Scientist claims to have broken RSA 2048, is this for real?

[D P]

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/edgerck_today-we-could-announce-it-quantum-computing-activity-7125215279688601600-XPso

Today, we could announce it. Quantum computing (QC) has become a reality. We broke the RSA -2048 key. Ron Rivest is a dear friend, but that was needed to advance.

The QC version used here has simultaneous multiple-states logic (following ‘all states at once’), with more than a googol of possible states. We show that the equivalence of QC techniques (with IBM, Google and others compared with our version of QC) has been hidden for about 2,500 years – since Pythagoras. All our QC computations were done in a commercial cellphone, or a commercial Linux desktop, as our QC devices -- opening the user market to many industries. No cryogenics or special materials were used.
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1d

We factored (and published in LinkedIn) numbers with more than 10^1000 decimal digits, and the capital cost was less than $1,000. The quantum computing (QC) version used here uses simultaneous multiple-states logic (following ‘all states at once’), with more than a googol of possible states. We show that the equivalence of QC techniques (with IBM, Google and others compared with our version of QC) has been hidden for about 2,500 years – since Pythagoras. All our computations were done in a commercial cellphone, or a commercial Linux desktop, as our QC devices -- opening the user market to many industries. No cryogenics or special materials were used.

[Greg Maxwell]

The world is full of scammers and people in the thrall of mental
illness, most people producing cryptocurrencies-- for example,
perhaps you know a few? Bogus claims of 'path tracing' super quantum
simulation running on ordinary hardware has been a thing since even
before Vitalik Buterin and his business partner were getting
themselves banned from Bitcoin IRC channels for ripping people off
with their quantum miner scam.

If someone announces the ability to break RSA2048 and it doesn't come
along with the factors of the RSA617 or RSA2048 channels or similar
(such as an RSA signature produced from those numbers) then simply
note them as unreliable in your mind, press delete, and move on.

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[Paul Hoffman]

The author sent a copy of the paper quickly after I asked for it. As far as I can tell (and I got this verified by someone who is a cryptographer), it's just gibberish. There is no discussion of the circuits used in the quantum computer he supposedly used, and the paper mixes up quantum computers and classical CPUs throughout. If you are still concerned, ask the author for the paper and "do your own research", but I propose that you not have food or drink in your mouth when you do so.

--Paul Hoffman

[Tony Arcieri]

On Thu, Nov 2, 2023 at 1:19 AM D P <dogepr...@gmail.com> wrote:

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/edgerck_today-we-could-announce-it-quantum-computing-activity-7125215279688601600-XPso

This claim in particular beggars belief:

"All our QC computations were done in a commercial cellphone, or a commercial Linux desktop, as our QC devices -- opening the user market to many industries."

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Tony Arcieri

[D P]

>>> The author sent a copy of the paper quickly after I asked for it.

Some of the recent comments in that LinkedIn thread reports of malware in the PDF. Wouldn't recommend opening PDF from unknown source and scanning your device for malware. This looks like some kind of spear-phishing.

[Brent Kimberley]

They do have a point.  How well does RSA-2048 resist simulated quantum annealing &/| simulated quantum Markov chains?

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[Joseph Gleason]

As opposed to many claims that people make, this one would be literally the easiest to prove.  You have some magic?  Great, factor some well known keys and sign some messages.  Lacking that proof, this is pretty safe to ignore.

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[John Mattsson]

>They do have a point.  How well does RSA-2048 resist simulated quantum annealing &/| simulated >quantum Markov chains?

Peter Gutmann’s paper that was recently discussed in the IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) is a good starting point for these type of questions.
https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/heffalump_crypto.pdf
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/0Y0n-ZzUIzN27o1O8a7gBYjWepE/

Cheers,
John Preuß Mattsson

 

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[Brent Kimberley]

Cute.  From a Shor’s algorithm perspective, is the revised security strength of RSA-2048 adequate for banking and water plants? 

[Ananth Raghunathan]

On Thu, Nov 2, 2023 at 8:28 AM Joseph Gleason <fire...@gmail.com> wrote:

As opposed to many claims that people make, this one would be literally the easiest to prove.  You have some magic?  Great, factor some well known keys and sign some messages.  Lacking that proof, this is pretty safe to ignore.

The beauty of NP problems!

 

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[Tony Arcieri]

On Thu, Nov 2, 2023 at 9:23 AM Brent Kimberley <Brent.K...@durham.ca> wrote:

They do have a point.  How well does RSA-2048 resist simulated quantum annealing &/| simulated quantum Markov chains?

Breaking RSA-2048 using simulated annealing would be a bold claim in and of itself, but simulated annealing on a “commercial cellphone” is a bridge too far