Lecture by Camilla Kronqvist | ”All consciousness has a moral character” (21 outubro, 16h00, Sala DF - FLUP)

[FLUP | Instituto de Filosofia]

Lecture by Camilla Kronqvist

“All consciousness has a moral character”

Murdoch, Anscombe and Diamond on what analyzing psychological concepts may show

 

Camilla Kronqvist (Åbo Akademi University)

 

21 de outubro 2025 | 16h00 | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia (Torre B – Piso 1)

Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto

 

Cora Diamond’s “Murdoch the Explorer” (2010) provides an overview of the central features of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophical thinking. Tracing the influences of Murdoch’s way of conducting moral philosophy on Diamond, it stops at points to consider similarities and differences between Murdoch’s vision of moral philosophy and that of Elisabeth Anscombe. Both philosophers, today often referred to as members of the Wartime Quartet (cf. Mac Cumhall and Waisman 2022) to Diamond, share a “double vision” of analytic philosophy. They were “insiders” but also saw it “in its cultural context, saw its unacknowledged commitment to specific values” (2010, 80). Yet, despite their shared commitments she identifies a possible disagreement in their view of what philosophical methods are needed in the reflection on morality. This disagreement concerns the place conceptual or linguistic analysis should have in clarifying the relation between philosophy of psychology and moral philosophy. In other words, whether it is possible, as Anscombe suggests in “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958), to set moral philosophy aside until we have finished analyzing psychological concepts, or whether any analysis of these concepts will already reveal what Murdoch calls the analyst’s moral vision (1956).

 

In my talk I address whether Diamond here has succeeded in identifying a fundamental inconsistency in Anscombe’s and Murdoch’s thought. I dwell on two points that seem central for Diamond’s analysis: (1) that Anscombe’s remark about setting moral philosophy aside committed her to the view that the analysis of psychological concepts could be void of ethical implications, (2) that Diamond correctly identifies Murdoch as suggesting that ”all consciousness has a moral character” (2010, 52). A central question that emerges is what it means to speak of “ethical” and “moral” in the context of Murdoch’s and Anscombe’s thought, and what different dimensions they may reveal about our language use.

 

https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/lecture-camilla-kronqvist

 

Organização:

Sofia Miguens (MLAG-IF)

RG Mind, Language and Action Group (MLAG)

Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto - UID/502/2025

Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

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