Re: [Cfrg] Homomorphic Encryption Standardization – Side Meeting

[Russ Housley]

This seems to overlap with the LAKE WG session. That is a shame.

Russ


> On Mar 25, 2020, at 5:02 PM, Yaron Sheffer <yaron...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Apologies for cross-posting.
>
> Dear IETFers,
>
> We would like to introduce the work of the Homomorphic Encryption Standardization consortium [1] to the IETF and IRTF community, and solicit feedback about the next steps to standardize this encryption technology. This was originally intended as an IETF-107 side meeting, instead we will hold it as a virtual meeting the week after IETF-107.
>
> Date/time: Tue March 31, 10:00-11:00 PST, 13:00-14:00 EST, 17:00-18:00 UTC, 20:00-21:00 IL.
>
> Meeting link: https://intuit.zoom.us/j/555682817
>
> We do not have an IETF-hosted mailing list yet, for discussion pre- and post-meeting, please join the homomorphicencryption.org Standards mailing list at [2].
>
> Thanks,
> Kurt, Kim and Yaron
>
> [1] https://homomorphicencryption.org/
>
> [2] https://groups.google.com/a/homomorphicencryption.org/forum/#!forum/standards
>
>
> Additional Zoom information:
>
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[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 5:03 PM Yaron Sheffer <yaron...@gmail.com> wrote:

Apologies for cross-posting.

Dear IETFers,

We would like to introduce the work of the Homomorphic Encryption Standardization consortium [1] to the IETF and IRTF community, and solicit feedback about the next steps to standardize this encryption technology. This was originally intended as an IETF-107 side meeting, instead we will hold it as a virtual meeting the week after IETF-107.

Date/time: Tue March 31, 10:00-11:00 PST, 13:00-14:00 EST, 17:00-18:00 UTC, 20:00-21:00 IL.

I would like to see this brought into IRTF as soon as possible either as part of CFRG or as a separate effort.

Right now the canon of commercial cryptography uses only the primitives developed up to 1990 (hash chains). I am currently trying to persuade people to make use of threshold cryptography techniques that were developed in the mid 90s. We need to get out of the habit of waiting 25 years for new cryptographic primitives to mature before we start looking at them.

We should stop asking 'does anyone need this' and instead ask 'is this useful'.

The other reason for bringing it into IRTF is that we really do need a clear IPR regime or else things can get ugly and efforts can stall.

 

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

I concur:

 

Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Homomorphic Encryption Standardization – Side Meeting

[Nico Williams]

On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 02:22:49PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> I would like to see this brought into IRTF as soon as possible either as
> part of CFRG or as a separate effort.
>
> Right now the canon of commercial cryptography uses only the primitives
> developed up to 1990 (hash chains). I am currently trying to persuade
> people to make use of threshold cryptography techniques that were developed
> in the mid 90s. We need to get out of the habit of waiting 25 years for new
> cryptographic primitives to mature before we start looking at them.
>
> We should stop asking 'does anyone need this' and instead ask 'is this
> useful'.

+1.

> The other reason for bringing it into IRTF is that we really do need a
> clear IPR regime or else things can get ugly and efforts can stall.

I hope by now everyone understands that patent IPR on crypto == 20 year
kiss of death. That explains a great deal of our collective habit of
waiting 20+ years to make use of new primitives -- it certainly does for
PAKEs, for example. Of course, for some that might be a feature.

Nico
--

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

+1

I follow the expiry of patents pretty closely. The Mesh uses crypto that was patent encumbered until very recently.

A feature I have not yet added to the Mesh messaging layer but plan to add is Micali's simultaneous contracts.

[Tony Rutkowski]

Hi Phil et al.,

You might be interested that there were no less than ten input documents on homomorphic encryption for new standards going into the SG17 meeting that just wrapped up today.  best, tony

TD	[ 2867-PLEN ]	New baseline text for X.tfmpc: Technical framework for Secure Multi-Party Computation	Editor
TD	[ 2897-PLEN ]	Proposal for new work item: Security guidelines for FHE-based data collaboration in machine learning	Rapporteur Q4/17
TD	[ 2694-PLEN ]	LS/i on Initial draft Supplement on Network 2030 Services: Capabilities, performance and design of new communications services for the Network 2030 applications [from ITU-T SG13]	ITU-T Study Group 13
C	[ 798 ]	Revised baseline text for X.fdip, Framework of de-identification processing service for telecommunication service providers (for determination)	Korea (Rep. of)
C	[ 859 ]	Proposed Modifications to X.fdip (Framework of de-identification process for telecommunication service providers)	United Kingdom
TD	[ 2850-PLEN ]	Revised baseline text for X.fdip: Framework of de-identification process for telecommunication service providers	Editor
C	[ 845 ]	Proposal for new work item: Security guidelines for FHE-based machine learning	Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) (Korea (Rep. of))
TD	[ 2529-PLEN ]	LS/i/r on AI (Artificial Intelligence)/ML (Machine Learning) and security (SG17-LS142) [from FG-AI4H]	FG-AI4H
TD	[ 2936-PLEN ]	LS/o/r on AI (Artificial Intelligence)/ML (Machine Learning) and security (reply to FG-AI4H-LS1) [from FG-AI4H]	ITU-T Study Group 17
C	[ 776 ]	Revised baseline text for X.sra-dlt : Security framework to Distributed Ledger Technology	Korea (Rep. of)

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[coen smith]

8(to)7 Versus & Homomorphic encryption The advantage of the NaVeOl Cript algorithm is its unparalleled speed, incomparably faster than homomorphic encoding, and simultaneously higher encryption complexity. https://eighttoseven.com/8to7/