggesting that this can't be true simply because the idea
offends you? The truth is whatever it is. The truth doesn't care about
your feelings. Certainly modern physics does not require simple-minded
Newtonian cause and effect so don't get your diapers all twisted in a
knot. Maybe you make decisions the way you do because of poor
information or your poor education or your religious indoctrination.
Wayne Throop
:::::: electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
:::::: free-will.
::::: Howard Brazee<how...@brazee.net> You list a bunch of reasons you
::::: reject this on philosophical grounds. Theologians have argued
::::: about free will for centuries and it ends up not really mattering -
::::: we have to act as though we have free will.
:::: I'm really hard-put to understand why this "free will" stuff, as
:::: the philosophers and such define it, is worth having. I mean, what
:::: good is it? Why does it matter if the way the mind functions is
:::: physical or not, or predictable or not? It's a most bizarre
:::: psychosis, this desiring of "free will".
:: IE everything we do is so influenced by outside forces that we don't
:: really have choices but want to believe we have choices.
The difficulty boils down to what constitutes "outside forces".
IMO, in considering hypothetically whether a purely material
implementation of consciousness plus deterministic physics permits "free
will", it's quite bizarre to consider the very forces of which the mind
is composed, to be "outside".
Paul Howard
No cites I'm afraid since it's mostly been in verbal discussions and I
didn't take notes about any cites they may have provided.
Of course, even as a Religious person, I agree that we have free-will.
Mind you, I really wonder at anybody who believes he lacks free-will
because that means his accomplishments aren't his doing just "outside
forces at work".
Somebody who complains that his failures aren't "his fault" is more
easily understandable (even if I might disagree).
Norm D. Plumber
>On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 04:53:41 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>>That would be our brains.
>>
>>I understand what you're saying but I consider it erroneous.
>>
>>
>>If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
>>electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
>>free-will.
>...
>
>You list a bunch of reasons you reject this on philosophical grounds.
I listed some logical reasons associated with my rejection of the
idea, but logic is not necessarily identical to philosophy.
>Theologians have argued about free will for centuries and it ends up
>not really mattering - we have to act as though we have free will.
Is that like, a law, we'll be punished if we don't pretend to have
something nonexistent? We have to act like it exists even though it
(in that case) doesn't? Required hypocrisy?
>But any rate, whether or not consciousness is purely physical is not
>because we like or reject the implications. The answer isn't based
>upon what we wish, it's based about what it actually is.
So if there is no free-will, we shouldn't act as though there is one,
right?
>So any argument needs to be based upon observations, not comfortable
>philosophies.
So then how do you justify your statement, "we have to act as though
we have free will" if it doesn't exist?
I'll make it easy for you; it does exist, you can accept that it
exists, or accept that you're a hypocrite for behaving as though it
does when in fact it doesn't, as you prefer.
Norm D. Plumber
If you have neither killed yourself nor become a virtual monster that
considers nothing other than his own personal advantage, then I can
conclude that you've either never fully thought through the question
or you've concluded that free-will exists... or as Spock would say,
"You are not logical."
Norm D. Plumber
Those particular gods, if they exist, should go fuck themselves to
death---and if you run into them, please tell them I said so.
Norm D. Plumber
I disagree with that statement.
> What we might
>choose from a menu for example. At the most fundamental level this is
>determined by quantum indeterminacy in the neurons of the brain.
>
>Certainly many of our decisions are influenced by outside forces but
>many aren't.
Many of our decisions are virtually compelled because of the corners
our previous decisions have painted us into, but that doesn't make
them random, it just shows that every free-will decision has
consequences associated with it.
Norm D. Plumber
>On Mar 16, 5:53 am, "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
>> David Johnston <davidjohnsto...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> >On Mar 15, 4:26 am, "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
>> >> Howard Brazee <how...@brazee.net> wrote:
>> >> >On Mon, 14 Mar 2011 14:25:25 -0700 (PDT), Zev <zev_h...@yahoo.com>
>> >> >wrote:
>>
>> >> >>> We do know that messing with brains messes thoughts. We do
>> >> >>> know that brains with different species think differently.
>>
>> >> >>Yes, but that doesn't prove that thought
>> >> >>can or cannot be purely physical.
>>
>> >> >It just indicates that we know there's a physical element. There's
>> >> >no repeatable evidence that it is anything else.
>>
>> >> What is it that knows there's a physical element?
>>
>> >That would be our brains.
>>
>> I understand what you're saying but I consider it erroneous.
>>
>> If consciousness is purely physical, a simple matter of
>> electrochemical interactions, then there is no such thing as
>> free-will.
>
>So are you suggesting that this can't be true simply because the idea
>offends you?
No, although I did attempt to point out that IF there is no such thing
as free-will, THEN all of society is nothing more than a massive
collection of chemicals so nobody should feel the least bit guilty
about anything they "don't choose" to do, since the chemicals caused
it all so it wasn't really a result of their (nonexistent) free-will.
The nonexistence of free-will grants carte-blanche to every living
being because it invalidates the whole concept of "fault", and by so
doing, it invalidates most of our blame-based societies.
If you want to work something out through logic, you need to learn
about "truth tables" and work through all the alternatives in order to
evaluate the situation.
> The truth is whatever it is. The truth doesn't care about
>your feelings.
I agree, nor does it care about yours (whatever those might be).
>Certainly modern physics does not require simple-minded
>Newtonian cause and effect so don't get your diapers all twisted in a
>knot.
I don't think cause-and-effect originated with Newton, I'm pretty sure
that concept was around long before his time.
However, causality is irrelevant to the question of whether or not
free-will exists. In the case of no-free-will, consequences ensue; in
the case of free-will, consequences ensue; causality per-se is
unaffected.
>Maybe you make decisions the way you do because of poor
>information or your poor education or your religious indoctrination.
So instead of simply asking a pointed question, you need to go further
and accuse me of being poorly informed, poorly educated, and a
religious puppet? There's little point in going there, but I suppose
your chemicals made you do it?
Wayne Throop
:: philosophers and such define it, is worth having. I mean, what good
:: is it? Why does it matter if the way the mind functions is physical
:: or not, or predictable or not? It's a most bizarre psychosis, this
:: desiring of "free will".
: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
: If you have neither killed yourself nor become a virtual monster that
: considers nothing other than his own personal advantage, then I can
: conclude that you've either never fully thought through the question
: or you've concluded that free-will exists... or as Spock would say,
: "You are not logical."
It's gibberish like that that makes me hard-put to understand it.
Hypothetically considering (or even concluding for a fact) that
the mind is purely physical is completely independent of any motive
for suicide or monstrous behavior. How the mind is implemented
simply doesn't enter into it. And while you can "conclude" that
I haven't thought it through, I've spent considerable time on it.
And the above certainly doesn't add anything.
And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
trag
> I'm really hard-put to understand why this "free will" stuff,
> as the philosophers and such define it, is worth having.
> I mean, what good is it? Why does it matter if the way the
> mind functions is physical or not, or predictable or not?
> It's a most bizarre psychosis, this desiring of "free will".
Especially because, if we lack free will it doesn't really matter.
We're going to react however we're fated to react and there's nothing
we can do about it one way or the other. We are, by definition,
incapable of altering our behaviour.
And if we do have free will, then great. Carry on.
SkyEyes
> ... or as Spock would say,
> "You are not logical."
It's spelled S-P-A-A-K, Norm.
"Spock" was Dr. Benjamin Spock, a famous baby doctor from the 1950s.
Not the same spelling as the Star Trek character played by Leonard
Nimoy.
Brenda Nelson, A.A.#34
BAAWA Knight of the Golden Litterbox
EAC Professor of Feline Thermometrics and Cat-Herding
skyeyes nine at cox dot net OR
skyeyes nine at yahoo dot com
Christopher A. Lee
wrote:
>On Mar 16, 11:50 am, "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
>
>> ... or as Spock would say,
>> "You are not logical."
>
>It's spelled S-P-A-A-K, Norm.
>
>"Spock" was Dr. Benjamin Spock, a famous baby doctor from the 1950s.
>Not the same spelling as the Star Trek character played by Leonard
>Nimoy.
There was a BBC radio spoof series on Star Trek called Star Terk where
the science officer was Pocks.
There were two captains - Captain Zlog and Captain Zalbert.
Wayne Throop
: specially because, if we lack free will it doesn't really matter.
: we can do about it one way or the other. We are, by definition,
: incapable of altering our behaviour.
:
: And if we do have free will, then great. Carry on.
Well... yeah. But to me, it's more "why would you *want* to act
differently than you're "fated" to act"? By which I mean, why do you
wish your mind would (or could) make a decision other than the one it makes?
What's the point of that?
Sigh. If it helps, consider
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#Compatibilism
If it doesn't, don't.
Bill Snyder
wrote:
>: trag <tr...@io.com>
>: specially because, if we lack free will it doesn't really matter.
>: We're going to react however we're fated to react and there's nothing
>: we can do about it one way or the other. We are, by definition,
>: incapable of altering our behaviour.
>:
>: And if we do have free will, then great. Carry on.
>
>Well... yeah. But to me, it's more "why would you *want* to act
>differently than you're "fated" to act"? By which I mean, why do you
>wish your mind would (or could) make a decision other than the one it makes?
>What's the point of that?
If you don't have free will, there *is* no point; there can't be.
You wish that because you're fated to do so.
--
Bill Snyder [This space unintentionally left blank]
Howard Brazee
wrote:
>And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
>Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
>full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
And Spock was constantly surprised when people acted like people. I
wonder if he was surprised when dogs acted like dogs too. Not very
rational.
huge
> On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 21:40:49 GMT, thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop)
> wrote:
>
>> And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
>> Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
>> full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
>
> And Spock was constantly surprised when people acted like people. I
> wonder if he was surprised when dogs acted like dogs too. Not very
> rational.
>
more complex. She still has blind spots that really do not
exemplify real logic choppers.
--
Not on my time you don't.
William December Starr
thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) said:
> And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
> Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
> full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
But with *gorgeous* raised eyebrows.
-- wds
Wayne Throop
:: you're "fated" to act"? By which I mean, why do you wish your mind
:: would (or could) make a decision other than the one it makes? What's
:: the point of that?
: Bill Snyder <bsn...@airmail.net>
: If you don't have free will, there *is* no point; there can't be.
: You wish that because you're fated to do so.
Which merely shifts the question to one of mechanism. What mechanism
has caused you to wish that. Basically, incompatibilists are very
strange people, imo.
William December Starr
huge <hu...@operamail.com> said:
> The new Spock is Bones' Constance Brennan,
Temperance, not Constance. (Not her birth name. I used to know
what it was, the one time they revealed it, but that's fallen out of
my memory stack.)
> although she's a bit more complex. She still has blind spots that
> really do not exemplify real logic choppers.
I do wish the writers would be more consistent about that aspect of
her character; it varies a lot from episode to episode. (And also
of course there's the elephant in the room: I find it _highly_
non-credible that someone with her blind spots regarding humans
would be a best-selling author of crime fiction. But I guess we
just have to give them that one.)
-- wds
Norm D. Plumber
>:: I'm really hard-put to understand why this "free will" stuff, as the
>:: philosophers and such define it, is worth having. I mean, what good
>:: is it? Why does it matter if the way the mind functions is physical
>:: or not, or predictable or not? It's a most bizarre psychosis, this
>:: desiring of "free will".
>
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: If you have neither killed yourself nor become a virtual monster that
>: considers nothing other than his own personal advantage, then I can
>: conclude that you've either never fully thought through the question
>: or you've concluded that free-will exists... or as Spock would say,
>: "You are not logical."
>
>It's gibberish like that that makes me hard-put to understand it.
Your use of the word "gibberish" is noted.
>Hypothetically considering (or even concluding for a fact) that
>the mind is purely physical is completely independent of any motive
>for suicide or monstrous behavior. How the mind is implemented
>simply doesn't enter into it.
If you presume that the concept of free-will is false, it
implies/means/follows that nobody is any more capable of choice than a
gear is capable of deciding to stop and be crushed by the train
driving it. With no ability to choose, all of ethics and morality
dissolves into meaningless prattle issued for the self-advantage of
the prattlers. As a result there is no reason whatsoever to even
consider the concept of "right" or "wrong" since without free-will
there remains only "must". Realizing that fully, anything other than
being the most efficient of gears toward self-interest is ridiculous,
and one can only choose between the acceptance of a life on the lowest
rung of hell, or putting an end to it... but of course you could not
"choose" in that case since you would have no capacity whatsoever for
"choice".
>And while you can "conclude" that
>I haven't thought it through, I've spent considerable time on it.
>And the above certainly doesn't add anything.
From that I can "conclude" that (a) I wouldn't hire you to program my
computers because you're not very good at the necessary kind of
thinking, or (b) you are not being altogether honest with us (which
includes yourself).
>And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
That simply shows that you recognize the existence of free-will mister
computer programmer guy, whether you choose to admit it or not... you
seem yourself to be a victim of that "most bizarre psychosis"
mentioned at the top of your post.
>Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
>full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
You sneer "illogically" then, with your "gibberish".
Norm D. Plumber
>On Mar 16, 11:50�am, "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
>
>> ... or as Spock would say,
>> "You are not logical."
>
>It's spelled S-P-A-A-K, Norm.
I doubt you learned that from the soundtrack.
Norm D. Plumber
>: trag <tr...@io.com>
>: specially because, if we lack free will it doesn't really matter.
>: We're going to react however we're fated to react and there's nothing
>: we can do about it one way or the other. We are, by definition,
>: incapable of altering our behaviour.
>:
>: And if we do have free will, then great. Carry on.
>
>Well... yeah. But to me, it's more "why would you *want* to act
>differently than you're "fated" to act"? By which I mean, why do you
>wish your mind would (or could) make a decision other than the one it makes?
>What's the point of that?
If there is no free-will then it's compelled/fated behaviour because
that's all it can possibly be, right?
>Sigh. If it helps, consider
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#Compatibilism
>
>If it doesn't, don't.
Their explanation seems... somehow conflicted:
[begin-quote]
"Compatibilists' arguments are that determinism does not matter; what
matters is that an individuals' will are the results of their own
desires and are not overridden by some external force. To be a
compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free
will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will."
[end-quote]
Determinism does matter because it is only physical determinism that
allows us to make any sense of the world's reactions to the inputs of
our free-will.
And it is conceptions of determinism that are really at issue, not
"conceptions" of free-will which is a simple binary and either exists
or not.
Norm D. Plumber
The wikipedia article you posted says,
"To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular
conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds
with free will"
Presumably then, anyone who is not a compatabilist by that definition
would be an incompatabilist, who are the folks you think are "very
strange people"?
I think their [the wikipedia authors'] idea that there can be more
than one "conception of free will" is strange. It seems to me that
free-will is a very simple concept, either it exists in which case we
are capable of deciding for ourselves, or it doesn't exist in which
case all of our apparent decisions are made for us and we're just
along for the ride like any other batch of chemicals.
The issue of determinism is the one that I consider open to more than
one conception. Physical determinism/causality is essential to the
usefulness of free-will. Without physical determinism we could
free-will all day long and never be able to reconcile our choices with
any results seen reflected in a willy-nilly physical world which does
not react in a deterministic/causal fashion.
huge
> In article<ccmdnYYEt-aY8RzQ...@earthlink.com>,
> huge<hu...@operamail.com> said:
>
>> The new Spock is Bones' Constance Brennan,
>
> Temperance, not Constance.
Oh, YES! (Slapping forehead.) Silly me.
> (Not her birth name. I used to know
> what it was, the one time they revealed it, but that's fallen out of
> my memory stack.)
>
>> although she's a bit more complex. She still has blind spots that
>> really do not exemplify real logic choppers.
>
> I do wish the writers would be more consistent about that aspect of
> her character; it varies a lot from episode to episode. (And also
> of course there's the elephant in the room: I find it _highly_
> non-credible that someone with her blind spots regarding humans
> would be a best-selling author of crime fiction. But I guess we
> just have to give them that one.)
Yes.
Wayne Throop
: If you presume that the concept of free-will is false, it
: implies/means/follows that nobody is any more capable of choice than a
: gear is capable of deciding to stop and be crushed by the train
: driving it. With no ability to choose, all of ethics and morality
: dissolves into meaningless prattle issued for the self-advantage of
: the prattlers.
Nonsense. In your analogy ethics and morality would be the teeth on
the gears. Your position is equivalent to supposing that if gears
are putely mechanical, then the teeth and gear ratios are irrelevant.
In short, nonsense.
: As a result there is no reason whatsoever to even consider the concept
: of "right" or "wrong" since without free-will there remains only
: "must".
You might as well claim that if gears are mechanical, the teeth and gear
ratios are irrelevant. Again, nonsense. One of those things that's so
ill-considered that it doesn't even rise to the level of being wrong.
It entirely misses the point.
Wayne Throop
: I think their [the wikipedia authors'] idea that there can be more
: than one "conception of free will" is strange.
You find it strange that words can be defined this way or that way.
I suppose this is unsurprising, if bizarre. My puzzlement is
with why anybody would worry about the incompatibilist version of
free will. Using the term that way is pretty much pointless, naict.
Whether incompatibilist free will exists has no useful consequences.
If it exists, your decisions are made by some ectoplasmic woo-woo voodoo
magic, or whatever it is you think the mind is. If not, your decisions
are made by physical processes. Which is the case matters not a whit;
you still make decisions, and these decisions are still made by your mind.
How much ectoplasm can dance on the head of a pin is of little interest.
: It seems to me that free-will is a very simple concept, either it
: exists in which case we are capable of deciding for ourselves, or it
: doesn't exist in which case all of our apparent decisions are made for
: us
"Made for us", pfft. You just have this peculiar notion that, even if
the mind is hypothetically implemented entirely in physical mechanisms,
that these physical mechanisms are something outside of the mind and
that this means the decisions reached by these mechanisms are somehow
made by some outside agency. You confuse the inside with the outside
for some reason. Bizarre.
trag
> : trag <t...@io.com>
And then my head exploded. I wonder what a compatibilist would say
about that. Probably ask whether it was truly my will for my head to
explode.
Sea Wasp (Ryk E. Spoor)
Someone set you up the bomb!
--
Sea Wasp
/^\
;;;
Website: http://www.grandcentralarena.com Blog:
http://seawasp.livejournal.com
Wayne Throop
:: you're "fated" to act"? By which I mean, why do you wish your
:: mind would (or could) make a decision other than the one it makes?
:: What's the point of that?
:: Sigh. If it helps, consider
:: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will#Compatibilism
:: If it doesn't, don't.
: trag <tr...@io.com>
: And then my head exploded. I wonder what a compatibilist would say
: about that. Probably ask whether it was truly my will for my head to
: explode.
I don't see why a compatibilist is any more likely to wonder that than a
incompatibilist would be. I don't see any reason ectoplasm (or whatever
nondeterminstic woowoo voodoo incompatibilists think the mind had better
be made of) can't make a head explode "by will alone" just as well as a
physical process in the brain. If anything, ectoplasm would seem more
likely to do so. Dangerous stuff, ectoplasm. Always remember
not to cross the streams.
"But won't the 'splodey hurt?" --- Gir
"It is by Caffiene alone I set my mind in motion --
It is by the Beans of Java that thoughts acquire speed --
The hands acquire shakes; the shakes become a warning --
It is by Caffiene alone I set my mind in motion..."
Norm D. Plumber
One of us entirely misses the point but he calls it "nonsense" to make
it easier to pretend he even gets what the point might be.
The point is, if you are not making choices because there is no
free-will, then you can never reasonably be held "wrong" for anything
since you didn't do it, there's no "you" involved, it's just a mass of
chemicals reacting.
Norm D. Plumber
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: I think their [the wikipedia authors'] idea that there can be more
>: than one "conception of free will" is strange.
>
>You find it strange that words can be defined this way or that way.
>I suppose this is unsurprising, if bizarre.
I must have been absent when the dictionary was imprinted at birth,
what I've had to do is read the words and the definitions and apply a
consistency razor to figure out what they must mean if they're to have
any consistent sense at all.
>My puzzlement is
>with why anybody would worry about the incompatibilist version of
>free will. Using the term that way is pretty much pointless, naict.
>Whether incompatibilist free will exists has no useful consequences.
>If it exists, your decisions are made by some ectoplasmic woo-woo voodoo
>magic, or whatever it is you think the mind is. If not, your decisions
>are made by physical processes. Which is the case matters not a whit;
>you still make decisions, and these decisions are still made by your mind.
If it's just physical processes there is no "you" apart from a blob of
chemicals.
>How much ectoplasm can dance on the head of a pin is of little interest.
Don't go all woo-woo on me with this "ectoplasm" stuff.
>: It seems to me that free-will is a very simple concept, either it
>: exists in which case we are capable of deciding for ourselves, or it
>: doesn't exist in which case all of our apparent decisions are made for
>: us
>
>"Made for us", pfft. You just have this peculiar notion that, even if
>the mind is hypothetically implemented entirely in physical mechanisms,
>that these physical mechanisms are something outside of the mind
How can you have it so backwards? If the mind is implemented as a
purely physical mechanism, the being is completely and causally
controlled by external physical impulses.
>and
>that this means the decisions reached by these mechanisms are somehow
>made by some outside agency. You confuse the inside with the outside
>for some reason. Bizarre.
Step way back and think about who's confused here... leave your ego
behind while you do that, if you can.
Bill Snyder
wrote:
>:: But to me, it's more "why would you *want* to act differently than
Presumably the same one that regulates your actions in general --
whatever that's supposed to be; I won't even try to guess.
Wayne Throop
: If it's just physical processes there is no "you" apart from a blob of
: chemicals.
That's an unuseful... no, idiotic, way to define a conscious "you".
If your definition of what it means to be a conscious entity is at
odds with either facts of the matter, or with models of the matter,
the problem is with your definition, and nowhere else.
Norm D. Plumber
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: If it's just physical processes there is no "you" apart from a blob of
>: chemicals.
>
>That's an unuseful... no, idiotic, way to define a conscious "you".
What is unuseful is your continued use of terms like "nonsense" and
"idiotic" to beat back something you don't comprehend.
>If your definition of what it means to be a conscious entity is at
>odds with either facts of the matter, or with models of the matter,
>the problem is with your definition, and nowhere else.
I agree, and I note that my view is not the one that contradicts the
facts.
Wayne Throop
: What is unuseful is your continued use of terms like "nonsense" and
: "idiotic" to beat back something you don't comprehend.
Then enlighten me. What good is it to insist on a definition for
consciousness that conflicts with the hypothesis that the mind is
implemented as physical processes? What does it gain you?
Why are you so fond of it?
:: If your definition of what it means to be a conscious entity is at
:: odds with either facts of the matter, or with models of the matter,
:: the problem is with your definition, and nowhere else.
: I agree, and I note that my view is not the one that contradicts the facts.
You've neglected to mention in what way the notion that minds
are physical processes conflicts with the facts.
You've also neglected "or models". So in fact you don't agree.
For some reason, you've decided that it's so taboo that the mind
might be a physical process, that you let the tail wag the dog and
insist on *defining* the mind in a way that's incompatible with it.
Rather than taking it for granted that minds exist, and making your
definitions fit. You'd rather cut off your mind to spite your brain,
than even entertain the possibility. Prejudice, pure and simple.
Oh, and of course your position does seem to contradict the heuristic
of occam's razor; it's consistent with the facts by multiplying
entities needlessly.
"You don't think my theory holds water?"
"A bathtub will hold warer. A canteen usually sufffices."
--- Michaelmas and Domino
Norm D. Plumber
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: What is unuseful is your continued use of terms like "nonsense" and
>: "idiotic" to beat back something you don't comprehend.
>
>Then enlighten me.
I can attempt to lead you through some logic but I can't force you to
accept it, or even guarantee that you'll understand it. In fact I
doubt that you will understand it since I've already written it down
several times and you appear not to have understood it before.
>What good is it to insist on a definition for
>consciousness that conflicts with the hypothesis that the mind is
>implemented as physical processes?
Assume that we do accept the hypothesis that the mind is a purely
physical mechanism. If our hypothesis is true, certain things follow.
It follows directly from our hypothesis that the mind, as a purely
physical object, is compelled by physical causality alone. Free-will
has been invalidated, the mind simply reacts to environmental
requirements as would any other physical mechanism, there is no
associated entity to exercise free-will.
Without the existence of free-will (which our hypothesis invalidates)
it follows directly that the blame-based concepts of ethics and
morality are attempts to blame a physical mechanism which had no
control whatsoever over its own actions, and are thus invalid and
ridiculous concepts.
Given that the mechanism is unconstrained by ethics and morality, the
optimization of survival demands that the mechanism act only on the
basis of maximum perceived self-interest.
Since the concepts of ethics and morality have been discarded as
inapplicable to machinery, the individual can take any action it
perceives to be in its own self-interest, without blame. There is
nobody to blame, it's simply a machine doing whatever its environment
caused it to do.
Therefore the hypothesis that the mind is a purely physical object
directly implies that there is nothing wrong with eating babies if
that's what you perceive that you should do. Criminals should not be
blamed but simply released as faultless (the chemicals made them do
it), or perhaps destroyed as being inconvenient components within the
larger mechanism we call society since they have shown by being
arrested and convicted (though they were not at fault) that they
represent mechanisms that are suitable for selection out of the
environment. Tort law should be abandoned as risible since there is
no concept of fault once you've invalidated the concept of free-will
by accepting the hypothesis that the mind is purely physical.
Et cetera and so on. Those are all direct implications of the
hypothesis that the mind is purely physical.
>What does it gain you? Why are you so fond of it?
If the direct logical descendants of a hypothesis are ridiculous or
unacceptable then perhaps the hypothesis from which they stem is
equally ridiculous or unacceptable. I think that's called "reducto ad
absurdum".
>:: If your definition of what it means to be a conscious entity is at
>:: odds with either facts of the matter, or with models of the matter,
>:: the problem is with your definition, and nowhere else.
>
>: I agree, and I note that my view is not the one that contradicts the facts.
>
>You've neglected to mention in what way the notion that minds
>are physical processes conflicts with the facts.
The facts being that we find it "wrong" when people eat our babies,
and that great multitudes of lawyers and associated hangers-on
actually do make their livings by assigning blame, for example?
>You've also neglected "or models". So in fact you don't agree.
Sorry but I'm not sure where the "or models" you refer to should
apply, or what you think "in fact you don't agree" means.
I assert that free-will exists, that there exists something more than
a purely physical mechanism, and that there is something which
represents "mind" as different from "brain". That doesn't mean I can
define it in 20-words-or-less.
>For some reason, you've decided that it's so taboo that the mind
>might be a physical process,
I druther not have people going around eating babies just because it
suits them, yeah, I consider that pretty taboo.
> that you let the tail wag the dog and
>insist on *defining* the mind in a way that's incompatible with it.
Actually I considered the possibility of "purely physical mind" and
constructed a reducto-ad-absurdum proof of its fallacy.
>Rather than taking it for granted that minds exist, and making your
>definitions fit. You'd rather cut off your mind to spite your brain,
>than even entertain the possibility. Prejudice, pure and simple.
Sorry, you've lost me there.
>Oh, and of course your position does seem to contradict the heuristic
>of occam's razor; it's consistent with the facts by multiplying
>entities needlessly.
Occam's Razor was set forth by a Franciscan priest. I am no more
obliged to select for simplicity in favor of consistency than I am
required to accept any of his other beliefs.
huge
Whoah! Are you saying that the _FACTS_ are dependent on whether
we 'gain' something from them? Should we then continue from now
on to _pretend_ the facts are untrue if the facts don't suit our
wishes?
>
> If the direct logical descendants of a hypothesis are
> ridiculous or unacceptable then perhaps the hypothesis from
> which they stem is equally ridiculous or unacceptable. I
> think that's called "reducto ad absurdum".
Reductio may apply if a _premise_ (not "descendant") is untrue,
but being simply "unacceptable" can never lead to reductio.
Only a _false_ premise can cause that.
Example:
Premises:
1) A ⊃ ~B
2) A
3) B
Conclusions:
______________
~B (by 1 and 2)
B (by 3) ------
Reductio, because there cannot be both B and ~B.
--
Michael Stemper
>On 03/16/2011 08:54 PM, Howard Brazee wrote:
>> On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 21:40:49 GMT, thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:
>>> And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
>>> Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
>>> full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
>>
>> And Spock was constantly surprised when people acted like people. I
>> wonder if he was surprised when dogs acted like dogs too. Not very
>> rational.
>>
>The new Spock is Bones' Constance Brennan, although she's a bit
I think that, in an SF newsgroup, using "Spock" and "Bones" in such
close proximity should include some disambiguation. At least, if it's
not intended to refer to Leonard McCoy.
--
Michael F. Stemper
#include <Standard_Disclaimer>
Outside of a dog, a book is man's best friend.
Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read.
huge
> In article<ccmdnYYEt-aY8RzQ...@earthlink.com>, huge<hu...@operamail.com> writes:
>> On 03/16/2011 08:54 PM, Howard Brazee wrote:
>>> On Wed, 16 Mar 2011 21:40:49 GMT, thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:
>
>>>> And yes, I am not logical, in the spockian sense.
>>>> Which is a good thing, since spockian "logic" is mere caricature,
>>>> full of pretense and sneering, signifying nothing.
>>>
>>> And Spock was constantly surprised when people acted like people. I
>>> wonder if he was surprised when dogs acted like dogs too. Not very
>>> rational.
>>>
>> The new Spock is Bones' Constance Brennan, although she's a bit
>
> I think that, in an SF newsgroup, using "Spock" and "Bones" in such
> close proximity should include some disambiguation. At least, if it's
> not intended to refer to Leonard McCoy.
>
Norm D. Plumber
>On 03/18/2011 06:55 AM, Norm D. Plumber wrote:
>> If the direct logical descendants of a hypothesis are
>> ridiculous or unacceptable then perhaps the hypothesis from
>> which they stem is equally ridiculous or unacceptable. I
>> think that's called "reducto ad absurdum".
>
>Reductio may apply if a _premise_ (not "descendant") is untrue,
>but being simply "unacceptable" can never lead to reductio.
>Only a _false_ premise can cause that.
>
>Example:
>Premises:
>1) A ? ~B
>2) A
>3) B
>Conclusions:
>______________
>~B (by 1 and 2)
>B (by 3) ------
>Reductio, because there cannot be both B and ~B.
Despite the terminology, if a descendant implication is inescapable
given the premise, I'd say that there's a certain equivalency
involved.
huge
What precisely is a "descendant" implication, in your mind?
Norm D. Plumber
One that is both obvious and inescapable.
For example, if the mind is a purely physical mechanism it can do
nothing other than react in accordance with the laws of physics, thus
it cannot have free-will.
Basically the idea of a purely physical mechanism "choosing" to decide
in some way other than that which the laws of physics dictate is
self-contradictory.
If a premise gives rise to a necessary but self-contradictory
implication it can hardly be more true than the implication which is
the same as not true at all.
For all I know there's some specific name for that, but I can meet
someone named Bill and within a minute call him Fred, go figure.
Kadaitcha Man
> thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:
>
>> : "Norm D. Plumber"<nom-de...@non.com>
>> : What is unuseful is your continued use of terms like "nonsense" and
>> : "idiotic" to beat back something you don't comprehend.
>>
>> Then enlighten me.
>
> I can attempt to lead you through some logic but I can't force you to
> accept it, or even guarantee that you'll understand it. In fact I
> doubt that you will understand it since I've already written it down
> several times and you appear not to have understood it before.
Throop never has been the brightest light bulb on the Christmas tree.
>> What good is it to insist on a definition for
>> consciousness that conflicts with the hypothesis that the mind is
>> implemented as physical processes?
>
> Assume that we do accept the hypothesis that the mind is a purely
> physical mechanism. If our hypothesis is true, certain things follow.
It isn't true.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110202132617.htm
[QUOTE]
ScienceDaily (Feb. 7, 2011) � The brain -- awake and sleeping -- is
awash in electrical activity, and not just from the individual pings of
single neurons communicating with each other. In fact, the brain is
enveloped in countless overlapping electric fields, generated by the
neural circuits of scores of communicating neurons. The fields were once
thought to be an "epiphenomenon, a 'bug' of sorts, occurring during
neural communication," says neuroscientist Costas Anastassiou, a
postdoctoral scholar in biology at the California Institute of
Technology (Caltech).
[...]
"In other words," says Anastassiou, the lead author of a paper about the
work appearing in the journal Nature Neuroscience, "while active neurons
give rise to extracellular fields, the same fields feed back to the
neurons and alter their behavior," even though the neurons are not
physically connected -- a phenomenon known as ephaptic coupling. "So
far, neural communication has been thought to occur at localized
machines, termed synapses.
[...]
"Increased spike-field coherency may substantially enhance the amount of
information transmitted between neurons as well as increase its
reliability. Moreover, it has been long known that brain activity
patterns related to memory and navigation give rise to a robust LFP and
enhanced spike-field coherency. We believe ephaptic coupling does not
have one major effect, but instead contributes on many levels during
intense brain processing."
[/QUOTE]
The monistic flatbrain theory of reductionists and functionalists is
dead, as is the absurd zombie of the inessentialist. The discovery of
cross-cortical spike-field coherence and ephaptic coupling could end up
being one of the greatest breakthroughs in the entire history of science.
Feynman also produced a paper proving that computers could never
simulate contemporary physics.
Feynman R., �Simulating physics with computers�,
International Journal of Theoretical Physics, Vol 21, 1982
http://www.pdfebooksdownloads.com/feynman-physics.html
The upshot is that if the brain contains one single quantum component
then computers cannot ever simulate the brain. It is known that calcium
ions shoot across synapses, but ions do not merely pass from one synapse
to another, they go into quantum superposition and simultaneously pass
and do not pass at the same time. This means then that the mind, unlike
the brain, cannot be not a physical machine.
The sad part is, there are a plethora of nitwits who believe all this to
be outright bullshit. However I find it highly implausible that the
likes of Bohr, Planck, Mme Curie, Lorentz, Einstein, Langevin,
Schr�dinger, Born, Pauli, Heisenberg, Dirac, Piccard, Brillouin, Debye,
de Broglie, et al, gathered at Solvay, Belgium, in 1927 in order to ruin
their collective careers.
See the work of Casey Blood PhD, Professor Emeritus of Physics at Rugers:
http://implications-of-quantum-mechanics.com/qm40_quantum-mechanics-brain-free-will.html
http://implications-of-quantum-mechanics.com/qm29_mind-mind-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics.html
Turing listed at least nine reasons why machines can never think, and
Daniel Dennett, one of the most virulent flatbrainers there is, argues
against machines ever being able to have conscious minds in Cog: Steps
Toward Consciousness in Robots (http://philpapers.org/rec/DENCST).
> It follows directly from our hypothesis that the mind, as a purely
> physical object, is compelled by physical causality alone. Free-will
> has been invalidated, the mind simply reacts to environmental
> requirements as would any other physical mechanism, there is no
> associated entity to exercise free-will.
<hackage>
Very well thought-out argument.
> Et cetera and so on. Those are all direct implications of the
> hypothesis that the mind is purely physical.
It's worse than that. Proponents of a purely physical model of the mind
cannot account for subjectivity arising out of objectivity.
> I assert that free-will exists, that there exists something more than
> a purely physical mechanism, and that there is something which
> represents "mind" as different from "brain". That doesn't mean I can
> define it in 20-words-or-less.
David Chalmer's thought experiment supports the idea that dualism is true.
Consider that there are creatures who are controlled by their minds and
that the minds remain strictly external to the creatures' brains. The
creatures have the capability to perform all the science they want to
perform, but they will never be able to figure out where their minds are
because their minds do not exist in the creatures' observable universe.
<more hackage of good argument>
>> Oh, and of course your position does seem to contradict the heuristic
>> of occam's razor; it's consistent with the facts by multiplying
>> entities needlessly.
>
> Occam's Razor was set forth by a Franciscan priest. I am no more
> obliged to select for simplicity in favor of consistency than I am
> required to accept any of his other beliefs.
Throop doesn't know how Occam's Razor works.
Q: Does property A explain X?
A: No. The theorem is incomplete. Add property B.
Q: Do properties A + B explain X?
A: No. The theorem is incomplete. Add property C.
Q: Do properties A + B + C explain X?
A: Yes. The theorem is complete.
Adding property D to explain X will violate the parsimony principle.
--
Official Overseer of Kooks and Trolls in alt.atheism.
Official Overseer of Kooks and Trolls in 24hoursupport.helpdesk.
alt.atheism atheist to Kadaitcha Man:
"Imagine if I were to suggest "I have a prehensile tail". You
would, naturally, ask for evidence."
Kadaitcha Man in reply to alt.atheism atheist:
"Not at all. I would unquestionably accept your admission to being
a monkey."
"K-Man's particular genius, however, lies not merely in his humour,
but his ability to make posters who had previously seemed reasonably
well-balanced turn into foaming, frothing, death threat-uttering
maniacs" - Snarky, Demon Lord of Confusion
huge
This is true for many traditional ideas of free will.
But take a look here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKLAbWFCh1E
The situation may be a bit more complicated than you think,
if you have 6.5 minutes to challenge your own beliefs.
>
> If a premise gives rise to a necessary but self-contradictory
> implication it can hardly be more true than the implication which is
> the same as not true at all.
Yes, but if we don't have free will it would be merely
undesirable, not contradictory.
>
> For all I know there's some specific name for that, but I can meet
> someone named Bill and within a minute call him Fred, go figure.
>
--
Norm D. Plumber
How many ideas of free-will can there be? Complete determinism or
free-will. You have the ability to choose, or you don't. It's
binary.
Of course if you don't have it, you'll be given to think whatever
physical causality imposes.
>But take a look here:
>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKLAbWFCh1E
>
>The situation may be a bit more complicated than you think,
>if you have 6.5 minutes to challenge your own beliefs.
Sorry, I simply don't do youtube.
>> If a premise gives rise to a necessary but self-contradictory
>> implication it can hardly be more true than the implication which is
>> the same as not true at all.
>
>Yes, but if we don't have free will it would be merely
>undesirable, not contradictory.
If we don't have free-will the idea of desirability goes out the
window--we would desire what we were given to desire by physical
causality, it's as irrelevant as the ambient temperature since there's
nobody to care one way or the other.
Norm D. Plumber
<hairless.or...@alt.diseases.narrow-mighty-monkey> wrote:
>Norm D. Plumber <nom-de...@non.com> confabulated:
>
>> thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:
>>
>>> : "Norm D. Plumber"<nom-de...@non.com>
>>> : What is unuseful is your continued use of terms like "nonsense" and
>>> : "idiotic" to beat back something you don't comprehend.
>>>
>>> Then enlighten me.
>>
>> I can attempt to lead you through some logic but I can't force you to
>> accept it, or even guarantee that you'll understand it. In fact I
>> doubt that you will understand it since I've already written it down
>> several times and you appear not to have understood it before.
>
>Throop never has been the brightest light bulb on the Christmas tree.
I choose not to be involved with whatever pissing-match is ongoing
between you and wt.
>>> What good is it to insist on a definition for
>>> consciousness that conflicts with the hypothesis that the mind is
>>> implemented as physical processes?
>>
>> Assume that we do accept the hypothesis that the mind is a purely
>> physical mechanism. If our hypothesis is true, certain things follow.
>
>It isn't true.
>
>http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110202132617.htm
>
>[QUOTE]
>ScienceDaily (Feb. 7, 2011) ? The brain -- awake and sleeping -- is
>awash in electrical activity, and not just from the individual pings of
>single neurons communicating with each other. In fact, the brain is
>enveloped in countless overlapping electric fields, generated by the
>neural circuits of scores of communicating neurons. The fields were once
>thought to be an "epiphenomenon, a 'bug' of sorts, occurring during
>neural communication," says neuroscientist Costas Anastassiou, a
>postdoctoral scholar in biology at the California Institute of
>Technology (Caltech).
Like what, I'm supposed to be impressed by what some postdoctoral
student says?
>[...]
>
>"In other words," says Anastassiou, the lead author of a paper about the
>work appearing in the journal Nature Neuroscience, "while active neurons
>give rise to extracellular fields, the same fields feed back to the
>neurons and alter their behavior," even though the neurons are not
>physically connected -- a phenomenon known as ephaptic coupling. "So
>far, neural communication has been thought to occur at localized
>machines, termed synapses.
No matter what the system, you can only eliminate feedback by
eliminating the system.
>[...]
>
>"Increased spike-field coherency may substantially enhance the amount of
>information transmitted between neurons as well as increase its
>reliability. Moreover, it has been long known that brain activity
>patterns related to memory and navigation give rise to a robust LFP and
>enhanced spike-field coherency. We believe ephaptic coupling does not
>have one major effect, but instead contributes on many levels during
>intense brain processing."
>[/QUOTE]
"We believe" is what I expect to hear at the local Baptist church.
>The monistic flatbrain theory of reductionists and functionalists is
>dead, as is the absurd zombie of the inessentialist. The discovery of
>cross-cortical spike-field coherence and ephaptic coupling could end up
>being one of the greatest breakthroughs in the entire history of science.
>
>Feynman also produced a paper proving that computers could never
>simulate contemporary physics.
>
>Feynman R., ?Simulating physics with computers?,
>International Journal of Theoretical Physics, Vol 21, 1982
>
>http://www.pdfebooksdownloads.com/feynman-physics.html
>
>The upshot is that if the brain contains one single quantum component
>then computers cannot ever simulate the brain. It is known that calcium
>ions shoot across synapses, but ions do not merely pass from one synapse
>to another, they go into quantum superposition and simultaneously pass
>and do not pass at the same time. This means then that the mind, unlike
>the brain, cannot be not a physical machine.
>
>The sad part is, there are a plethora of nitwits who believe all this to
>be outright bullshit. However I find it highly implausible that the
>likes of Bohr, Planck, Mme Curie, Lorentz, Einstein, Langevin,
>Schr?dinger, Born, Pauli, Heisenberg, Dirac, Piccard, Brillouin, Debye,
Depending on what is meant by "dualism" I might consider it true or
not true; generally speaking, what appears to be dualism is no more
than unrecognized integration on a higher level.
>Consider that there are creatures who are controlled by their minds and
>that the minds remain strictly external to the creatures' brains. The
>creatures have the capability to perform all the science they want to
>perform, but they will never be able to figure out where their minds are
>because their minds do not exist in the creatures' observable universe.
>
><more hackage of good argument>
>
>>> Oh, and of course your position does seem to contradict the heuristic
>>> of occam's razor; it's consistent with the facts by multiplying
>>> entities needlessly.
>>
>> Occam's Razor was set forth by a Franciscan priest. I am no more
>> obliged to select for simplicity in favor of consistency than I am
>> required to accept any of his other beliefs.
>
>Throop doesn't know how Occam's Razor works.
>
>Q: Does property A explain X?
>
>A: No. The theorem is incomplete. Add property B.
>
>Q: Do properties A + B explain X?
>
>A: No. The theorem is incomplete. Add property C.
>
>Q: Do properties A + B + C explain X?
>
>A: Yes. The theorem is complete.
>
>Adding property D to explain X will violate the parsimony principle.
Consistency trumps simplicity every time, in fact it's a pre-requisite
for useful simplicity.
TehGhodTrole
Then you won't mind blowing a hole in the side of your head with a .44
magnum, will you?
--
Trolling, for God's sake
Wayne Throop
: Whoah! Are you saying that the _FACTS_ are dependent on whether we
: 'gain' something from them?
No.
Wayne Throop
: It follows directly from our hypothesis that the mind, as a purely
: physical object, is compelled by physical causality alone.
That you characterize the (hypothetical) nornal operation
of the mind as being "compelled" is part and parcel of the
peculiar taboo you're so fond of.
Norm D. Plumber
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: It follows directly from our hypothesis that the mind, as a purely
>: physical object, is compelled by physical causality alone.
>
>That you characterize the (hypothetical) nornal operation
>of the mind as being "compelled" is part and parcel of the
>peculiar taboo you're so fond of.
Physical causality compels, that's what it does for a living, and a
mind that amounts to an object directed solely by physical causality
is nothing more than a robot zombie that has no free-will with which
to resist its asslamination. Compelled, forced, required by physics,
driven by electrochemical interaction, pick the soothing terminology
that best comforts you but it's a machine and no more, apply voltage
and it twitches, end of story.
You're so afraid to even *consider* the alternative to mind as a
purely physical mechanism that you're using the time-honored usenet
technique of applying a sideways ad-hom that suggests there's
something wrong with me because of a strawman taboo you've made up
thus my logic must be incorrect.
What are you so afraid of, do you think that the only alternative to
the idea of the mind as a purely physical construct is some half-assed
God-daddy who's doing a demonstrably for-shit job of running the
universe?
I don't think so, God is an optional anthropomorphic concept that is
not required.
Please either put forth some cogent discussion or not, but stop
wasting my time with your backpedalling "taboo" accusations; the
premise leads where it leads whether you like it or not. I take the
fact that you have not bothered to point out flaws in the logic I
posted but rather commented about some "taboo" to be an indication
that you have nothing whatsoever with which to actually rebut the
logic but the idea of the "hypothetical" being false scares you
shitless enough to try and run me out of the discussion. "Taboo" my
ass.
Wayne Throop
: Physical causality compels, that's what it does for a living,
You are still characterizing "comes to a conclusion with no outside
influence" to be "coersion". Possibly because for some reason, you seem
to think the causality involved is somehow external, and are counting
it somehow as an ourside influence. Which is just bizarre.
Geez, it's almost as if you were compelled to hold tightly
to these peculiar viewpoints. With no mental flexibility at all.
Howard Brazee
<nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>Physical causality compels, that's what it does for a living, and a
>mind that amounts to an object directed solely by physical causality
>is nothing more than a robot zombie that has no free-will with which
>to resist its asslamination. Compelled, forced, required by physics,
>driven by electrochemical interaction, pick the soothing terminology
>that best comforts you but it's a machine and no more, apply voltage
>and it twitches, end of story.
How is it any different from non-physical casualty?
>You're so afraid to even *consider* the alternative to mind as a
>purely physical mechanism that you're using the time-honored usenet
>technique of applying a sideways ad-hom that suggests there's
>something wrong with me because of a strawman taboo you've made up
>thus my logic must be incorrect.
In this argument, the question is - how does assuming a non-physical
soul make a difference? We see that theologians using your
assumption have argued without coming to a conclusion. Unless you
can demonstrate that your alternative explanation is non-casual, your
argument doesn't support your desired conclusion.
We do know that we can change a brain with a resulting change in
personality. We haven't observed anything to conclude anything as to
how souls work.
--
"In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found,
than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace
to the legislature, and not to the executive department."
- James Madison
Kadaitcha Man
> On 03/18/2011 07:58 AM, Norm D. Plumber wrote:
>> For example, if the mind is a purely physical mechanism it can do
>> nothing other than react in accordance with the laws of physics, thus
>> it cannot have free-will.
>>
>> Basically the idea of a purely physical mechanism "choosing" to decide
>> in some way other than that which the laws of physics dictate is
>> self-contradictory.
>
> This is true for many traditional ideas of free will.
>
> But take a look here:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKLAbWFCh1E
>
> The situation may be a bit more complicated than you think,
> if you have 6.5 minutes to challenge your own beliefs.
You mean almost one and a half hours, yes?
At 14 minutes Dennett starts playing with semantics. It's obvious what's
coming.
At 22 minutes he engages in his first of many semantic fact swaps.
At 23 minutes he sets up a very subtle straw man by removing statistical
probability from quantum indeterminism, and he has the cheek to say that
this "gives a clear sense of what quantum indeterminism is". Not two
sentences later he sets up a false juxtaposition between his neutered
version of quantum indeterminacy and Van Ingwagen's "exactly one
physically possible future"
(http://www.springerlink.com/content/u668450132511285) and
(http://philpapers.org/rec/VANMRD)
The Journal of Ethics
Volume 3, Number 4, 343-351, DOI: 10.1023/A:1009832417573
Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise -
Peter van Inwagen
At 26 minutes he states the absolutely bleeding obvious; you can't
change the future, you can only change what is anticipated to be in the
future.
At 27 minutes he states his claim, "Determinism does not imply
inevitability." It is at this instant where it realised he is plugging
his "Freedom Evolves" book[1]:
http://www.amazon.com/Freedom-Evolves-Daniel-C-Dennett/dp/0670031860
At some point towards the end he surreptitiously introduces gods and
magic then draws his conclusions, which appear to be hidden agendas to
support his "Freedom Evolves" claims that his materialist beliefs are
true, his belief that humans are evolved machines is true, and that his
belief there is nothing more to the mind than the brain is also true.
In summary, the unwary observer would be swept up in his breathless
philosophy, distracted by his tortuous twists of metaphor and meaning,
and will be left with absolutely no basis whatsoever from where his
claims can be argued against; tricked by word magick. Is that what
happened to you, k0oKy?
And where is the 6.5 minutes that will allegedly challenge one's own
beliefs? Hmmm?
[1] "The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett�s
Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic
universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be
said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that
on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a
serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is
argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations
than they can really bear, it can deliver only a significantly qualified
version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. Moreover, the new
argument depends upon an intermediate conclusion which, on the face of
it, looks to be self-contradictory. Dennett is able to avoid the
appearance of self-contradiction only by utilising a possible-worlds
framework for the understanding of �could have done otherwise�
judgements which is argued to be unsatisfactory..."
http://www.springerlink.com/content/d7776xv2327kx170/
Philosophical Studies
Volume 130, Number 3, 535-563, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-004-5955-x
Determinism and Inevitability - H. C. Steward
Wayne Throop
:: mind that amounts to an object directed solely by physical causality
:: is nothing more than a robot zombie that has no free-will with which
:: to resist its asslamination. Compelled, forced, required by physics,
:: driven by electrochemical interaction, pick the soothing terminology
:: that best comforts you but it's a machine and no more, apply voltage
:: and it twitches, end of story.
: Howard Brazee <how...@brazee.net>
: How is it any different from non-physical casualty?
IMO it's more interesting that this makes much the same attempt at an
intuition pump as Searle and the chinese room. In saying "it's just
a machine", you get to sweep the actual complexity under the rug, much
like Searle sweeps the actual complexity of an AI program under the rug
by imagining a human operating it.
It's "just" a machine, so all your intuitions about things like levers,
screws, and maybe even things as complex as wristwatches, are appealed to.
It's "just" a set of written rules, so all your intuitions about looking
things up in tables and performing simple actions are appealed to.
I mean, obviously nothing like what you experience subjectively while
thinking, is it? Must be nobody home in there, just an automaton.
But of course, it's really a bit of cognitive prestidigitation. Pay no
attention to the complex structures behind the verbal curtain.
For example, use the "apply voltage, it twitches, end of story" to support
the "blame is irrelevant" (because, after all, to "blame" an oblivious
light switch or thermostat is completely silly). But functionally,
blame is a social interaction; a physical thing. If the entity you are
blaming is (unlike a twitching muscle fiber) complex enough to respond to
social interactions, then the intuition pump evoking galvanic reactions
of frog legs is really a bit of a fraud.
There's a smooth progression from the simple to the complex embodied
in embryogenesis. Where does all the nonphysical mysterious ectoplasm
get injected into the process? What reason to suspect anything but
physical processes? And what reason to insist on definitions for
"mind" and "consciousness" and "will" that require something beyond
physical processes? What are you trying to explain with all the
(seemingly superfluous) non-physical ectoplasm?
Norm D. Plumber
>: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
>: Physical causality compels, that's what it does for a living,
>
>You are still characterizing "comes to a conclusion with no outside
>influence" to be "coersion".
Holy schneikes, are we on the same planet here?
A purely physical mind acts only based on outside influences, it has
no free-will, it is a machine that can only react to external physical
impetus; if it appears to be acting on anything internal that is
solely a result of previous external inputs as determined by physical
causality, aka "the laws of physics". Because it is purely physical
there is nothing and nobody inside except the machinery of its
implementation.
> Possibly because for some reason, you seem
>to think the causality involved is somehow external, and are counting
>it somehow as an ourside influence. Which is just bizarre.
>
>Geez, it's almost as if you were compelled to hold tightly
>to these peculiar viewpoints. With no mental flexibility at all.
You need to summon up enough "mental flexibility" to figure out what a
"purely physical mind" amounts to, podner. Until you're able to at
least recognize what's being said, you might as well go peel some
taters.
TehGhodTrole
There is no mental flexibility if the mind is purely physical. You may
as well be a discredited p-zombie, you stupid linuxfuck.
> Wayne Throop thr...@sheol.org http://sheol.org/throopw
--
Norm D. Plumber
>On Fri, 18 Mar 2011 13:52:47 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>Physical causality compels, that's what it does for a living, and a
>>mind that amounts to an object directed solely by physical causality
>>is nothing more than a robot zombie that has no free-will with which
>>to resist its asslamination. Compelled, forced, required by physics,
>>driven by electrochemical interaction, pick the soothing terminology
>>that best comforts you but it's a machine and no more, apply voltage
>>and it twitches, end of story.
>
>How is it any different from non-physical casualty?
In other words, how are the "laws of physics" (ie, physical causality)
different from the process of occurrence ("causality in the nude")?
I sense that we're too far apart here for a good answer to be possible
in one post.
To make a very long answer much shorter than it should be, the laws of
physics (which I've been referring to as "physical causality") are
subject to a phenomenon generally called "random chance" by those who
have not realized that it is a non-random part of the more general
process of occurrence.
>>You're so afraid to even *consider* the alternative to mind as a
>>purely physical mechanism that you're using the time-honored usenet
>>technique of applying a sideways ad-hom that suggests there's
>>something wrong with me because of a strawman taboo you've made up
>>thus my logic must be incorrect.
>
>In this argument, the question is - how does assuming a non-physical
>soul make a difference?
Here's the original question, but I have no idea who posted it:
>>>>My question is: what does thought come from?
>>>>Can it be purely physical?
If I'm not mistaken you are the first to introduce the term "soul",
the question was about the implications of thought being purely
physical.
I've been using the term "mind" to represent "that which thinks", and
perhaps I've used the term "brain" to represent the physical organ
where thinking seems to be done (at least in part), but the term
"soul" is new to the discussion. There are many views on what the
word "soul" means so maybe you need to define it if you want to talk
about it[a].
> We see that theologians using your
>assumption have argued without coming to a conclusion.
What does "your assumption" mean? The hypothesis under consideration
is that "thought is a purely physical phenomenon".
MY assumptions are probably least clear to me, but my assertion is
that free-will does exist therefore thought is not purely physical.
> Unless you
>can demonstrate that your alternative explanation is non-casual, your
>argument doesn't support your desired conclusion.
1. Values of "demonstrate" can vary significantly.
2. What is this "my alternative explanation" to which you refer?
3. Nothing is non-causal, though causality is aphysical[b].
4. What is my desired conclusion?
5. What argument of mine doesn't support my "desired conclusion" and
why?
>We do know that we can change a brain with a resulting change in
>personality.
Indeed, as a very young fellow I was quite convinced that drugs were
simply a matter of mind meeting expecation... until the first time I
got hugely stoned. Chemicals can affect our thinking. Temporarily,
anyway. Although they often effect changes in our behaviour, that is
not necessarily the case.
>We haven't observed anything to conclude anything as to
>how souls work.
Taking it upon myself to substitute the term "essential-nature" for
your word "soul" then I would opine that ideally they work[c] less
than nearly anything else.
[a] In reference to other than "soul food" or "soul music".
[b] Not constrained to or limited by the physical universe (which is
only the portion of reality that is manifest).
[c] In the sense of applying effort in order to accomplish.
Norm D. Plumber
ailing ringpiece begs for weak chocolate-eye for masterful fellatio.
If you'd like to try a crass couch hockey for one, then email me at
mailto:nom-de...@non.com.
Norm D. Plumber
/O/af.
/R/attling
/M/ouse who likes
/D/isgusting
/./
/P/ile driving with
/L/adies-for-hire.
/U/lcerous
/M/annified-lesbian who likes
/B/lood-thirsty
/E/arth-tremblers with
/R/ed-lighters.
Norm D. Plumber
Perhaps I ought to apologize for my presentation. Having dealt with
digital computers on a daily basis as a software developer for over 40
years, my concept of "just a machine" might be somewhat different from
that of the average layman. The machines I work with are exceedingly
complex, yet they are just machines. They are required by the laws of
physics to work as instructed[1]. Even if they are complex networks
of multiprocessors they are simply machines that work because of the
way electricity and conductors and semiconductors and all the other
details make them work.
It is fairly easy to implement a machine that mimics intelligence, but
as far as I know no true artificial intelligence has yet been created
even though the art of mimicry has advanced significantly since Eliza.
>There's a smooth progression from the simple to the complex embodied
>in embryogenesis. Where does all the nonphysical mysterious ectoplasm
>get injected into the process?
Friend Wayne, it is you alone who has injected "mysterious ectoplasm"
into the discussion.
>What reason to suspect anything but physical processes?
What reason to cling to the magical concept of "random chance" in
order to pretend that the specifics of theory have been validated?
>And what reason to insist on definitions for
>"mind" and "consciousness" and "will" that require something beyond
>physical processes?
What reason to cling to the belief that the physical universe
comprises all that is real? It is only the physical portion of all
that is real, the part of reality that is physically manifest.
>What are you trying to explain with all the
>(seemingly superfluous) non-physical ectoplasm?
Since it is you who has introduced "ectoplasm" into the discussion
that is a question I would look to you to answer.
[1] Except of course when the hardware malfunctions because of random
chance[2] or the software malfunctions because of programmer error.
[2] According to "modern science" (or something that resembles that
phrase) "random chance" is a magical thing that "just happens" once in
a while. It isn't magical or random, but that's beside the point.
Norm D. Plumber
Pewhapth I ought to apowogithe fow my pwethentation. Hafing deawt
with digitaw komputewth on a daiwy bathith ath a thoftwawe defewopew
fow ofew 40 yeawth, my kwonthpt of "yuft a makhine" might be thomewhat
diffewent fwom that of the afewage wayman. The makhineth I wowk with
awe ektheedingwy kompwekth, yet they awe yuft makhineth. They awe
wequiwed by the wawth of fythith to wowk ath inftwukted[1]. Efen if
they awe kompwekth netwowkth of muwtipwothethowth they awe thimpwy
makhineth that wowk bekawthe of the way ewektwithity and konduktowth
and themikonduktowth and aww the othew detaiwth make them wowk.
It ith faiwwy eathy to impwement a makhine that mimith intewwigenthe,
but ath faw ath I know no twue awtifithiaw intewwigenthe hath yet been
kweated efen though the awt of mimikwy hath adfanthed thignifikantwy
thinthe Ewitha.
>There's a smooth progression from the simple to the complex embodied
>in embryogenesis. Where does all the nonphysical mysterious ectoplasm
>get injected into the process?
Fwiend Wayne, it ith you awone who hath inyekted "myftewiwth
ektopwathm" into the dithkuthion.
>What reason to suspect anything but physical processes?
What weathon to kwing to the magikaw kwonthpt of "wandom tthanthe" in
owdew to pwetend that the thpethifith of theowy hafe been fawidated?
>And what reason to insist on definitions for
>"mind" and "consciousness" and "will" that require something beyond
>physical processes?
What weathon to kwing to the bewief that the fythikaw unifewthe
kompwitheth aww that ith weaw? It ith onwy the fythikaw powtion of
aww that ith weaw, the pawt of weawity that ith fythikawwy manifeft.
>What are you trying to explain with all the
>(seemingly superfluous) non-physical ectoplasm?
Thinthe it ith you who hath intwoduthed "ektopwathm" into the
dithkuthion that ith a queftion I wouwd wook to you to anthwew.
[1] Ekthept of kowthe when the hawdwawe mawfunktionth bekawthe of
wandom tthanthe[2] ow the thoftwawe mawfunktionth bekawthe of
pwogwammew ewwow.
[2] Akowding to "modewn thienthe" (ow thomething that wethembweth
that fwathe) "wandom tthanthe" ith a magikaw thing that "yuft
happenth" wonth in a whiwe. It ithn't magikaw ow wandom, but that'th
bethide the point.
Howard Brazee
wrote:
>: How is it any different from non-physical casualty?
>
>IMO it's more interesting that this makes much the same attempt at an
>intuition pump as Searle and the chinese room. In saying "it's just
>a machine", you get to sweep the actual complexity under the rug, much
>like Searle sweeps the actual complexity of an AI program under the rug
>by imagining a human operating it.
Moving to SF. I was always bothered by the meme of an infinite
number of alternate dimensions meaning that every possible scenario
existed. First, we can have an infinite number of even numbers
that don't include the number pi. So that didn't make logical sense
to begin with.
And the idea that you make every choice means you don't make any
choice. How depressing.
Paul Howard
> On Sat, 19 Mar 2011 05:17:43 GMT, thr...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop)
> wrote:
>
>> : How is it any different from non-physical casualty?
>>
>> IMO it's more interesting that this makes much the same attempt at an
>> intuition pump as Searle and the chinese room. In saying "it's just
>> a machine", you get to sweep the actual complexity under the rug, much
>> like Searle sweeps the actual complexity of an AI program under the rug
>> by imagining a human operating it.
>
>
> Moving to SF. I was always bothered by the meme of an infinite
> number of alternate dimensions meaning that every possible scenario
> existed. First, we can have an infinite number of even numbers
> that don't include the number pi. So that didn't make logical sense
> to begin with.
>
> And the idea that you make every choice means you don't make any
> choice. How depressing.
>
Larry Niven wrote a story using that theme. (Can't remember the title).
--
*
Paul Howard (Alias Drak Bibliophile)
*
Sometimes The Dragon Wins!
*
--------
*
Howard Brazee
<nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>>In this argument, the question is - how does assuming a non-physical
>>soul make a difference?
>
>Here's the original question, but I have no idea who posted it:
>
> >>>>My question is: what does thought come from?
> >>>>Can it be purely physical?
>
>If I'm not mistaken you are the first to introduce the term "soul",
>the question was about the implications of thought being purely
>physical.
I thought about not using that term. But it is the appropriate term
for something that thinks that is separated from the physical body.
>I've been using the term "mind" to represent "that which thinks", and
>perhaps I've used the term "brain" to represent the physical organ
>where thinking seems to be done (at least in part), but the term
>"soul" is new to the discussion. There are many views on what the
>word "soul" means so maybe you need to define it if you want to talk
>about it[a].
So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
indicated that it exists.
>> We see that theologians using your
>>assumption have argued without coming to a conclusion.
>
>What does "your assumption" mean? The hypothesis under consideration
>is that "thought is a purely physical phenomenon".
That we are predestined to do and think whatever we do and think,
because that is the way we were created.
>MY assumptions are probably least clear to me, but my assertion is
>that free-will does exist therefore thought is not purely physical.
Nor meta-physical.
Without arguing whether free-will does exist (if all of those scholars
couldn't come to an agreement, I don't see that we will) - assuming
it exists does not give us a handle on what a mind/soul actually is
and how it works.
Get enough of a handle on this so that we can at least hypothesis how
it is not deterministic.
Get enough of a handle on this so we can test a hypothesis.
>> Unless you
>>can demonstrate that your alternative explanation is non-casual, your
>>argument doesn't support your desired conclusion.
>
>1. Values of "demonstrate" can vary significantly.
>2. What is this "my alternative explanation" to which you refer?
Saying that free-will implies a non-physical mind. That is a huge
leap that doesn't have any supporting evidence.
>3. Nothing is non-causal, though causality is aphysical[b].
>4. What is my desired conclusion?
Apparently that we have a mind that is separate from the physical.
>5. What argument of mine doesn't support my "desired conclusion" and
>why?
>
>>We do know that we can change a brain with a resulting change in
>>personality.
>
>Indeed, as a very young fellow I was quite convinced that drugs were
>simply a matter of mind meeting expecation... until the first time I
>got hugely stoned. Chemicals can affect our thinking. Temporarily,
>anyway. Although they often effect changes in our behaviour, that is
>not necessarily the case.
>
>>We haven't observed anything to conclude anything as to
>>how souls work.
>
>Taking it upon myself to substitute the term "essential-nature" for
>your word "soul" then I would opine that ideally they work[c] less
>than nearly anything else.
So you are saying they work virtually not at all. I don't have any
evidence that they work at all.
Wayne Throop
: Friend Wayne, it is you alone who has injected "mysterious ectoplasm"
: into the discussion.
And the first time I did, I added "or whatever incompatibalists think
the mind had better be made of". Basically, you didn't give a term for
the nonphysical part you are supposing the mind has, so I gave it one.
But whatever you want to call it, it seems to be superfluous. At least,
I havent seen any particular case for it being subfluous.
: What reason to cling to the belief that the physical universe
: comprises all that is real?
To "cling"? None. All it would take to drop the hypothesis like a
hot potato is some noticeable explanatory utility for or evidence of
nonphysical things. Which of course would have to include some reason
not to count things that can affect phyhsical things as being themselves
physical.
More importantly, I'm not so much arguing that it must be so, but that
the arguments that it can't be so don't seem very coherent.
Or at least, don't seem very persuasive. Hence some puzzlement
that so many folks are persuaded.
Wayne Throop
:: choice. How depressing.
: Paul Howard <drakbib...@comcast.net>
: Larry Niven wrote a story using that theme. (Can't remember the title).
"All the Myriad Ways"
http://scp-wiki.wdfiles.com/local--files/warning-labels/spc_memetic.png
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/AllTheMyriadWays
Paul Howard
Thanks.
Norm D. Plumber
>On Sat, 19 Mar 2011 03:36:45 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>>In this argument, the question is - how does assuming a non-physical
>>>soul make a difference?
>>
>>Here's the original question, but I have no idea who posted it:
>>
>> >>>>My question is: what does thought come from?
>> >>>>Can it be purely physical?
>>
>>If I'm not mistaken you are the first to introduce the term "soul",
>>the question was about the implications of thought being purely
>>physical.
>
>I thought about not using that term. But it is the appropriate term
>for something that thinks that is separated from the physical body.
Unfortunately 'soul' has a lot of religious baggage that I prefer not
to be saddled with.
There is thinking (of which logical thought is one flavor) and there
is the exercising the free-will. Thinking is fairly well limited to
what the brain is capable of, as far as I can tell. Certainly a dose
of the appropriate chemicals will twist your thinker into a nice tight
knot. But even under the most masssively distruptive chemical attack,
the exercise of free-will seems to remain unaltered.
In any case, to describe that which exercises the free-will the term I
find least incorrect is "essential-nature", which is the inmost kernel
of the individual's uniqueness so to speak. It is that which
exercises free-will, and may participate in intuitional thinking, but
it seems not to change regardless of mental states imposed by
chemicals, hormones, etc.
>>I've been using the term "mind" to represent "that which thinks", and
>>perhaps I've used the term "brain" to represent the physical organ
>>where thinking seems to be done (at least in part), but the term
>>"soul" is new to the discussion. There are many views on what the
>>word "soul" means so maybe you need to define it if you want to talk
>>about it[a].
>
>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
>indicated that it exists.
As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
your challenge.
>>> We see that theologians using your
>>>assumption have argued without coming to a conclusion.
>>
>>What does "your assumption" mean? The hypothesis under consideration
>>is that "thought is a purely physical phenomenon".
>
>That we are predestined to do and think whatever we do and think,
>because that is the way we were created.
Don't try stuffing some half-assed creationist strawman into my mouth
friend, espeically not one that claims we are predestined. We are not
predestined at all, we have free-will, because we happen to have it.
>>MY assumptions are probably least clear to me, but my assertion is
>>that free-will does exist therefore thought is not purely physical.
>
>Nor meta-physical.
The term "meta-physical" has multiple meanings and off the cuff I'd
say that most of them have to do with crap like seances and crystal
balls. If you mean something else you'll need to explain what that
is.
>Without arguing whether free-will does exist (if all of those scholars
>couldn't come to an agreement, I don't see that we will) - assuming
>it exists does not give us a handle on what a mind/soul actually is
>and how it works.
>
>Get enough of a handle on this so that we can at least hypothesis how
>it is not deterministic.
>Get enough of a handle on this so we can test a hypothesis.
I've been testing a paradigm for nearly a decade, but the testing of
hypotheses regarding how the general process of occurrence works is
not something that can be mechanised.
>>> Unless you
>>>can demonstrate that your alternative explanation is non-casual, your
>>>argument doesn't support your desired conclusion.
>>
>>1. Values of "demonstrate" can vary significantly.
>>2. What is this "my alternative explanation" to which you refer?
>
>Saying that free-will implies a non-physical mind. That is a huge
>leap that doesn't have any supporting evidence.
Let's presume you're correct that it's "a huge leap". Let's go beyond
that and set aside its leapness for now.
Just supposing that free-will exists, what does that imply?
>>3. Nothing is non-causal, though causality is aphysical[b].
>>4. What is my desired conclusion?
>
>Apparently that we have a mind that is separate from the physical.
That depends on what you mean by "separate from" and what you mean by
"the physical". In my view "the physical" means all or part of the
physical universe, and the entire physical universe is only the
portion of reality that happens to be physically manifest now.
>>5. What argument of mine doesn't support my "desired conclusion" and
>>why?
>>
>>>We do know that we can change a brain with a resulting change in
>>>personality.
>>
>>Indeed, as a very young fellow I was quite convinced that drugs were
>>simply a matter of mind meeting expecation... until the first time I
>>got hugely stoned. Chemicals can affect our thinking. Temporarily,
>>anyway. Although they often effect changes in our behaviour, that is
>>not necessarily the case.
>>
>>>We haven't observed anything to conclude anything as to
>>>how souls work.
>>
>>Taking it upon myself to substitute the term "essential-nature" for
>>your word "soul" then I would opine that ideally they work[c] less
>>than nearly anything else.
>
>So you are saying they work virtually not at all. I don't have any
>evidence that they work at all.
It's often difficult to find evidence for something which you consider
so unlikely that looking for evidence of it is a waste of your time.
Zev
news:13004...@sheol.org...
> : "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
> :: If your definition of what it means to be a conscious entity is at
> :: odds with either facts of the matter, or with models of the matter,
> :: the problem is with your definition, and nowhere else.
>
> : I agree, and I note that my view is not the one that contradicts the
> facts.
>
> You've neglected to mention in what way the notion that minds
> are physical processes conflicts with the facts.
You've neglected to show how thought and consciousness
can be associated with purely physical processes.
Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you,
no more than electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
I admit it's difficult to tackle scientifically,
you can't even prove (to others) the fact of your own consciousness,
but the question invites derision.
That doesn't *prove* you're wrong, but imo,
it makes more sense to assume
some kind of non-physical component,
and get along with Occam's razor in one way or another.
After all, the Occam's razor rule doesn't *prove* anything anyway.
Virgil
wrote:
> : "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
> : Friend Wayne, it is you alone who has injected "mysterious ectoplasm"
> : into the discussion.
>
> And the first time I did, I added "or whatever incompatibalists think
> the mind had better be made of". Basically, you didn't give a term for
> the nonphysical part you are supposing the mind has, so I gave it one.
> But whatever you want to call it, it seems to be superfluous. At least,
> I havent seen any particular case for it being subfluous.
How about the case of merely being fluous?
Wayne Throop
: Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you, no more than
: electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
I don't know. Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
Or at least some benefit the supposition is required to obtain?
: imo, it makes more sense to assume some kind of non-physical component,
Why? What good is the assumption? What sense does it actually make?
: After all, the Occam's razor rule doesn't *prove* anything anyway.
True. But somewhat beside the point.
Insofar as I may be heard by anything, which may or may not care
what I say, I ask, if it matters, that you be forgiven for anything
you may have done or failed to do which requires forgiveness.
Conversely, if not forgiveness but something else may be required to
ensure any possible benefit for which you may be eligible after the
destruction of your body, I ask that this, whatever it may be, be
granted or withheld, as the case may be, in such a manner as to
insure your receiving said benefit.
--- Possibly Proper Death Litany,
from Creatures of Light and Darkness
Norm D. Plumber
>: Zev <zev_...@yahoo.com>
>: Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you, no more than
>: electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
>
>I don't know.
That's a good honest answer.
>Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
What IS the "I" above that said "I don't know"?
Is it a mechanism that uses the I-terminology to pretend life instead
of saying "no answer available at this time"?
Is it simply the sum of its parts, operating in accordance with its
electrochemical circuitry, or is there something more there?
Does something exist because of the way all the parts fit together
that would not exist if there were a few less parts or if the parts
were connected in a simpler way? Something that comes into existence
as complexity passes some unknown boundary?
Wayne Throop
::: electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
:: I don't know.
:: Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
: "Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com>
: What IS the "I" above that said "I don't know"?
Ah. So that would be "no", then.
Kadaitcha Man
villainous secrets. Ye qualling cobloaf, there is not yet so ugly a
fiend of hell as ye. Ye exuded:
> ::: Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you, no more than
> ::: electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
>
> :: I don't know.
> :: Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
>
> : "Norm D. Plumber"<nom-de...@non.com>
> : What IS the "I" above that said "I don't know"?
>
> Ah. So that would be "no", then.
Dumbfuck cunt.
> Wayne Throop thr...@sheol.org http://sheol.org/throopw
--
Terry Cross
> : Zev <zev_h...@yahoo.com>
> : Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you, no more than
> : electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
>
> I don't know. Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
No physical device yet built can equal the computing power of the
human mind -- or even a dog's mind. Only the thinnest hypotheses
support the idea that a physical brain can compute, and nothing would
support the necessity for computation in the megahertz range.
> Or at least some benefit the supposition is required to obtain?
>
> : imo, it makes more sense to assume some kind of non-physical component,
>
> Why? What good is the assumption? What sense does it actually make?
You propose that Maelzel's chess player is simply a machine. It is
not a hypothesis that fits the facts.
TCross
Kadaitcha Man
thy peevish chastity is not worth a breakfast in the cheapest country.
Ye prescribed:
> On Mar 19, 2:08 pm, thro...@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:
>> : Zev<zev_h...@yahoo.com>
>> : Is your own consciousness, the real "self" inside you, no more than
>> : electrons and energy levels (or whatever)?
>>
>> I don't know. Do you have some reason to suppose it must be more?
>
>
> No physical device yet built can equal the computing power of the
> human mind -- or even a dog's mind. Only the thinnest hypotheses
> support the idea that a physical brain can compute, and nothing would
> support the necessity for computation in the megahertz range.
You waffling idiot.
Howard Brazee
<nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
>>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
>>indicated that it exists.
>
>As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
>exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
>your challenge.
That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
only that we can explain things without it. Nor that Pluto isn't
made out of green cheese.
On a side note, check out this link:
http://www.disinfo.com/2011/03/experimental-philosophy-and-the-problem-of-free-will/
Howard Brazee
But there's a lot of people who want this to be true. Lots of people
have done research in such as para-normal. I'll use the body of
literature about what they've failed to find reproducible as a valid
starting point.
Norm D. Plumber
>On Sat, 19 Mar 2011 12:46:33 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
>>>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
>>>indicated that it exists.
>>
>>As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
>>exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
>>your challenge.
>
>That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
>only that we can explain things without it.
The unprovability of either view was sort of my point there, you
really can't "prove" that either view is true or false. You can build
a paradigm that's based on the presumption that one view or another is
valid, and you can see which paradigm works better, but that's not
proof... though it may be close enough for practical purposes.
> Nor that Pluto isn't
>made out of green cheese.
That's easily demonstrated, all you have to do is go to Pluto (trivial
detail, right?) and check.
>On a side note, check out this link:
>
>http://www.disinfo.com/2011/03/experimental-philosophy-and-the-problem-of-free-will/
[begin-quote]
Philosophers have argued for centuries, millennia actually, about
whether our lives are guided by our own free will or are predetermined
as the result of a continuous chain of events over which we have no
control.
[end-quote]
The concept of predetermination is erroneous imo because it assumes
that determination extends from the past into the future, yet acts of
free-will can only occur in the present.
The current world-state has been fully determined, in other words it
exists however it is and we can't retroactively wish it different than
it is. Choices made in the present invoke inescapable consequences
because of the way the universe works. But that doesn't mean that
just because the past is fixed, and consequences ensure, that we have
no free-will in the present. It is nothing more than all the previous
slices of "present" added together that comprises the past, and the
future does not yet exist except in our imaginations.
[begin-quote]
The central tenet in determinism is that everything that happens is
the result of something that caused it to happen, which itself was
caused by something earlier and so on.
[end-quote]
I guess they don't recognize acts of free-will as causitives, which
seems very silly to me... decide to jump off a cliff and you fall, if
that decision doesn't qualify as a causitive I don't know what does.
I didn't bother to read the whole thing, they could come to their
senses later on for all I know.
Norm D. Plumber
>On Sat, 19 Mar 2011 12:46:33 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>>So you are saying they work virtually not at all. I don't have any
>>>evidence that they work at all.
>>
>>It's often difficult to find evidence for something which you consider
>>so unlikely that looking for evidence of it is a waste of your time.
>
>But there's a lot of people who want this to be true. Lots of people
>have done research in such as para-normal. I'll use the body of
>literature about what they've failed to find reproducible as a valid
>starting point.
Okay, I'll just continue to consider the para-normal and supernatural
and all that stuff to be imagination/hallucination while considering
also that reality is not limited to the portion of it that is
currently physically manifest.
Howard Brazee
<nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>>>>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
>>>>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
>>>>indicated that it exists.
>>>
>>>As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
>>>exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
>>>your challenge.
>>
>>That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
>>only that we can explain things without it.
>
>The unprovability of either view was sort of my point there, you
>really can't "prove" that either view is true or false. You can build
>a paradigm that's based on the presumption that one view or another is
>valid, and you can see which paradigm works better, but that's not
>proof... though it may be close enough for practical purposes.
Still, all I asked was for some tests that "indicated" that it exists.
A much lower requirement than proof.
Terry Cross
> On Sat, 19 Mar 2011 12:46:33 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
>
> >>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
> >>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
> >>indicated that it exists.
>
> >As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
> >exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
> >your challenge.
>
> That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
> only that we can explain things without it.
Totally not true. The Michelson Morley experiment proves that light
does not travel through a medium, not as ordinarily understood.
Because though the speed of light is not infinite, it is completely
relative to the recipient of the light and not to some independent
medium, which until that time had been called "ether."
In the absence of "ether," far from "explaining things without it,"
physics was at a total loss to explain a wave that had no medium of
transmission.
TCross
Terry Cross
>
> >>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
> >>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
> >>indicated that it exists.
>
> >As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
> >exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
> >your challenge.
>
> That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
> only that we can explain things without it.
No, you cannot. No theory explains the computational power and
information storage and retrieval of a biological brain. The subject
is not popular the money sources, so the subject remains hand-waving
territory.
TCross
Terry Cross
> On Sun, 20 Mar 2011 13:39:15 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
>
>
>
> <nom-de-pl...@non.com> wrote:
> >>>>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
> >>>>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
> >>>>indicated that it exists.
>
> >>>As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
> >>>exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
> >>>your challenge.
>
> >>That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
> >>only that we can explain things without it.
>
> >The unprovability of either view was sort of my point there, you
> >really can't "prove" that either view is true or false. You can build
> >a paradigm that's based on the presumption that one view or another is
> >valid, and you can see which paradigm works better, but that's not
> >proof... though it may be close enough for practical purposes.
>
> Still, all I asked was for some tests that "indicated" that it exists.
> A much lower requirement than proof.
Since you have a heavily qualified acceptance level of existence, your
inkling prayer is dishonest. No theory you have in hand can explain
the phenomena already under your nose.
TCross
Wayne Throop
: In the absence of "ether," far from "explaining things without it,"
: physics was at a total loss to explain a wave that had no medium of
: transmission.
How fortunate, then, that by 1905 it was becoming apparent that
light was not a wave, and that quantum electrodynamics (which is
relativistic) has no particular problem with it.
Wayne Throop
: No, you cannot. No theory explains the computational power and
: information storage and retrieval of a biological brain.
That's about as bass-ackwards as things get. To point out how
un-physical the mind must be, you point to it's computational power,
which is just about the only thing about the mind that *is* well
explained and well understood as a physical process.
Tronscend
"Norm D. Plumber" <nom-de...@non.com> skrev i melding
news:21kco6ltiilh3k5kt...@4ax.com...
> I guess they don't recognize acts of free-will as causitives, which
> seems very silly to me... decide to jump off a cliff and you fall, if
> that decision doesn't qualify as a causitive I don't know what does.
>
> I didn't bother to read the whole thing
Pity.
Philosophy is not about anointing popular opinion,
but about developing knowledge.
Even things that "everybody knows is so" need to be
a) thought about
b) backed up with evidence
Example: Euclidean geometry, which everybody assumed was perfect,
until they set aside the fourth axiom (...? the one about parallell lines)
and discoverd a lot of non-Euclidean jometry.
With determinism, the question is not believeing this or that, or accepting,
or building tyou world-view around it; it is about finding solid arguments,
models, evidence, proof ... even a good description.
T
Tronscend
"Howard Brazee" <how...@brazee.net> skrev i melding
news:tjjco6dm1n1k7kohi...@4ax.com...
....
> But there's a lot of people who want this to be true. Lots of people
> have done research in such as para-normal. I'll use the body of
> literature about what they've failed to find reproducible as a valid
> starting point.
Well .....
- "Science treats of classes of phenomena."
- "We only understand what we have produced ourselves."
- "All experience must in principle be accessible to anyone."
These are the three of the biggies of empiricism.
Without them, stuff isn't science; but on this view, too,
science is only a type of description.
Which is not to say that there is no real stuff
that occurs rarely (perhaps only even once),
is not reproducible, and is not experienced by everyone
( ... like ... the French Revolution ....).
T
Norm D. Plumber
>On Sun, 20 Mar 2011 13:39:15 -0600, "Norm D. Plumber"
><nom-de...@non.com> wrote:
>
>>>>>So you have a term "mind" that is distinct from the physical body -
>>>>>and somehow different from a soul. Show me some tests that have
>>>>>indicated that it exists.
>>>>
>>>>As soon as you finish showing me the tests that show it does not
>>>>exist, presuming I accept them as valid, I'll see what I can do about
>>>>your challenge.
>>>
>>>That doesn't work. I can't prove that ether doesn't exist either,
>>>only that we can explain things without it.
>>
>>The unprovability of either view was sort of my point there, you
>>really can't "prove" that either view is true or false. You can build
>>a paradigm that's based on the presumption that one view or another is
>>valid, and you can see which paradigm works better, but that's not
>>proof... though it may be close enough for practical purposes.
>
>Still, all I asked was for some tests that "indicated" that it exists.
>A much lower requirement than proof.
Tests seem to imply measurment, and what one might reasonably measure
that isn't subjective is a very difficult question to answer.