Hello everyone,
I’m currently evaluating the impact of attestation certificate validation, particularly regarding the time spent checking Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and the overall size of CRLs, which can grow beyond our control.
I understand that not all attestation formats will have a certificate, and the certificate may not have a CRL distribution point extension.
Considering that the RP server could be used by millions of users, I’d like to ask if anyone can provide insights or data to better understand:
Any insights or references to relevant reports would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you in advance.
Very interesting linked post indeed.
Considering Google just locked me ouf of my (happily comparatively few) passkeys i store with them, that's also good to read because it's not just them possibly misusing them but also the problem of possibly losing access.
Especially as while google and co might let you backup passwords you store with them, with passkeys you are COMPLETELY at their mercy, which imo is just as bad as it sounds.
So the only way to actually keep control over passkeys is likely getting a FIDO device with enough resident credential storage as passkeys usually for some reason are made to be resident with all its advantages and disadvantages.
Although i'd say for some lower risk accounts it might not be a bad idea to have it anyway as an option, like for example some forums and stuff.
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I feel passkey managers have a recovery process. Like with Google Password manager, you could buy a new Android phone, sign in with the same google accounts, (use otp if passkey is unavailable) and use screen lock of the old phone to use the passkeys.
Also, as a fall back, I keep an older phone at home which is logged in to my same google and microsoft accounts and it would enable me to sign in new devices with passkeys in case I lose any device.
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"I feel passkey managers have a recovery process. Like with Google Password manager, you could buy a new Android phone, sign in with the same google accounts, (use otp if passkey is unavailable) and use screen lock of the old phone to use the passkeys."
Thanks Arshad for the idea. Gotta try to develop an open implementation of CTAP on a RPi Pico next weekend.
Anyways if this is helpful, I have been working on an Open Source implementation on ARM processor (https://github.com/AdityaMitra5102/RPi-FIDO2-Security-Key). [This is incomplete as of now just some basic stuff is working. Still need to implement UP, UV, error handling and stuff. And it doesn't use secure storage as of now.]
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Specific to your questions, I don't believe any of the data you are
asking for, exists.