SCRMBL POC: Reconstruction-Dependent Security for Post-Decryption Data Protection

[Aiden Tejada]

Hi all,

I'm Aiden Tejada. A few months ago I posted early concepts for SCRMBL on this list. I'm an undergraduate researcher leading a small research team at Praxic where we've refined the theoretical architecture significantly and I'm seeking feedback before moving into formal research and publication. 

To be direct: SCRMBL is not a PQC proposal. It's a complementary architectural layer for the HNDL threat model. PQC hardens the math. SCRMBL investigates whether reconstruction can be made infeasible independent of decryption strength—so that harvested data remains unrecoverable even after successful decryption.

The full theoretical architecture, threat model, cryptographic primitive selections, and known vulnerabilities are attatched at the bottom of this email. All components are currently theoretical, and no production implementation exists.

Specifically looking for feedback on threat model coverage, cryptographic soundness of our primitive combinations, architectural feasibility concerns, and prior work in reconstruction-resistant systems we should be engaging with.

POC PDF:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zk-oW0D0v45CYiSmVLD9c-Hfrsp9suiK/view?usp=sharing

Thank You, 

Aiden J. Tejada

Trinity College '29
Founder, Praxic

[Jacob Alperin-Sheriff]

Sorry man, this is garbage in the sense that it does absolutely nothing complementary to HNDL, it appears to be focused on encryption and rest and combines a bunch of things that exist on the market there. 

-Jacob Alperin-Sheriff

(609) 240-9132

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[Joshua Holden]

Hi, Aiden,

This list is supposed to be focused pretty tightly on PQC.  I'm not actually sure if there is a mailing list for discussing cryptographic architecture theory; maybe someone has a suggestion of a good place to post this?

----Josh