DCV/CAA logging currently is defined very broadly, leaving it unclear if DNSSEC verification logs are in scope or not. Additionally, DNS resolvers are not built for extensive logging.
This ballot aims to carve-out the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not.
MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements") based on Version 2.1.9 as specified in the following redline:
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
DCV/CAA logging currently is defined very broadly, leaving it unclear if DNSSEC verification logs are in scope or not. Additionally, DNS resolvers are not built for extensive logging.
This ballot aims to carve-out the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not.
The following motion has been proposed by Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo) and endorsed by Roman Fischer (SwissSign) and Ben Wilson (Mozilla).
MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements") based on Version 2.1.9 as specified in the following redline:
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: