Re: [pqc-forum] Abridged summary of pqc-forum@list.nist.gov - 7 updates in 4 topics

[Tushar Patel]

A suggestion for embedded systems would be to enforce ACVTS, in this case all testing will be online and prevents the need for storing any vectors, or alternatively use a device specific storage scheme so that systems cannot mimic the results, wish we could design processor if  or device id specific vectors.

Even if they are not networked they can support it through the low level firmware, processor bridge, JTAG, etc., and requiring an approved ACTVS intermediary.

On Tue, Sep 10, 2024 at 5:25 AM <pqc-...@list.nist.gov> wrote:

pqc-...@list.nist.gov

Google Groups

Today's topic summary
View all topics

• Suggestions for Managing KAT Sizes in FIPS 204 Compliance on Embedded Systems - 4 Updates
• CryptAttackTester numbers for BIKE and HQC - 1 Update
• Save the date - 6th NIST PQC Standardization Conference - 1 Update
• Question: Prime Numbers in Lattice-Based Cryptography and FHE - 1 Update

Suggestions for Managing KAT Sizes in FIPS 204 Compliance on Embedded Systems

Sofia Ramirez <sofarm...@gmail.com>: Sep 10 12:50AM -0700 Hi all,   For FIPS 204 (level 5) the size of public key, secret key and signature are about 12KB in total. For KAT on a embedded system, it needs to store at lease these amounts as test vectors! ...more

Stephan Mueller <smue...@chronox.de>: Sep 10 06:57AM -0500 Am Dienstag, 10. September 2024, 02:50:27 GMT-5 schrieb Sofia Ramirez:   Hi Sofia,   > However, memory resources in embedded system are often limited. Do you have > any suggestion or best practices ...more

Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <sflu...@cisco.com>: Sep 10 12:09PM And, instead of storing the expected signature for the KAT, would it be sufficient to store the (approved) hash of that signature?   With that and Stephan's suggestion (and with the message being ...more

Stephan Mueller <smue...@chronox.de>: Sep 10 07:15AM -0500 Am Dienstag, 10. September 2024, 07:09:14 GMT-5 schrieb 'Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)' via pqc-forum:   Hi Scott,   > And, instead of storing the expected signature for the KAT, would it be ...more

Back to top

CryptAttackTester numbers for BIKE and HQC

D. J. Bernstein <d...@cr.yp.to>: Sep 10 07:46AM +0200 We have run CAT to obtain high-assurance predictions for the cost of various non-quasi-cyclic ISD attacks against the following parameters:   * (24646,134), as in attacking BIKE-1 messages. ...more

Back to top

Save the date - 6th NIST PQC Standardization Conference

Moody, Dustin (Fed) <dustin...@nist.gov>: Sep 09 05:58PM Everybody,   NIST is planning for our 6th PQC Standardization Conference. The tentative dates will be September 24-26, 2025, and the conference will be held at NIST. We will announce further ...more

Back to top

Question: Prime Numbers in Lattice-Based Cryptography and FHE

ahmed alotaibi <alou...@gmail.com>: Sep 09 09:28AM -0700 Hello,   I am researching lattice-based cryptography and fully homomorphic encryption, and I have a question regarding the use of prime numbers in these systems.   Specifically, I am interested ...more

Back to top

You received this digest because you're subscribed to updates for this group. You can change your settings on the group membership page. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it send an email to pqc-forum+...@list.nist.gov.

[COSTA Graham]

THALES GROUP LIMITED DISTRIBUTION to email recipients

 

I don’t think this works if you were to pursue FIPS 140.  The logic related to performing the KAT needs to be within the boundary of the module.  For ACVTS, the logic dictating pass or fail is an external dependency.

 

I endorse the suggestions made by Stephan and Scott.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "pqc-forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to pqc-forum+...@list.nist.gov.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/d/msgid/pqc-forum/CAE3Q5jfoCF%2BF1RYa%2B3fkOV3_rRx04sYCZUhnrGrvTN-Ok_Q7sw%40mail.gmail.com.