MRSP Intermediate Violations (5.3), Mass Report of 26 Subordinate CAs

[Wayne]

I have been performing some unrelated research and had a read of the Mozilla Root Store Policy.

>5.3 Intermediate Certificates
>All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates and that directly or transitively chain to a CA certificate included in Mozilla’s root store MUST be operated in accordance with this policy.
>
>...
>
>Intermediate certificates created after January 1, 2019, with the exception of cross-certificates that share a private key with a corresponding root certificate:
>- MUST contain an EKU extension;
>- MUST NOT include the anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId; and
>- MUST NOT include both the id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-emailProtection KeyPurposeIds in the same certificate.

Thanks to Censys and the following query I've been about to check the above.
(cert.validation.nss.is_valid=true and not cert.labels="revoked" and (cert.labels = "intermediate" and not cert.labels="root")) and cert.parsed.validity_period.not_before>='2019-01-01' and not (cert.parsed.extensions.extended_key_usage.server_auth=false or cert.parsed.extensions.extended_key_usage.server_auth=true)

The following concerns all known intermediate certificates that chain to the NSS store that lack an EKU extension. No corresponding root certificate was found through checks.

Layout: ID, Subject CN, Subject DN, SHA256s matching

1. AC Sector Público
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Sector Público
8265756dd5cd8a37ee61e40351288e4b16a89dd248c1ec4eba25aaf161abf498


2. AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo
9ce630b35f8ae2c6419e734ad9d2fa30476dd9e7394b1e93b27f83f776a024ea


3. Amazon ECDSA 256 Root EU M1
C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon ECDSA 256 Root EU M1
9ead32c9285fe68ba2c5b0fe427d149b103fdfa1d0958d77c3da0ff246e853d3


4. Amazon ECDSA 384 Root EU M1
C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon ECDSA 384 Root EU M1
8e136ce0e77c848f2d2910abd4e3a764358bb1b7a4932202bc9b915732462d85


5. Amazon RSA 2048 Root EU M1
C=DE, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon RSA 2048 Root EU M1
eaffac50c7e3e15a68f779a5e70ec2f5e9fc4a03ff69ab337b4d6c4510432395


6. Certum EC-384 CA
C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum EC-384 CA
b72450abf5047a8af63ec9d87e331484850b1849a2550a82a86db6b41ed38760


7. Certum Trusted Network CA 2
C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2
08e7eac998a62c4155cc4cbc5eda32f5b41a12c012f29ab3433bd366348149f0


8. Certum Trusted Root CA
C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Root CA
fb13890c7ab14ff7b94b2714503e31123bfdd340fc4d979743166e0469b47a88


9. CFCA Global RSA ROOT G2
C=CN, O=China Financial Certification Authority, CN=CFCA Global RSA ROOT G2
6e6eb29f5eba910affd462fc921d724e526805efe908aec45bd409b624e14c09
faa4fa0ef7056d6953bbdfb36461e3f7cdf33352af724fd8254b184d3e2c941f


10. DigiCert Assured ID Root G2
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G2
d9ae5ed27c9c6485296c89a29d222f4ab2bc7eeca51ecc8d2d7a23fe9c1151da


11. DigiCert Global Root G2
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2
6523c34f1e879add7603cb2048a898a5e2f0c6c4b512c0d22782b85d43ae3371
79d57b15dfa65c2870eafe11b637765909cfe937b49c15ce7f194030cab395ad
a0d609a7e3c434e878a9a1c1bd065b8dcf33aa7efee1b11bc75cce5e5a042080
caf8ad697f7bda712ab127a8ad8b83f74a91a0de1784a1b483fef9ac79b67513


12. DigiCert Trusted Root G4
C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4
33846b545a49c9be4903c60e01713c1bd4e4ef31ea65cd95d69e62794f30b941


13. e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025
C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025
a01c4f8f68112fa9dac50b96809a791480168c8acb9e51c5482d8d3819688557


14. GlobalSign
OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign
f349954e8fb6d44011bcb789d97d9a2cb2032bd5f0b598d1fb8a099f5848d523


15. GlobalSign
OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign
c84e1378b974a991acdcdd733421e3061e6fa21a0491c8902bafde3855e0063e
dda8da736187d76f4f0ed5a5f667b54d99a98ae06091d0e3a01714e9221695ad


16. GTS Root R1
C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1
3ee0278df71fa3c125c4cd487f01d774694e6fc57e0cd94c24efd769133918e5


17. Microsoft TLS RSA Root G2
C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft TLS RSA Root G2
6a170583db584151e1c454eeca2a64cc5d8e484a5bd1156e720b4458654ee9e5


18. Root YE
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE
e14ffcad5b0025731006caa43a121a22d8e9700f4fb9cf852f02a708aa5d5666


19. Root YR
C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR
e57b7e6f150c419102e8d5c055729ff967b9d1a829bf00cec89ca604ebf4a86f


20. SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC
C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC
60ef412eabe7c3fc6399eed1b633b777747515b29d721b963dd258bc498ab292


21. SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC
C=US, ST=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC
06b9722a699c57dff1869f430b479bb6eb49aae1184eac9c5325c1334a34ea4c


22. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1
C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1
bc8bbd7d279d2e5f070bcef6faf3aab1bef30da3eb2875424295ad147f2aef07

23. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1
C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1
5a84c94054d340d650a29985ef97bb396352e215aed6c0b33ca7ffdd3bd5d2a2


24. TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 2
C=TR, ST=Kocaeli, O=TUBITAK Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi, CN=TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 2
ec6431ba9fc13e405df80ade58a048136f789a03fdca4cf5daa4336ac522225b


25. USERTrust ECC Certification Authority
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority
a6cf64dbb4c8d5fd19ce48896068db03b533a8d1336c6256a87d00cbb3def3ea


26. USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b


Whether directly or indirectly because of chaining these are currently in violation of the Mozilla Root Store Policy.

- Wayne

[Matthew McPherrin]

The following two entries from Let's Encrypt are not intermediate certificates:
They are roots, pending inclusion.
I haven't validated this to be true of every entry on the list, but it appears to me certainly the majority are either roots, or are cross-signed which have an explicit exemption in the policy.

18. Root YE - C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YE
e14ffcad5b0025731006caa43a121a22d8e9700f4fb9cf852f02a708aa5d5666

19. Root YR - C=US, O=ISRG, CN=Root YR
e57b7e6f150c419102e8d5c055729ff967b9d1a829bf00cec89ca604ebf4a86f

[Michael Stone]

Hi Wayne,

Good day.

Regarding the certificates you mentioned, for CFCA:

- sha256 Fingerprint=6E:6E:B2:9F:5E:BA:91:0A:FF:D4:62:FC:92:1D:72:4E:52:68:05:EF:E9:08:AE:C4:5B:D4:09:B6:24:E1:4C:09

this is a root certificate, it's not in violation with MRSP 5.3

- sha256 Fingerprint=FA:A4:FA:0E:F7:05:6D:69:53:BB:DF:B3:64:61:E3:F7:CD:F3:33:52:AF:72:4F:D8:25:4B:18:4D:3E:2C:94:1F

this is a cross certificate signed by CFCA  EV  ROOT, and within the 'exception' of MRSP 5.3.

I've just checked BR, it seems not in violation with BR/MRSP. 

Let me know if you have any other concerns.

[Wayne]

Yup my bad had the notBefore >=2019-01-01 still active on the checks. Here is a revised list being more conservative on any self-signs:

Layout: ID, Subject CN, Subject DN, SHA256s matching

1. AC Sector Público
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Sector Público
8265756dd5cd8a37ee61e40351288e4b16a89dd248c1ec4eba25aaf161abf498


2. AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo
9ce630b35f8ae2c6419e734ad9d2fa30476dd9e7394b1e93b27f83f776a024ea

3. DigiCert Global Root G2

C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2
6523c34f1e879add7603cb2048a898a5e2f0c6c4b512c0d22782b85d43ae3371
79d57b15dfa65c2870eafe11b637765909cfe937b49c15ce7f194030cab395ad
a0d609a7e3c434e878a9a1c1bd065b8dcf33aa7efee1b11bc75cce5e5a042080
caf8ad697f7bda712ab127a8ad8b83f74a91a0de1784a1b483fef9ac79b67513

4. GlobalSign

OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign
c84e1378b974a991acdcdd733421e3061e6fa21a0491c8902bafde3855e0063e
dda8da736187d76f4f0ed5a5f667b54d99a98ae06091d0e3a01714e9221695ad

5. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1

C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1
5a84c94054d340d650a29985ef97bb396352e215aed6c0b33ca7ffdd3bd5d2a2

6. SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1

C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1
bc8bbd7d279d2e5f070bcef6faf3aab1bef30da3eb2875424295ad147f2aef07

7. USERTrust RSA Certification Authority

C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b

- Wayne

[Wayne]

Okay something's odd with Censys. For the Digicert one checking elsewhere I can find the root...

https://platform.censys.io/certificates/cb3ccbb76031e5e0138f8dd39a23f9de47ffc35e43c1144cea27d46a5ab1cb5f

However searching for that by SPKI SHA256, or its own SHA256 fingerprint yields no results for the root:
cert.parsed.subject_key_info.fingerprint_sha256: "8bb593a93be1d0e8a822bb887c547890c3e706aad2dab76254f97fb36b82fc26"
> 34 results, however no self-signed

cert.fingerprint_sha256: "cb3ccbb76031e5e0138f8dd39a23f9de47ffc35e43c1144cea27d46a5ab1cb5f"

> 0 results

I'm wondering if this was imported into Censys in an odd way to break it appearing in searches.

- Wayne

[Wayne]

Exact same issue for Globalsign, if you know the root you can find the certificate:

https://platform.censys.io/certificates/2CABEAFE37D06CA22ABA7391C0033D25982952C453647349763A3AB5AD6CCF69

But searching for it by SHA256, SPKI, etc yields nothing.

- Wayne

[Wayne]

This is also true for the USERTrust cert:

USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
C=US, ST=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b

https://platform.censys.io/certificates/e793c9b02fd8aa13e21c31228accb08119643b749c898964b1746d46c3d4cbd2
https://platform.censys.io/certificates/1a5174980a294a528a110726d5855650266c48d9883bea692b67b6d726da98c5 notBefore 2000-05-30? Wrong or very old key material?

SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1
C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2022 - 1
5a84c94054d340d650a29985ef97bb396352e215aed6c0b33ca7ffdd3bd5d2a2

Root not on Censys due to SMIME: https://crt.sh/?id=7044154542

SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1
C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign RSA SMIME Root CA 2021 - 1
bc8bbd7d279d2e5f070bcef6faf3aab1bef30da3eb2875424295ad147f2aef07

Root not on Censys due to SMIME: https://crt.sh/?id=5011200301


So after all of the false positives and Censys oddities we're left with:

1. AC Sector Público
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Sector Público
8265756dd5cd8a37ee61e40351288e4b16a89dd248c1ec4eba25aaf161abf498


2. AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo
C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, organizationIdentifier=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC Unidades de Sellado de Tiempo

9ce630b35f8ae2c6419e734ad9d2fa30476dd9e7394b1e93b27f83f776a024ea

- Wayne

[Roman Fischer]

Dear Wayne,

 

Both SwissSign certificates mentioned are roots that are cross-signed by our "SwissSign Gold CA – G2" and thus fall under the exception of MRSP 5.3.

The corresponding self-signed roots can be found e.g. here:

• https://crt.sh/?id=5011200301
• https://crt.sh/?id=7044154542

 

Kind regards
Roman

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "dev-secur...@mozilla.org" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to dev-security-po...@mozilla.org.
To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/b0f2201f-7f37-4378-a26c-94f817f95dc2n%40mozilla.org.