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My reading of the original email is that Raghu’s organization achieved FIPS compliance by using the FIPS-approved OpenSSL provider. This is good, because I would have said that it while it is touch-and-go whether OpenSSL 3.5.4 is going to be FIPS-approved before Sep 2026, it is very unlikely that a submission made today by Raghu’s organization would be approved by then.
There is also a question of whether Raghu’s organization needs “FIPS approved”, or whether “FIPS pending” is good enough. It is almost inconceivable to me that 3.5.4 won’t be eventually approved, it’s just a matter of bureaucracy. OTOH, if FIPS approved is a contractual requirement (e.g. because the US Government is a customer), then until 3.5.4 is approved, FIPS and PQC are mutually exclusive with OpenSSL (and FIPS is impossible between Sep 2026 and the approval of 3.5.4).
On “PQC equivalents for classical algorithms”, don’t forget that if you are using AES128 you need to switch to AES256 (but AES256 is already considered acceptable).
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Martin Bonner |
From: Neil Horman <nho...@openssl.org>
Sent: 15 April 2026 14:53
To: Raghu Chidambaram <pcraghu...@gmail.com>
Cc: openssl-users <openss...@openssl.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: OpenSSL and PQC/FIPS support
Raghu- PQC algorithms approved by FIPS include FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA). These are supported currently only by the 3. 5. 4 FIPS provider and later versions. Currently 3. 5. 4 is undergoing review with our lab and
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/a/openssl.org/d/msgid/openssl-users/CAJbOq16tR2n_U1tWtzbCUzt57PjEZQbiJRjvM-3vPQ3gkrGyXA%40mail.gmail.com.
> then all the PQC algorithms which are part of this OpenSSL will be FIPS 140-3 compliant
Not quite (or at least, not necessarily). The correct statement is “all the algorithms (including PQ algorithms) supported by the FIPS provider in this OpenSSL will be FIPS 140-3 compliant”.
I haven’t checked, but it is perfectly possible that there are unapproved PQ algorithms which are supported by the base provider. In the classical world, the base provider supports CAMELLIA (or at least, it used to), the FIPS provider has never supported CAMELLIA because it isn’t an approved algorithm.
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Martin Bonner |
From: Raghu Chidambaram <pcraghu...@gmail.com>
Sent: 16 April 2026 07:12
To: openssl-users <openss...@openssl.org>
Cc: Raghu Chidambaram <pcraghu...@gmail.com>; Martin Bonner <Martin...@entrust.com>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: OpenSSL and PQC/FIPS support
HI Team, GM, In https: //csrc. nist. gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/modules-in-process/modules-in-process-list OpenSSL FIPS Provider The OpenSSL Corporation OpenSSL Corporation corporation@ openssl. org Voice: 877-673-6775 FIPS
The point I was trying to make, is that you will need to ensure you are using the FIPS provider (and not the default provider) if you want to claim FIPS compliance. Obviously if you want to claim PQ safety, you will need to make sure you use PQ safe algorithms. (Personally I would strongly consider use hybrid algorithms, but that is up to you.)
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Martin Bonner |
From: Raghu Chidambaram <pcraghu...@gmail.com>
Sent: 23 April 2026 08:41
To: openssl-users <openss...@openssl.org>
Cc: Raghu Chidambaram <pcraghu...@gmail.com>; Martin Bonner <Martin...@entrust.com>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: OpenSSL and PQC/FIPS support
Hi Team, Not quite (or at least, not necessarily). The correct statement is “all the algorithms (including PQ algorithms) supported by the FIPS provider in this OpenSSL will be FIPS 140-3 compliant”. -- As we are claiming for FIPS 140-3 for