Supergroup BLAST!

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Shay Logan

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Aug 10, 2020, 2:27:37 PM8/10/20
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Dear Cheerful Logicians and Friends of Logic,

We have a bountiful week ahead! There are four logic talks; including TWO(!) official supergroup talks.

In order here are the talks this week: All times are GMT-5. 
  • On Tuesday at 10:00 GMT-5, Damian Szmuc will speak in the Seminario de Lógica Iberoamericana on a very apt topic for these times---*Immune* logics!
  • On Thursday at 14:00 GMT-5, Brendan Fong will speak in the Lógicos em Quarentena seminar on compositional perspectives on supervised learning.
  • Later on Thursday is the first of our official supergroup talks. At 19:00 GMT-5, Graham Priest will speak in the Melbourne Logic Seminar about Impossible Worlds.
  • Finally, on Friday at 11:00 GMT-5, Stephen Read will talk to us about Paul of Venice's solutions to logical paradoxes. 
Details are below. Worth noting is that the Thursday talk is happening an hour earlier than usual. 

Supergroup Talk 1:

 

Speaker: Graham Priest (CUNY)

Title: Mission Impossible

Time and Date: Thursday August 13th, 19:00 GMT-5

Link: https://unimelb.zoom.us/j/846890369?pwd=TktZYmlIUGlYOU9ZaXFJcCt0TFJFZz09

Abstract: Saul Kripke's work on the semantics of non-normal modal logics introduced the idea of non-normal worlds, worlds where logically impossible things may hold. Such worlds can naturally be thought of as impossible worlds. Since Kripke's invention, the notion of an impossible world has undergone much fruitful development and application. Impossible worlds may be of different kinds—or maybe different degrees of impossibility; and these worlds have found application in many areas where hyperintensionality appears to play a significant role: intentional mental states, counterfactuals, meaning, property theory, to name but a few areas. But what, exactly, is an impossible world? How is it best to characterise the notion? To date, the notion is used more by example than by definition. In this paper I will investigate the question and propose a general characterisation, suitable for all standard purposes and tastes. In particular, it can be deployed whatever one takes the correct logic to be.


Supergroup Talk 2:

 

Speaker: Stephen Read (St. Andrews)

Title:  “Everything true will be false”: Paul of Venice’s two solutions to the logical paradoxes 

Time and Date: Friday August 14th, 11:00 GMT-5

Link: https://ksu.zoom.us/j/96831198878?pwd=ZnZTVmhFQjdIYUJJUXlXbkxkaUZodz09
Meeting ID: 968 3119 8878
Passcode: OfVenice

Abstract: In his Quadratura, Paul of Venice (1369-1429) considers a sophism involving time and tense which appears to show that there is a valid inference which is also invalid. His argument runs as follows: consider the inference concerning some proposition A: A will signify only that everything true will be false, so A will be false. Call this inference B. Then B is valid because the opposite of its conclusion is incompatible with its premise. In accordance with the standard medieval doctrine of ampliation, Paul takes A to be equivalent to ‘Everything that is or will be true will be false’. But he proceeds to argue that it is possible that B’s premise (‘A will signify only that everything true will be false’) could be true and its conclusion false, so B is not only valid but also invalid. Thus A is the basis of a logical paradox, aka an insoluble.  


In his Logica Parva, a self-confessedly elementary texts aimed at students and not necessarily representing his own view, and in the Quadratura, Paul follows the solution found in the Logica Oxoniensis, which posits an implicit assertion of its own truth in insolubles like BHowever, in the treatise on insolubles in his Logica Magna, Paul develops and endorses Roger Swyneshed’s solution, which stood out against this “multiple-meanings” approach in offering a solution that took insolubles at face value, meaning no more than is explicit in what they say. On this account,  insolubles imply their own falsity, and that is why, in so falsifying themselves, they are false. We consider how both types of solution apply to B and how they complement each other. On both, B is valid. But on one (following Swyneshed), B has true premises and false conclusion, and contradictories can be false together; on the other (following the Logica Oxoniensis), the counterexample is rejected. 

 

Talks by Member Groups:

 

Seminario de Lógica Iberoamericana:

 

Speaker: Damian Szmuc (Buenos Aires)

Title: Immune Logics

Time and Date: Tuesday, August 11 10:00am GMT-5

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89354138458?pwd=eXRmQmltS0xnTzE4anB5Q0hWTGF2Zz09

Meeting ID: 893 5413 8458

Password: 195576

Abstract: In the past few years, the family of many-valued logics called infectious logics received an increasing amount of attention. These systems count with a truth-value that is assigned to a complex formula whenever it is assigned to some of its components---thus, behaving in an infectious way. Rather informally, we could say that these values behave in a "value-in-value-out" fashion. From a mathematical point of view, infectious values of this sort can be thought of as all-purpose zero elements. The aim of this talk is to discuss a family of many-valued logics that can perhaps be considered as duals to the infectious systems---whence, they will be called immune logics. In this vein, these logics count with a truth-value that is never assigned to a complex formula whenever it is assigned to some of its components, except in certain cases. Once again rather informally, we could say that in some of these cases these values behave in a "value-in-different-value-out" manner. Therefore, immune values of this sort can be thought of as all-purpose identity elements. As regards immune logics, our goal is to describe and analyze various three-valued systems. For this purpose, we explore immune logics where validity is defined by letting the immune value be designated, systems where it is undesignated, and systems where mixed notions of validity are adopted. In doing so, we highlight the links to various logics that have already appeared in the literature and some which were not discussed until now.

 


Lógicos em Quarentena

 

Speaker: Brendan Fong (MIT)

Title: Backprop as Functor: A compositional perspective on supervised learning

Time and Date: Thursday, August 6 14:00 GMT-5

Link: https://meet.google.com/qhk-kstn-ahy

Abstract: A supervised learning algorithm searches over a set of functions A→B parametrised by a space P to find the best approximation to some ideal function f:A→B. It does this by taking examples (a,f(a))∈A×B, and updating the parameter according to some rule. We define a category where these update rules may be composed, and show that gradient descent---with respect to a fixed step size and an error function satisfying a certain property---defines a monoidal functor from a category of parametrised functions to this category of update rules. This provides a structural perspective on backpropagation, as well as a broad generalisation of neural networks.

 

Other Notes and Announcements:

 

Yay for logic!

Walter Alexandre Carnielli

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Aug 10, 2020, 7:40:33 PM8/10/20
to Shay Logan, logic-su...@googlegroups.com, Lista acadêmica brasileira dos profissionais e estudantes da área de LOGICA, tal...@googlegroups.com
Dear Shay, dear all:


We have an even bountifuller week ahead! We are forgetting
Alfredo Roque Freire (perhaps I had to fill some Supergroup agenda,
and did not...)
In any case, there's still time to add:

==================================
Dear enthusiastic logicians and partisans of Logic:

As part of the Logic Supergroup
(https://sites.google.com/view/logicsupergroup/the-logic-supergroup),
Colloquium Logicar is happy to announce its next meeting on
Wednesday August 12th 2020 ( 2:00 PM, GMT -3 hours) by Alfredo Roque
Freire, who will be talking about a chapter of his PhD thesis (which
I had the privilege to supervise) related to an important topic of
philosophy mathematics:

Title: Unreducible features of set theories
Alfredo Roque Freire
Unicamp/CLE and USP

Abstract: The universalist position in set theory maintains that there
is only a single, maximal universe of sets and, as a result, all
sentences about these objects are ideally verifiable. Often, those who
subscribe to this view are committed to offering a sensible account to
alternative universes familiar to many mathematicians. In this
article, we will analyze the reduction strategies offered by
universalists. Recently, Enayat in [1] proved that no two models of ZF
are bi-interpretable, while Hamkins and I in [2] proved that no two
well-founded models of
ZF are mutually interpretable. In view of these results, we will argue
that the range of the construction for alternative universes in a
single universe is limited. Thus, the adherents of an alternative
universe have sufficient grounds to reject the alleged copy offered by
the universalist as a faithful copy. Finally, we will argue that the
reasons for adding new elements to the multiverse should be specific
instead of being the result of an emulation in a previously known
universe.

[1] Enayat, A. (2017). Variations on a Visserian theme. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.07093.

[2] Freire, A. R., & Hamkins, J. D. (2020). Bi-interpretation in weak
set theories. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05262.

To participate. please access.
https://conferenciaweb.rnp.br/spaces/unicamp-cle-colloquium-logicae
**Please enter as “anonymous” unless you have an RNP account

Everyone welcome!

Shay Logan

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Aug 17, 2020, 1:06:45 PM8/17/20
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Dear Cheerful Logicians and Friends of Logic,

A few reminders/useful things to know: 
  • The supergroup finally has its own official website. Here's a link.

  • Universität Regensburg is hosting a virtual workshop on August 27 and 28 that might be of interest to many members. For more information visit this link

    This week there are two talks to announce. First, on Tuesday at 14:00 GMT-5, Jeremy Avigad is speaking in the Lógicos em Quarentena seminar hosted by the Brazillian Logic Society. The topic is Formal Mathematics and the Lean Theorem Prover. Then, on Friday at 09:00 GMT-5, Eleonora Cresto will give the official supergroup talk of the week. The topic is The Logic of Ungrounded Payoffs.

    More info below, as usual.

    Supergroup Talk:

     

    Speaker: Eleonora Cresto

    Title: The Logic of Ungrounded Payoffs

    Time and Date: Friday August 21, 0900 GMT-5

    Link: https://ksu.zoom.us/j/98598883520?pwd=N09pdjdyU2NDK2xISU9kcGRCek9VQT09

    Meeting ID: 985 9888 3520

    Passcode: Payoffs

    Abstract: Higher order likes and desires sometimes lead agents to have ungrounded or paradoxical preferences. This situation is particularly problematic in the context of games. If payoffs are interdependent, the overall assessment of particular courses of action becomes ungrounded; in such cases the matrix of the game is radically under-determined. In this talk I propose a dynamic doxastic and preference logic that can mimic the search for a suitable matrix. Upgrades are triggered by conjectures on other players’ utilities, which can in turn be based on behavioral or verbal cues. We can prove that, under certain conditions, pairs of agents with paradoxical preferences eventually come to believe that they are not able to interact in a game. As a result I hope to provide a better understanding of game-theoretic ungroundedness, and, more generally, of the structure of higher order preferences and desires.

     

    Talks by Member Groups:


    Lógicos em Quarentena

     

    Speaker: Jeremy Avigad

    Title: Formal Mathematics and the Lean Theorem Prover

    Time and Date: Thursday, August 20 14:00 GMT-5

    Link: https://meet.google.com/ijx-mwhr-fjg

    Abstract: Since the early twentieth century, it has been understood that mathematical statements can be expressed in formal languages, and mathematical proofs can be represented in formal deductive systems with precise rules and semantics, at least in principle. Remarkably, the development of computational proof assistants over the last few decades has made it possible to do this in practice. The technology is firmly based on the methods and concepts of modern logic, and in many ways the practice represents the contemporary embodiment of the foundational tradition. 


    In this informal talk, I will provide a brief overview of interactive theorem proving and the body of logic that supports it. I will then discuss a particular theorem prover, Lean, its formal library, mathlib, which are attracting a growing community of mathematical users. The Lean community web pages provide a good starting point for more information: https://leanprover-community.github.io/.

     

    Other Notes and Announcements:

    Walter Alexandre Carnielli

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    Aug 17, 2020, 10:36:02 PM8/17/20
    to Shay Logan, Marco Ruffino, Edson Bezerra, logic-su...@googlegroups.com, tal...@googlegroups.com, Lista acadêmica brasileira dos profissionais e estudantes da área de LOGICA, Marco Panza
    Dear passionate logicians and supporters of Logic:
    the Colloquium Logicae at CLE-Unicamp is happy to announce its joint
    seminar with the OCIE Seminar in the History and Philosophy of
    Mathematics and Logic, University of California Irvine as of
    Tuesday 8th September, 4pm-6pm hours (GMT -7) by Alfredo Roque
    Freire;
    =============================================

    Title: " Intentional theory dichotomy and twisted models of set theory"

    Alfredo Roque Freire
    Post-Doc Researcher
    Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science
    University of Campinas-Unicamp, Brazil

    Two modes of description were familiar to modern mathematicians: (i)
    descriptions of mathematical types to be satisfied by various
    structures, such as rings, fields, monoids; and (ii) intentional
    descriptions, which seek to specify mathematical objects as in
    geometry, arithmetic and real analysis. Due to the various limiting
    theorems in relation to formal systems (e.g. G\"odel's incompleteness
    and Loweinhein-Skolem theorems), it has become common to maintain that
    there is no sharp boundary between intentional and non-intentional
    theories. Since it is not possible to fix a single model for first
    order arithmetic, its axioms work in a similar way to axioms of
    general algebraic structures. This conclusion is the result of the
    following dichotomy: either there are precise and unambiguous ways to
    describe general collections of objects or there is no clear boundary
    between intentional theories and non-intentional theories. However,
    recent results on interpretability [1,2,3] develop restricted versions
    of absoluteness regarding theories historically considered to be
    intentional. In fact, models of arithmetic and set theory are unique
    with respect to bi-interpretations. We will argue that these results
    allow us not only to recover the dichotomy that separates intentional
    from non-intentional theories, but still remain compatible with
    pluralism regarding theories such as arithmetic and set theory.

    Finally, we will show to what extent conditions of absoluteness may be
    used as sufficient to incorporate non-classical set theories to the
    multiverse. We believe this absoluteness conditions are possibly
    obtained for the novel twisted valued models developed by Carnielli
    and Coniglio [4]. We will argue that these paraconsistent models have
    the virtue of being sufficiently rigid, and thus may be successfully
    included in the multiverse.

    [1] Friedman, H. M., & Visser, A. (2014). When bi-interpretability
    implies synonymy. Logic Group Preprint Series, 320, 1-19.

    [2] Enayat, A. (2017). Variations on a Visserian theme. arXiv preprint
    arXiv:1702.07093.

    [3] Freire, A. R., & Hamkins, J. D. (2020). Bi-interpretation in weak
    set theories. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05262.

    [4] Carnielli, W., & Coniglio, M. E. (2019). Twist-valued models for
    three-valued paraconsistent set theory.
    Logic and Logical Philosophy,, ON LINE FIRST:
    https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2020.015
    =====================

    Everyone is invited to join us on Zoom:


    Zoom link: https://uci.zoom.us/j/95859575948

    ===================================================

    Walter Carnielli
    https://waltercarnielli.com/
    Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science and
    Department of Philosophy
    University of Campinas –UNICAMP
    13083-859 Campinas -SP, Brazil

    Walter Alexandre Carnielli

    unread,
    Aug 18, 2020, 9:46:48 PM8/18/20
    to Shay Logan, Marco Ruffino, Edson Bezerra, logic-su...@googlegroups.com, tal...@googlegroups.com, Lista acadêmica brasileira dos profissionais e estudantes da área de LOGICA, Marco Panza
    Dear passionate logicians and supporters of Logic:

    Just a small correction: the next seminar under the Logic Supergroup
    by Alfredo Roque Freire is being organized by the following consortium:

    Chapman University, USC San Bernardino, Claremont University, UC
    Riverside and Colloquium Logicae of CLE-Unicamp;

    =============================================
    Title: " Intentional theory dichotomy and twisted models of set theory"
    Alfredo Roque Freire
    Post-Doc Researcher
    Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science
    University of Campinas-Unicamp, Brazil

    Tuesday 8th September, 4pm-6pm hours (GMT -7)
    =====================

    Everyone is invited to join us on Zoom:
    Zoom link: https://uci.zoom.us/j/95859575948

    ==================================================
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