Russia preparing for MitM
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MCC CS
Mar 10, 2022, 3:02:50 PM3/10/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org
Dear all,
I hope this is the correct place to start this discussion.
Today it was reported that (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1758773)
Russia is distributing a Root CA (https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888), which according to one user,
an ISP said it was mandatory. The certificate can be downloaded from the third button on https://www.gosuslugi.ru/tls
Although at present there's no MitM, it's likely that government websites
will start using this and once adoption is high enough Russia will perhaps start MitM.
Considering that the ISP was told it was mandatory, the certificate is worth urgent consideration.
An option we can consider is to allow the certificate for only the websites linked on gosuslugi.ru
Because of retaliation, Russia might be seen correct to reduce their reliance on Western certs.
To minimize the damage on Russian users, by allowing the root certificate for only the listed websites OR for
all .ru domains, the risk of MitM will be negated and the given reason of "reducing reliance on Western certs"
will be resolved. If the certificate is blocked completely, Russia-based users could be harmed further,
as they would have to follow the government against interventions of Mozilla et al, who are vulnerable
to name-and-shame in case if certificates currently used by RU companies are revoked.
I decided to start this thread to accelerate the examination of this certificate. Many thanks
I hope this is the correct place to start this discussion.
Today it was reported that (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1758773)
Russia is distributing a Root CA (https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888), which according to one user,
an ISP said it was mandatory. The certificate can be downloaded from the third button on https://www.gosuslugi.ru/tls
Although at present there's no MitM, it's likely that government websites
will start using this and once adoption is high enough Russia will perhaps start MitM.
Considering that the ISP was told it was mandatory, the certificate is worth urgent consideration.
An option we can consider is to allow the certificate for only the websites linked on gosuslugi.ru
Because of retaliation, Russia might be seen correct to reduce their reliance on Western certs.
To minimize the damage on Russian users, by allowing the root certificate for only the listed websites OR for
all .ru domains, the risk of MitM will be negated and the given reason of "reducing reliance on Western certs"
will be resolved. If the certificate is blocked completely, Russia-based users could be harmed further,
as they would have to follow the government against interventions of Mozilla et al, who are vulnerable
to name-and-shame in case if certificates currently used by RU companies are revoked.
I decided to start this thread to accelerate the examination of this certificate. Many thanks
Matthew Hardeman
Mar 10, 2022, 3:26:28 PM3/10/22
to MCC CS, dev-secur...@mozilla.org
There's certainly a history of Russia insisting on at least DNS and/or TLS SNI transparency.
For example, Russia once banned access to all Amazon AWS IP space and a lot of Google space because these services were permitting "domain fronting", in which intentionally presenting a Host: header different from the requested SNI name was being accepted and the request was proceeding per the Host label.
Not being able to track what sites Russian users were visiting, even without seeing the content, was apparently a red line even back in 2018.
With the various sanctions involved, I can see why Russia would respond this way. Someone has to issue certs for their sites, after all, and many CAs are now unable to.
Is there any reason to believe that browsers responding to this root won't just lead to mandatory Russian browsers?
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ValdikSS ValdikSS
Mar 10, 2022, 8:16:56 PM3/10/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org, mhar...@gmail.com, dev-secur...@mozilla.org, MCC CS
I won't rule out the possibility of this CA to be used for MiTM some day, but you should be aware that Thawte has revoked the certificates issued for the sanctioned banks, and more likely it's just a second option/last resort PKI chain for a "doomsday".
For example, VTB:
https://crt.sh/?id=5828347935
https://crt.sh/?id=6218871547
https://crt.sh/?identity=vtb.ru&iCAID=62131 (all of them)
Promsvyazbank:
https://crt.sh/?id=4582341817
https://crt.sh/?id=2713661323
https://crt.sh/?q=psbank.ru&iCAID=62131 (all of them)
The Central Bank of Russia (Centrobank):
https://crt.sh/?id=2355590937
Such development is understandable in the current situation when many foreign services and even transit ISPs don't want to continue the service, but I doubt they will try to break the internet with MiTM such blatantly: the blocks of "offending" websites are more likely, as we've seen for years.
For example, VTB:
https://crt.sh/?id=5828347935
https://crt.sh/?id=6218871547
https://crt.sh/?identity=vtb.ru&iCAID=62131 (all of them)
Promsvyazbank:
https://crt.sh/?id=4582341817
https://crt.sh/?id=2713661323
https://crt.sh/?q=psbank.ru&iCAID=62131 (all of them)
The Central Bank of Russia (Centrobank):
https://crt.sh/?id=2355590937
Such development is understandable in the current situation when many foreign services and even transit ISPs don't want to continue the service, but I doubt they will try to break the internet with MiTM such blatantly: the blocks of "offending" websites are more likely, as we've seen for years.
MCC CS
Mar 11, 2022, 2:19:17 AM3/11/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org
but you should be aware that Thawte has revoked the certificates issued for the sanctioned banks, that Gosuslugi email text is correct.
I understand, what I propose is shipping Firefox with the certificate built in, so that Firefox doesn't lose Marketshare, and limit the certificate to .ru domains, so that MitM crisis is averted.
ValdikSS ValdikSS
Mar 11, 2022, 2:31:29 AM3/11/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org, MCC CS
On Friday, March 11, 2022 at 10:19:17 AM UTC+3 MCC CS wrote:
I understand, what I propose is shipping Firefox with the certificate built in
It doesn't work that way. Any browser or operating system won't include the certificate unless it complies with CA/B requirements: https://cabforum.org/
There are technical requirements for the CA and certificates it issue, which Ministry of Digital's PKI fails right away, usage requirements and policy requirements, which they don't state, etc.
Matthew Hardeman
Mar 11, 2022, 11:00:12 AM3/11/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org
On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 1:31 AM 'ValdikSS ValdikSS' via dev-secur...@mozilla.org <dev-secur...@mozilla.org> wrote:
There are technical requirements for the CA and certificates it issue, which Ministry of Digital's PKI fails right away, usage requirements and policy requirements, which they don't state, etc.
Yes, even if it were desirable, I think there are certificate profile problems with that root.
Matthew Hardeman
Mar 17, 2022, 3:47:36 PM3/17/22
to dev-secur...@mozilla.org
Isn't VTB one of the banks subject to sanctions and who have likely had revocations from other CAs?
If so, this may be properly issued at VTB's request?
On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 2:35 PM Ferdinand Vroom <ferdinand...@gmail.com> wrote:
1 s:C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Sub CA
i:C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Root CAecho | openssl s_client -showcerts -verify_depth 2 -connect online-alpha.vtb.ru:443
CONNECTED(00000198)
depth=1 C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Sub CA
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 C = RU, ST = St. Petersburg, L = St. Petersburg, O = VTB Bank (PJSC), OU = IT Department, CN = online-alpha.vtb.ru
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
0 s:C = RU, ST = St. Petersburg, L = St. Petersburg, O = VTB Bank (PJSC), OU = IT Department, CN = online-alpha.vtb.ru
i:C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Sub CA
a:PKEY: rsaEncryption, 2048 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
v:NotBefore: Mar 4 14:59:21 2022 GMT; NotAfter: Mar 4 14:59:21 2023 GMT
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
1 s:C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Sub CA
i:C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Root CA
a:PKEY: rsaEncryption, 4096 (bit); sigalg: RSA-SHA256
v:NotBefore: Mar 2 11:25:19 2022 GMT; NotAfter: Mar 6 11:25:19 2027 GMT
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
---
Server certificate
subject=C = RU, ST = St. Petersburg, L = St. Petersburg, O = VTB Bank (PJSC), OU = IT Department, CN = online-alpha.vtb.ru
issuer=C = RU, O = The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications, CN = Russian Trusted Sub CA
---
No client certificate CA names sent
Peer signing digest: SHA256
Peer signature type: RSA
Server Temp Key: ECDH, prime256v1, 256 bits
---
SSL handshake has read 4043 bytes and written 451 bytes
Verification error: unable to get local issuer certificate
---
New, TLSv1.2, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
Server public key is 2048 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
No ALPN negotiated
SSL-Session:
Protocol : TLSv1.2
Cipher : ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
Session-ID: 92C894E2E60D09C67B901CB44D55B04285E17D6A23E8004358AF3F991EE5005F
Session-ID-ctx:
Master-Key: 084CA49C3821CFA73463E83DCCDE3DEB4CF0BA51795E6368C7BE8EC8CB8AD9E66B04F2C8D74A43AF570005F1AE4B75B5
PSK identity: None
PSK identity hint: None
SRP username: None
Start Time: 1647544075
Timeout : 7200 (sec)
Verify return code: 20 (unable to get local issuer certificate)
Extended master secret: yes
---
DONEOp vrijdag 11 maart 2022 om 02:16:56 UTC+1 schreef ValdikSS ValdikSS:
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