Hello Meshery Team,
🐸🐸 JFrog Open Source Security Contribution 🐸🐸
As part of JFrog’s ongoing Open Source Security initiative, I am
reporting a critical security issue in your GitHub Actions workflows.
The vulnerability allows untrusted PR code to run inside a trusted
pull_request_target context with access to sensitive secrets, leading
to a potential full repository compromise.
________________________________
🚨 Security Issue
Your workflow uses:
pull_request_target
and explicitly checks out attacker-controlled code:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
This means the workflow runs with:
The base repository's permissions
The base repository's secrets
The PR author’s code (fork-controlled)
The workflow then executes attacker-controlled logic through:
make ui-build
make server
make test-e2e-ci
During the E2E stage, the job exposes several sensitive secrets to
attacker-controlled code:
REMOTE_PROVIDER_TEST_USER_EMAIL
REMOTE_PROVIDER_TEST_USER_PASS
REMOTE_PROVIDER_TEST_USER_TOKEN
MESHERY_CI (a privileged GitHub token)
Although paths-ignore includes Makefile, this does not prevent
exploitation. The workflow will still run if the attacker modifies any
non-ignored file, allowing code execution through npm scripts, Go
code, or Makefile targets.
________________________________
🔥 Impact
A malicious PR author or compromised fork can:
Execute arbitrary code in your CI environment
Exfiltrate provider credentials
Exfiltrate MESHERY_CI, enabling direct pushes or workflow tampering
Potentially compromise downstream users (supply-chain risk)
This is a high/critical severity issue due to the combination of
pull_request_target, untrusted code execution, and exposed secrets.
________________________________
🧪 Proof of Concept
A working example demonstrating the vulnerability:
https://github.com/meshery/meshery/actions/runs/20004600192/job/57364903509?pr=16596#step:4:61
This run shows PR-controlled code executing inside a trusted context
where secrets were available.
BR,
Barak Haryati
i will be happy to open a bug after you will fix it
thank you
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